Chapter XVII: Preface: To the Sixth Volume (16)

"Then suddenly a new attempt was made to reduce the British
Legation. Guns firing round shot, eight-pounders and
four-pounders, were mounted on the Imperial City wall
overlooking from the north the Hanlin and the British
Legation. With glasses—the distance was only 350 yards—one
could clearly see the officers and distinguish their Imperial
Peacock feathers and Mandarin hats. … Three batteries in all,
carrying five guns, were mounted on the Imperial City wall
where the bombardment could be witnessed by the Empress
Dowager and her counsellors, and day after day round shot were
thrown from them into the British Legation, into a compound
crowded with women and children. … On July 5 Mr. David
Oliphant, of the British Legation, was killed. He was felling
a tree by the well in the Hanlin when he was shot by a sniper
concealed in a roof in the Imperial Carriage Park, and died
within an hour. Only 24 years of age, he was a student of
exceptional promise and ability. …

"Day by day the Chinese were pressing us more closely. In the
Fu they were gradually wedging their way in from the
north-east so as to cut the communications between the British
and the Legations to the east. They burned their way from house
to house. Keeping under cover, they set alight the gables
within reach by torches of cloth soaked in kerosene held at
the end of long poles. If the roof were beyond reach they
threw over fireballs of kerosene, or, if still further, shot
into them with arrows freighted with burning cloth. In this
way and with the use of the heavy gun they battered a way
through the houses and courtyards of the Prince's Palace. A
daring attempt made by the Japanese to capture the gun
resulted in failure. Coolies failed them when they were within
four yards of success, and they were forced to retire. Their
gallant leader Captain Ando was shot in the throat while
waving on his men, one marine was seriously wounded, and one
Christian volunteer killed. … By the 8th the position in the
Fu was alarming, for the Japanese force had been reduced to 13
marines and 14 volunteers; yet with decreasing numbers they
were constantly called upon to defend a longer line.
Reinforcements were sent them of half-a-dozen Customs and
student volunteers and of six British marines. Nothing can
give a better indication of the smallness of our garrison than
the fact that throughout the siege reinforcements meant five men
or ten men. Strong reinforcements meant 15 men. Our
reinforcements were counted by ones, not by companies. With
this force a line of intrenchments stretching from the outer
court of the Fu on the east across the grounds to near the
extreme northwest corner was held till the end. … The position
was one of constant solicitude, for the loss of the Fu would
have imperilled the British Legation. A Krupp gun, mounted 50
yards away, had the range and raked the post with shell and
shrapnel. To strengthen the breastwork exposure to rifle fire
was incurred from 20 yards' distance, while to reach the post
required crossing a zone of fire which was perhaps the hottest
in the whole of the defences. Many men were wounded there, and
one Italian had his head blown off. Shell fire finally made it
impossible to live there. The advanced posts were abandoned,
and the sentries fell back to the main picket. No sooner was
the advanced post abandoned than it was occupied by the
Chinese, and the defences we had made were turned against us.

{124}

"Meanwhile, the French and German Legations were being roughly
handled, and men were falling daily. At the German Legation
shells burst through the Minister's drawing-room. Most of the
other buildings conspicuous by their height were
uninhabitable, but every member of the Legation remained at
his post. So, too, in the French Legation, where the Austrians
were, Dr. and Madame von Rosthorn remained by the side of
their men. The French volunteers and Dr. Matignon stood
stanchly by their Legation, although it was fast tumbling into
ruins, their coolness and resolution being in curious contrast
to the despair of their Minister, who, crying, 'Tout est perdu,'
melodramatically burned the French archives in a ditch at the
British Legation. Chinese and French were so close that the
voices of the Chinese officers could be heard encouraging
their men. Chinese were within the Legation itself. Their guns
literally bombarded the Minister's residence 'à bout portant,'
and the noise of the exploding shells was terrific. Yet the men
never flinched. … July 11 was a day of many casualties. One
German was mortally wounded; one Englishman, one Italian, and
one Japanese were seriously wounded. Mr. Nigel Oliphant, a
volunteer, received a bullet wound in the leg, while Mr.
Narahara, the well-known secretary of the Japanese Legation,
wounded by the bursting of a shell, suffered a compound
fracture of the leg, which from the first gave cause for
anxiety. He gradually sank and died on July 24. …

On the 11th 18 prisoners were captured by the French in a
temple near the Legation. They were soldiers, and a Chinese
Christian gave information as to their whereabouts. Everyone
of them was put to death without mercy in the French Legation,
bayoneted by a French corporal to save cartridges. Questioned
before death they gave much information that was obviously
false. One man, however, declared that a mine was being driven
under the French Legation. His story had quick corroboration.
As the afternoon of the 13th was closing a feint attack was
made on the Japanese intrenchments in the Fu. Then the sound
of many bugles was heard from the camps round the French
Legation, to be followed in a few minutes by a terrific
explosion, and in a moment or two by another; and bricks and
debris were hurled into the air. It was a dull roar in the
midst of the devilish cries of hordes of Chinese, shrieking
like spirits in hell, the rattle of musketry, and the boom of
heavy guns. The mine of which the prisoner had warned us had
exploded and burst an entrance into the French Legation. When
the first mine exploded the French Captain Darcy, the Austrian
Charge d'Affaires, two French marines, and Mr. Destelan of the
Customs were standing over the death-trap. Mr. Destelan was
buried up to the neck, but was rescued unhurt, the two marines
were engulfed and their bodies were never recovered, Captain
Darcy and Dr. von Rosthorn escaped miraculously. The latter
was buried by the first explosion and released unhurt a moment
or two later by the second. Driven out of the main buildings,
the small garrison (it consisted only of 17 Austrians with
three officers, 27 French with two officers, and nine
volunteers) fell back a few paces to a line of defence, part
of which had only been completed in the afternoon, and
securely held the position.

"Simultaneously with this attack upon the French Legation the
Chinese made a determined assault upon the German Legation,
the effective strength of whose garrison numbered only one
officer and 31 men. They broke into the Club alongside the
Legation and were on the tennis ground when Count Soden and a
handful of German soldiers gallantly charged them at the point
of the bayonet and drove them out headlong. … Uniforms on the
dead Chinese showed that the attack had been carried out by
the troops of Yung Lu, reinforced by the savages of
Tung-fuh-siang. Some of the dead were armed with the latest
pattern Mauser and the newest German army revolver. Some
ammunition, of which the guards were in much need, was
recovered and distributed among the Japanese and Italians.
Firing continued round the other Legations; every battery
opened fire; the air hissed with bullets. There was momentary
darkness, then flames broke out from the large foreign houses
between the German Legation and Canal-street. It seemed at one
time as if the whole of the quarter would be burned, but the
fire did not spread. Heavy rain came on, and the rest of the
night passed in quiet.

"On July 14, a messenger, sent out on the 10th, with a letter
for the troops, returned to the British Legation. He had been
arrested by the Chinese, cruelly beaten, and taken, he said,
to the yamên of Yung Lu, and there given the following letter,
purporting to be written by Prince Ching 'and others,'
addressed to the British Minister. It was the first
communication of any kind whatsoever that had reached us from
outside for nearly one month. 'For the last ten days the
soldiers and Militia have been fighting, and there has been no
communication between us, to our great anxiety. Some time ago
we hung up a board, expressing our intentions, but no answer
has been received, and contrary to expectation the foreign
soldiers made renewed attacks, causing alarm and suspicion
among soldiers and people. Yesterday the troops captured a
convert named Chin Ssu-hei and learnt from him that all the
foreign Ministers 'were well, which caused us very great
satisfaction. But it is the unexpected which happens. The
reinforcements of foreign troops were long ago stopped and
turned back by the "Boxers," and if, in accordance with
previous agreement, we were to guard your Excellencies out of
the city, there are so many "Boxers" on the road to Tien-tsin
and Ta-ku that we should be apprehensive of misadventure. We
now request your Excellencies to first take your families and
the various members of your staffs, and leave your Legations
in detachments. We should select trustworthy officers to give
close and strict protection, and you should temporarily reside
in the Tsung-li-Yamên, pending future arrangements for your
return home, in order to preserve friendly relations intact
from beginning to end. But at the time of leaving the
Legations there must on no account whatever be taken any
single armed soldier, in order to prevent doubt and fear on
the part of the troops and people, leading to untoward
incidents. If your Excellencies are willing to show this
confidence, we beg you to communicate with all the foreign
Ministers in Peking, to-morrow at noon being the limit of
time, and to let the original messenger deliver the reply in
order that we may settle the day for leaving the Legations.
This is the single way of preserving relations which we have
been able to devise in the face of innumerable difficulties.
If no reply is received by the time fixed, even our affection
will not enable us to help you.
Compliments.
(Signed) Prince Ching and others.
July 14, 1900.'

{125}

"Following as it did immediately after the attack on the
French Legation, which reduced it to ruins, the letter did not
lack for impudence. 'Boxers' had driven back our troops,
'Militia,' not 'Boxers,' had been attacking us in Peking. The
letter was read with derision. It was interpreted as a
guileless attempt to seduce the Ministers away from their
Legations and massacre them at ease. News we heard
subsequently had just reached the Chinese of the taking of
Tien-tsin city. … On the 15th a reply was sent declining on
the part of the foreign representatives the invitation to
proceed to the Tsung-li-Yamên, and pointing out that no
attacks had been made by our troops, who were only defending
the lives and property of foreigners against the attacks of
Chinese Government troops. The reply concluded with a
statement that if the Chinese Government wished to negotiate
they should send a responsible official with a white flag. …

"The morning of the 16th opened with a disaster. Captain
Strouts, the senior British officer, was shot while returning
from the outposts in the Fu. He was struck in the upper part
of the left thigh by an expanding bullet, and died an hour
after being brought into the hospital, to the grief of the
entire community. … While shells were bursting in the trees,
and amid the crack of rifle bullets, the brave young fellow to
whose gallant defence we all owed so much was laid to rest. …
While the service was proceeding a messenger bearing a flag of
truce was approaching the gate. … The letter was from 'Prince
Ching and others.' It explained that the reason for suggesting
the removal of the Legations to the Tsung-li-Yamên was that
the Chinese Government could afford more efficient protection
to the members of the Legations if concentrated than if
scattered as at present. As the foreign Ministers did not
agree, however, the Chinese would as in duty bound do their
utmost to protect the Legations where they were. (While the
latter sentence was being read the translator had to raise his
voice in order that it should be heard above the crack of the
Imperial rifle bullets.) They would bring reinforcements and
continue their endeavours to prevent the 'Boxers' from firing,
and they trusted that the foreign Ministers on their part
would restrain their troops also from firing.

"By the same messenger a cipher message was brought to Mr.
Conger, the American Minister. It said:—'Communicate tidings
bearer.' It was in the State Department cipher and had no date
or indication by whom it had been sent. Mr. Conger replied in the
same cipher:—'For one month we have been besieged in British
Legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops.
Quick relief only can prevent general massacre.' When
forwarding his reply he asked that it should be sent to the
address from which the other had come, which address had not
been communicated to him. Next day the Yamên sent him an
answer saying that his message had been forwarded and
explaining that the telegram sent to him had been contained in
a telegram from Wu Ting Fang, the Chinese Minister at
Washington, dated July 11. This telegram read:—'The United
States cheerfully aid China, but it is thinking of Mr.
Minister Conger. The Hon. Secretary of State inquires after
him by telegram, which I beg to be transmitted to him and get
his reply.' From this we could well imagine what specious
assurances had been given to Mr. Hay by Wu Ting Fang's bland
assurances that there had been a most regrettable outbreak on
the part of lawless bands in the north of China which the
Government was vainly struggling to cope with. … From July 17
there was a cessation of hostilities; not that men were not
wounded afterwards and Christian coolies fired upon whenever
they showed themselves, but the organized attacks ceased and
the Krupp guns were muzzled. Fearing treachery, however, we
relaxed none of our vigilance. Trenches were cut where mines
might have been driven. All walls and shelters were so
strengthened as to be practically shell-proof. Our
preparations were purely defensive. On their part the Chinese
also continued work at their barricades. From their barricade
on the top of the wall near the German Legation they advanced
westward so that they could fire directly down into the German
Legation and pick off men going up the steps of the Minister's
house. They built a wall with loop-holes across
Legation-street not 20 yards from the Russian barricade. In
nearly every position the enemy were so close that you could
shoot into the muzzles of their rifles thrust through the
loop-holes. The cordon was still drawn tightly round us, and
we were penned in to prevent our acting in co-operation with
the troops who were coming to our relief. No provisions were
permitted to reach us, but a few eggs for the women and
children were surreptitiously sold us by Chinese soldiers. All
were on reduced rations, the allowance for the 2,750 native
Christians whom we had to provide for being barely sufficient
to save them from starvation. Their sufferings were very
great, the mortality among the children and the aged pitiful.
No one could have foreseen that within the restricted limits
of the besieged area, with the food supply therein obtainable,
473 civilians (of these 414—namely, 191 men, 147 women, 76
children—were inside the British Legation), a garrison of 400
men, 2,750 refugees, and some 400 native servants could have
sustained a siege of two entire months. Providentially in the
very centre of Legation-street there was a mill with a large
quantity of grain which turned out 900 lb. of flour a day
divided between the hotel and the Legation. One day the
Tsung-li-Yamên insultingly sent us a present of 1,000 lb. of
flour and some ice and vegetables, but no one would venture to
eat the flour, fearing that it might be poisoned.
Communications now passed almost daily with the Tsung-li-Yamên
or with the officials whose despatches were signed 'Prince
Ching and others.' On July 17, Sir Claude MacDonald replied to
the suggestion that the Ministers would restrain their troops
from firing upon the Chinese. He said that from the first the
foreign troops had acted entirely in self-defence, and would
continue to do so. But the Chinese must understand that
previous events had led to a want of confidence and that if
barricades were erected or troops moved in the vicinity of the
Legations the foreign guards would be obliged to fire. In the
afternoon the Chinese replied, reviewing the situation and
ascribing the hostilities to the attacks previously made by
the Legation guards. They noted with satisfaction that a
cessation of firing was agreed to on both sides, but suggested
that as foreign soldiers had been firing from the city wall
east of the Chien Mên, they should be removed from that
position.
{126}
Next day, Sir Claude MacDonald replied with a review of the
situation from the foreign point of view. … He hoped that
mutual confidence would gradually be restored, but meanwhile
he again pointed out that cessation of hostile preparations as
well as firing was necessary on the part of the Chinese troops
to secure that the foreign troops should cease firing. As for
the suggestion that the foreign troops should leave the city
wall, it was impossible to accede to it, because a great part
of the attacks on the Legations had been made from the wall.
He concluded by suggesting that sellers of fruit and ice
should be allowed to come in. They were never permitted to
come in. It was clear, however, that events were happening
elsewhere to cause alarm in the Imperial Court. On the
afternoon of the first day of what might be called the
armistice M Pelliot, a French gentleman from Tongking, entered
the Chinese lines and to the great anxiety of all was absent five
hours. He was taken by soldiers to a yamên of one of the big
generals—he knew not which—was plied with questions which,
speaking some Chinese, he could answer, and was sent back
unmolested with an escort of 15 soldiers 'to protect him
against the Boxers.' This unusual clemency was interpreted
favourably. It was clear that the Chinese had sustained a
severe defeat and that relief was coming. Next day direct
communication was for the first time held with an official of
the Tsung-li-Yamên. A secretary named Wen Jui came to the
Legation to see Sir Claude MacDonald and was received by the
Minister outside the gate, not being permitted to enter. He
said that the regrettable occurrences were due to 'local
banditti,' that the Government had great concern to protect
the foreigners, that Baron von Ketteler's body had been
recovered from the hands of the 'local banditti' who had
murdered him and been enclosed in a valuable coffin. He urged
that the maintenance of foreign troops on the city was
unnecessary and that they should be withdrawn. It was pointed
out to him that, as we had been very continuously shelled from
the city wall both from the Ha-ta Mên and the Chien Mên, it
would be inadvisable to retire. Asked to send copies of the
'Peking Gazette,' he hesitated a moment and then stammered
that he really had not himself seen the 'Peking Gazette' for a
long time, but he would inquire and see if they could be
bought. He never came back and never sent a 'Gazette.' His
name was Wen Jui. When we did obtain copies of the 'Gazette'
it was interesting to find two items that must have been
especially unpleasant for him to have us know. On June 24, by
Imperial decree, leaders were appointed to the 'Boxers,' or
'patriotic militia.' Among the chiefs was Wen Jui.

"The visit of Wen Jui was on the 18th. Up to the time of his
visit, though more than four weeks had passed since the
assassination, no allusion of any kind whatever had been made
in any 'Peking Gazette' to the murder of Baron van Ketteler.
Then the Empress-Dowager, yielding to her fears, published an
allusion to the murder. Will the German Emperor rest satisfied
with the tardy official reference to the brutal assassination
of his Minister by an Imperial officer? 'Last month the
Chancellor of the Japanese Legation was killed. This was,
indeed, most unexpected. Before this matter had been settled
the German Minister was killed. Suddenly meeting this affair
caused us deep grief. We ought vigorously to seek the murderer
and punish him.' No more. The date July 18; the murder June
20!

"Yet even in this decree there was a complete 'volte-face.'
Missionaries who were by the decree of July 2 'to be at once
driven away to their own countries' were by the decree of July
18 'to be protected in every province,' 'to be protected
without the least carelessness.' The truculence and
belligerence of the decrees issued when our troops had been
driven back had disappeared; the tone now was one of
justification and conciliation. Only one interpretation was
possible—that the Chinese had been defeated. Confirmation came
the same day. A messenger sent out by the Japanese
successfully passed the enemy's lines and brought us the news
that we had so long awaited. … By the same messenger a letter
was received by the French Minister. … The same messenger also
brought to the Belgian Minister a despatch from his Consul at
Tien-tsin. … Days followed quietly now, though 'sniping' did
not cease. Several casualties occurred among the garrison. A
Russian was killed and an Austrian wounded; an Italian wounded
and also a Japanese. In the Fu it was still dangerous for the
Christian refugees to move about, and several were hit and two
killed. But the Yamên became more and more conciliatory, until
we could gauge the advance of the reliefs by the degree of
apology in their despatches. But all supplies were rigorously
cut off, and the sufferings of the Christians were acute. …

"On the 22nd Sir Robert Hart received a despatch from the
Tsung-li-Yamên. They naïvely remarked that it was now one
month since they had heard from him, and his silence gave them
concern for his welfare. Moreover, a report had just reached them
that his house had been burned, but they expressed the hope
that he and al his staff were well. Another despatch requested
his advice upon a Customs question that had arisen in
Shanghai. Sir Robert Hart wrote a dignified reply. For more
than a month, he said, he had been a refugee in the British
Legation with all his staff, having had to flee from his house
without warning; that all Customs records and papers, and
every paper and letter of value that he had accumulated during
a lifetime, had been destroyed; that not only his house, but
some 19 other buildings in the occupation of his staff had
been burned with all their contents; that the acting postal
secretary had been killed by a shell, and two other members of
his staff—Mr. Richardson and Mr. Macoun—had been wounded by
bullets. …

"Meanwhile, the armistice continued, if armistice it can be
called where true armistice there was none. Desultory firing
continued, and sniping was still the chief pastime at the
Chinese outposts. Friendly relations were, however, opened
with some Chinese soldiers in the Fu. A Japanese Volunteer
established a bureau of intelligence to which the enemy's
soldiers had access. One soldier was especially communicative,
and earned high reward for the valuable information that he
conveyed to us. For a week from July 26 to August 2 daily
bulletins based upon this information of the advance of the
relief column were posted on the bell tower of the British
Legation.
{127}
An unbroken series of victories was attending our relief
forces. … Letters were given to the soldier to take to the
General of the relief column, and a reward offered if an
answer should be brought next day, but no answer was ever
brought. Our informant had brought the armies along too
quickly. He was compelled to send them back. Accordingly on
the 31st he made the Chinese recapture Chang-chia-wan, killing
60 of the foreigners; advancing upon Matou he killed 70
foreigners more, and drove them back to An-ping. Next day he
drove the foreigners disastrously back to Tien-tsin with a
loss of 1,000. The day was equally disastrous to himself. Our
informant had killed the goose that lay the golden egg. For a
messenger arrived on that day with letters from Tien-tsin,
dated July 30, informing us that a large force was on the
point of leaving for our relief. … Meanwhile, while our
informant was marching our relief backwards and forwards to
Tien-tsin, Prince Ching and others were vainly urging the
Ministers to leave Peking, but whether they left Peking or not
they were to hand over the Christian refugees now under the
protection of the Legations to the mercies of the Government,
which had issued a decree commanding that they be exterminated
unless they recanted their errors. In other communications
Prince Ching 'and others' urged that the foreign Ministers
should telegraph to their Government 'en clair' lying reports
of the condition of affairs in Peking.

Two days after the cessation of hostilities Prince Ching 'and
others' sent a despatch to Sir Claude MacDonald to the effect
that it was impossible to protect the Ministers in Peking
because 'Boxers' were gathering from all points of the
compass, and that nothing would satisfy them (the 'Boxers')
but the destruction of the Legations, and that the Ministers
would be given safe conduct to Tien-tsin. Sir Claude, in
reply, asked why it was that protection could be given to the
Ministers on the way to Tien-tsin and yet could not be given
to them while in the Legations in Peking. Prince Ching 'and
others' replied: 'July 25, 1900. … As to the inquiry what
difference there is between giving protection in the city or
on the road, and why it is possible to give it in the latter,
there is only an apparent discrepancy. For the being in the
city is permanent, the being on the road is temporary. If all
the foreign Ministers are willing to temporarily retire we
should propose the route to Tung-chau and thence by boat down
stream to Tien-tsin, which could be reached in only two days.
No matter what difficulties there might be a numerous body of
troops would be sent, half by water to form a close escort,
half by road to keep all safe for a long way on both banks.
Since the time would be short we can guarantee that there
would be no mishap. It is otherwise with a permanent residence
in Peking, where it is impossible to foretell when a disaster
may occur.' … In the envelope which brought this letter were
two other communications of the same guileless nature. 'On
July 24,' said the first, 'we received a telegram from Mr.
Warren, British Consul-General in Shanghai, to the effect that
while China was protecting the Legations no telegram had been
received from the British Minister, and asking the Yamên to
transmit Sir C. M. MacDonald's telegram to Shanghai. As in
duty bound we communicate the above, and beg you to send a
telegram "en clair" to the Yamên for transmission.' Tender
consideration was shown for us in the second letter:—'For the
past month and more military affairs have been very pressing.
Your Excellency and other Ministers ought to telegraph home
that your families are well in order to soothe anxiety, but at
the present moment peace is not yet restored, and your
Legation telegrams must be wholly "en clair," stating that all
is well, without touching on military affairs. Under those
conditions the Yamên can transmit them. The writers beg that
your Excellency will communicate this to the other foreign
Ministers.'

"Evasive replies were given to these communications. … Our
position at this time compelled us to temporize. We knew from
the alteration in tone of the Chinese despatches that they had
suffered defeats and were growing alarmed, but we did not know
how much longer international jealousies or difficulties of
obtaining transport were to delay the departure of the troops
for Tien-tsin. … Though now nominally under the protection of
an armistice sniping still continued, especially in the Fu,
into any exposed portion of the besieged area. … The Chinese
worked on continuously at their fortifications. … Finding that
the Ministers declined to telegraph to their Governments 'en
clair' that all was well with the Legations, the
Tsung-li-Yamên wrote to Sir Robert Hart asking him to send
home a telegram in the sense they suggested. Sir Robert
replied diplomatically, 'If I were to wire the truth about the
Legations I should not be believed.'

"A malevolent attempt was next made by the Chinese to obtain
possession of the refugees who were in our safe keeping. On
July 27 they wrote to Sir Claude MacDonald saying that 'they
hear that there are lodged at the Legations a considerable
number of converts, and that, as 'the space is limited and
weather hot, they suggest that they must be causing the
Legations considerable inconvenience. And now that people's
minds are quieted, these converts can all be sent out and go
about their ordinary avocations. They need not have doubts or
fears. If you concur, an estimate should be made of the
numbers and a date fixed for letting them out. Then all will
be in harmony.' The reply of the diplomatic body was to the
effect that while they were considering the two last
letters—one offering safe conduct to Tien-tsin and the other
declaring that the converts might leave the Legations in
perfect security—heavy firing was heard in the direction of
the Pei-tang, which was evidently being attacked in force;
that yesterday and last night a barricade was built across the
North Bridge, from behind which shots are being continuously
fired into the British Legation. The French and Russian
Legations are also being fired upon. As all this seems
inconsistent with the above letters, an explanation is asked
for before further consideration is given to the offer.
Promptly the Yamên sent its explanation. The Pei-tang
refugees, it seemed, who were starving, had made a sortie to
obtain food. And they had fired upon the people. 'A decree,'
it went on to say, 'has now been requested to the effect that
if the converts do not come out to plunder they are to be
protected and not to be continually attacked, for they also
are the children of the State. This practice (of continually
firing upon the converts) will thus be gradually stopped.'
{128}
Such a callous reply was read with indignation, and there was
not the slightest intention on the part of any Minister to
leave Peking. Yet on the 4th of August a decree was issued
appointing Yung Lu to conduct the foreign Ministers safely to
Tien-tsin 'in order once more to show the tenderness of the
Throne for the men from afar.' …

"On August 10, Friday, a messenger succeeded in passing the
enemy's lines, and brought us letters from General Gaselee and
General Fukushima. A strong relief force was marching to
Peking, and would arrive here if nothing untoward happened on
the 13th or 14th. Our danger then was that the enemy would
make a final effort to rush the Legations before the arrival
of reinforcements. And the expected happened. …

"Yesterday [August 13] passed under a continuous fusillade
which increased during the night. Then at 3 on this morning we
were all awakened by the booming of guns in the east and by
the welcome sound of volley firing. Word flew round that 'the
foreign troops are at the city wall and are shelling the East
Gate.' At daylight most of us went on to the wall, and
witnessed the shelling of the Great East Gate. We knew that
the allies would advance in separate columns, and were on the
qui vive of excitement, knowing that at any moment now the
troops might arrive. Luncheon, the hard luncheon of horse
flesh, came on, and we had just finished when the cry rang
through the Legation, 'The British are coming,' and there was
a rush to the entrance and up Canal-street towards the Water
Gate. The stalwart form of the general and his staff were
entering by the Water Gate, followed by the 1st Regiment of
Sikhs and the 7th Rajputs. They passed down Canal-street, and
amid a scene of indescribable emotion marched to the British
Legation. The siege has been raised.

"Peking, August 15. On reading over my narrative of the siege
I find that in the hurry and confusion of concluding my report
I have omitted one or two things that I had wished to say. In
the first place, I find that I have not in any adequate way
expressed the obligation of all those confined in the British
Legation to the splendid services done by the Reverend F. D.
Gamewell, of the American Episcopal Mission [who was educated
as a civil engineer at Troy and Cornell], to whom was due the
designing and construction of all our defences, and who
carried out in the most admirable manner the ideas and
suggestions of our Minister, Sir Claude MacDonald. To the
Reverend Frank Norris, of the Society for the Propagation of
the Gospel, our thanks are also specially due. He
superintended, often under heavy fire, the construction of
defences in the Prince's Fu and in other exposed places,
working always with a courage and energy worthy of admiration.
He was struck in the neck once by a segment of a shell, but
escaped marvellously from serious injury. He speaks Chinese
well, and Chinese worked under him with a fearlessness that
few men can inspire. In the second place, I noticed that I
have not sufficiently recorded the valuable services rendered
by Mr. H. G. Squiers, the First Secretary of the American
Legation, who on the death of Captain Strouts became Chief of
the Staff to Sir Claude MacDonald. He had been for 15 years in
the United States cavalry, and his knowledge and skill and the
resolution with which he inspired his small body of men will
not readily be forgotten. …

"To-day the Pei-tang Cathedral was relieved. Bishops, priests,
and sisters had survived the siege and, thanks to the
wonderful foresight of Bishop Favier, the Christians had been
spared from starvation. Japanese coming down from the north of
the city relieved the cathedral; French, British, and Russians
from the south arrived as the siege was raised. Mines had been
employed with deadly effect. The guards had lost five French
killed and five Italians. Some 200 of the Christians had
perished."

_London Times, October 13 and 15, 1900._

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (June-December).
Upright conduct of the Chinese Viceroys in
the Yang-tsze provinces.

In his annual message of December 3, 1900, to Congress,
referring to the occurrences in China, the President of the
United States remarked with much justice: "It is a relief to
recall and a pleasure to record the loyal conduct of the
viceroys and local authorities of the southern and eastern
provinces. Their efforts were continuously directed to the
pacific control of the vast populations under their rule and
to the scrupulous observance of foreign treaty rights. At
critical moments they did not hesitate to memorialize the
Throne, urging the protection of the legations, the
restoration of communication, and the assertion of the
Imperial authority against the subversive elements. They
maintained excellent relations with the official
representatives of foreign powers. To their kindly disposition
is largely due the success of the consuls in removing many of
the missionaries from the interior to places of safety." The
viceroys especially referred to in this are Chang Chih-tung
and Liu Kun-yi, often referred to as "the Yang-tsze viceroys."

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (July).
Speech of German Emperor to troops departing to China,
commanding no quarter.

See (in this volume)
GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (OCTOBER 9).

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (July).
American troops sent to co-operate with those of other Powers.
Capture of Tientsin by the allied forces.
Death of Colonel Liscum.
Reported massacre of foreign Ministers and others in Peking.
The long month of dread suspense.
Overtures from Earl Li Hung-chang for negotiation.

"On the 26th of June Major Gen. Adna R Chaffee, U. S. V., was
appointed to the command of the American forces in China. He
embarked from San Francisco on the 1st of July, reached
Nagasaki on the 24th, and Taku, China, on the 28th. … On
reaching Nagasaki he received the following instructions,
dated, … July 19: 'Secretary War directs that you proceed at
once with transport Grant, Sixth Cavalry, and Marines to Taku,
China, and take command of American land forces, which will be
an independent command known as the China relief expedition.
You will find there the Ninth and Fourteenth Infantry, one
battery of the Fifth Artillery, and one battalion of Marines.
Sumner sailed from San Francisco July 17 with Second Battalion
of Fifteenth Infantry and recruits to capacity of vessel.
{129}
Reinforcements will follow to make your force in the immediate
future up to 5,000, and very soon to 10,000. … Reports now
indicate that American Minister with all the legation have
been destroyed in Pekin. Chinese representative here, however,
insists to the contrary, and there is, therefore, a hope which
you will not lose sight of until certainty is absolute. It is
the desire of this Government to maintain its relations of
friendship with the part of Chinese people and Chinese
officials not concerned in outrages on Americans. Among these
we consider Li Hung Chang, just appointed viceroy of Chili.
You will to the extent of your power aid the Government of
China, or any part thereof, in repressing such outrages and in
rescuing Americans, and in protecting American citizens and
interests, and wherever Chinese Government fails to render
such protection you will do all in your power to supply it.
Confer freely with commanders of other national forces, act
concurrently with them, and seek entire harmony of action
along the lines of similar purpose and interest. There
should be full and free conference as to operations before
they are entered upon. You are at liberty to agree with them
from time to time as to a common official direction of the
various forces in their combined operations, preserving,
however, the integrity of your own American division, ready to
be used as a separate and complete organization. Much must be
left to your wise discretion and that of the admiral. At all
times report fully and freely to this Department your wants
and views. The President has to-day appointed you
major-general of volunteers.' …

"In the meantime the Ninth Infantry, from Manila, reached Taku
on the 6th of July. Two battalions of that regiment, under
Colonel Liscum, pressed forward to Tientsin, reaching that
point on the 11th, and on the 13th took part with the British,
French, and Japanese forces in an attack upon the southwest
part of the walled city of Tientsin, which had been rendered
necessary by the persistent shelling of the foreign quarters,
outside of the walls, on the part of the Chinese troops
occupying the city. Colonel Liscum's command formed part of a
brigade under General Dorward, of the British army, and was
assigned to the duty of protecting the flank of the allied
forces. In the performance of that duty it maintained a
position under heavy fire for fifteen hours, with a loss of 18
killed and 77 wounded. Among the killed was the gallant
Colonel Liscum, who thus ended an honorable service of nearly
forty years, commencing in the ranks of the First Vermont
Infantry at the outbreak of the civil war, and distinguished
by unvarying courage, fidelity, and high character. The
regiment was withdrawn from its position on the night of the
13th, and on the morning of the 14th the native city was
captured, and the southeast quarter was assigned to the
American forces for police and protection. …

"At the time of the capture of Tientsin the most positive and
circumstantial accounts of the massacre of all the ministers
and members of the legations in Pekin, coming apparently from
Chinese sources, had been published, and were almost
universally believed. The general view taken by the civilized
world of the duty to be performed in China was not that the
living representatives of the Western powers in Pekin were to
be rescued, but that their murder was to be avenged and their
murderers punished. In the performance of that duty time and
rapidity of movement were not especially important. The
resolution of the commanders of the allied forces,
communicated by Admiral Kempff on the 8th of July, to the
effect that 80,000 men would be required—20,000 to hold the
position from Taku to Tientsin and 60,000 to march to Pekin,
while not more than 40,800 troops were expected to have
arrived by the middle of August, practically abandoned all
expectation of rescuing the ministers and members of the
legations alive, for it proposed that after the middle of
August any forward movement should be still deferred until
40,000 more troops had arrived. On the 11th of July, however,
the American Secretary of State secured, through the Chinese
minister at Washington, the forwarding of a dispatch in the
State Department cipher to the American minister at Pekin, and
on the 20th of July, pursuant to the same arrangement, an
answer in cipher was received from Minister Conger, as
follows: 'For one month we have been besieged in British
legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops.
Quick relief only can prevent general massacre.' This dispatch
from Mr. Conger was the first communication received by any
Western power from any representative in Pekin for about a
month, and although it was at first received in Europe with
some incredulity, it presented a situation which plainly
called for the urgency of a relief expedition rather than for
perfection of preparation. It was made the basis of urgent
pressure for an immediate movement upon Pekin, without waiting
for the accumulation of the large force previously proposed."

_United States, Secretary of War,
Annual Report, November 30, 1900,
pages 14-16, 19-20._

As mentioned above, in the instructions of the American
government to General Chaffee, the veteran Chinese statesman
and diplomat, Earl Li Hung-chang, well known in Europe and
America, had now been recalled by the Peking government to the
viceroyalty of Chili, from which he was removed six years
before, and had been given the authority of a plenipotentiary
to negotiate with the allied Powers. He addressed a proposal
to the latter, to the effect that the Ministers in Peking
would be delivered, under safe escort, at Tientsin, if the
allies would refrain from advancing their forces to Peking.
The reply from all the governments concerned was substantially
the same as that made by the United States, in the following
terms: "The government will not enter into any arrangement
regarding disposition or treatment of legations without first
having free communication with Minister Conger. Responsibility
for their protection rests upon Chinese government. Power to
deliver at Tientsin presupposes power to protect and to open
communication. This is insisted on." Earl Li then asked
whether, "if free communication were established, it could be
arranged that the Powers should not advance pending
negotiations," and was told in reply: "Free communication with
our representatives in Peking is demanded as a matter of
absolute right, and not as a favor. Since the Chinese
government admits that it possesses the power to give
communication, it puts itself in an unfriendly attitude by
denying it. No negotiations seem advisable until the Chinese
government shall have put the diplomatic representatives of
the Powers in full and free communication with their
respective governments, and removed all danger to their lives
and liberty."

{130}

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (July-August).
Boxer attack on the Russians in Manchuria,
and Russian retaliation.

See (in this volume)
MANCHURIA: A. D. 1900.

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (August).
Appointment of Count Waldersee to command the allied forces.

Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee, appointed to command the
German forces sent to China, being of higher military rank
than any other of the commanding officers in that country, was
proposed for the general command of the allied armies, and
accepted as such. Before his arrival in China, however, many
of the American, Russian, and some other troops, had been
withdrawn.

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (August 4-16).
The advance of the allied forces on Peking and the capture
of the city.

The following is from the report of General Chaffee,
commanding the American forces in the allied movement from
Tientsin, to rescue the beleaguered Legations at Peking: "On
my arrival at Tientsin I called on the various generals
commanding troops, and on August 1 a conference of generals
was held at the headquarters of Lieutenant-General Linivitch,
of the Russian army. Present at the conference were the
commanding general of the Russian army and his chief of staff;
Lieutenant-General Yamagutchi and his chief of staff;
Major-General Fukushima, of the Japanese army;
Lieutenant-General Gaselee, of the British army, and his chief
of staff, General Barrow; General Frey, of the French army; the
Germans were also represented by an officer of the German
navy; myself and Major Jesse M. Lee, Ninth Infantry, and
Lieutenant Louis M. Little, of the marines, who speaks French.
The purpose of this conference was to decide whether the
armies were ready to make a movement for the relief of Pekin.
It was disclosed in the conference that the Japanese, whose
forces occupied the right bank of the river in and about
Tientsin, where also were located the British and American
forces, had by various patrols determined that the Chinese
were in considerable force in the vicinity of Pei-tsang, about
7 miles distance up the river from Tientsin, and that they
were strengthening their position by earthworks extending from
the right bank of the river westward something like 3 miles,
and from the left bank east to the railroad embankment was
also being strengthened. The forces were variously estimated,
from reports of Chinese, at from 10,000 to 12,000 men in the
vicinity of Pei-tsang, with large bodies to the rearward as
far as Yangtsun, where it was reported their main line of
defenses would be encountered.

"The first question submitted for decision was 'whether a
movement should be made at once,' which was decided in the
affirmative, two Powers only dissenting, and these not
seriously, as their doubt seemed to be that the force we could
put in movement was not sufficiently strong to meet the
opposition that might be expected. The decision was that the
attack should be made on Sunday, August 5, and as the
Japanese, British, and American forces occupied the right bank
of the river, the Russians the left, the attack should be made
without change of situation of the troops, the British to send
four heavy guns to aid the Russian column. The strategy on the
right bank of the river was left to the determination of the
British, American, and Japanese generals. The force reported
to the conference as available for the movement was: Japanese,
about 8,000; Russian, 4,800; British, about 3,000; American,
2,100; French, 800. With special effort on the part of
Captains Byron and Wood, Reilly's battery was gotten to
Tientsin August 3 and assembled. We were also able to make one
pack train available on the 4th, just in time to march with
the column. The marines and Sixth Cavalry were gotten off the
'Grant' and to Tientsin August 3. The presence of the Sixth
Cavalry at Tientsin, dismounted, enabled me to take all
available men of the Ninth and Fourteenth, also all the
marines except one company 100 strong, left to assist the
civil government of the city. By arrangement prior to my
arrival the officers selected to establish a civil government
for Tientsin were to be allowed a military force, of which the
United States should furnish 100. I was compelled, of course,
to leave the Sixth Cavalry, because the horses had not
arrived. … The troops moved out from the city of Tientsin
during the afternoon and night of August 4 and bivouacked in
the vicinity of Si-ku arsenal, the same that was taken by
Admiral Seymour in his retrograde movement."

The Chinese were driven from the Arsenal by the Japanese,
before whom they also fell back from Pei-tsang, and the first
serious battle was fought at Yang-tsun, on the 6th. Having
rested at Yang-tsun and cared for its sick and wounded, on the
7th, the army moved forward on the 8th, encountered slight
resistance at Shang-shia-wan on the 11th, found Tong-chow
abandoned, on the 12th, and reached Pekin on the 14th, having
suffered more from heat, fatigue, and the want of potable
water on the march, than from "Boxers" or imperial troops.

Returning now to the report of General Chaffee, we take from
it his account of the final movement to the walls of Pekin, of
the forcing of the gates and of the clearing of Chinese troops
from the city: "The Japanese when taking possession of
Tong-Chow in the morning [of the 12th] advanced troops toward
Pekin for a distance of 6½ miles. It was finally agreed that
the next day, the 13th, should be devoted to reconnaissance;
the Japanese should reconnoiter on the two roads to the right
or north of the paved road which is just north of the canal;
the Russians on the paved road, if at all; the Americans to
reconnoiter on the road just south of the canal; the British a
parallel road 1½ miles to the left of the road occupied by the
Americans. On the 14th the armies should be concentrated on
the advance line held by the Japanese, and that that evening a
conference should be held to determine what the method of
attack on Pekin should be. On the morning of the 13th I
reconnoitered the road to be occupied by the Americans with
Troop M, Sixth Cavalry, Reilly's battery, and the Fourteenth
Infantry up to the point specified in our agreement, or about
7 miles from Tong-Chow. Finding no opposition, I directed the
remainder of my force to march out and close in on the advance
guard. This force arrived at midnight. The British
reconnoitered their road with some cavalry. The Japanese
reconnoitered their front and also the front which properly
belonged to the Russians.

{131}

"For reasons unknown to me the Russians left their camp at
Tong-Chow about the time that my troops were marching to close
on my advance guard. They followed the road which had been
assigned to them, and about nine o'clock heavy firing was
heard in the vicinity of Pekin. It was the next day
ascertained that they had moved forward during the previous
evening and had attacked the 'Tong-pien-men Gate,' an east
gate of the city near where the Chinese wall joins the Tartar
wall. Very heavy artillery and considerable small-arm firing
was continued throughout the night. At the time of the
occurrence I supposed the firing to be the last efforts of the
Chinese troops to destroy the legations. …