Chapter CIV: Section 29 (24)

"Early on the morning of July 1, Lawton was in position around
El Caney, Chaffee's brigade [7th, 12th, and 13th U. S.
Infantry] on the right, across the Guantanamo road; Miles's
brigade [1st, 4th, and 25th U. S. Infantry] in the center, and
Ludlow's [8th and 22d U. S. Infantry and 2d Microcassettes
Volunteers] on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy's
retreat along the Santiago road was assigned to the latter
brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6.15 A. M. The
battle here soon became general and was hotly contested. The
enemy's position was naturally strong and was rendered more so
by blockhouses, a stone fort, and entrenchments cut in solid
rock, and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church. The
opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been
anticipated, and prevented Lawton from joining the right of
the main line during the day, as had been intended.

"After the battle had continued for some time Bates's brigade
of two regiments (3d and 20th United States Infantry] reached
my headquarters from Siboney. I directed him to move near El
Caney, to give assistance, if necessary. He did so and was put
in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued
with varying intensity during most of the day and until the
place was carried by assault, about 4.30 p. m. As the
Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road,
Ludlow's position enabled him to do very effective work and to
practically cut off all retreat in that direction.

"After the battle at El Caney was well opened and the sound of
the small-arms fire caused us to believe that Lawton was
driving the enemy before him, I directed Grimes's battery to
open fire from the heights of El Poso on the San Juan'
blockhouse, which could be seen situated in the enemy's
entrenchments extending along the crest of San Juan Hill. This
fire was effective and the enemy could be seen running away
from the vicinity of the blockhouse. The artillery fire from
El Poso was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They
evidently had the range of this hill, and their first shells
killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used
smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the positions
of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our
black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.

"At this time the cavalry division [of General Wheeler] under
General Sumner (commanding temporarily in consequence of the
illness of General Wheeler, who returned to duty that day],
which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of the El
Poso House, was ordered forward, with directions to cross the
San Juan River and deploy to the right on the Santiago side,
while Kent's division was to follow closely in its rear and
deploy to the left. These troops moved forward in compliance
with orders, but the road was so narrow as to render it
impracticable to retain the column of fours formation at all
points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as
to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It
naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the
long range rifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded a
number of our men while marching along this road and before
there was any opportunity to return this fire. At this time
Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to push forward with all
possible haste and place their troops in position to engage the
enemy. General Kent, with this end in view, forced the head of
his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the
narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the
San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred
yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that
was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, of my staff, who
had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This
information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner
moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to
utilize the road to the left. … After crossing the stream, the
cavalry moved to the right with a view of connecting with
Lawton's left when he should come up, and with their left
resting near the Santiago road. In the meanwhile Kent's
division, with the exception of two regiments of Hawkins's
brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from
the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing both
trails, but more especially the one to the left, and crossing
the creek formed for attack in the front of San Juan Hill."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 147._

"The particulars of this gallant attack, which won the hill
and decided the fate of Santiago, are given with more
clearness in the report of General Kent, who commanded the
division which had most of the fighting to do, than in that of
General Shafter. Wikoff's 'heroic brigade,' writes General
Kent, 'consisting of the 13th, 9th, and 24th United States
Infantry, speedily crossed the stream and were quickly
deployed to the left of the lower ford.
{605}
While personally superintending this movement Colonel Wikoff
was killed, the command of the brigade then devolving upon
Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry, who immediately fell
severely wounded, and then upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum,
24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the
withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade then
devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, 9th Infantry.
Meanwhile I had again sent a staff officer to hurry forward
the second brigade [Pearson's] which was bringing up the rear.
The 10th and 2d Infantry, soon arriving at the forks, were
deflected to the left to follow the Third Brigade [Wikoff's],
while the 21st was directed along the main road to support
Hawkins [whose brigade was composed of the 6th and 16th U. S.
Infantry and the 71st New York Volunteers].

"Crossing the lower ford a few minutes later, the 10th and 2d
moved forward in column in good order toward the green knoll …
on the left. Approaching the knoll the regiments deployed,
passed over the knoll, and ascended the high ridge beyond,
driving back the enemy in the direction of his trenches. I
observed this movement from the Fort San Juan Hill. … Prior to
this advance of the second brigade, the third, connecting with
Hawkins's gallant troops on the right, had moved toward Fort
San Juan, sweeping through a zone of most destructive fire,
scaling a steep and difficult hill, and assisting in capturing
the enemy's strong position (Fort San Juan) at 1.30 p. m. This
crest was about 125 feet above the general level and was
defended by deep trenches and a loopholed brick fort
surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements. General Hawkins, some
time after I reached the crest, reported that the 6th and 16th
Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider
incorrect. Credit is almost equally due the 6th, 9th, 13th,
16th, and 24th regiments of infantry. … The Thirteenth
Infantry captured the enemy's colors waving over the fort, but
unfortunately destroyed them. …

"The greatest credit is due to the officers of my command,
whether company, battalion, regimental, or brigade commanders,
who so admirably directed the formation of their troops,
unavoidably intermixed in the dense thicket, and made the
desperate rush for the distant and strongly defended crest, I
have already mentioned the circumstances of my third brigade's
advance across the ford, where, in the brief space of ten
minutes, it lost its brave commander (killed) and the next two
ranking officers by disabling wounds; yet in spite of these
confusing conditions the formations were effected without
hesitation, although under a stinging fire, companies acting
singly in some instances and by battalions and regiments in
others, rushing through the jungle, across the stream, waist
deep, and over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed-wire
entanglements. …

"The enemy having retired to a second line of rifle pits, I
directed my line to hold their positions and intrench. At ten
minutes past 3 p. m. I received almost simultaneously two
requests—one from Colonel Wood, commanding a cavalry brigade,
and one from General Sumner—asking for assistance for the
cavalry on my right, 'as they were hard pressed.' I
immediately sent to their aid the 13th Infantry, who promptly
went on this further mission, despite the heavy losses they
had already sustained. Great credit is due to the gallant
officer and gentleman, Brigadier General H. S. Hawkins, who,
placing himself between the two regiments, leading his
brigade, the 6th and 16th Infantry, urged and led them by
voice and bugle calls to the attack so successfully
accomplished."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 164._

The part borne by the dismounted cavalry division in the
capture of the Spanish intrenchments on San Juan Hill is
described as follows in the report of General Sumner,
temporarily in command:

"After crossing the creek with sufficient strength to hold it
and protect the crossing, I received verbal orders to move by
the right flank to connect with Lawton's left. During the
execution of this movement a balloon, under command of Colonel
Derby, came up the road, forcing open Wood's Brigade and
cutting it in two, thereby delaying the movement. The
artillery fire of the enemy opened upon the balloon and
continued for more than an hour, thereby subjecting part of my
command massed and the rest moving by the flank to long
shrapnel fire. Many officers and men were wounded here by
exploding shells and small arms' firing of the enemy. After
completing the deployment the command was so much committed to
battle that it became necessary either to advance or else
retreat under fire.

"Lieutenant Miley, representing General Shafter, authorized an
advance, which was ordered, Carroll's brigade taking the
advance, reinforced on the right by Roosevelt's regiment and
supported by the 1st and 10th Cavalry of Wood's Brigade. The
advance was made under heavy infantry fire through open flat
ground, cut up by wire fences, to the creek, dIstant about 600
yards. The advance was made in good order, the enemy's fire
being returned only under favorable opportunities. In crossing
the flat one officer (Captain O'Neil) and several men were
killed and several officers and men wounded. Both sides of the
creek are heavily wooded for about 200 yards. The creek was
swollen, and the crossing through this space and the creek was
made with great difficulty. After passing through the thick
woods the ground was entirely open and fenced by wire. From
this line it was necessary to storm the hill, upon the top of
which is a house loopholed, etc., for defense. The slope of
the hill is very difficult, but the assault was made with
great gallantry and with much loss to the enemy. In this
assault Colonel Hamilton, Lieutenants Smith and Shipp were
killed; Colonel Carroll, Lieutenants Thayer and Myer were
wounded. A number of casualties occurred among the enlisted
men. After taking this hill the front line advanced to take
the Fort San Juan Hill under fire from strong force of the
enemy in trenches and house known as 'Blockhouse.' … The
assault was successful, the line storming the trenches and
blockhouse with conspicuous gallantry and coolness, capturing
three prisoners, wounding and killing many of the enemy. …
Connected with my left, Hawkins's brigade of Kent's division
carried everything in front of it and captured the house and
hill known as 'Fort San Juan' proper."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2. page 370._

{606}

Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt, who commanded the Rough Riders
regiment that day, while Colonel Wood commanded the brigade,
tells the story of the fight, and what followed, very tersely,
in his report: "After crossing the river at the ford," says
the Lieutenant-Colonel, "we were moved along and up its light
bank under fire, and were held in reserve at a sunken road.
Here we lost a good many men, including Captain O'Neil,
killed, and Lieutenant Haskell, wounded. We then received your
order to advance and support the regular cavalry in the attack
on the intrenchments and blockhouses on the hills to the left.
The regiment was deployed on both sides of the road, and moved
forward until we came to the rearmost lines of the regulars.
We continued to move forward until I ordered a charge, and the
men rushed the blockhouse and rifle pits on the hill to the
right of our advance. They did the work in fine shape, though
suffering severely. The guidons of Troops E and G were first
planted on the summit, though the first men up were some A and
B troopers who were with me.

"We then opened fire on the intrenchments on a hill to our
left which some of the other regiments were assailing and
which they carried a few minutes later. Meanwhile we were
under a heavy rifle fire from the intrenchments along the
hills to our front, from whence they also shelled us with a
piece of field artillery until some of our marksmen silenced
it. When the men got their wind we charged again and carried
the second line of intrenchments with a rush. Swinging to the
left, we then drove the Spaniards over the brow of the chain
of hills fronting Santiago. By this time the regiments were
much mixed, and we were under a very heavy fire, both of
shrapnel and from rifles from the batteries, intrenchments,
and forts immediately in front of the city. On the extreme
front I now found myself in command with fragments of the six
cavalry regiments of the two brigades under me. The Spaniards
made one or two efforts to retake the line, but were promptly
driven back.

"Both General Sumner and you sent me word to hold the line at
all hazards, and that night we dug a line of intrenchments
across our front, using the captured Spaniards' intrenching
tools. We had nothing to eat except what we captured from the
Spaniards; but their dinners had fortunately been cooked, and
we ate them with relish, having been fighting all day. We had
no blankets and coats, and lay by the trenches all night. The
Spaniards attacked us once in the night, and at dawn they
opened a heavy artillery and rifle fire. Very great assistance
was rendered us by Lieutenant Parker's Gatling battery at
critical moments; he fought his guns at the extreme front of
the firing line in a way that repeatedly called forth the
cheers of my men. One of the Spanish batteries which was used
against us was directly in front of the hospital so that the
red cross flag flew over the battery, saving it from our fire
for a considerable period. The Spanish Mauser bullets made
clean wounds; but they also used a copper-jacketed or
brass-jacketed bullet which exploded, making very bad wounds
indeed.

"Since then we have continued to hold the ground; the food has
been short; and until today [July 4] we could not get our
blankets, coats, or shelter tents, while the men lay all day
under the fire from the Spanish batteries, intrenchments, and
guerrillas in trees, and worked all night in the trenches,
never even taking off their shoes. But they are in excellent
spirits, and ready and anxious to carry out any orders they
receive. At the end of the first day the eight troops were
commanded, two by captains, three by first lieutenants, two by
second lieutenants, and one by the sergeant whom you made
acting lieutenant. We went into the fight about 490 strong; 86
were killed or wounded, and there are about half a dozen
missing. The great heat prostrated nearly 40 men, some of them
among the best in the regiment."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 684._

There have been much contradiction and controversy concerning
some of the orders by which the battle of San Juan was
directed. The following are the conclusions on that subject of
a civilian observer who seems to have seen and investigated
with impartiality:

"The orders under which the battle of San Juan was fought were
given by Adjutant-General McClernand to General Kent, commanding
the Infantry Division—consisting, in addition to the
organizations already mentioned (Wikoff's and Pearson's
brigades), of the First Brigade, including the Sixth and
Sixteenth United States Infantry and the Seventy-first New
York, under General Hawkins—at about nine o'clock in the
morning. There is no question fortunately as to the exact
wording of the orders. A little green knoll to the left of the
Santiago road and half a mile short of the San Juan Heights was
pointed out as the point which was to be the extreme limit of
the forward movement of the Infantry Division. Once there,
further orders would be given. The orders under which General
Sumner advanced from El Pozo would appear to have been more
specific, and certainly more clear than the orders which
General Kent received for the Infantry Division a few minutes
later. At the same time, it is true that these orders were
also based upon a complete misconception of the situation and
a total ignorance of the Spanish position and the lay of the
country beyond El Pozo. General Sumner's orders were to
advance along that branch of the Aguadores Creek which runs
parallel with the Santiago road from El Pozo, until it joins
the main stream of the Aguadores at the angle subsequently
known as the 'bloody angle,' where the creek makes a sharp
turn to the left, and then runs a general southerly course
toward the town of Aguadores and the sea. This creek General
Sumner was instructed to hold until the result of Lawton's
attack upon Caney became known, and he received further
orders. Once the creek was reached, Sumner, under the most
unfavorable circumstances of a heavy fire, and the thick and
pathless jungles which his men had to penetrate, deployed his
whole division, and then sent back word to McClernand, the
adjutant-general of the corps, acquainting him with the actual
conditions by which he was confronted, and asking whether his
orders contemplated an attack upon the enemy's intrenched
position, setting forth at the same time the utter
impossibility of keeping his men inactive for a long time
under such a heavy fire as was being poured in upon them.

{607}

"Had it been proposed to carry out the plan, as discussed and
agreed upon at General Shafter's headquarters the night
before, to advance along the right flank of the Spanish
position, keeping in touch with Lawton, obviously these two
divisions, or a large part of them, should have been directed
to take the direct road which ran north from El Pozo to
Marianaje and thence to El Caney, leaving in front of San Juan
only force sufficient to retain the Spaniards in their
position. But the divisions were ordered to proceed along the
Santiago road, and in a very few minutes came under fire. The
original plan may have been changed at the last moment, of
course; but as every movement that was subsequently made was
in the line of carrying this plan out, until finally, on the
12th, General Lawton succeeded in completely investing the
town on the north and west, this does not seem likely. The
more probable explanation of the movement and of what
followed, and the one accepted by general officers, is as
follows: That it was still intended to follow Lawton's advance
on the right, but that owing to our failure to develop the
Spanish position in our front, and our complete ignorance of
the lay of the land, the flank movement was not begun until
too late—not until the troops had been led into a position
from which they could be extricated only by wresting from the
Spaniards the block-houses and the trenches from which,
unexposed and unseen, they were delivering such a galling fire
upon our men, engaged in wandering aimlessly about in an
almost trackless tropical jungle. At this moment of great
confusion and uncertainty, when the road was choked with the
regiments of both the cavalry and infantry divisions, mutually
hindering one another in their struggles to advance, and
having to sustain a heavy and destructive fire which could not
be answered, an ordeal even for the veteran soldier; at this
moment, when something might still have been done to mislead
the enemy and cover our advance, the war balloon was sent up
directly behind our columns. This mistake betrayed the exact
location of our advance, and the Spanish fire became heavier
and better directed, and our losses more severe."

_S. Bonsal,
The Fight for Santiago,
chapter 6 (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company)._

The same writer gives a sickening account of the sufferings of
the wounded after the battle and the miserable failure of
provision for any kind of succor or care of them. "Of course:"
he says, "in view of the perilous situation which the two
divisions now occupied upon the crest of the hill, and the
great anxiety which was felt at headquarters for the safety of
the whole army, and the preparations which had to be made
against the expected night attack of the Spaniards to drive
our men back and retake their lost position, the search for
the dead and wounded this evening had to be confined to a very
limited area, and was only as thorough as the shortness of the
time for which men could be spared from the colors permitted.
The jungle and the great fields of long grass were not
searched, and thus many of the wounded were not discovered
until the following day; and quite a number, indeed, not until
the armistice was declared, on the third day after the battle,
when the men had time to ransack the hill-side and the valley
for the missing. And there were some—those who had the
strength when they fell to crawl through the cactus, the
Spanish bayonet, and all manner of prickly and trailing plants
into the deeper and more protected recesses of the jungle—who
were never discovered at all until days, many days, had
passed; and the gathering of the vultures told where some poor
fellow had died without care and without food, of his wounds
or from starvation. Of such an one, when his place of hiding
was discovered, there was, as a rule, only left a whitened
skeleton and pieces of the uniform he had worn. The last
resting place of not a few was never discovered at all.

"I believe I am giving a moderate estimate when I say that at
least one-third of the men wounded on July 1st received no
attention, and were not brought back to the division hospital
until the afternoon of Ju]y 3d. This night we knew nothing,
and had not even the slightest suspicion, of how numerous the
undiscovered wounded were. … Only about half of the wounded
men who were discovered this evening and been brought back to
the dressing station when the moon rose above the dark forest
line, and lit up the battlefield and the heights of San Juan
as clearly, and, indeed, more clearly than day, for there was
now not the dazzling force and the confusing mirage of the
pitiless sunlight to blind the sight. The majority of these
men had had their wounds dressed where they fell, or soon
after falling, with the first-aid bandages. There were very
few indeed to whom it had been possible to give any further
attention than this, as the regimental surgeons, for want of
transportation, had been unable to bring their medical chests,
and those who were best provided carried with them only small
pocket cases. …

"When the first-aid bandages were applied, the wounded man and
those who helped him were, as a rule, under fire, which made
any but the most summary methods of wound-dressing quite
impossible. Fortunately these bandages, so simple and
practical, lent themselves excellently well to this procedure.
The first thing the soldiers or the hospital attendants would
do when they came upon a wounded man was, in the case of a
wound in the body, to tear off his shirt, or in the case of a
wound in the leg, tear off his trousers, and then wrap around
the wound the first-aid bandage. The wound-dressers were
generally in such haste, and the wounded men usually so
helpless to assist in any way, and their shirts and trousers
so rotten from the drenching rains in which they had been worn
without change day or night, that the taking off of the clothing
was literally what I call it—tearing, and the garment came off
so rent as to be quite useless for further wear. Consequently
the soldiers were carried half-naked, or, if they had been
wounded in both the body and the lower limbs, as was so
frequently the case, entirely naked, to the army wagons and so
down to the hospital, where there was not a scrap of clothing
or bedding forthcoming to cover them with. These who were
stripped in this way during the daytime were baked and
blistered by the fierce sunlight, only to shiver with the
penetrating cold and dampness after the rain had ceased to
fall and when the chill night came on.

"Knowing that he was totally unprepared to clothe or cover the
wounded that would probably be brought in, the chief surgeon
of the corps issued an order, the evening before the battle,
that all wounded men should be brought in with their blankets,
halves of shelter-tents, and ponchos when possible. This was
certainly a step in the right direction, even if it was but a
frank confession by the authorities that no preparation had
been made by them for the emergency which it cannot be said
was suddenly thrust upon them, but which they might have
foreseen and should have been preparing against for many weeks
previous.
{608}
While the attending soldiers, realizing how serious for their
wounded comrades it would be to have to lie in the hospitals
uncovered to wind and weather, made great efforts to find
their packs, these efforts were not often successful, and a
great majority of the wounded reached the hospital half
naked, and had thereafter only the covering and the bedding
which their comrades and the hospital attendants were able to
'rustle' for them, and this was little enough and not seldom
nothing at all.

"Had this expedition been provided with a greater number of
surgeons and hospital attendants, had the ambulances been at
hand which we left in Tampa or upon the transports, ambulances
without which it is reasonable to suppose—at least we had
supposed—no civilized power would enter upon an aggressive
war, much less upon a campaign in which we had the advantage
of choosing both our own time and the field of operations, the
outrageous treatment which our wounded suffered, and the
barbarous scenes which we were called upon to witness upon
this and the following days would never have occurred."

_S. Bonsai,
The Fight for Santiago,
chapter 8 (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company)._

The troops which had carried San Juan Hill were intrenched,
that night, in the positions they had gained, and those which
had taken El Caney were brought into connection with them,
Lawton's division on their right and Bates's brigade on the
left. The battle was renewed by the Spaniards soon after
daylight on the morning of the 2d, and raged with more or less
fury throughout the day. That evening, about 10 o'clock, a
fierce attempt was made to break through the American lines,
but without success. Again, on the morning of the third, the
Spaniards reopened battle, but with less vigor than before.
General Shafter then sent the following letter to General
Toral, the Spanish commander: "I shall be obliged, unless you
surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the
citizens of foreign countries, and all women and children,
that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow
morning." In reply, General Toral wrote; "It is my duty to say
to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will
inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of
your message." Several of the foreign consuls at Santiago then
came into the American lines and persuaded General Shafter to
delay the shelling of the town until noon of the 5th, provided
that the Spanish forces made no demonstration meantime against
his own. This established a truce which was renewed, in a
series of negotiations until the 10th. "I was of the opinion,"
reported General Shafter, "that the Spaniards would surrender
if given a little time, and I thought this result would be
hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand
they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon
this presumption I determined to offer to return all the
wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear
transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not
to serve against the forces of the United States until
regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These
officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates,
27 in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some
of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors,
and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish
prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades. The
cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically
terminated the battle of Santiago." General Shafter goes on to
say that when the battle was fiercest, on July 1st, he probably
had no more than 12,000 men on the firing line, not counting a
few Cubans who assisted in the attack on El Caney, and who
fought with valor. They were confronted by about equal numbers
of the enemy, in strong and intrenched positions. "Our losses
in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81
officers and 1,203 men wounded; missing 79. The missing, with
few exceptions, reported later." Up to this time, General
Shafter had been unable to complete the investment of the town
with his own men, and had depended upon General Garcia with
his Cubans, placed on the extreme right of the American lines,
to watch for and intercept reinforcements. They failed to do
so, and 2,800 Spaniards, under General Escario, entered the
city on the night of the 2d. The American commander now
extended his own lines as rapidly as possible and completed
the investment of the town.

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, pages 155-157._

As stated above, permission was given on the 3d for
non-combatants to leave the city. "They did leave in the
following days to the number of perhaps 20,000, filling the
neighboring villages and roads with destitute people, mostly
women and children. It then seemed to fall to our lot to see
that these people did not starve in a desolate country, and to
be as much our duty to take care of these people, whom our
policy had driven from their homes, as it was for Spain to
feed the reconcentrados, whom they drove from their homes
under their war policy. The task was not insignificant."

_Report of Inspector-General
(Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 596)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July).
Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.

See (in this volume)
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: A. D. 1898.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 1).
National Bankrupt Law.

After years of effort on the part of its advocates, a national
bankrupt law was enacted by both Houses of Congress and
received the President's signature on the 1st of July, 1898.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 3).
Destruction of the Spanish squadron at Santiago.

On the morning of July 3, Admiral Cervera, convinced that
Santiago would be taken by the American forces, and acting
under orders from the Captain-General at Havana, made a
desperate attempt to save his squadron by escaping to sea. The
result was a total destruction of the Spanish ships, in an
engagement with the blockading fleet, of which Admiral Sampson
gave the following account in his official report:

"The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9.35 and
10 a. m., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at
9.31 and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later.
The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at
that moment were as follows: The flagship 'New York' was 4
miles east of her blockading station and about 7 miles from
the harbor entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I
intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go
to the front to consult with General Shafter.
{609}
A discussion of the situation and a more definite
understanding between us of the operations proposed had been
rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of
the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff
on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General
Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made
arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in
the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron
appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near
their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle
about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the
westward, in the following order: The 'Indiana' about a mile
and a half from shore, the 'Oregon'—the 'New York's' place
being between these two—the 'Iowa,' 'Texas,' and 'Brooklyn,'
the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The
distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from 2½
to 4 miles, the latter being the limit of day blockading
distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about
8 miles. The 'Massachusetts' had left at 4 a. m., for
Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the 'Iowa' and
'Texas.' The auxiliaries 'Gloucester' and 'Vixen' lay close to
the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large
vessels, the 'Gloucester' to the eastward and the 'Vixen' to
the westward. The torpedo boat 'Ericsson' was in company with
the flagship and remained with her during the chase until
ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient
service in rescuing prisoners from the burning' Vizcaya.' …

"The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a
speed estimated at from 8 to 10 knots, and in the following
order: 'Infanta Maria Teresa' (flagship), 'Vizcaya,'
'Cristobal Colon,' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' The distance
between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from
the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of
the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an
interval of only about 12 minutes elapsed. Following the
'Oquendo,' at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the
torpedo-boat destroyer 'Pluton,' and after her the 'Furor.'
The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their
guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading
vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke
from their guns. The men of our ships in front of the port
were at Sunday 'quarters for inspection.' The signal was made
simultaneously from several vessels, 'Enemy ships escaping,'
and general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they
sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within 8
minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The
'New York' turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet,
flying the signal, 'Close in towards harbor entrance and
attack vessels,' and gradually increasing speed, until toward
the end of the chase she was making 16½ knots, and was rapidly
closing on the 'Cristobal Colon.' She was not, at any time,
within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part
in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts
in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one
of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to
escape from the 'Gloucester.'

"The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the
westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power
of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had
closed in towards the Morro at the instant of the enemy's
appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire,
well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and
silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards
carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the
battle developed into a chase in which the 'Brooklyn' and
'Texas' had, at the start, the advantage of position. The
'Brooklyn' maintained this lead. The 'Oregon,' steaming with
amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first
place. The 'Iowa' and the 'Indiana' having done good work, and
not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me,
in succession, at about the time the 'Vizcaya' was beached, to
drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These
vessels rescued many prisoners. The 'Vixen,' finding that the
rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran
outside of our own column and remained there during the battle
and chase.

"The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the
'Gloucester' excited the admiration of everyone who witnessed
it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is
a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht
'Corsair'—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She
was lying about 2 miles from the harbor entrance, to the
southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening
fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the
'Pluton' and 'Furor,' the 'Gloucester' was slowed, thereby
gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the
destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and
was able to close to short range, while her fire was accurate,
deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the
'Gloucester' was under the fire of the Socapa Battery. Within
twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago Harbor
the careers of the 'Furor' and the 'Pluton' were ended, and
two-thirds of their people killed. The 'Furor' was beached and
sunk in the surf; the 'Pluton' sank in deep water a few
minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury
from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships
'Iowa,' 'Indiana,' and the 'Texas,' yet I think a very
considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire,
at close range, of the 'Gloucester's' battery. After rescuing
the survivors of the destroyers, the 'Gloucester' did
excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the
'Infanta Maria Teresa.'

"The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering
in the same direction, and in formation, removed all tactical
doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every
United States vessel to close in, immediately engage, and
pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already
stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past
a number of the blockading ships which could not immediately
work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in
passing, and the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' and the 'Oquendo' were
probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen
minutes of the engagement. It was afterwards learned that the
'Infanta Maria Teresa's' fire main had been cut by one of our
first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With
large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft,
these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the
beach—the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' at about 10.15 a. m. at Nima
Nima, 6½ miles from Santiago Harbor entrance, and the
'Almirante Oquendo' at about 10.30 a. m. at Juan Gonzales, 7
miles from the port.

{610}

"The 'Vizcaya' was still under the fire of the leading
vessels; the 'Cristobal Colon' had drawn ahead, leading the
chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the
leading American ships. The 'Vizcaya' was soon set on fire,
and, at 11.15, she turned inshore, and was beached at
Aserraderos, 15 miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and
with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to
explode. When about 10 miles west of Santiago the 'Indiana'
had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at
Aserraderos the 'Iowa' was signaled to 'Resume blockading
station.' The 'Iowa' assisted by the 'Ericsson' and the
'Hist,' took off the crew of the 'Vizcaya,' while the
'Harvard' and the 'Gloucester' rescued those of the 'Infanta
Maria Teresa' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' This rescue of
prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish
vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and
gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and
aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it
was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main
magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just
inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers
and men until their work of humanity was complete.

"There remained now of the Spanish ships only the 'Cristobal
Colon'—but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by
the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of
escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the 'Vizcaya'
went ashore, the 'Colon' was about 6 miles ahead of the
'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon'; but her spurt was finished, and
the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the
'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' came the 'Texas,' 'Vixen,' and
'New York.' It was evident from the bridge of the 'New York'
that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the
chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12.50 the
'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' opened fire and got her range—the
'Oregon's' heavy shell striking beyond her—and at 1.20 she
gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors,
and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, 48 miles from Santiago.
Captain Cook, of the 'Brooklyn,' went on board to receive the
surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up in the 'New
York,' received his report, and placed the 'Oregon' in charge
of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the
prisoners to be transferred to the 'Resolute,' which had
followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had
gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all
their personal effects should be retained by the officers.
This order I did not modify. The 'Cristobal Colon' was not
injured by our firing, and probably is not much injured by
beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was
so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her
sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure,
after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it
became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was
pushed by the 'New York' bodily up on the beach, the 'New
York's' stem being placed against her for this purpose—the
ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable
judgment—and sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this
not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would
have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

"I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish
forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous
and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the
night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to
escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt
in daylight. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron
was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part
in it—the commodore in command on the second division, the
captains of ships, their officers, and men. The fire of the
battle ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance
of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost
before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. …
Several of the [American] ships were struck—the 'Brooklyn'
more often than the others—but very slight material injury was
done, the greatest being aboard the 'Iowa.' Our loss was 1 man
killed and 1 wounded, both on the 'Brooklyn.' It is difficult to
explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in
a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish
gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and
accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns
and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements
of prisoners and by observation."

_Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,
volume 2, pages 506-511._

Some particulars of the destruction of the "Furor," the
"Pluton," and the "Infanta Maria Teresa," and of the rescue of
surviving Spaniards, including Admiral Cervera, are given in a
report by Lieutenant Huse, executive officer of the "Gloucester,"
as follows: "The 'Pluton' was run on the rocks about 4 miles
west of Morro and blew up. Our crew cheered at the sight of
the explosion. The 'Furor' soon commenced to describe circles
with a starboard helm, her fire ceased, and it became apparent
that she was disabled. A white rag was waved from forward and
we stopped firing. Lieutenants Wood and Norman and Assistant
Engineer Proctor were sent to rescue the crews and to see if
the prizes could be saved. These found a horrible state of
affairs on the 'Furor.' The vessel was a perfect shambles. As
she was on fire and burning rapidly, they took off the living
and then rescued all they could find in the water and on the
beach. The 'Pluton' was among the rocks in the surf and could
not be boarded, but her crew had made their way ashore or were
adrift on life buoys and wreckage. These were all taken on board.
I have since learned that the 'New York' passed a number of
men in the water who had doubtless jumped overboard from the
destroyers to escape our fire. All these were probably
drowned. While this work was going on several explosions took
place on the 'Furor,' and presently—at about 11.30—she threw
her bows in the air, and turning to port slowly sank in deep
water. …

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"While one of our boats was still ashore, seeing heavy clouds
of smoke behind the next point the ship was moved in that
direction, the men being at quarters and everything in
readiness for further action. On rounding the point two
men-of-war were found on the beach burning fiercely aft, the
majority of the crew being crowded on the forecastle and
unable apparently to reach land, only 200 yards away. Our
boats, under Lieutenant Norman and Ensign Edson, put off to
the nearer vessel, which proved to be the flagship 'Infanta
Maria Teresa,' and rescued all on board by landing them on the
beach through the surf. Lieutenant Norman formally received
the surrender of the commander in chief and all his officers
and men present, and as soon as all hands had been transferred
ashore, brought on board this ship all the higher officers,
including the admiral. Lieutenant Wood meanwhile rescued the
remaining survivors on board the 'Oquendo,' the second of the
burning vessels. The Spanish officers not feeling that the
prisoners on shore were secure from attack by Cuban partisans,
by your orders I directed Lieutenant Norman to land with a
small force, establish a camp on shore, and hoist the United
States flag over it. He took with him all the rations that
could be spared from the stores aboard."

_Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,
volume 2, page 542._

The following is a translation, from Admiral Cervera's report,
as partly published in newspapers at Madrid, giving his
description of the destruction of his flagship and his own
rescue from death: "The enemy's fire produced terrible damages
on board the 'Infanta Maria Teresa,' destroying the elements
of defence—among others, the net for protection against fire.
In this critical moment the captain of the ship, Señor Concas,
fell wounded, and it was necessary to withdraw him, I taking
command of the vessel, because it was impossible to find the
second commandant of the 'Maria Teresa.' Immediately
afterwards they reported to me that my cabin was burning in
consequence of an explosion. The fire soon became very great
and ignited other parts of the ship. I gave orders to my aid
to flood the after magazines, but it was impossible. Dense
clouds of smoke impeded walking in the passages and practicing
any kind of operations. In this situation I could only think
of beaching the ship, and did so, running aground on Punta
Cabrera. The contest was impossible on our side, and there was
nothing more to be done but to save as much as possible. I
thought to lower the flag, but that was not possible on
account of the fire, which prevented all operations. In these
anxious moments two boats came to the aid of the 'Maria
Teresa,' into which a number of us jumped. Those that were not
dying were saved with nothing. The 'Teresa' lowered a small boat,
which sank before it could be of any service. Subsequently
they succeeded in launching a steam launch, but this also sank
after making one voyage to the beach. I succeeded in saving
myself with nothing, two sailors helping me, one named Andres
Sequeros and the officer D. Angel Cervera, all of us arriving
on board the American ship 'Gloucester' naked. At this time we
were all naked."

_Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,
volume 2, pages 558-559._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 July (4-17).
The surrender of Santiago and of all the Spanish forces
in eastern Cuba.

The following is a continuation of the report made by General
Shafter of his operations at Santiago de Cuba, resulting in
the surrender of the entire forces of Spain in eastern Cuba:
"The information of our naval victory was transmitted under
flag of truce to the Spanish commander in Santiago on July 4,
and the suggestion again made that he surrender to save
needless effusion of blood. On the same date I informed
Admiral Sampson that if he would force his way into the harbor
the city would surrender without any further sacrifice of
life. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was
temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the
navy should not enter the harbor. In the meanwhile letters
passing between General Toral and myself caused the cessation
of hostilities to continue; each army, however, continued to
strengthen its intrenchments. I was still of the opinion the
Spaniards would surrender without much more fighting, and on
July 6 called General Toral's attention to the changed
conditions and at his request gave him time to consult his
home Government. This he did, asking that the British consul,
with the employees of the cable company, be permitted to
return from El Caney to the city. This I granted. The strength
of the enemy's position was such I did not wish to assault if
it could be avoided. An examination of the enemy's works, made
after the surrender, fully justified the wisdom of the course
adopted. The intrenchments could only have been carried with
very great loss of life, probably with not less than 3,000
killed and wounded.

"On July 8 General Toral offered to march out of the city with
arms and baggage, provided he would not be molested before
reaching Holguin, and to surrender to the American forces the
territory then occupied by him. I replied that while I would
submit his proposition to my home Government, I did not think
it would be accepted. In the meanwhile arrangements were made
with Admiral Sampson that when the army again engaged the
enemy the navy would assist by shelling the city from ships
stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few minutes.
On July 10 the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia
arrived, and were placed on the line to the right of the
cavalry division. This enabled me to push Lawton further to
the right and to practically command the Cobra road. On the
afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce was broken off
at 4 p. m., and I determined to open with four batteries of
artillery, and went forward in person to the trenches to give
the necessary orders; but the enemy anticipated us by opening
fire with his artillery a few minutes after the hour stated.
His batteries were apparently silenced before night, while
ours continued playing upon his trenches until dark. During
this firing the navy fired from Aguadores, most of the shells
falling in the city. There was also some small-arms firing. On
this afternoon and the next morning we lost Captain Charles W.
Rowell, 2d Infantry, and 1 man killed, and Lieutenant Lutz, 2d
Infantry, and 10 men wounded. On the morning of July 11 the
bombardment by the Navy and my field guns was renewed and
continued until nearly noon, and on the same day I reported to
the Adjutant-General of the Army that the right of Ludlow's
brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. Thus our hold
upon the enemy was complete.

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