Chapter XC: Section 29 (10)

Practically the discussion was ended by a despatch from the
British Colonial Secretary, September 22d, in which he said;
"Her Majesty's Government have on more than one occasion
repeated their assurances that they have no desire to
interfere in any way with independence of South African
Republic, provided that the conditions on which it was granted
are honourably observed in the spirit and in the letter, and
they have offered as part of a general settlement to give a
complete guarantee against any attack upon that independence,
either from within any part of the British dominions or from
the territory of a foreign State. They have not asserted any
rights of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic
other than those which are derived from the Conventions
between the two countries or which belong to every
neighbouring Government (and especially to one which has a
largely predominant interest in the adjacent territories) for
the protection of its subjects and of its adjoining
possessions." Referring to his despatch of September 8, the
Secretary concluded: "The refusal of the Government of the
South African Republic to entertain the offer thus made,
coming as it does at the end of nearly four months of
protracted negotiations, themselves the climax of an agitation
extending over a period of more than five years, makes it
useless to further pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto
followed, and Her Majesty's Government are now compelled to
consider the situation afresh, and to formulate their own
proposals for a final settlement of the issues which have been
created in South Africa by the policy constantly followed for
many years by the Government of the South African Republic.
They will communicate to you the result of their deliberations
in a later despatch."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:
1899, C. 9518, 9521, 9530._

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State: A. D. 1899 (September-October).
The Free State makes common cause with
the South African Republic.

On the 27th of September, President Steyn communicated to the
British High Commissioner a resolution adopted that day by the
Orange Free State Volksraad, instructing the government to
continue efforts for peaceful settlement of differences
between the South African Republic and Great Britain, but
concluding with the declaration that "if a war is now begun or
occasioned by Her Majesty's Government against South African
Republic, this would morally be a war against the whole of
white population of South Africa and would in its results be
calamitous and criminal, and further, that Orange Free State
will honestly and faithfully observe its obligations towards
South African Republic arising out of the political alliance
between the two Republics whatever may happen."

On the 11th of October, the High Commissioner communicated to
President Steyn the ultimatum that he received from the South
African Republic, and asked: "In view of Resolution of
Volksraad of Orange Free State communicated to me in Your
Honour's telegram of 27th September I have the honour to
request that I may be informed at Your Honour's earliest
possible convenience whether this action on the part of the
South African Republic has Your Honour's concurrence and
support." The reply of the Orange Free State President was as
follows:

"The high handed and unjustifiable policy and conduct of Her
Majesty's Government in interfering in and dictating in the
purely internal affairs of South African Republic,
constituting a flagrant breach of the Convention of London,
1884, accompanied at first by preparations, and latterly
followed by active commencement of hostilities against that
Republic, which no friendly and well-intentioned efforts on
our part could induce Her Majesty's Government to abandon,
constitute such an undoubted and unjust attack on the
independence of the South African Republic that no other
course is left to this State than honourably to abide by its
Conventional Agreements entered into with that Republic. On
behalf of this Government, therefore, I beg to notify that,
compelled thereto by the action of Her Majesty's Government,
they intend to carry out the instructions of the Volksraad as
set forth in the last part of the Resolution referred to by
Your Excellency."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:
1899, C.—9530, pages 38 and 67._

{491}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal and Orange Free State:
A. D. 1899 (September-October).
Preparations for war.
Troops massed on both sides of the frontiers.
Remonstrances of Orange Free State.
The Boer Ultimatum.

Before the controversy between Boer and Briton had reached the
stage represented above, both sides were facing the prospect
of war, both were bringing forces to the frontier, and each
was declaring that the other had been first to take that
threatening step. Which of them did first begin movements that
bore a look of menace seems difficult to learn from official
reports. On the 19th of September, the British High
Commissioner gave notice to the President of the Orange Free
State that "it has been deemed advisable by the Imperial
military authorities to send detachments of the troops
ordinarily stationed at Cape Town to assist in securing the
line of communication between the Colony and the British
territories lying to the north of it"; and "as this force, or
a portion of it, may be stationed near the borders of the
Orange Free State," he wished the burghers of that State to
understand that the movement was in no way directed against
them. Eight days later, President Steyn, of the Orange Free
State, addressed a long despatch to the High Commissioner,
remonstrating against the whole procedure of the British
government in its dealing with the South African Republic, and
alluding to the "enormous and ever increasing military
preparations of the British government." On the 2d of October
he announced to the Commissioner that he had "deemed it
advisable, in order to allay the intense excitement and unrest
amongst our burghers, arising from the totally undefended state
of our border, in the presence of a continued increase and
movement of troops on two sides of this State, to call up our
burghers, to satisfy them that due precaution had been taken."
The High Commissioner replied on the 3d: "Your Honour must be
perfectly well aware that all the movements of British troops
which have taken place in this country since the beginning of
present troubles, which have been necessitated by the natural
alarm of the inhabitants in exposed districts, are not
comparable in magnitude with the massing of armed forces by
government of South African Republic on the borders of Natal."
Some days previous to this, on the 29th of September,
Secretary Chamberlain had cabled from London to Sir Alfred
Milner: "Inform President of Orange Free State that what he
describes as the enormous and ever-increasing military
preparations of Great Britain have been forced upon Her
Majesty's Government by the policy of the South African
Republic, which has transformed the Transvaal into a permanent
armed camp, threatening the peace of the whole of South Africa
and the position of Great Britain as the paramount State."

On the 9th of October the High Commissioner received another
telegram from the President of the Orange Free State, of which
he cabled the substance to London as follows: "He demurs to
statement that military preparations of Her Majesty's
Government have been necessitated by conversion of South
African Republic into an armed camp. Her Majesty's Government
must be entirely misinformed and it would be regrettable if,
through such misunderstanding, present state of extreme
tension were allowed to continue. Though Her Majesty's
Government may regard precautions taken by South African
Republic after Jameson Raid as excessive, Government of South
African Republic cannot be blamed for adopting them, in view
of large Uitlander population constantly being stirred up,
through hostile press, to treason and rebellion by persons and
organizations financially or politically interested in
overthrowing the Government. Arming of Burghers not intended
for any purpose of aggression against Her Majesty's dominions.
People of South African Republic have, since shortly after
Jameson Raid, been practically as fully armed as now, yet have
never committed any act of aggression. It was not till Her
Majesty's Government, with evident intention of enforcing
their views on South African Republic in purely internal
matters, had greatly augmented their forces and moved them
nearer to borders that a single Burgher was called up for the
purpose, as be firmly believed, of defending country and
independence. If this natural assumption erroneous, not too
late to rectify misunderstanding by mutual agreement to
withdraw forces on both sides and undertaking by Her Majesty's
Government to stop further increase of troops."

But, in reality, it was already too late; for, on the same day
on which the above message was telegraphed from Bloemfontein,
the government of the South African Republic had presented to
the British Agent at Pretoria a note which ended the
possibility of peace. After reviewing the issue between the
two governments, the note concluded with a peremptory
ultimatum, as follows: "Her Majesty's unlawful intervention in
the internal affairs of this Republic in conflict with the
Convention of London, 1884, caused by the extraordinary
strengthening of troops in the neighbourhood of the borders of
this Republic, has thus caused an intolerable condition of
things to arise whereto this Government feels itself obliged,
in the interest not only of this Republic but also [?] of all
South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and feels
itself called upon and obliged to press earnestly and with
emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things
and to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the
assurance
(a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by
the friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way
may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's
Government.
(b) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be
instantly withdrawn.
(c) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in
South Africa since the 1st June, 1899, shall be removed from
South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with
this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee on
the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities
against any portion of the possessions of the British Government
shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations
within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between
the Governments, and this Government will, on compliance
therewith, be prepared to withdraw the armed Burghers of this
Republic from the borders.
{492}
(d) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas
shall not be landed in any port of South Africa. This
Government must press for an immediate and affirmative answer
to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her Majesty's
Government to return such an answer before or upon Wednesday
the 11th October, 1899, not later than 5 o'clock p. m., and it
desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no
satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval
[it] will with great regret be compelled to regard the action
of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war,
and will not hold itself responsible for the consequences
thereof, and that in the event of any further movements of
troops taking place within the above-mentioned time in the
nearer directions of our borders this Government will be
compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war."

To this ultimatum the British government gave its reply, in a
despatch from Mr. Chamberlain to Sir Alfred Milner, October
10, as follows: "Her Majesty's Government have received with
great regret the peremptory demands of the Government of the
South African Republic conveyed in your telegram of 9th
October, Number 3. You will inform the Government of the South
African Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by
the Government of the South African Republic are such as Her
Majesty's Government deem it impossible to discuss."

_Great Britain,
Papers by Command: 1899, C.—9530._

Efforts which were being made at the time in Holland to assist
the Boer Republic in pacific negotiations with Great Britain
were suddenly frustrated by this action. A year later (in
November, 1900) it was stated in the States General at The
Hague that "in the autumn of 1899 the Netherlands Government
offered in London its good offices for the resumption of
negotiations with the Transvaal, but these efforts had no
result in consequence of the sudden ultimatum of the Transvaal
and the commencement of hostilities by the armies of the
Republics, actions which surprised the Netherlands Government.
When once the war had broken out any effort in the direction of
intervention would have been useless, as was shown by the
peremptory refusal given by Great Britain to the offer of the
United States."

An Englishman who was in the country at the time gives the
following account of the Boer preparation for war: "In the
towns the feeling was strongly against war; in the country
districts war was popular, as the farmers had not the
slightest doubt they would be able to carry out their threat
of 'driving the English into the sea.' … Skilled artillerymen
were finding their way into the country towards the end of
August last [1899]. The Boers themselves did not put much
faith in their artillery, but they were reassured by the
officers who told them that they would yet learn to respect
its usefulness and efficiency—a prophecy which to our cost has
been more than fulfilled. … General Joubert was always ready
and willing, at any time, to inspect and test new guns or
military necessaries, and no expense was spared to make the
Transvaal burgher army a first-class fighting-machine. …
Surprise has been expressed at the inaccurate statements made
by colonials as to the fighting strength of the Boers. They
had not allowed for the enormous increase of population. From
an absolutely reliable source the writer ascertained in
September last that they could put in the field between 50 and
60 thousand men, made up as follows: Transvaal burghers,
22,000; resident foreigners, etc., 10,000; Free Staters,
16,000; colonists who would cross the border and join, 6,000;
total, 54,000. … As soon as war seemed likely, no time was
lost in perfecting the military arrangements. Before Great
Britain had thought of mobilizing a soldier, the Boer
emissaries were again scouring the colonies of Natal and the
Cape, sounding the farmers as to what part they were prepared
to take in the coming conflict. … While people at home were
wondering what the next move would be, the Boers were ready to
answer the question. Towards the middle of September all
preparations were completed, the Government had laid in large
quantities of supplies (mainly of flour, Boer meal, and tinned
foods), which they anticipated would tide them over twelve to
eighteen months, and by that time, if they had not beaten the
British, they relied on foreign intervention. They had also
received large sums of money from Europe, and some additional
supplies of arms and ammunition. Ammunition was distributed in
large quantities throughout the country, each burgher
receiving a sealed packet in addition to his ordinary supply.
The last batch of the Mauser rides was distributed, and the
mobilization scheme finally arranged, by which, on a given
word being telegraphed to the different centres, the first
Republican army corps would be mobilized within twenty-four
hours. This actually took place. … The British Government
could hardly fail to be aware of the fact that the Transvaal
was in earnest this time. A visit to the country districts
towards the end of August, about the time when the Boer
Executive themselves sounded the country through their private
agencies, would have revealed the fact that the people were
not only perfectly willing to go to war, but that they
absolutely wished for it. As one Boer put it to the writer:
'We look on fighting the English as a picnic. In some of the
Kaffir wars we had a little trouble, but in the Vryheids
Oorlog (the Boer War of 1881) we simply potted the Rooineks as
they streamed across the veld in their red jackets, without
the slightest danger to ourselves.' They had the utmost
contempt for Tommy Atkins and his leaders, many of them
bragging that the only thing that deterred them from
advocating war instanter was the thought that they would have
to kill so many of the soldiers, with whom individually they
said there was no quarrel. With such a state of things, which
should have been perfectly clear to the Intelligence
Department (and through it to the War Office) in
London—because no resident with eyes to see could be deceived
in the matter—we allowed the present war to find us
unprepared!"

_J. Scoble and H. H. Abercrombie,
The Rise and Fall of Krugerism,
chapter 16 (New York: F. A. Stokes Co.)._

[Image: The Boer Republics and the Surroundings.]

{493}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1899 (October-November).
The Boer advance.
Invasion of Cape Colony and Natal.
The invaders joined by Dutch farmers of the colony.
The British unprepared.
Investment of Kimberley and Mafeking.

In a despatch dated January 16, 1900, Sir Alfred Milner gave
particulars of the first advance of the Boer forces from the
Orange Free State into Cape Colony, and of the extent to which
they were joined by Dutch farmers in districts south of Orange
River. He wrote: "The portion of the Colony with which I
propose to deal is that which lies south of the Orange River.
The districts north of that river have been so completely cut
off, and our accounts of what has been, and is, going on there
are so scanty and imperfect, that the history of their
defection cannot yet be written. I shall content myself with
quoting an extract from a report upon the state of affairs in
that region by a gentleman lately resident in Vryburg, which
undoubtedly fairly expresses the truth so far as he has been
in a position to observe it:—'All the farmers in the Vryburg,
Kuruman, and Taungs districts,' he says, 'have joined the
Boers, and I do not believe that you will find ten loyal
British subjects among the Dutch community in the whole of
Bechuanaland.' … The districts invaded by the enemy south of
the Orange River are:—Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North,
Wodehouse, and Barkly East. It was on the 12th October that
the enemy committed the first act of war and of invasion near
Vryburg, on the western border, but it was not till more than
a month later, namely, the 14th November, that they occupied
Colesberg. Apparently they were waiting for reinforcements,
for when they actually did cross the frontier they were 1,100
strong. Whatever the cause of their delay, it was not due to
any discouragement from the people of Colesberg. The small
British garrison then in the country being engaged elsewhere,
and the district being entirely unguarded save by a few
policemen, people from there continually visited the river to
communicate with the enemy. The Chief Constable reports that
when he left the town 300 Colesberg farmers had already joined
the enemy, and that 400 more were expected from the adjoining
district of Philipstown. … On the 16th November General
Grobler, the Boer Commandant, addressed the following telegram
to Bloemfontein:—'Colesberg was occupied by me without
opposition. … I was very well pleased with the conduct of the
Afrikanders. We were everywhere welcomed.' … Eastwards along
the border the tide of insurrection ran strong. In the closing
days of October a Boer force assembled at Bethulie Bridge, which
was guarded only by a handful of police. As the days passed
and the alarm grew, the Cape police force was withdrawn from
Burghersdorp, which lies south of Bethulie, down the line to
Stormberg, while, in their turn, the Imperial forces abandoned
the important position of Stormberg, and retired on
Queenstown, thus leaving the district clear for the invaders.
That they did not immediately advance was certainly not owing
to any fear of resistance at Burghersdorp, the inhabitants of
which fraternised with the commando stationed on the river,
continually passing to and fro. Finally, on the 14th November,
the date of the occupation of Colesberg, the advance was made,
and on the following morning a body of 500 Boers occupied the
town. … According to the despatch of the Boer Commandant,
dated 16th November, Burghersdorp was occupied 'amidst cheers
from the Afrikanders,' and 'the Colonial burghers are very
glad to meet us.' Commandeering at once began throughout the
district of Albert, and a Burghersdorp resident estimated that
about 1,000 farmers were prepared to join at the date of his
leaving the place. …

"Within a space of less than three weeks from the occupation
of Colesberg, no less than five great districts—those of
Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East, and
Wodehouse—had gone over without hesitation, and, so to speak,
bodily, to the enemy. Throughout that region the Landdrosts of
the Orange Free State had established their authority, and
everywhere, in the expressive words of a Magistrate, British
loyalists were 'being hunted out of town after town like
sheep.' In the invaded districts, as will be seen from the
above, the method of occupation has always been more or less
the same. The procedure is as follows:-A commando enters, the
Orange Free State flag is hoisted, a meeting is held in the
Court-house or market-place, and a Proclamation is read,
annexing the district. The Commandant then makes a speech, in
which he explains that the people must now obey the Free State
laws generally, though they are at present under martial law.
A local Landdrost is appointed, and loyal subjects are given a
few days or hours in which to quit, or be compelled to serve
against their country. … The number of rebels who have
actually taken up arms and joined the enemy during their
progress throughout the five annexed districts can for the
present only be matter of conjecture. I shall, however, be on
the safe side in reckoning that during November it was a
number not less than the total of the invading commandos, that
is, 2,000, while it is probable that of the invading commandos
themselves a certain proportion were colonists who had crossed
the border before the invasion took place. And the number,
whatever it was, which joined the enemy before and during
November has been increased since. A well-informed refugee
from the Albert district has estimated the total number of
Colonial Boers who have joined the enemy in the invaded
districts south of the Orange River at 3,000 to 4,000. In the
districts north of that river, to which I referred at the
beginning of this despatch, the number can hardly be less.
Adding to these the men who became burghers of the Transvaal
immediately before, or just after, the outbreak of war, with
the view of taking up arms in the struggle, I am forced to the
conclusion that, in round figures, not less than 10,000 of
those now fighting against us in South Africa, and probably
somewhat more, either are, or till quite recently were,
subjects of the Queen."-

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:
Cd. 264, 1900, pages 1-5._

The above relates to movements from the Orange Free State into
Cape Colony, where the most of reinforcement from Afrikander
inhabitants of British soil was to be got. From the Transvaal,
the movement of Boer forces across the frontiers, both
eastward and westward, was equally prompt. Early on the
morning of the 12th they were in Natal, advancing in three
strong columns, under General Joubert, upon Newcastle,
threatening the advance posts of the British at Dundee and
Glencoe (some 40 miles northeast of Ladysmith), where valuable
coal mines claimed defence. At the same time, another Boer
army, under General Cronje, had passed the western border and
was moving upon Mafeking, where Colonel (afterwards General)
Baden-Powell, with an irregular force of about 1,200 men, was
preparing for a siege.
{494}
The inhabitants of the town, including refugees, numbered
about 2,000 whites and 7,000 blacks. A few days later Boer
forces were skirmishing with the defenders of the diamond
mines at Kimberley, where Colonel Kekewich commanded about
1,000 men, and where Cecil Rhodes was among the beleaguered
citizens. The population of Kimberley was 33,000, more than
half blacks. It is plain that the British were wholly
unprepared for so vigorous an opening of hostilities on the
part of the Boers. A military writer in the "London Times,"
discussing the "Lessons of the War," at the end of a year
after its beginning, made the following statements and
comment:—"There was no difficulty in obtaining the fullest
information as to the resources of the Transvaal and the Free
State, and we have been officially informed that 'the armed
strength of the Boers, the number of their guns, with their
character and calibre,' as laid down in the report of the
Director of Intelligence, 'corresponds exactly with our
recently-ascertained knowledge of what the enemy has put into
the field.' Whether or not these reports ever travel from
Queen Anne's gate to Pall-mall seems uncertain, since the
Commander-in-Chief publicly stated that 'We have found that
the enemy … are much more powerful and numerous than we
expected.' The report of the Intelligence Department seems,
therefore, to have been as valueless for practical purposes as
were those transmitted to Paris by Colonel Stoffel prior to
the outbreak of the Franco-German war, and Lord Wolseley was
apparently as little aware of the fighting resources of the
Boers as was Marshal Lebœuf of those of the Germans. When,
early in September, 1899, it became a pressing necessity to
reinforce the troops in South Africa, it was painfully
realized that not a single unit at home was ready to take the
field. One weak battalion and three field batteries, hastily
compounded by wholesale drafting from others, represented the
available contribution from a standing army at home whose
nominal effectives considerably exceeded 100,000. The
reinforcements, totally inadequate to meet the crisis, were
made up by drawing upon India and the colonial garrisons."

_London Times, November 22, 1900._

Another writer in "The Times," reviewing, at nearly the same
time, the previous year of the war, gave this account of its
opening circumstances:—"If the organization of the British
Army had permitted the despatch at short notice of 30,000
troops from Great Britain, the whole course of the war would
have been different. It was a prevailing illusion that Mr.
Kruger would yield to diplomatic pressure not backed by
available force, and political expediency, over-riding
military considerations, led to a compromise. It was tardily
decided to bring the forces in South Africa up to a total of
about 22,000 by drawing on India and the colonial garrisons;
mobilization was deferred till October 7. Thus the first
reinforcements arrived barely in time to prevent Natal from
being over-run by the Boers, and the expeditionary force did
not begin to reach Durban [the port of Natal] till after
Ladysmith had been closely invested. … There were advisers of
the Cabinet who held that the military strength of the Boers
was a bubble easily pricked. Thus it was widely believed that
a severe repulse in Northern Natal would suffice to break up
the Boer forces, and, knowing only that a body of 4,000
British troops was assembled at Dundee and another somewhat
larger at Ladysmith, we hastily assumed that these places were
naturally well suited and had been specially prepared for
defence. When, on the 26th, the concentration at Ladysmith was
accomplished, after a painful and a hazardous march, it was
imagined that our forces occupied an intrenched camp, which,
if necessary, could be held with ease. Later it became clear
that Ladysmith was exceedingly ill-adapted for defence, that
it was practically unfortified when invested, and finally
that, if the attacking force had been composed of trained
troops, it must have fallen, in spite of every effort on the
part of the garrison. The occupation of Dundee, it was
discovered, was maintained against the military judgment of
Sir G. White. …

"When at length the army corps and the cavalry division began,
early in November, to arrive in South Africa, we believed that
the bulk of this large force, which was apparently ready to
take the field, would invade the Orange Free State and strike
for Bloemfontein, clearing Cape Colony and inevitably drawing
Boer forces away from the investments of Kimberley and of
Ladysmith. This was another illusion. At least one-half of the
expeditionary force was despatched to Durban and the rest was
frittered away between three separate lines of advance. There
were thus four separate groupings of British troops, spread
over an immense front, and incapable of affording each other
mutual support. Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief being
involved in a difficult campaign in Natal, there was no
responsible head in Cape Colony, where partial chaos soon
supervened. … Faulty as was the strategy which substituted
scattered efforts with insufficient force for a primary
object, that of the Boers was happily even more ill-conceived.
In place of attempting to occupy our troops in Natal and throwing
their main strength into Cape Colony, where a Dutch rising on
a large scale would inevitably have occurred, they also
preferred to fritter away their strength, devoting their main
efforts against Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and
contenting themselves with the occupation of Colesberg and
Stormberg in small force, which, however, was quickly swelled
by local rebels."

_London Times,
November 5, 1900. _

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1899 (October-December).
The early battles.
British reverses.
Siege of Ladysmith.

The serious fighting of the war began in Natal, as early as
the 20th of October, when three columns of the Boer forces
closed in on the British advance post at Glencoe. The first of
the Boer columns to arrive opened a precipitate attack, and in
the hard battle which ensued (at Talana Hill) the British
could claim the final advantage, though at very heavy cost.
Their commander, General Sir W. Penn Symons, received a mortal
wound and died three days afterwards, kindly cared for and
buried by the enemy, his successor in the command, General
Yule, having found it necessary to retreat from Glencoe and
Dundee to Ladysmith. The Boers were already striking at the
railroad between Glencoe and Ladysmith, and sharp fighting had
taken place on the 21st at Elandslaagte, a station on the line
only seventeen miles from the latter town.
{495}
The Boers, in that encounter, had been driven from the
neighboring hills, but the British had again suffered greatly,
and began to realize the quality of the foe with which they had
to deal. A graphic account of the battle at Elandslaagte was
written by the famous newspaper correspondent, G. W. Steevens,
who died shortly afterwards at Ladysmith. Two days after
Elandslaagte there was another engagement at Reitfontein,
still nearer to Ladysmith, fought for the purpose of keeping
the Boers from intercepting the retreat of General Yule. The
British forces defending Natal were now concentrated at
Ladysmith, which they had chosen for their main position, and
in which they had been collecting large quantities of military
stores. General Sir George White was there in general command.
The Boers, with General Joubert in chief command, were rapidly
closing in upon the town, and, on the 29th, they had a Creusot
(French) six-inch gun on a neighboring hill, within range,
ready to drop shells into its streets. That night General
White made an attempt to break their lines which ended in sore
disaster. One column, which marched far out, to a hill called
Nicholson's Nek, for a flanking attack on the enemy, lost most
of its ammunition and its battery, by a stampede of mules, and
then was caught in so helpless a position that it had to lay down
its arms. "The cursed white flag," wrote Mr. Steevens. "was up
again over a British force in South Africa. The best part of a
thousand British soldiers, with all their arms and equipment
and four mountain guns, were captured by the enemy. The Boers
had their revenge for Dundee and Elandslaagte in war; now they
took it full measure in kindness. As Atkins had tended their
wounded and succoured their prisoners there, so they tended
and succoured him here. One commandant wished to send the
wounded to Pretoria; the others, more prudent as well as more
humane, decided to send them back into Ladysmith. They gave
the whole men the water out of their own bottles; they gave
the wounded the blankets off their own saddles and slept
themselves on the naked veldt. They were short of transport,
and they were mostly armed with Martinis; yet they gave
captured mules for the hospital panniers and captured
Lee-Metfords for splints." It is consoling to come on a bit of
incident like this in the generally horrid story of war.

A few days later the communications of Ladysmith southward
were cut off, and the forces commanded by General White, about
10,000 in number, were hemmed in by superior numbers of the
Boers. British reinforcements were now beginning to arrive in
South Africa, and great numbers were at sea, not only imperial
troops, coming from England, India, Ceylon and elsewhere, but
colonial troops, offered by Canada, New Zealand and the
Australian colonies, and accepted by the imperial government.
The first operations of the British campaign were planned with
three objects, more or less distinct, namely, to rescue
General White's army, at Ladysmith, to relieve Kimberley, and
to expel the Boers from northern Cape Colony. They were
conducted on three lines, from the Natal port of Durban,
towards Ladysmith, under General Clery at the beginning; from
Cape Town towards Kimberley, under General Lord Methuen; from
Port Elizabeth and East London to Queenstown and the Cape
districts occupied by the Boers, under General Gatacre.

In the early battles of General Methuen's campaign, fought at
Belmont, November 23d, at Enslin, or Graspan, on the 25th, and
at Modder River, only 25 miles from Kimberley, on the 28th, he
carried his point, and kept up his advance, but at a heavy
sacrifice of men. The battle with Cronje's forces at Modder
River was a desperate struggle of ten hours duration, in which
the British lost nearly 500 men and gained little. The Boers
withdrew to an equally strong position, behind fortified lines
which extended, some six miles in length, on hills between two
points which bore the names of Spytfontein and Majesfontein.
There General Methuen attacked them again, December 11, and
met with a terrible repulse. His Highland Brigade, advancing
in the darkness, before daybreak, was in the midst of the
enemy's intrenchments before it knew them to be near, and was
horribly cut to pieces, losing 53 officers, including its
commander, General Wauchope, and 650 men. The British fell
back to Modder River, leaving not less than 1,000 men behind.
Just one day before this catastrophe, on the 10th, another of
like nature, but little less serious, was sustained by General
Gatacre's column, moving from Queenstown. He, too, attempted a
night march and an early morning attack on the Boers in a
fortified position at Stormberg, was misled by guides,
miscalculated the distance, neglected to send scouts ahead,
and so took his men to the very muzzles of waiting guns. From
the storm which then opened on them there were more than 500
who did not escape. Besides the dead and wounded, many went as
prisoners to Pretoria. Before the week of these defeats
reached its end, another, far worse, had been added in the
Natal campaign. General Sir Redvers Buller, appointed to the
chief command in South Africa, had arrived at Cape Town on the
last day of October, and, after some general study of the
field at large, had taken personal direction of the operations
in Natal, for the relief of Ladysmith. His movements were
undoubtedly hurried by urgent appeals from General White. On
the 15th of December he felt prepared to attempt the passage
of the Tugela River, near Colenso, and did so with his full
force, at two drifts, or fords, some two miles apart. Like
Methuen and Gatacre, he seems to have been strangely
misinformed as to the location and strength of the
intrenchments of the Boers. The latter had succeeded again and
again in concealing lines of deadly rifle-pits and batteries
until their assailants fairly stumbled against them, within
fatally close range. This happened at Colenso, as at Stormberg
and Majesfontein and the ill-managed attempt to begin an
advance upon Ladysmith cost 165 men and officers killed, 670
wounded, 337 prisoners and missing, besides 11 guns.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900.
Fighting qualities of the Boers.

"Take a community of Dutchmen of the type of those who
defended themselves for fifty years against all the power of
Spain at a time when Spain was the greatest power in the
world. Intermix with them a strain of those inflexible French
Huguenots who gave up home and fortune and left their country
forever at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.
The product must obviously be one of the most rugged, virile,
unconquerable races ever seen upon earth.
{496}
Take this formidable people and train them for seven
generations in constant warfare against savage men and
ferocious beasts, in circumstances under which no weakling
could survive, place them so that they acquire exceptional
skill with weapons and in horsemanship, give them a country
which is eminently suited to the tactics of the huntsman, the
marksman, and the rider. Then, finally, put a finer temper
upon their military qualities by a dour fatalistic Old
Testament religion and an ardent and consuming patriotism.
Combine all these qualities and all these impulses in one
individual, and you have the modern Boer—the most formidable
antagonist who ever crossed the path of Imperial Britain."

_A. C. Doyle,
The Great Boer War,
chapter 1._

Count Adalbert von Sternberg, a German officer who served with
the Boers, and who has since related his experiences in a
book, writes to the same effect. "The Boers," he remarks,
"were mounted, whilst the English were on foot, a matter of
considerable importance in these hot countries. Given the same
or even slightly superior forces, no Continental army would
have played its part better than the English, and I even doubt
whether, in regard to practical equipment and technical smartness
and efficiency the Continent would have done as well. The fact
is the Boer is an enemy of quite exceptional a character, such
as never has been met before, or is likely to be met again.
Mounted sharpshooters, armed with the very best of weapons,
acclimatized, fanatical, and accustomed to habits of war, are
terrible opponents, and cannot be dealt with off hand as if
they were hordes of savages. One must not forget that the
Boers have the keenest eyes imaginable, and that they
understand better than anyone else how to get the fullest
advantage of cover. All these are advantages which go far
towards compensating defective leading and the weakening of
moral due to being always on the defensive. … The Boers would
have had much greater successes if they had not abandoned all
idea of taking the offensive. They could not be brought to
that, for that they lacked courage, and to that lack of
courage they owe their destruction."

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (January-February).
Continued British disasters on the Tugela.
Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener in the field.
Invasion of Orange Free State.
Capture of General Cronje and army.
Relief of Kimberley and Ladysmith.

The dark and heavy clouds of disaster which overhung the
British in South Africa at the close of the year shadowed
England with anxiety and gloom. For the first time, the
seriousness of the task of war in which the country had become
engaged was understood, and energies corresponding to it were
roused. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, of Indian and Afghan
renown, was sent out to take supreme command, with the equally
famous Lord Kitchener, subjugator of the Egyptian Sudan, for
his chief of staff. Immense reinforcements of troops were
provided for with haste. On the 1st of January it was
estimated that 30,000 fresh troops were afloat or on the point
of embarkation, and that Lord Roberts would have 200,000 men
at command when all then assigned to South Africa should have
reached Natal and the Cape. Lord Roberts landed at the Cape on
the 10th of January, and was occupied for a month in
organizing and preparing for new movements in the field.
Meantime, General Buller had made a second attempt to turn the
strongly fortified position of his opponent on the Tugela,
between his own army and the beleaguered force at Ladysmith,
and had failed more discouragingly than before. Crossing the
Tugela, some miles west of Colenso, on the 17th, he pressed a
hard-fought, uphill advance, from one to another of the rocky
hills (called kopjes) of the region, for several days. On the
23d his troops stormed the fortifications of the Boers on
Spion Kop, a spur of the Drakenberg mountains, and carried
them with heavy loss, only to find that they were commanded
from other heights and could not be held. Again he drew back
to the southern bank of the Tugela, on the 29th; but only for
a few days. On the 5th of February his army was once more
pushed beyond the river, and entrenched in a position among
the hills, which it held until the 9th, and was then, for the
third time, withdrawn. This third movement is supposed to
have been a feint, intended to detain the Boer forces in his
front, either from some assault feared at Ladysmith or from
interference with the campaign which Lord Roberts was about to
open. The besieged at Ladysmith were holding out with grim
resolution, but they were known to be in sore straits.
Occasional messages by the heliograph told of much sickness
and fast approaching starvation in the town. Fever was killing
more than the shells from the bombarding guns; and the chances
of relief seemed to have almost disappeared.

But a sudden change in the whole military situation was about
to be made. Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener had organized
arrangements of transportation and supplies for handling the
immense force now at their command, and were ready to execute
their plans. The former arrived at Modder River on the 9th of
February; two days later his columns were set in motion, and
the Boer forces, under General Cronje, were too greatly
outnumbered to withstand the avalanche which fell upon them.
General French led a cavalry expedition to Kimberley, reaching
the town on the 15th and raising the siege. The next day
General Cronje was in retreat towards Bloemfontein, the Free
State capital, harassed by British cavalry, and with the main
army of Lord Roberts straining every nerve to strike him
before he reached it. On the 18th he was brought to bay, at a
point on the Madder River, near Paardeberg, where he defended
himself for nine days, in a situation that was impregnable to
assault, but terribly exposed to artillery fire from
surrounding heights. He was expecting help from the forces in
Natal and elsewhere, and several attempts were made by his
associates to reach him; but the British were too strong to be
driven from their prey. After suffering to such a degree that
his men would endure no more, the brave and stubborn Boer
surrendered on the 27th, his army, reduced to about 4,000,
laying down their arms. Some 500 had been taken in the
previous fighting, and considerable numbers in the last days
of the siege, are said to have deserted and found means to
slip through the enemy's lines. The prisoners were sent, for
convenience of custody, to the island of St. Helena, the
general being accompanied by his whole family, and treated
with much respect.

{497}

While these operations were being carried to success by Lord
Roberts, General Buller was again attacking the formidable
fortifications of the enemy in his front. From the 14th of
February until the 23d he sacrificed great numbers of men in
assaults which failed to break a passage through the kopjes
defended by Boer guns. But Lord Roberts's invasion of the Free
State had, by this time, caused large withdrawals of Boers
from the line of the Tugela, and they were preparing to raise
the siege of Ladysmith. Consequently, when the British attack
was renewed, on the 27th, it achieved success, at last. The
Boers were driven from their main position and abandoned their
whole line. Ladysmith was reached by a swift advance of
cavalry the next day, and the half-starved garrison and
citizens were soon receiving supplies.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (March).
Overtures of peace from Presidents Kruger and Steyn.
The reply of Lord Salisbury.
Death of General Joubert.

On the 5th of March, the Presidents of the South African
Republic and the Orange Free State addressed the following
telegram, jointly, to Lord Salisbury: "The blood and tears of
the thousands who have suffered by this war, and the prospect
of all the moral and economic ruin with which South Africa is
now threatened, make it necessary for both belligerents to ask
themselves dispassionately, and as in the sight of the Triune
God, for what they are fighting, and whether the aim of each
justifies all this devouring misery and devastation. With this
object, and in view of the assertions of various members of
the British Parliament to the effect that this war was begun
and is being carried on with the set purpose of undermining
Her Majesty's authority in South Africa, and of setting up an
Administration over all South Africa independent of Her
Majesty's Government, we consider it our duty solemnly to
declare that this war was undertaken solely as a defensive
measure for securing the threatened independence of the South
African Republic, and is only continued in order to secure the
incontestable independence of both Republics as sovereign
international States, and to ensure that those of Her
Majesty's subjects who have taken part with us in this war
shall suffer no harm whatever in person or property. On these
conditions, but on these conditions alone, are we now, as in
the past, desirous of seeing peace reëstablished in South
Africa, and of putting an end to the evil now reigning over
South Africa; while, if Her Majesty's Government is determined
to destroy the independence of the Republics, there is nothing
left to us and our people but to persevere to the end in the
course already begun, in spite of the overwhelming
pre-eminence of the British Empire, confident that the God who
lighted the unextinguishable fire of the love of freedom in
the hearts of our fathers will not forsake us, but will
accomplish His work in us and in our descendants. We hesitated
to make this declaration earlier to Your Excellency, as we
feared that as long as the advantage was always on our side,
and as long as our forces held defensive positions far in Her
Majesty's Colonies, such a declaration might hurt the feelings
of honour of the British people; but now that the prestige of the
British Empire may be considered to be assured by the capture
of one of our forces by Her Majesty's troops, and that we are
thereby forced to evacuate other positions which our forces
had occupied, that difficulty is over, and we no longer
hesitate clearly to inform your Government and people in the
sight of the whole civilised world why we are fighting, and on
what conditions we are ready to restore peace."

On the 11th Lord Salisbury replied as follows: "I have the
honour to acknowledge Your Honours' telegram, dated the 5th of
March, from Bloemfontein, of which the purport is principally
to demand that Her Majesty's Government shall recognise the
'incontestable independence' of the South African Republic and
Orange Free State 'as sovereign international States,' and to
offer, on those terms, to bring the war to a conclusion. In
the beginning of October last peace existed between Her
Majesty and the two Republics under the Conventions which then
were in existence. A discussion had been proceeding for some
months between Her Majesty's Government and the South African
Republic, of which the object was to obtain redress for
certain very serious grievances under which British residents
in the South African Republic were suffering. In the course of
those negotiations, the South African Republic had, to the
knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, made considerable
armaments, and the latter had, consequently, taken steps to
provide corresponding reinforcements to the British garrisons
of Cape Town and Natal. No infringement of the rights
guaranteed by the Conventions had, up to that point, taken
place on the British side. Suddenly, at two days' notice, the
South African Republic, after issuing an insulting ultimatum,
declared war upon Her Majesty; and the Orange Free State, with
whom there had not even been any discussion, took a similar
step. Her Majesty's dominions were immediately invaded by the
two Republics, siege was laid to three towns within the
British frontier, a large portion of the two Colonies was
overrun, with great destruction to property and life, and the
Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants of extensive
portions of Her Majesty's dominions as if those dominions had
been annexed to one or other of them. In anticipation of these
operations the South African Republic had been accumulating
for many years past military stores on an enormous scale,
which by their character could only have been intended for use
against Great Britain. Your Honours make some observations of a
negative character upon the object with which these
preparations were made. I do not think it necessary to discuss
the questions you have raised. But the result of these
preparations, carried on with great secrecy, has been that the
British Empire has been compelled to confront an invasion
which has entailed upon the Empire a costly war and the loss
of thousands of precious lives. This great calamity has been
the penalty which Great Britain has suffered for having in
recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two Republics.
In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the
position which was given to them, and the calamities which
their unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's
dominions, Her Majesty's Government can only answer Your
Honours' telegram by saying that they are not prepared to
assent to the independence either of the South African
Republic or of the Orange Free State."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:
Africa, Number 2, 1900._

{498}

On the 27th of March, the Boer cause experienced a great loss,
in the sudden death, from peritonitis, of General Joubert, the
Commandant-General and Vice President of the South African
Republic.

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State: A. D. 1900 (March).
Proclamation to the burghers by the British commander.

Soon after entering the Orange Free State, Lord Roberts issued
a proclamation addressed to the burghers, assuring them that
the British government did not believe them to be responsible
for the aggressive act of war committed by the government of
the Orange Free State, and bore them no ill-will. "I,
therefore," his proclamation continued, "warn all Burghers to
desist from any further hostility towards Her Majesty's
Government and the troops under my command, and I undertake
that any of them, who may so desist and who are found staying
in their homes and quietly pursuing their ordinary
occupations, will not be made to suffer in their persons or
property on account of their having taken up arms in obedience
to the order of their Government. Those, however, who oppose
the forces under my command, or furnish the enemy with
supplies or information, will be dealt with according to the
customs of war. Requisitions for food, forage, fuel, or
shelter, made on the authority of the officers in command of
Her Majesty's troops, must be at once complied with; but
everything will be paid for on the spot, prices being
regulated by the local market rates. If the inhabitants of any
district refuse to comply with the demands made on them, the
supplies will be taken by force, a full receipt being given.
Should any inhabitant of the country consider that he or any
member of his household has been unjustly treated by any
officer, soldier or civilian attached to the British Army, he
should submit his complaint, either personally or in writing,
to my Headquarters or to the Headquarters of the nearest
General Officer. Should the complaint on enquiry be
substantiated, redress will be given. Orders have been issued
by me, prohibiting soldiers from entering private houses, or
molesting the civil population on any pretext whatever, and
every precaution has been taken against injury to property on
the part of any person belonging to, or connected with, the
Army."

After the occupation of Bloemfontein, Lord Roberts issued a
second proclamation, announcing that he had received authority
from his government to offer the following terms to those "who
have been engaged in the present war": "All Burghers who have
not taken a prominent part in the policy which has led to the
war between Her Majesty and the Orange Free State, or
commanded any forces of the Republic, or commandeered or used
violence to any British subjects, and who are willing to lay
down their arms at once, and to bind themselves by an oath to
abstain from further participation in the war, will be given
passes to allow them to return to their homes and will not be
made prisoners of war, nor will their property be taken from
them."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:
Cd. 261, 1900, pages 62-63._