Chapter XCVII: Section 29 (17)

Notwithstanding the opposition of the Great Powers, the Greeks
were rashly bent upon war with the Turks, and, when balked in
Crete, began hostile demonstrations along the Turkish frontier
in their own peninsula. The events that followed have been
thus described by an eye-witness, who wrote immediately
afterwards: "When I arrived in Athens," says this writer,
"early last March [1897], although the Cretan insurrection was
being openly supported by Greek arms, war had not been
declared against Turkey. It was what I think was once
described in Parliament as 'a condition of war,' but not war.
… King George and his advisers rashly decided to attempt to
hasten matters in their own fashion. Agitation was begun
without and within the Turkish frontier, and the Ethuike
Hetairia manufactured alarms and disturbances in Macedonia and
Epirus. Attempts were made in other directions, but though
money and emissaries were sent, nothing came of it. Meanwhile
the mobilisation of the Greek army was begun, and later on
reserves were called out. Knowing a good deal about the
relative condition of preparedness for war of both Turkey and
Greece, I spoke without reserve on the subject to the King
and, later on, to the Princes. I told them nearly every
military intelligence department in Europe knew that Turkey
had been getting her troops ready for a year past to deal with
insurrection or invasion along the Macedonian frontier. Within
the Salonica military district she had nearly 100,000 men under
arms, all well trained and passably equipped. Besides infantry
she had nearly 10,000 cavalry, and within a month could place
a further force of 70,000 infantry in the field. Against these
the Greeks could not bring more than 60,000 regulars. There no
doubt might be mustered twice that number of men, but they
would be untrained irregulars and volunteers who would take a
month at least before they could be of much use, and Turkey
would have her bands of irregulars out also to offset their
value. It was notorious besides that the Greek army was
indifferently organised, that it had no transport, no
commissariat department, no medical department, and was
without anything like a sufficiency of trained officers. …

"Prepared or not, the Greeks clamoured for war, never doubting
latterly but that they would win. They protested that the
Hellenes were aroused and would fight and die, if need be, to
the last man. Greece would not waive an iota of her demands.
We were told that the Greeks scattered throughout the Turkish
Empire would spring to arms and paralyze the enemy's hands.
There were to be fearful outbreaks in Macedonia, Epirus, and
Albania, and tumults and burnings in all the chief cities
under Turkish rule where Greeks dwelt—Smyrna, Constantinople,
Salonica, and so on. I was informed that insurrectionary bands
were being got ready to invade Macedonia and Epirus, and I was
introduced to several of the leaders of these new expeditions.
… I saw many of these Greek filibusters at Kalabaka and other
places. By order from Athens the local commandants supplied
them with stores, transport, and trenching tools, and sent
guides to direct them, so that they should slip across into
Macedonia at the most suitable points for conducting their
operations. …

"The Greeks had a fairly long innings carrying on the war
within Turkish territory, whilst disingenuously disclaiming
responsibility for the acts of their own levies. Finally, in
April, the Sultan declared war and set his forces in motion.
Prior to that date the Greeks had moved up the whole of their
available strength close to the Thessalian frontier. The army
numbered nearer fifty than sixty thousand, of all ranks. …
Before war was declared the Crown Prince Constantine arrived
in Larissa, and took over the command of the Greek army in
Thessaly. … He had no military experience; and, as events
disclosed, was neither of a martial disposition nor of a firm
temperament. He showed subsequently that he felt keenly his
false position, and he tried to excuse the awful failures made
in the conduct of the campaign of panic and flight. …

"Independence Day having passed without a general invasion of
Macedonia by the Greeks, it is likely that the Turks had
thought the danger over, when suddenly firing began in a night
along the frontier from Nezeros to Ravenni. For a day or two the
Greeks carried all before them, capturing many block-houses
and taking a number of prisoners. They succeeded in
penetrating Turkish territory in some places for two or three
miles. … The Turks were in immediate danger of being
outflanked in one part of the field of operations, and
separated from their main force at Elassona. It was midday,
the 19th of April, when at a critical moment for the safety of
a portion of Edhem's forces an order arrived from the Crown
Prince to cease firing and retire the whole Greek army back
upon their own side of the frontier. … After an interval of
three hours, during which there was little or no firing, a
message arrived from headquarters that a blunder had been made
and the army was to readvance and engage the enemy. It was a
lost opportunity, for the Turks followed up the Greeks and
reoccupied the lines from which they had been driven. … The
cost of the blunder was a serious one to the Greeks, for in a
futile attempt, on the following day, to retake Gresovala,
General Mavromichali lost 2,000 men. …

"On the 21st of April, without any of the pictorial display or
reputed hand-to-hand fighting, some 40,000 Turks, not less,
accompanied by three cavalry regiments and half a score of
batteries, quietly streamed down the zigzag paved way in the
steep Melouna pass into Thessaly. They occupied the village of
Legaria and positions among the lowest foot hills at the
outlet of the pass. The Greeks were not able to embarrass them
as they deployed, although an attempt was made to find the
range with artillery. … For two days there was a fierce
artillery duel, interspersed occasionally with sharp rifle
fire as the infantry became engaged on the right and left of
the line. … All had ended in favour of the Greeks when the sun
set on the 22nd April, and the battle of Mati was over. … It
was the same night that the Crown Prince ordered the army to
retreat upon Larissa, twenty-five miles distant by road. About
8 P. M. the men were roused from their first sleep and
commanded to fall in. They did so very orderly and quietly,
thinking it was intended to deliver a surprise attack upon the
Turks.
{548}
The whole army was on the march, and had got five or six miles
from the battle-field, or close to Turnavos, when the
unaccountable mad panic seized them. Some say it originated
one way, some another. … The army broke into pieces and became
a furious rabble, which fled by road and fields south as hard
as most could run. Arms and ammunition and baggage were cast
aside wholesale. The Greek officers, as a rule, behaved worse
than the men, for they led the fleeing mob, and many of them
never stopped until they reached Pharsala or Vola. … The
whilom Greek army was a mob convinced that the Turkish cavalry
was upon their heels, though it never was near them. It gave
them the strength of despair, and so they covered afoot fifty
to sixty miles within twenty-four hours. The inhabitants of
Larissa and all the surrounding country, terrified at the
sudden calamity, were left by the military and civic
authorities, without hint or warning, to shift for themselves.
… The women and children of Larissa had to carry what they
wished to save upon their own backs. Thousands of these
helpless creatures, together with sick and wounded soldiers,
were left around the railway station, whilst officers rode off
upon the early or later special trains, to fly, as some of
them did, as far as Athens. The troops had gone hours before I
left Larissa, and even then there were no signs of the enemy
to be seen."

_Bennet Burleigh,
The Greek War, as I saw it
(Fortnightly Review, July, 1897)._

"Not until several hours after the departure of the last
Greek, did a few Turkish cavalrymen cautiously enter the town
[Larissa], some distance ahead of the Turkish army. … It was
the design of the Greeks to save Volo, a wealthy town, and the
haven of refuge of many of the peasants. Accordingly, a line
was formed from two miles beyond Pharsala to the pass which
was the doorway to Volo. About three miles from this pass was
the village of Velestino; and on the hills back of it were the
headquarters of Colonel Smollenske, commander of this, the
right wing of the Greek army. The Greek fleet, with decks
cleared for action, was in the Bay of Volo; having gone there
after the defeat of Mati, hoping that, in case the army
failed, its heavy guns would protect the town. After four
days, the Turks, having digested their victory with cigarettes
and coffee, were ready to renew fighting. Meanwhile, the Greeks
had put themselves in a sort of order. Evidently, the first
intention of the Turks was to force their way through
Smollenske's line and on to Volo. Accordingly, they attempted
to storm Smollenske's rifle-pits; but they were driven back
for the first time, and with the greatest loss that any such
movement had yet encountered in the campaign. … The Turks,
after a slight resistance, withdrew from the villages in front
of Velestino, which they had taken, and were soon moving over
to the left. Their plan of cutting the Greek line in two was
executed with energy. On the morning of May 7, Edhem Pasha
sent his fearless infantry, under heavy fire, up the hollows
between the mountain-ridges which ran at right angles to the
Turkish line across the plain. They intrepidly scaled the
ridges, and forced the Greeks from the position. Smollenske's
force was flanked and separated from the Crown Prince's force:
and he retreated in an orderly manner to Almyro. The Crown
Prince's force had been flanked on its left; at the same time
it was being flanked on its right by the force that had
flanked Smollenske. The Crown Prince, therefore, withdrew to
the heights of Domoko.

"So apparent was now the hopelessness of the Greek cause that
even the new ministry, which had been buoyed up into almost an
aggressive spirit by the 'victory' of Velestino, begged for
the intervention of the Powers. It was granted in the form of
a demand on the Sultan for an armistice. As there are six
Powers, each having a formal foreign office, this took some
time. The Sultan, as usual, was more deliberate than the six
tormentors, whom he in return tormented. Being truly Greek,
the Greek Cabinet seemed to believe that articles of peace
would be signed the moment the necessity of peace appealed to
the ministerial mind. … Two days after Pharsala, the Turkish
army appeared on the plain some ten miles from Domoko. There
it rested quietly for more than a week, leisurely celebrating
the important feast of Bairam. This confirmed the belief of
the Greek generals that the war was at an end. The morning of
May 17 found the Crown Prince's force more than ever convinced
of an armistice, and quite unprepared for an attack. At nine
o'clock the whole Turkish army began to advance upon the
astounded Greeks—most astounded of them all were the Crown
Prince and General Macris—in such a manner as to leave no
doubt as to its intention.

"The battle of Domoko which followed was the most sanguinary
of the campaign. … For three hours, that is, until
sundown,—the attack having begun at four o'clock,—the Greeks
steadily returned the hot fire of the Turks, who soon ceased
to advance, and doggedly hung on to the ground that they had
gained. … During this attack in front the Turks were making a
more important movement, strategically, on the right. … With
amazing intrepidity, during the hot action on the centre, the
Turks had fought their way over the mountains at the Greeks'
far right. Some reserves were sent around at sunset—but too
late. The Turkish left wing was already even with the town of
Domoko. Military experts maintain that the Crown Prince, by
readjusting his forces over night, could have given the
phlegmatic enemy a surprise in the morning, and held him in
check for several days. The retreat over the pass to Lamia
began at ten o'clock in the evening; and the next morning the
battalions covering the retreat were under heavy fire. The
Greeks' next stand was to be at Thermopylæ. Should the Turks
advance spiritedly, Smollenske's army would be cut off from
that of the Crown Prince, and forced to surrender. But the
Sultan, being somewhat appeased by more blood-letting, now
bowed before a letter from him whom the Greeks called 'a vile
enemy,'—the Czar,—who, for this act, saw his influence at
Constantinople supplanted by that of Germany, though the fear
of Russia was undiminished. At last the armistice came,—none
too soon for the demoralized army of Greece. The war had
lasted just thirty-one days."

_F. Palmer,
How the Greeks were defeated
(Forum, November, 1897)._

{549}

The preliminary treaty of peace, signed September 18, required
Greece to pay to Turkey a war indemnity of nearly eighteen
millions of dollars, arrangements for securing the payment of
which were to be controlled by an international commission
composed of one representative of each of the mediating
Powers. The same Powers were likewise to settle with Turkey a
rectification of the Greek frontier. Greece, in fact, was
helplessly in their hands.

TURKEY: A. D. 1897-1899.
Prolonged anarchy in Crete.
The inharmonious "Concert of Europe."
Final departure of Turkish troops and
officials from the island.
Organization of government under Prince George of Greece.

"The autonomous regime promised to this unfortunate island—the
Cuba of Europe—is still [at the end of 1897] apparently far
from realization. In the meantime a most distressing
condition; amounting to practical anarchy, prevails everywhere
except at some ports where the international gendarmerie
maintain a fair semblance of order. So completely have the
houses and property of the Mahometan population been destroyed
by the insurgents that the coming of winter has brought no
prospect to the former but one of desolation and famine.
Considerable pillaging of Christian houses by Mahometan
refugees was also reported from Candia, Kydonia, and other
points. In Candia the Turkish gendarmerie—recruited from the
worst class of Bashi-Bazouks—have proved worse than useless
for keeping order; they connive with the marauders and share
in the pillage. The British occupation is said to be only
nominal. …

"A strange satire upon the concert of Europe and the pretenses
of Western civilization was the circular letter addressed by
the Sultan to the powers, about mid-October, urging upon them
'in firm language' the necessity of promptness in restoring
tranquillity to the disordered island, and warning them of the
dangers of procrastination in this matter. … To accomplish the
pacification of Crete, the Sultan, in the letter referred to,
suggested that the entire population, Christian and Mahometan,
should be disarmed; that the disarmament should be carried out
by Ottoman troops; that the international troops should
co-operate in the work if the powers so desired; that the
entire force should be commanded by a European general in the
Turkish service; that an Ottoman garrison should be
permanently maintained; that the governor should be a
Christian and an Ottoman subject; and that a corps of
gendarmerie should be formed. … Toward the end of October it
was announced that the powers had finally chosen for the post
of governor-general of Crete Colonel Charles Schaeffer, a
native of the grand duchy of Luxemburg, and a man of extended
experience in the Turkish and Egyptian services, … related to
several of the principal houses of the aristocracy at St.
Petersburg, as well as to some of the most influential
personages in the entourage of the Sultan. … The Porte,
however, protested, with the support of Germany, against the
appointment of Colonel Schaeffer, who appears to have been
suspected of English sympathies. Russia, too, it was said,
objected, insisting that the appointee must be of the Orthodox
Greek faith. Thus, on the question of selecting a
governor-general for Crete, the concert of the powers broke
down as it did at other points during the long crisis. At the
end of November the name of Prince Francis Joseph of
Battenberg was prominently mentioned as a prospective
candidate of favor. The Cretan assembly proposed, unless a
suitable governor were speedily chosen by the powers, to offer
the post to a candidate of its own selection."

_Current History, 1897,
pages 865-866._

Months went on, while the Powers still discussed the Cretan
situation and no agreement was reached. In January, 1898, the
Turkish government appointed Edhem Pasha governor of Candia;
but, in the face of the admirals of the blockading squadrons,
who exercised an undefined authority, he seems to have had
practically little power. Presently, a new attempt was made to
select a Christian Governor-general. France and Russia
proposed Prince George of Greece, but Austria and Turkey
opposed. In April, Austria and Germany withdrew from the
blockade and from the "Concert," leaving Great Britain,
Russia, France and Italy to deal with Cretan affairs alone.
The admirals of these Powers, acting under instructions, then
divided the Cretan coast among themselves, each directing the
administration of such government as could be conducted in his
own part. The British admiral had Candia, the capital town,
and there trouble arose which brought the whole Cretan
business to a crisis. He attempted to take possession of the
customs house (September 6), and landed for that purpose a
small force of 60 men. They were attacked by a Turkish mob,
with which they fought desperately for four hours, losing 12
killed and some 40 wounded, before they could make their
retreat to the shore and regain their ship. At the same time a
general massacre of Christians in the town was begun and some
800 perished before it was stopped. Edhem Pasha, with about
4,000 Turkish troops at his command, was said to have waited
long for the mob to do its work before he interfered.

This outbreak brought the four Powers to a decisive agreement.
They joined in imperatively demanding the withdrawal of
Turkish troops and officials from the island, and enforced the
demand. Guarantees for the safety of the Mohammedan population in
life and property were given; it was conceded that the
Sultan's suzerainty over Crete should be maintained, and he
was allowed to hold one military post in the island for a sign
of the fact. On those terms the Turkish evacuation of Crete
was carried out in November, and Prince George of Greece was
appointed, not Governor-general, but High Commissioner of the
four Powers, to organize an autonomous government in the
island and administer it for a period of three years. The
appointment was accepted, and Prince George was received with
rejoicing in Crete on the 21st of December. The blockade had
been raised on the 5th, and on the 26th the admirals departed.

During the following two years (1899-1900) there seems to have
been a generally good condition of order restored and
preserved. A constitution was framed by a national assembly,
which conferred the executive authority on Prince George, as
High Commissioner, with responsible councillors, and created a
Chamber of Deputies, elected for the most part by the people,
but containing ten members appointed by the High Commissioner.
Equal rights for all religious beliefs was made a principle of
the constitution.

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (May-July).
Representation in the Peace Conference at The Hague.

See (in this volume)
PEACE CONFERENCE.

{550}

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (October).
Concessions to the Armenians.

In October an irade was published by the Sultan which withdrew
restrictions on the movements of Armenians in the provinces,
except in the case of suspects; granted pardon or commutation
of sentence to a number of Armenian prisoners; ordered payment
of sums due to Armenian government officials who had been
killed or expelled at the time of the massacres; directed
assistance to be given in the repairing and rebuilding of
churches, schools, and monasteries which had been injured or
destroyed, and also gave direction for the building of an
orphanage near Constantinople.

TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (November).
Railway to the Persian Gulf.

A German Bank Syndicate obtained from the Sultan, in November,
1899, a concession for the extension of the Anatolian Railway
from Konieh in Asia Minor, to Basra, or Bassorah, on the
Persian Gulf. The line, which will pass through Bagdad, and
along the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, is to be
completed within eight years from the date of the grant. "The
concession is regarded as a startling proof of German
influence in Constantinople, and a defeat both for Russian and
British diplomacy. It is certainly a defeat for the former,
and will greatly increase suspicion at St. Petersburg as to
the ultimate ends of Germany in Turkey; but we suspect that
Indian statesmen will perceive considerable compensations in
the arrangement. Not to mention that all railways which
approach India develop Indian trade, the railway may secure us
a strong ally in Asia. It is not of much use for Russia to be
running a line from the Caspian to Bushire if when she gets
there she finds Britain and Germany allied in the Persian
Gulf, and able by a railway through Gedrosia to Sind to throw
themselves right across her path."

_Spectator (London),
December 2, 1899._

"The opposition of the French company owning the
Smyrna-Kassaba road, which extends east as far as Afion
Karahissar, was removed by granting this company 40 per cent
of the shares in the extension, and the local objection was
obviated by a provision in the concession giving the Turkish
Government the right to purchase the line at any time. Few
railroad lines can be of greater prospective importance than
this 2,000 miles of railroad uniting the Persian Gulf with
Europe, forming a rapid transit to and from the East, opening
up large tracts of agricultural country, and paving the way
for German commercial supremacy in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.
It is not difficult to see how Germany, with preferential
rates for goods on German lines, will be able to control the
chief markets of Asia Minor and invade the East. … Germans
purchased the Constantinople-Ismid Railroad from an English
company and extended it to Angora. They also checkmated the
French and English by extending their line from Eski-Sher to
Konieh, thus preventing extension of both the Smyrna-Afion
Karahissar and the Smyrna-Aidin-Dinair roads. The two great
distributing points—Constantinople and Smyrna—are thus
controlled by Germans, and German goods may enter the interior
of Asia Minor and the great valley of the Tigris and Euphrates
on German-controlled roads at a decided advantage. Germans
have obtained the right to build docks and warehouses at Haida
Pasha, the terminus of the Anatolian railroads; and with
through rates for German goods on German lines, German freight
cars may be sent across the Bosphorus and travel to Mesopotamia
and the confines of India and Persia without change."

_United States Consular Reports,
April, 1900, page 497._

Professor Hilprecht has remarked, in the "Sunday School Times"
that "a new era for Babylonian archeology will begin when the
railroad from Koniah to Baghdad and Bassorah has been
constructed. It will then take about a week from London to the
ruins of Babylon, where, doubtless, a railway station (Hillah)
will be established. At present the traveler needs at the best
six weeks to cover this route. This railroad," says the
Professor, "has now become a certainty."

TURKEY: A. D. 1899-1901.
Impending outbreak in Macedonia.

The state of things in Macedonia, where the people have long
been on the brink of revolt against Turkish rule, excited to
it from Bulgaria and encouraged from Greece, but warned
otherwise by Russia and Austria, is thus described by the
"Economist," in an article quoted in "Littell's Living Age,"
March, 1899: "It is improbable, for reasons stated below, that
Macedonia will rise in insurrection this year [1899], but,
nevertheless, there is great danger in that quarter, which is
evidently disturbing both Vienna and St. Petersburg, and
exciting apprehensions in Constantinople. The Austrian and
Russian Foreign Offices are both issuing intimations that if a
revolt occurs Turkey will be allowed to put it down by Turkish
methods, and the Sultan is raising more troops, sending
Asiatic levies to Macedonia, and despatching some of his
ablest officers to control the hill districts. Severe warnings
have also been sent both to Belgrade and Sofia, and the Greeks
are warned that if their active party moves the Government of
Athens will not again be saved by Europe from the worst
consequences. All these symptoms imply that there is grave
fear, among those who watch Macedonia, that the patience of
her sorely oppressed people has given way, and that they have
resolved to risk everything rather than remain longer under
the rule of Pashas from whom no man's life and no woman's
honor is safe for twelve hours together. It is known,
moreover, that the course of events in Crete and the
appearance of the Tsar's Rescript have greatly stirred the
population. The former is held by them to show that if a
Christian population in Turkey will risk massacre, Europe will
not allow them to be exterminated, while the latter has made
submission more difficult by putting an end to hope for the
next five years. …

"Turkish subjects must be driven to despair before they will
rise against the Turks, and if they can even hope to be left
alone, the Macedonians will wait, rather than encounter so
dreadful a risk. They have, it is true, the example of the
Cretans to encourage them, but their country is not an island,
and they have the fate both of the Armenians and the
Thessalians to warn them that on the mainland the Turks cannot
be resisted by half-drilled forces.

"It seems almost a truism to say that Europe is foolish to
allow such a source of danger as Macedonia presents to
continue without a cure; but there is something to be said on
the other side. The Powers sincerely desire peace, and the
Macedonian magazine cannot be flooded without a war, if it be
only a war between Russia and the Sultan.
{551}
Nobody knows to what such a war would lead, or in what
condition Eastern Europe might emerge from it. Moreover,
however much the Macedonians may excite the sympathies of
philanthropists, they have done a good deal to alienate those
of politicians. They decline to be either Austrian or Russian.
They asked for years to be aided by Greece, and when Greece
declared war on Turkey they refused to rise behind Edhem
Pasha, whom they could have cut away from his supports. They
now ask aid from Bulgaria, but they are most unwilling to
submit to Sofia, and so make of Bulgaria a fairly strong
State. They wish, they say, to make of Macedonia a
Principality, but if it were so made the Slavo-Macedonians
would begin fighting the Græco-Macedonians, until both had
been nearly ruined. They must join one party or the other if
they wish to be free, and stick to the one they join, and
fight for it with a coherence which they have never yet
displayed."

On the 7th of January, 1901, a correspondent of the "London
Times" wrote on the same subject from Vienna, as follows:

"The situation in Macedonia, as described in trustworthy
accounts coming from different directions, testifies to the
increasing danger of trouble. Things have gone so far that an
outbreak may occur this year. In diplomatic circles it is
considered impossible that in any case it can be delayed for
longer than a twelvemonth. In Constantinople, Athens, and all
the capitals of the Balkan States the eventuality of a
Macedonian rising has been expected for several years past,
and in more than one instance preparations have been made
accordingly. To what extent the Macedonia committees have
received official patronage in Bulgaria is now of secondary
interest. The mischief has been done, and the agitation in
Macedonia is at present beyond the control of the Bulgarian
authorities, even if they wished to keep it in check, which is
not certain. All that can be said with confidence is that last
summer Austria and Russia made a vigorous and successful effort
to put an end to the almost open encouragement extended to the
Macedonian committees at Sofia, which was within an ace of
involving the Principality in a war with Rumania. The
Austro-Russian 'entente' [an understanding or agreement
between Russia and Austria, in 1897, to act together in
keeping peace in the Balkan peninsula] has, in fact, done
excellent service wherever diplomatic pressure can be brought
to bear. But, unfortunately, that does not include Macedonia.
If the revolutionary element in that province of the Ottoman
Empire sets at defiance the imposing Turkish forces
concentrated on the spot, it is not likely that it will be
influenced by what is probably regarded as the remote
contingency of the direct armed intervention of Austria and
Russia. All the warnings and scoldings in the world will not
suffice to preserve peace in Macedonia.

"It is difficult to say what foundation there may be for the
statement that the Sultan himself seeks to take advantage of
the disturbed condition of Macedonia for purposes of his own.
It is alleged that he wishes to prevent any change in the
existing regime in Crete by exciting the apprehension in
Athens and elsewhere that an attempt to modify the status quo
in that island would cause a massacre of the Hellenic
population in Macedonia. This view of the case finds
expression in the following extracts from a letter addressed
to the 'Roumanie,' one of the leading organs of
Bukharest:—'The thoroughly bad policy pursued by the Sublime
Porte in Macedonia, which consists in allowing that unhappy
province to remain a prey to Bulgarian agitators so as in case
of need to terrify diplomacy by the spectre of a revolution,
has contributed to open the eyes of the Powers. On the other
hand, the irresistible attraction exercised by the Kingdom of
Greece, not only on the Cretans themselves, but also on all
the rayahs of the Ottoman Empire, is an indisputable fact.'"

See, also (in this volume),
BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES.

TURKEY: A. D. 1900.
The Zionist movement of the Jews to colonize Palestine.

See (in this volume)
JEWS: A. D. 1897-1901.

TURKEY: A. D. 1901.
The Cretan question.

The provisional arrangement of government for Crete,
administered by Prince George, of Greece, as High Commissioner
for the Powers, expires by limitation in December, 1901. What
shall then be done with the island is a question that was
referred, by the several Powers of the Concert, in the early
part of the year, to their ambassadors at Rome, in conference
with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
administration of Prince George appears to have been quite
remarkably satisfactory to all concerned, and its continuation
was evidently desired, as much by the Cretans as by the
protecting Powers; but the former sought to have it placed on
a basis of permanency, in some form that would be practically
tantamount to the long craved annexation to Greece. Prince
George naturally looks in the same direction, and he is said
to have made it known that he would decline to hold his post
provisionally beyond the term of three years for which he
accepted it in 1898. The ambassadorial conference at Rome
decided, however, that the time has not come for a permanent
settlement of the Cretan question, and that the provisional
arrangement for its government must be renewed. A Press
despatch from Athens, on the 22d of March, 1901, announced the
decision and indicated the circumstances of the situation, as
follows:

"The Cretan Assembly meets at the end of next month, and its
probable attitude towards the question of union with Greece is
already the subject of speculation here. The decision of the
conference of Ambassadors at Rome is embodied in a memorandum
which has been handed to Prince George by the Consuls at
Canea, while a copy of the document has been unofficially
presented to King George 'à titre d'information.' The
Ambassadors express their opinion that any manifestation on
the part of the Cretans in favour of union with Greece would
be inopportune at the present moment, and they propose a
prolongation of the present provisional system of government
without assigning any definite term to the High Commissioner's
mandate.

"Whether Prince George, who is an enthusiastic advocate of
union with Greece, will accept the new arrangement
unconditionally remains to be seen. Meanwhile the islanders
are occupied with preparations for the elections.

{552}

"It appears that at a recent sitting of the Prince's Council
one of the most prominent of Cretan politicians advocated the
institution of an autonomous Principality on the lines already
laid down by the existing Constitution. The proposal provoked
a violent outburst on the part of the Athenian Press, which
denounces its author as a traitor to the cause of Hellenism.
The opinion apparently prevails here that the establishment of
a Principality would finally preclude the union of the island
with Greece."

TURKEY: A. D. 1901.
Order regulating the visit of Jews to Palestine.

See (in this volume)
JEWS: A. D. 1901.

----------TURKEY: End--------

TWAIN, Mark:
Description of scenes in the Austrian Reichsrath.

See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).

U.

UCHALI, Treaty of.

See (in this volume)
ITALY: A. D. 1895-1896.

UGANDA: A. D. 1894.
Creation of the Protectorate.

See (in this volume)
BRITISH EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE: A. D. 1895-1897.

UGANDA: A. D. 1897-1898.
Native insurrection and mutiny of Sudanese troops.

A train of serious troubles in the Uganda Protectorate began
in May, 1897, with an insurrection of some of the chiefs,
instigated by the king, Mwanga, who was restive under British
control. The revolt was suppressed after some sharp fighting,
especially at Kiango, on the 24th of July, and King Mwanga
escaped into German territory. In August he was formally
deposed by a council of chiefs, and his infant son, Chua, was
elected king in his place, under a regency of three of the
chiefs. But a more serious trouble followed, from the mutiny
of a part of the Sudanese troops which had been serving in
Uganda. These troops were being sent to join an expedition,
under Major Macdonald, for the exploration of the districts
adjacent to the Italian sphere of influence, and were not
permitted to take their women with them. This seems to have
been their chief grievance. They also complained of being
overworked, underpaid, insufficiently fed, and commanded by
young officers who would not listen to their complaints. They
seized Fort Lubas, on the frontier between Uganda and Usoga,
made prisoners of several of their officers, whom they finally
murdered, and held the fort against repeated attacks until early
in January, 1898, when they made their escape. They were
pursued and attacked (February 24) at Kabagambe, on Lake
Kioja, where they had built a fort. Many were killed, the
remainder much scattered. A considerable party got away to the
eastern side of the Nile and continued to give trouble there
throughout the year.

Meantime, the deposed king, Mwanga, had escaped from the
Germans and effected a new rising among his late subjects; and
another deposed king, Kabarega, of Unyoro, had also
reappeared, to make trouble in that region. After the
suppression of the Sudanese mutiny these risings were
overcome, with the help of some 1,100 troops brought from
India for the emergency. In March, there was news of
Kabarega's death, and the British Acting Commissioner and
Consul General issued the following proclamation:

"Whereas Kabarega, the deposed King of Unyoro, is reported to
have deceased, and whereas the present disordered state of
affairs in that country has proved that, for the maintenance
of good government and good-will, it is expedient to provide
for the succession to the kingdom of a member of the Royal
House, it is hereby publicly proclaimed that Karukala, son of
Kabarega, is now appointed King of Unyoro, under the
protection of Her Britannic Majesty. The Kingdom of Unyoro
comprises the provinces of—Busindi, Shifalu, Magungu, Kibero,
Bugoma, Bugahiaobeire. This appointment is in accordance with
the general conditions by which countries in British African
Protectorates are guided and regulated, and it secures to the
Kingdom of Unyoro all the advantages which accrue from its
being an integral part of such a Protectorate. The local
government of the country will be administered, under the
guidance of Her Majesty's Representative, by a Council of
Regency of either two or three Chiefs, to be appointed by Her
Majesty's Commissioner. This Council of Regency will, subject
to the approval of Her Majesty's Commissioner, select and
appoint the Katikiro and the other Chiefs of the first rank
required in accordance with local custom. These Chiefs, on
their appointment being confirmed, will select and appoint in
full Council the lesser grade Chiefs, until the system of
local administration is complete."

Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications
(Papers by Command: Africa, Number 7, 1898, page 42).

UGANDA RAILWAY, The.

On the 30th of April, 1900, the British Parliament voted
£1,930,000 for the completion of the railway under
construction from Mombasa, on the Indian Ocean, to Lake
Victoria-Nyanza, officially known as the Mombasa-Victoria
Railway. Previous expenditure had been about £3,000,000. On
the 30th of October it was reported that rails were laid down
to the 452d mile from Mombasa, and that advance gangs were
working about 40 miles beyond that point.

UITLANDERS.

See (in this volume)
SOUTH AFRICA (THE TRANSVAAL): A. D. 1885-1890, and after.

UNGAVA, The district of.

See (in this volume)
CANADA: A. D. 1895.

UNITED CHRISTIAN PARTY.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).

UNITED IRISH LEAGUE, The.

See (in this volume)
IRELAND: A. D. 1900-1901.

UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL.

See (in this volume)
BRAZIL.

{553}

----------UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Start--------

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1868-1885.
Cuban questions in controversy with Spain.

See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1868-1885.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1894.
Legislation to promote the reclamation of arid lands.

The following measure of legislation to promote the
reclamation of arid lands was carried through Congress as an
amendment to the appropriation bill for Sundry Civil
Expenditures, and became law August 18, 1894:

"Section 4.
That to aid the public land States in the reclamation of the
desert lands therein, and the settlement, cultivation, and
sale thereof in small tracts to actual settlers, the Secretary
of the Interior with the approval of the President, be, and
hereby is, authorized and empowered, upon proper application
of the State to contract and agree, from time to time, with
each of the States in which there may be situated desert lands
as defined by the Act entitled 'An Act to provide for the sale
of desert land in certain States and Territories,' approved
March 3d, 1877, and the Act amendatory thereof, approved March
3d, 1891, binding the United States to donate, grant and
patent to the State free of cost for surveyor price such
desert lands, not exceeding one million acres in each State,
as the State may cause to be irrigated, reclaimed, occupied,
and not less than twenty acres of each one hundred and
sixty-acre tract cultivated by actual settlers, within ten
years next after the passage of this Act, as thoroughly as is
required of citizens who may enter under the said desert land
law.

"Before the application of any State is allowed or any
contract or agreement is executed or any segregation of any of
the land from the public domain is ordered by the Secretary of
the Interior, the State shall file a map of the said land
proposed to be irrigated which shall exhibit a plan showing
the mode of the contemplated irrigation and which plan shall
be sufficient to thoroughly irrigate and reclaim said land and
prepare it to raise ordinary agricultural crops and shall also
show the source of the water to be used for irrigation and
reclamation, and the Secretary of the Interior may make
necessary regulations for the reservation of the lands applied
for by the States to date from the date of the filing of the map
and plan of irrigation, but such reservation shall be of no
force whatever if such map and plan of irrigation shall not be
approved. That any State contracting under this section is
hereby authorized to make all necessary contracts to cause the
said lands to be reclaimed, and to induce their settlement and
cultivation in accordance with and subject to the provisions
of this section; but the State shall not be authorized to
lease any of said lands or to use or dispose of the same in
any way whatever, except to secure their reclamation,
cultivation and settlement.

"As fast as any State may furnish satisfactory proof according
to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Interior, that any of said lands are
irrigated, reclaimed and occupied by actual settlers, patents
shall be issued to the State or its assigns for said land so
reclaimed and settled: Provided, That said States shall not
sell or dispose of more than one hundred and sixty acres of
said land to any one person, and any surplus of money derived
by any State from the sale of said lands in excess of the cost
of their reclamation, shall be held as a trust fund for and be
applied to the reclamation of other desert lands in such
State. That to enable the Secretary of the Interior to examine
any of the lands that may be selected under the provisions of
this section, there is hereby appropriated out of any moneys
in the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, one thousand
dollars."

_Acts, 53d Congress, 2d Session, chapter 301._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895.
Re-survey of Mexican boundary.

See (in this volume)
MEXICO: A. D. 1892-1895.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (January-February).
The monetary situation.
Contract for replenishing the gold reserve in the Treasury.

The alarming situation of the Treasury of the United States at
the beginning of the year 1895 was clearly described by the
President in his special Message to Congress, January 28.

_See in volume 5, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895)._

By the operation of what had been aptly called "the endless
chain" of the greenback currency issues of the government
(paid out with one hand, to be redeemed with the other in
gold, which the declining value of silver brought more and
more into demand) the gold reserve in the Treasury was fast
being exhausted, and the hour was approaching when, without
some effective relief, the obligations of the nation would
have to be paid in depreciated silver coin, and its credit
lost. The appeal of the President to Congress had no effect.
The Senate was controlled by a majority of men who desired
precisely the result which he wished to avert. The state of
things in that body was described by Senator Sherman, of the
Committee on Finance, in the following words:

"The Committee on Finance is utterly helpless to deal with
this vast question. We are quite divided upon it. We are not
allowed to propose a measure to this Senate which all can
approve of, unless there is attached to it a provision for
free coinage of silver."

The attitude of the House was different, but almost equally
hostile to the President's views. Its Republican majority was
not favorable to the aims of the free silver parties, but held
that the relief needed for the Treasury was to be sought in a
return to higher import duties, as a means of obtaining
increased revenue. Hence, a bill to carry out the
recommendations of the President was rejected in the House, on
the 7th of February, by a vote of 162 against 135.

On the following day, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr.
Carlisle, exercising authority which he possessed to sell
certain four per cent. thirty year bonds, contracted with
August Belmont &; Co., who represented the Rothschilds of
London, and with the house of J. P. Morgan & Co., of New York,
on behalf of J. S. Morgan & Co., London, and themselves, for
supplying 3,500,000 ounces of standard gold coin of the United
States, at the rate of 817.80441 per ounce, in exchange for
such bonds. It was a condition of the contract that one half
of the coin supplied should be brought from Europe: also that
the contracting syndicate should use its influence to protect
the Treasury against withdrawals of gold.
{554}
At the same time, the Secretary of the Treasury reserved the
right to substitute three per cent. gold bonds, if Congress
would authorize such an issue, to be taken by the syndicate at
par, in place of the four per cents to which his existing
authority was restricted. It was shown that the consequent
saving in interest would be $539,000 per annum, amounting to
$16,174,770 in thirty years; but the proposal was rejected in
the House of Representatives by 167 votes against 120. The
contract was accordingly carried out in its original form,
with success so far that the withdrawals of gold from the
Treasury dropped for a considerable period to a low point. It
appeared that when this emergency break was put upon the
working of the "endless chain," the sub-treasury in New York
was believed to be within twenty-four hours of a suspension of
gold payments. But the contract was loudly condemned.
nevertheless, by the opponents of the administration.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (February).
Renewed insurrection in Cuba.

_See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1895._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (April-May).
Decision of the Supreme Court against the constitutionality
of the Income Tax.

Cases testing the constitutionality of the income tax which
Congress had attached to the Tariff Act of 1894, were brought
to a partial decision in the Supreme Court in April, and
finally in May, 1895.

See, in volume 4 of original edition,
or in volume 5 of revised edition,
TARIFF LEGISLATION, UNITED STATES: A. D. 1894.

[Transcriber's note: For this set see, Volume 4,
"TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1894."]

The cases in question were "Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Company," and "Hyde v. Continental Trust Company." On
the first hearing, the illness and absence of one of the
justices, Mr. Jackson, of Tennessee, left but eight members
in attendance, and they divided equally on several points
which were vital to the decision of the question of
constitutionality in the tax. The appellants accordingly
filed a petition for a re-hearing, submitting, among other
reasons, the following: "The question involved in these cases
was as to the constitutionality of the provisions of the
tariff act of August 15, 1894 (sections 27 to 37), purporting
to impose a tax on incomes. The Court has held that the same
are unconstitutional, so far as they purport to impose a tax
upon the rent or income of real estate and income derived
from municipal bonds. It has, however, announced that it was
equally divided in opinion as to the following questions, and
has expressed no opinion in regard to them: (1) Whether the
void provisions invalidate the whole act. (2) Whether, as to
the income from personal property as such, the act is
unconstitutional as laying direct taxes. (3) Whether any part
of the tax, if not considered as a direct tax, is invalid for
want of uniformity.

"The court has reversed the decree of the Circuit Court and
remanded the case, with directions to enter a decree in favor
of complainant in respect only of the voluntary payment of the
tax on the rents and income of defendant's real estate and
that which it holds in trust, and on the income from the
municipal bonds owned or so held by it. While, therefore, the
two points above stated have been decided, there has been no
decision of the remaining questions regarding the
constitutionality of the act, and no judgment has been
announced authoritatively establishing any principle for
interpretation of the statute in those respects."

The re-hearing asked for was granted by the Court on the 6th
of May, when Justice Jackson was able to take his seat on the
bench, after which, on the 20th of May, by the opinion of five
members of the Court against four, the law was pronounced null,
so far as concerned the imposition of a tax on incomes. The
opinion of the majority was delivered by Chief Justice Fuller,
who said, in part:

"The Constitution divided Federal taxation into two great
classes, the class of direct taxes, and the class of duties,
imposts and excises; and prescribed two rules which qualified
the grant of power as to each class. The power to lay direct
taxes apportioned among the several States in proportion to
their representation in the popular branch of Congress, a
representation based on population as ascertained by the
census, was plenary and absolute; but to lay direct taxes
without apportionment was forbidden. The power to lay duties,
imposts, and excises was subject to the qualification that the
imposition must be uniform throughout the United States.

"Our previous decision was confined to the consideration of
the validity of the tax on the income from real estate and on
the income from municipal bonds. … We are now permitted to
broaden the field of inquiry, and to determine to which of the
two great classes a tax upon a person's entire income, whether
derived from rents, or products, or otherwise, of real estate,
or from bonds, stocks, or other forms of personal property,
belongs; and we are unable to conclude that the enforced
subtraction from the yield of all the owner's real or personal
property, in the manner prescribed, is so different from a tax
upon the property itself, that it is not a direct, but an
indirect tax in the meaning of the Constitution.

"The words of the Constitution are to be taken in their
obvious sense, and to have a reasonable construction. In
Gibbons v. Ogden, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, with his usual
felicity, said: 'As men, whose intentions require no
concealment, generally employ the words which most directly
and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the
enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the
people who adopted it must be understood to have employed
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they
have said.' 9 Wheat. 1, 188. And in Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, where the question was whether a controversy
between two States over the boundary between them was within
the grant of judicial power, Mr. Justice Baldwin, speaking for
the Court, observed: 'The solution of this question must
necessarily depend on the words of the Constitution; the
meaning and intention of the convention which framed and
proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions
of the people of and in the several States; together with a
reference to such sources of judicial information as are
resorted to by all courts in construing statutes, and to which
this court has always resorted in construing the
Constitution.' 12 Pet. 657, 721. We know of no reason for
holding otherwise than that the words 'direct taxes,' on the
one hand, and 'duties, imposts and excises,' on the other,
were used in the Constitution in their natural and obvious
sense. Nor in arriving at what those terms embrace do we
perceive any ground for enlarging them beyond or narrowing
them within their natural and obvious import at the time the
Constitution was framed and ratified.

{555}

"And passing from the text, we regard the conclusion reached
as inevitable, when the circumstances which surrounded the
convention and controlled its action and the views of those
who framed and those who adopted the Constitution are
considered. … In the light of the struggle in the convention
as to whether or not the new Nation should be empowered to
levy taxes directly on the individual until after the States
had failed to respond to requisitions—a struggle which did not
terminate until the amendment to that effect, proposed by
Massachusetts and concurred in by South Carolina, New
Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island, had been rejected—it
would seem beyond reasonable question that direct taxation,
taking the place as it did of requisitions, was purposely
restrained to apportionment according to representation, in
order that the former system as to ratio might be retained
while the mode of collection was changed. This is forcibly
illustrated by a letter of Mr. Madison of January 29, 1789,
recently published, written after the ratification of the
Constitution, but before the organization of the government
and the submission of the proposed amendment to Congress,
which, while opposing the amendment as calculated to impair
the power only to be exercised in extraordinary emergencies,
assigns adequate ground for its rejection as substantially
unnecessary, since, he says, 'every State which chooses to
collect its own quota may always prevent a Federal collection,
by keeping a little beforehand in its finances and making its
payment at once into the Federal treasury.'