Chapter LXXXVI: Section 29 (6)

Articles XIV. and XV. read thus: Article XIV. "All persons,
other than natives, conforming themselves to the laws of the
South African Republic, (a) will have full liberty, with their
families, to enter, travel or reside in any part of the South
African Republic; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess
houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops and premises; (c)
they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any
agents whom they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be
subject, in respect of their persons or property, or in
respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether
general or local, other than those which are or may be imposed
upon citizens of the said Republic." Article XV. "All persons,
other than natives, who establish their domicile in the
Transvaal between the 12th day of April, 1877, and the 8th day
of August, 1881, and who within twelve months after such last
mentioned date have had their names registered by the British
resident, shall be exempt from all compulsory military service
whatever." Article XVI. provides for a future extradition
treaty; XVII. for the payment of debts in the same currency in
which they were contracted; XVIII. establishes the validity of
certain land grants; XIX. secures certain rights to the
natives; XX. nullifies the Convention if not ratified by the
Volksraad within six months from the date of its
signature—February 27, 1884.

{459}

With considerable reluctance, the Convention was ratified by
the Volksraad of the South African Republic in the following
terms: "The Volksraad having considered the new Convention
concluded between its deputation and the British Government at
London on 27th February 1884, as likewise the negotiations
between the contracting parties, which resulted in the said
Convention, approves of the standpoint taken by its deputation
that a settlement based upon the principle of the Sand River
Convention can alone fully satisfy the burghers of the
Republic. It also shares the objections set forth by the
deputation against the Convention of Pretoria, as likewise
their objections against the Convention of London on the
following points:

1st.
The settlement of the boundary, especially on the western
border of the Republic, in which the deputation eventually
acquiesced only under the express conditions with which the
Raad agree.

2nd.
The right of veto reserved to the British Crown upon treaties
to be concluded by the Republic with foreign powers; and

3rd.
The settlement of the debt.

Seeing, however, that in the said Convention of London
considerable advantages are secured to the Republic,
especially in the restoration of the country's independence,
Resolves, With acknowledgment of the generosity of Her
Britannic Majesty, to ratify, as it hereby does, the said
Convention of London."

_Selected Official Documents of the South African
Republic and Great Britain
(Supplement to the Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, July, 1900)._

Also in:
_State Papers, British and Foreign, volume 75._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1885-1890.
The gold discoveries on the Rand and the influx
of Uitlanders (Outlanders or Foreigners).

"It was not until 1884 that England heard of the presence of
gold in South Africa. A man named Fred Stuben, who had spent
several years in the country, spread such marvellous reports
of the underground wealth of the Transvaal that only a short
time elapsed before hundreds of prospectors and miners left
England for South Africa. When the first prospectors
discovered auriferous veins of wonderful quality on a farm
called Sterkfontein, the gold boom had its birth. It required
the lapse of only a short time for the news to reach Europe,
America, and Australia, and immediately thereafter that vast
and widely scattered army of men and women which constantly
awaits the announcement of new discoveries of gold was set in
motion toward the Randt [the Witwatersrand or
Whitewatersridge]. … In December, 1885, the first stamp mill
was erected for the purpose of crushing the gneiss rock in
which the gold lay hidden. This enterprise marks the real
beginning of the gold fields of the Randt, which now yield one
third of the world's total product of the precious metal. The
advent of thousands of foreigners was a boon to the Boers, who
owned the large farms on which the auriferous veins were
located. Options on farms that were of little value a short
time before were sold at incredible figures, and the prices
paid for small claims would have purchased farms of thousands
of acres two years before. In July, 1886, the Government
opened nine farms to the miners, and all have since become the
best properties on the Randt. … On the Randt the California
scenes of '49 were being re-enacted. Tents and houses of sheet
iron were erected with picturesque lack of beauty and
uniformity, and during the latter part of 1886 the community
had reached such proportions that the Government marked off a
township and called it Johannesburg. The Government, which
owned the greater part of the land, held three sales of
building lots, or 'stands,' as they are called in the
Transvaal, and realized more than $300,000 from the sales. …
Millions were secured in England and Europe for the
development of the mines, and the individual miner sold his
claims to companies with unlimited capital. The incredibly
large dividends that were realized by some of the investors
led to too heavy investments in the Stock Exchange in 1889,
and a panic resulted. Investors lost thousands of pounds, and
for several months the future of the gold fields appeared to
be most gloomy. The opening of the railway to Johannesburg and
the re-establishment of stock values caused a renewal of
confidence, and the growth and development of the Randt was
imbued with renewed vigour. Owing to the Boers' lack of
training and consequent inability to share in the development
of the gold fields, the new industry remained almost entirely
in the hands of the newcomers, the Uitlanders [so called in
the language of the Boers], and two totally different
communities were created in the republic. The Uitlanders, who,
in 1890, numbered about 100,000, lived almost exclusively in
Johannesburg and the suburbs along the Randt. The Boers,
having disposed of their farms and lands on the Randt, were
obliged to occupy the other parts of the republic, where they
could follow their pastoral and agricultural pursuits. The
natural contempt which the Englishmen, who composed the
majority of the Uitlander population, always have for persons
and races not their intellectual or social equals, soon
created a gulf between the Boers and the newcomers."

_H. C. Hillegas,
Oom Paul's People,
chapter 3
(with permission of D. Appleton & Co., copyright, 1899)._

As the influx of newcomers increased and advanced, "the Boers
realized that the world and civilisation were once more upon
them. In spite of all the opposition that patriarchal
prejudice could muster, railways usurped the place of the slow
moving ox-waggon, and in the heart of their solitude a city
had arisen; while to the north and to the east between them
and the sea were drawn the thin red lines of British boundary.
… A primitive pastoral people, they found themselves isolated,
surrounded—'shut in a kraal for ever,' as Kruger is reported
to have said,—while the stranger was growing in wealth and
numbers within their gates. Expansion of territory, once the
dream of the Transvaal Boers, as their incursions into
Bechuanaland, into Zululand, and the attempted trek into
Rhodesia, all testify, was becoming daily less practicable.
One thing remained,—to accept their isolation and strengthen
it. Wealth, population, a position among the new States of the
world had been brought to them, almost in spite of themselves,
by the newcomer, the stranger, the Uitlander. What was to be
the attitude towards him politically? Materially he had made
the State—he developed its resources, paid nine-tenths of its
revenue. Would he be a strength or a weakness as a citizen—as
a member of the body politic? Let us consider this new element
in a new State—how was it constituted, what were its component
parts? Was it the right material for a new State to
assimilate?
{460}
Cosmopolitan to a degree—recruited from all the corners of the
earth—there was in it a strong South African element,
consisting of young colonists from the Cape Colony and
Natal—members of families well known in South Africa—and many
of them old schoolfellows or in some other way known to each
other. Then the British contingent, self-reliant, full of
enterprise and energy—Americans, for the most part skilled
engineers, miners and mechanics—French, Germans, and
Hollanders. A band of emigrants, of adventurers, and
constituted, as I think all emigrants are, of two great
classes—the one who, lacking neither ability nor courage, are
filled with an ambition, characteristic particularly of the
British race, to raise their status in the world, who find the
conditions of their native environment too arduous, the
competition too keen, to offer them much prospect, and who
seek a new and more rapidly developing country elsewhere; and
another, a smaller class who sometimes through misfortune,
sometimes through their own fault, or perhaps through both,
have failed elsewhere.

"Adventurers all, one must admit; but it is the adventurers of
the world who have founded States and Kingdoms. Such a class
as this has been assimilated by the United States and absorbed
into their huge fabric, of which to-day they form a huge and
substantial portion. What should the Transvaal Boers have done
with this new element so full of enterprise and vigour? This
had been for the last ten years the great question for them to
solve. … Enfranchisement, participation in the political life
of the State by the Uitlander,—this means, they said, a
transference of all political power from our hands to those of
men whom we do not trust. 'I have taken a man into my coach,'
said President Kruger, 'and as a passenger he is welcome; but
now he says, Give me the reins; and that I cannot do, for I
know not where he will drive me.' To the Boer it is all or
nothing; he knows no mean, no compromise. Yet in that very
mean lies the vital spirit of republicanism. What is the
position of the Boers in the Cape Colony? Are they without
their share, their influence, their Africander bond in the
political affairs of the country? And so it is throughout the
world today,—in the United States, in England, in France, in
the British Colonies, wherever the individual thrives and the
State is prosperous—the compromise of divided political power
among all classes, all factions, is the great guarantee of
their well being. … That the enfranchisement of the Uitlander
would mean a complete transference of political power into his
hands involves two assumptions: the first is that the
Uitlanders would form a united body in politics; the second is
that their representatives would dominate the Volksraad. The
most superficial acquaintance with the action of the
inhabitants of the Witwatersrand district on any public matter
will serve to refute the first of these. … The second of these
assumptions—though it is continually put forward—almost
answers itself. The number of representatives from the
Uitlander districts under any scheme of redistribution of
seats which the Boer could reasonably be expected to make
would fall considerably short of those returned from the Boer
constituencies. Such was the attitude of the Boers on this
vital question which led to the Reform Movement of 1895; and I
have stated what I believe to be the injustice of it as
regards the Uitlanders and the unwisdom of it in the true
interests of the Boers."

_A. P. Hillier,
Raid and Reform,
pages 24-29 (London: Macmillan & Co.)._

SOUTH AFRICA:
Portuguese Possessions: A. D. 1891.
Delagoa Bay Railway question.

See (in this volume)
DELAGOA BAY ARBITRATION.

SOUTH AFRICA:
The Transvaal: A. D. 1894.
Estimated population.

In October, 1894, the British agent at Pretoria, J. A. de Wet,
estimated the population of the Transvaal (on the basis of a
census taken in 1890) as follows:
"Transvaalers and Orange Free Staters, 70,861:
British subjects, 62,509:
other foreigners, 15,558;"
total, 148,928.

SOUTH AFRICA:
The Transvaal: A. D. 1894.
The "Commandeering" question.
Visit of the British High Commissioner to Pretoria.
Demonstration of British residents.

The first question which came to a sharp issue between the
government of the South African Republic and the British
subjects resident in the gold fields related to the claim
which the former made on the latter for military service in
the wars of the Republic with neighboring native tribes. The
demand for such service was made, in each case, by what was
called a "commando," the commando being defined in the
military law of the Boers as follows: "By commando is
understood a number of armed burghers and subjects of the
state called together to suppress rebellion amongst the
natives, or disturbances amongst the white population."
British residents protested against the requirement of this
service from them; and the British Government, in 1894, opened
negotiations with that of the Boer Republic to obtain their
exemption from it. It was acknowledged that there is "nothing
contrary to international comity in the application of such a
law as the commando law to a foreigner"; but, said the British
Colonial Secretary, in a despatch (June 8, 1894) giving
instructions to the British High Commissioner in South Africa,
"Her Majesty's Government consider that a special reason for
now claiming exemption for our people is afforded by the fact
that treaties have been concluded by the South African
Republic under which, as they understand, the subjects of no
less than seven Powers—Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Germany,
France, Italy, and Switzerland—are now exempt from this
liability; and they consider that they can hardly be expected
to acquiesce in a state of things under which Her Majesty's
subjects, whose interests in the South African Republic are
greater and more intimate than those of any other Power,
should remain in a position of such marked disadvantage. I
have therefore to instruct you to address, in moderate and
courteous terms, a friendly representation to the Government
of the South African Republic on the subject."

Negotiations on the subject were then opened, which led to a
visit to the Boer capital by the British High Commissioner,
Sir H. B. Loch, on invitation from President Kruger. His
arrival at Pretoria (June 25) gave occasion for a
demonstration on the part of British residents which showed
the state of feeling existing more plainly, no doubt, than it
had appeared before. The circumstances were reported a few
days later by the High Commissioner, as follows: "When I
entered the carriage with President Kruger, two men got on to
the box with a Union Jack, and the crowd, notwithstanding the
President's remonstrances, took the horses out and dragged the
carriage to the hotel, a distance of nearly a mile, singing all
the way 'God save the Queen,' and 'Rule Britannia.'
{461}
On arrival at the hotel, the address was presented, to which I
briefly replied, and then called for three cheers for the
President, which were heartily given. He was then dragged in
his carriage to the Government Office. I am satisfied that no
personal insult was intended, by this demonstration, to the
President, and any annoyance with which he viewed the
occurrence seemed to be caused from the fact of the
arrangements for keeping order having been so defective. The
political atmosphere, however, was charged with such an amount
of electricity that every moment an explosion was imminent.
The Legislative and Executive enactments which press heavily
on the great industry which contributes upwards of £1,000,000
annually out of a total revenue of little more than a million
and a quarter, without the population that produces this
wealth possessing any franchise rights, or voice in the
government of the country, has created a deep-seated feeling
of dissatisfaction, shared alike by the English, American,
German, and other foreign residents in the country. The
compulsory commandeering was the last straw that broke down
the patience they had hitherto exhibited. … The Transvaal
Government were, before my arrival, seriously alarmed at the
state of feeling at Johannesburg, but when they came to
consider the real meaning of the demonstration on my arrival
at Pretoria, which showed to them how general the
dissatisfaction was amongst all classes of British subjects,
who formed the majority of the whole population of the
Republic, they, for the first time, realised the imminent
danger of the situation, and told me of their dread of a
collision that at any moment might occur between the Boer
burghers, who were in considerable numbers in the town, and
the English and foreign residents."

To avoid any further excitement of feeling, the Commissioner
declined to visit Johannesburg, which he had intended to do.
During his stay at Pretoria, he submitted to President Kruger
the draft of a Convention stipulating that "the subjects of
Her Majesty the Queen whilst residing within the limits of the
South African Republic, and the citizens of the South African
Republic whilst residing within the dominions of Her Majesty
the Queen, shall enjoy the same rights and privileges as the
subjects of the most favoured nation with regard to military
service and all obligations of a like nature"; and he received
from President Kruger a counter proposition, for the
negotiation of a new agreement, to take the place of the
London Convention of 1884, embodying the desired provision
concerning military service, along with other amendments of
the old Convention. To this proposal, President Kruger added:
"In order, however, to meet the request of Her Majesty's
Government, the Government will, in the meantime,
provisionally, no more commandeer British subjects for
personal military service." Practically, this assurance
disposed of the commandeering grievance; but no Convention on
the subject was attained.

_Great Britain, Parliamentary Publication.
(Papers by Command, C. 8159)._

"A great mass meeting was held at Johannesburg (July 14) for
the purpose of demanding that the franchise should be extended
to all aliens, and insisting that the Constitution should be
amended and made more genuinely democratic. In consequence of
this meeting the Volksraad passed at one sitting two readings
of a bill restricting severely the right of public meeting. No
outdoor meetings or addresses were to be allowed, and an
assemblage of six persons would be considered a public
meeting. The police were given power by this bill to order
those present to disperse, and everyone attending was made
liable to imprisonment for two years, while the callers of any
meeting that the police might consider to be against the
public peace might be fined £500 or sentenced to two years
hard labour. … On the return of the 'commandeered' men from
the war [with the rebellious chief Malaboch] President Kruger
welcomed them, and said that no doubt the Volksraad would
bestow on them the rights of full citizenship. The effect of
the Franchise Act passed in June, however, was in general to
prevent any citizen from obtaining the franchise unless his
father was born in the State or had been naturalized. The
formation of committees by aliens for the support of political
candidates was rendered penal. … The Volksraad postponed for
one year the consideration of the Government proposal to grant
the franchise to the foreign residents who had recently served
in the various 'commandos' against the Kaffir rebels."

_Annual Register, 1894, page 369._

SOUTH AFRICA:
British South Africa Company: A. D. 1894-1895.
Extended charter and enlarged powers of the Company.
Its master spirit, Mr. Cecil J. Rhodes.
Attitude towards the South African Republic.

The British South Africa Company, royally chartered in 1889
for the promotion of "trade, commerce, civilization and good
government" in "the region of South Africa lying immediately
to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and
west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the
Portuguese dominions," was now in full possession, both
politically and commercially, not only of the great domain of
the Matabeles and the Mashonas, stretching to the Zambesi
River, but likewise of a vast territory beyond that stream.
Its charter had been extended in 1891, to cover the whole
sphere of British influence north of the Zambesi, except the
strip of country called Nyassaland, which borders the western
shore of Nyassa Lake. It had subjugated the Matabeles,
extinguished their kingdom, driven its native sovereign, Lo
Bengula, to exile and death.

See in volume 4,
SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1885-1893.

By a new agreement with the British Government, signed on the
23d of May, 1894, it had received political authority over
this imperial domain, in addition to the powers and privileges
which its broad charter gave.

The administration of the government of the region was to be
conducted by the Company, under an Administrator and a Council
of four members composed of a Judge and three other members.
The Administrator to be appointed by the Company, with the
approval of the Colonial Secretary, and to be removed either
by the Secretary or by the Company, with the approval of the
Secretary. The Judge, appointed by the Company, with the
approval of the Colonial Secretary, and removable only by the
Secretary, was to be a member of the Council ex officio.
{462}
The members of the Council, other than the Judge, to be
appointed by the Company, with the approval of the Secretary,
and to be removable by the Company. … The Administrator
should, as representative of the Company, administer the
government, but must take the advice of his Council on all
questions of importance. In cases of emergency, when he found
it impracticable to assemble a quorum, the Administrator might
take action alone, but must report such action to the Council
at its next meeting. Moreover, he might overrule the Council,
but must, in that case, report the matter forthwith to the
Company, with the reasons for his action; and the Company
might rescind the decision of the Administrator, whether made
with, or without, or against, the advice of the Council. With
the concurrence of at least two members of the Council, and
with the approval of the British High Commissioner for South
Africa, the Administrator was empowered to frame and issue
regulations, which should have the force of law; but the
Colonial Secretary or the Company could veto any such
regulation at any time within twelve months of the date of
approval by the High Commissioner. This power of making
ordinances included the power to impose such taxes as might be
necessary, and the right to impose and to collect customs
duties. The armed forces of the Company were expressly
forbidden to act outside the defined limits of its territory
without the permission of Her Majesty's Government.

The master spirit of the Company which exercised these
imperial powers of government over so great a dominion in
Africa was Mr. Cecil J. Rhodes, Premier of Cape Colony,
organizer and chief of the De Beers Consolidated Mining Co. in
the diamond fields,—millionaire projector and manager of
everything stupendous in the enterprises of the African world.
He seemed, in fact, to be more than a master spirit in the
Company. Apparently he had created it as an instrument of his
ambitions, and it moved in his shadow throughout. Its
Administrator, Dr. Leander S. Jameson, was his closely
confidential friend. Presently it stamped his name on the
broad empire which bore already the stamp of his personality
and will, by proclaiming (May 1, 1895): "The territories now
or hereafter placed under the control of the British South
Africa Company shall be named collectively Rhodesia. The
provinces at the present time included in the territory of
Rhodesia are Mashonaland, Matabeleland, and Northern
Zambesia." Great ambitions—imperial ambitions—had thus come
to be powerfully embodied in a corporation which practically
served the will of one remarkably able man. They were
ambitions which had been in conflict from the beginning with
the interests as well as the ambitions of the Boers of the
South African Republic, and the conflict was not to be ended
by the triumph which the Rhodesians had won. Naturally the
Boer was jealous and distrustful of the energetic men who had
seized lands which he desired and hemmed his republic in.
Naturally, too, the bold adventurers of Rhodesia, arrogant in
their success and as little scrupulous as "empire-builders"
are apt to be, looked with contempt and impatience at the
plodding Boer, as an obstacle to their booming development in
Africa of a civilization "up to date." Between the two
incongruous neighbors rose the cry of the angry Uitlanders at
Johannesburg, threatening the one and appealing to the
sympathy of the other. The consequences soon appeared.

SOUTH AFRICA:
The Transvaal: A. D. 1895 (July).
Opening of Delagoa Bay Railway.-

The opening of the railway to Delagoa Bay was celebrated with
much ceremony at Pretoria on the 8th of July.

SOUTH AFRICA:
The Transvaal: A. D. 1895 (September-December).
Closing of Vaal River "drifts" (fords) as ports of entry.
Anger in Cape Colony.
A threatening situation.

In September, the government of the South African Republic
adopted a measure, for the benefit of its new railway,
connecting Delagoa Bay with Pretoria, and for the development
of foreign trade via Delagoa Bay rather than through Cape
Colony, which raised a storm of indignation at the Cape,
giving birth to a grievance there which became for a time more
threatening than the grievances of the Uitlanders of the Rand.
The measure in question was one that closed the "drifts" or
fords of the Vaal River, between Cape Colony and the
Transvaal, as ports of entry for the importation of over-sea
goods. As stated by the British High Commissioner, in a
despatch (October 7) to Mr. Chamberlain, the British Colonial
Secretary, the history of the case is as follows:

"In the year 1891 the Cape Government came to an agreement
with the Transvaal Government and the Netherlands Railway
Company to advance the latter £600,000 towards the
construction of the railway from the Vaal river to
Johannesburg, receiving in exchange for such advance
Netherlands Railway Company 4 per cent. bonds at £93,
guaranteed by the Transvaal Government. It was stipulated in
the agreement that the Cape Government might fix the traffic
rates on the Transvaal extension until the close of 1894, or
until the completion of the railway from Delagoa Bay to
Pretoria, if such completion should take place before that
date. The railway extension from the Vaal river so provided
for was opened in September, 1892, and the Cape Government
secured thereby, during the continuance of the agreement,
practically the monopoly of the Johannesburg traffic. The
agreement terminated on the 31st December, 1894, the Delagoa
Bay to Pretoria Railway having shortly before been completed
and commenced working. Up to the close of the agreement the
through-traffic rates from the coast to Johannesburg had been
fixed by the Cape at the average rate of about 2.4d. per ton
per mile. After the close of the agreement the Netherlands
Railway Company raised the rates on its 52 miles of railway,
from the Vaal river to Johannesburg, to an average of nearly
8d. per ton per mile. Upon this importers began to remove a
portion of their goods from the railway at the Vaal river, and
to send them on by road and bullock-waggon to their
destination in the Transvaal, instead of by the Netherlands
Railway to Johannesburg and elsewhere as before. This move has
recently been met by the Transvaal Government issuing a
Proclamation closing the drifts on the Vaal river alongside
the railway as ports of entry for over-sea goods, leaving them
open for other goods, the produce of South Africa. Importers of
over-sea goods have thus only the choice between making use of
the Netherlands line from the Vaal to Johannesburg at the
enhanced traffic rates imposed on that line, or of importing
via Delagoa Bay or Durban."
{463}
Vigorous remonstrances against this measure were made
instantly by the government of Cape Colony, not only on the
ground of its unfriendliness to the Colony, but also as being
an infraction of the 13th article of the London Convention of
1884 (see above: A. D. 1884-1894), and the British government
was appealed to for its interference. To this appeal the
British Colonial Secretary replied with much caution, on the
1st of November, in a communication cabled to the High
Commissioner, as follows: "Subject to the conditions stated
further on, I am prepared to authorize you to send to the
Government of the South African Republic a message to the
following effect.:—'I am advised by the Law Officers of the
Crown (who, it is hardly necessary to state, have examined the
question from a purely legal standpoint) that the recent
action of the South African Republic is a breach of Article
XIII. of the London Convention. I am further advised that the
Government of the South African Republic cannot now set itself
right by making general the prohibition of entry by the
drifts, so as to include Colonial goods, if and when they
reissue their Proclamation, which, I am surprised to observe,
they appear to have some intention of doing. Her Majesty's
Government accept the legal advice which they have received;
but independently of their Conventional rights they are of
opinion that the closing of the drifts, and especially the
extension of that measure to Colonial goods, is so unfriendly
an action as to call for the gravest remonstrance on their
part. While anxious for an amicable settlement of the
question, they must therefore protest against what they regard
as an attempt to force the hand of the Cape Government in
Conference by a proceeding which almost partakes of the nature
of an act of hostility.' You will communicate this message
confidentially to your Ministers in writing, pointing out that
when once it is sent Her Majesty's Government cannot allow the
matter to drop until they have obtained a compliance with
their demands, even if it should be necessary to undertake an
expedition for that purpose. Her Majesty's Government do not
intend that such au expedition should, like most previous
Colonial wars, be conducted at the entire cost of this
country; and you should explain to your Ministers that you are
therefore instructed to require from them a most explicit
undertaking in writing that, if it becomes necessary to send
an expedition, the Cape Parliament will bear half the gross
expense, and that the Local Government will furnish a fair
contingent of the fighting force, so far as its resources in
men may suffice, besides giving the full and free use of its
railways and rolling stock for military purposes. If your
Ministers cannot give you such assurances you will report
fully by telegraph, and defer action pending further
instructions from me; but if you obtain these assurances in
writing, explicitly and without qualification, you may send
the above message to the Government of the South African
Republic."

This was followed by a further cautionary message, November 3,
in these words: "Referring to my telegrams of the 1st
November, although willing to support your Ministers on the
conditions already stated, I should think it would be well, in
their own interests, and those of South African commerce
generally, if they will be as moderate as they can find it
consistent with their duty to be in their demands as to their
share of railway business. I have no doubt that you have
availed yourself of any chances you may have had of impressing
such a view on them and if you think it expedient you may tell
them, confidentially, that such is my view." On the 4th, Sir
Hercules Robinson replied: "My Ministers, including Schreiner
and Faure, the two Dutch Members, were unanimous in their
decision to accept your conditions. I am assured by Mr. Rhodes
that he can count on the support of the majority in the Cape
Parliament, and there are no facts before me which would lead
me to a different view; but I do not think that the question
will arise, as the Government of the South African Republic
will not hold out against the united action of the Cape and
Her Majesty's Government." On the same day he transmitted to
President Kruger the message contained (as above) in Secretary
Chamberlain's despatch of November 1. On the 21st of November
the reply of the Transvaal Government was given, as follows:

"This Government most deeply regrets that the Cape Colony has
by its own acts created a condition of things, in consequence
of which it afterwards found itself compelled to invoke the
intervention of the British Government, and it still more
deeply regrets that Her Majesty's Government, on the 'ex
parte' representations of the Cape Colony, felt itself
constrained to telegraph to this Government in the terms of
the communication of the 3rd instant. From the reply of this
Government, it will be evident to your Excellency that it
wishes to contribute in every possible way to preserve the
good understanding in South Africa, and it therefore considers
a passage such as occurs in your Excellency's telegram of the 3rd
instant, 'An attempt to force the hand of the Cape Government
at the Conference by a measure which almost resembles the
nature of a hostile act,' not justified as regards this
Republic. This Government adheres to its opinion and view that
it has an undoubted right to regulate the ports of entrance on
the borders of the Republic, and if Her Majesty's Government
calls this an unfriendly act, this Government can only say
that it was the consequence of an unfriendly act of the Cape
Colony. In order not to be the cause of disturbance in South
Africa, this Government is prepared to submit the regulating
of the ports of entrance on the borders to arbitration, it
being convinced of the justice of its assertion that the
regulating of the ports of entrance on its borders by it is no
infringement of Article 13 of the Convention of London."

_Great Britain,
Papers by Command: 1897, C. 8474, pages 11-21. _

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1895 (November).
The state of discontent among the Uitlanders, and its causes.
The franchise question.
Growth of British Imperialistic designs.

The suspension of commandeering went a very little way towards
removing the grievances of the British residents in the
Transvaal. Underlying that and all other causes of discontent
was the evident determination of the Boer inhabitants of the
Republic to keep in their own hands the whole power of
government, both state and municipal, and to deal with the
increasing multitude of incomers from the outside world (whom
they called Uitlanders, or Outlanders) permanently as aliens,
excluded from citizenship by as many bars as a jealous
legislature could raise.
{464}
Until 1882, a foreigner, settling in the Transvaal, could
become a citizen and a voter after a residence of two years.
The required residence was then raised to five years, and in
1887 it was carried up to fifteen. By this time the immigrant
population was growing numerous, and its complaints of
disfranchisement and non representation in the Volksraad, or
Legislature, soon took on angry tones. In 1890 a nominal
concession was made to the discontented Uitlanders, by the
creation of a Second Volksraad (see, in this volume,
CONSTITUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC—the bracketed
amendments or added articles following Article 29), to which
they could elect representatives. The suffrage in elections to
this new chamber was given after two years residence, on the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic, and
qualification for sitting in it was acquired after a residence
of four years. But the Second Volksraad had no independent
power. It could act only on certain specified subjects,
taxation not included, and all that it did was subject to
overruling by the First Volksraad, while the enactments of the
latter were entirely valid without its consent. The Second
Volksraad, in fact, was no actual branch of the national
legislature, but a powerless appendage to it, where an
appearance of representation in the government could be given
to the Uitlander population without the reality.

Naturally, this aggravated rather than pacified the discontent
of the new comers. They were a rapidly increasing multitude,
congregated, for the most part, in one district, where it was
easy for them to feel and act in combination. By 1895 there
was said to be 100,000 of them in the 'Witwatersrand, and some
60,000 natives were working in their mines. They were being
heavily taxed, and they complained that they could get nothing
adequate in return for the taxation,—neither an efficient
police, nor decent sanitary regulations, nor a proper water
supply, nor a safe restraint upon the sale of liquors to their
native work people. At the same time it was charged that
corruption prevailed in the omnipotent First Volksraad, and
among public officials, and that, on the whole, the Republic
was in bad as well as in ignorant hands. This was not alone
the view of the complaining foreign residents, but was shared
more or less by unprejudiced visitors to the country,
including Mr. James Bryce, who travelled in the Transvaal in
1895, and who wrote of the grievances of the Uitlanders in
quite a sympathetic vein.

Until the gold-seekers came into it, the Republic had been
poor and its revenues small. Their coming gave it a full
treasury. They were the principal consumers of the imported
goods on which its tariff was laid. Their large use of
dynamite and other explosives in mining gave the government an
opportunity to make a highly profitable monopoly of the
manufacture, afterwards exchanged for an equally profitable
concession to a monopolistic company. Their mines were the
proper subject of a tax which yielded large returns. In fact,
the Republic was taking much to itself from the Uitlanders,—no
more, perhaps, than it had a fair right to take,—but,
according to what seems to be trustworthy testimony, it was
giving them far less in return for it than they had a just
right to demand, and it was offering them no prospect of
anything better in time to come.

It seems to be certain that responsibility for whatever was
hostile and unjust in the treatment of the foreign population
rested largely upon the President of the Republic, Mr. Paul
Kruger, who had been at the head of the government for many
years. He exercised an influence and authority that had
scarcely any limit. The Volksraad was obedient to his will,
and most of its legislation was understood to emanate from him
and from those whose council he took. There can be little
doubt that he practically shaped the whole policy of the Boer
Republic in its dealing with the Uitlanders, and that it
expressed the attitude of his mind toward foreigners in
general and Englishmen in particular. He distrusted even the
Dutch of Cape Colony, and sought Hollanders for the public
service when he needed qualifications which his own people did
not possess.

"While within the Transvaal there was growing discontent,
matters were so shaping themselves without as to still further
complicate the situation. The idea of a Confederation of
British South Africa and the extension of the British sphere
to the Zambesi, had long been the dream of imperialists, and
the ruling classes at the Cape had persistently urged this
upon the home government. … After the consolidation of the
diamond companies. Mr. Cecil Rhodes became the imperialist
leader in South Africa and marshaled behind him all the
corporate interests and combined influence of his many
associates. The Boer Republics stood in the way of the success
of imperialistic enterprise. Then too the 'scramble for
Africa,' which began with the efforts of the King of Belgium
to consolidate the native tribes of central Africa under
Belgian rule and which resulted in the carving out of the
Congo Free State, the assertion of German protection over
Damaraland and Namaqueland, and the joint effort of European
powers to check the British sphere, all lent zest to ambition
and brought the English popular mind into temper for concerted
action. Under such circumstances the 'little England' party
lost its standing and an imperial policy gained fullest
support. With such an atmosphere surrounding the Transvaal the
grievances of the 'aliens' within could not long be
disregarded without serious trouble."

_F. A. Cleveland,
The South African Conflict
(The American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Number 265), pages 19-22._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1895-1896.
Revolutionary conspiracy of disaffected Uitlanders
at Johannesburg with Rhodesians.
The Jameson Raid and its results.

In the fall of 1895, certain of the disaffected Uitlanders at
Johannesburg, leaders of an organization called the Transvaal
National Union, abandoned attempts to obtain what they sought
from the President and the Volksraad by petition and
agitation, and either invited or accepted proposals of
assistance from the armed forces of the British South Africa
Company, with a view to some kind of a revolutionary
undertaking. The story of the plot has been told with great
frankness by one of the actors in it, Mr. Alfred P. Hillier,
who writes:

{465}

"Mr. Cecil Rhodes, … accustomed as he was to success, quick
movement and rapid developments, in his great career, had …
watched with impatient eyes the setting back of the clock
within the South African Republic. His chief lieutenant, Dr.
Jameson, who had shared with him the labour of reclaiming from
barbarism and developing Rhodesia, and whose ambition was no
less than his superior's, discussed with him the desirability
of some active outside pressure; and between them was evolved
what is known as the Jameson plan. Mr. Beit, the capitalist
most largely interested in the mines of the Rand, an old
financial colleague of Mr. Rhodes, both in the De Beers
amalgamation and in the establishment of the Chartered
Company, promised both his influence and his purse in support
of the plan. Overtures were then made to Mr. Lionel Phillips,
who was at the head of the Chamber of Mines, and Mr. Charles
Leonard, the Chairman of the National Union. … The plan at
this early stage was presented in a very attractive form. A
force under Dr. Jameson was to be quietly gathered on the
border. The Johannesburg agitation, reinforced with capitalist
support, was to be steadily pushed forward. Rifles and
ammunition were to be smuggled into Johannesburg. Both the
High Commissioner and the Colonial Office might be counted on,
it was said, to support a vigorous forward movement for
reform. Mr. Phillips and Mr. Leonard, sick and weary of the
hopelessness of unsupported constitutional action, and of the
continual set back in Boer politics, already casting round in
their minds for some new departure, accepted and from that
time forth co-operated with Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson in the
development of the Jameson plan.

"In October, 1895, a meeting took place at Groote Schuur, Mr.
Rhodes' residence near Cape Town, at which were present, in
addition to Mr. Cecil Rhodes, Mr. Lionel Phillips, Mr.
Hammond, Mr. Charles Leonard, and Colonel Frank Rhodes. At
this meeting the plan was more fully discussed and matured;
and in November, 1895, when Dr. Jameson visited Johannesburg,
the details were finally settled. The letter of invitation was
written, signed and handed to Dr.Jameson, and the date of
combined action provisionally fixed for the end of December.
Dr. Jameson's force was to be about 1,000 strong, and the
start to be made when finally summoned by the signatories of
the letter. In the meantime the Johannesburg leaders were to
have sent in to them 4,500 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of
ammunition, and were, if possible, to arrange for an attack on
the Pretoria Arsenal simultaneously with the move from
outside. With regard to the letter of invitation which was
subsequently used by Dr. Jameson as a justification for his
start, … Mr. Leonard, Colonel Rhodes, and Mr. Phillips have
all distinctly stated that this letter was never intended as
an authority to Dr. Jameson to enter the Transvaal, unless and
until he received a further summons from them. Such was in
brief the history of the Jameson plan as far as concerned
Johannesburg. And it is necessary here to refer to the
position with regard to it of the bulk of the men who
subsequently constituted the Reform Committee. They at this
time, with the exception of a few of their number, of which I
personally was one, were entirely ignorant of what was going
on. … The Johannesburg leaders, relying on the general
sentiment of the community, assumed the responsibility of
arranging a basis of operations. So that the plan when it was
gradually revealed to various men had either to be accepted by
them in its entirety or rejected. … Men demanded and received
assurance that the movement was to be a republican one, and in
no way to be an attempt on the independence of the country. A
sufficient number of rifles were also to be forthcoming, and
the High Commissioner was to be on the spot to expedite the
adjustment of matters immediately disturbances arose."

_A. P. Hillier,
Raid and Reform,
pages 47-53._

The practical working of the conspiracy proved less easy than
the planning of it. Arms and ammunition were smuggled into
Johannesburg, but not in sufficient quantities. The time of
action had been fixed for the 28th of December. When it came
near there were found to be only 2,500 rifles at hand, instead
of the 10,000 that were wanted. A scheme for the surprising of
the Boer arsenal at Pretoria was pronounced at the last moment
impracticable. Still more disconcerting to many was a report
which came from Cape Town, that Jameson would require the
rising to be made under and in favor of the British flag. "The
movement within the Transvaal," says Mr. Hillier, "had from
its outset been one in favour, not of a British Colony, but of
a sound Republic. … Many Americans and South Africans had
accorded their support only on this understanding." Until a
clearer arrangement with the Rhodesians on this point could be
reached, the leaders in Johannesburg determined not to act.
Accordingly, on the 26th of December, two days before the
appointed date of insurrection, they telegraphed to Jameson,
in covert language which he understood, that it was
"absolutely necessary to postpone the flotation." On the
following day they issued a lengthy manifesto, setting forth
all their grievances, and deferring until the 6th of January a
general meeting of the National Union which had been called
for the 27th of December—the eve of the intended rising. The
manifesto concluded as follows:

"We have now only two questions to consider:
(a) What do we want?
(b) how shall we get it?

I have stated plainly what our grievances are, and I shall
answer with equal directness the question, 'What do we want?'
We want:

(1) the establishment of this Republic as a true republic:

(2) a Grondwet or Constitution which shall be framed by
competent persons selected by representatives of the whole
people and framed on lines laid down by them—a constitution
which shall be safeguarded against hasty alteration;

(3) an equitable franchise law, and fair representation;

(4) equality of the Dutch and English languages;

(5) responsibility of the Legislature to the heads of the
great departments;

(6) removal of religious disabilities;

(7) independence of the courts of justice, with adequate and
secured remuneration of the judges;

(8) liberal and comprehensive education;

(9) efficient civil service, with adequate provision for pay
and pension;

(10) free trade in South African products.

That is what we want. There now remains the question which is
to be put before you at the meeting of the 6th January. viz.,
How shall we get it?"

_Great Britain: Papers by Command, 1896, C.—7933._

{466}

Acting, as appears, on his own responsibility, Dr. Jameson
refused to be stopped by the postponement at Johannesburg,
and, on the evening of December 29, he entered the Transvaal
territory, from Pitsani-Pitlogo, in Bechuanaland, with a force
of about 500 men. His movement created consternation in all the
circles of the conspiracy, and received no effectual support.
It was promptly disavowed and condemned by the British
authorities, and by the home officials of the British South
Africa Company. Cecil Rhodes could do nothing but tacitly
acknowledge his responsibility for what his lieutenant had
done (though the precipitation of the raid was evidently a
surprise and a trouble to him) by resigning the premiership of
Cape Colony. Meantime, the invaders had learned that the Boers
were not to be ridden over in the easy fashion they supposed.
Hasty levies had intercepted their march, had repulsed them at
Krugersdorp, with a heavy loss in killed and wounded,
surrounded them at Doornkop, and forced them to surrender on
New Year's day. A few days later, the Uitlanders at
Johannesburg, some of whom had made a confused and ineffectual
attempt to take arms, proclaiming a provisional government,
and around whose town the excited Boers had gathered in large
force, were persuaded by the British High Commissioner to
submit to the Transvaal authorities, and more than fifty of
the leaders were placed under arrest.

"With great difficulty, President Kruger overcame the desire
of his people that Jameson and his officers should be brought
to trial and punished in the country they had outraged by
their invasion, and they were handed over to the British
government for removal to England and trial by an English
court. The trial took place in July (20-28), before the Lord
Chief Justice (Lord Russell of Killowen), Baron Pollock, and
Justice Hawkins, with a special jury. The charge on which the
prisoners were tried was that of having fitted out a warlike
expedition against a friendly state, in violation of the
Foreign Enlistment Act. The charge of the Lord Chief Justice
gave the following questions to the jury: Were preparations
for a raid made by the defendants? Did they aid, abet,
counsel, or procure such preparation? Were they employed in
the actual expedition? Did the Queen exercise dominion and
sovereignty in Pitsani-Pitlogo? The jury returned affirmative
answers, which were held to constitute a verdict of "guilty,"
and sentence was pronounced,—fifteen months of imprisonment
for Dr. Jameson, and terms varying from five to ten months for
his four subordinate officers. During the trial and after
there were many demonstrations of popular sympathy with the
prisoners. Meantime, in April, the Transvaal authorities had
brought the imprisoned leaders of the Johannesburg "reform
committee" to trial at Pretoria on charges of treason and had
convicted them all. Four, namely, Colonel Rhodes (brother of
Cecil), Lionel Phillips, George Farrar, and John Hays Hammond
(an American), were sentenced to death; the remainder to a
payment of heavy fines. The death sentences were soon
commuted, first to imprisonment for fifteen years, and
subsequently to fines of $125,000 on each of four prisoners.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1896 (January).
Message of the German Emperor to President Kruger,
relative to the Jameson Raid.

The critical situation of affairs produced by the Jameson raid
was dangerously complicated at the beginning by the
publication of the following telegram, sent to President
Kruger, on the 3d of January, by the German Emperor: "I
express my sincere congratulations that, supported by your
people and without appealing for help to friendly powers, you
have succeeded by your own energetic action against the armed
bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace,
and have thus been enabled to restore peace, and safeguard the
independence of your country against attacks from without."
President Kruger replied: "I testify to Your Majesty my very
deep and heartfelt thanks for Your Majesty's sincere
congratulations. With God's help we hope to do everything
further that is possible for the holding of our dearly bought
independence and the stability of our beloved republic." This
kindled a white heat of indignation in England. It was
supposed to signify a disposition on the part of the German
Emperor to recognize the absolute independence which the South
African Republic claimed, and to threaten interference as
between Great Britain and the Boers. A powerful "flying
squadron" was instantly put in commission, and several ships
were ordered to Delagoa Bay. For some time the relations
between Great Britain and Germany were seriously strained; but
various influences gradually cooled the excited feeling in
England, though not a little distrust of German intentions has
remained.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1896 (January-April).
Urgency of the British Colonial Secretary for redress of
Uitlander grievances.
Invitation to President Kruger to visit England.
His requirement that Article IV. of the London Convention
shall be discussed.
Deadlock of the parties.