Chapter XXIV: Introduction (23)
Mr. TUCKER was sorry the petition had a second reading, as he conceived it contained an unconstitutional request, and from that consideration he wished it thrown aside. He feared the commitment of it would be a very alarming circumstance to the Southern States; for if the object was to engage Congress in an unconstitutional measure, it would be considered as an interference with their rights, the people would become very uneasy under the Government, and lament that they ever put additional powers into their hands. He was surprised to see another memorial on the same subject; and that signed by a man who ought to have known the constitution better. He thought it a mischievous attempt, as it respected the persons in whose favor it was intended. It would buoy them up with hopes, without a foundation, and as they could not reason on the subject, as more enlightened men would, they might be led to do what they would be punished for, and the owners of them, in their own defence, would be compelled to exercise over them a severity they were not accustomed to. Do these men expect a general emancipation of slaves by law? This would never be submitted to by the Southern States without a civil war. Do they mean to purchase their freedom? He believed their money would fall short of the price. But how is it they are more concerned in this business than others? Are they the only persons who possess religion and morality? If the people are not so exemplary, certainly they will admit the clergy are; why, then, do we not find them uniting in a body, praying us to adopt measures for the promotion of religion and piety, or any moral object? They know it would be an improper interference; and to say the best of this memorial, it is an act of imprudence, which he hoped would receive no countenance from the House.
Mr. SENEY denied that there was any thing unconstitutional in the memorial; at least, if there was it had escaped his attention, and he should be obliged to the gentleman to point it out. Its only object was, that Congress should exercise their constitutional authority to abate the horrors of slavery, as far as they could; indeed, he considered that all altercation on the subject of commitment was at an end, as the House had impliedly determined yesterday that it should be committed.
Mr. BURKE saw the disposition of the House, and he feared it would be referred to a committee, maugre all their opposition; but he must insist, that it prayed for an unconstitutional measure; did it not desire Congress to interfere and abolish the slave trade, while the constitution expressly stipulates that Congress shall exercise no such power? He was certain the commitment would sound an alarm, and blow the trumpet of sedition in the Southern States. He was sorry to see the petitioners paid more attention to than the constitution; however, he would do his duty and oppose the business totally; and if it was referred to a committee, as mentioned yesterday, consisting of a member from each State, and he was appointed, he would decline serving.
Mr. SCOTT.--I cannot entertain a doubt but the memorial is strictly agreeable to the constitution; it respects a part of the duty particularly assigned to us by that instrument, and I hope we may be inclined to take it into consideration. We can at present lay our hands upon a small duty of ten dollars; I would take this, and if it is all that we can do, we must be content: but I am sorry that the framers of the constitution did not go further, and enable us to interdict the traffic entirely; for I look upon the slave trade to be one of the most abominable things on earth; and if there was neither God nor devil, I should oppose it upon the principles of humanity, and the law of nature. I cannot, for my part, conceive how any person can be said to acquire a property in another; is it by virtue of conquest? What are the rights of conquest? Some have dared to advance this monstrous principle, that the conqueror is absolute master of his conquest; that he may dispose of it as his property, and treat it as he pleases; but, enough of those who reduce men to the state of transferable goods, or use them like beasts of burthen, who deliver them up as property or patrimony to others. Let us argue on principles countenanced by reason and becoming humanity; the petitioners view the subject in a religious light, but I do not stand in need of religious motives to induce me to reprobate the traffic in human flesh; other considerations weigh with me to support the commitment of the memorial, and to support every constitutional measure likely to bring about its total abolition. Perhaps, in our Legislative capacity, we can go no further than to impose a duty of ten dollars; but I do not know how far I might go, if I was one of the Judges of the United States, and those people were to come before me and claim their emancipation; but I am sure I would go as far as I could.
Mr. JACKSON differed with the gentleman last up, and supposed the master had a qualified property in his slave. He said the contrary doctrine would go to the destruction of every species of personal service. The gentleman said, he did not stand in need of religion to induce him to reprobate slavery, but if he is guided by that evidence upon which the Christian system is founded, he will find that religion is not against it. He will see, from Genesis to Revelations, the current setting strong that way. There never was a Government on the face of the earth, but what permitted slavery. The purest sons of freedom in the Grecian Republics, the citizens of Athens and Lacedæmon, all held slaves. On this principle the nations of Europe are associated; it is the basis of the feudal system. But suppose all this to have been wrong, let me ask the gentleman if it is good policy to bring forward a business at this moment, likely to light up the flame of civil discord; for the people of the Southern States will resist one tyranny as soon as another? The other parts of the continent may bear them down by force of arms, but they will never suffer themselves to be divested of their property without a struggle. The gentleman says, if he was a Federal Judge, he does not know to what length he would go in emancipating these people; but I believe his judgment would be of short duration in Georgia, perhaps even the existence of such a judge might be in danger.
Mr. SHERMAN could see no difficulty in committing the memorial; because it was probable the committee would understand their business, and perhaps they might bring in such a report as would be satisfactory to gentlemen on both sides of the House.
Mr. BALDWIN was sorry the subject had ever been brought before Congress, because it was of a delicate nature as it respected some of the States. Gentlemen who had been present at the formation of this constitution could not avoid the recollection of the pain and difficulty which the subject caused in that body. The members from the Southern States were so tender upon this point, that they had well-nigh broken up without coming to any determination; however, from the extreme desire of preserving the Union, and obtaining an efficient Government, they were induced mutually to concede, and the constitution jealously guarded what they agreed to. If gentlemen look over the footsteps of that body, they will find the greatest degree of caution used to imprint them, so as not to be easily eradicated; but the moment we go to jostle on that ground, I fear we shall feel it tremble under our feet. Congress have no power to interfere with the importation of slaves beyond what is given in the ninth section of the first article of the constitution; every thing else is interdicted to them in the strongest terms. If we examine the constitution, we shall find the expressions relative to this subject cautiously expressed, and more punctiliously guarded than any other part, "The migration or importation of such persons shall not be prohibited by Congress." But lest this should not have secured the object sufficiently, it is declared, in the same section, "That no capitation or direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census;" this was intended to prevent Congress from laying any special tax upon negro slaves, as they might, in this way, so burthen the possessors of them as to induce a general emancipation. If we go on to the fifth article, we shall find the first and fifth clauses of the ninth section of the first article restrained from being altered before the year 1808.
Gentlemen have said that this petition does not pray for an abolition of the slave trade. I think, sir, it prays for nothing else; and therefore we have no more to do with it than if it prayed us to establish an order of nobility, or a national religion.
Mr. SYLVESTER said, that he had always been in the habit of respecting the Society called Quakers; he respected them for their exertions in the cause of humanity; but he thought the present was not a time to enter into a consideration of the subject, especially as he conceived it to be a business within the province of the State Legislatures.
Mr. LAWRENCE observed, that the subject would undoubtedly come under the consideration of the House; and he thought, as it was now before them, that the present time was as proper as any; he was therefore for committing the memorial, and when the prayer of it had been properly examined, they could see how far Congress may, constitutionally, interfere: as they knew the limits of their power on this, as well as every other occasion, there was no just apprehension to be entertained that they would go beyond it.
Mr. SMITH (of South Carolina) insisted that it was not in the power of the House to grant the prayer of the petition, which went to the total abolishment of the slave trade, and it was therefore unnecessary to commit it. He observed, that in the Southern States difficulties had arisen on adopting the constitution, inasmuch as it was apprehended that Congress might take measures under it for abolishing the slave trade.
Perhaps the petitioners, when they applied to this House, did not think their object unconstitutional, but now they are told that it is, they will be satisfied with the answer, and press it no further. If their object had been for Congress to lay a duty of ten dollars per head on the importation of slaves, they would have said so, but that does not appear to have been the case. The commitment of the petition, on that ground, cannot be contended. If they will not be content with that, shall it be committed to investigate facts? The petition speaks of none. For what purpose, then, shall it be committed? If gentlemen can assign no good reason for the measure, they will not support it when they are told that it will create jealousies and alarm in the Southern States; for I can assure them that there is no point on which they are more jealous and suspicious, than on a business with which they think the Government has nothing to do.
When we entered into this confederacy, we did it from political, not from moral motives, and I do not think my constituents want to learn morals from the petitioners; I do not believe they want improvements in their moral system; if they do, they can get it at home.
The gentleman from Georgia has justly stated the jealousy of the Southern States. On entering into this Government, they apprehend that the other States, not knowing the necessity the citizens of the Southern States were under to hold this species of property, would, from motives of humanity and benevolence, be led to vote for a general emancipation; and had they not seen that the constitution provided against the effect of such a disposition, I may be bold to say they never would have adopted it. And, notwithstanding all the calmness with which some gentlemen have viewed the subject, they will find that this discussion alone will create great alarm. We have been told, that if this would be the case, we ought to have avoided it, by saying nothing; but it was not for that purpose that we were sent here. We look upon this measure as an attack upon the palladium of the property of our country; it is therefore our duty to oppose it by every means in our power. Gentlemen should consider, that when we entered into a political connection with the other States, that this property was there; it was acquired under a former Government, conformably to the laws and constitution, therefore any thing that will tend to deprive them of that property, must be an _ex post facto_ law, and, as such, is forbidden by our political compact.
I said the States would never have entered into the Confederation, unless their property had been guarantied to them, for such is the state of agriculture in that country, that without slaves it must be abandoned. Why will these people, then, make use of arguments to induce the slave to turn his hand against his master? We labor under difficulties enough from the ravages of the late war. A gentleman can hardly come from that country with a servant or two, either to this place or Philadelphia, but there are persons trying to seduce his servants to leave him; and, when they have done this, the poor wretches are obliged to rob their master, in order to obtain a subsistence; all those, therefore, who are concerned in this seduction, are accessories to the robbery.
The reproaches which they cast upon the owners of negro property, is charging them with the want of humanity. I believe the proprietors have as much humanity as persons in any part of the continent, and are as conspicuous for their good morals as their neighbors. It was said yesterday that the Quakers are a society known to the laws and the constitution, but they are no more so than other religious societies; they stand exactly in the same situation; their memorial, therefore, relates to a matter in which they are no more interested than any other sect, and can only be considered as a piece of advice, which it is not customary to refer to a committee; but if it is supposed to pray for what they think a moral purpose, is that sufficient to induce us to commit it? What may appear a moral virtue in their eyes, may not be so in reality. I have heard of a sect of Shaking Quakers, who, I presume, suppose their tenets of a moral tendency. I am informed one of them forbids to intermarry, yet you may see them with a numerous offspring about them. Now, if these people were to petition Congress to pass a law prohibiting matrimony, would gentlemen agree to refer such a petition? I think if they would reject one of that nature, as improper, they ought also to reject this.
Mr. PAGE was in favor of the commitment. He hoped that the designs of the respectable memoralists would not be stopped at the threshold, in order to preclude a fair discussion of the prayer of the memorial. He observed, that gentlemen had founded their arguments upon a misrepresentation; for the object of the memorial is not declared to be the total abolition of the slave trade, but that Congress will consider whether it be not in reality within their power to exercise justice and mercy, which, if adhered to, they cannot doubt must produce the abolition of the slave trade. If, then, the prayer contained nothing unconstitutional, he trusted the meritorious effort of the petitioners would not be frustrated.
With respect to the alarm that was apprehended, he conjectured there was none; but there might be just cause if the memorial was not taken into consideration. He placed himself in the case of a slave, and said, that, on hearing that Congress had refused to listen to the decent suggestions of a respectable part of the community, he should infer that the General Government (from which was expected great good would result to every class of citizens) had shut their ears against the voice of humanity, and he should despair of any alleviation of the miseries he and his posterity had in prospect; if any thing could induce him to rebel, it must be a stroke like this, impressing on his mind all the horrors of despair. But if he was told that application was made in his behalf, and that Congress was willing to hear what could be urged in favor of discouraging the practice of importing his fellow-wretches, he would trust in their justice and humanity, and wait the decision patiently. He presumed that these unfortunate people would reason in the same way, and he, therefore, conceived the most likely way to prevent danger was to commit the petition. He lived in a State which had the misfortune of having in her bosom a great number of slaves; he held many of them himself, and was as much interested in the business, as any gentleman in South Carolina or Georgia, yet if he was determined to hold them in eternal bondage, he should feel no uneasiness or alarm on account of the present measure, because he should rely upon the virtue of Congress that they would not exercise any unconstitutional authority.
Mr. MADISON.--The debate has taken a serious turn, and it will be owing to this alone if an alarm is created; for, had the memorial been treated in the usual way, it would have been considered as a matter of course, and a report might have been made so as to have given general satisfaction. If there was the slightest tendency by the commitment to break in upon the constitution, he would object to it; but he did not see upon what ground such an event was to be apprehended. The petition prayed, in general terms, for the interference of Congress, so far as they were constitutionally authorized: but even if its prayer was, in some degree, unconstitutional, it might be committed, as was the case on Mr. Churchman's petition, one part of which was supposed to apply for an unconstitutional interference by the General Government. He admitted, that Congress is restricted by the constitution from taking measures to abolish the slave trade; yet there are a variety of ways by which it could countenance the abolition, and regulations might be made in relation to the introduction of them into the new States to be formed out of the Western Territory. He thought the object well worthy of consideration.
Mr. GERRY thought the interference of Congress fully compatible with the constitution, and could not help lamenting the miseries to which the natives of Africa were exposed by this inhuman commerce. He never contemplated the subject, without reflecting what his own feelings would be, in case himself, his children, or friends were placed in the same deplorable circumstances. He then adverted to the flagrant acts of cruelty which are committed in carrying on that traffic; and asked, whether it can be supposed that Congress has no power to prevent such abuses? He then referred to the constitution, and pointed out the restrictions laid on the General Government respecting the importation of slaves. It was not, he presumed, in the contemplation of any gentleman in this House to violate that part of the constitution; but that we have a right to regulate this business, is as clear as that we have any rights whatever; nor has the contrary been shown by any person who has spoken on the occasion. Congress can, agreeably to the constitution, lay a duty of ten dollars on imported slaves; they may do this immediately. He made a calculation of the value of the slaves in the Southern States, and supposed they may be worth ten millions of dollars. Congress have a right, if they see proper, to make a proposal to the Southern States to purchase the whole of them, and their resources in the Western Territory might furnish them with the means. He did not intend to suggest a measure of this kind; he only instanced these particulars to show that Congress certainly has a right to intermeddle in the business. He thought that no objection had been offered of any force to prevent the commitment of the memorial.
Mr. BOUDINOT had carefully examined the petition and found nothing like what was complained of by gentlemen contained in it; he, therefore, hoped they would withdraw their opposition and suffer it to be committed.
Mr. SMITH (of South Carolina) said, that as the petitioners had particularly prayed Congress to take measures for the annihilation of the slave trade; and as that was admitted, on all hands, to be beyond their power, and as the petitioners would not be gratified by a tax of ten dollars per head, which was all that was within their power, there was, of consequence, no occasion for committing it.
The question on the commitment being about to be put, the yeas and nays were called for, and were as follows:
YEAS.--Messrs. Ames, Benson, Boudinot, Brown, Cadwalader,
Clymer, Fitzsimons, Floyd, Foster, Gale, Gerry, Gilman,
Goodhue, Griffin, Grout, Hartley, Hathorn, Heister,
Huntington, Lawrence, Lee, Leonard, Livermore, Madison,
Moore, Muhlenberg, Page, Parker, Partridge, Rensselaer,
Schureman, Scott, Sedgwick, Seney, Sherman, Sinnickson,
Smith, (of Maryland,) Sturges, Thatcher, Trumbull,
Wadsworth, White, and Wynkoop--43.
NAYS.--Messrs. Baldwin, Bland, Burke, Coles, Huger,
Jackson, Matthews, Sylvester, Smith, (of South Carolina,)
Stone, and Tucker--14.
The memorials were referred accordingly.
MONDAY, February 15.
_Public Credit._
The House went again into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. BALDWIN in the chair.
Mr. MADISON's motion for a discrimination being under consideration,
Mr. SEDGWICK.--The proposition, Mr. Chairman, contains a question of the utmost importance. And the committee must be obliged to the gentleman who brought it forward for his very ingenious discussion of the subject of the domestic debt. With respect to the question now before the committee, so much has been said, that I think it will not be necessary to consume much of their time in the investigation. On the subject of contracts I have to observe, that whenever a voluntary engagement is made for a valuable consideration for property advanced or services rendered, and the terms of the contract are understood, if no fraud or imposition is practised, the party engaging is bound to the performance, according to the literal meaning of the words in which it is expressed. Such contract, whether of a Government or an individual, may be either transferable or not transferable. The latter species of contract receives an additional value from its capacity of being transferred, if the circumstances of the possessor should render a sale of it necessary or convenient to him. To render the transferable quality of such evidences of contract in any degree advantageous to the possessor, it is necessary to consider, in case of sale, the alienee possessed of all the property of the original holder; and indeed it is highly absurd, and even contradictory, to say, that such evidences of debt are transferable, and at the same time to say that there is in them a kind of property that the holder could not convey by _bona fide_ contract.
This is the construction which has invariably been given to these contracts, whether formed by Government or by individuals. To deprive the citizen of the power of binding himself by his own voluntary contract, or to prevent a disposition of property in its nature alienable, would be a violent and unjustifiable invasion of one of those rights of which man, as a citizen, is the most tenacious, and would indeed break one of the strongest bonds by which society is holden together.
In the transfers which have been made, the contracts were fairly made; the whole rights have been transferred. It is not pretended any fraud or imposition has been practised. The risk was calculated by the parties, and it was observed, that the risk contemplated a revolution in the Government.
From the foregoing deduction of particulars, it is presumed to be proved that a property is vested in the transferees. That if this property is divested by the Government, the law for that purpose would have a retrospective operation, and that no _ex post facto_ law could be more alarming than that by which the right of private property is violently invaded.
Having considered the nature of the contract, and of the obligations which result from it, I beg leave to call the attention of the committee to those circumstances by which that obligation may be destroyed, impaired, or suspended. They are stated to be, 1. Performance. 2. Voluntary discharge. 3. Composition. 4. Inability.
And gentlemen are called upon to give information of any other causes which can produce either of those effects.
With regard, more particularly, to the proposition before the committee, I have, to observe, that with regard to these contracts, there has existed a depreciation in consequence of the failure of Government regularly to pay the interest. That in this depreciated state, the securities have been alienated; that of course the original holders have sustained a loss; that if the loss resulted from the fault, and not the misfortune of Government, the creditors have, undeniably, a demand against the Government for compensation; that this demand, however well founded, can never authorize the Government to invade the honestly acquired property of the present possessors, a property warranted by the terms of the contract itself, and sanctioned by the act of Congress, of April, 1783, and the validity of it recognized by the constitution we have sworn to support.
With regard to the claims of the original holders, it is, however, observable, that the domestic creditor, at the time the contract was formed, well knew the nature of the constitution of the Government administered by Congress, the other contracting party; that its power of performance depended on the ability and good-will of the States; that Congress had always performed its duty, had made the necessary requisitions; that this was its utmost power; and that the failure had arisen wholly from the neglect of the States. I therefore submit it to the committee, whether, if the original holder has a just or equitable demand, he should not resort to the State of which he is a member?
I admit, that the case of an original holder is indeed a hard one; that I have a respect for his misfortunes and for his pretensions; that if satisfaction is discovered to be just and practicable, I would not hesitate to go to the utmost ability of the Government for that purpose. But let me ask, what merit will the Government possess, if it strip one class of citizens, who have acquired property by the known and established rules of law, under the specious pretence of doing justice to another class of citizens?
It was implicitly agreed, that eighty per cent. depreciation would not authorize the interference proposed by the motion. I ask, then, for some point of depreciation to be pointed out, which will authorize such interference.
The question for which I contend has received the universal approbation of mankind; there are no instances of the interference contended for, and this general sense of mankind affords me some evidence of truth.
This contract was founded on a valuable consideration. It was the price of our liberty and independence. The possessor claimed, according to the very terms of the contract, though it is not pretended that the engagements of Government have been performed. No composition with the creditors is proposed; nor is the proposition founded on any pretended inability of the Government; for to comply with the intention of it, 1,600,000 dollars, annually, more than is proposed by the report of the Secretary, would be required.
By reason of the circumstances which have taken place, the honorable gentleman (Mr. MADISON) supposes, that, if the whole amount of a security shall be paid to the present possessor, he will have a sum of money to which the original holder is equitably entitled. If this is true, then, no interposition is necessary, it being a well-known rule of law, that an action will always lie to recover money out of the hands of another, to which the plaintiff, from the principles of equity and good conscience, is entitled.
With regard to the effects, which will probably result from this measure, I have to observe, that they will be destructive to our national character. That the world is now willing, charitably, to impute our former miscarriages to events we could not control; but should our first measures, in regard to public faith, be a violent infraction of our contracts, it will sanction all our bitterest enemies have said, to our disadvantage. With regard to its effects on credit, little dependence will be placed on the plighted faith of a Government which, under the pretence of doing equity, has exercised a power of dispensing with its contracts, and has thereby formed for itself a precedent of future violations, both with respect to its funds and contracts. With regard to discovering who was the original holder, except so far as respects the army debt, I am certain there are no documents by which the necessary facts can be discovered.
I presume it is a fact, with regard to much the greater part of the debt, that any fictitious name was inserted. And with regard to the army debt, the soldiers, generally, who were in the service at the conclusion of the war, had received ample satisfaction for their services, at the time of their enlistment, having been paid more, on an average, than two hundred and fifty dollars per man.
I have only to add, that the proposed system will lay a foundation for infinite frauds and perjuries, and that it will, beyond all powers of calculation, multiply the evils of speculation.
Mr. LAWRENCE observed, that the proposition of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MADISON) derived force from the talents and knowledge of that gentleman in public transactions; but that, on examination, it would be found to contain doctrines very repugnant to the interest and prosperity of the Union.
He then stated, that the debts contracted by the United States were for loans of money, supplies of articles necessary for the public wants, and for actual services rendered in different employments. That these debts were ultimately adjusted and reduced to their present transferable form. That every part of the contract was essential to it. The negotiability was a material part. That the nature of the contract was frequently recognized by the late Government. That, in 1783, Congress recommended certain funds to be established to pay the interest, and put the principal in a course of discharge. That this recommendation was unequivocal, as to the nature of it, and made no discrimination between the possessor and original holder. That the subsequent conduct of that body was conformable to this recommendation. That they had annually called on the States to furnish money to pay the interest, without discriminating between the original holder and present possessor. That they had paid interest on the securities, without making any discrimination. That provision had been made for holders of loan-office certificates that were subject to liquidation, to have them cancelled, and others issued for the specie value. That the holders of certificates were enabled to have them registered, to guard against accidents; and that no distinction was made between the original holder and the alienee. That the transferable nature of the claim was for the benefit of the creditor, because it gave it an active value. That he consented to take it, and consulted his own advantage. That the conduct of the late Congress, since the war, had been uniform in the support of this contract, and they had done no act to impair its obligation, according to the terms of it. That this contract was valid against the Government; for, notwithstanding the truth of the gentleman's observations, that the nation is the same, though the bodies that administered the Government were different, there was yet far greater security; and to remove all doubt, a clause that made all debts and engagements valid against the United States, under the late General Government, valid against the present, was inserted in the constitution.
He further observed, that this contract having descended upon the Government, there was no right in the Legislature to impair the force of it. That the particular Governments are restrained from passing laws impairing the obligations of contracts. That this interference would be a violation of the contract, between the individuals, when the certificate was transferred; and it would not be presumed, the States being prohibited, that the General Government had the power to do it.
He then adverted to the principles of the gentleman, to wrest the obligation of the public to the original holder; and observed, that the same principles were in favor of the present possessor. That public justice required a performance of contracts, when there was no fraud on the part of the holder. That the possessor had been guilty of no fraud, no deception. That the contract between him and the original holder was fair, and that a hazard and risk attended the purchase adequate to the advantage. That nothing short of a revolution in Government could have produced payment. That if there was an imposition, the public occasioned it; and between the original holder and the public, there might be a claim for retribution. That public faith was as sacredly pledged to the bearer, or present possessor, as to the original creditor. That public credit results from fair and upright conduct; that the Government, to support it, must perform its contract. That this was a contract recognized by them, and as such should be discharged. That the condition we have been in made it proper for us to be cautious on this subject; and even at present, people doubted our disposition to establish our credit. That this would give a fatal blow to it, and when we should recover, if ever, was doubtful. That the public opinion was difficult to be ascertained; gentlemen had different modes to determine it. He supposed it was better ascertained by the acts of public bodies than by squibs in the newspapers, or by pamphlets written by individuals. That the uniform conduct of men, deputed by the particular States to represent them, in the late General Government, was the best standard; and their opinion, from the year 1783, was in favor of the present possessor. That the conduct of the particular States was another circumstance; that he did not know of any discrimination made by them, though it had been attempted. That the general opinion of men of property was in favor of it; and that these sources of public opinion were more certain than those he had before mentioned.
He further observed, that although he believed gentlemen supposed no advantage would be derived to the United States from this discrimination, yet much would arise. That part of the army was composed of foreigners, many had left the country, others were dead; all their part would be unclaimed. That certificates were issued to public officers to a great amount, and were paid by them to persons from whom they purchased. The difficulty of making proof of the original creditor would be great; and, from this circumstance, great sums would be gained to the public. That there were persons enough who would have sagacity to discern this; and they would doubt the purity of the public motive, should the gentleman's plan be adopted.
He then adverted to the circumstance of the new creditor receiving paper. That this paper might be subject to another liquidation on the same principle as the present. That it would introduce doubt and distrust of public engagements; and there would be no greater security, although a fund was pledged, than there is at present, for whenever the public pleased, they might destroy the obligation. Arguments were improperly addressed to their feelings; but that however hard it may be for the original creditor, who had parted with his certificates, to contribute to pay the debt, yet it would be equally hard on him who had been injured by Continental money, who had been plundered by the enemy, who had had his property burned by them in the course of the war; and that instances of these kinds were numerous.
He then adverted to the doctrine of the Court of Equity; and urged that this court must be governed by principle. That were the committee this high court, and the United States the original creditor, and the present possessor before them; and if there appeared no fraud on the part of the possessor, the original creditor would have no just claim on him. That between the United States and original creditors, the United States were in fault, and the claim, if good, would be against them.
Mr. SMITH (of S. C.) remarked, that it was necessary and proper the House should give the subject the most ample discussion. The question had long agitated the public mind, and the people should know that it had occupied the serious attention of their Representatives, and be made acquainted with the principles of their decision. For his part, having bestowed on it the most attentive consideration, he could assert, that the more he contemplated it, the more he was impressed with a conviction, that the proposition was unjust, impolitic, and impracticable. It consisted of two parts: The one was to take away the property of one person; the other was to give that property to another; and this by a voluntary interposition of the House, by a mere act of power, without the assent of the former, or without even the application of the latter. For it was remarkable, that the original holders, who had alienated their certificates, had not come forward with this demand; and it is presumable, that, had they applied for redress, they would reject any indemnification which was the result of such manifest injustice. To prove that this was taking away the property of a citizen by force, he observed, that the purchaser had, by a fair purchase, acquired a right to the full amount of the sum expressed in the certificate, which it was not within the power of the House to divest him of. No tribunal on earth could lawfully deprive a man of his property fairly obtained. The purchaser bought under the act of Congress, making the securities transferable; and having given the market price, without fraud or imposition, he was, by virtue of such purchase, vested with the complete and absolute ownership of the certificate, as fully as the original holder; and had as much right to demand full payment as the original holder would have had, had the security been still in his hands. Even should the House refuse, by an act of power, to pay him more than half his demand, the other half would still remain against the public; it could not be extinguished. The debt would continue to haunt them; the creditors would loudly clamor for justice, and sooner or later the balance would be paid. Then would they incur all the odium of a violation of private rights, without deriving to the public any advantage whatever. He considered the measure as doing a certain evil, that a possible good might result from it. This was not, in his opinion, the proper mode of doing good. Justice cannot be founded on injustice; and to take money out of the pocket of one man, to put it into that of another, is a precedent which may justify future interferences. This step would lead the House to others: for, if the principle be a just one, then the Government should look into all the transactions and speculations of individuals, in order to correct them, and make retribution to every individual according to his losses. He was persuaded, that the true policy of a Legislative body was, to pursue the broad road of justice, clearly marked out before them; for it was an undeniable truth, that whenever they deviated into by-roads and trackless paths, without any other guide than their own imagination, they would get bewildered in a labyrinth of difficulties, and rejoice to trace back their steps, and regain the plain road. Now, the plain line of conduct is, to do strict justice, such as is enforced in judicial tribunals, between man and man, in a similar case. The debtor is bound to pay the debt to the holder of the security; the contract, between the giver of the bond and the person to whom it was given, is done away the moment the latter assigns it to another person. If A gives a bond to B, who parts with it to C, there is no longer any obligation on the part of A to pay B, but he must pay it to C. A has nothing to do with the private negotiations between B and C, nor to inquire what consideration was given for the security. All that he has to inquire is, whether he really signed it and had value received for it, and the amount of it. He cannot say to the holder, you gave but fifty dollars for this security of one hundred dollars, and I will pay you only fifty; for the law will compel him to pay the hundred. This is a point of justice between man and man. Is there another point of law and justice for the Government? By what rule is the Government to square its conduct, if not by those sacred rules which form the basis of civil society, and are the safeguard of private property?
The gentleman from Virginia has said, that giving the present holders, by alienation, the highest market price, would be doing them ample justice; but did the public mean to refund them the money they had actually advanced? No; they were to receive this ample justice by a bit of paper, nominally for ten shillings; but which this very measure would instantly depreciate to eight, or six shillings. They would have this consolation, that, according to the gentleman's reasoning, they would still have a claim against the Government for the balance. For, if the original holder, by selling his certificate for four shillings, has now a just claim against the Government for the balance of sixteen shillings, which it is asserted he has, of course the alienee, to whom the public should now acknowledge a debt of ten shillings, which he would sell for only six, would hereafter have a just demand against the public for four shillings. The reasoning might be carried further, for it would follow, that whenever the public shall pay in paper which shall depreciate, the seller will have a demand against the Government for the difference.
The constitution itself, he said, was opposed to the measure, for it was an _ex post facto_ law, which was prohibited in express terms. The transfer of public securities was lawful at the time these alienations were made; an attempt, therefore, to punish the transferees is an attempt to make an _ex post facto_ law, by making that now unlawful which was lawful at the time it was done. It alters the nature of the transaction, and annexes the idea of guilt to that which at the moment of commission, was not only perfectly innocent, but was explicitly authorized and encouraged by a public act of Congress. By that act those who had money were invited to purchase of those who held securities, and now we are called upon to punish the purchasers who bought under that invitation. The constitution restrains the States from passing any laws impairing the force of contracts; _a fortiori_ is the Legislature of the Union restrained. What an example to hold up to the Judiciary of the United States! How could they annul a State law, when the State would be able to plead a precedent on the part of Congress? The right of property is a sacred right; no tribunal on earth can deprive a citizen of his property, unless for a fair equivalent, for the public welfare. The purchaser is vested, by the sale, with an absolute right, to the full amount of the security, and it is beyond their authority to divest him of it. They might, indeed, by an act of power, declare that he should be paid only half; but his right to the other moiety would not be extinguished. It had been said, that the original holder still had a claim against the public, because he had received only two shillings and sixpence for services worth twenty shillings. On the same principle, and with more justice, the present holder would still have a claim for ten shillings, because he has the public bond for twenty shillings. No ingenuity can overcome these stubborn principles of law and justice; they are immutable, and must ultimately prevail. The House had been told that if the Government had defrauded the original holders out of their dues, it was fit the public should rectify the fraud. The former Government was not deficient in inclination to do them ample justice; but, from the imbecility of the Confederation, had not the means. In those days of democratic enthusiasm, the people were afraid of an energetic Government: having so recently experienced the severity of the former one, the citizens of these States were cautious in trusting any Government with power; and it is not improbable that some of the original holders, who suffered their embarrassments, from the want of a Government competent to the payment of its debts, would themselves have opposed vesting Congress with powers adequate to this object. Even the present constitution, which is a mild one, met with considerable opposition: had it been rejected, the public securities would have never been paid.
Mr. AMES agreed with the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MADISON) in regard to the validity of the debt. There was propriety in saying the nation is the same, though the Government be changed. The debt is the price of our liberties, and cannot be diminished a farthing, the gentleman from Virginia says; and why? Because the Government, as one of the contracting parties, cannot annul, or vary the bargain without the consent of the other. If the measure proposed by that gentleman corresponds with that sound principle, he should have the pleasure of agreeing with him on the ultimate decision; but if the measure should be found, on a fair discussion, to be subversive of that principle, it would not merit the countenance of the committee.
A claim upon our justice is made, on behalf of the original holders of securities, who have transferred them. Does the plighted faith of the country stand charged to pay the difference between the price their securities sold for in the market and their nominal sum? In order to make the affirmative appear, the worthy gentleman has said, that the paper is the only evidence of a prior contract; and while the paper was sold, the residuary right to the debt still remained in the seller. Supposing this novel doctrine to be true, which cannot be conceded, it will not warrant any conclusion in prejudice of any purchaser of the Loan-office debt; for the paper was given when the loan was made; as no prior debt existed, the paper is the very debt. The gentleman ought, therefore, to confine his motion to the army debt, as his principle seems inapplicable to any other. And even on liquidating the army debt, the certificate extinguished the prior debt; otherwise the public would be twice charged. As, when one man owes another an account, and gives his bond for the balance, the account is no longer of force. By the terms of the certificate, the person transferring has lost his claim against the public. He has freely transferred; for if violence or fraud were practised, the law will afford him redress. In society, as well as in a state of nature, property is changed by the consent of the last occupant. He may dispose of it by gift or at half price, and give a complete title. Nor will the pretence that this transfer was free only in appearance, avail; for the motives which disposed the owner to sell cannot affect the right of the purchaser. Every such creditor risked something; either that the Government would not pay him at all, or not in due season. The risk, computed in free and open market, will be nearly right. It is a kind of insurance against these risks, and the insurers and insured will calculate the rate of insurance better than Government can do it. If there is a new risk of Government interposing, it seems that the purchaser, who may be called the insurer, did not rate his risk high enough. It seems pretty clear, therefore, that there is no claim on the stipulated justice of the country.
The committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again.
TUESDAY, February 16.
_Public Credit._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. BALDWIN in the chair.
Mr. MADISON's proposition still under consideration.
Mr. JACKSON observed, that although as young a politician as any on the floor, and convinced that the weight of experience was against him, on so important a national subject, he could not be silent; particularly as he had the honor of seconding the gentleman's motion (Mr. MADISON) now before the House, that it would be therefore expected that he should bring forward his reasons, and the principle which actuated him to it. He confessed, that had he not before leaned to the side of a discrimination, the arguments of that able gentleman would have induced him to support the plan he had brought forward. He was induced on another motive to rise, to show that the numerous arguments of the gentlemen in opposition, yesterday, had not convinced him of the impracticability or injustice of the composition.
The House were told much of the moral obligations we were under of paying our debts, and the impolicy and injustice of interfering with private contracts. The obligation, he believed, was nowhere denied; the debt was of the highest nature; it was the price of our independence: the only difficulty is, how that debt shall be discharged. He would here observe, that the justice of the plan before the House, had not been so fully objected to, as the impracticability, although it had been asserted to be unjust, by some of the gentlemen who had spoken.
He would consider the justice of the proposition. The House had been told the nature of those contracts, and the valuable considerations of them. The contract, as it struck him, fell under the legal terms of _do, ut des_; I give that thou mayest give--or, I give that I may receive. In all contracts there are three requisites: 1st. The agreement. 2d. The consideration. 3d. The thing to be done or omitted. This consideration is to be an equivalent, or full recompense for the thing to be performed. Let us examine what is the thing to be done, and what the consideration is. The creditor, who was to perform the third article of the contract, held twenty shillings, which was to be given for a valuable consideration. What was this consideration? Two shillings and sixpence. He argued, that if this twenty shillings was worth no more than two shillings and sixpence, the contract was fair and substantial; but, if gentlemen carried the idea further, and declared this twenty shillings was money of equal value with the two shillings and sixpence given, he contended that the contract was destroyed. Equity would relieve, would declare it an unrighteous bargain, that there was not an adequate compensation, and would set aside the contract.
This public opinion is in favor of the original creditor; it is impossible to be otherwise. The people of America are a grateful people, and they cannot, with indifference, view the earnings of those who established their independence, converted into the coffers of the wealthy and ambitious. The speculator, he contended, was already more than satisfied, if it was only on the principle of interest which had accrued for six, seven, and eight years past, and which they had speculated on since.
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Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 1 (of 16)Chapter XXIV: Introduction (23)
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