Chapter CVII: Section 29 (27)

By an Act of Congress approved April 22, 1898, providing for
the temporary increase of the military establishment of the
United States, "the organized and active land forces were
declared to consist of the Regular Army and of the militia of
the several States when called into service, constituting two
branches, designated, respectively, as be Regular Army and the
Volunteer Army of the United States. And the President was
authorized to organize the regular and volunteer troops into
divisions of three brigades, each brigade to be composed of
three or more regiments, and when three or more divisions are
present in the same army, to organize them into army corps,
each corps to consist of not more than three divisions. Under
the authority conferred upon him by the joint resolution of
April 20 and the act of April 22, 1898, the President issued a
proclamation, dated April 23, 1898, calling for volunteers to the
number of 125,000 men, to be apportioned as far as practicable
among the several States, Territories, and the District of
Columbia, according to population, to serve for two years
unless sooner discharged. Among the several arms of the
service the troops were apportioned as follows: Five regiments
and 17 troops of cavalry, 16 batteries of light artillery, 1
regiment and 7 batteries of heavy artillery, 119 regiments and
10 battalions of infantry. May 25, 1898, the President issued
a proclamation calling for an additional force of 75,000 men.
For controlling military reasons, it was determined to utilize
so much of this additional force as was necessary to bring up
the several State organizations in service to the full legal
strength, the remainder to be apportioned among the several
States and Territories according to their respective quotas as
nearly as possible. The apportionment to the several arms of
service under this second call was for 16 batteries of light
artillery, 3 battalions of heavy artillery, and 22 regiments,
ten battalions, and 46 companies of infantry."

The strength of the Regular Army on the 1st of April, 1898,
just before the breaking out of the war, was as follows:

Officers. Enlisted Men.

General officers and staff corps. 532 2,026
Cavalry. 437 6,047
Artillery. 288 4,486
Infantry. 886 12,828
Miscellaneous. 653

Total. 2,143 26,040

The Regular Army was authorized to be increased to 65,000 men
as a war footing. The total strength of the armies, Regular
and Volunteer, at several later dates, was as follows:

{628}

DATE. Regulars. Volunteers. Total.

April 15, 1898 28,183 28,183
May 31, 1898 38,816 124,776 162,592
August 31, 1898 56,362 216,256 272,618
January 31, 1899 65,531 90,241 155,772
June 30, 1899 63,535 16,550 80,085

Maximum force at any one time during Spanish-American war,
274,717 officers and men. On the 29th of November, 1898, the
Army of the United States consisted of 2,324 officers and
61,444 enlisted men of the regular force, and of 5,216
officers and 110,202 enlisted men of the volunteer force,
making an aggregate of 7,540 officers and 171,646 enlisted
men.

PAY OF ARMY.

Payments made to Regular and Volunteer armies engaged during
Spanish-American war, from April 21, 1898, to April 11, 1899,
$67,065,629.56.

CASUALTIES IN ACTION.

In Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines between May 1, 1898,
and June 30, 1899.

Killed Cuba Porto Rico Philippines
Officers 21 16
Enlisted men 223 4 219

Wounded:
Officers 101 92
Enlisted men 1,344 36 1,349

Died of Wounds:
Officers 10 10
Enlisted men 64 8 82

Died of Disease:
Officers 34 4 11
Enlisted men. 888 251 369

Grand total, 5,136.

Casualties in Fifth Army Corps in campaign against Santiago,
June 22, 1898, to July 17, 1898.

Officers. Enlisted Men.

Killed. 21 222
Wounded 101 1,344

At battle of Las Guasimas, June 24, 1898.

Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 1 15
Wounded 6 43

At battle of El Caney, July 1, 1898.

Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 4 77
Wounded 25 335

At Aguadores, July 1-2, 1898.

Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 2
Wounded 10

At battle of San Juan, July 1-3, 1898.

Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 15 127
Wounded 69 945

Casualties around Santiago, July 10-12, 1898.

Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 1 1
Wounded 1 11

Grand total of casualties in killed and wounded
during the war with Spain.

WHERE. KILLED. WOUNDED.

Officers. Enlisted Men. Officers. Enlisted Men.

Cuba 23 237 99 1,332
Porto Rico. 3 4 36
Manila 17 10 96

Total 23 257 113 1,464

The deaths from all causes (including casualties in action) in
the whole Army, regulars and volunteers, for the fourteen
months from May, 1898, to June, 1899, inclusive, were 6,619.
This is equivalent to an annual rate of 33.03 per thousand of
strength. The deaths from disease during the whole period were
at an annual rate of hut 25.68 per thousand. These were as
follows:

STATIONS. Number of Deaths Rate per 1,000.

United States 3,577 23.81
Cuba 928 45.14
Porto Rico 238 38.15
Philippines 402 17.20

{629}

Deaths in the armies of the United States, by countries,
between May 1, 1898, and June 30, 1899.

[Off. = Officer; Enl. = Enlisted Men.]

COUNTRY KILLED. DIED OF DISEASE. ACCIDENT. WOUNDS Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. REGULARS. United States 1 5 10 32 874 1 51 Cuba 19 184 5 60 8 381 7 Porto Rico 3 73 3 Hawaiian Islands 10 1 Philippine Islands 4 81 1 33 4 109 10 At sea 1 11 4 77

Total 24 270 7 114 51 1,524 1 72

VOLUNTEERS. United States 1 87 2,836 3 111 Cuba 3 39 10 16 457 2 12 Porto Rico 3 1 157 5 Hawaiian Islands 33 1 Philippine Islands 14 146 3 67 5 215 6 At sea 5 122 2

Total 17 188 3 78 114 3,820 5 137

Aggregate 38 458 10 192 165 5,344 6 209

COUNTRY. DROWNED. SUICIDE. MURDER TOTAL. HOMICIDE Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. REGULARS. United States 1 16 19 18 35 993 Cuba 7 5 6 32 650 Porto Rico 1 3 1 3 81 Hawaiian Islands 1 12 Philippine Islands 19 1 3 1 10 256 At sea 1 4 2 6 94

Total 2 48 1 32 26 86 2,086

VOLUNTEERS. United States 23 1 15 22 91 3,008 Cuba 4 3 21 525 Porto Rico 2 1 1 1 169 Hawaiian Islands 34 Philippine Islands 1 9 3 23 446 At sea 2 1 5 127

Total 1 40 1 20 26 141 4,309

Aggregate 3 88 2 52 52 224 6,395

{630}

Recapitulation of casualties in action in the armies of the
United States between May 1, 1898, and June 30, 1899.

[Off. = Officer; Enl. = Enlisted Men.]

COUNTRY. KILLED. WOUNDED. TOTAL. AGGREGATE Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. REGULARS.

Cuba 18 183 86 1,126 104 1,309 1,413 Porto Rico 1 2 15 2 16 18 United States 1 5 10 1 15 16 Philippines, to August 13, 1898 7 1 25 1 32 33 Philippines since February 4, 1899 2 74 20 410 22 484 506

Total 21 270 109 1,586 130 1,856 1,986

VOLUNTEERS.

Cuba 3 39 15 218 18 257 275 Porto Rico 3 2 21 2 24 26 Philippines, to Aug. 13, 1898 11 9 74 9 85 94 Philippines, since February 4, 1899 14 135 62 865 76 1,000 1,076

Total 17 188 88 1,178 105 1,366 1,471

Grand total 38 458 197 2,764 235 3,222 3,457

HOSPITALS.

From the declaration of war with Spain to September 20, 1899,
there have been established:

Beds. 20 field division hospitals, averaging 250 beds each 5,000 31 general hospitals with a total capacity of about 13,800 Railroad ambulance train 270 4 hospital ships 1,000

Total 20,070

In addition to these over 5,000 cases were treated in civil
hospitals. It is difficult even to approximate the number of
men treated in these hospitals. During that period somewhat
over 100,000 cases were admitted on sick report, a number
equal to 2,147 per 1,000 of strength during the year, or to
179 per 1,000 per month—the ratio of admissions to hospital
cases being 13 to 8. Using these data as a basis, and assuming
the mean strength of the Army (Regulars and Volunteers) to have
been 154,000, it would appear that from May 1, 1898, to
September 20, 1899, about 275,000 cases have been treated in
these hospitals.

TRANSPORTATION OF SPANISH PRISONERS OF WAR TO SPAIN.

The following is a statement showing the dates of embarkation,
names of vessels, and number of officers, enlisted men, and
others who took passage:

[Date = Date of Embarkation,
Off. = Officers
Men = Enlisted men,
Women = Women and children over 5 years of age,
Priests = Priests and Sisters of Charity.]

Date Name of Vessel. Off. Men Women Priests Total

August 9 Alicante 38 1,069 6 11 1,124 August 14 Isla de Luzon 137 2,056 40 4 2,237 August 16 Covadonga 109 2,148 79 2,336 August 19 Villaverde 52 565 34 651 August 19 Isla de Panay 99 1,599 26 5 1,729 August 22 P. de Satrustegui 128 2,359 68 2,555 August 25 Montevideo 136 2,108 122 2 2,368 August 27 Cherihon 18 905 37 960 August 28 Colón 100 1,316 59 1,475 August 30 do 23 726 5 754 September 1 Leon XIII 113 2,209 108 2,430 September 3 San Ignacio 59 1,408 20 12 1,499 September 6 Leonora 15 1,118 1,333 September 12 Cindad de Cadiz 53 19 14 86 September 17 San Augustin 65 800 45 910 September 17 San Francisco 18 588 11 617

Total 1,163 20,974 679 48 22,864

ARMS AND AMMUNITION CAPTURED AT SANTIAGO.

Mauser carbines, Spanish, 7 mm 16,902
Mauser rifles, Argentine, 7½ mm 872
Remington rifles, 7 mm 6,118
Total rifles 23,892

Mauser carbines, Spanish 833
Mauser carbines, Argentine 7½ mm 84
Remington carbines, 7½ mm 330

Total carbines 1,247

Revolvers 75

{631}

Mauser-Spanish—cartridges, 7 mm. 1,500,000
Mauser-Argentine—cartridges, 7½ mm. 1,471,200
Remington cartridges, 7½ mm 1,680,000

Total. 4,651,200

Nine hundred and seventy-three thousand Remington
cartridges, 7½ mm., worthless.

STRENGTH OF THE NAVY, REGULAR AND AUXILIARY.

The number of enlisted men allowed by law prior to the
outbreak of hostilities was 12,500. On August 15, when the
enlisted force reached its maximum, there were 24,123 men in
the service. This great increase was made necessary by the
addition of 128 ships to the Navy. The maximum fighting force
of the Navy, separated into classes, was as follows:

Battle ships (first class). 4
Battle ships (second class). 1
Armored cruisers. 2
Coast defense monitors. 6
Armored ram. 1
Protected cruisers. 12
Unprotected cruisers. 3
Gunboats. 18
Dynamite cruiser. 1
Torpedo boats. 11
Vessels of old Navy,
Including monitors. 14
Auxiliary Navy:
Auxiliary cruisers. 11
Converted yachts. 28
Revenue cutters. 15
Light-house tenders. 4
Converted tugs. 27
Converted colliers. 19
Miscellaneous. 19

NAVAL, PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED OFF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898.

Officers. 99
Enlisted men. 1,675

CASUALTIES IN ACTION.

ENGAGEMENT. Casualties Killed Wounded Died later from wounds Action at Manila Bay, May 1 9 9 Action off Cienfuegos, May 11 12 1 11 1 Action off Cardenas, May 11. 8 5 3 Action off San Juan, Porto Rico, May 12 8 1 7 Engagements at Guantanamo, Cuba, June 11 to 20 22 *6 16 Engagement off Santiago: June 22 10 1 9 July 3 11 1 10 Miscellaneous: Yankee, June 13. 1 1 Eagle, July 12 1 1 Bancroft, August 2 1 1 Amphitrite, August 7 1 1 †l

Total 84 16 68 2

* One accidentally killed.
† Accidentally shot.

_Congressional Record,
February 1, 1901, pages 1941-1962._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.
Investigation of the conduct of the War Department
in the war with Spain.

Severe criticism of the conduct of the War Department during
the war with Spain, including many charges of inefficiency in
its service, produced by improper appointments made for
political reasons, and other charges of misdoing in the
purchase of supplies, under influences either political or
otherwise corrupt, led to the appointment by the President, in
September, 1898, of an investigating commission, composed of
nine soldier and civilian members, as follows:
General Grenville M. Dodge, President.
Colonel James A. Sexton.
Colonel Charles Denby,
Captain Evan P. Howell,
Honorable Urban A. Woodbury,
Brigadier-General John M. Wilson, U. S. A.,
General James A. Beaver,
Major-General Alexander McD. Cook, U. S. A.,
Dr. Phineas S. Conner.

The report of the Commission, made in the following February,
cannot be said to have been a convincing and satisfactory one
to the country at large. It was indignantly described as a
"whitewashing report," even by many journals and writers of
the party in power. Its inquiries did not appear to have been
keenly and impartially searching; its conclusions were not
thought to be drawn with a rigorous and fearless hand.

The charges against the War Department which excited most
feeling and drew most public attention related to the quality
of the fresh beef supplied to the army, which was in two
forms, refrigerated and canned. Major-General Miles,
commanding the Army, had declared that much of the
refrigerated beef furnished to the soldiers should be called
"embalmed beef," maintaining that it had been "apparently
preserved with secret chemicals, which destroy its natural
flavor" and which were believed to be "detrimental to the
health of the troops." He intimated that hundreds of tons of
such beef had been contracted for by the Commissary-General
"under pretense of experiment." In repelling this serious
accusation, Commissary-General Charles P. Eagan read a
statement before the Commission, so violent and unmeasured in
its vituperation of the commanding general that it was
returned to him for correction; many newspapers declined to
publish it, and he was subsequently tried by court-martial in
consequence—as related below. The conclusion of the
Commission on the subject of the charges relating to
refrigerated beef was stated in its report as follows:

"The Commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef
furnished by contractors and issued to the troops during the
war with Spain was subjected to or treated with any chemicals
by the contractors or those in their employ."

Concerning the canned beef, which had caused much disgust in
the army, the Commission reported:

"The result of our own testing and of all the analyses made at
our instance … is that the canned meat which has been brought
to our attention is pure, sound, and nutritive. It has not
been found to contain any acids or any deleterious substance,
but to be unadulterated meat. The testimony before us is that
the canned meat is not, in general, intended to be issued to
troops except as an emergency ration. The preponderance of the
proof is that meat on the hoof and the refrigerated beef are
more acceptable. A number of officers and others have
testified that the meat is unpalatable. Its palatability
greatly depends upon the mode in which it is cooked. In a
tropical climate, carried on the march, exposed to heat, the
meat so changes in appearance as to become repulsive. In the
Navy, where the meat is properly cared for, there has been no
complaint, so far as has appeared in evidence before us. After
careful consideration we find that canned meat, as issued to
the troops, was generally of good quality, was properly
prepared, and contained no deleterious substance.
{632}
At times probably material of poor quality is issued; in one
of the cans sent to us and examined by the chemist a large
amount of gristle was found. That it was not issued 'under
pretense of an experiment' is indicated by the fact that it
has been in use in the Army for more than 20 years."

On the general management of the Quarter-master's Department,
with which much fault had been found, the Commission reported:
"The conclusions drawn … are as follows:

"1. The Quartermaster's Department, a month before war was
declared, was neither physically nor financially prepared for
the tremendous labor of suddenly equipping and transporting an
army over ten times the size of the Regular Army of the United
States.

"2. That the department devoted the ability, zeal, and
industry of its officers to accomplish the herculean task
before it so soon as funds were made available and war was
declared.

"3. That it deserves credit for the great work accomplished,
for the immense quantity of materials obtained and issued
within so short a period, and for its earnest efforts in
reference to railroad transportation and in protecting the
great interests of the General Government committed to its
charge. Its officers, especially those at the head-quarters of
the department and at its depots, worked earnestly and
laboriously day and night, sparing themselves in no possible
way.

"4. There appears to have been a lack of system, whereby, even
as late as October, troops in camps and in the field were
lacking in some articles of clothing, camp and garrison
equipage; and hospitals, at least at two important localities
in the South—Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Huntsville,
Alabama—lacked stoves, while at Huntsville fuel was wanting.

"5. There appears to have been lack of executive or
administrative ability, either on the part of the
Quartermaster's Department or the railroad officials, in
preventing the great congestion of cars at Tampa and
Chickamauga when these camps were first established, which
congestion caused delay, annoyance, and discomfort to the
large bodies of troops concentrating at those places.

"6. There appears to have been a lack of foresight in
preparing and promptly having available at some central
locality on the seacoast the necessary fleet of transports
which it seemed evident would be required for the movement of
troops to a foreign shore, and, finally, when the call came
suddenly and the emergency was supreme, the department appears
not to have fully comprehended the capacity of the fleet under
its command; not to have supplied it with a complete outfit of
lighters for the immediate disembarkation of troops and
supplies; to have accepted without full investigation the
statement that the vessels were capable of transporting 25,000
men, while really they could not and did not transport more
than 17,000 with their artillery, equipments, ammunition, and
supplies, and lacked sufficient storage room for the necessary
amount of wagon transportation—that very important element
in the movement of an army in the face of an enemy.

"7. The Quartermaster's Department should maintain on hand at
all times a complete supply for at least four months for an
army of 100,000 men of all articles of clothing, camp and
garrison equipage, and other quartermaster's supplies which
will not deteriorate by storage or which cannot at once be
obtained in open market.

"Finally. In the opinion of this commission, there should be a
division of the labor now devolving upon the Quartermaster's
Department."

In another part of its report, dealing especially with the
Santiago campaign, the Commission makes a statement which
seems to reflect some additional light on the sixth paragraph
of the finding quoted above, relative to the unpreparedness of
the quartermaster's department for the landing of the Santiago
expedition. It says:

"The Navy Department, on the 31st of May, 1898, sent the
following communication to the honorable the Secretary of War:
'This Department begs leave to inquire what means are to be
employed by the War Department for landing the troops,
artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other heavy
objects when the pending military expedition arrives on the
Cuban coast near Santiago. While the Navy will be prepared to
furnish all the assistance that may be in its power, it is
obvious that the crews of the armored ships and of such others
as will be called upon to remove the Spanish mines and to meet
the Spanish fleet in action can not be spared for other purposes,
and ought not to be fatigued by the work incident to landing
of the troops and stores, etc.' This information, so far as
can be ascertained, was never communicated to either General
Miles or General Shafter; the expedition therefore left Tampa
with no facilities for landing other than were afforded by the
boats of the several transports conveying the expedition, with
the exception of several lighters and steam tugs of light draft,
such as could be hastily secured."

On the conduct of the Medical Department, which was another
matter of investigation, the Commission reported: "To sum up,
in brief, the evidence submitted shows:

" 1. That at the outbreak of the war the Medical Department
was, in men and materials, altogether unprepared to meet the
necessities of the army called out.

"2. That as a result of the action through a generation of
contracted and contracting methods of administration, it was
impossible for the Department to operate largely, freely, and
without undue regard to cost.

"3. That in the absence of a special corps of inspectors, and
the apparent infrequency of inspections by chief surgeons, and
of official reports of the state of things in camps and
hospitals, there was not such investigation of the sanitary
conditions of the army as is the first duty imposed upon the
Department by the regulations.

"4. That the nursing force during the months of My, June, and
July was neither ample nor efficient, reasons for which may be
found in the lack of a proper volunteer hospital corps, due to
the failure of Congress to authorize its establishment, and to
the nonrecognition in the beginning of the value of women
nurses and the extent to which their services could be
secured.

"5. That the demand made upon the resources of the Department
in the care of sick and wounded was very much greater than had
been anticipated, and consequently, in like proportion, these
demands were imperfectly met.

{633}

"6. That powerless as the Department was to have supplies
transferred from point to point, except through the
intermediation of the Quartermaster's Department, it was
seriously crippled in its efforts to fulfil the regulation
duty of 'furnishing all medical and hospital supplies.'

"7. That the shortcomings in administration and operation may
justly be attributed, in large measure, to the hurry and
confusion incident to the assembling of an army of untrained
officers and men, ten times larger than before, for which no
preparations in advance had been or could be made because of
existing rules and regulations.

"8. That notwithstanding all the manifest errors, of omission
rather than of commission, a vast deal of good work was done
by medical officers, high and low, regular and volunteer, and
there were unusually few deaths among the wounded and the
sick.

"What is needed by the medical department in the future is—

"1. A larger force of commissioned medical officers.

"2. Authority to establish in time of war a proper volunteer
hospital corps.

"3. A reserve corps of selected trained women nurses, ready to
serve when necessity shall arise, but under ordinary
circumstances, owing no duty to the War Department, except to
report residence at determined intervals.

"4. A year's supply for an army of at least four times the
actual strength, of all such medicines, hospital furniture,
and stores as are not materially damaged by keeping, to be
held constantly on hand in the medical supply depots.

"5. The charge of transportation to such extent as will secure
prompt shipment and ready delivery of all medical supplies.

"6. The simplification of administrative 'paper work,' so that
medical officers may be able to more thoroughly discharge
their sanitary and strictly medical duties.

"7. The securing of such legislation as will authorize all
surgeons in medical charge of troops, hospitals, transports,
trains, and independent commands to draw from the Subsistence
Department funds for the purchase of such articles of diet as
may be necessary to the proper treatment of soldiers too sick
to use the army ration. This to take the place of all
commutation of rations of the sick now authorized.

"Convalescent soldiers traveling on furlough should be
furnished transportation, sleeping berths or staterooms, and
$1.50 per diem for subsistence in lieu of rations, the soldier
not to be held accountable or chargeable for this amount."

_Report of the Commission, volume 1._

Public opinion of the report, when divested of partisan
prejudice, was probably expressed very fairly in the following
comments of "The Nation," of New York:

"The two leading conclusions of the court of inquiry as to the
quality of the beef supplied to our troops during the war with
Spain, are in accordance with the evidence and will be
accepted as fairly just by the country. The court finds that
so far as the canned roast beef was concerned, the charges
which General Miles made against it as an unsuitable ration
are sustained, but that as regards the use of chemicals in the
treatment of refrigerated beef his charges were not
established. If instead of saying 'not established,' the court
had said 'not fully sustained,' its verdict would have been
above criticism on these two points. There was evidence of the
use of chemicals, but it was not conclusive and was flatly
contradicted. There is no doubt whatever that the use of the
refrigerated beef was a blunder, but there was very little
evidence to sustain a more serious charge than that against
it.

"But while the court has found justly on these points, it is
difficult to read its report without feeling that its members
did so reluctantly, and that, if left to follow their
inclinations, they would have censured General Miles and
allowed everybody else concerned to go free. General Miles is
the one person involved whom they allow no extenuating
circumstances to benefit in their report. At every opportunity
they take the worst possible view of his conduct, while almost
invariably taking the most lenient view possible of nearly
everybody else. … So far as the findings of the court apply to
Eagan's conduct, they are condemnatory in general terms, but
they do not seek to go behind him for the reasons for his
conduct. … No attention whatever is paid to the evidence of
several reputable witnesses that Eagan had told them that he
had to buy of certain contractors; none is paid, either, to
the evidence of Eagan's subordinates that he himself so
altered the refrigerated beef contracts that no one could say
whether they called for preservation for seventy-two hours or
twenty-four. Leniency of this kind is never shown toward
General Miles."

_The Nation,
May 11, 1899._

Perhaps a weightier criticism is represented by the following,
which we quote from an article contributed to "The
Independent" by General Wingate, President of the National
Guard Association of the United States: "So far as the
refrigerated beef was concerned, the truth probably is that
there was little, if any, 'embalming' about it. Soldiers
generally agree that the beef itself was almost universally
good. … General Miles, on the other hand, was clearly right in
asking that the troops might be furnished with beef cattle on the
hoof, which could follow the army over any road and which
would keep in good condition on the luxuriant grasses of Cuba
and Porto Rico. This was the system pursued in our Civil War.
No one has yet explained why it was abandoned for the
experiment of furnishing this kind of beef to places in the
tropics where it had to be hauled in wagons for many hours
over muddy roads, and when most of the wagons required to move
it promptly had to be left behind for want of water
transportation.

"The matter of the refrigerated or so-called 'embalmed' beef
is, however, of very slight consequence compared with that of
the canned roast beef. The use of that beef as an army ration
in this country, at least, was new. Officer after officer has
testified before the court of inquiry that they never saw it
so issued before the Cuban campaign. It is true that the navy
uses it, but the facilities on shipboard for caring for and
cooking food are so different and so superior to those of an
army in the field that no comparison can justly be made
between them. Moreover, as was recently stated in the 'Army
and Navy Journal,' the belief is general in the navy that the
canned beef it had rejected on inspection was afterward sold
to the army and accepted by it without inspection.
{634}
Be this as it may, the evidence is overwhelming that the
canned roast beef which was issued to the army was repulsive
in appearance and disagreeable in smell. … Governor Roosevelt
says in his testimony that 'from generals to privates he never
heard any one who did not condemn it as an army ration.' Its
defects appeared on the voyage to Santiago, if not before. It
was then so bad that the men would not touch it, and as
Governor Roosevelt says in his article in 'Scribner's,' his
Rough Riders, who certainly were not particular, could not eat
it, and as it constituted one-third of the rations, his men
had to go hungry. And yet, in spite of these facts, a million
pounds of that beef was purchased from Armour & Co. alone, and
its issue was continued not only in Cuba but in Porto Rico.
What is worse than all, after its defects were fully known it
was issued as a traveling ration to the fever-racked men on
their homeward voyage to this country; men who needed and were
entitled to receive the most nourishing food and to whom this
indigestible stuff was poison. This should never be forgotten
or forgiven by the plain people of the country. …

"No one in authority has been willing to admit that there was
the slightest thing wrong, or the least need for improvement
in his department. … This is another of the hundreds of
examples which have occurred in our past war, and which will
continue to take place in the future until the whole staff
system of the army has been rectified, of the reign of that
hide bound bureaucratic spirit which induces the head of a
department in Washington to decide in his office what should
be used by the troops in the field without practical
experience on the subject, and to stubbornly close his eyes
and ears to everything which will tend to show that it is
possible that his department has made a mistake. …

"It is noticeable that so far not an official in any of the
supply or medical departments is known to have been court
martialed or even censured. Yet I do not hesitate to say that
the summary dismissal from the service, in the beginning, of
two or three quartermasters and commissaries, including the
gentlemen who were the cause of sending thousands of cars to
Tampa without invoices or anything on the outside of them to
indicate their contents, would have saved the lives of
hundreds of our soldiers. Under these circumstances it is most
lamentable to find that the awful experiences which have made
so many homes desolate, and so many of our best young men
invalids, have borne no practical fruit. Both the army
officials and Congress are like the Bourbons, they 'have
learned nothing and forgotten nothing.'"

_G. W. Wingate,
What the Beef Scandal Teaches
(Independent, April 6, 1899)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.
Joint High Commission for settlement of
pending questions with Canada.

See (in this volume)
CANADA: A. D. 1898-1899.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899 (October-October).
Military government of Porto Rico.

See (in this volume)
PORTO RICO: A. D. 1898-1899 (OCTOBER-OCTOBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899 (December-January).
Instructions by the President to General Otis,
Military Governor of the Philippines.
Their proclamation by the latter in a modified form.
The effect.

See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898-1899 (DECEMBER-JANUARY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January).
The case of Commissary-General Eagan.

A court-martial, sitting in January, 1899, for the trial of
Commissary-General Eagan, on the charge that he had been
guilty of "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and
conduct to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline," in the abusive language that he had applied to
the commanding general of the army, in the course of his
testimony before the Commission to investigate the conduct of
the War Department found the accused officer guilty, and
imposed the inevitable penalty of dismissal from the service,
but recommended executive clemency in his case.

See:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.

The sentence was commuted by the President to suspension from
rank and duty for six years. This involved no loss of pay,
and, at the end of six years, General Eagan will go on the
retired list.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January).
Appointment of the First Commission to the Philippines.
The President's instructions to the Commissioners.

See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (JANUARY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January-February).
The Treaty of Peace in the Senate.
Its ratification.

The Treaty of Peace with Spain, signed at Paris December 10,
1898, was sent by the President to the Senate on the 4th of
January, 1899, and held under debate in that body until the
6th of February following. The opposition to it was very
strong, being especially directed against the acquisition of
the Philippine Islands, involving, as that acquisition did,
the embarkation of the Republic in a colonial or imperial
policy, of conquest and of government without the consent of
the governed, which seemed to a great number of thoughtful
people, not only incongruous with its constitution, but a
dangerous violation of the principles on which its republican
polity is founded. But even those most opposed to the
acquisition of the Philippine Islands were reluctant to reopen
the state of war by rejection of the treaty, and directed
their efforts mainly towards the securing of a definite
declaration from Congress of the intention of the government
of the United States to establish independence in the islands.

"Even before the signing of the treaty at Paris, on the 6th of
December, when the demand of the American commissioners for
cession of the Philippines was known, the opposition expressed
itself in the following resolution, introduced by Senator
Vest, of Missouri:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled. That under the
Constitution of the United States no power is given to the
Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and
governed permanently as colonies. The colonial system of
European nations can not be established under our present
Constitution, but all territory acquired by the Government,
except such small amount as may be necessary for coaling
stations, correction of boundaries, and similar governmental
purposes, must be acquired and governed with the purpose of
ultimately organizing such territory into States suitable for
admission into the Union."

This resolution became the ground of much senatorial debate
during the following weeks. The arguments opposed to it, and
supporting the policy of the administration, are represented
fairly by the following passage from a speech made by Senator
Platt, of Connecticut, on December 16:

{635}

"I propose to maintain that the United States is a nation;
that as a nation it possesses every sovereign power not
reserved in its Constitution to the States or the people; that
the right to acquire territory was not reserved, and is
therefore an inherent sovereign right; that is a right upon
which there is no limitation, and with regard to which there
is no qualification; that in certain instances the right may
be inferred from specific clauses in the Constitution, but
that it exists independent of these clauses; that in the right
to acquire territory is found the right to govern it; and as
the right to acquire is a sovereign and inherent right, the
right to govern is a sovereign right not limited in the
Constitution, and that these propositions are in accordance
with the views of the framers of the Constitution, the
decisions of the Supreme Court, and the legislation of
Congress.

"Mr. President, this is a nation. It has been called by
various names. It has been called a Confederated Republic, a
Federal Union, the Union of States, a league of States, a rope
of sand; but during all the time these names have been applied
to it it has been a nation. It was so understood by the
framers of the Constitution. It was so decided by the great
judges of the Supreme Court in the early days of the
Constitution. It is too late to deny it, and, Mr. President,
it is also too late to admit it, and not have faith in it.
Intellectual assent to the doctrines of Christianity does not
make a man a Christian. It is saving faith that makes the
Christian. And a mere intellectual assent to the doctrine that
we are a nation does not make the true patriot. It is high
time that we come to believe without qualification, to believe
in our hearts, in the exercise of patriotic faith, that the
United States is a nation. When we come to believe that, Mr.
President, many of the doubts and uncertainties which have
troubled men will disappear.

"It is time to be heroic in our faith and to assert all the
power that belongs to the nation as a nation. … The attempt to
shear the United States of a portion of its sovereign power is
an attempt which may well be thoroughly and fully discussed.
In the right to acquire territory is found the right to
govern, and as the right to acquire is sovereign and
unlimited, the right to govern is a sovereign right, and I
maintain is not limited in the Constitution. If I am right in
holding that the power to acquire is the sovereign power
without limitation, I think it must be admitted that the right
to govern is also sovereign and unlimited. But if it is sought
to rest the right to govern upon that clause of the
Constitution which gives Congress the power to dispose of or
make 'all needful rules and regulations' for the government of
the territory of the United States, I submit there is no
limitation there. There is no qualification there."

On the 4th of January the Senate received the treaty from the
President. On the 7th, Senator Mason, of Illinois, introduced
the following resolution, and, subsequently, spoke with
earnestness in its support:

"Whereas all just powers of government are derived from the
consent of the governed: Therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate of the United States, That the
Government of the United States of America will not attempt to
govern the people of any other country in the world without
the consent of the people themselves, or subject them by force
to our dominion against their will."

On the 9th an impressive speech was made by Senator Hoar, of
Massachusetts, mainly in reply to Senator Platt. He spoke
partly as follows:

"Mr. President, I am quite sure that no man who will hear or
who will read what I say today will doubt that nothing could
induce me to say it but a commanding sense of public duty. I
think I dislike more than most men to differ from men with
whom I have so long and so constantly agreed. I dislike to
differ from the President, whose election I hailed with such
personal satisfaction and such exulting anticipations for the
Republic. I dislike to differ from so many of my party
associates in this Chamber, with whom I have for so many years
trod the same path and sought the same goal. I am one of those
men who believe that little that is great or good or permanent
for a free people can be accomplished without the
instrumentality of party. And I have believed religiously, and
from my soul, for half a century, in the great doctrines and
principles of the Republican party. I stood in a humble
capacity by its cradle. I do not mean, if I can help it, to
follow its hearse. I am sure I render it a service; I am sure
I help to protect and to prolong the life of that great
organization, if I can say or can do anything to keep it from
forsaking the great principles and doctrines in which alone it
must live or bear no life. I must, in this great crisis,
discharge the trust my beloved Commonwealth has committed to
me according to my sense of duty as I see it. However
unpleasant may be that duty, as Martin Luther said, 'God help
me. I can do no otherwise.'

"I am to speak for my country, for its whole past and for its
whole future. I am to speak to a people whose fate is bound up
in the preservation of our great doctrine of constitutional
liberty. I am to speak for the dead soldier who gave his life
for liberty that his death might set a seal upon his country's
historic glory. I am to speak for the Republican party, all of
whose great traditions are at stake, and all of whose great
achievements are in peril. …

"The question with which we now have to deal is whether
Congress may conquer and may govern, without their consent and
against their will, a foreign nation, a separate, distinct,
and numerous people, a territory not hereafter to be populated
by Americans, to be formed into American States and to take its
part in fulfilling and executing the purposes for which the
Constitution was framed, whether it may conquer, control, and
govern this people, not for the general welfare, common
defense, more perfect union, more blessed liberty of the
people of the United States, but for some real or fancied
benefit to be conferred against their desire upon the people
so governed or in discharge of some fancied obligation to
them, and not to the people of the United States.

"Now, Mr. President, the question is whether the men who
framed the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, meant
to confer that power among the limited and restrained powers
of the sovereign nation that they were creating. Upon that
question I take issue with my honorable friend from
Connecticut.
{636}
I declare not only that this is not among the express powers
conferred upon the sovereignty they created, that it is not
among the powers necessarily or reasonably or conveniently
implied for the sake of carrying into effect the purposes of
that instrument, but that it is a power which it can be
demonstrated by the whole contemporaneous history and by our
whole history since until within six months they did not mean
should exist—a power that our fathers and their descendants
have ever loathed and abhorred—and that they believed that no
sovereign on earth could rightfully exercise it, and that no
people on earth could rightfully confer it. They not only did
not mean to confer it, but they would have cut off their right
hands, everyone of them, sooner than set them to an instrument
which should confer it. …

"The great contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution is
to be found in the Declaration of Independence. Over every
clause, syllable, and letter of the Constitution the
Declaration of Independence pours its blazing torch-light. The
same men framed it. The same States confirmed it. The same
people pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred
honor to support it. The great characters in the
Constitutional Convention were the great characters of the
Continental Congress. There are undoubtedly, among its burning
and shining truths, one or two which the convention that
adopted it were not prepared themselves at once to put into
practice. But they placed them before their countrymen as an
ideal moral law to which the liberty of the people was to
aspire and to ascend as soon as the nature of existing
conditions would admit. Doubtless slavery was inconsistent
with it, as Jefferson, its great author, has in more than one
place left on record. But at last in the strife of a great
civil war the truth of the Declaration prevailed and the
falsehood of slavery went down, and at last the Constitution
of the United States conformed to the Declaration and it has
become the law of the land, and its great doctrines of liberty
are written upon the American flag wherever the American flag
floats. Who shall haul them down?"

Two days later (January 11) the following resolutions were
introduced by Senator Bacon, of Georgia:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,

First, That the Government and people of the United States
have not waged the recent war with Spain for conquest and for
the acquisition of foreign territory, but solely for the
purposes set forth in the resolution of Congress making the
declaration of said war, the acquisition of such small tracts
of land or harbors as may be necessary for governmental
purposes being not deemed inconsistent with the same.

"Second. That in demanding and in receiving the cession of the
Philippine Islands it is not the purpose of the Government of
the United States to secure and maintain dominion over the
same as a part of the territory of the United States, or to
incorporate the inhabitants thereof as citizens of the United
States, or to hold said inhabitants as vassals or subjects of
this Government.

"Third. That whereas at the time of the declaration of war by
the United States against Spain, and prior thereto, the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were actively engaged in
a war with Spain to achieve their independence, and whereas
said purpose and the military operations thereunder have not
been abandoned, but are still being actively prosecuted
thereunder, therefore, in recognition of and in obedience to
the vital principle announced in the great declaration that
governments derive 'their just powers from the consent of the
governed,' the Government of the United States recognizes that
the people of the Philippine Islands of a right ought to be
free and independent; that, with this view and to give effect
to the same, the Government of the United States has required
the Government of Spain to relinquish its authority and
government in the Philippine Islands and to withdraw its land
and naval forces from the Philippine Islands and from the
waters thereof.

"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaim any
disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their
determination when an independent government shall have been
duly erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to
transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be
reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by
Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of
the islands to their people."

On the 13th, Senator McLaurin, of South Carolina, returned to
the question of constitutional power in the government of the
United States to hold territory in a permanently subject
state, and spoke against the view maintained by Senator Platt,
of Connecticut: "To hold," he said, "that there is an inherent
power of sovereignty in the nation, outside of the
Constitution, to do something not authorized by that
instrument is to place this 'inherent sovereignty' above the
Constitution and thus destroy the very foundation upon which
constitutional government rests. Judge Gray in the
Chinese-exclusion case, said: 'The United States are a
sovereign and independent nation, and are invested by the
Constitution with the entire control of international
relations and with all the powers of government necessary to
maintain that control and make it effective.' While holding
that the United States are a sovereign and independent nation,
it will be seen that he also holds that the sovereignty of the
nation is vested by the Constitution; and if so, it can only
be exercised in the mode pointed out in the Constitution and
is controlled by the words of the grant of this sovereignty.
There was no nation of the United States until the adoption of
the Federal Constitution; hence before that time there could
be no sovereignty of the nation. What conferred this
sovereignty? Clearly the States, by and through the Federal
Constitution. If so, then there can be no inherent right of
sovereignty except that conferred by the Constitution.

"The Senator further contends that we are a sovereign nation,
and as such have the same inherent right to acquire territory
as England, France, Germany, and Mexico. I controvert that
proposition. The sovereignty of the nation of Great Britain
and the others is vested in the people, and has never been
delegated and limited as in our country. These Governments
enjoy sovereignty in its elementary form.
{637}
What the government wills it may do without considering the
act or its consequences in the light of an organic law of
binding obligation. Our Government is in a very different
position. The Federal Constitution is the embodiment of the
sovereignty of the United States as a nation, and this
sovereignty can only be exercised in accordance with the
powers contained in its provisions. Great Britain can do
anything as a nation in the way of the exercise of
governmental functions. There is nothing to prohibit or
restrict the fullest exercise of her sovereignty as a nation.
Hence there is no analogy, and the sovereignty of the United
States as a nation differs widely from that of Great Britain.

"It is further contended that a sovereign right can not be
limited and that all our Constitution can do is to prescribe
the manner in which it can be exercised. If, as already shown,
the sovereignty of the United States was conferred by the
States through the Federal Constitution, it is clear that, in
conferring the power and prescribing the manner of its
exercise, they did set a limit in the very terms of the
instrument itself. I deny, therefore, that the United States
as a nation has a sovereign, inherent right and control
outside of the grant of such power in the Constitution. This
is not an essential element of nationality so far as our
nation is concerned, although it may be in England or Russia,
where the nationality and sovereignty incident to it are not
created and limited by a written constitution."

On the 14th of January, Mr. Hoar submitted the following:

"Resolved, That the people of the Philippine islands of right
ought to be free and independent; that they are absolved from
all allegiance to the Spanish Crown, and that all political
connection between them and Spain is and ought to be totally
dissolved, and that they have, therefore, full power to do all
acts and things which independent states may of right do; that
it is their right to institute a new government for
themselves, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness; and that with
these rights the people of the United States do not propose to
interfere."

On the 18th, Mr. Bacon amended his resolutions, given above,
by changing the phrase "an independent government" to "a
stable and independent government," and then spoke upon them
with force, saying, among other things: "The simple fact that
we went to war with Spain did not devolve upon us any
obligation with reference to the Philippine Islands. We went
to war with Spain not for the purpose of correcting all the
evils with which her people were afflicted; we went to war
with Spain not to break the chains of tyranny with which she
might be binding her different colonies: we did not undertake
to be the great universal benefactor and to right all the
wrongs of all the world, or even all the wrongs that Spain
might be inflicting upon any of her people. "We went to war
because a particular colony which she was afflicting lay at
our doors; we went to war because the disorders of that
Government affected the peace of our community and were
injurious to our material interest. We said there was a
condition of affairs which was unbearable and that we would
put an end to it.

"To that extent and to that alone we claimed and avowed the
reason for the declaration of war. So it follows that the mere
declaration of war did not affect in any manner our relations
with the Philippine Islands except to put us in a state of war
with them as a part of the Spanish domain, and in no manner
laid any obligations upon us as to those islands. We were not
charged with the duty of preserving order in Asia. We were not
charged with the obligations of seeing that they had a stable
and orderly government in any part of that hemisphere. No such
duty rested upon us. None such was assumed by us. Therefore
the simple declaration of war did not lay any obligation upon
us as to the Philippine Islands, and I desire that any Senator
will put his finger upon the act which laid us under any
obligations to the Philippine Islands outside of the fact that
in the war which ensued we took those who were the insurgents
in those islands to be our allies and made a common cause with
them.