Chapter LXXXVIII: Section 29 (8)

"The question above referred to was duly put by the President
to the judges, who had unanimously signed a letter to the
effect that they did not feel themselves at liberty to give
any answer, when the chief justice of the Cape Colony arrived
in Pretoria, and through his mediation a written understanding
was proposed by the judges on March 19, and accepted without
any qualification by the President on March 22, 1897. By the
terms of this compact the judges undertook not to test laws
and resolutions of the Volksraad on the distinct understanding
that the President would as soon as possible submit a draft
Grondwet to the Volksraad providing how alone the Grondwet can
be altered by special legislation in a manner analogous to the
provisions contained in the constitution of the Orange Free
State on the subject, and incorporating the guaranties for the
independence of the judiciary. By these means the judges
intended to protect both the constitution and the bench
against sudden surprises and attacks, such as, for instance,
the oft-quoted measure known as Law Number 1, of 1897. They
did this to avert a crisis, and, in order to help the
Government and Volksraad out of a difficulty of their own
creation, placed themselves under a temporary obligation upon
the faith of the President as speedily as possible complying
with his portion of the understanding."

_United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,
House Document Number 618._

The promised amendment of the Grondwet was not made, and the
issue concerning it was brought to a crisis in the next year.

See below: A. D. 1898 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY).

SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1897 (February):
Appointment of Sir Alfred Milner.

In February, Sir Alfred Milner was appointed High Commissioner
for South Africa and Governor of Cape Colony, to succeed Sir
Hercules Robinson, retired, and raised to the peerage as Lord
Rosmead.

{475}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February).
The franchise.

The government of the Transvaal extended the full franchise to
862 Uitlanders who supported it at the time of the Jameson
raid.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February.)
Indemnity claimed by the South African Republic for
the Jameson Raid.

On the 16th of February, 1877, the State Secretary of the
South African Republic, Dr. W. J. Leyds, presented to the
British High Commissioner the following "specification of the
compensation to which the Government of the South African
Republic lays claim for and in connexion with the incursion
into the Territory of the South African Republic by Dr.
Jameson and the Troops of the Chartered Company at the end of
December 1895 and the beginning of January 1896.

1. Expenditure for military and commando
services In connexion with the incursion,
the sum of. £136,733 s.4 d.3

2. Compensation to the Netherlands South
African Railway Company for making use,
in accordance with the concession granted
to that Company, of the railway worked by
it during the commando on account of the
incursion of Dr. Jameson. £9,500 s.0 d.0

3. Disbursements to surviving relatives
of slain and wounded. £234 s.19 d.6

4. For annuities, pensions, and disbursements
to widows and children of slain burghers and
to relatives of unmarried slain burghers, as
also to wounded burghers, a total sum of. £28,243 s.0 d.0

5. Expenses of the telegraph department,
for more overtime, more telegrams on service
in South African communication, more
cablegrams, &c. £4,692 s.11 d.9

6. Hospital expenses for the care of the
wounded and sick men, &c. of Dr. Jameson. £225 s.0 d.0

7. For support of members of the families of
commandeered burghers during the commando. £177 s.8 d.8

8. Compensation to be paid to the and the
commandeered burghers for their services
troubles and cares brought upon them. £62,120 s.0 d.0

9. Account of expenses of the Orange
Free State. £36,011 s.19 d.1

Total £677,936 s.3 d.3

"Moral or intellectual compensation to which the Government of
the South African Republic lays claim for and in connexion
with the incursion into the Territory of the South African
Republic by Dr. Jameson and the Troops of the Chartered
Company at the end of December 1895 and the beginning of
January 1896. One million pounds sterling (£1,000,000)."

To this claim the British colonial secretary, Mr. Chamberlain,
replied on the 10th of April, saying, with reference to the
specification under the second head, "for moral or
intellectual damage," that "Her Majesty's Government … regret
that they do not feel justified in presenting it to the
British South Africa Company"; and adding: "Her Majesty's
Government fear that they may be compelled to take similar
exception to certain of the items composing the first head,
especially in view of the very short period which elapsed
between the crossing of the frontier by Dr. Jameson's force
and its surrender; but as it is apparent from the nature of
the figures that the Government of the South African Republic
have proceeded on very precise data in arriving at the various
sums to which they lay claim, Her Majesty's Government, before
offering any observations on this part of the claim, would ask
his Honour to be so good as to furnish them with full
particulars of the way in which the different items comprised
in the first head have been arrived at."

_Great Britain,
Papers by Command: C.—8404, 1897; and C.—8721, 1898._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February-July).
British parliamentary investigation of the Jameson Raid.

A Committee of the British House of Commons, appointed "to
inquire into the origin and circumstances of the incursion
into the South African Republic by an armed force, and into
the administration of the British South Africa Company," began
its sittings on the 16th of February, 1897. Among the members
of the Committee were the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
Attorney-General, Mr. Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, Sir William Harcourt, Sir John Lubbock, Sir H.
Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Labouchere, Mr. John Ellis, Mr.
Buxton, Mr. Blake, and others. Mr. Rhodes, who was first
examined by the Committee, read a statement of the
circumstances leading up to the raid, in which he said that,
as one largely interested in the Transvaal, he felt that the
unfriendly attitude of the Boer Government was the great
obstacle to common action among the various states in South
Africa, and that, therefore, he had assisted the movement in
Johannesburg with his purse and influence. "Further," he said,
"acting within my rights, in the autumn of 1895 I placed a
body of troops under Dr. Jameson, prepared to act in the
Transvaal in certain eventualities." Subsequently Mr. Rhodes
declared: "With reference to the Jameson raid, I may state
that Dr. Jameson went in without my authority." He concluded
his statement by declaring that in what he did he was greatly
influenced by his belief that the policy of the Boer
Government was to "introduce the influence of another foreign
Power into the already complicated system of South Africa."
Mr. Rhodes was kept under examination before the Committee for
four days, and then "almost the next thing heard of him was
that he had started for South Africa on his way back to
Rhodesia." Another witness examined was Sir Graham Bower,
Secretary to the High Commissioner at the Cape. "His evidence
was certainly most startling, and at the same time of great
importance. He stated that late in October, 1895, Mr. Rhodes
came into his office and said: 'I want you to give me your
word of honour that you will not say a word to anyone about
what I am going to tell you.' Sir Graham Bower—who, as he
said, had a great many Cape secrets in his possession—pledged
his word, and soon found he was in possession of a secret
which it was his official duty to disclose to the High
Commissioner and his private duty not to disclose. Mr. Rhodes
then said that he was negotiating about the Protectorate, that
there was going to be a rising in Johannesburg, and that he
wished to have a police force on the border. He added in
substance: 'If trouble comes I am not going to sit still. You
fellows are infernally slow.' It further transpired that on
the fateful Sunday (December 28) Mr. Rhodes had told him that
Jameson had gone in, but that he hoped that the message he had
sent would stop him."
{476}
When Dr. Jameson was examined he fully acknowledged his
conspiracy with the Johannesburg revolutionists, and stated
that he had given information of it to Mr. Rhodes, adding; "He
agreed, and we arranged that when the rising took place he
should go to Johannesburg or Pretoria with the High
Commissioner and Mr. Hofmeyr to mediate between the Transvaal
Government and the Uitlanders. With these matters settled, I
left Cape Town and joined my camp at Pitsani. I required no
orders or authority from Mr. Rhodes, and desired neither to
receive nor to send any messages from or to Cape Town."

In the course of the inquiry, Mr. Chamberlain, the Colonial
Secretary, desired to give testimony, and related that Dr.
Harris, the Secretary in South Africa to the British South
Africa Company, said to him, "I could tell you something in
confidence," or "I could give you some confidential
information"; but that he (Chamberlain) stopped him at once,
saying, "I do not want to hear any confidential information. I
am here in an official capacity, and I can only hear
information of which I can make official use"; and adding: "I
have Sir Hercules Robinson in South Africa. I have entire
confidence in him, and I am quite convinced he will keep me
informed of everything I ought to know." In concluding his
testimony, Mr. Chamberlain said: "I desire to say, in the most
explicit manner, that I did not then have, and that I never
had, any knowledge or—until, I think it was, the day before
the raid took place—the slightest suspicion of anything in the
nature of a hostile or armed invasion of the Transvaal." The
Committee having called upon Mr. Rhodes' solicitor, a Mr.
Hawksley, to produce telegrams which had passed between Mr.
Rhodes and himself, refused to do so.

"The proceedings which ensued were not to the credit of the
Committee, for instead of reporting the matter to the House at
once in a special report, they decided to refer to it in the
interim report on the raid. Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake alone
opposed this course, which was either a confession of
unwillingness to reach the bottom of the business, or the
suggestion that somebody was to be shielded. … Having devoted
two days to hearing counsel on behalf of Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Beit
and Dr. Harris, the Committee adjourned to consider its
report. The general feeling was that the proceedings had been
conducted with singular laxity or want of skill. Those
interested in keeping secret the true history of the raid were
entirely successful, and it was generally by the merest chance
that any fact of importance was elicited from the witnesses.
The representatives of the Opposition, Sir William Harcourt,
Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Buxton, were, after Mr.
Rhodes had been unaccountably permitted to quit England,
willing to allow the breakdown of the proceedings; and what
was even more surprising in so strict a parliamentarian as Sir
William Harcourt, a witness was allowed to treat the Committee
with defiance, and to pass unchecked. To a very great extent the
inquiry had been obviously factitious, but in whose interest
concealment was considered necessary remained undivulged. It
was surmised that reasons of State had been found which
outweighed party considerations, and that the leaders of the
Opposition had been privately convinced that the alleged
grounds were sufficient for the course adopted."

The report of the majority of the Committee, signed by all of
its members except Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake (the former of
whom submitted a minority report), was made public on the 13th
of July. The results of its inquiry were summed up under the
following heads:

I. "Great discontent had, for some time previous to the
incursion, existed in Johannesburg, arising from the
grievances of the Uitlanders.

II. Mr. Rhodes occupied a great position in South Africa; he
was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and, beyond all other
persons, should have been careful to abstain from such a
course of action as that which he adopted. As managing
director of the British South Africa Company, as director of
the De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Gold Fields of South
Africa, Mr. Rhodes controlled a great combination of
interests; he used his position and those interests to promote
and assist his policy. Whatever justification there might have
been for action on the part of the people of Johannesburg, there
was none for the conduct of a person in Mr. Rhodes' position
in subsidising, organising, and stimulating an armed
insurrection against the Government of the South African
Republic, and employing the forces and resources of the
Chartered Company to support such a revolution. He seriously
embarrassed both the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and
his proceedings resulted in the invasion of the territory of a
State which was in friendly relations with her Majesty, in
breach of the obligation to respect the right to
self-government of the South African Republic under the
conventions between her Majesty and that State. Although Dr.
Jameson 'went in' without Mr. Rhodes' authority, it was always
part of the plan that these forces should be used in the
Transvaal in support of an insurrection. Nothing could justify
such a use of such a force, and Mr. Rhodes' heavy
responsibility remains, although Dr. Jameson at the last
moment invaded the Transvaal without his direct sanction.

III. Such a policy once embarked upon inevitably involved Mr.
Rhodes in grave breaches of duty to those to whom he owed
allegiance. He deceived the High Commissioner representing the
Imperial Government, he concealed his views from his
colleagues in the Colonial Ministry and from the board of the
British South Africa Company, and led his subordinates to
believe that his plans were approved by his superiors.

IV. Your committee have heard the evidence of all the
directors of the British South Africa Company, with the
exception of Lord Grey. Of those who were examined, Mr. Beit
and Mr. Maguire alone had cognisance of Mr. Rhodes' plans. Mr.
Beit played a prominent part in the negotiations with the
Reform Union; he contributed large sums of money to the
revolutionary movement, and must share full responsibility for
the consequences.

V. There is not the slightest evidence that the late High
Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Rosmead, was made
acquainted with Mr. Rhodes' plans. The evidence, on the
contrary, shows that there was a conspiracy to keep all
information on the subject from him. The committee must,
however, express a strong opinion upon the conduct of Sir
Graham Bower, who was guilty of a grave dereliction of duty in
not communicating to the High Commissioner the information
which had come to his knowledge. Mr. Newton failed in his duty
in a like manner.

VI. Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor any of
the officials of the Colonial Office received any information
which made them, or should have made them or any of them,
aware of the plot during its development.

{477}

VII. Finally, your committee desire to put on record an
absolute and unqualified condemnation of the raid and of the
plans which made it possible."

"The result caused for the time being grave injury to British
influence in South Africa. Public confidence was shaken, race
feeling embittered, and serious difficulties were created with
neighbouring States. The course of action subsequently taken by
the Government increased the suspicions which were aroused by
such an emasculated report. Two days after its publication
(July 15), Mr. Balfour was asked to set apart a day for the
formal discussion of so important a matter. To this request
Mr. Balfour, with the tacit concurrence of the front
Opposition bench, replied that he saw no useful purpose to be
served by such a debate."

Those who were known as the "Forward Radicals," or "Forwards,"
in the House, were not to be silenced in this manner, and
debate was forced upon a motion expressing regret at "the
inconclusive action and report of the select committee on
British South Africa," and summoning Mr. Hawksley to the bar
of the House, to produce "then and there," the telegrams which
he had refused to the committee. In the course of the
discussion which followed, Mr.Chamberlain expressed his
conviction that, "while the fault of Mr. Rhodes was about as
great a fault as a politician or statesman could commit, there
existed nothing which affected his personal character as a man
of honour." When Sir Elliott Lees, a supporter of the
government, rose to protest against such a doctrine, he was
met by cries which silenced his speech. The House then
divided, and the resolution was defeated by 304 to 77. "It was
an open secret that throughout the debate one member,
unconnected with either front bench, sat with the famous
telegrams in his pocket, and with them certain correspondence
relating thereto which he had been instructed to read in the
event of Mr. Rhodes' character being aspersed."

_Annual Register, 1897._

"The position … stands thus. The Colonial Office conceals its
own documents. From none of its officials have we had any
detailed or frank statement as to their relations to South
African affairs during the critical period. The High
Commissioner himself has not been examined. Mr. Rhodes has
been allowed to go without any serious inquiry into this
branch of the case. The most important cables are refused by
Mr. Rhodes's order, and the Committee decline to exercise
their power to compel the production of them. The story, in
fact, so far as it concerns this question of the truth or
falsity of the allegation that Mr. Chamberlain was 'in it,' is
being smothered up, with an audacious disregard of the
principles which guide all ordinary tribunals. The last steps
in this proceeding have been taken with the direct assent of
the leader of the Opposition. Everybody, therefore, is
inquiring what reason can have induced Sir William Harcourt to
execute this startling change of front. There is only one
reason that can, with any probability, be assigned-that is,
that some member of the Government has made a 'Front Bench
communication' to the leader of the Opposition, indicating to
him explicitly that there are 'reasons of State' for stopping
the disclosures. There can be little doubt that this is what
has happened, and conjecture, not only in this country but
elsewhere, will naturally be keen to know what the nature of
this momentous disclosure was.

"If Mr. Chamberlain was as absolutely free from knowledge of
the Jameson plan as he has professed to be, it is hard to see
how full disclosure could do any damage to the Empire, or
could do anything but good to the Colonial Secretary himself.
Mr. Chamberlain, of course, professes in words his private
desire that everything should come out. He has not, however,
assisted in the attainment of that result. The consequence is
that a national and international question of very grave
importance has arisen. It is said in circles usually well
informed, that when the Raid occurred, it became necessary to
give assurances to foreign Governments, and in particular to
Germany, that the Queen's Government was in no way
compromised. These assurances, it is said, were given. It is
even said that they were given expressly in the name of the
Queen. Something of this kind may well have happened; but it
is hard to see how, if it did happen, and if the Colonial
Office was as innocent as it claims to be, the disclosure of
the facts can do anything but confirm the Queen's word. That
documents exist which are supposed to be compromising, and
which the very authors of them allege to be compromising, is a
fact past hiding. It casts, unless it is cleared up, a damning
doubt. Therefore it would appear to be the duty of all honest
men, and, above all, of the Parliament of Great Britain, to
see that an immediate end is put to a policy which may be
aptly described as 'thimble-rigging,' and that the truth,
whether it suits Mr. Rhodes or Mr. Chamberlain, or neither of
them, must be told at fist."

_Contemporary Review,
July, 1897._

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State and Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (April).
Treaty of alliance.

In April, the two republics entered into a treaty for mutual
support and defense against attacks on the independence of
either, each opening its political franchises to the citizens
of the other on the taking of an oath of allegiance.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (April).
Military expenditure by British and Boer Governments.

The budget of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer,
submitted to the House of Commons in April, contained an item
of '£200,000 for increased military expenditure in South
Africa. This was promptly attacked by the opposition, who
accused the government of pursuing a war policy in its
dealings with the Transvaal. Sir William Harcourt declared
that Mr. Chamberlain had, "in every utterance of his during
the last few months, been endeavouring to exasperate sentiment
in South Africa, and to produce what, thank God! he had failed
in producing—a racial war." Mr. Chamberlain retorted that Sir
William Harcourt's attitude was unpatriotic and injurious to
the cause of peace. He denied aggressiveness in the policy of
the government, asserting that the South African Republic had
been spending millions on armaments imported from abroad, in
view of which the strengthening of the British garrison at the
Cape by an additional regiment and three batteries was no
unreasonable measure. Mr. Balfour, also, begged the House and
the country to believe that the troops were sent only as a
measure of precaution, to maintain admitted rights.

{478}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (May-October).
The British assertion of suzerainty and declination of
proposal to arbitrate disagreements.

On the 7th of May, 1897, the Acting State Secretary of the
South African Republic addressed to the British Agent at
Pretoria a communication of great length, reviewing the
positions taken by Mr. Chamberlain in his several arraignments
of the government of the Republic for alleged violation of the
London Convention of 1884, and proposing an arbitration of the
questions involved. "The complaint," he wrote, "which Her
British Majesty's Government has advanced in an unmistakably
pronounced manner over an actual or possible breach of the
Convention has deeply grieved this Government, as it thinks
that it has fulfilled its obligations. It sees in the
fulfilment of the mutual obligations under the Convention one
of the best guarantees for the maintenance of a mutual good
understanding and for the promotion of reciprocal confidence.
To this good understanding and that confidence, however,
severe shocks have been given by events which cannot be
lightly forgotten. And if it were not that this Government
wishes to guard itself against adopting a recriminating tone,
it might put the question whether, for example, the incursion
of Dr. Jameson, whether considered as a breach of the
Convention or a grievance, is not of immeasurably greater
importance than the various matters adduced by Her British
Majesty's Government would be, even if the contention that
they constitute breaches of the Convention could be accepted.
There should, in the view of this Government, be a strong
mutual endeavour to restore the shocked confidence and to calm
the excited spirit which this Government with sincere regret
sees reigning throughout almost the whole of South Africa.
This Government is anxious to co-operate for this end, for the
desire of the Republic, with the maintenance of its
independence and rights, is for peace, and where for the
reasons given it has been unable to entertain the proposal of
Her British Majesty's Government in the matter of the Aliens
Law,—and it appears very difficult to arrive at a solution of
the question by means of correspondence,—it wishes to come to
a permanent good understanding along a peaceful course, not
only with respect to its undisturbed right to make an alien
law, but also with regard to all points touching the
Convention which are referred to in the two Despatches under
reply by Her British Majesty's Government. While it respects
the opinion of Her British Majesty's Government, it takes the
liberty, with full confidence in the correctness of its own
views, to propose to Her British Majesty's Government the
principle of arbitration with which the honourable the First
Volksraad agrees, in the hope that it will be taken in the
conciliatory spirit in which it is made. …

"Although this Government is firmly convinced that a just and
impartial decision might be obtained even better in South
Africa than anywhere else, it wishes, in view of the
conflicting elements, interests, and aspirations, which are
now apparent in South Africa, and in order to avoid even the
appearance that it would be able or desire to exercise
influence in order to obtain a decision favourable to it, to
propose that the President of the Swiss Bondstate, who may be
reckoned upon as standing altogether outside the question, and
to feel sympathy or antipathy neither for the one party nor
for the other, be requested to point out a competent jurist,
as has already oftener been done in respect of international
disputes. The Government would have no objection that the
arbitrator be subject to a limitation of time, and gives the
assurance now already that it will willingly subject itself to
any decision if such should, contrary to its expectation, be
given against it. The Government repeats the well-meant wish
that this proposal may find favour with Her British Majesty's
Government, and inasmuch as the allegations of breaches of the
Convention find entrance now even in South Africa, and bring
and keep the feelings more and more in a state of suspense,
this Government will be pleased if it can learn the decision
of Her Majesty's Government as soon as possible."

Mr. Chamberlain's reply to this proposal was not written until
the 16th of the following October, when he, in turn, reviewed,
point by point, the matters dealt with, in the despatch of Mr.
Van Boeschoten. With reference to the Jameson raid he said: "Her
Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the
Government of the South African Republic see in the fulfilment
of the mutual obligations under the London Convention one of
the best guarantees for the maintenance of a mutual
understanding and for the promotion of reciprocal confidence.
Her Majesty's Government have uniformly fulfilled these
obligations on their part, and they must strongly protest
against what appears to be an implication in the Note under
consideration that the incursion of Dr. Jameson can be
considered as either a breach of the Convention by Her
Majesty's Government or a grievance against them. That
incursion was the act of private individuals unauthorised by
Her Majesty's Government, and was repudiated by them
immediately it became known. The immense importance to the
Government of the South African Republic of that repudiation,
and of the proclamation issued by the High Commissioner under
instructions from Her Majesty's Government, is recognised
throughout South Africa. Her Majesty's Government maintain
strongly that since the Convention of 1881 there has never
been any breach or even any allegation of a breach on their
part of that or the subsequent Convention, and, as the subject
has been raised by the implied accusation contained in the
Note under consideration, Her Majesty's Government feel
constrained to contrast their loyal action in the case of the
Jameson raid with the cases in which they have had cause to
complain that the Government of the South African Republic
failed to interfere with, if they did not countenance,
invasions of the adjacent territories by its burghers in
violation of the Convention, and they feel bound to remind the
Government of the Republic that in one of these cases Her
Majesty's Government were compelled to maintain their rights
by an armed expedition at the cost of about one million
sterling, for which no compensation has ever been received by
them."

Concerning the proposal of arbitration, the reply of the
British colonial secretary was as follows: "In making this
proposal the Government of the South African Republic appears
to have overlooked the distinction between the Conventions of
1881 and 1884 and an ordinary treaty between two independent
Powers, questions arising upon which may properly be the
subject of arbitration.
{479}
By the Pretoria Convention of 1881 Her Majesty, as Sovereign
of the Transvaal Territory, accorded to the inhabitants of
that territory complete self-government subject to the
suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, upon
certain terms and conditions and subject to certain
reservations and limitations set forth in 33 articles, and by
the London Convention of 1884 Her Majesty, while maintaining
the preamble of the earlier instrument, directed and declared
that certain other articles embodied therein should be
substituted for the articles embodied in the Convention of
1881. The articles of the Convention of 1881 were accepted by
the Volksraad of the Transvaal State, and those of the
Convention of 1884 by the Volksraad of the South African
Republic. Under these Conventions, therefore, Her Majesty
holds towards the South African Republic the relation of a
suzerain who has accorded to the people of that Republic
self-government upon certain conditions, and it would be
incompatible with that position to submit to arbitration the
construction of the conditions on which she accorded
self-government to the Republic. One of the main objects which
Her Majesty's Government had in view was the prevention of the
interference of any foreign Power between Her Majesty and the
South African Republic, a matter which they then held, and
which Her Majesty's present Government hold, to be essential
to British interests, and this object would be defeated by the
course now proposed. The clear intention of Her Majesty's
Government at the time of the London Convention, that
questions in relation to it should not be submitted to
arbitration, is shown by the fact that when the delegates of
the South African Republic, in the negotiations which preceded
that Convention, submitted to Her Majesty's Government in the
first instance (in a letter of the 26th of November, 1883,
which will be found on page 9 of the Parliamentary Paper C.
3947 of 1884) the draft of a treaty or convention containing
an arbitration clause, they were informed by the Earl of Derby
that it was neither in form nor in substance such as Her
Majesty's Government could adopt."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command.
C.—8721, 1898._

SOUTH AFRICA: Natal: A. D. 1897 (December).
Annexation of Zululand.

See (in this volume)
AFRICA: A. D. 1897 (ZULULAND).

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1898.
The position of political parties.
The Progressives and the Afrikander Bund.

"The present position of parties at the Cape is as unfortunate
and as unwarranted as any that the severest critic of
Parliamentary institutions could have conjured up. … The Cape
has always had the curse of race prejudice to contend with.
Time might have done much to soften, if not to expunge it, if
home-made stupidities had not always been forthcoming to goad
to fresh rancour. The facts are too well known to need
repetition. It is true not only of the Transvaalers that 'the
trek has eaten into their souls,' and up to the time of
emancipation and since, every conceivable mistake has been
committed by those in authority. Thus, when the breach was, to
all appearances, partly healed, the fatal winter of 1895 put
back the hands of the clock to the old point of departure. As
Englishmen, our sympathies are naturally with the party that
is prevalently English, and against the party that is
prevalently Dutch; but to find a real line of political
difference between them other than national sentiment requires
fine drawing. … According to our lines of cleavage both
Bondsmen [Afrikander Bund] and Progressives are Conservatives
of a decided type. Practically they are agreed in advocating
protective duties on sea-borne trade, although in degree they
differ, for whilst the Bond would have imposts as they are,
the Progressives wish to reduce the duties on food stuffs to
meet the grievance of the urban constituencies, and might be
induced to accord preferential treatment to British goods. On
the native question neither party adopts what would in England
be considered an 'advanced' programme, for education is not
made a cardinal point, and they would equally like, if
possible, to extend the application of the Glen Grey Act,
which, by levying a tax on the young Kaffirs who have not a
labour certificate, forces them to do some service to the
community before exercising their right of 'putting the
spoon,' as the phrase is, 'into the family pot.' Neither party
wishes to interfere with the rights of property or the
absolute tenure of land under the Roman-Dutch law. A tax on
the output of diamonds at Kimberley has been advocated by some
members of the Bond as a financial expedient, but it is
understood to have been put forward rather as a threat against
Mr. Rhodes personally than as a measure of practical politics.
Questions of franchise are tacitly left as they are, for no
responsible politicians wish to go back upon the enactment
which restricted the Kaffir vote to safe and inconsiderable
limits. The redistribution of seats was the subject of a Bill
upon which the last House was dissolved, after the rebuff that
the Ministry received upon a crucial division, but it has been
dealt with rather for practical than theoretical reasons. Two
schemes of redistribution have been formulated, and each has
been proposed and opposed with arguments directed to show the
party advantage to be derived. For political reform, in the
abstract, with or without an extension of the suffrage, there
is no sort of enthusiasm in any quarter. Railway
administration furnishes, no doubt, an occasional battle-field
for the two sides of the House. Roughly, the Progressives
favour the northern extension, and are willing to make
concessions in rates and charges to help on the new trade with
Rhodesia; whilst the Bond declare themselves against special
treatment of the new interests, and would spend all the money
that could be devoted to railway construction in the farming
districts of the colony itself. Mr. Rhodes, however, has
warned the Cape that any hostile action will be counteracted
by a diversion of traffic to the East, and it is unlikely that
any line of policy will be pursued that is likely to injure
the carrying trade of the southern ports. Between the
followers of Mr. Rhodes and the followers of Mr. Hofmeyr there
is no wide divergence of principle on public affairs of the
near future, so far as they have been or are to be the subject
of legislation; where the difference comes in is in the
attitude they severally assume towards the two republics and
the territories of the north, but when talk has to yield to
action it is improbable that there will be much in their
disagreement."

_N. L. W. Lawson,
Cape Politics and Colonial Policy
(Fortnightly Review, November 1898)._

{480}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1898 (January-February).

Re-election of President Kruger.
Renewed conflict of the Executive with the Judiciary.
Dismissal of Chief-Justice Kotze.

The Presidential election in the South African Republic was
held in January and February, the polls being open from the 3d
of the former month until the 4th of the latter. President
Kruger was re-elected for a fourth term of five years, by
nearly 13,000 votes against less than 6,000 divided between
Mr. Schalk Burger and General Joubert, who were opposing
candidates. Soon afterwards, the conflict of 1897 between the
Judiciary and the Executive (see above: A. D. 1897,
JANUARY-MARCH), was reopened by a communication in which
Chief-Justice Kotze, of the High Court, called the attention
of the President to the fact that nothing had been done in
fulfilment of the agreement that the independence of the Court
and the stability of the Grondwet should both be protected by
law against arbitrary interference, and giving notice that he
considered the compromise then arranged to be ended. Thereupon
(February 16) President Kruger removed the judge from his
office and placed the State Attorney in his seat. Justice
Kotze denied the legality of the removal, and adjourned his
court sine die. In a speech at Johannesburg, some weeks
afterwards, he denounced the action of President Kruger with
great severity, saying: "I charge the President, as head of
the State, with having violated both the constitution and the
ordinary laws of the land; with having interfered with the
independence of the High Court; and invaded and imperilled the
rights and liberties of everyone in the country. The
guarantees provided by the constitution for the protection of
real and personal rights have disappeared, and these are now
dependent on the 'arbitrium' of President Kruger."

SOUTH AFRICA: Rhodesia and the British South Africa Company:
A. D. 1898 (February).
Reorganization.

In February, the British government announced the adoption of
plans for a reorganization of the British South Africa Company
and of the administration of its territories. The Company,
already deprived of military powers, was to give up, in great
part, but not wholly, its political functions. It was still to
appoint an Administrator for Rhodesia south of the Zambesi,
and to name the majority of members in a council assisting
him, so long as it remained responsible for the expenses of
administration; but, by the side of the Administrator was to
be placed a Resident Commissioner, appointed by the Crown, and
over both was the authority of the High Commissioner for South
Africa, to whom the Resident Commissioner made reports. At
home the status of the Board of Directors was to be
considerably altered. The life directorships were to be
abolished, and the whole Board of Directors in future to be
elected by the shareholders,—any official or director removed
by the Secretary of State not being eligible without his
consent. The Board of Directors was to communicate all
minutes, etc., to the Secretary of State, and he to have the
power of veto or suspension. Finally, the Secretary of State
was to have full powers to inspect and examine all documents;
Colonial Office officials named by him were, in effect, to
exercise powers like those of the old Indian Board of Control.

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1898 (March-October).

Election in favor of the Afrikander Bund.
Change in the government.

Elections to the Upper House of the Cape Parliament, in March,
gave the party called the Progressives, headed by Mr. Rhodes, a
small majority over the Afrikander Bund—more commonly called
the Bond. The Parliament opened in May, and the Progressive
Ministry, under Sir Gordon Sprigg, was defeated in the Lower
House in the following month, on a bill to create new
electoral divisions. The Ministry dissolved Parliament and
appealed to the constituencies, with the result of a defeat on
that appeal. The Bond party won in the elections by a majority
of two, which barely enabled it to carry a resolution of want
of confidence in the government when Parliament was
reassembled, in October. The Ministry of Sir Gordon Sprigg
resigned, and a new one was formed with Mr. Schreiner at its
head.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1898-1899.
Continued dispute with the British Government
concerning Suzerainty.

During 1898 and half of 1899, a new dispute, raised by Mr.
Chamberlain's emphatic assertion of the suzerainty of Great
Britain over the South African Republic, went on between the
British Colonial Office and the government at Pretoria.
Essentially, the question at issue seemed to lie between a
word and a fact and the difference between the disputants was
the difference between the meanings they had severally drawn
from the omission of the word "suzerainty" from the London
Convention of 1884. On one side could be quoted the report
which the Transvaal deputation to London, in 1884, had made to
their Volksraad, when they brought the treaty back, and
recommended that it be approved. The treaty, they reported,
"is entirely bilateral [meaning that there were two sides in
the making of it] whereby your representatives were not placed
in the humiliating position of merely having to accept from a
Suzerain Government a one-sided document as rule and
regulation, but whereby they were recognized as a free
contracting party. It makes, then, also an end of the British
suzerainty, and, with the official recognition of her name,
also restores her full self-government to the South African
Republic, excepting one single limitation regarding the
conclusion of treaties with foreign powers (Article 4). With
the suzerainty the various provisions and limitations of the
Pretoria Convention which Her Majesty's Government as suzerain
had retained have also, of course, lapsed."

On the other side, Mr. Chamberlain could quote with effect
from a speech which Lord Derby, then the British Colonial
Secretary, who negotiated the Convention of 1884 with the Boer
envoys, made on the 17th of March, that year, in the House of
Lords. As reported in Hansard, Lord Derby had then dealt with
the very question of suzerainty, as involved in the new
convention, and had set forth his own understanding of the
effect of the latter in the following words: "Then the noble
Earl (Earl Cadogan) said that the object of the Convention had
been to abolish the suzerainty of the British Crown. The word
'suzerainty' is a very vague word, and I do not think it is
capable of any precise legal definition.
{481}
Whatever we may understand by it, I think it is not very easy
to define. But I apprehend, whether you call it a
protectorate, or a suzerainty, or the recognition of England
as a paramount Power, the fact is that a certain controlling
power is retained when the State which exercises this
suzerainty has a right to veto any negotiations into which the
dependent State may enter with foreign Powers. Whatever
suzerainty meant in the Convention of Pretoria, the condition
of things which it implied still remains; although the word is
not actually employed, we have kept the substance. We have
abstained from using the word because it was not capable of
legal definition, and because it seemed to be a word which was
likely to lead to misconception and misunderstanding."

_Great Britain,
Papers by Command: C. 9507, 1899, pages 24 and 34._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (March).
Petition of British subjects to the Queen.

A fresh excitement of discontent in the Rand, due especially
to the shooting of an Englishman by a Boer policeman, whom the
Boer authorities seemed disposed to punish lightly or not at
all, led to the preparation of a petition to the British
Queen, from her subjects in the South African Republic,
purporting to be signed in the first instance by 21,684, and
finally by 23,000. The genuineness of many of the signatures
was disputed by the Boers, but strenuously affirmed by those
who conducted the circulation of the petition. It set forth
the grievances of the memorialists at length, and prayed Her
Majesty to cause them to be investigated, and to direct her
representative in South Africa to take measures for securing
from the South African Republic a recognition of their rights.
The petition was forwarded to the Colonial Office on the 28th
of March.

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1899, C. 9345._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (May-June).
The Bloemfontein Conference between President Kruger and
the British High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner.

There seems to be no mode in which the questions at issue
between the British and the Boers, and the attitude of the two
parties, respectively, in their contention with each other,
can be represented more accurately than by quoting essential
parts of the official report of a formal conference between
President Kruger and the British High Commissioner in South
Africa, Sir Alfred Milner, which was held at Bloemfontein, the
capital of the Orange Free State, during five days, May
31-June 5, 1899. The meeting was arranged by President Steyn,
of the Orange Free State, with a view to bringing about an
adjustment of differences by a free and full discussion of
them, face to face. In the official report of the
conversations that occurred, from which we shall quote, the
remarks of President Kruger are given as being made by the
"President," and those of the High Commissioner as by "His
Excellency." The latter, invited by the President to speak
first, said:

"There are a considerable number of open questions between Her
Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African
Republic on which there is at present no sign of agreement. On
the contrary, disagreements seem to increase as time goes on.
… In my personal opinion the cause of many of the points of
difference, and the most serious ones, arises out of the
policy pursued by the Government of the South African Republic
towards the Uitlander population of that Republic among whom
many thousands are British subjects. This policy, the bitter
feeling it engenders between the Government and a section of
Uitlanders, and the effect of the resulting tension in South
Africa, and the feeling of sympathy in Great Britain, and even
throughout the British Empire generally, with the Uitlander
population, creates an irritated state of public opinion on
both sides, which renders it much more difficult for the two
Governments to settle their differences amicably. It is my
strong conviction that if the Government of the South African
Republic could now, before things get worse, of its own motion
change its policy towards the Uitlanders, and take measures
calculated to content the reasonable people among them, who,
after all, are a great majority, such a course would not only
strengthen the independence of the Republic but it would make
such a better state of feeling all round that it would become
far easier to settle outstanding questions between the two
Governments. … The President, in coming here, has made a
reservation as to the independence of the Republic. I cannot
see that it is in any way impairing the independence of the
Republic for Her Majesty's Government to support the cause of
the Uitlanders as far as it is reasonable. A vast number of
them are British subjects. If we had an equal number of
British subjects and equally large interests in any part of
the world, even in a country which was not under any
conventional obligations to Her Majesty's Government we should
be bound to make representations to the Government in the
interests of Her Majesty's subjects, and to point out that the
intense discontent of those subjects stood in the way of the
cordial relations which we desire to exist between us. I know
that the citizens of the South African Republic are intensely
jealous of British interference in their internal affairs.
What I want to impress upon the President is that if the
Government of the South African Republic of its own accord,
from its own sense of policy and justice, would afford a more
liberal treatment to the Uitlander population, this would not
increase British interference, but enormously diminish it. If
the Uitlanders were in a position to help themselves they
would not always be appealing to us under the Convention. …

"President.—I shall be brief. I have come with my commission,
in the trust that Your Excellency is a man capable of
conviction, to go into all points of difference. … I should
like His Excellency to go point by point in this discussion,
so that we can discuss each point that he thinks requires
attention, not with a view to at once coming to a decision,
but to hear each side, and we can go back on any point if
necessary, and see if we can arrive at an understanding. I
would like to give concessions as far as is possible and
practicable, but I want to speak openly, so that His
Excellency may be able to understand. I should like to say
that the memorials placed before Her Majesty's Government came
from those who do not speak the truth. I mean to convey that
we do give concessions wherever we think it practicable to do
so, and after we have discussed it in a friendly way Your
Excellency will be able to judge whether I or the memorialists
are right. I have said that if there are any mistakes on our
side, we are willing to discuss them. Even in any matter
concerning internal affairs I would be willing to listen to
his advice if he said it could be removed in this way or that
way. But when I show him that by the point we may be
discussing our independence may be touched, I trust he will be
open to conviction on that subject. …

{482}

"His Excellency.—I think the point which it would be best to
take first, if the President agrees, … would be the Franchise.
… There are a number of questions more or less resting upon
that. … I should like to know a little more about the
President's views. I want to know more because if I were to
begin and say I want this, that, and the other, I know I
should be told this was dictation. I do not want to formulate
a scheme of my own, but I can, if necessary.

"President.—As long as I understand that it is meant in a
friendly manner, and you mean to give hints, I won't take it
that they are commands. It has already been arranged that you
give me friendly hints and advice, and I will not take it as
dictation, even though it should be on points on which I
should consider you have no right to interfere. … I would like
you to bear one point in view, namely, that all kinds of
nations and languages, of nearly all powers, have rushed in at
the point where the gold is to be found. In other countries …
there are millions of old burghers, and the few that come in
cannot out-vote the old burghers, but with us, those who
rushed in to the gold fields are in large numbers and of all
kinds, and the number of old burghers is still insignificant;
therefore we are compelled to make the franchise so that they
cannot all rush into it at once, and as soon as we can assure
ourselves by a gradual increase of our burghers that we can
safely do it, our plan was to reduce the time for anyone there
to take up the franchise, and that is also my plan. … As His
Excellency doubtless knows, I have proposed to the Volksraad
that the time should be reduced by five years, and gradually
as more trusted burghers join our numbers, we can, perhaps, go
further. There are a number who really do not want the
franchise, but they use it as pretext to egg on people with
Her Majesty. … You must remember, also, on this subject, that
the burghers in our Republic are our soldiers, who must
protect the land, and that we have told these men to come and
fight when we have had difficulties with the Kaffirs. They
wanted the vote, but they would not come and fight. Those who
were willing to help obtained the franchise, but it appears
that many do not want to have it.

"His Excellency.—They did not want to take the obligations
without the rights of citizenship, and in that I sympathize
with them. If they should obtain that right, then naturally
they would have to take those burdens upon them.

"President.—Those who want the franchise should bear the
burdens.

"His Excellency.—Yes. Immediately they get the franchise they
take upon themselves the obligations connected therewith."

[From this the talk wandered to the subject of commandeering,
until the High Commissioner brought it back to the franchise
question.]

"His Excellency.—If I made a proposal to admit strangers under
such conditions as to swamp the old burghers it would be
unreasonable. But the newcomers have, at present, no influence
on the legislation of the Republic, which makes an enormous
difference. They haven't got a single representative. The
First Volksraad consists of 28 members, and not one member
represents the feelings of the large Uitlander population.

"President.—Men from any country could after two years vote
for the Second Volksraad, and after two years more sit in the
Second Raad. There are Englishmen who have obtained the full
franchise in that way, and are eligible for the Volksraad. And
now I have proposed to shorten the last ten years of the
period required for the full franchise and make it five years.