Chapter CVI: Section 29 (26)

"The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined
advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his
brigade rapidly through Malate and over the bridges to occupy
Binondo and San Miguel, as contemplated in his instructions.
In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing
simultaneously on the Pasay road, encountered a very sharp
fire, coming from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his
front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing
to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the
roads and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With
much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the
brigade commander and the troops engaged these difficulties
were overcome with a minimum loss, and MacArthur advanced and
held the bridges and the town of Malate, as was contemplated
in his instructions.

"The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the
walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into
Malate a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon
Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Whittier, United States Volunteers,
of my staff, and Lieutenant Brumby, United States Navy,
representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate
with the Captain-General. I soon personally followed these
officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the
Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the
Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of
capitulation was signed by the Captain-General and myself.
This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal
terms of capitulation, as arranged by the officers
representing the two forces, a copy of which is hereto
appended and marked.
{620}
Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea
front were hauled down and the American flag displayed and
saluted by the guns of the navy. The Second Oregon Regiment,
which had proceeded by sea from Cavite, was disembarked and
entered the walled town as a provost guard, and the colonel
was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in
places of security. The town was filled with the troops of the
enemy driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed and
standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming
proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred.

"In leaving the subject of the operations of the 13th, I
desire here to record my appreciation of the admirable manner
in which the orders for attack and the plan for occupation of
the city were carried out by the troops exactly as
contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under fire a
town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all
principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the
insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an
army of Spaniards more than equal in numbers to the American
troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all
rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete
possession of a city of 300,000 people, filled with natives
hostile to the European interests, and stirred up by the
knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside
trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate,
resolute American soldier, well and skillfully handled by his
regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish. …

"The amount of public funds and the numbers of the prisoners
of war and small arms taken have been reported in detail by
cable. It will be observed that the trophies of Manila were
nearly $900,000, 13,000 prisoners, and 22,000 arms.
Immediately after the surrender my headquarters were
established in the ayuntamiento, or city office of the
Governor-General, where steps were at once inaugurated to set
up the government of military occupancy. … On the 16th a
cablegram containing the text of the President's proclamation
directing a cessation of hostilities was received by me, and
at the same time an order to make the fact known to the
Spanish authorities, which was done at once. This resulted in
a formal protest from the Governor-General in regard to the
transfer of public funds then taking place, on the ground that
the proclamation was dated prior to the surrender. To this I
replied that the status quo in which we were left with the
cessation of hostilities was that existing at the time of the
receipt by me of the official notice, and that I must insist
upon the delivery of the funds. The delivery was made under
protest.

"After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of
my office as military governor, I had direct written
communication with General Aguinaldo on several occasions. He
recognized my authority as military governor of the town of
Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to
withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at
the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters
in this connection had not been settled at the date of my
departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank
and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted
to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for
trouble with them owing to that fact, but, notwithstanding
many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the
leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they
are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to
antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only
chance of future political improvement.

"On the 28th instant I received a cablegram directing me to
transfer my command to Major-General Otis, United States
Volunteers, and to proceed to Paris, France, for conference
with the peace commissioners. I embarked on the steamer
'China' on the 30th in obedience to these instructions."

_Report of General Wesley Merritt
(Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, pages 39-45)._

"Aguinaldo … retired to Malalos, about 25 miles to the
northward, leaving his troops entrenched round Manila, and
there with considerable pomp and ceremony on September 29th,
1898, he was declared First President of the Philippine
Republic, and the National Congress was opened with Pedro
Paterno as President of that assembly."

_G. J. Younghusband,
The Philippines and Round About,
page 27._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-December).
War with Spain.
Suspension of hostilities.
Negotiation of Treaty of Peace.
Instructions to American Commissioners.
Relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and cession
of Porto Rico, the island of Guam and the Philippine Islands
to the United States.

In his message to Congress, December 5, 1898, President
McKinley gave the following account of his reception of
overtures from Spain, for the termination of the war, and of
the negotiations which resulted in a treaty of peace:

"The annihilation of Admiral Cervera's fleet, followed by the
capitulation of Santiago, having brought to the Spanish
Government a realizing sense of the hopelessness of continuing
a struggle now become wholly unequal, it made overtures of
peace through the French Ambassador, who, with the assent of
his Government, had acted as the friendly representative of
Spanish interests during the war. On the 26th of July M.
Cambon presented a communication signed by the Duke of
Almodovar, the Spanish Minister of State, inviting the United
States to state the terms upon which it would be willing to
make peace. On the 30th of July, by a communication addressed
to the Duke of Almodovar and handed to M. Cambon, the terms of
this Government were announced, substantially as in the
protocol afterwards signed. On the 10th of August the Spanish
reply, dated August 7th, was handed by M. Cambon to the
Secretary of State. It accepted unconditionally the terms
imposed as to Cuba, Porto Rico and an island of the Ladrone
group, but appeared to seek to introduce inadmissible
reservations in regard to our demand as to the Philippine
Islands. Conceiving that discussion on this point could
neither be practical nor profitable, I directed that, in order
to avoid misunderstanding, the matter should be forthwith
closed by proposing the embodiment in a formal protocol of the
terms upon which the negotiations for peace were to be
undertaken.
{621}
The vague and inexplicit suggestion of the Spanish note could
not be accepted, the only reply being to present as a virtual
ultimatum a draft of protocol embodying the precise terms
tendered to Spain in our note of July 30th, with added
stipulations of detail as to the appointment of commissioners
to arrange for the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles. On
August 12th M. Cambon announced his receipt of full powers to
sign the protocol submitted. Accordingly, on the afternoon of
August 12th M. Cambon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain, and
the Secretary of State, as the plenipotentiary of the United
States, signed a protocol providing:

Article I—
Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title
to Cuba.

Article II-
Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico
and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by
the United States.

Article III-
The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and
harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace,
which shall determine the control, disposition and government
of the Philippines.

The fourth article provided for the appointment of joint
commissions on the part of the United States and Spain, to
meet in Havana and San Juan, respectively, for the purpose of
arranging and carrying out the details of the stipulated
evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in
the West Indies.

The fifth article provided for the appointment of not more
than five commissioners on each side, to meet at Paris not
later than October 1st, and proceed to the negotiation and
conclusion of a treaty of peace, subject to ratification
according to the respective constitutional forms of the two
countries.

The sixth and last article provided that upon the signature of
the protocol hostilities between the two countries should be
suspended and that notice to that effect should be given as
soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its
military and naval forces. Immediately upon the conclusion of
the protocol I issued a proclamation of August 12th,
suspending hostilities on the part of the United States. The
necessary orders to that end were at once given by telegraph.
The blockade of the ports of Cuba and San Juan de Porto Rico
was in like manner raised. On the 18th of August the
muster-out of 100,000 Volunteers, or as near that number as
was found to be practicable, was ordered. On the 1st of
December 101,165 officers and men had been mustered out and
discharged from the service and 9,002 more will be mustered
out by the 10th of this month. Also a corresponding number of
general staff officers have been honorably discharged from the
service. The military commissions to superintend the
evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the adjacent islands were
forthwith appointed: For Cuba, Major-General James F. Wade,
Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, Major-General Matthew C.
Butler. For Porto Rico, Major-General John R. Brooke,
Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley and Brigadier-General William
W. Gordon, who soon afterwards met the Spanish commissioners
at Havana and San Juan respectively. … Pursuant to the fifth
article of the protocol, I appointed William H. Day, late
Secretary of State; Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye and
George Gray, Senators of the United States, and Whitelaw Reid,
to be the peace commissioners on the part of the United
States. Proceeding in due season to Paris they there met on
the first of October five commissioners, similarly appointed
on the part of Spain."

_Message of the President to Congress,
December 5, 1898._

The instructions given (September 16) by President McKinley to
the commissioners appointed to treat for peace with Spain, and
the correspondence between the commissioners at Paris and the
President and the Secretary of State at Washington during the
progress of the negotiations, were communicated confidentially
to the United States Senate on the 30th of January, 1899, but
not published until February, 1901, when the injunction of
secrecy was removed and the printing of the papers ordered by
vote of the Senate. The chief interest of these papers lies in
their disclosure of what passed between the American executive
and the peace commissioners on the subject of the Philippine
Islands which led to the demand for their entire surrender by
Spain.

In his instructions of September 16th to the commissioners, on
their departure for the meeting with Spanish commissioners at
Paris, the President wrote on this subject: "By article 6 of
the protocol it was agreed that hostilities between the two
countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect
should be given as soon as possible by each Government to the
Commanders of its military and naval forces. Such notice was
given by the Government of the United States immediately after
the signature of the protocol, the forms of the necessary
orders having previously been prepared. But before notice
could reach the commanders of the military and naval forces of
the United States in the Philippines they captured and took
possession by conquest of the city of Manila and its suburbs,
which are therefore held by the United States by conquest as
well as by virtue of the protocol. In view of what has taken
place it is necessary now to determine what shall be our
future relations to the Philippines. …

"Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to
lasting results and to the achievement of the common good
under the demands of civilization rather than to ambitious
designs. The terms of the protocol were framed upon this
consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by
Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that
requirement we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged.
It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but
simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say
that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent
peace on and near our own territory that the Spanish flag
should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events
and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and
the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere. The
Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less
true, however, that, without any original thought of complete
or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our
arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we can not
disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human
action. A vowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated
all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we can
not be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part
the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which
we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose
growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has
plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.

{622}

"Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial
opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be
indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the
enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in
the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open
door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to
others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and
inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on
large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial
basis and upon broad and equal privileges. It is believed that
in the practical application of these guiding principles the
present interests of our country and the proper measure of its
duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its
exemption from unknown perils will be found in full accord
with the just, moral, and humane purpose which was invoked as
our justification in accepting the war.

"In view of what has been stated, the United States can not
accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of
the island of Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the United
States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and
merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States into
such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United
States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and
merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and
rates of trade and commerce, together with other rights of
protection and trade accorded to citizens of one country
within the territory of another. You are therefore instructed
to demand such concession, agreeing on your part that Spain
shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in
the ports of any territory in the Philippines ceded to the
United States."

On the 7th of October, Mr. Day, on behalf of the American
commissioners, cabled a long communication from Paris to Mr.
Hay, his successor in the United States Department of State,
summarizing testimony given before the Commission by General
Merritt, lately commanding in the Philippines, and statements
brought by General Merritt from Admiral Dewey, General Greene,
and others. In part, the telegram was as follows:

"General Anderson, in correspondence with Aguinaldo in June
and July, seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and
native authorities, but subsequently changed his tone. General
Merritt reports that Admiral Dewey did not approve this
correspondence and advised against it. Merritt and Dewey both
kept clear of any compromising communications. Merritt
expresses opinion we are in no way committed to any insurgent
programme. Answering questions of Judge Day, General Merritt
said insurrection practically confined to Luzon. Tribal and
religious differences between the inhabitants of various
islands. United States has helped rather than injured
insurrection. Under no obligation other than moral to help
natives. Natives of Luzon would not accept Spanish rule, even
with amnesty. Insurgents would be victorious unless Spaniards
did better in future than in past. Insurgents would fight
among themselves if they had no common enemy. Think it
feasible for United States to take Luzon and perhaps some
adjacent islands and hold them as England does her colonies.
Natives could not resist 5,000 troops. … General Merritt
thinks that if United States attempted to take possession of
Luzon, or all the group as a colony, Aguinaldo and his
immediate followers would resist it, but his forces are
divided and his opposition would not amount to anything. If
the islands were divided, filibustering expeditions might go
from one island to another, thus exposing us to constant
danger of conflict with Spain. In answer to questions of
Senator Frye, Merritt said insurgents would murder Spaniards
and priests in Luzon and destroy their property if the United
States withdrew. United States under moral obligation to stay
there. He did not know whether the effect of setting up a
government by the United States in Luzon would be to produce
revolutions in other islands. It might cause reforms in their
government. … Answering questions of Mr. Gray, Merritt said
consequences in case of either insurgent or Spanish triumph
made it doubtful whether United States would be morally
justified in withdrawing. Our acts were ordinary acts of war,
as if we had attacked Barcelona, but present conditions in
Philippine Islands were partly brought about by us. Insurgents
not in worse condition by our coming. Spaniards hardly able to
defend themselves. If we restored them to their position and
trenches, they might maintain themselves with the help of a
navy when we withdrew. Did not know that he could make out a
responsibility by argument, but he felt it. It might be
sentimental. He thought it would be an advantage if the United
States would change its policy and keep the islands. (He)
thought our interests in the East would be helped by the cheap
labor in the Philippines, costing only from 20 to 80 cents a
day, according to skill. … Answering questions of Mr. Reid,
Merritt said he considered capture of Manila practically
capture of group. Nothing left of Spanish sovereignty that was
not at mercy of the United States. Did not think our humanity
bounded by geographical lines. After Dewey's victory we armed
insurgents to some extent, but Dewey says it was
over-estimated. Insurgents bought arms from Hongkong merchants
with Dewey's cognizance, but Dewey was not in favor of allowing
this to continue. Spaniards would destroy Aguinaldo and his
principal followers, if allowed to do so."

October 25, Judge Day cabled a message to Washington, saying:
"Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning
Philippine Islands are set forth in statements transmitted
herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit
instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question
in joint commission almost immediately." The differing
statements then transmitted were three in number, the first of
them signed by Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, who said:
"Information gained by commission in Paris leads to conviction
that it would be naval, political, and commercial mistake to
divide the archipelago. Nearly all expert testimony taken
tends to this effect. As instructions provide for retention at
least of Luzon, we do not consider question of remaining in
Philippine Islands at all as now properly before us. We
therefore ask for extension of instructions. Spain governed
and defended these islands from Manila, and with destruction
of her fleet and the surrender of her army we became as
complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with
nothing needed to complete the conquest save to proceed with
the ample forces we had at hand to take unopposed possession.
{623}
The Ladrones and Carolines were also governed from the same
capital by the same governor-general. National boundaries
ought to follow natural divisions, but there is no natural
place for dividing Philippine Islands. … If we do not want the
islands ourselves, better to control their disposition; that
is, to hold the option on them rather than to abandon it.
Could then at least try to protect ourselves by ample treaty
stipulations with the acquiring powers. Commercially, division
of archipelago would not only needlessly establish dangerous
rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept."

Disagreeing with this view, Judge Day said:

"I am unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the
entire Philippine island group. In the spirit of our
instructions, and bearing in mind the often declared
disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of
conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be
consistent in our demands in making peace. Territory
permanently held must be taken as war indemnity and with due
regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our
military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents.
Whether this conduct was wise or unwise is not now important. We
cannot leave the insurgents to mere treaty stipulations or to
their unaided resources, either to form a government or to
battle against a foe which (although) unequal to us, might
readily overcome them. On all hands it is agreed that the
inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government. This
is particularly true of Mindanao and the Sulu group. Only
experience can determine the success of colonial expansion
upon which the United States is entering. It may prove
expensive in proportion to the scale upon which it is tried
with ignorant and semibarbarous people at the other side of
the world. It should therefore be kept within bounds." Judge
Day, accordingly, suggested a division of the archipelago that
would give to the United States Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan,
and control the entrance to the China Sea. Senator Gray, in a
third statement, dissented from both these views, saying: "The
undersigned can not agree that it is wise to take Philippine
Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse
accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted
upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs the case of
Cuba and Porto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into
European politics and the entangling alliances against which
Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will
make necessary a navy equal to largest of powers; a greatly
increased military establishment; immense sums for
fortifications and harbors; multiply occasions for dangerous
complications with foreign nations, and increase burdens of
taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American
labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap; no area
for homes for American citizens; climate and social conditions
demoralizing to character of American youth; new and disturbing
questions introduced into our politics; church question
menacing. On whole, instead of indemnity—injury. The
undersigned can not agree that any obligation incurred to
insurgents is paramount to our own manifest interests. … No
place for colonial administration or government of subject
people in American system. So much from standpoint of
interest; but even conceding all benefits claimed for
annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit
to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and
Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength
to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and
by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in the hour of
victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for
doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from
high moral position boastfully assumed. We should set example
in these respects, not follow in the selfish and vulgar greed
for territory which Europe has inherited from medieval times.
Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn
and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now that we have
achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our
word. … At the very least let us adhere to the President's
instructions and if conditions require the keeping of Luzon
forego the material advantages claimed in annexing other
islands. Above all let us not make a mockery of the injunction
contained in those instructions, where, after stating that we
took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and
in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations, and
that we had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of
conquest, the President among other things eloquently says:
'It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace
should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in
facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the
concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its
original action.' This and more, of which I earnestly ask a
re-perusal, binds my conscience and governs my actions."

But the President had now arrived at a different state of
mind, and directed Secretary Hay to make the following reply,
on the 26th: "The information which has come to the President
since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the
cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands
subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future
contention, can not be justified on political, commercial, or
humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole
archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the
former must therefore be required. The President reaches this
conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole
subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities
it will impose, believing that this course will entail less
trouble than any other and besides will best subserve the
interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we can not
escape responsibility."

Two days later, the moral and political reflections of the
President on the subject were expressed still further to the
commissioners by Secretary Hay, in the following telegram:

"While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest,
which position must not be yielded, yet their disposition,
control, and government the President prefers should be the
subject of negotiation as provided in the protocol. It is
imperative upon us that as victors we should be governed only
by motives which will exalt our nation. Territorial expansion
should be our least concern; that we shall not shirk the moral
obligations of our victory is of the greatest.
{624}
It is undisputed that Spain's authority is permanently
destroyed in every part of the Philippines. To leave any part
in her feeble control now would increase our difficulties and
be opposed to the interests of humanity. The sentiment in the
United States is almost universal that the people of the
Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from
Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President fully
concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the
islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or
powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We
must either hold them or turn them back to Spain.
Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen
as are the difficulties which are before us, the President can
see but one plain path of duty—the acceptance of the archipelago.
Greater difficulties and more serious
complications—administrative and international—would follow
any other course. The President has given to the views of the
commissioners the fullest consideration, and in reaching the
conclusion above announced in the light of information
communicated to the commission and to the President since your
departure, he has been influenced by the single consideration
of duty and humanity. The President is not unmindful of the
distressed financial condition of Spain, and whatever
consideration the United States may show must come from its
sense of generosity and benevolence, rather than from any real
or technical obligation. The terms upon which the full cession
of the Philippines shall be made must be left largely with the
commission."

On the 3d of November, Judge Day cabled: "After a careful
examination of the authorities, the majority of the commission
are clearly of opinion that our demand for the Philippine
Islands can not be based on conquest. When the protocol was
signed Manila was not captured, siege was in progress and
capture made after the execution of the protocol. Captures
made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded and
status quo restored as far as practicable. We can require
cession of Philippine Islands only as indemnity for losses and
expenses of the war. Have in view, also, condition of islands,
the broken power of Spain, anarchy in which our withdrawal would
leave the islands, etc. These are legitimate factors."

On the 4th, Senator Davis added a personal telegram as
follows: "I think we can demand cession of entire archipelago
on other and more valid grounds than a perfected territorial
conquest of the Philippine Islands, such as indemnity or as
conditions of peace imposed by our general military success
and in view of our future security and general welfare,
commercial and otherwise. I think the protocol admits all
these grounds, and that the ground alone of perfected
territorial conquest of the Philippine Islands is too narrow
and untenable under protocol."

Secretary Hay replied, for the President, on the 5th: "The
President has no purpose to question the commission's judgment
as to the grounds upon which the cession of the archipelago is
to be claimed. His only wish in that respect is to hold all
the ground upon which we can fairly and justly make the claim.
He recognizes fully the soundness of putting forward indemnity
as the chief ground, but conquest is a consideration which
ought not to be ignored. How our demand shall be presented,
and the grounds upon which you will rest it, he confidently
leaves with the commissioners. His great concern is that a
treaty shall be effected in terms which will not only satisfy
the present generation but, what is more important, be
justified in the judgment of posterity."

Discussion followed, in which Judge Day and Senator Gray
repeated the views they had formerly expressed, in dissent
from the policy determined upon by the President and his
cabinet, the latter saying: "Believing that the result of a
failure to obtain a treaty would be the forcible seizure of
the whole Philippine Islands group, an event greatly to be
deprecated as inconsistent with the traditions and
civilization of the United States, I would be willing to take
the islands by the cession of a treaty of peace, and I would,
to that end, make such reasonable concessions as would comport
with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak and
prostrate foe. I mean that I would prefer the latter
alternative to the former, not that I have changed my mind as
to the policy of taking the Philippine Islands at all."

So far as concerned the demands of the United States (which
Spain was powerless to resist), the question was settled, on
the 13th of November, by a telegram from Secretary Hay to Mr.
Day, in which he said: "We are clearly entitled to indemnity
for the cost of the war. We can not hope to be fully
indemnified. We do not expect to be. It would probably be
difficult for Spain to pay money. All she has are the
archipelagoes of the Philippines and the Carolines. She surely
can not expect us to turn the Philippines back and bear the cost
of the war and all claims of our citizens for damages to life
and property in Cuba without any indemnity but Porto Rico,
which we have and which is wholly inadequate. … You are
therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole
of the Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain ten to
twenty millions of dollars, and if you can get cession of a
naval and telegraph station in the Carolines, and the several
concessions and privileges and guaranties, so far as
applicable, enumerated in the views of Commissioners Frye and
Reid, you can offer more."

_United States, 56th Congress, 2d Session,
Senate Document Number 148
(Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain)._

Discussion between the Spanish and American commissioners at
Paris was prolonged until the 10th of December, when the
former yielded to what they protested against as hard terms,
and the following Treaty of Peace was signed:

Treaty of Peace.

ARTICLE I.
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to
Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to
be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so
long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the
obligations that may under international law result from the
fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and
property.

ARTICLE II.
Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and
other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.

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ARTICLE III.
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the
Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within
the following line: A line running from west to east along or
near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the
middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred
and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty seventh
(127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence
along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of
four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude,
thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five
minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the
meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and
thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence along
the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and
thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the
parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40')
north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees
and forty minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the
one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude
east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection
of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the
one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of
longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred
and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of
Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will
pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000)
within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of
the present treaty.

ARTICLE IV.
The United States will, for the term of ten years from the
date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present
treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of
the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and
merchandise of the United States.

ARTICLE V.
The United States will, upon the signature of the present
treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish
soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by
the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question
shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of
the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate
the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms
similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to
arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in
the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which
is to continue in force till its provisions are completely
executed. The time within which the evacuation of the
Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed
by the two Governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war
vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their
carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and
materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and
naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the
property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of
field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences,
shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months,
to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the
treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase
such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between
the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.

ARTICLE VI.
Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release
all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned
for political offences, in connection with the insurrections
in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United
States. Reciprocally the United States will release all
persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will
undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in
the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. The
Government of the United States will at its own cost return to
Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return
to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines,
according to the situation of their respective homes,
prisoners released or caused to be released by them,
respectively, under this article.

ARTICLE VII.
The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for
indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either
Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other
Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the
late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of
ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for
indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will
adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain
relinquished in this article.

ARTICLE VIII.
In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III
of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto
Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of
Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings,
wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and
other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong
to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of
Spain. And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or
cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph
refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights
which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of
all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private
establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other
associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess
property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or
of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such
individuals may be. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession,
as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively
referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may
exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in
such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy
of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested.
Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in
respect of documents in the archives of the islands above
referred to. In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as
the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of
Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official
archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the
islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the
rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and
records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons
shall without distinction have the right to require, in
accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts,
wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols
or files, or which may be contained in the executive or
judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands
aforesaid.

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ARTICLE IX.
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes
or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights
of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such
property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the
right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions,
being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in
default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.

ARTICLE X.
The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the
free exercise of their religion.

ARTICLE XI.
The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by
this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be
subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside,
pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they
shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to
pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the
courts belong.

ARTICLE XII.
Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which
Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be
determined according to the following rules:

1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private
individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date
mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or
right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be
final, and shall be executed in due form by competent
authority in the territory within which such judgments should
be carried out.

2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the
date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment
before the court in which they may then be pending or in the
court that may be substituted therefor.

3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the
Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which
by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its
jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having
been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the
competent authority of the place in which the case arose.

ARTICLE XIII.
The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents
acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico,
the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of
the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall
continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and
artistic works, not subversive of public order in the
territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of
duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be
reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of
this treaty.

ARTICLE XIV.
Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in
the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over
which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present
treaty.

ARTICLE XV.
The Government of each country will, for the term of ten
years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the
same treatment in respect of all port charges, including
entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties,
as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the
coastwise trade. This article may at any time be terminated on
six months notice given by either Government to the other.

ARTICLE XVI.
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty
by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the
time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the
termination of such occupancy, advise any Government
established in the island to assume the same obligations.

ARTICLE XVII.
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the
United States, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain;
and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within
six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. In
faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have
signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. Done
in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year
of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.

[Signed]
William R. Day,
Cushman K. Davis,
William P. Frye,
Geo. Gray,
Whitelaw Reid,
Eugenio Montero Ríos,
B. de Abarzuza,
J. de Garnica,
W. R. de Villa Urrutia,
Rafael Cerero.

That the treaty would be ratified by the Senate of the United
States was by no means certain when it was signed, and
remained questionable for two months.

See below:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY).

Some time after the conclusion of the treaty, it was
discovered that the boundaries defined in it for the cession
of the Philippine Islands failed to include the islands of
Cagayan, or Kagayan, and Sibutu, in the southern part of the
archipelago. Still later, it was found that several small
islands (the Bachi or Bashee group, and others) belonging to
the Spanish possessions in the East were left lying outside of
the northern Philippine boundary, as laid down in the treaty
of cession. It is said that the Japanese government called
attention to this latter error, desiring to have the islands
in question, which are near to Formosa, controlled by the
United States, rather than by Spain. By a new treaty with
Spain, negotiated in 1900, all these outlying islands were
acquired by the United States, for the sum of $100,000.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August).
Losses of the armies at Santiago and in the Philippines.

See below:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE).

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August 21).
The War with Spain.
Letter from departing Spanish soldiers to the soldiers
of the American army.

The following letter, addressed, on the eve of their departure
for Spain, by the Spanish soldiers at Santiago, to the
soldiers of the American army, "is surely," says
Lieutenant-Colonel Miley, who quotes it in his book entitled
"In Cuba with Shafter"—"is surely the most remarkable letter
ever addressed by vanquished soldiers to their conquerors:

'Soldiers of the American Army: We would not be fulfilling our
duty as well-born men in whose breasts there lives gratitude
and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without
sending you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and
farewell. We fought you with ardor and with all our strength,
endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest
rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been
vanquished by you, so our generals and chiefs judged in
signing the capitulation, but our surrender and the
blood-battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for
resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly.
You fought and acted in compliance with the same call of duty
as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective
States. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great
courage, as before stated—a quality we had not met with during
the three years we have carried on this war against a people
without a religion, without morals, without conscience, and of
doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but shot
their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled.
This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this
unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws
and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most
civilized nations of the world; have given honorable burial to
the dead of the vanquished; have cured their wounded with
great humanity; have respected and cared for your prisoners
and their comfort; and lastly, to us, whose condition was
terrible, you have given freely of food and of your stock of
medicines, and have honored us with distinction and courtesy,
for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost
harmony. With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all,
there remains but to express our farewell, and with the
greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in
this land, which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but
will be yours. You have conquered it by force and watered it
with your blood, as your conscience called for under the
demands of civilization and humanity; but the descendants of
the Congos and Guineas, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous
Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers—these people are
not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will
find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern
civilized humanity. From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers.

(Signed) Pedro Lopez De Castillo, Soldier of Infantry.
Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898.'"

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August-December).
Situation in the Philippines following the occupation
of Manila by American forces.
Growing distrust and unfriendliness of the Tagalos.
Report of General Otis.

See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (December).
Organization of military government in Cuba.

See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1898-1899 (DECEMBER-OCTOBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.
Statistics of the Spanish-American War.

The following military and naval statistics of the war with
Spain, compiled from official sources, were submitted to the
House of Representatives, during its debate on the Army Bill,
in December, 1900, as part of an appendix to a speech made in
support of the Bill by Honorable Charles Dick, of Ohio:

ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF THE ARMY
DURING AND AFTER THE WAR.