Chapter LXXV: Section IV (2)

Substantially the same account of things at Manila in this
period has been given in a magazine article by Mr. John
Foreman, the well known writer on the Philippine Islands. "The
conduct," he declares, "of the boisterous, undisciplined
individuals who formed a large percentage of the first
volunteer contingents sent to Manila had had an ineffaceably
demoralizing effect on the proletariat, and has inspired a
feeling of horror and loathful contempt in the affluent and
educated classes who guide the Philippine public opinion. From
the outset it was a mistake to treat the Christian Philippine
population like savages ignorant of western civilization,
considering that there are thousands of Filipinos mentally
equal to the invading forces, and comparable, in intellectual
training, with the average middle-class Europeans.

"Within a fortnight after the capitulation of Manila the
drinking saloons had increased four-fold. According to the
latest advices, there are at least twenty to one existing in
the time of the Spaniards. Drunkenness, with its consequent
evils, is rife all over the city among the new white
population. The orgies of the new-comers, the incessant street
brawls, the insults offered with impunity to natives of both
sexes, the entry with violence into private houses by the
soldiery, who maltreated the inmates and laid hands on what
they chose, were hardly calculated to arouse in the natives
admiration for their new masters. Brothels were absolutely
prohibited under the Spanish rule, but since the evacuation
there has been a great influx of women of ill fame, whilst
native women have been pursued by lustful tormentors. During a
certain period after the capitulation there was indiscriminate
shooting, and no peaceable native's life was safe in the
suburbs. Adventurers of all sorts and conditions have flocked
to this centre of vice, where the sober native is not even
spoken of as a man by many of the armed rank and file, but, by
way of contempt, is called a yuyu. A few miles from Manila,
the villages of Mandaloyan and Sant Ana were looted by the
victors, much of the spoil being brought up to the capital and
included in auction sales or sold to the Chinese. In Taal the
houses of families, with whom I have been long acquainted,
were ransacked, effects of little value, or too difficult to
transport, being carelessly strewn about from sheer
wantonness. And presumably no greater respect for private
property was shown in the other numerous villages overrun by
the invaders. …

"The situation then during this period was somewhat as
follows: The Filipinos, aided by Dewey's victory, had driven
the Spaniards from practically the whole Archipelago except
the city of Manila, they had established a government of their
own, and they looked upon the country as belonging both by
nature and by right of conquest to them. We upon the other
hand, having destroyed the Spanish fleet and captured the city
of Manila, and being in the process of acquiring by treaty the
Spanish title to the whole country regarded it as belonging to
us. The situation was therefore critical."

_J. Foreman,
Will the United States withdraw from the Philippines?
(National Review, September, 1900)._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (September-December).
Instructions from the President of the United States to the
Commissioners for the negotiation of peace with Spain
concerning the Philippine Archipelago.
Cession of the Islands to the United States.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1898 (JULY-DECEMBER).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (October-November).
State of the country under the native government of Aguinaldo,
as witnessed by two U. S. naval officers who traversed it.-
Conflicting opinions as to the fitness of the Filipinos
for self-government.

During October and November, 1898, while the only authority in
Luzon, outside of Manila and Cavite, was that exercised by the
native government organized under Aguinaldo, two American
naval officers, Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Cadet Leonard R.
Sargent, with permission from Admiral Dewey, made a tour of
observation through seven provinces of the island, and
rendered a report of what they saw and what they experienced,
which Admiral Dewey sent to Washington, commending it to the
attention of the government as containing "the most complete
and reliable information obtainable in regard to the present
state of the northern part of Luzon Island." Subsequently Mr.
Sargent wrote articles descriptive of the journey, which were
published in "The Outlook" and "The Independent," and which
were reprinted, with the official report, in a document
compiled for the U. S. Senate. The following is from the
article in "The Outlook," September 2, 1899:

"Although this government has never been recognized, and in
all probability will go out of existence without recognition,
yet it cannot be denied that, in a region occupied by many
millions of inhabitants, for nearly six months it stood alone
between anarchy and order. The military forces of the United
States held control only in Manila, with its environs, and in
Cavite, and had no authority to proceed further; while in the
vast remaining districts the representatives of the only
recognized power on the field were prisoners in the hands of
their despised subjects. It was the opinion at Manila during
this anomalous period in our Philippine relations, and
possibly in the United States as well, that such a state of
affairs must breed something akin to anarchy. I can state
unreservedly, however, that Mr. Wilcox and I found the
existing conditions to be much at variance with this opinion.
During our absence from Manila we travelled more than 600
miles in a very comprehensive circuit through the northern
part of the island of Luzon, traversing a characteristic and
important district. In this way we visited seven provinces, of
which some were under the immediate control of the central
government at Malolos, while others were remotely situated,
separated from each other and from the seat of government by
natural divisions of land, and accessible only by lengthy and
arduous travel. As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's
government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I
offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey
throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with
only the most pleasant recollections of the quiet and orderly
life which we found the natives to be leading under the new
regime."

{374}

The following is from the official report, jointly made by
Cadet Sargent and Paymaster Wilcox:

"The Philippine officers, both military and civil, that we
have met in all the provinces we have visited, have, with very
few exceptions, been men of intelligent appearance and
conversation. The same is true of all those men who form the
upper class in each town. The education of most of them is
limited, but they appear to seize every opportunity to improve
it. They have great respect and admiration for learning. Very
many of them desire to send their children to schools in the
United States or Europe. Many men of importance in different
towns have told us that the first use to be made of the
revenues of their government, after there is no more danger of
war, will be to start good schools in every village. The
poorer classes are extremely ignorant on most subjects, but a
large percentage of them can read and write. …

"Of the large number of officers, civil and military, and of
the leading townspeople we have met, nearly every man has
expressed in our presence his sentiment on this question [of
independence]. It is universally the same. They all declare
that they will accept nothing short of independence. They
desire the protection of the United States at sea, but fear
any interference on land. …

"There is much variety of feeling among the Philippines with
regard to the debt of gratitude they owe the United States. In
every town we found men who said that our nation had saved
them from slavery, and others who claimed that without our
interference their independence would have been recognized
before this time. On one point they are united, however, viz.,
that whatever our Government may have done for them it has not
gained the right to annex them. They have been prejudiced
against us by the Spaniards. The charges made have been so
numerous and so severe that what the natives have since
learned has not sufficed to disillusion them. With regard to
the record of our policy toward a subject people, they have
received remarkable information on two points,—that we have
mercilessly slain and finally exterminated the race of Indians
that were natives of our soil, and that we went to war in 1861
to suppress an insurrection of negro slaves, whom we also
ended by exterminating. Intelligent and well-informed men have
believed these charges. They were rehearsed to us in many
towns in different provinces, beginning at Malolos. The
Spanish version of our Indian problem is particularly well
known."

_United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,
Senate Document 66._

In the third number of the first series of its publications,
the Philippine Information Society—see below: A. D. 1899
(JANUARY-FEBRUARY)—has brought together a number of
conflicting opinions expressed by various persons concerning
the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government, among them
the following:

"The population of Luzon is reported to be something over
3,000,000, mostly natives. These are gentle, docile, and under
just laws and with the benefits of popular education would
soon make good citizens. In a telegram sent to the department
on June 23 I expressed the opinion that 'these people are far
superior in their intelligence and more capable of
self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar
with both races.' Further intercourse with them has confirmed
me in this opinion."

_Admiral Dewey,
Letter, August 29, 1898,
Replying to inquiry of War Department._

"They [the natives] would have to be educated up to it
[self-government]. They want a protectorate, but they do not
exactly understand what that means. Their idea is that they
should collect the revenues and keep them in their treasury,
and that we should be at the expense of maintaining an army
and a navy there for their protection, which is the kind of a
protectorate they would like very much."

_General Merritt,
statement before United States Peace Commission at Paris,
October 4, 1898._

"If the United States should evacuate these islands, anarchy
and civil war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign
intervention. The insurgents were furnished arms and the moral
support of the navy prior to our arrival, and we cannot ignore
obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations,
which our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish
Government is completely demoralized, and Spanish power is
dead beyond all possibility of resurrection. … On the other
hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the country without the
support of some strong nation. They acknowledge this
themselves, and say their desire is for independence under
American protection, but they have only vague ideas as to what
our relative positions would be—what part we should take in
collecting and expending the revenue, and administering the
government."

_General F. V. Greene,
Memorandum concerning the Philippine Islands,
made August 27, 1898._

"The capability of the Filipinos for self-government cannot be
doubted. Such men as Arellano, Aguinaldo, and many others whom
I might name are highly educated; nine tenths of the people
can read and write, all are skilled artisans in one way or
another; they are industrious, frugal, temperate, and, given a
fair start, could look out for themselves infinitely better
than our people imagine. In my opinion they rank far higher
than the Cubans or the uneducated negroes to whom we have
given right of suffrage."

_General Charles King,
Letter to Milwaukee Journal,
June 22, 1899._

"Concerning the capacity of the Filipinos to govern themselves
I regret to say that I see no reason to change the opinion
previously expressed, that they are unfit. I wish my opinion
might be otherwise, for I prefer to believe them capable of
self-government. There are a number of Filipinos whom I have
met, among them General Aguinaldo and a few of his leaders,
whom I believe thoroughly trustworthy and fully capable of
self-government, and the main reliance for small official
positions and many larger ones would be upon people who know
no standard of government other than that the Spaniards have
furnished. Their sense of equity and justice seems not fully
developed, and their readiness to coerce those who come under
their power has been strongly illustrated in this city since
our occupation. A regularly organized system of blackmail has
been instituted under the guise of making subscriptions to the
insurgent cause."

_Major J. F. Bell
[of Engineers, on "secret service"]
Letter to General Merritt, Manila, August 29, 1898._

{375}

"The people are the most enlightened and vigorous branch of
the Malay race, and have been Christians for centuries, in
fact longer than the principles of the Reformation were
established in Great Britain, and are the nearest akin to
European people of any alien race, and it is simply ridiculous
to imagine that eight to ten millions of such people can be
bought and sold as an article of commerce without first
obtaining their consent. Let all those who are greedy for a
slice of the archipelago ponder well over this before burning
their fingers."

_H. W. Bray
[merchant and planter in the islands for fifteen years],
Letter to Singapore Free Press, June 8, 1898._

"The native has no expansive ideas; he cannot go far enough to
understand what it is to rule matters for the benefit of the
common weal; he cannot get past his own most personal
interest, or his town, at the most. I think the greatest
length he would go would be his own town. But constructing
laws, and obeying them, for the benefit of the commonwealth, I
do not think he is capable of it at all. I think an attempt at
a native government would be a fiasco altogether."

_John Foreman,
Testimony before United States Peace Commission at Paris._

"The excuse that they [the Filipinos] are not ripe for
independence is not founded on facts. The Filipinos number
more educated people than the kingdom of Servia and the
principalities of Bulgaria and Montenegro. They have fewer
illiterates than the states of the Balkan peninsula, Russia,
many provinces of Spain and Portugal, and the Latin republics
of America. There are provinces in which few people can be
found who do not at least read. They pay more attention to
education than Spain or the Balkan states do. There is no lack
of trained men fit to govern their own country, and indeed in
every branch, because under the Spanish rule the official
business was entirely transacted by the native subalterns. The
whole history of the Katipunan revolt and of the war against
Spain and America serves to place in the best light the
capability of the Filipinos for self-government."

_F. Blumentritt,
The Philippine Islands,
page 61._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898-1899 (December-January).
Instructions by the President of the United States to
General Otis, Military Governor and Commander in
the Philippines.
Their proclamation to the people of the Islands as
modified by General Otis.
The effect.

On the 27th of December, 1898, the following instructions,
dated December 21, and signed by the President, were cabled by
the Secretary of War to General Otis, in command of the United
States forces in the Philippines. They were not made public in
the United States until the 5th of January following, when
they appeared in the newspapers of that day: "The destruction
of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United
States naval squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Dewey,
followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the
Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the
Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty
therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries
at Paris, on the 10th inst., and as the result of victories of
the American arms, the future control, fulfilment disposition
and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the
United States. In of the offices of the sovereignty thus
acquired, and the responsible obligations of government thus
assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the
entire group becomes immediately necessary, and the military
government heretofore maintained by the United States in the
city, harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended with all
possible despatch to the whole of the ceded territory. In
performance of this duty, the military commander of the United
States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of
the islands, in severing the former political relations of the
inhabitants and in establishing a new political power, the
authority of the United States is to be exerted for the
security of the persons and property of the people of the
islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights.
It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of
occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner
that we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends,
to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments
and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who,
either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with
the government of the United States to give effect to these
beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its support
and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful
rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without
severity so far as may be possible.

"Within the absolute domain of military authority, which
necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory
until the government of the United States shall otherwise
provide, the municipal laws of the territory in respect to
private interests and property and the repression of crime are
continued in force, the authority to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals so far as practicable. The operations of
civil and municipal government are to be performed by such
officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by
taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen, as far
as may be practicable, from the inhabitants of the islands.
While the control of all the public property and the revenues
of the state passes with the cession, and while the use and
management of all public means are of necessity reserved to
the authority of the United States, private property, whether
belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected
except for cause duly established. The taxes and duties
heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late government
become payable to the authorities of the United States, unless
it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates
or modes of contribution to the expenses of government,
whether general or local. If private property be taken for
military use, it shall be paid for when possible in cash at a
fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not practicable
receipts are to be given.

{376}

"All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual
possession of the land and naval forces of the United States
will be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All
goods and wares not prohibited for military reasons by due
announcement of the military authority will be admitted upon
payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force
at the time of their importation. Finally, it should be the
earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to
win the confidence, respect and affection of the inhabitants
of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way
that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is
the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the
mission of the United States is one of benevolent
assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right
for arbitrary rule. In the fulfilment of this high mission,
supporting the temperate administration of affairs to the
greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously
maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance
and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings
of good and stable government upon the people of the
Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

WILLIAM McKINLEY."

On receiving President McKinley's "proclamation," as the
instructions of December 21 were commonly described, General
Otis promptly forwarded a copy to General Miller, who had been
sent to occupy the city of Iloilo, and the latter made it public.
Meantime General Otis had studied the document with care and
arrived at conclusions which he sets forth in his subsequent
annual report as follows: "After fully considering the
President's proclamation and the temper of the Tagalos with
whom I was daily discussing political problems and the
friendly intentions of the United States Government toward
them, I concluded that there were certain words and
expressions therein, such as 'sovereignty,' 'right of
cession,' and those which directed immediate occupation, etc.,
though most admirably employed and tersely expressive of
actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the Tagalo
war party to incite widespread hostilities among the natives.
The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that certain
words, as 'sovereignty,' 'protection,' etc., had peculiar
meaning disastrous to their welfare and significant of future
political domination, like that from which they had recently
been freed. It was my opinion, therefore, that I would be
justified in so amending the paper that the beneficent object
of the United States Government would be brought clearly
within the comprehension of the people, and this conclusion
was the more readily reached because of the radical change [a
change of cabinet] of the past few days in the constitution of
Aguinaldo's government, which could not have been understood
at Washington at the time the proclamation was prepared. …

"The amended proclamation of January 4 appeared in the
English, Spanish, and Tagalo languages, and was published in
Manila through newspapers and posters. The English text is as
follows: 'To the people of the Philippine Islands:
Instructions of His Excellency the President of the United
States relative to the administration of affairs in the
Philippine Islands have been transmitted to me by direction of
the honorable the Secretary of War, under date of December 28,
1898. They direct me to publish and proclaim, in the most
public manner, to the inhabitants of these islands that in the
war against Spain the United States forces came here to
destroy the power of that nation and to give the blessings of
peace and individual freedom to the Philippine people; that we
are here as friends of the Filipinos; to protect them in their
homes, their employments, their individual and religious
liberty, and that all persons who, either by active aid or
honest endeavor, co-operate with the Government of the United
States to give effect to these beneficent purposes, will
receive the reward of its support and protection. The
President of the United States has assumed that the municipal
laws of the country in respect to private rights and property
and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing
in force in so far as they be applicable to a free people, and
should be administered by the ordinary tribunals of justice,
presided over by representatives of the people and those in
thorough sympathy with them in their desires for good
government; that the functions and duties connected with civil
and municipal administration are to be performed by such
officers as wish to accept the assistance of the United
States, chosen in so far as it may be practicable from the
inhabitants of the islands; that while the management of
public property and revenues and the use of all public means
of transportation are to be conducted under the military
authorities, until such authorities can be replaced by civil
administration, all private property, whether of individuals
or corporations, must be respected and protected. If private
property be taken for military uses it shall be paid for at a
fair valuation in cash if possible, and when payment in cash
is not practicable at the time, receipts therefor will be
given to be taken up and liquidated as soon as cash becomes
available. The ports of the Philippine Islands shall be open
to the commerce of all foreign nations, and goods and
merchandise not prohibited for military reasons by the
military authorities shall be admitted upon payment of such
duties and charges as shall be in force at the time of
importation. The President concludes his instructions in the
following language: "Finally, it should be the earnest and
paramount aim of the Administration to win the confidence,
respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines
by insuring to them in every possible way the full measure of
individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of a free
people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United
States is one of beneficent assimilation, which will
substitute the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary
rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, while upholding
the temporary administration of affairs for the greatest good
of the governed, there will be sedulously maintained the
strong arm of authority to repress disturbance, and to
overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of
good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine
Islands."

"'From the tenor and substance of the above instructions of
the President, I am fully of the opinion that it is the
intention of the United States Government, while directing
affairs generally, to appoint the representative men now
forming the controlling element of the Filipinos to civil
positions of trust and responsibility, and it will be my aim
to appoint thereto such Filipinos as may be acceptable to the
supreme authorities at Washington. It is also my belief that
it is the intention of the United States Government to draw
from the Filipino people so much of the military force of the
islands as is possible and consistent with a free and
well-constituted government of the country, and it is my
desire to inaugurate a policy of that character.
{377}
I am also convinced that it is the intention of the United
States Government to seek the establishment of a most liberal
government for the islands, in which the people themselves
shall have as full representation as the maintenance of law
and order will permit, and which shall be susceptible of
development, on lines of increased representation and the
bestowal of increased powers, into a government as free and
independent as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces of the
world. It will be my constant endeavor to cooperate with the
Filipino people, seeking the good of the country, and I invite
their full confidence and aid.
E. S. OTIS, Major-General,
U. S. V., Military Governor.'

"Before publication of this proclamation I endeavored to
obtain from able Filipino residents of the city an expression
of opinion as to its probable effect upon the population, but
was not much encouraged. A few days thereafter they declared
the publication to have been a mistake, although the foreign
residents appeared to believe the proclamation most excellent
in tone and moderation, offered everything that the most
hostile of the insurgents could expect, and undoubtedly would
have a beneficial influence. It was received by the better
classes of natives with satisfaction, as it was the first
authoritative announcement of the attitude which the United
States assumed toward the islands and declared the policy
which it intended to pursue, and because the declared policy
was one which, in their opinion, conditions imperatively
demanded should be imposed for the interests of the Filipino
people who were incapable of self-government. The publication
separated more widely the friendly and war factions of the
inhabitants and was the cause of exciting discussion. The
ablest of insurgent newspapers, which was now issued at
Malolos and edited by the uncompromising Luna, … attacked the
policy of the United States as declared in the proclamation,
and its assumption of sovereignty over the islands, with all
the vigor of which he was capable. …

"Aguinaldo met the proclamation by a counter one in which he
indignantly protested against the claim of sovereignty by the
United States in the islands, which really had been conquered
from the Spaniards through the blood and treasure of his
countrymen, and abused me for my assumption of the title of
military governor. Even the women of Cavite province, in a
document numerously signed by them, gave me to understand that
after all the men were killed off they were prepared to shed
their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence of
their country. The efforts made by Aguinaldo and his
assistants made a decided impression on the inhabitants of
Luzon outside of Manila. … Shortly before this time the
insurgents had commenced the organization of clubs in the
city, membership in which now, I was informed, amounted to
10,000. The chief organizer was a shrewd mestizo, a former
close companion of Aguinaldo, by whom he had been commissioned
to perform this work. He was a friend and associate of some of
our officers; was engaged in organizing the clubs only, as he
stated, to give the poorer classes amusement and education;
held public entertainments in athletics to which our officers
were invited, and in which our soldiers were asked to
participate. Gradually arms were being secretly introduced and
bolos were being manufactured and distributed. The arms were
kept concealed in buildings, and many of them were
subsequently captured. The Chinamen were carrying on a
lucrative business in bolo making, but the provost-marshal had
cruelly seized considerable of their stock. These clubs had
received military organization and were commanded by cunning
Filipino officers regularly appointed by the Malolos
government. The chief organizer departed after organization
had been perfected and thereafter became a confidential
adviser in Malolos affairs. This organization was the subject
of grave apprehension, as it was composed of the worst social
element of the city, and was kept under police supervision as
closely as possible. … The streets of the city were thronged
with unarmed insurgent officers and enlisted men from the
numerically increasing insurgent line on the outskirts, proud
of their uniforms and exhibiting matchless conceit, amusing to
our men, who were apparently unconcerned observers, but who
were quick to take in the rapidly changing conditions. …

"Greater precautionary measures were directed and taken in the
way of redistributing organizations throughout the city, in
advancing and strengthening (though still far within our own
mutually conceded military lines) our posts of observation,
and for the quick response of the men if summoned for
defensive action. Otherwise no change in the conduct,
condition, or temper of the troops was observable. So quietly
were these precautions effected that Filipino citizens,
noticing the apparent indifference of our men, warned me
repeatedly of the danger to be apprehended from a sudden
simultaneous attack of the insurgents within and without the
city, and were quietly informed that we did not anticipate any
great difficulty. Another very noticeable proof of
premeditated intent on the part of the insurgents was
perceived in the excitement manifested by the natives and
their removal in large numbers from the city. All avenues of
exit were filled with vehicles transporting families and
household effects to surrounding villages. The railway
properties were taxed to their utmost capacity in carrying the
fleeing inhabitants to the north within the protection of the
established insurgent military lines. Aguinaldo, by written
communications and messages, invited his old-time friends to
send their families to Malolos, where their safety was
assured, but Hongkong was considered a more secure retreat and
was taken advantage of. A carefully prepared estimate showed
that 40,000 of the inhabitants of the city departed within the
period of fifteen days."

_Report of General Otis, August 31, 1899
(Message and Documents: Abridgment, 1899-1900,
volume 2, pages 1075-88)._

The counter-proclamation of Aguinaldo, referred to above by
General Otis, was issued on the 5th of January, 1899, from
Malolos, addressed to My brothers, the Filipinos, all the
honorable consuls, and other foreigners." It said:

"Major General E. S. Otis's proclamation published yesterday
in the Manila papers obliges me to circulate the present one,
in order that all who read and understand it may know of my
most solemn protest against said proclamation, for I am moved
by my duty and my conscience before God, by my political
obligations with my beloved country, by my official and
private relations to the North American nations.
{378}
In the above mentioned proclamation, General Otis calls
himself 'Military Governor in the Philippines,' and I protest
once and a thousand times, with all the energy in my soul,
against such an authority. I solemnly proclaim that I have
never had, either at Singapore or here in the Philippines, any
verbal or written contract for the recognition of American
sovereignty over this cherished soil. … Our countrymen and
foreigners are witnesses that the land and naval forces of the
United States existing here have recognized by act the
belligerency of the Philippines, not only respecting but also
doing public honor to the Filipino banner, which triumphantly
traversed our seas in view of foreign nations represented here
by their respective consuls.

"As in his proclamation General Otis alludes to some
instructions issued by His Excellency the President of the
United States relating to the administration of affairs in the
Philippines, I solemnly protest in the name of God, root and
source of all justice and all right, who has visibly acceded
me the power to direct my dear brethren in the difficult task
of our regeneration, against this intrusion of the United
States Government in the administration of these islands. In
the same manner I protest against such an unexpected act which
treats of American sovereignty in these islands in the face of
all antecedents that I have in my possession referring to my
relations with the American authorities, which are unequivocal
testimony that the United States did not take me out of Hong
Kong to make war against Spain for their own benefit, but for
the benefit of our liberty and independence, to which end said
authorities verbally promised me their active support and
efficacious co-operation. So that you all may understand it,
my beloved brothers, it is the principle of liberty and
absolute independence that has been our noble ambition for the
purpose of obtaining the desired object, with a force given by
the conviction, now very widespread, not to retrace the path
of glory that we have passed over."-

_United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,
Senate Document 208, page 103._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (January).
Appointment of the First Commission to the Philippines
and the President's instructions to it.

On the 20th of January, 1899, the President of the United
States addressed the following communication to the Secretary
of State: "My communication to the Secretary of War, dated
December 21, 1898, declares the necessity of extending the
actual occupation and administration of the city, harbor, and
bay of Manila to the whole of the territory which by the
treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, passed from the
sovereignty of Spain to the sovereignty of the United States,
and the consequent establishment of military government
throughout the entire group of the Philippine Islands. While
the treaty has not yet been ratified, it is believed that it
will be by the time of the arrival at Manila of the
commissioners named below. In order to facilitate the most
humane, pacific, and effective extension of authority
throughout these islands, and to secure, with the least
possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection
of life and property to the inhabitants, I have named Jacob G.
Schurman, Rear-Admiral George Dewey, Major General Elwell S.
Otis, Charles Denby, and Dean C. Worcester to constitute a
commission to aid in the accomplishment of these results. In
the performance of this duty, the commissioners are enjoined
to meet at the earliest possible day in the city of Manila and
to announce, by a public proclamation, their presence and the
mission intrusted to them, carefully setting forth that, while
the military government already proclaimed is to be maintained
and continued so long as necessity may require, efforts will
be made to alleviate the burden of taxation, to establish
industrial and commercial prosperity, and to provide for the
safety of persons and of property by such means as may be
found conducive to these ends.

"The commissioners will endeavor, without interference with
the military authorities of the United States now in control
of the Philippines, to ascertain what amelioration in the
condition of the inhabitants and what improvements in public
order may be practicable, and for this purpose they will study
attentively the existing social and political state of the
various populations, particularly as regards the forms of
local government, the administration of justice, the
collection of customs and other taxes, the means of
transportation, and the need of public improvements. They will
report through the Department of State, according to the forms
customary or hereafter prescribed for transmitting and preserving
such communications, the results of their observations and
reflections, and will recommend such executive action as may
from time to time seem to them wise and useful. The
commissioners are hereby authorized to confer authoritatively
with any persons resident in the islands from whom they may
believe themselves able to derive information or suggestions
valuable for the purposes of their commission, or whom they
may choose to employ as agents, as may be necessary for this
purpose.

"The temporary government of the islands is intrusted to the
military authorities, as already provided for by my
instructions to the Secretary of War of December 21, 1898, and
will continue until Congress shall determine otherwise. The
commission may render valuable services by examining with
special care the legislative needs of the various groups of
inhabitants, and by reporting, with recommendations, the
measures which should be instituted for the maintenance of
order, peace, and public welfare, either as temporary steps to
be taken immediately for the perfection of present
administration, or as suggestions for future legislation. In
so far as immediate personal changes in the civil
administration may seem to be advisable, the commissioners are
empowered to recommend suitable persons for appointment to
these offices from among the inhabitants of the islands who
have previously acknowledged their allegiance to this
Government.

"It is my desire that in all their relations with the
inhabitants of the islands the commissioners exercise due
respect for all the ideals, customs, and institutions of the
tribes which compose the population, emphasizing upon all
occasions the just and beneficent intentions of the Government
of the United States. It is also my wish and expectation that the
commissioners may be received in a manner due to the honored
and authorized representatives of the American Republic, duly
commissioned on account of their knowledge, skill, and
integrity as bearers of the good will, the protection, and the
richest blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering
nation.

WILLIAM McKINLEY."

_Report of the Philippine Commission, January 31, 1900,
volume 1, exhibit 2 (page 185)._

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PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (January-February).
Causes of and responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities
between the Americans and the Filipinos.

"The Philippine Information Society," organized for the
purpose of "placing within reach of the American people the
most reliable and authoritative evidence attainable in regard
to the people of the Philippine Islands and our relations to
them," has published in Number VII of the First Series of its
pamphlets a carefully made collection of information, from
official and other sources, relative to the circumstances in
which hostilities between the American and Filipino forces
came about. On this as on other subjects which the society has
investigated it seems to have pursued its inquiries with no
aim but to learn and set forth the truth. Its conclusions,
resting on the evidence which it submits, are stated in an
introduction to the pamphlet as follows:

"It will presumably he admitted that the important question
with regard to the Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899,
is not, who fired the first shot, but who was responsible for
the conditions that made it evident to every observer weeks
before the clash came that a single shot might bring on war. …
The situation may be briefly explained as follows: We believed
that the Philippine Archipelago was and ought to be ours, and
we were moving to take possession as rapidly as possible. The
Filipinos, or at least Aguinaldo's government and followers,
believed that the country was theirs and they resented every
effort on our part to occupy it. We considered it ours through
cession from Spain and right of conquest. They claimed that
Spain no longer held possession of the country and therefore
had no right to cede it to us; moreover, that by right of
conquest we were entitled only to temporary occupation of
Manila. We wished to extend our sovereignty throughout the
Archipelago with all possible dispatch. They desired
independence, or at least a protectorate which, while securing
them from foreign aggression, should leave them control of
their internal affairs. While a discussion of the justice of
either position does not come within the limits of the present
inquiry, it is important to remember that from the first a
minority in this country urged that the Filipinos were
entitled to a promise of ultimate independence, and that a
resolution of Congress, similar to that passed in the case of
Cuba, would avert all occasion for war. This course having
been rejected by our country, the question arises, did the
assertion of United States sovereignty render war inevitable? …

"No doubt most Americans believe that left to themselves the
Filipinos would soon have lapsed into anarchy, while a few
maintain that with temporary assistance in international
affairs they would have developed a government better suited
to their peculiar needs than we can ever give them. Still
others who are familiar with the Filipinos and kindred races
believe that their aspiration for an independent national
existence was not deep rooted, that had we adopted an
affectionate, admiring tone to their leaders, had we
recognized their government and approved of it, we could soon
have made their government our government, could have been as
sovereign as we pleased, and had the people with us. Whatever
view one may hold, it must be admitted that if we were to
establish our sovereignty by peaceful methods it was essential
to win the confidence and affection of the Filipinos. … There
is every indication that the Filipinos were prepared, at
first, to treat us as friends and liberators. General Anderson
tells the following interesting story: The prevailing
sentiment of the Filipinos towards us can be shown by one
incident. About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in
Cavite invited a number of our army and navy officers to a
banquet. There was some post-prandial speech-making, the
substance of the Filipino talk being that they wished to be
annexed but not conquered. One of our officers in reply
assured them that we had not come to make them slaves, but to
make them free men. A singular scene followed. All the
Filipinos rose to their feet, and Buencomeno, taking his
wine-glass in his hand, said: We wish to be baptized in that
sentiment. Then he and the rest poured the wine from their
glasses over their heads. After the very first, however, the
cultivation of intimate relations with the Filipino leaders
seems to have been considered unimportant or inadvisable.
General Merritt states that he never saw Aguinaldo. Social
intercourse between our officers and the Filipinos was
discouraged by General Otis. In fact after the surrender of
Manila General Whittier seems to have been the only one of our
superior officers who ever had a personal interview with
Aguinaldo.

"Certainly after the proclamation of January 4, [see above: A.
D. 1898-1899 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY)] war could only have been
avoided by a decisive action of Congress promising ultimate
independence to the Filipinos. That proclamation of January 4
raised the issue and provoked the counter proclamation of
January 5, which so stirred the people against us—a
proclamation in which Aguinaldo once and a thousand times and
with all the energy of his soul protested against American
sovereignty, and which closed with the words, 'upon their
heads be all the blood which may be shed.' …

"Aguinaldo's proclamation was followed by a series of
conferences of which General Otis reports 'It was one
continued plea for some concession that would satisfy tho
people.' On January 16th he cabled to Washington, 'Aspiration
Filipino people is independence with restrictions resulting
from conditions which its government agree with American when
latter agree to officially recognize the former.' Finally on
January 25th he sent word to the insurgent commissioners that
'To this dispatch no reply has been received.' From this time
General Otis states, the insurgents hurried forward
preparations for war. Contemporaneous with these events in the
Philippines the Treaty of Peace was pending in the United
States Senate where it had been assigned for a vote on
February 6th.

"With regard to the actual outbreak of' hostilities, there is
a sharp difference of opinion. The United States press
dispatches announcing the outbreak, and the contemporaneous
newspaper statements by the Filipinos … are of interest as
evidence that from the very first each side claimed the other
to be the aggressor.
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As to which of these opposing claims is borne out by the
facts, the editors would say that after careful study of all
the accessible evidence they find that according to the most
authoritative statements the outbreak occurred as the result
of a trespass by four armed Filipinos on territory admitted by
the Filipino in command to be within the jurisdiction of the
United States. The number of Filipinos has been variously
estimated. The editors follow the report of General MacArthur
in command of the division in which the firing began, which
agrees with the report of Second-Lieutenant Wheedon of the
First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry, stationed at Santa
Mesa. The action of the Filipino trespassers seems to have
been an instance of bad discipline in the insurgent army.
Certainly it was not ordered on that date by the insurgent
leaders, although there are some indications that the leaders
had planned to attack in a few days. The claim that our forces
instigated the attack for the purpose of securing the votes
necessary to ratify the treaty is absolutely unsupported by
any evidence which has come to the attention of the editors."

_Philippine Information Society,
Publications, First Series, VII., Introduction._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (January-November).
Attack on American forces by the Tagalos.
Continued hostilities.
Progress of American conquest.

"No definite date had been set for the attack [by the hostile
Tagalos], but a signal by means of rockets had been agreed
upon, and it was universally understood that it would come
upon the occurrence of the first act on the part of the
American forces which would afford a pretext; and in the lack
of such act, in the near future at all events. Persistent
attempts were made to provoke our soldiers to fire. The
insurgents were insolent to our guards and made persistent and
continuous efforts to push them back and advance the insurgent
lines farther into the city of Manila. … With great tact and
patience the commanding general had held his forces in check,
and he now made a final effort to preserve the peace by
appointing a commission to meet a similar body appointed by
Aguinaldo and to 'confer with regard to the situation of
affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent,
purposes, aims, and desires of the Filipino people and of the
people of the United States.' Six sessions were held, the last
occurring on January 29, six days before the outbreak of
hostilities. No substantial results were obtained, the
Filipino commissioners being either unable or unwilling to
give any definite statements of the 'intent, purposes, and
aims of their people.' At the close of the last session they
were given full assurances that no hostile act would be
inaugurated by the United States troops. The critical moment
had now arrived. Aguinaldo secretly ordered the Filipinos who
were friendly to him to seek refuge outside the city. The
Nebraska regiment at that time was in camp on the east line at
Santa Mesa, and was guarding its front. For days before the
memorable 4th of February, 1899, the outposts in front of the
regiment had been openly menaced and assaulted by insurgent
soldiers; they were attempting to push our outposts back and
advance their line. They made light of our sentinels and
persistently ignored their orders. On the evening of the 4th
of February, an insurgent officer came to the front with a
detail of men and attempted to pass the guard on the San Juan
Bridge, our guard being stationed at the west end of the
bridge. The Nebraska sentinel drove them back without firing,
but a few minutes before 9 o'clock that evening a large body
of insurgent troops made an advance on the South Dakota
outposts, which fell back rather than fire. About the same
time the insurgents came in force to the east end of the San
Juan Bridge, in front of the Nebraska regiment. For several
nights prior thereto a lieutenant in the insurgent army had
been coming regularly to our outpost No. 2, of the Nebraska
regiment, and attempting to force the outpost back and
insisting on posting his guard within the Nebraska lines; and
at this time and in the darkness he again appeared with a
detail of about six men and approached Private Grayson, of
Company D, First Nebraska Volunteers, the sentinel on duty at
outpost No. 2. He, after halting them three times without
effect, fired, killing the lieutenant, whose men returned the
fire and then retreated. Immediately rockets were sent up by
the Filipinos, and they commenced firing all along the line, …
and continued to fire until about midnight; and about 4
o'clock on the morning of February 5 the insurgents again
opened fire all around the city and kept it up until the
Americans charged them and drove them with great slaughter out
of their trenches."

_Philippine Commission, Preliminary Report
(Exhibit 1.—Report, January 31, 1900,
volume 1, pages 174-175)._

"They [the insurgents] were promptly repulsed in a series of
active engagements which extended through the night of the
4th, and the 5th, 6th, and 10th days of February. Our lines
were extended and established at a considerable distance from
the city in every direction. On the 22d of February a
concerted rising of the Tagalogs in the city of Manila, of
whom there are about 200,000, was attempted, under
instructions to massacre all the Americans and Europeans in
the city. This attempt was promptly suppressed and the city
was placed under strict control. The troops composing the
Eighth Army Corps under General Otis's command at that time
were of regulars 171 officers and 5,201 enlisted men and of
volunteers 667 officers and 14,831 enlisted men, making an
aggregate of 838 officers and 20,032 enlisted men. All of the
volunteers and 1,650 of the regulars were, or were about to
become entitled to their discharge, and their right was
perfected by the exchange of ratifications of the treaty on
the 11th of April. …

"The months of the most intense heat, followed by the very
severe rainy season of that climate, were immediately
approaching, and for any effective occupation of the country
it was necessary to await both the close of the rainy season
and the supply of new troops to take the place of those about
to be discharged. Practically all the volunteers who were then
in the Philippines consented to forego the just expectation of
an immediate return to their homes, and to remain in the field
until their places could be supplied by new troops. They
voluntarily subjected themselves to the dangers and casualties
of numerous engagements, and to the very great hardships of
the climate. They exhibited fortitude and courage, and are
entitled to high commendation for their patriotic spirit and
soldierly conduct. …

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