Chapter CII: Section 29 (22)

"With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace,
and its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is
brought to the end of his effort. In my annual message of
December last I said: 'Of the untried measures there remain
only: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents;
recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention
to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the
contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other
party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be
thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal
aggression.' Thereupon I review these alternatives, in the
light of President Grant's measured words, uttered in 1875,
when after seven years of sanguinary, destructive, and cruel
hostilities in Cuba he reached the conclusion that the
recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and
indefensible; and that the recognition of belligerence was not
warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law. I
commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question,
pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a
recognition of belligerence which, while adding to the already
onerous burdens of neutrality within our own jurisdiction,
could not in any way extend our influence or effective offices
in the territory of hostilities. Nothing has since occurred to
change my view in this regard; and I recognize as fully now as
then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which
process the so-called recognition of belligerents is
published, could, of itself and unattended by other action,
accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor—the
instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery
that afflicts the island.

"Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the
independence of the present insurgent government in Cuba, we
find safe precedents in our history from an early day. They
are well summed up in President Jackson's message to Congress,
December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the
independence of Texas. He said: 'In all the contests that have
arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of the disputes
relating to the Crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the
separation of the American possessions of both from the
European Governments, and out of the numerous and constantly
occurring struggles for dominion in Spanish America, so wisely
consistent with our just principles has been the action of our
Government that we have, under the most critical
circumstances, avoided all censure, and encountered no other
evil than that produced by a transient estrangement of good
will in those against whom we have been by force of evidence
compelled to decide. It has thus made known to the world that
the uniform policy and practice of the United States is to
avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the
internal government of other nations, and eventually to
recognize the authority of the prevailing party without
reference to our particular interests and views or to the
merits of the original controversy. … But on this, as on every
other trying occasion, safety is to be found in a rigid
adherence to principle. In the contest between Spain and the
revolted colonies we stood aloof, and waited not only until
the ability of the new States to protect themselves was fully
established, but until the danger of their being again
subjugated had entirely passed away.
{588}
Then, and not until then, were they recognized. Such was our
course in regard to Mexico herself. … It is true that with
regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has been
expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the
Republic himself captured, and all present power to control
the newly-organized government of Texas annihilated within its
confines; but, on the other hand, there is, in appearance at
least, an immense disparity of physical force on the side of
Texas. The Mexican Republic, under another Executive, is
rallying its forces under a new leader and menacing a fresh
invasion to recover its lost dominion. Upon the issue of this
threatened invasion the independence of Texas may be
considered as suspended; and were there nothing peculiar in
the relative situation of the United States and Texas, our
acknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis could
scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve
with which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all
similar questions.'

"Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that
there might be imputed to the United States motives of selfish
interest in view of the former claim on our part to the
territory of Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in
seeking recognition of independence as an incident to the
incorporation of Texas in the Union, concluding thus:
'Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still
stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until
Mexico itself or one of the great foreign powers shall
recognize the independence of the new government, at least
until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have
proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of
that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to
uphold the government constituted by them. Neither of the
contending parties can justly complain of this course. By
pursuing it we are but carrying out the long-established
policy of our Government, a policy which has secured to us
respect and influence abroad and inspired confidence at home.'

"These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson.
They are evidence that the United States, in addition to the
test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition
of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted
state shall 'constitute in fact a body politic, having a
government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the
elements of stability,' and forming de facto, 'if left to
itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of
discharging the duties of a state'), has imposed for its own
governance in dealing with cases like these the further
condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due
to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again
subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away. This
extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. The
Congress, to whom President Jackson referred the question as
one 'probably leading to war,' and therefore a proper subject
for 'a previous understanding with that body, by whom war can
alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for
sustaining its perils must be furnished,' left the matter of
the recognition of Texas to the discretion of the Executive,
providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when
the President should be satisfied that the Republic of Texas
had become 'an independent State.' It was so recognized by
President Van Buren, who commissioned a chargé d'affaires
March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to
reconquer the Texan territory, and when there was at the time
no bona fide contest going on between the insurgent province
and its former sovereign.

"I said in my message of December last, 'It is to be seriously
considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond
dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the
recognition of belligerency in its favor.' The same
requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered
when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in
question, for no less positive test can be applied to the
greater act than to the lesser, while, on the other hand, the
influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal
policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors
when the recognition of belligerency is concerned, are
secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors when the real
question is whether the community claiming recognition is or
is not independent beyond peradventure.

"Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be
wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the
present time the independence of the so-called Cuban republic.
Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United
States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this
country now to the recognition of any particular government in
Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of
international obligation toward the organization so
recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be
subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We
would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to
it the mere relation of a friendly ally. When it shall appear
hereafter that there is within the island a government capable
of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a
separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper
forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be
promptly and readily recognized and the relations and
interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.

"There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the
war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational
compromise between the contestants or as the active ally of
the one party or the other. As to the first, it is not to be
forgotten that during the last few months the relation of the
United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention
in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending
to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate
pacific result just and honorable to all interests concerned.
The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest,
unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba untarnished
by differences between us and Spain and unstained by the blood
of American citizens. The forcible intervention of the United
States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large
dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents
where neighboring states have interfered to check the hopeless
sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their
borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves,
however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the
contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.

{589}

"The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized
as follows:

First.
In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities,
bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there,
and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or
unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is
all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is
therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for
it is right at our door.

Second.
We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that
protection and indemnity for life and property which no
government there can or will afford, and to that end to
terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal
protection.

Third.
The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious
injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people and
by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the
island.

Fourth,
and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition
of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and
entails upon this Government an enormous expense.

With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us
and with which our people have such trade and business
relations—when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in
constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves
ruined—where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and
are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation,
the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to
prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and
entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need
not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a
constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a
semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

"These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out
have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has
deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already
transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of
inquiry on the destruction of the battleship 'Maine' in the
harbor of Habana during the night of the 15th of February. The
destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart
with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave
sailors and marines and two officers of our Navy, reposing in
the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to
death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the
nation. The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to
say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government,
was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the
'Maine' was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a
submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility:
that remains to be fixed. In any event the destruction of them
'Maine' by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and
impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is
intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the
Spanish Government cannot assure safety and security to a
vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Habana on a
mission of peace, and rightfully there.

"Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic
correspondence, a dispatch from our minister to Spain, of the
26th ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish minister
for foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do
all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter
of the 'Maine.' The reply above referred to of the 31st
ultimo, also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain
to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can
arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the
note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the 10th
instant, as follows: 'As to the question of fact which springs
from the diversity of views between the reports of the
American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the facts be
ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose
decision Spain accepts in advance.' To this I have made no
reply.

"President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the
contest as it then appeared, and its hopeless and apparent
indefinite prolongation, said: 'In such an event, I am of
opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the
responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously
consider the only remaining measures possible—mediation and
intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of water
separating the island from the peninsula, … the contending
parties appear to have within themselves no depository of
common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and
excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of
peacemaker. In this view in the earlier days of the contest
the good offices of the United States as a mediator were
tendered in good faith, without any selfish purpose, in the
interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both
parties, but were at the time declined by Spain, with the
declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be
indispensable. No intimation has been received that in the
opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the
strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its
injuries to the interests of the United States and of other
nations. Each party seems quite capable of working great
injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the
relations and interests dependent on the existence of peace in
the island; but they seem incapable of reaching any
adjustment, and both have thus far failed of achieving any
success whereby one party shall possess and control the island
to the exclusion of the other. Under these circumstances, the
agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention,
seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be
invoked for the termination of the strife.'

"In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during
the pending struggle, it was said: 'When the inability of
Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become
manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is
extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence,
and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has
degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the
useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of
the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be
presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain
will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly
hesitate to recognize and discharge.'

{590}

"In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to
this question, I said: 'The near future will demonstrate
whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just
alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all
our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba,
is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and
other action by the United States will remain to be taken.
When that time comes that action will be determined in the
line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without
misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this
Government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to
it the protection of their interests and honor, and to
humanity. Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense
ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic
considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the
Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and
property of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts
to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be
honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a
duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization,
and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault
on our part, and only because the necessity for such action
will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the
civilized world.'

"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has
waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may
flame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not
been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present
methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition
which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of
Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in
behalf of endangered American interests which give us the
right and the duty to speak and act, the War in Cuba must
stop.

"In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the
Congress to authorize and empower the President to take
measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities
between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to
secure in the island the establishment of a stable government,
capable of maintaining order and observing its international
obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security
of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military
and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for
these purposes. And in the interest of humanity and to aid in
preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I
recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be
continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public
Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

"The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn
responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the
intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors.
Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the
Constitution and the law, I await your action.

"Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing
message, official information was received by me that the
latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General
Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim
a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which
have not yet been communicated to me. This fact with every
other pertinent consideration will, I am sure, have your just
and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which
you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful
result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving
people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another
justification for our contemplated action."

_Congressional Record,
April 11, 1898._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April).
Action of Congress empowering the President to expel
Spanish authority from the island of Cuba, and its result
in a state of war with Spain.

On the 13th of April, two days after receiving the President's
Message, as above, the House of Representatives adopted the
following resolution, by a vote of 324 against 19: "Resolved,
That the President is hereby authorized and directed to
intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, to the end and with
the purpose of securing permanent peace and order there and
establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable
and independent government of their own in the island of Cuba;
and the President is hereby authorized and empowered to use
the land and naval forces of the United States to execute the
purpose of this resolution."

_Congressional Record,
April 13, 1898, pages 4192-4196._

Three days later the Senate adopted the following, by 27 votes
against 21: "Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,

First.
That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent, and that the Government of the
United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the
true and lawful Government of that island.

"Second.
That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the
Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third.
That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces
of the United States, and to call into the actual service of
the United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into
effect.

"Fourth.
That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over said island except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave
the government and control of the island to its people."

_Congressional Record,
April 16, 1898, page 4386-4387._

The two Houses were in conflict, it will be seen, on the
question of the recognition of what claimed to be the
government of the Republic of Cuba, organized by the
insurgents. A majority of the House shared the doubts
expressed by the President in his message, as to the existence
of such a government in Cuba as could be recognized without
embarrassment; a majority of the Senate shut its eyes to that
doubt. After two days of heated controversy, the Senate gave
way, and the following resolution, recommended by conference
committees, was adopted in both Houses,—in the Senate by 42
yeas to 35 nays (12 not voting); in the House by 311 to 6 (39
not voting):

{591}

"Resolved, etc.

"First.
That the people of the Island of Cuba are and of right ought
to be free and independent.

"Second.
That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the
Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third.
That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces
of the United States, and to call into the actual service of
the United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into
effect.

"Fourth.
That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave
the government and control of the island to its people."

_Congressional Record,
April 18, 1898, pages 4421-4422, and 4461-4462._

One week later, on the 25th of April, the President
communicated to Congress an account of his action in
accordance with this joint resolution, and its result in a
state of war between the United States and Spain as follows:

"Upon communicating to the Spanish minister in Washington the
demand which it became the duty of the Executive to address to
the Government of Spain in obedience to said resolution, the
minister asked for his passports and withdrew. The United
States minister at Madrid was in turn notified by the Spanish
minister for foreign affairs that the withdrawal of the
Spanish representative from the United States had terminated
diplomatic relations between the two countries, and that all
official communications between their respective
representatives ceased therewith.

"I commend to your special attention the note addressed to the
United States minister at Madrid by the Spanish minister for
foreign affairs on the 21st instant, whereby the foregoing
notification was conveyed. It will be perceived therefrom that
the Government of Spain, having cognizance of the joint
resolution of the United States Congress, and in view of the
things which the President is thereby required and authorized
to do, responds by treating the reasonable demands of this
Government as measures of hostility, following with that
instant and complete severance of relations by its action
which, by the usage of nations, accompanies an existent state
of war between sovereign powers.

"The position of Spain being thus made known and the demands
of the United States being denied with a complete rupture of
intercourse by the act of Spain, I have been constrained, in
exercise of the power and authority conferred upon me by the
joint resolution aforesaid, to proclaim under date of April
22, 1898, a blockade of certain ports of the north coast of
Cuba, lying between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and of the port
of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba; and further, in
exercise of my constitutional powers and using the authority
conferred upon me by the act of Congress approved April 22,
1898, to issue my proclamation dated April 23, 1898, calling
forth volunteers in order to carry into effect the said
resolution of April 20, 1898. …

"In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the
adoption of such other measures as may be necessary to enable
me to carry out the expressed will of the Congress of the
United States in the premises, I now recommend to your
honorable body the adoption of a joint resolution declaring
that a state of war exists between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of Spain, and I urge speedy action
thereon, to the end that the definition of the international
status of the United States as a belligerent power may be made
known, and the assertion of all its rights and the maintenance
of all its duties in the conduct of a public war may be
assured."

_Congressional Record,
April 25, 1898, page 4671._

The recommendation of the President was carried out, on the
same day, by the passage in both Houses, unanimously, of an
enactment, "First. That war be, and the same is hereby,
declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 21st day
of April, A. D. 1898, including said day, between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. Second. That the
President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed
and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the
United States, and to call into the actual service of the
United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect."

_Congressional Record,
April 25, pages 4674 and 4693._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April).
Cabinet changes.

Two resignations from the President's cabinet occurred in
April, both occasioned by failing health. Honorable James A.
Gary was succeeded as Postmaster-General by Honorable Charles
Emory Smith, and Honorable John Sherman was followed in the
Secretaryship of State by his First Assistant in that office,
Judge William R. Day.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May).
War with Spain.
Military preparations.
Regular and Volunteer armies.
"The Rough Riders."

At the outbreak of the war, the Regular Army of the United
States numbered but 28,000 officers and men. Under authority
given by acts of Congress it was rapidly increased, and
returns for May, 1898, show 2,191 officers and nearly 42,000
men in the ranks. At the same time, a Volunteer Army was being
speedily raised and equipped. By proclamation of April 2-3d,
the President called for 125,000 volunteers, to be
apportioned, as far as practicable, among the states and
territories, according to population. On the 25th of May he
called for 75,000 more. Before the end of May, 118,580
enlisted volunteers, with 6,224 officers, were reported to
have been mustered in. These were assembled in various camps
and prepared for service in a more or less hurried way. At the
beginning, six army corps were constituted, embracing both the
Regular and Volunteer branches of the army. The First Corps,
under Major General John R. Brooke, and the Third under Major
General James F. Wade, were organized at Camp Thomas, Georgia.
The Second was organized under Major General William M.
Graham, at Camp Alger, near Falls Church, Virginia. The
organization of the Fourth Corps, Major General John J.
Coppinger, commanding, was begun at Mobile, Alabama. The Fifth
Corps was organized at Tampa, Florid., under Major General
William R. Shafter.
{592}
A Sixth Corps, which had been provided for, was never
organized; but the Seventh was formed, at Tampa, Florida,
under Major General Fitzhugh Lee. Subsequently an Eighth Corps
was concentrated at San Francisco, and transported to the
Philippine Islands. Tampa, Florida, was the port chosen for
the shipment of troops to Cuba, and extensive preparations
were made for the transport service from that point. The
movement waited, first, for the preparation of newly levied
troops, and, secondly, for naval operations to make the voyage
of transports to Cuba safe from attack.

_Annual Report of the Adjutant-General to the
Major-General Commanding the Army, 1898._

Among the Volunteer regiments organized, one known as that of
"the Rough Riders" excited public interest in the greatest
degree. "The moment that the newspapers sent broadcast the
tale that such a regiment was contemplated, excitement began
in nearly every State in the Union, and did not end until the
announcement was made that the regiment was complete. As it
stood, finished, the troops which made it up, theoretically
came from the following sections, although men from the East
and from other States and Territories were scattered through
each troop. Troops A, B, and C, from Arizona. Troop D, from
Oklahoma. Troops E, F, G, H, and I, from New Mexico. Troop K,
from Eastern colleges and cities. Troops L and M, from Indian
Territory.

"Senator Warren, of Iowa, is responsible for the idea of the
Rough Riders. He introduced and carried through Congress,
aided by Senators Kyle, Carter, and others, a bill authorizing
the enrollment of three regiments, to be made up of expert
hunters, riflemen, cow-men, frontiersmen, and such other hardy
characters as might care to enlist from the Territories.
Captain Leonard Wood, of the Medical Corps, was the
President's chief medical adviser, and had had much experience
in Indian fighting in the West. Theodore Roosevelt was
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and had had some knowledge of
men and things on the frontier, through his life on his Own
and other ranches. It was the President's intention to offer
to Wood the colonelcy of one regiment, to Roosevelt the
colonelcy of a second, and to Griggsby, of Montana, the
colonelcy of a third. Wood and Roosevelt received their offers
at about the same moment. Roosevelt promptly declined his, on
the theory that he had not had sufficient military experience
to warrant him in taking command of a regiment. He asked that
he might be given the second place in the regiment commanded
by Wood, which was done. Thus the Rough Riders began.

"Alexander Brodie, who afterwards became major of the
regiment, was probably the first man to systematically start
towards the organization of this particular regiment. … It was
on the 3d of May that the Arizona men started for San Antonio.
It was on the 8th of May that the very last men of all—those
of K Troop—left Washington for San Antonio. These were the
'dude warriors,' the 'dandy troopers,' the 'gilded gang.' When
their train pulled into San Antonio, and they started
stragglingly to march into camp, they encountered a contingent
of 340 cowboys from New Mexico. Oil and water are not farther
removed than were the everyday natures of these two groups of
men. Yet, instantly they fraternized, and from that
moment—through the hardships of it all—these men were
brothers. … Probably no military organization has ever been
made up of men selected from so large a number of applicants,
or of men so carefully selected. … A large delegation of men
from Harvard College called upon Roosevelt one day in
Washington and offered their services in a body. Indeed,
delegations of that kind from most of the Eastern Colleges
went to him, but went to him in vain. His secretary answered
more than five thousand individual applications for places in
the regiment, and answered ninety-nine per cent. of them with
declinations."

_E. Marshall,
The Story of the Rough Riders,
chapter 1
(Copyright, G. W. Dillingham & Co., New York)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May: Cuba)
War with Spain.
Blockade of Cuban ports.

On the 21st of April, the following instructions were
despatched by the Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral
Sampson, appointed that day to the command of the naval force
on the Atlantic Station: "You will immediately institute a
blockade of the north coast of Cuba, extending from Cardenas
on the east to Bahia Honda on the west; also, if in your
opinion your force warrants, the port of Cienfuegos, on the
south side of the island. It is considered doubtful if the
present force at your command would warrant a more extensive
blockade. It should be borne in mind that whenever the Army is
ready to embark for Cuba the Navy will be required to furnish
the necessary convoy for its transports. For this reason it
does not seem desirable that you should undertake at present
to blockade any more of the island than has been indicated. It
is believed that this blockade will cut off Havana almost
entirely from receiving supplies from the outside. The Navy
Department is considering the question of occupying the port
of Matanzas by a military force large enough to hold it and to
open communications with the insurgents, and this may be done
at an early date, even before the main party of the Army is
ready to embark. If this operation is decided upon, you are
directed to co-operate with the Army and assist with such
vessels as are necessary to cover and protect such a
movement."

_Report of Secretary of Navy, 1898,
volume 2, page 175._

In previous confidential orders to the commander of the North
Atlantic squadron, issued April 6, in anticipation of
hostilities, the Department had directed as follows: "In the
event of hostilities with Spain, the Department wishes you to
do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war
vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats
which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.

"2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron
to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago
de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the
more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within
those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest
that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats
might accomplish the desired object, viz, the destruction of
the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own
men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. There are two
reasons for this: First. There may be no United States troops
to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and
arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of
October. Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it
particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled
before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable
vessels.

{593}

"3. The Department further desires that, in case of war, you
will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the
ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de
Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause
the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over."

_Report of Secretary of Navy, 1898,
volume 2, page 171._

The prudent policy here set forth restricted the action of the
fleet to blockading duty so closely, during the early weeks of
the war, that no serious demonstrations against the Spanish
land batteries were made. Admiral Sampson had been urgent for
permission to force the entrance to Havana harbor, before its
defenses were strengthened, expressing perfect confidence that
he could silence the western batteries, and reach a position
from which the city would be at the mercy of his guns; but he
was not allowed to make the attempt. The projected occupation
of Matanzas was not undertaken.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May: Philippines).
Statements of the circumstances in which Aguinaldo, the
head of the insurrectionary movement in the Philippines,
went to Manila, to co-operate with the American forces.

On the 4th of May, 1898, the following was published in the
"Singapore Free Press": "General Emilio Aguinaldo, accompanied
by his aide-de-camp, Colonel Marcelo H. del Pilar, and his
private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba, arrived incognito in
Singapore from Saigon on April 21, 1898. In Saigon, where
Aguinaldo had remained for one week, he had interviews with
one or two old Philippino friends now resident there. The
special purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to
consult other friends here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray,
an old and intimate English friend, for fifteen years resident
in the Philippines, about the state of affairs in the islands
generally—particularly as to the possibility of war between
the United States and Spain, and whether, in such an event,
the United States would eventually recognize the independence
of the Philippines, provided he lent his co-operation to the
Americans in the conquest of the country. The situation of the
moment was this, that the conditions of the honorable peace
concluded on December 14, 1897, between President Aguinaldo,
on behalf of the Philippine rebels, and H. E. Governor-General
Primo di Rivera, on behalf of Spain, had not been carried out,
although their immediate execution had been vouched for in
that agreement. These reforms would have provided protection
to the people against the organized oppression and rapacity of
the religious fraternities, would have secured improved civil
and criminal procedure in courts, and have guaranteed, in many
ways, improvements in the fiscal and social conditions of the
people. The repudiation by the Spanish Government of these
conditions, made by General Primo di Rivera, now left the
rebel leaders, who had for the most part gone to Hongkong,
free to act. And it was in pursuance of that freedom of action
that Aguinaldo again sought counsel of his friends in Saigon
and Singapore, with a view to the immediate resumption of
operations in the Philippines.

"Meantime Mr. Bray, whose assistance to this journal on
matters connected with the Philippines has been very
considerable, as our readers will have seen, was introduced by
the editor of the Singapore Free Press to Mr. Spencer Pratt,
consul-general of the United States, who was anxious, in view
of contingencies, to learn as much as possible about the real
condition of the Philippines. It was a few days after this
that Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore, when he at once
met his friends, including Mr. Bray. Affairs now becoming more
warlike, Mr. Bray, after conversation with Mr. Spencer Pratt,
eventually arranged an interview between that gentleman and
General Aguinaldo, which took place late on the evening of
Sunday, the 24th April, at 'The Mansion,' River Valley road.
There were present on that occasion General Emilio Aguinaldo y
Fami, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general United States of
America; Mr. Howard W. Bray; Aguinaldo's private secretary,
Mr. J. Leyba; Colonel M. H. del Pilar, and Dr. Marcelino
Santos.

"During this conference, at which Mr. Bray acted as
interpreter, General Aguinaldo explained to the American
consul-general, Mr. Pratt, the incidents and objects of the
late rebellion, and described the present disturbed state of
the country. General Aguinaldo then proceeded to detail the
nature of the co-operation he could give, in which he, in the
event of the American forces from the squadron landing and
taking possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order
and discipline amongst the native troops and inhabitants in
the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the
war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenceless
Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare.
He further declared his ability to establish a proper and
responsible government on liberal principles, and would be
willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United
States intend giving to Cuba.

"The consul-general of the United States, coinciding with the
general views expressed during the discussion, placed himself
at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral Dewey at
Hongkong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent interchange of
telegrams consequently took place. As a result another private
interview was arranged at the American consular residence at
the Raffles Hotel between General Aguinaldo, Mr. Spencer
Pratt, Mr. Howard Bray, and Mr. Leyba, private secretary to
General Aguinaldo. As a sequel to this interview, and in
response to the urgent request of Admiral Dewey, General
Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong by the first available
steamer, the Peninsular and Oriental 'Malacca,' on Tuesday,
the 26th April, at noon, accompanied by his aide-de-camp,
Captain del Pilar, and Mr. Leyba, his private secretary. …

"Throughout the whole stay of General Aguinaldo in Singapore
the editor was kept fully informed daily of the progress of
affairs. Naturally, however, all statement of what occurred
has been withheld by us until what has been deemed the fitting
moment has arrived. The substance of the whole incident in its
relations to the recent course of affairs in the Philippines
has been very fully telegraphed by the editor both to New York
and London."

{594}

Mr. Pratt, the U. S. Consul-General at Singapore, had already,
under date of April 28, given his own official report of the
interview with General Aguinaldo, to the Department at
Washington, as follows:

"I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th
instant, and confirmed in my dispatch Number 211 of that date,
a telegram which deciphered read as follows. … 'General
Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey
co-operation insurgents Manila.
PRATT.'

"The facts are these: On the evening of Saturday the 23d
instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here,
incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents,
General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. H. W. Bray, an English gentleman
of high standing, who, after fifteen years' residence as a
merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by
the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish
misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom
I had previously obtained much valuable information for
Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc.,
at different points in the islands. Being aware of the great
prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no
one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same
influence and control that he could, I determined at once to
see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was
accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the
24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present
the General's trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as
interpreter.

"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the
state of and object sought to be obtained by the present
insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the
Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself,
whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the
Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent
action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the
expediency of co-operating with our fleet, then at Hongkong,
and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed
thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should
the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day
as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:
'Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange
with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if
desired. Telegraph.
PRATT.'

"The Commodore's reply reading thus:
'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.
DEWEY.'

"I received it late that night, and at once communicated to
General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private
secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off
by the British steamer 'Malacca,' which left here on Tuesday,
the 26th. Just previous to his departure, I had a second and
last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of
which I shall give you by next mail. The general impressed me
as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the
confidence that had been placed in him.

"I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with
the commander of our forces, I have prevented possible
conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and
administering the Philippines. If this course of mine meets
with the Government's approval, as I trust it may, I shall be
fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I consider there is due
some special recognition for most valuable services rendered.
How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to
decide."

Two days later (April 30), Mr. Pratt reported further, as
follows: "Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th
instant, I have the honor to report that in the second and
last interview I had with General Emilio Aguinaldo, on the eve
of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the
necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting
absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no
excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American
Government, the President having declared that the present
hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord
with modern principles of civilized warfare. To this General
Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended and was
perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the
insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should
direct. The general further stated that he hoped the United
States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least
long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government
of their own, in the organization of which he would desire
American advise and assistance. These questions I told him I
had no authority to discuss."

Of the arrival of Aguinaldo at Hongkong and his conveyance
thence to Manila, the following account was given by Mr.
Wildman, the U. S. Consul at Hongkong, in a communication to
the State Department at Washington, which bears date July 18:
"On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong and immediately called
on me. It was May 16 before I could obtain permission from
Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States
ship 'McCulloch,' and I put him aboard in the night so as to
save any complications with the local Government. Immediately
on the arrival of Aguinaldo at Cavite he issued a
proclamation, which I had outlined for him before he left,
forbidding pillage, and making it a criminal offense to
maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of
which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he
hoped to maintain control over the natives, and from that date
until the present time he has been uninterruptedly successful
in the field and dignified and just as the head of his
government. According to his own statements to me by letter,
he has been approached by both the Spaniards and the Germans,
and has had tempting offers made him by the Catholic Church.
He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Consul
Williams, and his own junta here in Hongkong, and nothing of
moment has occurred which would lead anyone to believe that he
was not carrying out to the letter the promises made to me in
this consulate. The insurgents are fighting for freedom from
the Spanish rule, and rely upon the well-known sense of
justice that controls all the actions of our Government as to
their future."

{595}

In reply to Consul Pratt's report of his interviews with
General Aguinaldo, and of his proceedings in connection with
the departure of that personage from Singapore to Hongkong,
the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Day, wrote, June 16,
as follows: "The Department observes that you informed General
Aguinaldo that you had no authority to speak for the United
States; and, in the absence of the fuller report which you
promise, it is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this
Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To
obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General
Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so
doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be
practicable to gratify. This Government has known the
Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious
subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes.
While their contest with that power has been a matter of
public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from
this Government any recognition. The United States, in
entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of
its military operations in that quarter, will do so in the
exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and
will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their
former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience
which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the course of
your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the
assumption that this government would cooperate with him for
the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting
his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize
any political claims which he may put forward, your action was
unauthorized and cannot be approved."

_Treaty of Peace, and Accompanying Papers
(55th Congress, 3d Session, Senate Document Number 62,
part 2, pages 337-354)._

See, also (in this volume),
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1806-1808.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-June).
The War with Spain.
Movements or the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera,
and the blockading of it in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.
Lieutenant Hobson's exploit.
The sinking of the collier "Merrimac" in the channel.

The opening of hostilities found a Spanish squadron of four
armored cruisers (the "Cristobal Colon," the "Almirante
Oquendo," the "Vizcaya," and the "Infanta Maria Teresa,") with
three torpedo-boat destroyers (the "Pluton," "Furor" and
"Terror") and some lighter craft, assembled at the Cape Verde
islands, under Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera. They were in
Portuguese waters, and Portugal, though friendly to Spain, was
forced to issue a proclamation of neutrality, on the 20th of
April, which required the Spanish fleet to depart. Some of the
vessels then returned to Spain; but the seven named above
sailed westward, and their destination became a mystery, very
exciting for some time to the American mind. They might
attempt to surprise some American coast city; they might
intercept the battle-ship "Oregon," then making her way from
the Pacific coast, by the long circuit around Cape Horn; they
might have some plan for breaking the Cuban blockade. Acting
on the latter conjecture, and surmising that Porto Rico would
be chosen for the Spanish naval base, Admiral Sampson moved in
that direction to seek them. He attacked the forts at San Juan
(May 12), and satisfied himself that no fleet was in the bay.