Chapter XXXIII: Introduction (32)

Mr. B. said, he should now conclude what he had to say, had not an honorable gentleman (Mr. JACKSON) brought forward the observations of the author of the _Federalist_, vol. 2, p. 72, 73, 74, to show a different contemporaneous exposition of the constitution, and charged the author, who he alleged was said to be also the author of the present plan before the House, with a change of sentiment. As this gentleman is not here to speak for himself, he ought to have the next best chance by having what he then wrote candidly attended to, especially as gentlemen allow him to be a good authority. Mr. B. read only part of the 73d page referred to by Mr. JACKSON, in these words: "Had the Convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the constitution relates; accommodated, too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the particular powers which are the means of attaining the general power must always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same." How these sentiments can be said to be a different contemporaneous exposition must be left to the House to determine.

Mr. B. then begged the indulgence of the House to hear the same gentlemen when arguing expressly on that part of the constitution now under consideration; and then read pp. 144, 145, and 146, of the 1st vol. of the _Federalist_, which are too long to be inserted. He declared that, in his opinion, it was impracticable to put together language in the same length that could more forcibly and pointedly elucidate and prove the construction contended for in support of the bill on the table. There remained yet but two objections, to answer which Mr. B. would detain the House a little longer.

The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. JACKSON) had charged the measure with establishing the commercial interests, to the great injury of the agricultural. If this was true he never would agree to it, for he considered the agricultural interests of America as its great and sure dependence. Mr. B. confessed that so far from seeing these measures in this point of light, he could not bring his mind to comprehend how the commercial interests of a country could be promoted without greatly advancing the interests of agriculture. Will the farmer have any temptation to labor, if the surplus of what he raises beyond his domestic consumption is to perish in his barn for want of a market? Can a market be obtained without the merchant? If commerce flourishes, the merchants increase, and of course the demand for the produce of the land; but if the mercantile interests fail, there is none to export the surplus produced by agriculture. If the farmer should undertake to export his own produce, he could not give his whole attention to his affairs; or, if the merchant should attempt to raise the grain he wanted, he could not carry on his merchandise. The one interest depends on the other; a separation destroys both.

But the incapacity of the Bank to extend its influence to the extremes of the Union has been argued from the gentleman never having seen a note of the present Bank of North America in Georgia; he therefore concludes that bank has never been of any service to her agricultural interests. Mr. B. said that he drew very different conclusions from this fact. He supposed that by means of the bank the traders with Georgia had been enabled to send her the precious metals, while the bank paper had answered their purposes nearer home, where it circulated with undoubted credit. He instanced a case of a Philadelphia merchant, who was possessed of £100 in gold, and £100 credit at the bank; the merchant wanted £100 worth of rice of a Georgia planter, and the like value in flour of a Pennsylvania farmer. When he purchased the one of the Georgian, he could safely pay him the whole in gold, while he found the Pennsylvanian would as readily receive the bank paper for his flour; but had there been no bank, he could have purchased but £50 worth of each, and the Georgia and Pennsylvanian both would have gone without a market for the residue. In short, the whole Union may be likened to the body and limbs; you cannot aid or comfort one but the other must be likewise benefited.

He said it was, however, difficult and impracticable to show that every measure adopted by the Government should have an effect perfectly equal over so extensive a country as that of the United States; it was sufficient if, upon the whole, the measures of Government, taken all together, produced the desired equality.

The last objection was, that by adopting this bill we exposed the measure to be considered and defeated by the Judiciary of the United States, who might adjudge it to be contrary to the constitution, and therefore void; and not lend their aid to carry it into execution. This, he alleged, gave him no uneasiness. He was so far from controverting this right in the Judiciary, that it was his boast and his confidence. It led him to greater decision on all subjects of a constitutional nature, when he reflected that if, from inattention, want of precision, or any other defect, he should do wrong, that there was a power in the Government which could constitutionally prevent the operation of such a wrong measure from affecting his constituents. He was legislating for a nation, and for thousands unborn; and it was the glory of the constitution that there was a remedy even for the failures of the supreme Legislature itself.

Upon the whole, then, he said, that on taking the power in question in every point of view, and giving the constitution the fullest consideration, under the advantage of having the objections placed in the strongest point of light by the great abilities of the gentlemen in the opposition, he was clearly in favor of the bill; as to its expediency, there could be little doubt in the minds of any gentleman; and unless more conclusive arguments could be adduced to show its unconstitutionality, he should in the end vote for passing the bill.

SATURDAY, February 5.

_Bank of the United States._

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for incorporating the Bank of the United States.

The question being on the passage of the bill,

Mr. SMITH observed, that he considered it his duty to offer the reasons which should influence him in giving his vote on this occasion. He had wished amendments to the bill, as some parts of it, he confessed, did not perfectly please him; but his wishes having been overruled, the question now is, whether the bill shall pass? Though he came southward of the Potomac, the principle of the bill met his approbation. It would be a deplorable thing if this Government should enact a law subversive of the constitution, or that so enlightened a body as the Senate of the United States should, by so great a majority as were in favor of this bill, pass a law so hostile to the liberties of this country, as the opposition to this measure have suggested the bank system to be; and it would be very extraordinary if an officer of this Government who has produced a performance explanatory of the constitution, of such celebrity as to be resorted to as an authority, should be so inconsistent with himself as to propose a law entirely subversive of the principles laid down in his able defence of the constitution.

He then adverted to the objection drawn from that article of the constitution, that no preference shall be given to one port over another. He showed that the clause was inserted for a particular purpose, and could not be cited as a rule not to be deviated from, as a preference was and must necessarily be given to one port over another. He produced numerous instances in point. In consequence of various clauses in the revenue laws, general regulations sometimes operate partially, and commercial arrangements, apparently unequal, produce the good of the community at large.

In reference to construing the constitution, he observed, that the present moment, when the powers of the Government were assailed from various quarters, he conceived the most improper to contract these powers.

The right to construe the constitution he argued from the principles advanced by Mr. MADISON, in the debate on the power of removability, and read sundry observations from _Lloyd's Register_, made by that gentleman, corroborative of this sentiment. Those arguments, he conceived, applied very aptly to the present subject.

Matters of a fiscal nature necessarily devolve on the General Government, and he urged that every power resulting from the acknowledged right of Congress to control the finances of this country must be as necessarily implied as in the case of the power of removability.

He then alluded to the expediency of a National Bank. The Secretary gave notice, in his first report, that this plan was in contemplation. Nothing was ever read with greater avidity; and though it is now more than a year since this intimation was given, yet no objections have been offered against it either by the States or by individuals--even the State of North Carolina has not mentioned it. [Here Mr. BLOODWORTH (if the reporter did not misunderstand) informed Mr. SMITH that the report had not been seen by the Legislature of North Carolina.] Mr. SMITH said he was sorry for it--and then proceeded to notice some partial quotations, made by Mr. JACKSON, from _Dr. Smith's Wealth of Nations_, against bank systems. He said, he could have wished the gentleman had been more copious in his quotations from that author; if he had, he would have found that that author has fully demonstrated their utility.

He noticed the divisions of opinions on the subject of a National Bank in the city of Philadelphia. He supposed ideas of personal advantages induced these opposing sentiments. He, however, thought this subject should be taken up altogether on general principles; and even if its immediate influence should not extend to the extremes of the Union, if the establishment promises a general preponderating advantage, local considerations must be considered in a secondary point of view. The principal inquiry is, will the institution facilitate the management of the finances? This, he thought, had been made apparent. This is the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, after due and mature consideration of the subject; and he certainly enjoys the best means of forming an opinion; he is at the head of the Fiscal Department, and deservedly enjoys the public confidence. Very little has been offered to disprove his sentiments on this part of the question, and the inexpediency of the measure should be clearly proved before the plan is rejected; for an officer who deservedly enjoys the public confidence is entitled to the support of the Legislature in those plans which are expedient and constitutional.

Mr. S. mentioned instances in which Congress exercised power by implication, and observed, that this was necessary to the execution of the duties which devolve on the Government by the constitution. The power to establish a National Bank must reside in Congress, for no individual State can exercise any such power. The right of no particular State is therefore infringed by the institution. It had repeatedly been said, that Philadelphia would derive peculiar advantages from the Bank of the United States, but, he said, if the present plan should fail, it was a question whether the stockholders of the Bank of North America would not derive greater advantages from the necessity which, in that case, Government would be under of resorting to them for loans. The institution, as before observed, is founded on general principles, and will undoubtedly, in its operations, prove of general utility.

Mr. STONE said, if, upon questions like the present, he had given pain to members he regarded, they might be assured the pain was reciprocal. Let us cherish mutual toleration. We might conceive that each pursued the system which he advocated from the purest motives. We differ in our ideas of Government, and our sense of the sacredness of the written compact. We varied widely in our opinions of the direction of this Government. The great lesson of experiment would show who is right; but we are influenced in our habits of thinking by our local situations, and, perhaps, the distinct interests of the States we represent. He observed, that upon the present occasion, the opinions respecting the constitution seem to be divided by a geographical line, dividing the continent. Hence it might be inferred, that other considerations mixed with the question; and it had been insinuated that it was warped by the future seat of Government. But other causes may be assigned for the diversity of sentiment--the people to the eastward began earliest in favor of liberty. They pursued freedom into anarchy--starting at the precipice of confusion, they are now vibrating far the other way. He said, that all our taxes are paid by the consumers of manufactures; those taxes are all bounties upon home manufactures. The people to the eastward are the manufacturers of this country; it was no wonder that they should endeavor to strengthen the hands of a Government by which they are so peculiarly benefited.

It is a fact that the greatest part of the Continental debt has travelled eastward of the Potomac. This law is to raise the value of the Continental paper. Here, then, is the strong impulse of immediate interest in favor of the Bank. He took notice of the distinction made by the plan of the bill, between Continental and State paper. The State paper, on account of partial payments of interest, still remained in the respective States. But this could not, by the present system, be subscribed; so that the Southern States were deprived of the advantage that might have been given to the only paper they have. But if gentlemen charge us with defending the seat of Government, let them remember that this betrays consciousness of an attack. If they believe that this scheme tends to break the faith of the Union pledged to the Potomac, it is no wonder they suppose we oppose it upon that ground. He would not have mentioned this subject, had it not been hinted at. But let the whole of it come forth; let gentlemen consult their own bosoms; let the public decide the truth of his observations. He hoped he should not be suspected of any bias. That so uniform had been his conduct upon all questions, turning upon principles similar to the present, that every member in the House, he believed, had conjectured rightly of the side he would take, before he had uttered a word upon the subject, When implication first raised its head in this House, he started from it as a serpent which was to sting and poison the constitution. He felt in unison with his country. The fears, the opinions, the jealousies of individuals and of States, had been explained by a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. MADISON.) He should only remark, that all those who opposed the Government dreaded this doctrine; those who advocated it, declared that it could not be resorted to; and all combined in opinion that it ought not to be tolerated. Never did any country more completely unite in any sentiment than America in this, "that Congress ought not to exercise, by implication, powers not granted by the constitution." And is it not strange? For the admission of this doctrine destroys the principle of our Government at a blow; it at once breaks down every barrier which the Federal constitution had raised against unlimited legislation. He said, that necessity was the most plausible pretext for breaking the spirit of the social compact, but the people of this country have anticipated that pretext. They have said to the Ministers of this country, "we have given you what we think competent powers, but if experience proves them inadequate, we will enlarge them; but, in the mean time, dare not usurp those which we have reserved."

It is agreed on all hands, that the power to incorporate the subscribers to a banking company, is not expressly granted, and although gentlemen have agreed that it is implied--that it is an incident, that it is a means for effectuating powers expressly granted, yet they are not agreed as to the particular power to which this is an incident. They admit, that the sweeping clause in the constitution confers no additional power. But if he understood the gentlemen, several of them were of opinion that all governments, instituted for certain ends, draw to them the means of execution as of common right. This doctrine would make ours but a short constitution. [Here he read the preamble and then said:] Here is your constitution! Here is your bill of rights! Do these gentlemen require any thing more respecting the powers of Congress, than a description of the ends of government? And if, of right, they can carry these into effect, will they regard the means, though they be expressly pointed out? But I would ask if there is any power under heaven which could not be exercised within the extensive limits of this preamble?

The Convention might have stopped here; and there was no need, according to the doctrine of the gentleman, to point out any of the means for the ends mentioned in the preamble. That portion of the constitution which by all America has been thought so important, according to their logic, would become a dead letter; but the preamble, in fair construction, is a solemn compact, that the powers granted shall be made use of to the ends thereby specified.

He then reprobated, in pointed terms, the latitude of the principles premised. He said the end of all government is the public good; and if the means were left to legislation, all written compacts were nugatory. He observed, that the sober discretion of the Legislature, which, in the opinions of gentlemen, ought to be paramount, was the very thing intended to be curbed and restrained by our constitution.

He then declared, that our form of government not only pointed out the ends of government, but specified the means of execution. He said, we may make war--this would draw to it the power of raising an army and navy, laying taxes, establishing a judiciary, &c. But the spirit of the constitution, in this respect, had been well explained by Mr. MADISON, and he should not recapitulate.

He said, a gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SMITH) had remarked that all our laws proceeded upon the principle of expediency--that we were the judges of that expediency--as soon as we gave it as our opinion that a thing was expedient, it became constitutional. What then remains of your constitution, except its mode of organization? We may look into it to refresh our memories respecting the times, places, and manner of composing the Government; that, as to the powers of Congress, were he of that gentleman's opinion, he would never look into it again. Gentlemen see the difficulties of their theories, and are obliged to confess that these incidental powers are not easily defined. They rest in the sober discretion of the Legislature.

One gentleman (Mr. AMES) has said, no implication ought to be made against the law of nature, against rights acquired, or against power pre-occupied by the States; that it is easier to restrain than to give competent powers of execution. Now these notions are hostile to the main principle of our Government, which is only a grant of particular portions of power, implying a negative to all others. It has been shown that the ends of government will include every thing. If gentlemen are allowed to range in their sober discretion for the means, it is plain that they have no limits. By the cabalistic word _incident_, your constitution is turned upside down, and instead of being a grant of particular powers, guarded by an implied negative to all others, it is made to imply all powers. But, strange to tell, America forgot to guard it by express negative provisions. Is there any difference in effect between lodging general powers in a government, and permitting the exercise of them by subtle constructions? He said there was a difference. In the one case the people fairly gave up their liberty, and stood prepared; in the other, they were unexpectedly tricked out of their constitution.

The preceding remarks showed how dangerous is the doctrine of implication, and upon what small data ingenuity can raise the most dangerous superstructure. He should now take a view of these precedents, in the former and present Congress, which are relied on to justify the present measure.

1st. The Bank of North America. Here he stated the distressful and critical situation of America at the period of its establishment; he remarked, that it was at the time of the declension of the Continental money. He showed that there were no powers in the Confederation to which (even according to the reasoning of the other side) this power could be incidental, but what required the vote of nine States; that the ordinance passed by a vote of seven States, which showed that necessity alone gave birth to that measure. He showed the dissimilarity of the situations of the former and this Congress, and the difference in their powers, and, consequently, in the dangers to be apprehended from the encroachment of either.

2d. The redemption of our prisoners at Algiers. This comes within the power to regulate trade. If, said he, we are not capable of redeeming, by the best means in our power, our citizens, our trade may be entirely ruined; and hence, the law which would be made for their redemption would be necessary and proper. But, by the constitution, the Executive may make treaties; these may be general, or for a particular object, and the Legislature may effectuate them by grants of money.

3d. We have bought certificates, and not destroyed them. This, they say, is implied from the power of paying the debts.

He asked if, before the purchase, the certificates were debts due from the United States? And demanded, if, by the purchase, they were divested of that quality? In my judgment, when a debt is fairly cancelled, it is as much like a payment as need be.

4th. We had no right, except by implication, to give a salary to the Vice President. He had voted against the salary, and had been for a _per diem_ allowance, because he thought the Vice President was viewed by the constitution only as the President of the Senate. But this example fails most palpably, as Congress, in the compensations, are not confined by the constitution either to a particular sum or mode of payment.

5th. Congress have made corporations, and exercised complete legislation in the Western Territory. He said, to answer this case, nothing more was necessary than to read the clause in the constitution which gives to Congress expressly the power to make all the rules and regulations for them.

It seemed to him as if gentlemen were inverting the order of things, by making powers where there were none, and attempting to prove express grants to the implications.

6th. Our regulations respecting freighters and owners, and between captains and seamen. He had not those regulations correctly in his memory, but he believed them proper and necessary regulations of commerce.

7th. It has been said we have exclusive jurisdiction in places belonging to Congress, and within the ten miles square. We could erect a bank in any of those places; its influence would extend over the continent; the principle upon which we founded this power could not be confined to a particular time or a spot of land. Gentlemen ridicule the idea that the exercise of a pervading influence and a general principle should be limited by any particular number of years, or be confined within a fort. He said, the power of exclusive legislation in those places was expressly granted, and, under its influence, the Congress might exercise complete and exclusive legislation within those limits; that the power was confined to the places. But if the general powers of this constitution are to be governed by the same rules of construction, and we are to have no regard to place, it follows that Congress can exercise exclusive legislation over this continent. He was astonished at this doctrine. It would be equally reasonable to say, that France, because within the limits of her own dominions, and over her own property, she exercised exclusive legislation, that hence she had a right to legislate for the world.

8th. The power of removal of officers by the President alone. He said, it was known he had opposed that doctrine. He left it to be defended by those who had voted for it. But he hoped Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, and some other gentlemen, who had opposed it, would review the arguments they had used upon that occasion.

He observed, after taking a view of these precedents on the danger of laying down improper principles in legislation, how eagerly men grasped at the slightest pretexts for exercise of power. He shuddered to think what a broad and commanding position this Bank will form for further encroachments.

A gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. SEDGWICK) has said, that whenever a power is granted, all the known and usual means of execution are always implied. The idea had been properly examined by Mr. GILES, but he would ask, if incorporating the subscribers to a bank was the known and usual means of borrowing money, especially when the subscribers were not obliged to loan; or of collecting taxes, when no taxes were levied on the bank.

But gentlemen tell us, that if we tie up the constitution too tightly, it will break; if we hamper it, we cannot stir; if we do not admit the doctrine, we cannot legislate at all. And with a kind of triumph, they say that implication is recognized by the constitution itself in the clause wherein we have power to make all laws, to carry, &c. He said, he was ready to meet the gentlemen upon this ground. This clause was intended to defeat those loose and proud principles of legislation which had been contended for. It was meant to reduce legislation to some rule. In fine, it confined the Legislature to those means that were necessary and proper.

He said, it would not be pretended that it was necessary and proper for the collection of taxes. Indeed, one gentleman (Mr. AMES) had attempted to show that the payments in specie could not be made, if by chance a great quantity of debt suddenly accumulated in a particular place. But it might be remembered, that this necessity, if it arrived, was created by the Legislature, and that would be strange reasoning which broke a good constitution to mend a bad law. No taxes are to be collected by this bill.

It would not be necessary and proper as a means of borrowing money, because, first, we do not want to borrow money, and, if we did, this law, though it may be the probable, is not the necessary mean; for if it was the interest of the stockholders, they might, and he believed would, refuse to loan. He said, that the institution might be defended upon more plausible grounds, if the Bank had been taxed; or if a condition to loan money to the public had been part of the plan. Upon what ground, then, do gentlemen stand? They can only say, that they have implied a great and substantive power in Congress, which gives to Government, or to individuals, the influence of fifteen millions of dollars, irrevocably, for twenty years, with a power of making by-laws, &c., because there is a probability that this institution may be convenient and agreeable in the operations of Government. He asked, upon parallel principles, what might Congress not do? He said, that the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. MADISON,) pursuing the doctrine into all the forms in which it might appear, had struck upon several cases which were very pointed--an incorporation of manufacturers with exclusive privileges; merchants with the same; a national religion. This a gentleman (Mr. AMES) has said was unfair and extravagant reasoning; and yet, in five minutes, the gentleman's own reasoning led him to ask, with warmth, if Congress could not join stocks with a company to trade to Nootka? And he condescended to doubt, if the privileges given to such a company might not be exclusive. He saw clearly, himself, that his theory led to the latter conclusion; for if expediency, if convenience, if facility, if fears of war, if preparations for events which might never happen, can justify an incorporation upon the present plan, the same suggestions, the same logic, will legalize incorporations with exclusive privileges. The deductions of the gentleman from Virginia are sound and right, and cannot be fairly controverted. Congress may then do any thing. Nay, if the principles now advocated are right, it is the duty of the Legislature of the Union to make all laws; not only those that are necessary and proper to carry the powers of the Government into effect, but all laws which are convenient, expedient, and beneficial to the United States. Then where is your constitution! Are we not now sitting, in our sober discretion, a General Government, without the semblance of restraint? Yes, said he, we have still a constitution, but where is it to be found? Is it written? No. Is it among the archives? No. Where is it? It is found in the sober discretion of the Legislature--it is registered in the brains of the majority!

He proceeded. I say there is no necessity, there is no occasion, for this Bank. The States will institute banks which will answer every purpose. But a distrust of the States is shown in every movement of Congress--will not this implant distrust also in the States? Will you gain by this contest? This scheme may give, and I am convinced will give, partial advantages to the States. In the fair administration of our Government, no partial advantages can be given; but, by this bill, a few stockholders may institute banks in particular States, to their aggrandizement and the oppression of others. This Bank will swallow up the State banks; it will raise in this country a moneyed interest at the devotion of Government; it may bribe both States and individuals. He said, gentlemen asked who would be offended or hurt by this plan? Have we heard any complaints against it? Have the newspapers reprobated it? These questions had no influence on his mind. He said it was one of those sly and subtle movements which marched silently to its object; the vices of it were at first not palpable or obvious; but when the people saw a distinction of banks created--when they viewed with astonishment the train of wealth which followed individuals, whose sudden exaltation surprised even the possessors--they would inquire how all this came about? They will then examine into the powers by which these phenomena have arisen, and they will find--they will reprobate the falsehood of the theories of the present day.

He said, that gentlemen had told us of the sudden irruptions of enemies. When those necessities arrive, it is time enough to make use of them to break your constitution. But, gentlemen say, upon emergencies the Bank will loan money. We differ in opinion. I think when we want it most, the Bank will be most unable and unwilling to lend. If we are in prosperity, we can borrow money almost any where; but in adversity, stockholders will avoid us with as much caution as any other capitalists.

But a gentleman (Mr. AMES) tells us not to be alarmed, the Bank will not eat up liberty--he said he was not afraid. He was not under any apprehensions that all the little influence that Congress possessed would destroy the great spirit of American liberty. The body of the people would laugh at and ridicule any attempt to enslave them; but a conduct which had that tendency might arouse alarming passions. He said, there existed at this moment ill-blood in the United States, which to quiet he would readily agree to enter into a foreign war. America with us, we might defy the world. There was but one people he was afraid of offending. This was America. He was not afraid of foreign enemies, but the resentment of our own country is always a subject of serious apprehension. He observed, that there were other parts of this important and diffusive subject which he might have touched, but he had fatigued himself and the House.

Mr. SMITH (of South Carolina) said, as he had been greatly misunderstood by the gentleman last up, he wished to explain the position he had laid down. He had never been so absurd as to contend, as the gentleman had stated, that whatever the Legislature thought expedient, was therefore constitutional. He had only argued that in cases where the question was, whether a law was necessary and proper to carry a given power into effect, the members of the Legislature had no other guide but their own judgment, from which alone they were to determine whether the measure proposed was necessary and proper to carry the powers vested in Congress into full effect. If, in such cases, it appeared to them, on solemn deliberation, that the measure was not prohibited by any part of the constitution, was not a violation of the rights of any State or individual, and was peculiarly necessary and proper to carry into operation certain essential powers of the Government, it was then not only justifiable on the part of Congress, but it was even their duty to adopt such measure. That, nevertheless, it was still within the province of the Judiciary to annul the law, if it should be by them deemed not to result by fair construction from the powers vested by the constitution.

MONDAY, February 7.

_Bank of the United States._

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for incorporating the Bank of the United States.

The question being on the passage of the bill,

Mr. GILES.--In the course of discussing the present important question, it has been several times insinuated that local motives, and not a candid and patriotic investigation of the subject upon its merits, have given rise to that difference of opinion which has been heretofore manifested in this House. I shall not examine the truth of this observation, but merely remark, that the causes which may have produced the arguments against the proposed measure, whatever they may be, can neither add to, nor take from, their merit or influence, and, of course, the insinuations might have been spared without injury to the subject; but so far as the observation may have been intended to apply to myself, I can truly say, that if a bias were to influence my conduct, it would rather direct it to favor, than to oppose the proposed measure. This bias would arise from two causes: the one from the respect which I entertain for the judgments of the majority who advocate the measure; the other of a more serious nature. I have observed with regret a radical difference of opinion between gentlemen from the Eastern and Southern States, upon the great Governmental questions, and have been led to conclude, that the operation of that cause alone might cast ominous conjecture on the promised success of this much valued Government. Mutual concessions appear to be necessary to obviate this effect, and I have always been pleased in manifesting my disposition to make advances; but from the most careful view of the arguments in favor of the proposed measure considered under this impression, they do not seem to me sufficient to establish the propriety of its adoption, and I am therefore impelled, by the joint influence of duty and opinion, to be one in the opposition.

A gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. AMES) prefaced his observations with this remark, that it is easier to point out defects and raise objections to any proposed system, than to defend it from objections, and prove its affirmative propriety, and warned the House against the effects of arguments of this nature, urged in opposition to the measures now under consideration. I agree with the gentleman in this idea in general, but we should reflect that in the present case the address of the arguments in favor of the measure is made to one of the strongest affections of the human mind, the love of dominion; and hence we may justly conclude, that they will be received and relished with their full and unabated influence. This reflection appears to me to be at least a counterpoise to that remark.

The advocates of this bill have been called on, and I conceive with propriety, to show its constitutionality and expediency, both of which have been doubted by those of the opposition. In support of the first position, a multitude of arguments have been adduced, all of which may be reducible to the following heads; such as are drawn from the constitution itself; from the incidentality of this authority to the mere creation and existence of government; from the expediency of the measure itself; and from precedents of Congress; to which may be added a similar exercise of authority by Congress, under the former Confederation.

Observations arising from the constitution itself, were of two kinds. The right of exercising this authority is either expressed in the constitution, or deducible from it by necessary implication. One gentleman only, from Massachusetts, (Mr. SEDGWICK,) has ventured to assert, that, discarding the doctrine of implication, he could show that the right to exercise the authority contended for was expressly contained in the constitution. This, I presume, must have been a mistake in language, because the difference between an express and an implied authority appears to me to consist in this--in the one case, the natural import of the words used in granting the authority would of themselves convey a complete idea to the mind of the authority granted, without the aid of argument or deduction; in the other, to convey a complete idea to the mind, the aid of argument and deduction is found necessary to the usual import of words used; and that gentleman proceeded with a labored argument to prove, that the authority was expressly granted, which would have been totally useless, if his assertion had been just.

[Mr. SEDGWICK rose to explain; he never conceived the authority granted by the express words of the constitution, but absolutely by necessary implication from different parts of it.]

I shall not contend as to the assertion, but shall proceed to consider the arguments in favor of the measure upon the doctrine of implication; which, indeed, are those only which deserve consideration.

In doing this, I shall consider the authority contended for to apply to that of granting charters to corporations in general, for I do not recollect any circumstance, and I believe none has been pretended, which could vary this case from the general exercise of that authority. To establish the affirmative of this proposition, arguments have been drawn from the several parts of the constitution; the context has been resorted to. "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," &c. It has been remarked, that here the ends for which this Government was established are clearly pointed out; the means to produce the ends are left to the choice of the Legislature, and that the incorporation of a bank is one necessary mean to produce these general ends. It may be observed, in reply, that the context contemplates every general object of Government whatever; and if this reasoning were to be conclusive, every object of Government would be within the authority of Congress, and the detail of the constitution would have been wholly unnecessary, further than to designate the several branches of the Government which were to be intrusted with this unlimited, discretionary choice of means, to produce these specified ends. The same reasoning would apply as forcibly to every clause of the constitution, restraining the authority of Congress to the present case, or to any one in which the constitution is silent. The only candid construction arising from the context appears to me to be this; it is designed, and it is the known office of every member to point out the great objects proposed to be answered by the subsequent regulations of which the constitution is composed. These regulations contain the means by which these objects are presumed to be best answered. These means consist in a proper distribution of all Governmental rights between the Government of the United States and the several State governments, and in fixing limits to the exercise of all authorities granted to the Government of the United States. The context, therefore, gives no authority whatever, but only contemplates the ends for which certain authorities are subsequently given. Arguments drawn from this source appear to be ineffectual in themselves, and the reliance of gentlemen upon them indicates a suspicion and distrust of such as may be drawn from other parts of the constitution. The advocates of the bill have turned away from this context, and have applied to the body of the constitution in search of arguments. They have fixed upon the following clauses, to all or some one of which they assert the authority contended for is clearly incidental; the right to lay and collect taxes, &c., &c.; to provide for the common defence and general welfare, &c.; to borrow money, &c.; to regulate commerce with foreign nations, &c. The bill contemplates neither the laying nor collecting taxes, and, of course, it cannot be included in that clause; indeed, it is not pretended, by the bill itself, to be at all necessary to produce either of those ends; the furthest the idea is carried in the bill, is, that it will tend to give a facility to the collection.

The terms "common defence and general welfare" contain no grant of any specific authority, and can relate to such only as are particularly enumerated and specified. "To borrow money." Gentlemen have relied much upon this clause; their reasoning is, that a right to incorporate a bank is incidental to that of borrowing money, because it creates the ability to lend, which is necessary to effectuate the right to borrow. I am at a loss to discover one single relation between the right to borrow, and the right to create the ability to lend, which is necessary to exist between principal and incident. It appears to me that the incidental authority is paramount to the principal, for the right of creating the ability to lend is greater than that of borrowing from a previously existing ability. I should, therefore, rather conclude that the right to borrow, if there be a connection at all, would be incidental to the right to grant charters of incorporation, than the reverse of that proposition, which is the doctrine contended for by the advocates of the measure. The same reasoning which would establish a right to create the ability to lend, would apply more strongly to enforce the will after the ability is created; because the creator would have a claim of gratitude at least upon the created ability, which if withheld, perhaps, with justice might be insisted on. "To regulate commerce with foreign nations." This is by no means a satisfactory ground for the assumption of this authority; for if it be deemed a commercial regulation, there is a clause in the constitution which would absolutely inhibit its exercise. I allude to that clause which provides that no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; and it seems to be admitted, that one principal effect to be produced by the operation of this measure will be to give a decided commercial preference to this port over every other in the United States.

Gentlemen finding it difficult to show that necessary relation and intimate connection between the authority contended for, and any one of the specified authorities before mentioned, which would be essential to the establishment of their doctrine, have referred to what has been generally called the sweeping clause, and have made deductions from the terms "necessary" and "proper;" they have observed that certain specified authorities being granted, all others necessary to their execution follow without any particular specification. This observation may in general be true, but its fallacy here consists in its application to this particular case. It cannot be applied until the exercise of this authority be proved to be necessarily connected with some one of the previously enumerated authorities, and here the argument, as well as the fact, fails.

The authority contended for seems to me to be a distinct substantive branch of legislation, and, perhaps, paramount to any one of the previously enumerated authorities, and should therefore not be usurped as an incidental subaltern authority.

I am confirmed in this opinion from the indistinct, confused conceptions of gentlemen who advocate the measure. They rely upon the incidentality of this authority to some one of those particularly specified, and yet have applied it as an incident to several distinct, unconnected subjects of legislation; and then, distrusting their own conclusions, or as if the inquiry would be too troublesome or minute, they leave this ground, and assert that it is incidental to the result of the whole combined specified authorities. Gentlemen must, therefore, view this right through different optics, at different times; or, what I rather believe to be the fact, they have no distinct view of it at all, the right having no existence.

A gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. SEDGWICK,) finding the usual import of the terms used in the constitution to be rather unfavorable to the doctrines advanced by him, has favored us with a new exposition of the word "necessary." He says that "necessary," as applicable to a mean to produce an end, should be construed so as to produce the greatest quantum of public utility. I have been taught to conceive that the true exposition of a necessary mean to produce a given end was that mean without which the end could not be produced.

The gentleman's reasoning, however, if pursued, will be found to teem with dangerous effects, and would justify the assumption of any given authority whatever. Terms are to be so construed as to produce the greatest degree of public utility. Congress are to be the judges of this degree of utility. This utility, when decided on, will be the ground of constitutionality. Hence any measure may be proved constitutional which Congress may judge to be useful. These deductions would suborn the constitution itself, and blot out the great distinguishing characteristic of the free constitutions of America, as compared with the despotic Governments of Europe, which consist in having the boundaries of governmental authority clearly marked out and ascertained.

The exclusive jurisdiction over ten miles square has been adverted to by one gentleman (Mr. AMES) as a specified authority, to which the one contended for is suggested to be incidental. He has reasoned in this manner: Congress possess jurisdiction over ten miles square, &c.; Congress may therefore establish a bank within the ten miles square, and, as principle is not applicable to place, Congress may exercise the same authority any where else. This seems to me to be an ingenious improvement upon sophistical deduction; the gentleman, however, should have reflected that the ground upon which he built the right to exercise this authority was that of exclusive jurisdiction, and to extend the principle it is necessary to extend the right of exclusive jurisdiction; without this, the basis of his argument fails, and the superstructure, however beautiful, must follow; for the principle, if at all deducible from that source, is expressly confined to place, and cannot operate beyond it.

I shall now consider the second resource, whence the constitutional right of exercising the proposed authority is derived; its incidentality to the mere creation and existence of government. It has been observed, that in all governments there are certain rights tacitly granted, and certain other rights retained; that it is impossible, in framing a constitution, to enumerate every minute governmental right, and that such an attempt would be chimerical and vain. And hence the incidentality of this authority to the mere existence of government is inferred. These observations seem to me to apply to a government growing out of a state of society, and not to a government composed of chartered rights from previously existing governments, or the people of those governments. I have been taught to consider this as a Federal, not as a consolidated Government, and am not prepared or disposed at present to relinquish that idea. A gentleman from New York (Mr. LAWRENCE) has remarked, that the Government is consolidated _quo ad_ the powers granted, and of course _quo ad_ their incidents; but he should first have shown that the authority contended for is one of those granted, or incidental to some one of them, before the application can be made. The observation can have no tendency to establish either of those positions. What effect would this doctrine, if admitted, have upon the State governments? And how would it be relished by them? Their dignity and consequence will not only be prostrated by it, but their very existence radically subverted. A third resource of deducing this constitutional authority is resorted to--the expediency of the proposed measure itself. I presume the great object of the constitution was to distribute all governmental rights between the several State Governments and the Government of the United States; the expediency, therefore, of the exercise of all constitutional rights, as they relate to State or General Governments, is properly contemplated and decided by the constitution, and not by the Governments among which the distribution is made. A gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SMITH) has said, that the expediency and constitutionality of the proposed measure cannot be considered separately, because the constitutionality grows out of the expediency. This is but candidly unveiling the subject of that sophistical mask which has been ingeniously thrown over it by some gentlemen; for all the arguments adduced in favor of the measure, from whatever source they arise, if pursued, will be found to rush into the great one of expediency, to bear down all constitutional provisions, and to end themselves in the unlimited ocean of despotism.

Several gentlemen have said, that this authority may be safely exercised, since it does not interfere with the rights of States or individuals. I think this assertion not very correct; if the States be constitutionally entitled to the exercise of this authority, it is an intrusion on their rights to do an act which would eventually destroy or impede the freest exercise of that authority; for it is totally immaterial whether the effect be produced by the operation of this, or by an inhibition in express terms. The States may not only incorporate banks, but may of right prohibit the circulation of bank paper within their respective limits; the act, therefore, if it be intended to have an effectual operation, will certainly infringe this right, or exist at the mercy of the State governments. This reasoning, however, places the subject in another point of view a little singular. It contemplates the authority contended for as vacant ground, and justifies the tenure by the mere title of occupancy. In almost all the remarks in favor of the measure, gentlemen seem to have forgotten the peculiar nature of this Government. It being composed of mere chartered authorities, all authority not contained within that charter would, from the nature of the grant, have been retained to the granting party; and I will venture to assert, that this opinion was the _sine qua_ _non_ of the adoption and existence of this Government; but if this opinion had been doubtful, Congress themselves have made an express declaration in favor of this construction to the proposed amendments to the constitution. Gentlemen have inferred a constitutional right to exercise the authority contended for from a fourth resource--the former usages and habits of Congress. In affirmance of this argument, several acts of Congress have been referred to--the power of removal from office, the government of the Western Territory, the cession from North Carolina, the purchase of West Point, &c. I shall not examine into the propriety of these several acts, though I conceive it would not be difficult to show, that they differ materially, upon constitutional grounds, from the one now proposed. I shall only remark, that, if Congress have heretofore been in the usage and habit of disregarding and violating the constitution, it is high time that that habit and usage be corrected. I hope and trust that the people of the United States will not tamely see the only security of their rights and liberties invaded and violated, but also see one violation of it with impunity boldly urged as an argument to justify another.