Chapter XII: Preface: To the Sixth Volume (11)

The British Minister at Peking, in reply, dissented warmly
from Lord Salisbury's opinion. "The battle of Concessions is
not, in my opinion," he cabled on the 23d of July, "going
against us. … Up to the present, any concessions granted to
other nationalities are far out-balanced in financial value by
the Shansi and Honan mining and railway concession, with its
possible extensions. I have consistently informed the Chinese
government that, as to differential rates and privileges, we
want none ourselves, and cannot admit that other nationalities
have a claim to them." In due time, as will appear, Sir Claude
was able to furnish very good evidence in support of his
contention that the "battle of concessions" was not going
against Great Britain, by forwarding a list of all the
concessions granted to clamoring capitalists and promoters of
the several nationalities. Meantime, he gave close attention
to the varying fortunes of the battle.

A concession for the Peking-Hankow Railway was the one which
interested the English most. Its line would traverse the rich
and populous provinces of Chi-li, Honan, and Hoa-Pé, and be
connected by another line, for which the Russo-Chinese Bank
held concessions, with the valuable coal-mining basin of
Ping-ting. Early in August, the British found reason to
believe that the pending agreement with a Belgian syndicate
for the building of this road was one that would give control
of it to the Russo-Chinese Bank,—which meant Russian, or
Russian and French control. He promptly remonstrated to the
Yamên, and was assured that the agreement had not yet been
submitted to the throne, and would not be ratified if the
effect were such as he had described. He cabled this assurance
to Lord Salisbury on the 6th of August. On the 13th he had a
very different report to make. "I learnt on the 9th," he says,
"that the Yamên had, under the influence of Li Hung-chang,
abandoned this position [that they would not ratify the
Belgian agreement if its effect was to give control of the
Peking-Hankow line of railway to the Russo-Chinese Bank], and
intended to ratify the agreement immediately. In view of the
urgency of the matter, I addressed a note on the same day to
the Yamên, in which I asked for an interview on the 10th or
11th instant, and informed them that the Chinese text of the
Contract had reached me, warning them at the same time that if
they did not give me another interview before they ratified
the Agreement Her Majesty's Government would look upon their
action as unfriendly, and would probably insist on the same
rights being given to Great Britain in all the provinces
adjoining the Yang-tsze.

"On the evening of the 10th the Yamên answered that they would
appoint a day for an interview when they had received the
Contract, which, they said, had not yet reached Peking for
ratification. On the 11th I replied that I understood from
this communication that they undertook not to ratify until
they had seen me. To this they returned an evasive answer to
the effect that they were all engaged by ceremonies at the
Palace connected with the Emperor's birthday, which would last
some days. I should add that I had already, on the 10th, sent
them a note in which I criticized the Contract in detail,
stating finally that I should have further objections to bring
forward at my interview with them. I now hear on good
authority that the Contract was ratified yesterday, the 12th.
That the ratification has thus been rushed through is
undoubtedly due to the influence of Li Hung-chang, combined
with strong pressure on the part of the Representatives of
Russia, France, and Belgium, and if heavy payment is not
exacted from the Chinese Government for their bad faith, Li
will persuade his colleagues that it is safer to slight
England than any other Power, and any pressure which we may
want to bring to bear in other matters will be without weight.
I therefore think that Her Majesty's Government should insist
either:—

"1. On a written assurance from the Yamên that if British
Syndicates apply for any railway concessions in the Yang-tsze
provinces, they shall be given on the same terms as those
which France, under cover of the Belgian Syndicate, has
received in the Peking-Hankow Contract, and that no mining or
railway concessions will be granted in those provinces unless
they have been previously declined by British Syndicates; or

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"2. On a written assurance that all railways for which British
Syndicates are now in Treaty, that is to say—
(a.) The Shan-hai-Kuan-Niuchwang line;
(b.) The line from Tien-tsin to Chinkiang (the latter, as I
understand, in conjunction with Germans and Americans);
(c.) The line from Shanghae to Nanking with its
continuations and branches;
(d.) The lines in Honan and Shansi should be granted
without any further delay on terms identical with those
contained in the Contract for the Peking-Hankow line. The
latter consist, so far as I can learn, in complete control
over the construction, choice of material, working, and
personnel of the line, together with an Imperial guarantee
for the repayment of the loan.

The second demand seems to me to be preferable on the whole;
it will be impossible to obtain either demand without bringing
great pressure to bear, and I consider that the demand should
be made not as a compensatory concession, but as a punishment
for bad faith."

On the 17th the reply of the British Foreign Office was sent
by Mr. Balfour, as follows:

"With reference to your telegram of the 13th instant, inform
Yamên that they must assent to your proposal Number 2 without
delay, omitting from it the Shankaikuan-Newchwang Railway,
which we must deal with as a separate question. You are
authorized to inform them, if you have any reason to apprehend
that they will delay compliance, that, unless they agree at
once, we shall regard their breach of faith concerning the
Peking-Hankow Railway as an act of deliberate hostility
against this country, and shall act accordingly. After
consultation with the Admiral, you may give them the number of
days or hours you think proper within which to send their
reply. The delay should not be of too long duration. It should
be noted, on face of your demand, that Chingkiang Concession
is for Americans and Germans, if they desire a share, as well
as ourselves. Also make it clear that your ultimatum has
nothing to do with the line to Newchwang."

The tone of these demands made them effectual. On the 4th of
September, Sir Claude MacDonald was able to announce to his
superiors, in London: "At an interview which I had with them
yesterday, the Yamên entered into the following
undertaking:—Within the next few days they will address a
despatch to me, apologising for their action, and consenting
to the construction of the following lines by British
Syndicates:

1. A. line from Shanghae to Nanking with a continuation viâ
Chinkiang to Sui Yang. They said, however, that the latter
route was that followed by the line from Tien-tsin to
Chinkiang, for which they said that a Preliminary Agreement
had been signed between Yung Wing and the Anglo-American
Syndicate; and the continuation in question must be dependent
on the cancellation of that Agreement.

2. A line connecting Hangchow and Soochow with Shanghae, to be
continued if required to Ningpo.

3. A line from Canton to Kowloon.

4. The Peking Syndicate to be entitled to construct a railway
to convey minerals from their mines to the Yang-tsze. The
Yamên have also agreed to send me a Confidential note
embodying a declaration that the terms accorded for the
construction of these lines will not be inferior to those
granted for the construction of any railways in China proper.
The Manchurian lines are excluded from the scope of this
Agreement. I venture to think that this is a satisfactory
settlement. I did not give them an ultimatum, confining myself
to a warning of the grave consequences which would now attend
any failure on their part to keep their word. The fact that
the fleet is concentrating is, of course, known to them."

Before receiving this announcement, Mr. Balfour had cabled, on
the 24th of August:

"Negotiations with Yamên may be facilitated if you informed
them at once that, unless the very moderate terms already
demanded are immediately complied with, we shall, in addition,
require the Concession of another line, on same conditions as
those granted in case of Peking Hankow line of railway, and
that additional demands will be preferred as the result of
further delay. If you think it would conduce to the rapid and
satisfactory termination of the negotiations, you are
authorized to make a communication to them in this sense."
Whether this suggestion was acted upon or not does not appear.

This transaction, connected with the project of a railway from
Peking to Hankow, appears to illustrate, not unfairly, on the
whole, the mode in which speculative concessions were being
wrung from the Chinese government in the busiest year of
oriental speculation, 1898. The outcome of the grand "battle"
was communicated by Sir Claude MacDonald to Lord Charles
Beresford, on the 23d of November, in a full list of the
concessions then granted to British subjects, compared with
the grants to other nationalities. "We do not seem," wrote Sir
Claude, with pardonable complacency, "to have come out second
best. … Not a single bona fide or approximately practical
scheme which has been brought to this Legation has failed to
be put through." The summarized result in railway concessions
was

9 British (2,800 miles);
3 Russian (1,530 miles);
2 German (720 miles);
3 French (420 miles);
1 Belgian (650 miles);
1 American (300 miles).

In detail, the railway and mining concessions were described
in the list as follows:

CHINA:
"Railway and other Concessions obtained by British Companies:

I. Province of Shansi.
The Peking Syndicate have acquired the 'sole right to open and
work coal and iron mines throughout the districts of Yu Hsien
and Ping Ting-chou, and the Prefectures of Lusan Fu, Tsü-chou
Fu, and Ping Yang Fu, and also petroleum, wherever found.'
Under their contract, the Syndicate have also the right to
'construct branch railways to connect with main lines or with
water navigation, to facilitate transport of Shansi coal.'
This has been interpreted officially to include the right of
connecting the mines with Siang-yang in Hupeh, the nearest
head of navigation giving access to the Yang-tsze. This means
a railway of 250 miles. As to the value of this Concession, it
is not amiss to quote the testimony of Baron von Richthofen,
the great authority on the geology of China. He says that, 'in
proportion to its area, Shansi has probably the largest and
most easily workable coalfield of any region on the globe, and
the manufacture of iron is capable of almost unlimited
extension.'

II. Province of Honan.
The Peking Syndicate have also acquired rights similar to
those obtained in Shansi in that part of Honan north of the
Yellow River.

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III. Province of Chihli.
The Hong Kong and Shanghae Bank are financing and controlling
the North China railways from Peking to Tien-tsin, and thence
to Shanhaikuan and Newchwang. The total length of these lines
is about 500 miles, of which 300 miles are completely open to
traffic.

IV. This bank has also acquired a half-interest in the
coal-mines at Nan P'iao, in the Ch'ao-yang district. According
to experts, these mines possess the best and richest coal
seams in North China, and they have the immense advantage of
being close to a line of railway and the sea.

V. Provinces of Chihli and Kiangsu.
The Tsung-li Yamên have undertaken officially that the
construction of the Tien-tsin-Chinkiang line shall be
intrusted to an Anglo-German Syndicate. The British portion of
this Syndicate is represented in China by Messrs. Jardine,
Matheson, and Co., and the Hong Kong and Shanghae Bank. This
will be a trunk line of 600 miles, passing through more
populous country than the Lu-Han Railway (the Belgian line),
with which it is certain to be able to compete successfully.

VI. Province of Kiangsu.
A British Syndicate, represented by Messrs. Jardine, Matheson,
and Co., and the Hong Kong and Shanghae Bank, has obtained the
Concession to finance and construct the Shanghae-Nanking
Railway. There is no more paying district than this for a
railway in China. The length of line will be 170 or 180 miles.

VII. Provinces of Kiangsu, Anhui, and Honan.
The same Syndicate has the right to extend the
Shanghae-Nanking Railway from P'u-k'ou, opposite Nanking, to
Hsin Yang, in Honan, a distance of 270 miles.

VIII. Provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang.
The same Syndicate has the right to construct a line from
Soochow to Hangchow, with a possible extension to Ningpo. This
line will run through very populous districts for over 200
miles. The last three Concessions all lie within the Yang-tsze
region.

IX. Province of Chêkiang.
The Peking Syndicate have also obtained mining Concessions
similar to the Shansi and Honan in this province.

X. Province of Kwangtung.
The Jardine Syndicate has the right to construct a railway
from Kowloon to Canton. The length of line will be nearly 100
miles.

XI. Provinces of Hupei, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung.
An American Syndicate signed a preliminary Agreement for the
construction of a railway from Hankow to Canton in May last.
Negotiations are now in progress for the amalgamation of this
Concession with Number 10, Kowloon to Canton, and the working
of the whole line from Hankow to Kowloon by an Anglo-American
Company. This will be a trunk line of, approximately, 600
miles long.

XII. Provinces of Yünnan, Kweichow, and Ssuchuan.
The right to extend the Burmah system into China as far as the
Yang-tsze is admitted, and surveys are now in progress. This
involves a possible railway of 700 miles.

See Remarks on French Concessions.

CHINA:
"Concessions other than British. Russian.

The Manchurian Railway Concession dates from 1896. As is well
known, it was obtained as recompense for help given in
securing the retrocession of Liaotung. From Stretensk on the
Shilka, where it leaves the main Siberian line, this railway
will cross the Argun and Hingan Mountains, and reach Kirin viâ
Petuna. The whole length from Stretensk to Vladivostock is
estimated at 1,400 miles, of which about 1,000 will pass
through Chinese territory. The Concession is purely
strategical. The country traversed, though potentially rich,
in great part is, and will be for long, sparsely populated,
and the line cannot, in the near future at any rate, hope to
pay its working expenses.

2. The Port Arthur Agreement of March 1898 arranges for the
conclusion by Russia of a branch from the above line to Port
Arthur or Talienwan. The length of the railway will be about
400 miles. Commercially, this branch is more promising than
the first Concession.

3. The Russo-Chinese Bank has signed a contract for the
construction of a branch line from T'ai-yüan Fu to connect
with the Lu-Han trunk lines near Chêng-tung. Length,
approximately 130 miles. They have, up to date, been unable to
raise money for this line. I think it very possible that it
will eventually be built by an Anglo-Russian Syndicate. I am
trying to arrange this.

"French.—The French possess the right to construct three
lines, but beyond acquiring this right they have done nothing.

1. From Tonquin up the Red River Valley to Yünnan Fu, say 200
miles. The impression in French railway circles is that a
railway through Yünnan will not pay expenses, and if any
serious attempt is made to carry out the extension of the
Tonquin system, it will be merely as a stepping-stone to
Ssü-ch'uan. Yet again, any pretensions that a railway from
Yünnan to the Yang-tsze may have to rank as a commercial
project have been pronounced against by every traveller in
Central China.

2. Langson-Lungchow-Nanning Railway; length, about 100 miles.
(There appears to be an alternative open to the French of
going to Pésé instead of Nanning.) The right to build this
line has been conceded, but the idea is growing amongst the
French of Tonquin that, instead of diverting traffic from the
West River, a line from Langson to Lungchow and Nanning would
prove an additional feeder of the West River route.

3. From Pakhoi inland, presumably to Nanning; length, say 120
miles. The Tonquin press have pointed out that this line will
benefit English commerce more than French. It will never, in
my opinion, be built-by the French.

" German.
1. Kiao-chau-Yichow-Tsinan line; length, 420 miles. Nothing
has been done towards the construction of this line, which
does not promise commercially.

2. Tien-tsin-Chin-kiang line to be built by an Anglo-German
Company.

See Number 5 of the British Concessions.

"Belgian.
The Lu-Han or Peking-Hankow Railway. A Franco-Belgian
Syndicate have secured the Concession for this, a trunk line
of some 650 or 700 miles, passing north and south through
Chihli, Honan, and Hupeh. This railway is an old project born
of Chang-Chih-Tung's objection to building lines near the
coast, 'lest they should facilitate the access of an enemy.'
Its prospects as a commercial enterprise are not considered so
good as those of the rival Tien-tsin-Chinkiang line.

"American.
The only railway in which America is at present interested is
the trunk line projected from Hankow to Canton."

See British Concessions, Number 11.

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On the 18th of December the British Minister announced to Lord
Salisbury: "An Imperial Decree, stating that no more railway
proposals will be for the present entertained by the Chinese
government, has been officially communicated to me by the
Yamên." To which the response from London was: "You should
inform the Chinese Government that Her Majesty's Government
claim, in the event of their revoking their present resolve
not to entertain any more proposals for railways, priority of
consideration by the Chinese Government of all British
applications already made." This notice was given, as
directed, and the Yamên replied to it (December 31) with some
dignity: "We have the honour to observe that the development
of railways in China is the natural right and advantage of the
Chinese Government. If, hereafter, in addition to the lines
already sanctioned, which will be proceeded with in order,
China proposes to construct other railways, she will negotiate
with the nation which she finds suitable. When the time
arrives China must use her own discretion as to her course of
action. The applications of British merchants can, of course,
be kept on record as material for negotiation at that day, but
it is not expedient to treat them as having a prior claim over
all others to a settled agreement."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:
China, Number 1, 1899, pages 164-69, 190-92, 215-16,
327, 344-47; and Number 1, 1900, page 22._

CHINA: A. D. 1898 (March).
An intelligent Chinese view of the situation of the country.

How well the situation and the dangers of their country were
understood at this period by some, at least, of the Chinese
officials, and how intelligently they considered them, may be
gathered from some passages in a memorial addressed by Viceroy
Chang Chih-tung and another high official, Sheng Hsuan-huai,
Director-General of Railways, to the Emperor, on the subject
of the construction of the Hankow-Kwangtung Railway. A
translation of the document was transmitted to London at the
end of March. The memorialists say: "The original idea was
that the construction of the Hankow-Kwangtung Southern trunk
line should be postponed for a time, but now, owing to the
exigencies of the present situation, this work must not be
delayed. The powerful foreign nations stand around watching
for their opportunity, and, making use of trivial pretexts in
the conduct of international affairs, swiftly dispatch their
war-ships from one end of the Empire to the other. It is
impossible to say when our communication by sea may be
blocked, and the establishment of internal communication by
railways has become a necessity. Kwungtung is a rich province,
and the defence of the southern territory and waterways must
not be neglected, so that the making of the Hankow-Kwangtung
line should be proceeded with at the same time as the northern
road. The original intention was to construct a road from
Kwangtung to Hupeh viâ Chiangsi, but this circuitous route is
longer than the direct route through Hunan Province, and for
many reasons it will be a source of greater prosperity and
strength to the Empire if the latter route is adopted. There
is, moreover, no doubt that the officials and merchants of the
three provinces are in favour of this scheme. The most direct
route will be to proceed viâ Ch'en-chou, Yung-chou, Feng-chou,
and Ch'ang-sha to Wuch'ang, and so to Hankow. … Now Hankow is
the central point to which all the waterways of the eighteen
provinces from north, south, east, and west converge. If
England is allowed to build the Hankow and Kwangtung road,
passing through this important point, afterwards when the
Russian line advances southward, and the English line is
continued to the north, although we shall be in possession of
the Hankow-Lü Kou-chiao line, we shall be stilled and our
profits curtailed, for, being between the other lines, we
shall not be able to defend our own. It is also greatly to be
feared that our own line would pass into either English or
Russian hands. In this case not only is our throat stopped by
the foreigners being in possession of our ports, but our vital
parts are injuriously affected. Should we wish to raise and
drill soldiers, make arms, or obtain funds for the necessities
of the Empire, it will be impossible, and China not only will
not make progress, but we fear she will barely be able to
maintain her independence.

"Your memorialists are distressed when they consider the
extreme danger of the situation, but they think that the best
method of meeting it is to proceed ourselves at once with the
construction of the Hankow-Kwangtung Railway. Should it be
made by degrees, starting from Kwangtung through Hunan to
Hankow, it will be seized forcibly before completion, and we
fear sufficient funds cannot be raised for hurrying forward
its construction. Your memorialist, Sheng, had the intention
of employing American capital for the construction of the Lü
Kou-chaio-Hankow line, but afterwards when the American,
Washburn, came to China, his conditions were found to be too
hard, and consequently negotiations were broken off. Your
servant was thus constrained to approach Belgium. By acting
thus our privileges would not be lost, nor would ill
consequences follow. But Belgium is a small country, and her
strength is inconsiderable, and often she has pointed out that
an unfinished railroad is hardly a sufficient guarantee for
the loan. Consequently she is very undecided, but we have
hopes that by the adoption of some compromise terms may be
arrived at, though the question is extremely difficult. Thus
another scheme must be adopted for raising the capital for the
southern line. There are grave objections to allowing either
England, France, or Germany to undertake the work, and your
memorialists suggest that Wu Ting-fang, the Minister at
Washington, should be communicated with. He is a Cantonese,
and will not fail to do his best to find a scheme."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:
China, Number 1, 1899,pages 87-89._

CHINA: A. D. 1898 (March-July).
Russian acquisition of Port Arthur and Talienwan.
Ineffectual British opposition.
Consequent British demand for Wei-hai Wei.
Its lease by China.

While the British Minister at Peking was securing these
assurances from the Tsung-li Yamên, concerning the
non-alienation of the Yang-tsze region and the opening of
inland waters to steam navigation, the Russian Minister was
equally busy, extorting a cession or lease of Port Arthur and
Talienwan, with privileges of railway construction through
neighboring territory which gave immense value to those
acquisitions. The probability of his success was soon known to
the British authorities, who made no serious objection to the
leasing of Talienwan, but were strongly opposed to a Russian
occupation of Port Arthur.
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On the 22d of March, 1898, Lord Salisbury wrote to the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg: "Her Majesty's Government on
their part would not regard with any dissatisfaction the lease
by Russia of an ice-free commercial harbour, connected by
rail with the trans-Siberian Railway which is now under
construction. Questions of an entirely different kind are
opened if Russia obtains control of a military port in the
neighbourhood of Peking. Port Arthur is useless for commercial
purposes, its whole importance being derived solely from its
military strength and strategic position, and its occupation
would inevitably be considered in the East as a standing
menace to Peking and the commencement of the partition of
China."

On the 28th of March he wrote again: "Port Arthur is not a
commercial harbour. It is doubtful whether it could be
converted into one. It is certain that, even if such a project
were possible, it could never be worth while for the owners or
lessees of Talienwan to embark upon it. But though not a
commercial harbour, Port Arthur supplies a naval base, limited
indeed in extent, but possessing great natural and artificial
strength. And this, taken in connection with its strategic
position, gives it an importance in the Gulf of Pechili and
therefore at Peking, upon which, in their representations to
Japan at the close of the war with China, the Russian
Government laid the greatest emphasis. It is from this last
point of view that the occupation of Port Arthur chiefly
concerns Her Majesty's Government. It is not because a
position which can easily be made a naval arsenal of great
strength has been acquired by Russia that they regret its
occupation by that Power. It is because the possession, even
if temporary, of this particular position, is likely to have
political consequences at Peking of great international
importance, and because the acquisition of a Chinese harbour
notoriously useless for commercial purposes by a foreign Power
will be universally interpreted in the Far East as indicating
that the partition of China has begun.

"As regards the second of these reasons nothing further need
be said, inasmuch as Her Majesty's Government understand from
Count Mouravieff's communication to you that this result is as
little desired by the Russian Government as it is by that of
Her Majesty. As regards the first, it may perhaps be proper to
observe that a great military Power which is coterminous for
over 4,000 miles with the land frontier of China, including
the portion lying nearest to its capital, is never likely to
be without its due share of influence on the councils of that
country. Her Majesty's Government regard it as Most
unfortunate that it has been thought necessary in addition to
obtain control of a port which, if the rest of the Gulf of
Pechili remains in hands so helpless as those of the Sovereign
Power, will command the maritime approaches to its capital,
and give to Russia the same strategic advantage by sea which
she already possesses in so ample a measure by land. Her
Majesty's Government have thought it their duty thus to put on
record their grave objections to the occupation of Port Arthur
by Russia."

Before this despatch was written, Lord Salisbury already knew
that his remonstrances had failed and that Russia was to
possess Port Arthur, and he had cabled, March 25, the
following instructions to Sir Claude MacDonald, the British
Minister to Peking: "Balance of power in Gulf of Pechili is
materially altered by surrender of Port Arthur by Yamên to
Russia. It is therefore necessary to obtain, in the manner you
think most efficacious and speedy, the refusal of Wei-hai Wei
on the departure of the Japanese. The terms should be similar
to those granted to Russia for Port Arthur. British fleet is
on its way from Hong Kong to Gulf of Pechili." The day
following, Lord Salisbury advised the British Ambassador at
Berlin by telegram: "Her Majesty's Government have demanded a
reversionary lease of Wei-hai Wei, and it is possible that the
German Government will address you with regard to our
occupying territory which forms part of the Province of
Shantung. Should this be the case, you are authorized to
explain that Wei-hai Wei is not at present, and cannot, we
believe, be made a commercial port by which access can be
obtained to any part of the province. We do not wish to
interfere with the interests of Germany in that region. The
action, in our opinion very regrettable, of Russia with
respect to Port Arthur, has compelled us to take the course we
are now pursuing."

On the 29th of March the completion of the transaction by
which China transferred Port Arthur and Talienwan to Russia
was officially announced at St. Petersburg by the following
publication in the "Official Messenger": "At Peking on the
15th (27th) March a special Agreement was signed by the
Plenipotentiaries of Russia and China, by virtue of which
Ports Arthur and Talienwan, with the corresponding territory
and waters, have been ceded to the Imperial Government for
twenty-five years—which period, by mutual agreement, may be
still further prolonged—and the construction allowed of
branches of railways in order to connect these ports with the
main Great Siberian line. This Agreement is a direct and
natural outcome of the friendly relations between great
neighbouring Empires, all of whose endeavours should be
directed towards the preservation of tranquillity along the
vast extent of their neighbouring possessions for the common
benefit of the people of both of them. The peaceful
occupation, by the diplomatic Agreement of the 15th March, of
the ports and territory of a friendly nation shows, in the
best possible way, that the Government of China truly
appreciates the meaning of the Agreement established between
us.

"Securing the inviolability of the sovereign rights of China,
and satisfying the daily requirements of Russia in her
capacity of a great and neighbouring naval Power, this
Agreement can in no way insure [injure?] the interests of any
other foreign Power; on the contrary, it gives to all nations
of the world the possibility in the near future of entering
into communication with this hitherto closed-up country on the
coast of the Yellow Sea. The opening to the commercial fleets
of all foreign nations of the port of Talienwan creates in the
Pacific Ocean a new and extended centre for the commercial and
trading undertakings of those nations, especially by means of
the Great Siberian line, henceforth to be taken into account,
and which, thanks to the friendly Treaty between Russia and
China, will unite the extreme ends of the Old World. Thus, the
Agreement signed at Peking has for Russia a deep historical
signification, and must be joyfully welcomed by all to whom
happy peace and successes, based on the mutual understandings
of nations, are dear."

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On the 3d of April, Sir Claude MacDonald was able to announce
by cable to Lord Salisbury: "Yamên agreed yesterday to the
following arrangement: China will lease Wei-hai Wei to Great
Britain on the same terms as Port Arthur has been leased to
Russia, but Great Britain agrees not to take possession of the
place until it has been given up by Japan. The lease will
continue until Russia ceases to occupy Liaotung Peninsula.
Details are left for subsequent adjustment." Negotiations
relative to the terms of the lease of Wei-hai Wei were
protracted until the first of July, when the Convention
determining them was signed at Peking. Its provisions were as
follows: "The territory leased shall comprise the Island of
Liu-kung and all islands in the Bay of Wei-hai Wei, and a belt
of land 10 English miles wide along the entire coast line of the
Bay of Wei-hai Wei. Within the above-mentioned territory
leased Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction. Great
Britain shall have, in addition, the right to erect
fortifications, station troops, or take any other measures
necessary for defensive purposes, at any points on or near the
coast of the region east of the meridian 121° 40' east of
Greenwich, and to acquire on equitable compensation with that
territory such sites as may be necessary for water supply,
communications, and hospitals. Within that zone Chinese
administration will not be interfered with, but no troops
other than Chinese or British shall be allowed therein. It is
also agreed that within the walled city of Wei-hai Wei,
Chinese officials shall continue to exercise jurisdiction
except so far as may be inconsistent with naval and military
requirements for the defence of the territory leased. It is
further agreed that Chinese vessels of war, whether neutral or
otherwise, shall retain the right to use the waters herein
leased to Great Britain. It is further understood that there
will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants of
the territory herein specified, and that if land is required
for fortifications, public officers, or any official or public
purpose, it shall be bought at a fair price."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:
China, Number 1, 1898, and Number 1, 1899._

CHINA: A. D. 1898 (April-July).
Charges of corruption against Li Hung-chang and
the Tsung-li Yamên.

"One of the censors of highest rank memorialised the Emperor
early in April, accusing the whole Tsung-li Yamên of being in
Russian pay, and alleging that the sum of 10,000,000 taels was
paid to them. He also stated that Li Hung-chang had secured
from Russia 1,500,000 taels, and he prayed for a full inquiry
and for the decapitation of Li Hung-chang if the accusation
were proved, or if he were found guiltless, he himself should
be decapitated. Li Hung-chang was dismissed on September 6,
but afterwards in November was appointed an imperial
commissioner to report on the inundations of the Yellow River,
an unwelcome post. … A Black Flag rebellion in the southern
province of Kwang-si, in which the secret society called The
Triads was said to be concerned, was giving the Pekin
Government great anxiety in July. The rebels, numbering about
40,000, were for a time victorious and seemed determined to
overthrow the dynasty."

_Annual Register, 1898, pages 333-334._

CHINA: A. D. 1898 (April-August).
France in the field with demands.
New demands from Great Britain.

France had now come forward to seize a place in the attacking
line, preparatory to what seemed to be the impending partition
of China. On the 12th of April, Sir Claude MacDonald cabled to
Lord Salisbury the following despatch: "I had an interview
with the Yamên yesterday, at which they informed me that
China, had acceded to the following demands on the part of
France:

1. Kwangchow Wan [in the Lei-chau peninsula, on the southern
coast, near Tonquin] to be leased as a coaling-station to
France.

2. The right to construct a railway to Yünnan-fu from the
Tonquin frontier.

3. The promise not to alienate any territory in the three
provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yünnan, which border on
the French frontier.

4. The Chinese Government agree that if ever they constitute a
Postal Department independent of the maritime customs, and if
a European is to be appointed as Director thereof, France
shall have an equal right with that of other Powers to
nominate a candidate for the post of Director.

The Chinese Government are willing—

1. To lease us as much additional territory on Kowloon
promontory [opposite Hong Kong], exclusive of Kowloon city, as
is required for military and naval purposes.

2. The Yamên state that China is quite willing to allow the
extension into Yünnan of the Burmah Railway."

On the 13th, Mr. Balfour, in the absence of Lord Salisbury,
cabled from London in reply: "Inform Yamên that, although they
have not followed our advice, we are anxious to maintain, as
far as possible, integrity of China, and will, therefore, not
make new territorial demands upon them. It is, however,
absolutely necessary, if we are to pursue this policy, that
they, on their side, should first immediately conclude
negotiations—

(a) for giving us an the land required for military defences
of Hong Kong;

(b) to fulfil their promise to make Nanning a Treaty port;

(c) to give some railway concession;

(d) an agreement as to the non-alienation of Kuang'tung and
Yünnan.

In connection with condition (d), it is in the interests of
the integrity of China, and is justified by the proximity of
Yünnan to Burmah, and by our commercial preponderance in
Kuang'tung."

On the same day (13th April) the British Minister at Paris
telegraphed to the Foreign Office, London: "It is stated in
to-night's papers that, at the Cabinet Council held this
morning, M. Hanotaux was able to announce to his colleagues
that the French demands on China had been satisfactorily met.
They are stated in the semi-official 'Temps' to be:—

1. Concession of a lease of a bay on the south coast of China.

2. Concession of a railway connecting Tonquin with Yünnan-fu
by the Red River.

3. Engagement on the part of China never to alienate the
territories of the provinces contiguous to Tonquin.

4. Engagement never to cede to any other Power the Island of
Hainan.

5. Arrangement in regard to the constitution of the postal
service."

Thus, for the time being, France was satisfied, and England
would be, before she gave rest to the Tsung-li Yamên. Her
present demands, as above specified by Mr. Balfour, were
pressed without ceasing by the pertinacious Sir Claude. On the
9th of June he obtained from the Yamên a lease for the British
government of about 200 square miles of territory on the
mainland opposite its island crown colony of Hong Kong, and
surrounding the Chinese city of Kowloon, the latter, however,
to remain under Chinese jurisdiction.
{89}
The term of the lease was 90 years. With regard to the opening
of Nanning as a Treaty Port, he received an assurance from the
Yamên in August that it should be done so soon as the Kwang-si
rebellion was crushed. On the other points he had equal
success.

_Great Britain. Papers by Command:
China, Number 1, 1899, pages 12, 19, 98-99, 178._

CHINA: A. D. 1898 (May).
How the murder of a missionary was made the ground of French
demands for a Railway Concession.

On the 17th of May, 1898, the British Minister at Peking
cabled to Lord Salisbury: "Murder of missionary in Kuang-si.
French demands for compensation. … The Yamên … said they were
not certain that the murdered missionary was not a Chinaman,
and that the demands made by the French for compensation
comprise a Concession for a railway to some point on the
sea-coast not specified, a chapel to be built, and a pecuniary
indemnity of 100,000 fr. to be paid. Up to the present they had
refused all these demands." Later, the following particulars
of the murder were received from the British Consul at Canton:
"The occurrence happened about a fortnight ago at
Yun-gan-chou, in the P'ing-lo Prefecture. While walking
through the streets the missionary noticed a placard directed
against the Christian religion. Having discovered the author
of the placard, the missionary, with two converts, proceeded
to his house and attempted to arrest him. Out of this a
disturbance arose in which the passers-by took part, and in
the end the missionary and the two converts lost their lives."

On the 21st of May Sir Claude MacDonald reported to Lord
Salisbury from Peking: "I am very reliably informed that the
demands made at an interview with the Yamên yesterday by M.
Pichon, the French Minister, in connection with this case
were:—

1. A Concession to construct a railway from Pakhoi to Nanning;

2. Construction of a chapel at Pakhoi;

3. A pecuniary indemnity of 100,000 fr.; and

4. The responsible officials to be punished.

In response to these demands, the Yamên suggested that the
Railway Concession should be granted in a document by itself,
apart from the granting of the other demands, and that the
chapel should be built at Yungan-chou, the scene of the
murder, instead of at Pakhoi, and the French Minister
undertook to refer these modifications to his Government for
their favourable consideration."

On the 27th, Sir Claude reported further that he had heard on
very good authority that all the French demands had been
granted, and added: "The Yamên have since denied to me that
they have committed themselves to granting them, but I have
little doubt that they have practically done so. The reason
for making the Railway Concession a separate matter is that
the Chinese are anxious to avoid establishing precedents for
compensation for attacks on missionaries taking the shape of
commercial Concessions, and they hope, rather foolishly, to do
so by nominally closing the missionary case before the other
matter is taken up. They did this in the case of the German
Agreement for the lease of Kiao-chau Bay, which begins by
declaring that the Shantung missionary case has already been
closed. The French demands are not at all excessive. I have
already expressed my belief that the proposed railway will not
injure us commercially, provided, of course, that no
differential rates are allowed, as to which I shall insist on
specific assurances from the Yamên."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:
China, Number 1, 1899, pages 91, 146, 150._

Alluding to this incident, and to that which the German
government made its pretext for seizing Kiao Chau (see, above,
A. D. 1897-November), a German writer has remarked:

"Never before, perhaps, has so much material value been
attached to ministers of the Gospel in foreign lands, and the
manner in which, after their death, they are used to spread
civilization is somewhat foreign to our older ideas of the
functions of the bearers of spiritual blessings."

CHINA: A. D. 1898 (June-September).
Momentary influence of a reform party in the palace.
Futile attempt of the young emperor to uphold it.

The decaying state of the Empire had now become so desperately
plain, and the predatory swarm of governments and speculators
which gathered to despoil it had grown so greedy and so bold,
that a party which could see that the only hope for its
salvation must be sought in some modernizing reforms, of
education and administration, was able to win a momentary
footing of influence in the palace at Peking. Its leading
spirit appears to have been one Kang Yeu Wei, an extremely
radical reformer who came from Canton. In an article which he
wrote some months later, and which was published in the
"Contemporary Review," Kang Yeu Wei gave this account of
himself, and of the mode in which he was brought into
relations with the young Emperor:

"I was always fond of studying Western learning. After the
French took Foochow in 1885 there was evident danger of
China's end drawing nigh. Consequently, in 1889, I
memorialised about the matter in great grief. I feared
Russia's advance southward, and pointed out the secret
intentions of Japan and the latent danger in Corea. I thought
that China had come to such a pass that if she should devote
these years for the purpose of speedy reform she might become
strong, but if there was delay nothing could save her. At that
time the high Ministers of State were all Conservatives, and
would not present my memorial to the throne. After the loss of
Formosa, Wêng Tung Ho [the Emperor's tutor] was sorry that he
had listened to their advice, and was very cordial to me. Then
I exhorted him to reform, and I wrote a long memorial, signed
by 1,300 provincial graduates, to urge reform again and again,
and a Reform Club was formed in Peking, and the newspaper,
'Chinese Progress,' was started in Shanghai. At this time
(1895) Wêng Tung Ho strongly urged reform on the Emperor, but
was checked by the Empress-Dowager, and almost put aside then,
and the Reform Club was shut up. I then returned to Canton,
and founded the Ethical Society in Canton province and the
Sacred Society in Kwang-Si province. My disciples, Liang Chi
Chao and Tan Tze Tung, formed the Southern Learning Society in
Hunan province; Liu Shio started the Fookien Learning Society
in the Fukien province; Yang Tui the Szechuen Learning
Society, in the province of Szechuen; Yang Shin Sheu and Sung
Peh Luh opened the Pass Learning Society in the provinces of
Shansi and Shensi; I and my brother K'ang Kwang In, with King
Yuen Shen, opened a Chinese girls' school and formed the
Anti-foot-binding Society in Shanghai; and many newspapers
were started. Thus newspapers and new schools flourished in
all the provinces, and all the empire knew of the reform.

{90}

"When Kiaochow was taken by the Germans I went to Peking again
and sent up another memorial strongly urging reform, with the
same motive as Peter the Great, and on the same political
lines as have been adopted by the present Emperor of Japan. I
also presented my books on the history of reform in Japan and
the history of Peter the Great's reforms, and suggested that
all the coast of the empire be open to international trade.
Wêng Tung Ho approved of it, and strongly supported the
measure at Court. But the crowd of Conservatives opposed, and
he could not carry it. Then it was proposed to make an
alliance with England, as was advised in the reform paper of
Macao. The Government was undecided and feared that a great
nation like England would not be willing. But when England
asked that Port Arthur and Ta Lien Wan should be open ports I
hastened to Wêng Tung Ho and said, 'China is saved and will
not perish. You must grant the request. Since God gives us
this opportunity, it should on no account be let slip.' But
the Empress-Dowager and Li Hung Chang had made up their minds
to give them to Russia. Again, England promised to lend China
ten millions at 3 per cent. Russia was forcing China to borrow
from her at 4 per cent. The Foreign Office was in great fear
between these two great nations, and undecided. They then
discussed about borrowing from both, and finally decided not
to borrow from either. I said, 'You should decline Russia's
offer and borrow from England. Russia, though she might
threaten us, will never dare to declare war on this account.'
The Empress-Dowager favoured Russia and was afraid. In the end
they did not borrow from either.

"When Russia was seeking Port Arthur and Ta Lien Wan, I
presented two memorials that they should be refused to Russia
and both made open ports. The Emperor blamed Prince Kung and
Li Hung Chang, and asked, 'What is the use of a secret treaty
with Russia? Not only does Russia not protect us, but she
herself takes away territory from us.' Both the Prince and Li
replied: 'It is by giving Port Arthur and Ta Lien Wan to
Russia that the secret treaty is preserved.' At this the
Emperor was very angry. When the Empress-Dowager decided to
give them to Russia, and Wêng Tung Ho found that all my
prophecies came true, he strongly recommended me to the
Emperor. Kao Hsueh Tseng, the Supervising Censor, Chen Pao
Chen, the Governor of Hunan, Su Chih Ching, of the Hanlin
College, and Li Twan Fên, President of the Board of Rites,
also had recommended me from time to time. When the Emperor
asked the members of the Cabinet, Wêng-Tung Ho recommended me,
saying, 'His abilities are a hundred times superior to my
own,' and prayed the Emperor to listen to me in all matters of
reform. I also presented to the Emperor a record of England,
France, and Germany, a comparative diagram of all nations, and
the Reverend Timothy Richard's 'History of the Nineteenth
Century' and his 'Essays for the Times,' and translations of
Western books. The Emperor then understood something of the
cause of the rise and fall of nations, and made up his mind to
introduce great reforms. Desiring men to help him, he invited
me, and acted on my former suggestions."

But the situation at Peking, as Kang Yeu Wei describes it,—the
weakness of the young Emperor and the strength of the
Empress-Dowager,—made the undertaking of reform hopeless from
the beginning. The Empress-Dowager had professed to resign the
government, but, says Kang Yeu Wei, "she really still held the
reins in her hands. She read the memorials about appointments.
All the Ministers of the first and second rank were her
nominees. The Emperor had no voice. In all matters he had to
inform her first before acting. The Emperor was only an
Emperor in name.

"The Emperor was of a studious disposition. Since the loss of
Formosa he has been greatly distressed about the decline of
the Empire. After this his faithful tutor, Wêng Tung Ho, who
was a learned man, sought foreign books for study, and
presented them, with atlases, to the Emperor. These the
Emperor daily studied, discovered the cause of foreign
prosperity, discovered the reason of China's weakness and
conservatism, and made up his mind to reform. But this was not
in accordance with the view of the Empress-Dowager. At the
beginning of the war with Japan the Emperor and his Ministers
wanted war. The Empress-Dowager and Li Hung Chang wanted
peace. The Empress-Dowager was ready to give up Manchuria and
Formosa. The Emperor could not think of it for a moment
without crying with distress; he wanted to make an alliance
with England and to reform, while the Empress-Dowager was
equally bent on alliance with Russia without reform. Thus
their views diverged more and more, so that when the Emperor
wanted to reform in 1895 the Empress hated him; two of his
favourite Imperial ladies were beaten: the Vice-Presidents,
Chang Lin, Wang Ming Luan, and Tsz Tui, a brother of one of
these Imperial ladies, were driven away: and the Imperial
ladies' tutor, Wên Ting Shih, was stripped of his honours,
never to be employed any more. This was because all these
advised the Emperor to keep the power in his own hands.

"The eunuch Kow Lang Tsai memorialised the Empress-Dowager to
resign the government into the hands of the Emperor. For this
he was put to death. The Emperor himself narrowly escaped
being put aside then. … Chang Lin was a straightforward man in
whom Prince Kung put great confidence. In a memorial to the
Emperor he said: 'The relation of the Empress-Dowager to the
late Emperor Tung Chih was that of his own mother, but her
relation to you is that of the widowed concubine of a former
Emperor.' When the Empress-Dowager came to know this she was
in a great rage. Prince Kung was also in great fear. When the
Emperor issued an edict, by command of the Empress-Dowager, to
degrade Chang Lin, Prince Kung was weeping on his knees. When
asked the reason of it, the Emperor waved his hand and said,
'Don't ask him.' The Emperor and the Prince wept together, and
the Prince wept so bitterly that he had no strength to rise
up. The Emperor commanded the eunuchs to help him up and lead
him away. Wên Ting Shih begged the Emperor to exercise his
rights. The Emperor waved his hand, saying, 'Don't speak,' for
the Emperor knew long ago that when he took the reins of
government into his own hands the Empress hated him."

{91}

Nevertheless, in 1898, the well-meaning but weak young Emperor
was moved to a spasmodic assertion of his authority, in bold
strokes of reform. "Rather than lose his empire like those of
the Chin and the Ming dynasties, and become a by-word of
disgrace for all future generations, he would risk the dangers
of reform. If he succeeded, then he would get power into his
own hands and save his country. If he failed, he would greatly
open the minds of the people and prepare them for the future,
and thus, perhaps, preserve a remnant of China. At this time
the Emperor considered the chief thing was to preserve the
country from being lost to foreign nations, and looked upon
his position on the throne as of little consequence in
comparison—considering the welfare of the people as of
supreme importance, while his own person was of little
importance. He had none to consult with, but decided to risk
all danger and try."

_Kang Yen Wei,
The Reform of China and the Revolution of 1898
(Contemporary Review, August, 1899). _

Read with a knowledge of what came of them, the futile decrees
which the helpless young Emperor issued in June, 1898, seem
pathetic in the extreme. The following is a translation of the
first of his reform edicts, which bears the date, "Kuang Hsu,
24th year, 4th moon, 23d day," corresponding to June 11, 1898:

"For a long time past the condition of Imperial affairs has
been a subject of discussion among the officials of the
Empire, both metropolitan and provincial, with a view to bring
about changes necessary for improvement. Decrees have been
frequently issued by the Emperor, for a special system of
examinations, for doing away with the surplus soldiery, for
the alteration of the military examinations and for the
institution of colleges. In spite of the fact that these
things have so often been carefully thought out, and so many
plans have been formed, there is no general consensus of
opinion, and discussion is still rife as to which plans are
best. There are some among the older officials who affirm that
the old ways are best and need no alteration, and that the new
plans are not required. Such babblings are vain and useless.