Chapter LXXIV: Section IV (1)

On the Internment of Belligerents and the Care of the Wounded
in Neutral Countries.

ARTICLE LVII.
A neutral State which receives in its territory troops
belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them, as far
as possible, at a distance from the theatre of war. It can
keep them in camps, and even confine them in fortresses or
localities assigned for this purpose. It shall decide whether
officers may be left at liberty on giving their parole that
they will not leave the neutral territory without
authorization.

ARTICLE LVIII.
Failing a special Convention, the neutral State shall supply
the interned with the food, clothing, and relief required by
humanity. At the conclusion of peace, the expenses caused by
the internment shall be made good.

ARTICLE LIX.
A neutral State may authorize the passage through its
territory of wounded or sick belonging to the belligerent
armies, on condition that the trains bringing them shall carry
neither combatants nor war material. In such a case, the neutral
State is bound to adopt such measures of safety and control as
may be necessary for the purpose. Wounded and sick brought
under these conditions into neutral territory by one of the
belligerents, and belonging to the hostile party, must be
guarded by the neutral State, so as to insure their not taking
part again in the military operations. The same duty shall
devolve on the neutral State with regard to wounded or sick of
the other army who may be committed to its care.

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ARTICLE LX.
The Geneva Convention applies to sick and wounded interned in
neutral territory. The Convention establishing these
regulations was not signed by the delegates from the United
States, nor by those of Great Britain. The reasons for
abstention on the part of the latter were stated in a
communication from the British War Office, as follows: "Lord
Lansdowne … considers it essential that the revised Articles,
together with the Preamble and final dispositions, should be
submitted to the most careful examination by the high military
authorities and by the legal advisers of Her Majesty's
Government, before he can pronounce a definitive opinion on
the three points raised. Subject to such reserves as may
result from this examination, Lord Lansdowne is of opinion
that the Project of Convention is in general of such a nature
that it may, in principle, be accepted as a basis of
instructions for the guidance of the British army, but he is
unable, until that examination has been completed, to offer an
opinion as to whether it is desirable to enter into an
international engagement. Lord Lansdowne would therefore
suggest, for Lord Salisbury's consideration, that instructions
should be given to Sir Julian Pauncefote to reserve full
liberty for Her Majesty's Government, to accept only such
Articles as, after mature examination by their military and
legal advisers, they may approve of." Probably the delegates
from the United States were similarly instructed by their
government.

Added to the Convention relative to Laws and Customs of War
were three Declarations, separately signed, as follows:

1. "The contracting powers agree to prohibit, for a term of
five years, the launching of projectiles and explosives from
balloons, or by other new methods of a similar nature."

2. "The contracting parties agree to abstain from the use of
bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such
as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover
the core, or is pierced with incisions."

3. "The contracting parties agree to abstain from the use of
projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases."

The first of these Declarations was signed by the delegates
from the United States, but not by those from Great Britain.
The second and third were signed by neither British nor
American representatives. In the discussion that preceded the
adoption of the second Declaration by a majority of the
Conference, Captain Crozier, of the American delegation,
presented the objections to it, on which he and his colleagues
were in agreement with the British representatives. He said
"there was a great difference of opinion as to whether the
bullets of small calibre rifles sufficed to put men 'hors de
combat,' which was admitted on all sides to be the object
which rifle fire was expected to achieve. He considered the
proposition before the Conference to be unsatisfactory, since
it limited the prohibition to details of construction which
only included a single case, and left all others out of
consideration. He would not enter into a recapitulation of all
the advantages of small calibre rifles, since they were
perfectly well known; but he felt sure that certain Powers
might adopt calibres even smaller than those at present in
use, and, in this case, he maintained that they would be
compelled to secure increased shock by some new method of
construction of the projectile. He considered that it would be
perfectly easy to devise such projectiles while keeping within
the terms of the proposed interdiction, and he thought that
the result might be the ultimate adoption of a bullet of an
even less humane character than those aimed at by the
Resolution. He declared that he had nothing to say for or
against the Dum-Dum bullet [see, in this volume, DUM-DUM
BULLET], of which he knew nothing except what had been stated
during the meetings of the First Commission, but that he was
not disposed to make any condemnation without proofs, and
these proofs had not been forthcoming."

As for the third Declaration, it was opposed by Captain Mahan,
who spoke for the Americans, because "he considered the use of
asphyxiating shell far less inhuman and cruel than the
employment of submarine boats, and as the employment of
submarine boats had not been interdicted by the Conference
(though specially mentioned with that object in the Mouravieff
Circular), he felt constrained to maintain his vote in favour of
the use of asphyxiating shell on the original ground that the
United States' Government was averse to placing any
restriction on the inventive genius of its citizens in
inventing and providing new weapons of war."

PEACE CONFERENCE:
Convention for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the
principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864.

ARTICLE I.
Military hospital-ships, that is to say, ships constructed or
assigned by States specially and solely for the purpose of
assisting the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked, and the names of
which shall have been communicated to the belligerent Powers
at the commencement or during the course of hostilities, and
in any case before they are employed, shall be respected and
cannot be captured while hostilities last. These ships,
moreover, are not on the same footing as men-of-war as regards
their stay in a neutral port.

ARTICLE II.
Hospital-ships, equipped wholly or in part at the cost of
private individuals or officially recognized relief Societies,
shall likewise be respected and exempt from capture, provided
the belligerent Power to whom they belong has given them an
official commission and has notified their names to the
Hostile Power at the commencement of or during hostilities,
and in any case before they are employed. These ships should
be furnished with a certificate from the competent
authorities, declaring that they had been under their control
while fitting out and on final departure.

ARTICLE III.
Hospital-ships, equipped wholly or in part at the cost of
private individuals or officially recognized Societies of
neutral countries, shall be respected and exempt from capture,
if the neutral Power to whom they belong has given them an
official commission and notified their names to the
belligerent Powers at the commencement of or during
hostilities, and in any case before they are employed.

ARTICLE IV.
The ships mentioned in Articles I, II, and III shall afford
relief and assistance to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked of
the belligerents independently of their nationality. The
Governments engage not to use these ships for any military
purpose. These ships must not in any way hamper the movements
of the combatants. During and after an engagement they will
act at their own risk and peril. The belligerents will have
the right to control and visit them; they can refuse to help
them, order them off, make them take a certain course, and put
a Commissioner on board; they can even detain them, if important
circumstances require it. As far as possible the belligerents
shall inscribe in the sailing papers of the hospital-ships the
orders they give them.

{365}

ARTICLE V.
The military hospital-ships shall be distinguished by being
painted white outside with a horizontal band of green about a
metre and a half in breadth. The ships mentioned in Articles
II and III shall be distinguished by being painted white
outside with a horizontal band of red about a metre and a half
in breadth. The boats of the ships above mentioned, as also
small craft which may be used for hospital work, shall be
distinguished by similar painting. All hospital-ships shall
make themselves known by hoisting, together with their
national flag, the white flag with a red cross provided by the
Geneva Convention.

ARTICLE VI.
Neutral merchantmen, yachts, or vessels, having, or taking on
board, sick, wounded, or shipwrecked of the belligerents,
cannot be captured for so doing, but they are liable to
capture for any violation of neutrality they may have
committed.

ARTICLE VII.
The religious, medical, or hospital staff of any captured ship
is inviolable, and its members cannot be made prisoners of
war. On leaving the ship they take with them the objects and
surgical instruments which are their own private property.
This staff shall continue to discharge its duties while
necessary, and can afterwards leave when the
Commander-in-chief considers it possible. The belligerents
must guarantee to the staff that has fallen into their hands
the enjoyment of their salaries intact.

ARTICLE VIII.
Sailors and soldiers who are taken on board when sick or
wounded, to whatever nation they belong, shall be protected
and looked after by the captors.

ARTICLE IX.
The shipwrecked, wounded, or sick of one of the belligerents
who fall into the hands of the other, are prisoners of war.
The captor must decide, according to circumstances, if it is
best to keep them or send them to a port of his own country,
to a neutral port, or even to a hostile port. In the last
case, prisoners thus repatriated cannot serve as long as the
war lasts.

ARTICLE X.
The shipwrecked, wounded, or sick, who are landed at a neutral
port with the consent of the local authorities, must, failing
a contrary arrangement between the neutral State and the
belligerents, be guarded by the neutral State, so that they
cannot again take part in the military operations. The
expenses of entertainment and internment shall be borne by the
State to which the shipwrecked, wounded, or sick belong.

ARTICLE XI.
The rules contained in the above Articles are binding only on
the Contracting Powers, in case of war between two or more of
them. The said rules shall cease to be binding from the time
when, in a war between the Contracting Powers, one of the
belligerents is joined by a non-Contracting Power.

ARTICLE XII.
The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.
The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague. On the
receipt of each ratification a "procès-verbal" shall be drawn
up, a copy of which, duly certified, shall be sent through the
diplomatic channel to all the Contracting Powers.

ARTICLE XIII.
The non-Signatory Powers who accepted the Geneva Convention of
the 22d August, 1864, are allowed to adhere to the present
Convention. For this purpose they must make their adhesion
known to the Contracting Powers by means of a written
notification addressed to the Netherland Government, and by it
communicated to all the other Contracting Powers.

ARTICLE XIV.
In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties denouncing
the present Convention, such denunciation shall not take
effect until a year after the notification made in writing to
the Netherland Government, and forthwith communicated by it to
all the other Contracting Powers. This denunciation shall only
affect the notifying Power.

In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed
the present Convention and affixed their seals thereto.

[Signed by the representatives of Belgium, Denmark, Spain,
Mexico, France, Greece, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Persia,
Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Siam, Sweden and Norway, and
Bulgaria]

----------PEACE CONFERENCE: End--------

PEARY'S EXPLORATIONS.

See (in this volume)
POLAR EXPLORATION, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898—.

PEKING: A. D. 1900.
The siege of the Foreign Legations and their rescue.
Occupation of the city by the allied forces.
Looting and outrage.
March through the "Forbidden City."

See (in this volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE-AUGUST);
and (AUGUST 4-16, and 15-28).

PEKING: A. D. 1900-1901.
Seizure of grounds for a fortified Legation Quarter.

See (in this volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1900-1901 (NOVEMBER-FEBRUARY).

PEKING SYNDICATE, Chinese concessions to the.

See (in this volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1898 (FEBRUARY-DECEMBER).

PELAGIC SEAL KILLING, The question of.

See (in this volume)
BERING SEA QUESTIONS.

PELEW ISLANDS:
Sale by Spain to Germany.

See (in this volume)
CAROLINE AND MARIANNE ISLANDS.

PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1897.
Great strike of coal miners.
Conflict at Lattimer.

See (in this volume)
INDUSTRIAL DISTURBANCES: A. D. 1897.

PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1900.
Strike of anthracite coal miners.

See (in this volume)
INDUSTRIAL DISTURBANCES: A. D. 1900.

PENNSYLVANIA, University of:
Expeditions to explore the ruins of Nippur.

See (in this volume)
ARCHÆOLOGICAL RESEARCH: BABYLONIA:
AMERICAN EXPLORATION.

PENNY POSTAGE, British Imperial.

See (in this volume)
ENGLAND: A. D. 1898 (DECEMBER).

PENSIONS, Old-Age.

See references (in this volume) under
OLD-AGE PENSIONS.

PEONES.

See (in this volume)
PORTO RICO: A. D. 1898-1899 (AUGUST-JULY).

PEOPLE'S PARTY, The.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER);
and 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).

{366}

PERRY'S EXPEDITION TO JAPAN,
Proposed monument to commemorate.

See (in this volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1901.

PERSIA: A.D. 1896.
Assassination of the Shah.

The Shah of Persia, Nâsr-ed-din, was shot, on the 1st day of
May, when entering the mosque of Shah Abdul Azim, by one Mirza
Mahomed Reza, said to be of the Babi sect. Nâsr-ed-din had
reigned since 1848. He was succeeded by his son,
Muzaffar-ed-din, who was forty-three years old at his
accession.

PERSIA: A. D. 1897-1899.
Recent exploration of the ruins of Susa.

See (in this volume)
ARCHÆOLOGICAL RESEARCH: PERSIA.

PERSIA: A. D. 1899 (May-July).
Representation in the Peace Conference at The Hague.

See (in this volume)
PEACE CONFERENCE.

PERSIA: A. D. 1900.
Russian railway projects.

See (in this volume)
RUSSIA IN ASIA: A. D. 1900.

PERSIAN GULF, Railways to the.

See (in this volume)
TURKEY: A. D. 1899 (NOVEMBER);
and RUSSIA IN ASIA: A. D. 1900.

PERU: A. D. 1894-1899.
Overthrow of an unconstitutional government.
Legitimate authority restored.

The death of President Bermudez, in March, 1894, brought about
a revolutionary movement in the interest of ex-President
Caceres. Constitutionally, the First Vice-President, Dr. del
Solar, would have succeeded the deceased President, until a
new election was held; but the Second Vice-President, who was
a partisan of Caceres, and who had the army with him, seized
control of the government. In May, Caceres was proclaimed
Provisional President, and in August it was claimed for him
that he had been elected by Congress; but the election was not
recognized by his opponents. A formidable rebellion was
organized, under the lead of ex-President Pierola, who had
been in exile and now returned. Civil war raged for nearly a
year, Pierola gaining steadily. In February, 1895, his forces
reached the capital and laid siege to it. On the 17th of March
they entered the city, and there was desperate fighting in the
streets of Lima for three days, nearly 2,000 of the
combatants being killed and more than 1,500 wounded. Chiefly
through the efforts of the Papal delegate, the bloody conflict
was finally stopped and terms of peace arranged. A provisional
government, made up from both parties, was formed, under which
a peaceable election was held in the following July. Pierola
was then elected President. Caceres and his partisans
attempted a rising the next year (1896), but it had no
success. In the northern department of Loreto, on the border
of Ecuador, an abortive movement for independence was set on
foot by an ambitious official, who gave the government
considerable trouble, but accomplished nothing more. In 1899,
President Pierola was succeeded by Eduardo L. de Romana,
elected in May. A rebellion attempted that year by one General
Durand was promptly suppressed.

PERU: A. D. 1894.-1900.
The dispute with Chile concerning Tacna and Arica.

See (in this volume)
CHILE: A. D. 1884-1900.

PESCADORES ISLANDS:
Cession by China to Japan.

See (in this volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1894-1895.

PHILADELPHIA: A. D. 1897.
Opening of the Commercial Museum.

A Commercial Museum which has acquired great importance was
opened in Philadelphia on the 2d of June, 1897. "In both aim
and results the institution is unique. Other countries, also,
have their commercial museums, which are doing excellent work.
Their scope, however, is much more limited; the Museum of
Philadelphia differing from them in that it is an active, not
merely a passive, aid to the prospective exporter. The foreign
museums, situated in London, Bremen, Hamburg, Stuttgart,
Vienna, Havre, Brussels, and various other commercial centres,
do not extend active aid, but content themselves with more or
less complete displays of samples of domestic and foreign
competitive goods sold in export markets. The theory of their
organization is, that the manufacturer, contemplating a
foreign business campaign, will be enabled to pursue it
intelligently through the study of these samples. The
initiative is left to the exporter himself, who must discover
what opportunities exist for him abroad; and it is also left
to him to take advantage of his opportunities in the way that
may seem best to him. The display of manufactured samples is
only a small part of the work of the Philadelphia Museum. This
institution shows not only what goods are sold in foreign
markets, but also where those markets are, what commercial
conditions obtain in connection with them, what particular
kinds of goods they demand, how these markets may be best
competed for, and where the raw material may be most
profitably purchased. It furnishes information, furthermore,
as to business connections as well as the credit ratings of
the agents or firms recommended. To secure specific
information it is not necessary to visit the institution
itself; for reports of trade opportunities abroad are
distributed by the Museum to its members; and these reports
are provided with photographs of many of the articles which,
at that particular time, are in demand, in certain parts of
the world. Under these circumstances, the exporter is
practically provided with a staff of expert, foreign
representatives, without any expense to himself beyond the
merely nominal fee for membership. While its activities are
dependent to a certain extent upon the income derived from
subscribers, the Museum is not a money-making institution.
Indeed, its income from this source does not cover half the
expenditures. It is enabled to carry on its work only by
reason of the generous, annual appropriation provided for it
by the City Councils of Philadelphia. But a very large income
is required to maintain a staff of 150 employees in
Philadelphia, as well as 500 regular and several thousand
occasional correspondents scattered throughout the world. The
only advantage which the city itself derives from the Museum
is that resulting indirectly from the presence of foreign
buyers attracted to Philadelphia by the Museum's work."

_W. P. Wilson,
The Philadelphia Commercial Museum
(Forum, September, 1899)._

PHILADELPHIA: A. D. 1899.
National Export Exposition and International
Commercial Congress.

See (in this volume)
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONGRESS.

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----------PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: Start--------

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS:
Number, area, shore line, and population.

"In regard to the number and areas of the islands in the
archipelago there must necessarily be a certain inaccuracy,
because the group has never been properly surveyed, and the
only method of determining the number and areas is by counting
and measuring on the charts. The following figures are
probably the best ever compiled. They are drawn from
enumeration and mensuration on maps recently obtained by the
United States commissioners to the Philippines and which are
without doubt the most complete and the most thorough ever
made. The following is quoted from the introduction to these
maps, which are being published by the United States Coast and
Geodetic Survey. All the islands or groups having an area of over
20 square miles have been measured, and the areas are here
given in square miles and square kilometers. Many different
statements have been made in regard to the number of the
islands composing the archipelago. The cause for this must be
attributed to the scale of the charts on which the count was
made and the difficulty of distinguishing between rocks and
formations of sufficient area to dignify them by the name of
islands. Thus on a small-scale Spanish chart of the entire
group 948 islands were counted; on various large-scale charts
of the same area there were found 1,725. The principal
islands, with the extent of shore line of some of them and
their area, are given on the following lists. The areas were
carefully measured, but are subject to the inaccuracy of the
length of general shore line.

Name. Square Miles. Square kilometers.

Babuyan 36 93
Bagata, or Quinalasag 27 70
Balabae 38 98
Basilan 350 907
Batan 21 54
Bantayan 26 67
Bohol 1,430 3,727
Bucas 41 106
Burias 153 422
Busuanga 328 850
Calayan 37 96
Calamian 117 303
Camiguin (Babnyanes group) 54 140
Camiguin 71 184
Catandunanes 680 1,761
Cebu 1,742 4,512
Dalupiri 20 53
Dinagat 259 671
Dumaran 95 246
Fuga 21 54
Guimaras 176 456
Leite (Leyte) 2,713 7,027
Linapacan 40 104
Luzon 47,238 122,346
Mactan 20 52
Malhou (Homonkon) 35 91
Marindugna 287 743
Masbate 1.200 3,341
Mindanao 36,237 93,854
Mindoro 3,972 10,987
Negros 4,854 12,571
Olutanga 71 184
Panaon 57 148
Panay 4,708 12,194
Panglao 24 62
Pangutaran 32 85
Polillo 231 598
Samal 105 272
Samar 5,040 13,054
Saranguani 36 93
Semerara 23 60
Siargao 134 347
Sibuyan 131 339
Siquijor 83 215
Sulu, or Jolo 241 624
Tablas 250 648
Ticao 94 243
Ybayat, or Ibayat 22 57
Ylin 24 62

GROUPS.

Alabat 76 197
Jomalig

Banton 44 114
Simara
Romblon

Daram 41 106
Buad

Camotes group: 74 192
Ponson
Poro
Pasijan

Calaguas group:
Tinagua 19 49
Guintinua

Cuyos group: 28 73
Cuyos
Cugo
Agutaya
Hamipo
Bisukei

Laguan 23 60
Batag

Limbancauyan 184 477
Mesa, or Talajit
Maripipi
Balupiri
Biliran

Lubang 53 163
Ambil
Golo

San Miguel 82 212
Batan
Cacraray
Rapurrapu

Tawi Tawi group: 183 414
Tawi Tawi
Tabulinga
Tandubato

Others of the
Tawi Tawi group. 54 140

Total measured 118,542 307,025

Estimated area of
unmeasured islands 1,000 2,500

Total area 119,542 309,615

{368}

Length of general shore line.

Name. Miles Kilometers

Bohol 161 259
Cebu 310 499
Jolo Archipelago 858 1,381
Kalamines 126 203
Leite 363 584
Luzon 2,144 3,450
Masbate 244 393
Mindanao 1,592 2,562
Mindoro 322 518
Negros 386 621
Palawan 644 1,036
Panay 377 607
Samar 412 663
Minor islands 3,505 5,641

Total 11,444 18,417

"The following [as to population] is a quotation from an
article by W. F. Wilcox, of the United States Census Bureau.
It is well to notice that the last official census was in 1887
and that the figures of that census, though probably
underestimating the population of the islands, are the ones
which, in default of better, we are obliged to take as final.
It is probable that these are an understatement of the true
population of the Philippines for several reasons, among which
is one not observed by Mr. Wilcox, and which is therefore
mentioned. It is, of course, only supposition, but is at least
suggestive. For every adult counted in the census the
officials were obliged to return a poll tax. Thus, for
instance, if 100,000 persons were counted 100,000 pesetas
would have to be returned to the treasury. It has therefore
been supposed that the officials counted, say, 150,000 and
returned only 100,000 pesetas and 100,000 names. Mr. Wilcox
says (American Statistical Association Publ., September,
1899): 'The population of the islands in 1872 was stated in a
letter to Nature (6:162), from Manila, by Dr. A. B. Meyer, who
gives the latest not yet published statistics as his
authority. The letter gives the population of nine islands, as
follows:

Luzon 4,467,111
Panay 1,052,586
Cebu 427,356
Leite 285,495
Bohol 283,515
Negros 255,873
Samar 250,062
Mindanao 191,802
Mindoro 70,926

"It also gives the population of each of the 43 provinces of
the islands. The population was not counted, but estimated.
The number who paid tribute was stated as 1,232,544. How this
was ascertained we are not informed. The total population,
7,451,352, was approximated 'on the supposition that about the
sixth part of the whole has to pay tribute.' In reality this
population is 6.046 times the assigned tribute-paying
population. But Dr. Meyer adds: 'As there exist in all the
islands, even in Luzon, independent tribes and a large number
in Mindanao, the number of 7,451,352 gives no correct idea of
the real population of the Philippines. This is not known at
all and will not be known for a long time to come.'

"Since 1872 there have been actual enumerations of the
Philippines, but authorities differ as to the time when they
occurred and the detailed results. These enumerations were
usually confined to the subject and Catholic population, and
omitted the heathen, Mohammedan, and independent tribes. Four
reports of the entire population have been printed:

1. A report made by the religious orders in 1876 or 1877, in
which the nationalities and creeds of the population were
distinguished.

2. A manuscript report to Professor Blumentritt of the
enumeration made by the religious orders in December, 1879.

3. The official report of the civil census of December 31,
1877, contained in Reseña geog. y estad. de España, 1888, p.
1079.

4. The official report upon the census taken by the civil
officers December 31, 1887, and printed in the first volume of
Censo de la Poblacion de España, at Madrid, in 1891.

The first two may be compared, and tend somewhat to
corroborate each other, as follows:

1. Tribute-paying natives. 5,501,356

2. Army 14,545
3. Navy 2,924
4. Religious officers (Geistlichkeit) 1,962
5. Civil officers 5,552
6. Other Spaniards 13,265

Total Spaniards 38,248

1876-77. 1879.
Total Catholics 5,539,604 5,777,522
Heathen and Mohammedan natives 602,853 632,640
Foreigners (In 1876 there were:
British, 176; German, 109;
Americans, 42; French, 30) 378 592
Chinese 30,797 39,054

Total 6,173,632 6,449,813

"The third enumeration reported 5,567,685 as the
tribute-paying population. To this number should be added the
estimated number of the independent tribes, 'Indios no
sometidos'; this according to the missionaries' count was
about 600,000, making a total of 6,167,685. Most experts agree
that this official report is untrustworthy and involves
serious omissions, but believe that the facts are so
imperfectly known that they are unable to correct it. One
author, del Pac, writing in 1882, started from the
missionaries' census of 1876-77, viz, 6,173,632, assumed that
this omitted as many as 600,000 members of independent tribes
and that the increase of 1876-1882 would be 740,000. In this
way he got 7,513,632. A second writer, Sanciano, estimated the
population in 1881 as 10,260,249. The missionaries made an
estimate of their own in 1885 which showed 9,529,841.

[Image: Seat of War in the Island of Luzon.]

{369}

"The fourth enumeration of those mentioned above showed a
population of 5,985,123 in 1887, and the totals both for the
group as a whole and for the fifty odd provinces tend to
confirm and to be confirmed by the civil count of 1877. This
number, however, represents only the nominally Catholic or
tribute-paying population. To it must be added the Mohammedan
or heathen tribes set down by clerical authorities as about
600,000. Perhaps the highest authority in this field,
Professor Blumentritt, is confident that this number does not
include all the independent tribes, but only those in the
mountains who have a special arrangement freeing them from all
the dues of the subject tribes. On the whole, therefore, Prof.
H. Wagner is inclined to estimate these omissions of
independent or non-Christian tribes at about 1,000,000 and the
population of the group at about 7,000,000. This result is
indorsed by the latest German authority, Hübner's
Geographisch-Statistische Tabellen for 1898, which gives the
population as
5,985,124 + 1,000,000 = 6,985,124, as follows:

Spanish Estimated number
census. not counted.

Luzon and adjacent islands 3,443,000 150,000
Mindoro and Masbate 126,000 100,000
Visayas Archipelago 2,181,000 200,000
Mindanao 209,000 400,000
Calamianes and Palawan 22,000 50,000
Jolo (Sulu) Islands 4,000 100,000

Total 5,985,000 1,000,000

"Personally I am disposed to suspect that this number,
although called by Professor Wagner an outside estimate, is
below rather than above the truth. In favor of this position
it may be urged that Professor Wagner's estimate makes no
allowance either for the natural increase of population,
1887-1898, or for the fact that the first careful census of
densely populated regions, like India and Japan, usually
reveals a larger population than had been previously
estimated. This analogy might reasonably be applied to Luzon
and the Visayas."

_United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,
Senate Document Number 171, pages 4-7._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS:
The native inhabitants.

"The inhabitants of the Philippines belong to three sharply
distinct races—the Negrito race, the Indonesian race, and the
Malayan race. It is universally conceded that the Negritos of
to-day are the disappearing remnants of a people which once
populated the entire archipelago. They are, physically,
weaklings of low stature, with black skin, closely-curling
hair, flat noses, thick lips, and large, clumsy feet. In the
matter of intelligence they stand at or near the bottom of the
human series, and they are believed to be incapable of any
considerable degree of civilization or advancement. Centuries
ago they were driven from the coast regions into the wilder
interior portions of the islands by Malay invaders, and from
that day to this they have steadily lost ground in the
struggle for existence, until but a few scattered and
numerically insignificant groups of them remain. … It is
believed that not more than 25,000 of them exist in the entire
archipelago, and the race seems doomed to early extinction. …

"So far as is at present known, the Philippine tribes
belonging to the Indonesian race are confined to the great
island of Mindanao, the surface of which constitutes about
one-third of the total land area of the archipelago. … The
Philippine representatives of this race are physically
superior not only to the Negritos, but to the more numerous
Malayan peoples as well. They are tall and well developed,
with high foreheads, aquiline noses, wavy hair, and often with
abundant beards. The color of their skins is quite light. Many
of them are very clever and intelligent. None of the tribes
have been Christianized. Some of them have grown extremely
fierce and warlike as a result of their long struggle with
hostile Malayan peoples. Others, more happy in their
surroundings, are pacific and industrious.

"The great majority of the inhabitants of the Philippines are
of Malayan extraction, although the race is not found pure in
any of the islands, but is everywhere more or less modified
through intermarriage with Chinese, Indonesians, Negritos,
Arabs, and, to a limited extent, Spaniards and other
Europeans. The individuals belonging to these Malayan tribes
are of medium size, with straight black hair. As a rule the
men are beardless, and when they have a beard it is usually
straggling, and appears late in life. The skin is brown and
distinctly darker than that of the Indonesians, although very
much lighter than that of the Negritos. The nose is short and
frequently considerably flattened. The representatives of
these three races are divided into numerous tribes, which
often differ very greatly in language, manners, customs, and
laws, as well as in degree of civilization. …

"Any estimate of the total population must manifestly depend
on the number of inhabitants assigned to the various wild
tribes, of which there are no less than 69. For the purposes
of this report the commission has adopted as the total figure
8,000,000, considering this a conservative estimate. Baranera,
whose figures are believed to be carefully prepared, places
the total at 9,000,000. The extent of territory occupied in
whole or in part by each of the more important civilized
tribes can be estimated with a greater degree of accuracy, and
is approximately as follows: Visayans (occupying 28,100 square
miles) 2,601,600; Tagalogs (15,380 sq. miles) 1,663,900;
Bicols (6,900 sq. miles) 518,100; Ilocanos (6,170 sq. miles)
441,700; Pangasinaus (1,950 sq. miles) 365,500; Pampangas
(1,950 sq. miles) 337,900; Moros (12,860 sq. miles) 268,000;
Cagayans(11,500 sq. miles) 166,300. All of these peoples,
although ignorant and illiterate, are possessed of a
considerable degree of civilization, and, with the exception
of the Mohammedan Moros, are Christianized."

_Philippine Commission,
Report, January 31, 1900, volume 1, pages 11-15._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1896-1898.
The Katipunan and the rising against Spanish rule.
Appearance of Aguinaldo as a leader.
Dr. José Rizal.
The Treaty of Biac-na-bato.
Departure of Aguinaldo and his return with
the American forces.

The Philippine Islands, discovered in 1521 by Magellan (or
Maghallanes or Magalhaes), and occupied by the Spaniards in
1565, seems, for a long period, to have interested that people
more as a missionary than as a commercial field. Indeed, the
doings of the church and of the religious orders, and the
acceptance of Roman teachings of Christianity by the greater
part of the native population, make up the essential history
of the Philippines until quite recent times. If the islands
had offered gold mines, or pearl fisheries, or spice forests
to their European discoverers, the story would certainly have
been different. As it was, the Spaniards were not moved to
much eagerness in exploiting such resources of commerce as
they found; and so, through fortunate circumstances, the
natives were made converts instead of slaves.
{370}
By missionaries, more than by soldiers, they were subdued; by
the church, more than by the Spanish state, they were ruled.
It is certain that there were great corruptions and
oppressions in the government, and it follows that a large
share of responsibility for them rests on those who controlled
the affairs of the church. For the past hundred years, at
least, the more spirited part of the native population has
been restive under the misrule and its burdens, and frequent
attempts at insurrection have been made. Such an outbreak in
1872 was suppressed and punished with a vengefulness, in
executions and banishment, which rankled ever afterwards in
the hearts of the people.

A secret society, called the "Katipunan," or League, was then
formed, which became a revolutionary organization, and from
which sprang the most serious of Filipino rebellions, in 1896.
The province of Cavite was the center of revolt, and it was
there that Emilio Aguinaldo, then the schoolmaster at Silan,
came into prominence as a leader. Mr. John Foreman, who was in
the Philippines at the time of the insurrection, states that
Aguinaldo was personally humane, but fearful atrocities were
committed in the first months of the rising by some of the
insurgents of his band. One captured priest, according to Mr.
Foreman's account, "was cut up piecemeal; another was
saturated with petroleum and set on fire; and a third was
bathed in oil and fried on a bamboo spit run through the
length of his body." The Spaniards, on their side, were
equally inhuman in their treatment of captured rebels and
"suspects." Says Mr. Foreman: "About 600 suspects were
confined in the dungeons of Fort Santiago at the mouth of the
Pasig River. Then occurred a frightful tragedy. The dungeons
are below water-mark at high tide; the river filtered in
through the crevices in the ancient masonry; thus twice a day
these unfortunates were up to their waists or necks in water,
according to the height of the men. The Spanish sergeant on
duty threw his rug over the only light and ventilating shaft,
and, in a couple of days, carts were seen by many citizens
carrying away the dead, calculated to number 70. Provincial
governors and parish priests seemed to regard it as a duty to
supply the capital with batches of 'suspects' from their
localities. In Vigan, where nothing had occurred, many of the
heads of the best families and monied men were arrested and
brought to Manila in a steamer. They were bound hand and foot,
and carried like packages of merchandise in the hold. I
happened to be on the quay when the steamer discharged her
living freight, with chains and hooks to haul up and swing out
the bodies like bales of hemp. …

"Thousands of peaceful natives were treated with a ferocity
which would have shocked all Europe. … Within three months of
the outbreak, hundreds of the richest natives and half-castes
in Manila were imprisoned for a few days and released
conditionally"—the condition being a payment of ransom,
sometimes said to be as high as $40,000. But General Blanco,
the then Governor-General, was not vigorous enough in his
measures to satisfy the all-powerful clerical party in the
islands, and he was replaced by General Polaveja, who received
large reinforcements from Spain, and who succeeded in breaking
the strength of the rebellion to a great extent. But the
character of Polaveja's administration is thus described by
Mr. Foreman: "Apart from the circumstances of legitimate
warfare, in which probably neither party was more merciful
than the other, he initiated a system of striking terror into
the non-combatant population by barbarous tortures and
wholesale executions. … Men were escorted to the prisons by
pure caprice and subjected to horrible maltreatment. Many of
them were liberated in the course of a few days, declared
innocent, but maimed for life and forever unable to get a
living. … The only apparent object in all this was to
disseminate broadcast living examples of Spanish vengeance."
The most notable victim at this period was Dr. José Rizal, a
physician, highly educated in Europe, distinguished as an
oculist, and the author of certain novels in which the
condition of things in his native country was set forth. On
his return to the Islands, Dr. Rizal incurred the enmity of
the friars by opposing them, and was pursued by their
hostility. From 1893 to 1896 he was kept in banishment,
closely watched, at a small town in the island of Mindanao.
Then he sought and obtained permission to go to Cuba in the
medical staff of the Spanish army; but, just as he arrived at
Manila, on his way to Spain, the insurrection of 1896 broke
out, and though he was suffered to depart, his enemies pursued
him with accusations of complicity in the rising and caused
him to be brought back. Says Mr. Foreman, who was an
eye-witness of what occurred: "Not a few of us who saw the
vessel leave wished him 'God speed.' But the clerical party
were eager for his extermination. … The lay authorities always
had to yield to the monks, and history herein repeated itself.
Dr. Rizal was cabled for to answer certain accusations, and so
on his landing in the Peninsula he was incarcerated in the
celebrated fortress of Montjuich (the scene of so many
horrors), pending his re-shipment by the returning steamer. He
reached Manila as a state prisoner in the Colon, isolated from
all but his jailors. It was materially impossible for him to
have taken any part in the rebellion, whatever his sympathies
may have been." Nevertheless, he was tried by court-martial
for sedition and rebellion, condemned and shot; and his memory
is cherished in the islands as that of a martyred patriot.
"The decree of execution was one of Polaveja's foulest acts."

Having scotched but not killed the insurrection, Polaveja went
home, with broken health, in the spring of 1897, and was
succeeded by General Primo de Rivera, who, after some months
of continued warfare, opened negotiations with Aguinaldo, the
recognized leader of the revolt. The result was a treaty,
known as the "Pacto de Biac-na-bato, signed December 14. By
this treaty "the rebels undertook to deliver up their arms and
ammunition of all kinds to the Spaniards; to evacuate the
places held by them; to conclude an armistice for three years
for the application and development of the reforms to be
introduced by the other part, and not to conspire against
Spanish sovereignty in the Islands, nor aid or abet any
movement calculated to counteract the reforms.
{371}
Emilio Aguinaldo and 34 other leaders undertook to quit the
Philippine Islands, and not to return to them until so
authorised by the Spanish Government. On behalf of the Spanish
Government it was agreed to pay, through the medium of Pedro
A. Paterno, to the rebels the sum of $1,000,000, and to the
families who had sustained loss by reason of the war $700,000,
in instalments and conditionally,"—the condition being that no
renewal of rebellion or conspiracy occur. Aguinaldo and other
chiefs of the insurrection left the Islands, accordingly; but
they are said to have been utterly duped. One instalment, only
($400,000), of the promised money was ever paid; the promised
reforms were not carried out, and persecution of those who had
been in sympathy with the rising was renewed.

_J. Foreman,
The Philippine Islands,
chapter 26 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons)._

"Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore.
A portion of the money, $400,000, was deposited in banks at
Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one
of his subordinate chiefs named Artacho, which is interesting
on account of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo.
Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents
according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a
trust fund, and was to remain on deposit until it was seen
whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms,
and if they failed to do so, it was to be used to defray the
expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of
court by paying Artacho $5,000. No steps have been taken to
introduce the reforms, more than 2,000 insurgents, who had
been deported to Fernando Po and other places, are still in
confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to carry on
the operations of the present insurrection."

_F. V. Greene,
Memorandum concerning the Situation in the Philippines,
August 30, 1898 (Treaty of Peace and Accompanying Papers:
55th Congress, 3d Session,
Senate Document Number 62, part 1, page 421._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1897.
Refusal of United States Government to negotiate
with the insurgent republic.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (NOVEMBER).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (April-May).
Circumstances in which Aguinaldo was brought to
Manila to co-operate with American forces.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1898 (APRIL-MAY: PHILIPPINES).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (April-July).
Destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.
Blockade and siege of the city.
Co-operation of insurgents under Aguinaldo.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (APRIL-JULY).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (May-August).
Conduct of English and German naval officers at Manila.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (MAY-AUGUST).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (July-August).
Correspondence between the American commander and Aguinaldo.

This is fully given (showing the relations between the
American and Filipino forces, before the capture of Manila),
in the general account of the Spanish-American War.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1898 (JULY-AUGUST: PHILIPPINES).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (July-September).
American capture of Manila.
Relations with the Filipino insurgents.
General Merritt's report.
Aguinaldo declared President of the Philippine Republic.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (August).
Suspension of hostilities between the United States and Spain.
Manila held by the former pending the conclusion
of a treaty of peace.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (JULY-DECEMBER).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (August).
Losses of the American army during the war with Spain.

See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (August-December).
The state of things following the occupation of Manila
by American forces.
Growing distrust and unfriendliness of the Tagalos.
General Otis's report.

Of the state of things which followed the departure of General
Merritt, August 30, General Otis, who succeeded him in
command, reported subsequently as follows:

"Until October 14 [1898], the United States troops in the
Philippines remained stationed at Manila and Cavite, as
provided in General Merritt's orders of August 23, with very
slight exceptions, Major-General Anderson retaining
supervision of the district of Cavite and Major-General
MacArthur of the troops stationed in Manila, the three
organizations composing the provost guard continuing, however,
under the control of Brigadier-General Hughes. They were most
bountifully supplied with subsistence and medicines, but light
clothing suited to the climate and facilities necessary for
occupying and messing in barracks were needed. These were soon
obtained through contract and purchase from the merchants of
Hongkong and Manila and by shipment from the United States.
The troops received tactical instructions daily, but the
weather was too hot for much physical exertion, and time hung
heavily upon them. They entertained the impression that the
Spanish war had terminated, and the volunteers appeared to
believe that they should be recalled to the United States at
once and regular troops sent out to perform the monotonous
garrison duties which were about to follow the victory of
Manila. Many became ill from too free indulgence in the fruits
and manufactured drinks of the country, and indifference to
that care and attention of person which a tropical climate
makes necessary. Homesickness alone produced illness in
numerous cases, so that early in September the hospitals began
to be rapidly filled. This led to the adoption of judicious
precautionary measures. … In November improvement was
noticeable, and in January the health of this army would
compare favorably with those of any concentrated army of like
proportions in existence. To be sure the men had become by
this time fairly acclimatized, and new troops arriving here
will be obliged to pass through this period of acclimatization
before they become properly efficient for prolonged service in
the field.

{372}

"During my first weeks of duty here I was impressed with the
spirit of suspicion and the partially concealed unfriendly
feeling manifested by the Tagalos toward the American forces.
That they either had very little confidence in our promises or
were then forming conclusions to oppose any establishment of
United States authority in Luzon was apparent, however loudly
they might disclaim hostile intent or declare as an excuse for
their attitude fear of the return of Spain. I saw, however,
with satisfaction, their ablest men by education, and mental
equipment taking part in their authoritative deliberations,
and I had considerable confidence in the efficacy of their
suggestions and advice. Still, after carefully weighing
conditions, I was unable to arrive at any satisfactory
conclusions. …

"Measures were being applied constantly to improve the
sanitary condition of the city, to increase the efficiency of
the troops, and to meet any emergency which might develop from
an uprising of the inhabitants, or from hasty action by any
portion of our or the insurgent forces, which, though
maintaining amicable intercourse, were, in fact, in an
attitude of resistance and hostility upon all questions
involving the right of armed occupation of the suburbs and
defenses of Manila. The insurgent soldiers had looted
extensively the portions of the city to which they gained
access, and were greatly disappointed that this privilege over
other parts of the same was not accorded them. Their enforced
withdrawal to outer lines was the cause of discontent, and
augmented any desire which they may have formerly entertained
to resist or attack the American troops. This growing
discontent was observable among the lower classes of the
city's inhabitants, from whom a considerable share of
Aguinaldo's army was drawn, and was undoubtedly increased by
the reprehensible conduct and illegal actions of some of our
own men, who were severely punished for their misdeeds when
detected. Outwardly, however, relations of the most friendly
character were maintained. The officers and enlisted men of
the two armies mingled in friendly social intercourse. To the
casual observer the only discordant element in this dense
complex population, made up of every nation and tongue in
existence, were the hated Spanish prisoners, whom the
Filipinos still longed to persecute and kill, and who were
obliged to keep within the walls of Old Manila for safety.
Repeated conferences were held with influential insurgents,
whose chief aim appeared to be to obtain some authoritative
expression on the intent of the United States with regard to
the Philippines, and complained that they were unable to
discover anyone who could speak ex cathedra. They asserted
that their Malolos arrangement was a government de facto,
which had the right to ask an expression of intent from the
United States Government. …

"My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory solution of
the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered from a
dispatch sent to Washington on December 7, wherein I stated
that conditions were improving and that there were signs of
revolutionary disintegration; that I had conferred with a
number of the members of the revolutionary government and
thought that the most of them would favor peaceful submission
to United States authority. I had strong reasons for this
expressed confidence from assurances made to me by some of the
ablest Filipinos who had occupied positions of importance in the
insurgent government and had signified their intention to
withdraw from it."

_Report of General Otis,
August 31, 1899
(Message and Documents: Abridgement, 1899-1900,
volume 2, pages 1048-1052)._

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (August-December).
The state of things following the occupation of Manila,
as represented by English witnesses.

The writer of the following remarks, in an interesting book on
"The Inhabitants of the Philippines," published late in 1900, is
an English civil engineer, who had resided in Luzon for
fourteen years and knew the country and people thoroughly
well:

"Personally, I think that if a sympathetic and conciliatory
attitude had been adopted, had the local government
established been recognized, had Aguinaldo and his staff been
given commissions in the Native Army or Civil Service, and the
flower of the Tagal Army taken into the service of the United
States, a peaceful settlement could have been made on the
lines of a Protectorate. I therefore look upon the war as
unnecessary, and consider the lives already sacrificed, and
that will have to be sacrificed, as absolutely thrown away.
The tragical side of American unpreparedness is manifest in
the state of anarchy in which the whole Archipelago has been
plunged by the American unreadiness to occupy the military
posts as soon as they were vacated by the Spanish garrisons. A
hideous orgy of murder, plunder, and slave-raiding has
prevailed in Visayas, and especially in Mindanao.

"Three conditions were essential to a peaceful settlement:

First.
A broad-minded and sympathetic representative of America,
fully authorized to treat, and a lover of peace.

Second.
A strict discipline amongst the American forces.

Third,
The principal aim and object of the Tagal insurrection must be
secured.

"General Otis does not seem to me to fulfil the first
condition, he lacked prestige and patience, and he showed that
he had an insufficient conception of the magnitude of his task
by occupying himself with petty details of all kinds and by
displaying an ill-timed parsimony. Apparently he had no power
to grant anything at all, and only dealt in vague generalities
which the Tagals could not be expected to accept.

"As regards the second point, I regret that I am not
personally acquainted with the gentlemen from Nebraska,
Colorado, Dakota and other states serving in the United States
Army or volunteers. I have no doubt that they are good
fighting-men, but from all I can hear about them they are not
conspicuous for strict military discipline, and too many of
them have erroneous ideas as to the most suitable drink for a
tropical climate. Manila was in the time of the Spaniards a
most temperate city; a drunken man was a very rare sight, and
would usually be a foreign sailor. Since the American
occupation, some hundreds of drinking saloons have been
opened, and daily scenes of drunkenness and debauchery have
filled the quiet natives with alarm and horror. When John L.
Motley wrote his scathing denunciation of the army which the
great Duke of Alva led from Spain into the Low Countries, to
enforce the high religious purposes of Philip II., he could
not foresee that his words would be applicable to an American
Army sent to subjugate men struggling to be free 'for their
welfare, not our gain,' nor that this army, besides bringing
in its train a flood of cosmopolitan harlotry, would be
allowed by its commander to inaugurate amongst a strictly
temperate people a mad saturnalia of drunkenness that has
scarcely a parallel.
{373}
Such, however, is undoubtedly the case, and I venture to think
that these occurrences have confirmed many of the Tagals in
their resolve rather to die fighting for their independence
than to be ruled over by such as these."

_F. H. Sawyer,
The Inhabitants of the Philippines,
page 113-114 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons)._