Chapter CIII: Section 29 (23)

The truth was that Cervera was then just entering the
Caribbean Sea, considerably to the south of Sampson's search.
He touched at the French island of Martinique, and at the
Dutch island of Curaçoa, and then slipped across to Santiago
de Cuba, where he was to be overtaken by his fate. In the long
hill-sheltered bay, with a narrow entrance, which forms this
excellent Cuban harbor, the Spanish fleet was so hidden that
nearly a fortnight passed before its whereabouts could be
fully ascertained. It was not until May 20 that a blockade of
Santiago was established by a flying squadron of the American
fleet, under Commodore Schley, with certainty that the
squadron of Cervera was harbored there. On the 1st of June,
Admiral Sampson arrived on the scene, with a stronger naval
force, and took command. To attempt to force the narrow
entrance of the harbor, strongly fortified and thickly mined
as it was, and attack the Spanish fleet in the bay, was not
deemed practicable. The course resolved upon was to hold the
enemy fast in the shelter he had sought, until Santiago could
be taken, by a land attack. In pursuance of this plan, an
exploit of splendid daring was performed, in the early morning
of June 3, by a young officer, Lieutenant Richmond Pearson
Hobson, with a crew of seven volunteers, who placed and sank a
huge coaling ship, the "Merrimac," in the channel that leads
into Santiago Bay. The following is Admiral Sampson's report
of the undertaking and its achievement:

"Before coming here, I decided to make the harbor entrance
secure against the possibility of egress of the Spanish ships
by obstructing the narrow part of the entrance by sinking a
collier at that point. Upon calling upon Mr. Hobson for his
professional opinion as to a sure method of sinking the ship,
he manifested a most lively interest in the problem. After
several days' consideration he presented a solution which he
considered would insure the immediate sinking of the ship when
she had reached the desired point in the channel. This plan we
prepared for before we reached Santiago. This plan included
ten electric torpedoes on the outside of the ship, each of 78
pounds of gunpowder, sinking the ship partially before going
in, cutting the sea valves, and opening the cargo ports. The
plan contemplated a crew of only seven men and Mr. Hobson, who
begged that it might be intrusted to him. The anchor chains
were ranged upon deck for both the anchors, forward and aft,
the plan including the anchoring of the ship almost
automatically. As soon as I reached Santiago and had the
collier to work upon the details were commenced and diligently
prosecuted, hoping to complete them in one day, as the moon
and tide served best the first night after our arrival.
Notwithstanding every effort, the hour of 4 o'clock in the
morning arrived and the preparations were scarcely completed.
After a careful inspection of the final preparations I was
forced to relinquish the plan for that morning, as dawn was
breaking. Mr. Hobson begged to try it at all hazards.

"This morning proved more propitious, as a prompt start could
be made. Nothing could have been more gallantly executed. We
waited impatiently after the firing by the Spaniards had
ceased. When they did not reappear from the harbor at 6
o'clock I feared they had all perished. A steam launch, which
had been sent in charge of Naval Cadet Powell to rescue the
men, appeared at this time, coming out under a persistent fire
from the batteries, but brought none of the crew. A careful
inspection of the harbor from this ship showed that the
'Merrimac' had been sunk in the channel somewhat farther in
than had been intended.
{596}
This afternoon the chief of staff of Admiral Cervera came out
under a flag of truce with a letter from the Admiral extolling
the bravery of the crew in an unusual manner. I can not myself
too earnestly express my appreciation of the conduct of Mr.
Hobson and his gallant crew. I venture to say that a more
brave and daring thing has not been done since Cushing blew up
the 'Albemarle.'" The sunken ship did not actually block the
channel; but that fact takes nothing from the gallantry of the
exploit. Why the intended spot in the channel was missed was
explained by Lieutenant Hobson in a statement which he
afterwards made: "When the 'Merrimac' poked her nose into the
channel," says the Lieutenant, "our troubles commenced. The
deadly silence was broken by the swash of a small boat
approaching us from the shore. I made her out to be a picket
boat. She ran close up under the stern of the 'Merrimac' and
fired several shots from what seemed to be 3 pounder guns. The
'Merrimac's' rudder was carried away by this fire. That is why
the collier was not sunk across the channel. We did not discover
the loss of the rudder until Murphy [the volunteer assigned to
that duty] had cast anchor. We then found that the 'Merrimac'
would not answer to the helm and were compelled to make the
best of the situation. … Submarine mines and torpedoes were
exploded all around us, adding to the excitement. The mines
did no damage, although we could hear the rumbling and feel
the ship tremble. We were running without lights, and only the
darkness saved us from utter destruction. When the ship was in
the desired position and we found that the rudder was gone, I
called the men on deck. While they were launching the
catamaran I touched off the explosives. At the same time two
torpedoes, fired by the 'Reina Mercedes,' struck the
'Merrimac' amidships. I can not say whether our own explosives
or the Spanish torpedoes did the work, but the 'Merrimac' was
lifted out of the water, and almost rent asunder."

What followed, in the experience of the crew, when their
vessel went down, is described as follows by Lieutenant
Hobson, in a narrative of "The Sinking of the Merrimac," which
he published at a later day: "The stricken vessel now reeled
to port. Some one said: 'She is going to turn over on us,
sir,' to which I replied: 'No; she will right herself in
sinking, and we shall be the last spot to go under.' The
firing suddenly ceased. The vessel lowered her head like a
faithful animal, proudly aware of its sacrifice, bowed below
the surface, and plunged forward. The stern rose and heeled
heavily; it stood for a moment, shuddering, then started
downward, righting as it went. A great rush of water came up
the gangway, seething and gurgling out of the deck. The mass
was whirling from right to left 'against the sun'; it seized
us and threw us against the bulwarks, then over the rail. Two
were swept forward as if by a momentary recession, and one was
carried down into a coal-bunker—luckless Kelly. In a moment,
however, with increased force, the water shot him up out of
the same hole and swept him among us. The bulwarks
disappeared. A sweeping vortex whirled above. We charged about
with casks, cans, and spars, the incomplete stripping having
left quantities on the deck. The life-preservers stood us in
good stead, preventing chests from being crushed, as well as
buoying us on the surface; for spars came end on like
battering-rams, and the sharp corners of tin cans struck us
heavily. … When we looked for the life-boat we found that it
had been carried away. The catamaran was the largest piece of
floating debris; we assembled about it. The line suspending it
from the cargo-boom held and anchored us to the ship, though
barely long enough to reach the surface, causing the raft to
turn over and set us scrambling as the line came taut.

"The firing had ceased. It was evident the enemy had not seen
us in the general mass of moving objects; but soon the tide
began to drift these away, and we were being left alone with
the catamaran. The men were directed to cling close in, bodies
below and only heads out, close under the edges, and were
directed not to speak above a whisper, for the destroyer was
near at hand, and boats were passing near. We mustered; all
were present, and direction was given to remain as we were
till further orders, for I was sure that in due time after
daylight a responsible officer would come out to reconnoiter.
It was evident that we could not swim against the tide to
reach the entrance. Moreover, the shores were lined with
troops, and the small boats were looking for victims that
might escape from the vessel. The only chance lay in remaining
undiscovered until the coming of the reconnoitering boat, to
which, perhaps, we might surrender without being fired on. …
The air was chilly and the water positively cold. In less than
five minutes our teeth were chattering; so loud, indeed, did
they chatter that it seemed the destroyer or the boats would
hear. … We remained there probably an hour."

At daylight a steam launch approached, and was hailed by
Lieutenant Hobson, who judged that there must be officers on
board to whom it would be safe to surrender. He was more than
right. The commander of the launch was Admiral Cervera, in
person, who took the nearly exhausted men from the water and
treated them with great kindness, admiring the bravery of
their exploit, and sending a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson
to announce their safety. They were taken aboard the 'Reina
Mercedes,' and, as prisoners of war, were confined at first in
Morro Castle, and afterwards in the city. It so happened that
they were locked in the Morro during a bombardment of the
Spanish coast defences and fleet by ten of our vessels on June
6th, when about 1,500 projectiles were fired; and much anxiety
and indignation were expressed in this country in view of that
circumstance; but Mr. Ramsden, British consul at Santiago,
explained in a despatch that they were removed as soon as
lodgings could be prepared in the barracks—actually on June
7th. They were released on July 6th in exchange for prisoners
captured by our forces.

{597}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-July).
War with Spain,
Destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.
Despatches of Admiral Dewey.
His relations with Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief.
Arrival of American troops for the occupation of the city.

Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic Squadron, then
awaiting orders at Hongkong, received on the 25th of April the
following despatch by cable from the Secretary of the Navy: "War
has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at
once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once,
particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture
vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors." On the sixth day
after receiving these orders (namely on May 1st), he was able
to report from Manila, by a telegram sent from Hongkong on the
7th: "The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning.
Immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish
vessels: 'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de
Biloa,' 'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de
Cuba,' 'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Curreo,'
'Velasco,' one transport, 'Isla de Mandano,' water battery at
Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dispensatory. The
squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. I
request the Department will send immediately from San
Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. The only means of
telegraphing is to the American consul at Hongkong."

In due time the post brought particulars of the action, in the
following report from Commodore Dewey, dated May 4: "The
squadron left Mirs Bay, [China] on April 27, immediately on
the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at
Manila, who brought important information and who accompanies
the squadron. Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30
and, finding no vessels there, proceeded down the coast and
arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon.
The 'Boston' and 'Concord' were sent to reconnoiter Port
Subic, I having been informed that the enemy intended to take
position there. A thorough search of the port was made by the
'Boston' and 'Concord,' but the Spanish fleet was not found,
although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal (
inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their
intention to go there. Entered the Boca Grande, or south
channel, at 11.30 p. m., steaming in column at distance at 8
knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the
south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots
taking effect. The 'Boston' and 'McCulloch' returned the fire.
The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed, and
arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5.15 a.
m. by three batteries at Manila and two at Cavite and by the
Spanish fleet anchored in an approximately east and west line
across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal water
in Canacao Bay. The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the
flagship 'Olympia,' under my personal direction, leading,
followed at distance by the 'Baltimore,' 'Raleigh,' 'Petrel,'
'Concord,' and 'Boston,' in the order named, which formation
was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire
at 5.41 a. m. While advancing to the attack, two mines were
exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective. The
squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges
varying from 5,000 to 2,000 yards, countermarching in a line
approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The
enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective.

"Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the
'Olympia' with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One
was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before
an opportunity occurred to fire torpedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish
flagship 'Reina Christina' made a desperate attempt to leave
the line and come out to engage at short range, but was
received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the
'Olympia' being concentrated upon her, that she was barely
able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started
in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished until
she sank. At 7.35 a. m., it having been erroneously reported
to me that only 15 rounds per gun remained for the 5-inch
rapid-fire battery, I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron
for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, if
necessary. The three batteries at Manila had kept up a
continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which
fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these
batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance
to the Pasig River, the second on the south bastion of the
walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one-ha]f
mile farther south. At this point I sent a message to the
Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not
cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of
silencing them.

"At 11.16 a. m., finding that the report of scarcity of
ammunition was incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the
attack. By this time the flagship and almost the entire
Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12.30 p. m. the squadron
ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships
sunk, burnt, and deserted. At 12.40 p. m. the squadron
returned and anchored off Manila, the 'Petrel' being left
behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats,
which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed
by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete
manner possible. The Spanish lost the following vessels:
Sunk—'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de Ulloa.'
Burnt—'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de Cuba,'
'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Correo,' 'Velasco,'
and 'Isla Mindanao,' (transport). Captured—'Rapido,' and
'Hercules' (tugs), and several small launches. I am unable to
obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded,
but believe their loss to be very heavy. The 'Reina Christina'
alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded.

"I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron
under my command was inconsiderable. There were none killed,
and only 7 men in the squadron very slightly wounded. As will
be seen by the reports of the commanding officers which are
herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were struck and even
penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the
squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle. I
beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander
in chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more
loyal, efficient, and gallant captains than those of the
squadron now under my command. … On May 2, the day following
the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavite, where it
remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns and
magazines of the batteries there. … On the 3d the military
forces evacuated the Cavite Arsenal, which was taken
possession of by a landing party."

{598}

Promptly in response to this report of his victory, a joint
resolution of thanks to Commodore Dewey and his officers and
men, by the two Houses of Congress, was despatched to them,
with announcement to the former of his promotion to the rank
of rear-admiral. The admiral replied, on the 13th, from
Cavite, making due acknowledgments, and adding: "I am
maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe
rebels are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and
making no demonstrations. Great scarcity of provisions in the
city. I believe the Spanish Governor-General will be obliged
to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To retain
possession and thus control Philippine Islands would require,
in my best judgment, a well equipped force of 5,000 men."

On the 20th he reported, further: "Aguinaldo, the rebel
commander in chief, was brought down by the 'McCulloch' [from
Hongkong]. Organizing forces near Cavite and may render
assistance that will be valuable." On the 27th of June, in
reply to inquiries from the Navy Department, he explained his
relations with Aguinaldo, as follows: "Aguinaldo, insurgent
leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by
permission, on 'Nanshan.' Established self Cavite, outside
arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his
army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a
personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting
him in any way with the force under my command, and on several
occasions I have declined requests that I should do so,
telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of
the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to
understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being
opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of
insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil
government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron,
but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been
wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and
ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from
the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct
the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations
with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The
United States has not been bound in any way to assist
insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my
knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to
capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they
not yet having many guns. In my opinion these people are far
superior in their intelligence and more capable of
self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar
with both races."

_Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1898,
volume 2, pages 67-72 and 103._

On the 30th of June, troops sent from San Francisco, to the
number of 2,500 officers and men, commanded by General T. M.
Anderson, arrived in Manila Bay, to co-operate with the navy
in taking Manila and occupying the city, when taken. They were
followed by a second expeditionary force, under General F. V.
Greene, which arrived July 17, and by a third, July 25 and 31,
with which came General Merritt, commanding the corps and the
Department of the Pacific. General Merritt's army then
numbered nearly 11,000 men, and it was increased during the
next few weeks to more than 15,000.

_Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 499._

An English officer, Major Younghusband, who visited Manila at
this time, remarked: "It may, perhaps, with some confidence be
prophesied that when the cold fit, which will in due course
follow the warmth of the present enthusiasm, falls on the
nation, America will discover that the true parting of the
ways was … in having allowed Admiral Dewey to do more than
defeat the Spanish fleet and exact a heavy indemnity from the
city of Manila before sailing away." It would seem to be more
true, however, to say that the parting of the ways was when a
military expedition was sent from San Francisco to Manila, to
be landed, for the capture of the city and for the occupation
of the islands. It is claimed with reason that Admiral Dewey
could not "sail away," after the destruction of the Spanish
ships, because he needed the harbor he had seized, his fleet
having lost most of the privileges it had formerly been using
in neutral ports, when it became the fleet of a belligerent
power. To retain possession of Manila Bay while it was needed
by the American fleet was clearly a measure connected
legitimately with the general conduct of the war against
Spain. But it is difficult to see that the landing of soldiers
on the island of Luzon and the capture of the city of Manila
added anything to the security with which the Bay was held for
the purposes of Admiral Dewey's fleet, or that it contributed
at all to the weakening of Spain in the war, and to the rescue
of Cuba from Spanish misrule. For two months, from the first
day of May until the last day of June, before a soldier
arrived, and for six weeks longer, before Manila surrendered,
Admiral Dewey appears to have been as fully and as
conveniently in possession of all the advantages that
harborage there could give him, as he was after the Spanish
flag had been lowered in the city and on the island.
Therefore, the American conquest of the Philippines does not
readily connect itself with the war for the liberation of
Cuba, as a necessary part of it, but presents itself to the
mind as a somewhat supplementary enterprise, undertaken with
objects of its own.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (May-August).
Conduct of English and German naval officers at Manila.

While Admiral Dewey was holding Manila Bay, before the taking
of the city, there were many rumors and exciting stories
afloat, of offensive behavior towards the American fleet by
commanders of German war ships that were sent to the scene. As
far as possible, the facts were officially suppressed, in
order to avoid a quarrel between the two countries, and no
authoritative account of what occurred can be found. But some
incidents obtained publicity which are probably true in the
main. The first unpleasant happening appears to have been the
arrival in Manila Bay of a German naval vessel, which steamed
in with entire disregard of the blockading fleet, as though
the port was its own. Thereupon Admiral Dewey sent a forcible
reminder to the captain that he was intruding upon a blockade,
by firing a shot across his bow, and ordering him to heave to.
The German captain, in a rage, is said to have called on the
commanding officer of a British squadron that was in the Bay,
for advice as to what he should do, and was told that he owed
the American Admiral an apology for his violation of naval
etiquette, well settled for such circumstances as those
existing in Manila Bay. According to the story, the British
commander, Captain Sir Edward Chichester, himself on the best
of terms with Admiral Dewey, visited the latter, on behalf of
the German officer, and made the matter smooth.
{599}
But, either through indiscretion of his own, or because he had
instructions to interfere as much as possible with the
proceedings of the Americans, the German commander continued
to pursue an offensive course. According to report, be went so
far as to stop a movement which Aguinaldo (then a recognized
ally of the United States) was making, to take possession of a
certain island, and to capture some Spaniards who were on it.
This provoked Admiral Dewey to a demonstration against him so
threatening that he drew back in haste, and the island was
occupied.

According to all accounts, Admiral Dewey showed unsurpassed
wisdom and dignity in meeting and checking these offensive
proceedings without allowing them to become a cause of
international quarrel; and he was happily aided in doing so by
the hearty support of the British naval commander. According
to still another report of the time, a German admiral, who had
come upon the scene, meditated an interference to forbid the
bombarding of Manila, when the city was about to be attacked,
and, calling upon Sir Edward Chichester to ascertain what
action the latter would take, was significantly told, "That is
only known to Admiral Dewey and myself,"—which convinced him
that his project was not wise. An English writer has related,
with much satisfaction, that when Sir Edward's ship, the
"Immortalité," finally steamed out of Manila Bay, returning to
Hong Kong, "every ship in the American fleet manned her yards
and gave the British man-of-war three cheers as she passed
along; and she with the answering signal, 'thank you,' flying
at her mast-head, went on her way."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).
Act creating the United States Industrial Commission.

An Act "authorizing the appointment of a non-partisan
Commission to collate information and to consider and
recommend legislation to meet the problems presented by labor,
agriculture, and capital," was passed by Congress and approved
by the President June 18, 1898. It provided:

"That a commission is hereby created, to be called the
'Industrial Commission,' to be composed as follows. Five
members of the Senate, to be appointed by the presiding
officer thereof; five members of the House of Representatives,
to be appointed by the Speaker, and nine other persons, who shall
fairly represent the different industries and employments, to
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. … That it shall be the duty of this
commission to investigate questions pertaining to immigration,
to labor, to agriculture, to manufacturing, and to business,
and to report to Congress and to suggest such legislation as
it may deem best upon these subjects. … That it shall furnish
such information and suggest such laws as may be made a basis
for uniform legislation by the various States of the Union, in
order to harmonize conflicting interests and to be equitable
to the laborer, the employer, the producer, and the consumer.
… That the commission shall give reasonable time for hearings,
if deemed necessary, and if necessary it may appoint a
subcommission or subcommissions of its own members to make
investigation in any part of the United States, and it shall
be allowed actual necessary expenses for the same. It shall
have the authority to send for persons and papers and to
administer oaths and affirmations. … That it may report from
time to time to the Congress of the United States, and shall
at the conclusion of its labors submit a final report."

The Commission thus contemplated was duly appointed by the
President, and organized by the election of Senator Kyle for
its chairman. For the scope and plan of its investigations a
committee on procedure made the following recommendations,
which were adopted by the Commission and which have been
followed in what it has done:

"The main work of the Commission may … be said to be to study
and compare existing laws bearing upon industrial conditions,
here and elsewhere, to ascertain by competent testimony
wherein they are deficient, defective, inoperative, or
oppressive, and to recommend such remedial statutes as will
tend not only to make the conditions of industry more uniform
as between the several States, but to remove such existing
sources or causes of discontent, inequality, and injustice as
can be reached and regulated through legislation. … In order
to secure satisfactory results, it appears to your committee
imperatively necessary that the work shall be confined
strictly to the main purpose, viz, of ascertaining the nature
and effects of existing legislation, and the nature of
remedial legislation which may be necessary or desirable to
equalize conditions in industry and to remove any just grounds
of complaint on the part of either labor or capital or of the
people at large.

"To facilitate the progress of the work we recommend the
division of the Commission into four subcommissions of five
members each, to be severally charged with the investigation
of present conditions and the formulation of remedial
suggestions in the following branches of industry:

1. On agriculture and agricultural labor.

2. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in
manufacturing and general business.

3. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in mining.

4. On transportation.

In addition, we recommend a fifth subcommission, to be known
as the subcommission on statistics, in the membership of which
there shall be one representative of each of the above
subcommissions. …

"The committee also suggests that there are certain subjects
of inquiry which appertain equally to all the groups into
which it has recommended that the Commission be segregated.
The subjects of immigration, of education, of combinations and
trusts, and of taxation at once suggest themselves as
belonging in this category. It is therefore recommended that
these subjects, one or more of them, be examined into by the
full Commission pending the organization of the several
subcommissions."

The subject to which the Commission gave earliest attention
was that of "Trusts and Industrial Combinations," on which it
submitted a preliminary report on the 1st of March, 1900.

See (in this volume)
TRUSTS.

{600}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).
Act providing for the arbitration of disputes between
employers and employees in inter-state commerce.

The following are the main sections of a very important Act of
Congress, approved June 1, 1898, which provides for the
arbitration of disputes between railway and other employees
engaged in interstate commerce and the companies or
individuals employing them:

"That the provisions of this Act shall apply to any common
carrier or carriers and their officers, agents, and employees,
except masters of vessels and seamen, … engaged in the
transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad,
or partly by railroad and partly by water, for a continuous
carriage or shipment, from one State or Territory of the
United States or the District of Columbia, to any other State
or Territory of the United States, or the District of
Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an
adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United
States through a foreign country to any other place in the
United States. …

"Section 2. That whenever a controversy concerning wages,
hours of labor, or conditions of employment shall arise
between a carrier subject to this Act and the employees of
such carrier, seriously interrupting or threatening to
interrupt the business of said carrier, the chairman of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor
shall, upon the request of either party to the controversy,
with all practicable expedition, put themselves in
communication with the parties to such controversy, and shall
use their best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to
amicably settle the same; and if such efforts shall be
unsuccessful, shall at once endeavor to bring about an
arbitration of said controversy in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.

"Section 3. That whenever a controversy shall arise between a
carrier subject to this Act and the employees of such carrier
which can not be settled by mediation and conciliation in the
manner provided in the preceding section, said controversy may
be submitted to the arbitration of a board of three persons,
who shall be chosen in the manner following: One shall be
named by the carrier or employer directly interested; the
other shall be named by the labor organization to which the
employees directly interested belong, or, if they belong to
more than one, by that one of them which specially represents
employees of the same grade and class and engaged in services
of the same nature as said employees so directly interested:
Provided, however, That when a controversy involves and
affects the interests of two or more classes and grades of
employees belonging to different labor organizations, such
arbitrator shall be agreed upon and designated by the
concurrent action of all such labor organizations; and in
cases where the majority of such employees are not members of
any labor organization, said employees may by a majority vote
select a committee of their own number, which committee shall
have the right to select the arbitrator on behalf of said
employees. The two thus chosen shall select the third
commissioner of arbitration; but, in the event of their
failure to name such arbitrator within five days after their
first meeting, the third arbitrator shall be named by the
commissioners named in the preceding section. A majority of
said arbitrators shall be competent to make a valid and
binding award under the provisions hereof. The submission
shall be in writing, shall be signed by the employer and by
the labor organization representing the employees, shall
specify the time and place of meeting of said board of
arbitration, shall state the questions to be decided, and
shall contain appropriate provisions by which the respective
parties shall stipulate, as follows:

"First. That the board of arbitration shall commence their
hearings within ten days from the date of the appointment of
the third arbitrator, and shall find and file their award, as
provided in this section, within thirty days from the date of
the appointment of the third arbitrator; and that pending the
arbitration the status existing immediately prior to the
dispute shall not be changed: Provided, That no employee shall
be compelled to render personal service without his consent.

"Second. That the award and the papers and proceedings,
including the testimony relating thereto certified under the
hands of the arbitrators and which shall have the force and
effect of a bill of exceptions, shall be filed in the clerk's
office of the circuit court of the United States for the
district wherein the controversy arises or the arbitration is
entered into, and shall be final and conclusive upon both
parties, unless set aside for error of law apparent on the
record.

"Third. That the respective parties to the award will each
faithfully execute the same, and that the same may be
specifically enforced in equity so far as the powers of a
court of equity permit: Provided, That no injunction or other
legal process shall be issued which shall compel the
performance by any laborer against his will of a contract for
personal labor or service.

"Fourth. That employees dissatisfied with the award shall not
by reason of such dissatisfaction quit the service of the
employer before the expiration of three months from and after
the making of such award without giving thirty days' notice in
writing of their intention so to quit. Nor shall the employer
dissatisfied with such award dismiss any employee or employees
on account of such dissatisfaction before the expiration of three
months from and after the making of such award without giving
thirty days' notice in writing of his intention so to
discharge.

"Fifth. That said award shall continue in force as between the
parties thereto for the period of one year after the same
shall go into practical operation, and no new arbitration upon
the same subject between the same employer and the same class
of employees shall be had until the expiration of said one
year if the award is not set aside as provided in section
four. That as to individual employees not belonging to the
labor organization or organizations which shall enter into the
arbitration, the said arbitration and the award made therein
shall not be binding, unless the said individual employees
shall give assent in writing to become parties to said
arbitration. …

"Section 7. That during the pendency of arbitration under this
Act it shall not be lawful for the employer, party to such
arbitration, to discharge the employees, parties thereto,
except for inefficiency, violation of law, or neglect of duty;
nor for the organization representing such employees to order,
nor for the employees to unite in, aid, or abet, strikes
against said employer; nor, during a period of three months
after an award under such an arbitration, for such an employer
to discharge any such employees, except for the causes
aforesaid, without giving thirty days' written notice of an
intent so to discharge; nor for any of such employees, during
a like period, to quit the service of said employer without
just cause, without giving to said employer thirty days'
written notice of an intent so to do; nor for such
organization representing such employees to order, counsel, or
advise otherwise.
{601}
Any violation of this section shall subject the offending
party to liability for damages; Provided, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent any employer, party to
such arbitration, from reducing the number of its or his
employees whenever in its or his judgment business necessities
require such reduction. …

"Section 10. That any employer subject to the provisions of
this Act and any officer, agent, or receiver of such employer
who shall require any employee, or any person seeking
employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into
an agreement, either written or verbal, not to become or
remain a member of any labor corporation, association, or
organization; or shall threaten any employee with loss of
employment, or shall unjustly discriminate against any
employee because of his membership in such a labor
corporation, association, or organization; or who shall
require any employee or any person seeking employment, as a
condition of such employment, to enter into a contract whereby
such employee or applicant for employment shall agree to
contribute to any fund for charitable, social or beneficial
purposes; to release such employer from legal liability for
any personal injury by reason of any benefit received from
such fund beyond the proportion of the benefit arising from
the employer's contribution to such fund; or who shall, after
having discharged an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent
such employee from obtaining employment, or who shall, after
the quitting of an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent
such employee from obtaining employment, is hereby declared to
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof in
any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in
the district in which such offense was committed, shall be
punished for each offense by a fine of not less than one
hundred dollars and not more than one thousand dollars."

_United States Statutes at Large,
volume 30, page 424._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).
The War with Spain.
Seizure of the island of Guam.

The following order, dated May 10, 1898, was addressed by the
Secretary of the Navy to the Commander of the U. S. S.
'Charleston':

"Upon the receipt of this order, which is forwarded by the
steamship 'City of Pekin' to you at Honolulu, you will proceed
with the 'Charleston' and 'City of Pekin' in company, to
Manila, Philippine Islands. On your way, you are hereby
directed to stop at the Spanish Island of Guam. You will use
such force as may be necessary to capture the port of Guam,
making prisoners of the governor and other officials and any
armed force that may be there. You will also destroy any
fortifications on said island and any Spanish naval vessels
that may be there, or in the immediate vicinity. These
operations at the Island of Guam should be very brief, and
should not occupy more than one or two days. Should you find
any coal at the Island of Guam, you will make such use of it
as you consider desirable. It is left to your discretion
whether or not you destroy it. From the Island of Guam,
proceed to Manila and report to Rear-Admiral George Dewey, U.
S. N., for duty in the squadron under his command."

In a despatch dated June 24, Captain Glass, of the
"Charleston," reported the execution of these orders as
follows: "I have the honor to report that in obedience to the
Department's telegraphic order of May 24, 1898, this ship
sailed from Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, on the 4th instant for
Manila with the transports 'City of Pekin,' 'Australia,' and
'City of Sydney' under convoy. When clear of land, I opened
the confidential order of May 10, 1898, and changed course for
the Island of Guam, next day informing Commander Gibson, in
charge of transports, and Brigadier-General Anderson,
commanding expeditionary force, of the change in my orders and
that the transports would accompany the 'Charleston.' Arriving
off the north end of the island at daylight, June 20, I first
visited the port of Agana, the capital of Guam, and of the
Mariana group, and finding no vessels there of any kind,
proceeded to San Luis D'Apra, where it was expected that a
Spanish gunboat and a military force would be found, a rumor
to that effect having reached me while at Honolulu. Arriving
off the port at 8.30 a. m., it was found that Fort Santiago,
on Oroté Point, was abandoned and in ruins, and I steamed
directly into the harbor, having ordered the transports to
take a safe position outside and await instructions. A few
shots were fired from the secondary battery at Fort Santa Cruz
to get the range and ascertain if it was occupied. Getting no
response, ceased firing and came to anchor in a position to
control the harbor, and it was then found that this fort also
was abandoned. The only vessel in port was a small Japanese
trading vessel from Yokohama. An officer had just shoved off
from the ship to board the Japanese vessel, and obtain
information as to the condition of affairs on shore, when a
boat was seen approaching the ship, through the reefs at the
head of the harbor, flying the Spanish flag and bringing two
officers, the captain of the port, a lieutenant-commander in
the Spanish navy, and the health officer, a surgeon of the
Spanish army. These officers came on board, and, in answer to
my questions, told me they did not know that war had been
declared between the United States and Spain, their last news
having been from Manila, under date of April 14. I informed
them that war existed and that they must consider themselves
as prisoners. As they stated that no resistance could be made
by the force on the island, I released them on parole for the
day, to proceed to Agana and inform the governor that I
desired him to come on board ship at once, they assuring me
that he would do so as soon as he could reach the port. While
awaiting the return of these officers, an examination was made
of the harbor, the only dangers to navigation were buoyed, and
the transports came in during the afternoon.

"At 5 p. m. the governor's secretary, a captain in the Spanish
army, came on board, bringing me a letter from the governor,
in which he stated that he was not allowed by law to go on
board a foreign vessel and requested me to meet him on shore
for a conference. This letter is appended, marked A. As it was
then too late to land a party, from the state of the tide on
the reef between the ship and the landing place, I directed
the secretary to return and say to the governor that I would
send an officer ashore with a communication for him early next
day.
{602}
… At 8.30 a. m. on June 21 Lieutenant William Braunersreuther
was sent ashore, under flag of truce, with a written demand
for the immediate surrender of the defenses of the Island of
Guam and all officials and persons in the military service of
Spain. Mr. Braunersreuther was directed to wait half an hour
only for a reply, to bring the governor and other officials on
board as prisoners of war in case of surrender, or in case of
refusal or delay beyond the time given, to return and take
command of the landing force, which he would find in
readiness, and proceed to Agaña. At 12.15 p. m. Mr.
Braunersreuther returned to the ship, bringing off the
governor and three other officers, his staff, and handed me a
letter from the governor acceding fully to my demand. Having
received the surrender of the Island of Guam, I took formal
possession at 2.45 p. m., hoisting the American flag on Fort
Santa Cruz and saluting it with 21 guns from the 'Charleston.'
From a personal examination of Fort Santa Cruz, I decided that
it was entirely useless as a defensive work, with no guns and
in a partly ruinous condition, and that it was not necessary
to expend any mines in blowing it up. The forts at Agaña, San
Luis D'Apra, and Umata are of no value and no guns remain in
the island except four small cast-iron guns of obsolete
pattern at Agaña, formerly used for saluting, but now
condemned as unsafe even for that purpose. No Spanish vessel
of war has visited Guam during the last eighteen months. No
coal was found on the island."

_Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1898,
volume 2, pages 151-3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June-July).
War with Spain.
Expedition of the army under General Shafter
against Santiago de Cuba.
Battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill.

To co-operate with the navy in operations for the capture of
Santiago de Cuba, and of the Spanish fleet blockaded in the
harbor of that town, orders were issued from Washington on the
31st of May, by Major-General Miles, Commanding the Army,
"with the approval of the Secretary of War," which directed
General Shafter, commanding the forces assembled at Tampa,
Florida, to place them on transports and proceed with them,
under convoy of the navy, to Santiago. Owing to an extreme
lack of both railway and harbor facilities at Tampa, an entire
week was consumed in the embarkation of the troops and
supplies. When on shipboard, the expedition was delayed
another week by false reports of the appearance of Spanish
cruisers on the Cuban coast, which seemed to the Washington
authorities to call for a stronger naval convoy to guard the
transport fleet. It was not until the 14th of June that the
fleet was permitted to sail, with 16,000 men. It arrived off
Guantanamo, near Santiago, on the morning of the 20th.

Meantime, the blockading fleet had bombarded the forts at
Santiago twice, on the 6th and on the 16th, and had silenced
them, for the time being, on both occasions, but apparently
with no permanent effect. With more success, two vessels from
the fleet had entered the harbor of Guantanamo on the 7th and
taken possession of the lower bay, where a marine battalion
was landed on the 10th and established in camp, to hold ground
until the army arrived. Meantime, also, communication with
General Garcia, commanding Cuban forces, had been opened, and
arrangements made, the results of which were subsequently
acknowledged by General Miles, in his annual report, as
follows:

"General Garcia regarded my requests as his orders, and
promptly took steps to execute the plan of operations. He sent
3,000 men to check any movement of the 12,000 Spaniards
stationed at Holguín. A portion of this latter force started
to the relief of the garrison at Santiago, but was
successfully checked and turned back by the Cuban forces under
General Feria. General Garcia also sent 2,000 men, under
Perez, to oppose the 6,000 Spaniards at Guantánamo, and they
were successful in their object. He also sent 1,000 men, under
General Ríos, against the 6,000 men at Manzanillo. Of this
garrison, 3,500 started to reenforce the garrison at Santiago,
and were engaged in no less than thirty combats with the
Cubans on their way before reaching Santiago. … With an
additional force of 5,000 men General Garcia besieged the
garrison of Santiago, taking up a strong position on the west
side and in close proximity to the harbor, and he afterwards
received General Shafter and Admiral Sampson at his camp near
that place. He had troops in the rear, as well as on both
sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our
troops."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 16._

The troops from Tampa, under General Shafter, arriving on the
20th, were disembarked on the 22d, 23d and 24th, at Daiquiri,
and advanced to Siboney. The first resistance encountered was
at La Guasima, three miles from Siboney, on the Santiago road,
where the Spaniards were driven from strong entrenchments by a
part of Young's brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division
(dismounted). The brigade thus first in the fighting was
composed of the 1st and 10th regiments of regular cavalry and
the 1st United States Volunteer cavalry, commonly called the
"Rough Riders." After the engagement at La Guasima, six days
were occupied in concentrating the army (including the Cuban
auxiliaries of General Garcia), mostly at Sevilla, a short
distance beyond La Guasima, on the same road, and in
overcoming great difficulties of transportation for supplies.

On June 30, General Shafter reconnoitered the country around
Santiago and made his plan of attack. "From a high hill," says
his subsequent report, "from which the city was in plain view,
I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The
roads were very poor, and, indeed, little better than
bridlepaths, until the San Juan River and El Caney were
reached. The position of El Caney, to the northeast of
Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the
Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a strong
outpost that might be used to assail the right flank and rear
of any force operating against San Juan Hill. In view of this
I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney with one
division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to
Santiago, passing by El Poso House, and, as a diversion, to
direct a small force against Aguadores from Siboney along the
railroad by the sea, with a view of attracting the attention
of the Spaniards in the latter direction and of preventing
them from attacking our left flank.

"During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders and
explained to them my general plan of battle. Lawton's division
[composed of Chaffee's, Miles' and Ludlow's brigades],
assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out
during the afternoon toward El Caney, to begin the attack
there early the next morning.

{603}

[Image: Map Illustrating the Santiago Campaign …]

{604}

After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney road
toward Santiago and take position on the right of the line.
Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry [embracing Sumner's
brigade—3d, 6th and 9th regular cavalry, and Young's brigade
mentioned above] and Kent's division of infantry [Wikoft's,
Hawkins's and Pearson's brigades] were directed on the
Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El Poso,
toward which heights Grimes's battery moved on the afternoon
of the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the
next morning and at the proper time prepare the way for the
advance of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The attack at
this point was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard
at El Caney and his infantry fire showed he had become well
engaged.

"The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted to
cutting out and repairing the roads and to other necessary
preparations for battle. These preparations were far from what
I desired them to be; but we were in a sickly climate; our
supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road,
which the rains might at any time render impassable; fear was
entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing
our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of
supplies; and lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with
8,000 reenforcements for the enemy, was en route from
Manzanillo and might be expected in a few days. Under those
conditions I determined to give battle without delay.