Chapter XXXIX: Introduction (38)

Every man who has ever seen militia in the field, cannot but know that a very trifling disaster, or a slight cause of discontent, is sufficient to make them disband, and forget all subordination, so far as even to neglect the means of self-defence; whereas regular troops, under proper discipline, and acting with greater steadiness and concert, are much more to be depended on, especially when the object of attack is distant, and great fatigue is to be undergone. The militia, in whatever mode they may be called out, will hardly furnish men of the proper description; if large pay be offered, the temptation will equally prevail upon those who are unfit for the service as it will upon good, effective men; besides, some of the States have no militia laws; and, even in those States which have such laws, they are gone into disuse; no dependence can therefore be placed on militia under any laws now existing. There is, indeed, a general militia law now before the House: but if it ever passes, it certainly cannot be passed in due season to answer the purpose of providing for the immediate defence of the frontier. Regular troops must be raised, or nothing effectual can be done; and if to avoid the expense we refuse the only aid that may prove of any real service, we render ourselves responsible for the consequences of this parsimonious policy, which may be attended with the ruin and destruction of our fellow-citizens in the Western country.

The Cornplanter's speech was again mentioned and called for; but, as it had been confidentially communicated by the President, an objection was made to having it read, without clearing the galleries. Whereupon,

An honorable member rose, and mentioned his having read it in one of the public newspapers in the State of New Jersey.

To this it was answered, that if any gentleman had the newspaper to produce, the speech might be publicly read from that; otherwise, although it might be very proper that the speech itself should be read, yet, as it had been confidentially received from the Executive, there would be a manifest trespass on propriety and decorum in having it read with open galleries; it was therefore wished that the galleries might be cleared.

The Parliamentary etiquette requiring that this should be done by the House, and not by a committee, the committee rose for the purpose; and,

The Speaker having resumed the chair, the motion for clearing the galleries was renewed.

An objection was here started by an honorable gentleman in favor of the augmentation, who said that, as some gentlemen had spoken on the popular side of the question, whilst the galleries had been open, it was unfair to preclude those of opposite sentiments from an opportunity of answering their arguments in the same public manner, and proving to the people the justice and necessity of the war.

The motion, however, was persisted in, and the galleries were cleared.[42]

[The speakers in this day's debate were Messrs. WAYNE, GOODHUE, BOUDINOT, LIVERMORE, STEELE, PARKER, BOURNE, (Rhode Island,) WHITE, and MOORE. Mr. WHITE and Mr. MOORE opposed the motion; they were in favor of the augmentation proposed in the bill. The other gentlemen were in favor of striking out the clause.]

FRIDAY, January 27.

_Protection of the Frontiers._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill for making further and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States.

Mr. MERCER rose and addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: I originally opposed the reference of this subject to the Secretary of the Treasury, on principles supported by the constitution, by the theory of free government, and from practical observation on the progress of our own, and I believe the result now before us will fully exemplify every evil predicted.

Let any man examine this bill, and compare it with the terms of the original reference. Let it then be asked, whether the submission to devise ways and means to provide for the defence of the Western frontier, authorized the plans proposed by the Treasury Department, that we are now giving sanction to? Did it authorize a perpetual tax, irrepealable by the whole Legislature, without a breach of faith, according to received doctrine? At least, so far placing the purse-strings in the hands of the Executive, who may refuse an assent to the repeal; in the power of the Senate also, and consequently beyond the reach of the Representatives of the people, who alone are deputized by, and may be recalled by the great mass of society, and to whom the constitution expressly confines the power of originating money bills. Have we, in truth, originated this money bill? Do we ever originate any money bill? If a reference, such as made to the Secretary, was proposed to the Senate, who are a branch of the Legislature, nearly of equal importance with ourselves, would it not be held a breach of the constitution? Were they to propose such a plan as this to us, would it not be received with indignation? Why so little jealousy of the Executive Department, separated by the constitution with so much care from us? Of the Treasury Department, too, which is considered in other countries as possessing and exercising the means of corruption? It is in my judgment a direct infraction of the letter and spirit of the constitution, of the principles of free government, and I have heard no attempt to defend it, but on the ground of pitiful evasion, more dishonorable to ourselves and dangerous to the public, than an open violation, that would rouse their resentment and ensure opposition.

But did the submission of a provision to defend the frontier authorize a system for the encouragement of manufactures, thereby placing the occupations and productive labor of our citizens under the direction of Government, and rendering the living of the artist and subsistence of the farmer, so far equally dependent on and subservient to the views of Administration? Did it authorize an entire provision for the public debt, past, present, and to come? Did it authorize a plan for supplying former deficiencies, which it is admitted do not exist? Lastly, did it authorize an extensive increase of the Sinking Fund, which we are informed is one of the principal objects? It would be an affront to common sense to answer one of these queries in the affirmative--it authorized none of them. And yet these are all its offspring; these are the great objects it produced. It is true there are in the bill two or three little clauses that were authorized, and which relate to the submission, and which might well have escaped my attention, and would probably never attract the observation of the public, but for the title--a bill for the protection of the frontiers. By these clauses five hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars of the whole moneys to be for ever raised from its perpetual revenue, are appropriated for this year's campaign. After that sum is expended, we must, even the next year, look out for new taxes, and upon the same principles, as long as the Indian war continues (and by the enlistments it is not contemplated to be of very short duration) new taxes must be provided, for the residue of these taxes are by this bill appropriated to other purposes, for ever, after five hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars are paid. This appropriation is unalterable even by the whole Legislature, unless by a breach of public faith, or providing other equal revenue. Should every year's Indian war, and every national disaster excuse Government for laying a perpetual tax, equal to the increased annual demand, it will be selling us defeats at a very high price; and if Government are paid so well, they may be tempted to repeat the tragical representation.

But what is the reflection that naturally arises from a contemplation of this bill. That Administration will not even permit us to defend the helpless women and children of the frontier from the brutal ferocity of a savage foe, but on condition that the Representatives surrender up for ever the sacred trust of the constitution, and place in the power and under the control of the Executive and Senate, a perpetual tax. Unless they throw the power of regulating the labor and industry of their fellow-citizens into the hands of Government, and into a mean dependence on Administration; and unless they furnish a large sum of money, under the denomination of a Sinking Fund, for the purposes of speculation, in order to raise and lower the price of stocks at pleasure, or as may suit the views and interest of the band of favorites that are in the secret.

Hard and oppressive conditions! Was this the object of the reference to the Secretary? It was not the avowed one, nor could it have been suspected, from a simple proposition to devise ways and means to defend the frontier. A mighty fabric has been erected on this slight foundation, to hurry us into its adoption. We have been officially, I suppose, informed that the money for the War Department is almost expended; that the preparations for the Western expedition must stop, unless we pass the bill immediately; and thus, with the tomahawk suspended over our heads, we must give up to Administration the dearest interests of the people, and sacrifice the most sacred rights of the constitution.

MONDAY, January 30.

_Protection of the Frontiers._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill making farther and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States; and, after some time spent therein, the Chairman reported that the committee had again had the said bill under consideration, and made several amendments thereto; when the same being read, some were agreed to, and others disagreed to.

And then the said bill being before the House, a motion was made, and the question being put to amend the same, by striking out the second section thereof, in the words following:

"_And be it further enacted_, That there shall be raised
three additional regiments of infantry, each of which,
exclusively of the commissioned officers, shall consist of
nine hundred and twelve non-commissioned officers,
privates, and musicians:"

It passed in the negative--yeas 18, nays 34, as follows:

YEAS.--John Baptist Ashe, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub
Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue,
William Barry Grove, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon,
Nathaniel Niles, Josiah Parker, Israel Smith, John Steele,
Thomas Sumter, George Thatcher, Artemas Ward, Hugh
Williamson, and Francis Willis.

NAYS.--Fisher Ames, Abraham Baldwin, Robert Barnwell,
Egbert Benson, John Brown, Jonathan Dayton, William
Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, William B. Giles, Andrew Gregg,
Thomas Hartley, Daniel Huger, Philip Key, Aaron Kitchell,
John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, James
Madison, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg,
William Vans Murray, John Page, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker,
Joshua Seney, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan
Sturges, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor
Tucker, Abraham Venable, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Anthony Wayne,
and Alexander White.

The farther consideration of the said bill was then postponed until to-morrow.

TUESDAY, January 31.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of War, covering his report on the petitions of James Swaine, Abraham Springer, Timothy Mountford, sundry seamen, Samuel Wail, for himself and servant, John Carnaghan, James Shields, Henry Skinner, and William Loring; which were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

_Protection of the Frontiers._

The House resumed the consideration of the bill for making farther and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States; and the same being further amended, was

_Ordered_, To be engrossed, and read the third time to-morrow.

WEDNESDAY, February 1.

Mr. PAGE, from the committee to whom was referred the petition of John Churchman, made a report; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

_Protection of the Frontiers._

An engrossed bill for making farther and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States, was read the third time, and the blanks therein filled up; and on the question that the said bill do pass,

It was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 29, nays 19.

FRIDAY, February 3.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate recede from their amendments, disagreed to by this House, to the bill to establish Post Offices and Post Roads within the United States, and do agree to the amendments proposed by the House to their amendment to the said bill.

_The Cod Fisheries._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled, "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."

The first section being read as follows:

"_Be it enacted, &c._, That the bounty, now allowed upon
the exportation of dried fish of the fisheries of the
United States, shall cease on all dried fish exported after
the tenth day of June next; and in lieu thereof, and for
the more immediate encouragement of the said fisheries,
there shall be afterwards paid, on the last day of December
annually, to the owner of every vessel or his agent, by the
collector of the district where such vessel may belong,
that shall be qualified agreeably to law, for carrying on
the Bank and other cod fisheries, and that shall actually
have been employed therein at sea, for the term of four
months at least, of the fishing season next preceding
(which season is accounted to be from the last day of
February, to the last day of November in every year) for
each and every ton of such vessel's burden, according to
her admeasurement, as licensed or enrolled; if of twenty
tons and not exceeding thirty tons, one and a half dollars,
and if above thirty tons, two and a half dollars, of which
bounty three-eighth parts shall accrue and belong to the
owner of such fishing vessel, and the other five-eighths
thereof shall be divided by him, his agent or lawful
representative, to and among the several fishermen who
shall have been employed in such vessel, during the season
aforesaid, or a part thereof, as the case may be, in such
proportions as the fish they shall respectively have taken
may bear to the whole quantity of fish taken on board such
vessel during such season. _Provided_, That the bounty, to
be allowed, and paid on any vessel for one season, shall
not exceed one hundred and seventy dollars."

Mr. GILES expressed some doubt respecting the principle of the bill; and for the purpose of collecting the sense of the committee on the subject, he thought the most effectual means would be a motion to amend the bill, by striking out the whole section. He accordingly made the motion, observing at the same time, that he could not positively assert, whether the reasons which determined him against the principle of the bill, were well founded or not; that, in matters where a local preference is given, it is necessary to accommodate; and he would be happy if his objections could be removed. The present section of the bill appears to contain a direct bounty on occupations; and if that be its object, it is the first attempt as yet made by this Government to exercise such authority; and its constitutionality struck him in a doubtful point of view; for in no part of the constitution could he, in express terms, find a power given to Congress to grant bounties on occupations: the power is neither directly granted, nor (by any reasonable construction that he could give) annexed to any other power specified in the constitution. It might perhaps be brought in under a mode of construction already adopted by the House, viz: that of "ways and ends," by which any power whatever might be equally implied; but he wished ever to see some connection between a specified power, and the means adopted for carrying it into execution. There is a great difference between giving encouragement, and granting a direct bounty. Congress have a right to regulate commerce; and any advantage thereby resulting to a particular occupation connected with commerce, comes within that authority; but when a bounty is proposed to a particular employment or occupation, this is stepping beyond the circle of commerce; and such a measure will affect the whole manufacturing and agricultural system. In all cases, the revenue, to be employed in this bounty, is drawn from all the sources of revenue in the United States, and confined to a particular object. He was averse to bounties in almost every shape, as derogations from the common right; and he thought there would be no great difficulty in proving, that a government is both unjust and oppressive in establishing exclusive rights, monopolies, &c., without some very substantial merit in the persons to whom they are granted; although even in that case, the propriety of such grants is still questionable. Under a just and equal government, every individual is entitled to protection in the enjoyment of the whole product of his labor, except such portion of it as is necessary to enable Government to protect the rest; this is given only in consideration of the protection offered. In every bounty, exclusive right, or monopoly, Government violates the stipulation on her part; for, by such a regulation, the product of one man's labor is transferred to the use and enjoyment of another. The exercise of such a right on the part of Government can be justified on no other principle, than that the whole product of the labor of every individual is the real property of Government, and may be distributed among the several parts of the community by governmental discretion; such a supposition would directly involve the idea that every individual in the community is merely a slave and bondman to Government, who, although he may labor, is not to expect protection in the product of his labor. An authority given to any government to exercise such a principle, would lead to a complete system of tyranny.

He entertained fewer doubts, respecting the principle, as it regards political economy. All occupations that stand in need of bounties, instead of increasing the real wealth of a country, rather tend to lessen it; the real wealth of every country consisting in the active product of useful labor employed in it. It is therefore bad policy to encourage any occupation that would diminish, instead of increasing the aggregate wealth of the community; and if an occupation is really productive, and augments the general wealth, bounties are unnecessary for its support; for when it reimburses the capital employed, and yields a profit besides, it may be said to support itself. When it fails in these points, any forced advantage that is given to it by the Government, only tends to decrease the wealth of the country. The subject, however, might be considered in a more favorable point of view: and that is, whether the provision be essential to the defence of the United States, and whether the bounties proposed in the bill were more than equivalent to the portion of defence that would be procured by them. The bill does not (in his opinion) contain that kind of encouragement, which is essential to the national defence. Any man who takes a view of this country, must be convinced that its real support rises from the land, and not from the sea; and the opposite mistake must have arisen merely from a servile imitation of the conduct of Great Britain: the inhabitants of this country heretofore thought favorably of her Government, and the Revolution has not yet altered their former ideas respecting it. But the circumstances of the two countries will, on examination, be found widely different; Britain, surrounded by the sea on every side, finds a navy necessary to support her commerce; whilst America, possessed of an immense territory, and having yet ample room to cultivate that territory, has no occasion to contend by sea with any European power: her strength and her resources are all to be found within the United States; and if she but attends to her internal resources, the object of national defence will be much better answered.

Mr. G. next proceeded to consider whether that portion of the national defence which might be derived from the fisheries, would not be purchased at too high a price. Although the apparent intention of the bill is only to convert the present existing drawbacks into a bounty; yet the drawbacks being allowed only to the actual exportation of the fish, and the bounty being granted on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, there can be no comparative value between the drawback and the bounty; they have no necessary relation to each other, and the latter may exceed the former, or the former exceed the latter. He had made a calculation, and upon the most favorable principles, grounded on the Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State. Here he produced a calculation, tending to show that the proposed bounty on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, would considerably exceed the amount of the present drawbacks. From a comparison between the bounty, and the number of sailors employed in the fisheries, he showed what an expense each man would be to the United States; and, after other remarks, observed, that even Great Britain, whose whole national support and defence depends on her navy, had found, that the men employed in the fisheries, though so necessary for that defence, had cost her too much; that America, whose consequence, as a nation, does not depend on a navy, ought to take a lesson from the experience of Britain: that he did not wish to enter into a competition with Britain and France, in supplying the different markets with fish; that, as those nations are able to hold out greater encouragement to their fishermen, than we can to ours, we would, by such a competition, only exhaust the Treasury of the United States to no purpose; and upon this principle alone, he thought there was some reason to doubt the policy of the measure proposed in the section under consideration, which therefore he hoped the committee would agree to strike out, unless his objection could be obviated.

Mr. MURRAY observed, that in order to demonstrate the propriety of the measure, it would be incumbent on the friends of the bill, first, to prove that the fishery trade is in a state of decay, that the stock employed in it does not yield the ordinary profits, so as to justify the merchants in embarking their capital in this branch of trade: that there is a system of defence in contemplation, which the circumstances of the country call for, and which this trade is calculated to furnish; that other branches of trade, which do not stand in need of encouragement, are not equally capable of furnishing seamen for the purpose: that this particular object so peculiarly claims the attention and encouragement of the United States, as to leave far behind every consideration of the manufacturing interest, the agricultural, &c. All this he thought necessary for gentlemen to prove, and to show some very strong necessity for encouraging one particular class of men, in preference to all others.

Mr. GOODHUE.--It happens that the fisheries of the United States are almost entirely confined to the State of Massachusetts; and they furnish a considerable, a principal portion of our export trade. As we are a part of the United States, the United States in general are interested in the prosperity of that branch of business, so far at least as it contributes to the national defence: it furnishes a copious nursery of hardy seamen, and offers a never-failing source of protection to the commerce of the United States. If we engage in a war with any European power, those seamen will be excluded from their ordinary employment, and must have recourse to privateering. During the late war with Great Britain, we annoyed the enemy more in that line than in all others; and had it not been for privateering, it would often have been impossible to keep together our armies, who frequently, in the hour of need, were supplied by the privateers with ammunition and clothing, of which they were wholly destitute. All that we wish to obtain by this bill is, that we may not be burdened with duties. An opinion has been entertained, that no drawbacks ought to be allowed on the re-exportation of articles imported from foreign countries; but if this opinion were to obtain in practice, and no drawbacks were to be admitted, we must confine our importation to articles for our own consumption. The drawback allowed by the existing law, on the exportation of salt fish, was calculated to be only equal to the duty beforehand paid on the quantity of salt used in curing the fish; but the fishermen complain that, as the act now stands, they are wholly excluded from any participation in the benefit, which centres entirely in the coffers of the merchants. The object of the present bill is, only to repay the same money into the hands of those persons who are immediately concerned in catching the fish; and there can no reasonable objection be made to such a transfer of the drawback, as Government will not lose a single dollar by the change. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) talks of the unconstitutionality of granting bounties; but no bounty is required. We only ask, in another mode, the usual drawback for the salt used on the fish. If we can make it appear that the bill does not contemplate any greater sums to be drawn from the Treasury, than are already allowed, it is to be hoped that no further opposition will be made to the measure; and that this is really the case, can be proved by documents from the Treasury office. Here he read a statement and calculation to prove his assertion; and to show that the United States will probably pay one thousand dollars per annum less in the proposed bounties on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, than they would in the drawbacks on the exportation of the fish. The fishermen, he continued, are now under no control; and in consequence of this want of a proper restraint, they often take whims into their heads and quit the vessels during the fishing season. To prevent the inconveniences of this practice, the bill contemplates their exclusion from the bounty, unless they enter into such contracts and regulations, as may be found necessary for the proper and successful conducting of the business, which, from our advantageous situation, would be entirely in our hands, if we did not meet with such opposition and discouragement from foreign nations, whose bounties to their own fishermen, together with the duties laid upon our fish, would, to persons less advantageously situated than us, amount almost to a total prohibition.

In the Report from the Secretary of State, a drawback is contemplated of the duties on all foreign articles, used by the seamen employed in the fishing trade, such as coffee, rum, &c.; but we ask it on the salt alone; nor is it asked as a bounty, but merely as a transfer from the hand of the merchant to that of the fishermen.

Mr. WHITE had no objection to give the trade a proper degree of encouragement; but he did not relish the idea of granting bounties; if any gentleman would prepare an amendment, so as to make them drawbacks in fact, as well as in words, he would consent to the measure.

Mr. AMES, after some introductory observations, adverted to the necessity of fixing some point in which both sides would agree. Disputes, he said, could not be terminated--or, more properly, they could not be managed at all, if some first principles were not conceded. The parties would want weapons for the controversy.

Law is in some countries the yoke of government, which bends or breaks the necks of the people; but, thank Heaven, in this country, it is a man's shield--his coat of mail--his castle of safety. It is more than his defence: it is his weapon to punish those who invade his rights--it is the instrument which assists--it is the price that rewards his industry.

If I say that fishermen have equal rights with other men, every gentleman feels in his own bosom a principle of assent. If I say that no man shall pay a tax on sending his property out of the country, the constitution will confirm it; for the constitution says, _no duty shall be laid on exports_. If I say, that on exporting dried fish, the exporter is entitled to drawback the duty paid on the salt, I say no more than the law of the land has confirmed. Plain and short as these principles are, they include the whole controversy. For I consider the law allowing the drawback as the right of the fishery, the defects of that law as the wrong suffered, and the bill before us as the remedy. The defects of the law are many and grievous. Supposing 340,000 quintals exported----

The salt duty is $42,744
The drawback is only 34,000
--------
Loss to the fishery 8,744

Whereas Government pays $45,900, at
13-1/2 cents, including charges, which are
3-1/2 cents on a quintal: which is beyond
what the fishery receives 11,900
--------
Being a clear loss to the Government of 3,156

So that, though the whole is intended for the benefit of the fishery, about one-fourth of what is paid is not so applied: there is a heavy loss both to Government and the fishery. Even what is paid on the export is nearly lost money; the bounty is not paid till the exportation, nor then, till six months have elapsed; whereas the duty on salt is paid before the fish is taken: it is paid to the exporter, not to the fisherman. The bounty is so indirect, that the poor fisherman loses sight of it. It is paid to such persons, in such places, and at such periods, as to disappoint its good effects; passing through so many hands, and paying so many profits to each, it is almost absorbed. The encouragement, too, is greatest in successful years, when least needed; and is least in bad fishing seasons, when it is most needed. It is a very perplexed, embarrassing regulation to the officers of Government and to the exporter; hence the great charge: and, with all this charge and trouble, it is liable to many frauds. Four hundred miles of coast, little towns, no officer. All these defects the bill remedies; and, besides, gives the money on condition that certain regulations are submitted to, which are worth almost as much as the money.

The bill is defended on three grounds. First, it will promote the national wealth; second, the national safety; third, justice requires it: the last is fully relied on.

To show that the fishery will increase the wealth of the nation, it cannot be improper to mention its great value. The export before the war brought more than a million of dollars into this country; probably it is not less at present, and no small part in gold and silver. It is computed that thirty thousand persons, including four thousand seamen, subsist by it. Many say, very composedly, if it will not maintain itself, let it fall. But we should not only lose the annual million of dollars which it brings us; an immense capital would be lost. The fishing towns are built on the naked rocks, or barren sands, on the side of the sea. Those spots, however, where trade would sicken and die--which husbandry scorns to till--and which nature seems to have devoted to eternal barrenness, are selected by industry to work miracles on. Houses, stores, and wharves, are erected, and a vast property created, all depending on this business. Before you think it a light thing to consign them to ruin, see if you can compute what they cost; if they outrun your figures, then confess that it would be bad economy, as well as bad policy, to suffer rival nations to ruin our fishery. The regulations of foreign nations tend to bring this ruin about. France and England equally endeavor, in the language of the Secretary of State, to mount their marine on the destruction of our fishery. The fishers at Newfoundland are allowed liberal bounties by the English Government; and, in the French West Indies, we meet bounties on their fish and duties on our own, and these amount to the price of the fish. From the English islands we are quite shut out; yet such is the force of our natural advantages, that we have not yielded to these rivals. The Secretary of State has made these statements in his Report.

The more fish we catch, the cheaper; the English fish will need a greater bounty: whereas if we should yield, the English would probably need no bounty at all; they would have the monopoly. For example; suppose the English can fish at two dollars the quintal--we catch so much that we sell at one dollar and two-thirds: the loss to them is one-third of a dollar on each quintal. They must have that sum as a bounty. Whereas, if we increase our fishery, a greater and a greater bounty is needed by foreign nations. The contest so painfully sustained by them must be yielded at last, and we shall enjoy alone an immense fund of wealth to the nation, which nature has made ours; and though foreigners disturb the possession, we shall finally enjoy it peaceably and exclusively. If the lands of Kentucky are invaded, you drive off the invader; and so you ought. Why not protect this property as well? These opinions are supported by no common authority. The State of Massachusetts having represented the discouragements of the fishery, the subject has received the sanction of the Secretary of State; he confirms the facts stated in the petition; he says it is too poor a business to pay any thing to Government.

Yet, instead of asking bounties, or a remission of the duties on the articles consumed, we ask nothing but to give us our own money back, which you received under an engagement to pay it back, in case the article should be exported. If nothing was in view, therefore, but to promote national wealth, it seems plain that this branch ought to be protected and preserved; because, under all the discouragements it suffers, it increases, and every year more and more enriches the country, and promises to become an inexhaustible fund of wealth.

Another view has been taken of the subject, which is drawn from the naval protection afforded, in time of war, by a fishery. Our coasting and foreign trade are increasing rapidly; but the richer our trade becomes, the better prize to the enemy: so far from protecting us, it would be the very thing that would tempt him to go to war with us. As the rice and the tobacco planter cheerfully pay for armies, and turn out in the militia to protect their property on shore, they cannot be so much deceived as to wish to have it left unprotected when it is afloat; especially when it is known that this protection, though more effectual than the whole revenue expended on a navy could procure, will not cost a farthing; on the contrary, it will enrich while it protects the nation. The coasters and other seamen, in the event of a war, would be doubly in demand, and could neither protect themselves nor annoy the enemy to any considerable degree; but the fishermen, thrown out of business by a war, would be instantly in action. They would, as they formerly did, embark in privateers; having nothing to lose, and every thing to hope, they would not dishonor their former fame. Their mode of life makes them expert and hardy seamen. Nothing can be more adventurous. They cast anchor on the banks, three hundred leagues from land, and with a great length of cable ride out the storms of winter. If the gale proves too strong they often sink at their anchors, and are food for fish which they came to take: for ever wet, the sea almost becomes their element. Cold and labor in that region of frost, brace their bodies, and they become as hardy as the bears on the islands of ice: their skill and spirit are not inferior: familiar with danger, they despise it. If I were to recite their exploits, the theme would find every American heart already glowing with the recollection of them; it would kindle more enthusiasm than the subject has need of. My view is only to appeal to facts, to evince the importance of the fishery as a means of naval protection. It is proper to pass over Bunker's Hill, though memorable by the valor of a regiment of fishermen; nor is it necessary to mention, further, that five hundred fishermen fought at Trenton.

It is known, that the privateers manned by fishermen, in want of every thing, not excepting arms, which they depended on taking from their enemies, brought into port warlike stores of every kind, as well as every kind of merchandise sufficient for the army and country: the war could not have been carried on without them. Among other exploits almost beyond belief, one instance is worth relating: these people, in a privateer of sixteen guns, and one hundred and fifty men, in one cruise took more than twenty ships, with upwards of two hundred guns, and nearly four hundred men. The privateers from a single district of Massachusetts, where the fishery is chiefly seated, took more than two thousand vessels, being one third of the British merchant vessels, and brought in near one thousand two hundred. A hundred sail of privateers, manned by fishermen, would scour every sea in case of a war.

The first question is, how much does Government receive by the duty on the salt used in curing the fish which is exported? The quantity of fish must be known. Several ways of information are to be explored. The Secretary of State supposes the fish of 1790 to be 354,276 quintals. A Treasury return of fish exported from August 20, 1789, to September 30, 1790, which is thirteen and one-third months, is 378,721 quintals. For a year, equal to 340,849 quintals.

Foreign dried fish imported from August 15, 1789, to August, 1790, 3,701 quintals; five per cent. drawback thereon is only three hundred and ten dollars, at one dollar and sixty-six cents per quintal. Mr. GILES is mistaken in supposing that foreign fish deducts $16,000 from our estimate. Return of fish in seven months, from May 30, to December, 1790, exported, all fish of the United States, 197,278 quintals: which, for a year, is 338,184 quintals. The medium may be fairly taken for the time past at 340,000 quintals a year.

Six gentlemen of Marblehead certify, that 5,043 hogsheads, or 40,344 bushels of salt, were used on 38,497-1/2 quintals; which, for 340,000 quintals, gives 356,200 bushels. The duty, at twelve cents, is $42,744, which Government receives. But the charge to the United States, is, at thirteen and a half cents per quintal

$45,900 Whereof the fishery receives ten cents on each quintal exported 34,000 ------ Charges as the law stands 11,900

Further, this is but an estimate made up from what the last year proved. The next may be very different, and probably it will be. If more money should be demanded than $44,000, we must not be accused of misleading Congress. But in that case an increase would be made by law; for the more fish is exported, the more thirteen and a half cents must be paid; so that the bill creates no burden in that way. But the increase of the export of fish will probably operate in favor of Government. For it is known that the economy, skill, and activity of the fishery are making progress. Its success has progressed. The more fish to a vessel, the cheaper the allowance on the tonnage. Therefore, the tonnage of vessels will not increase in a ratio with the increase of the fish.

The very objections prove this. For they deem the encouragement too great. But any encouragement must have the effect.

The difference of the agreements for distributing the fish according to the present practice, or by this bill, makes a great one in the quantity taken. The bill reforms the practice in this point. Marblehead vessels take less than those from Beverly. The former throw the fish into a common stock, which is afterwards divided upon a plan very unfriendly to exertion. A man works for the whole--perhaps twelve hours, and they take about eight hundred quintals to a vessel. But in Beverly, the exertion is as great as can be made; eighteen hours a day, because each man has what he catches, and they catch eleven hundred quintals.

Marblehead seamen sailing from other towns, and dividing as last mentioned, which the bill establishes, seldom fail to catch two or three hundred quintals more than vessels and men from Marblehead on the first plan. Accordingly, I assert on good authority, that the increase in Marblehead only may be computed at fifteen thousand quintals, merely in consequence of the reform by the bill. The best informed persons whom I have consulted, entertain no doubt that the export, in case the bill should pass, would not be less than four hundred thousand quintals, probably more; but at four hundred thousand quintals, it would add seven thousand two hundred dollars more to the salt duty; a sum more than equal to any estimate of the actual tonnage, or any probable increase of it

$42,744
7,200
------
Salt duty on 400,000 quintals 49,944

Other facts confirm the theory, that skill and exertion are increasing in this business.

In 1775, 25,000 tons, 4,405 seaman. Fish sold for $1,071,000. In 1790, three-fourths of the seamen and three-fourths of the tonnage take as much fish. It is owing to this that our fishery stood the competition with foreign nations.

Finally, the average in future may be relied on not to be less than 350,000 quintals.

Salt duty on which $43,944 Bounties 44,000 ------ Wanted 56

The calculations first made will answer the purpose,

340,000 quintals pay salt duty $42,744 Tonnage bounty 44,000 ------ Wanted 1,256

This is the mighty defect. Observe the authentic return of the export of fish may be, and we can almost prove it to be, below the future export. Whereas, to banish all doubt, we go to the top of the scale for the tonnage, we take what we know to be the utmost. This we might have represented more favorably if we had chosen to conceal any thing. But even this will answer our purpose.

For two hundred tons are wanting in the estimate of the bounties, being nineteen thousand eight hundred, not twenty thousand, which will take off one-third of the deficient sum.

The tonnage over sixty-eight, which receives nothing, is not mentioned; and which probably is not less than another third.

The boats under five tons, though trifling, are to be noticed--they receive nothing.

But, above all, the chances of non-compliance with the regulations are in favor of the remainder of the twelve hundred and fifty-six dollars being stopped. Boats may not get twelve quintals to the ton, or vessels may have their voyages broken up, and not stay four months on the fishing ground; in either case they would receive nothing. Take all these together, is it not to be doubted that twelve hundred and fifty-six dollars will remain of the forty-four thousand in the Treasury?

But these are trifles which I cannot believe gentlemen are anxious about.

For the event cannot be reduced to a certainty. What quantity of fish will be exported, no man can tell now. But as Government may receive more than it will pay, the chance may turn the other way, and it may have to pay a few hundred dollars more than it will have received. We have seen that the chance is most in favor of Government. But one chance must balance the other. This answer is sincerely relied on as a good one.

I barely mention that the wear of cordage, cables, sails, and anchors, is very great. These articles, on being imported, pay duties. So that it is probable the extra duty paid by the fishery on their extra consumption, will overbalance any little sums supposed to exceed in the bounty.

It has been asked, as if some cunning was detected, why if the money received in the Treasury to pay the drawbacks is equal to the proposed bounties, a further appropriation should be made? This cunning question admits of several very simple answers.

The bill being for seven years, the average product is the proper sum to be calculated. But the three first years may fall short of the bounties, say two thousand dollars a year, which is six thousand dollars.

The four last may exceed two thousand dollars, say eight thousand dollars.

Shall a poor fisherman wait for the whole, or if he takes his part according to the money in the Treasury--for a twenty-fourth part of the bounty on his vessel, from 1792 to 1795?

2d. This delay would happen after a bad year, the very time when he would most need prompt pay.

3d. But fish taken this year will not be exported till December next. Therefore the money will not be stopped by the drawback as the law stands, till six months after.

A substitute has been proposed for the clause, to appropriate the drawback only.

This is absolutely improper. For the ten cents allowed as drawback is but a part of the duty paid on salt. It is not easy to see any reason why a part stopped at the Treasury should be equal to the whole paid there long before. The drawback falls near nine thousand dollars short of the salt duty received by the Government. The expense of the drawback would be very heavy and useless.

Nor may gentlemen apprehend that Government, by paying next December, will advance money to the fishery. The salt duty will have been paid, and Government will have the use of the money many months before the fishermen will have a right to call for the bounties.

It is left to the candor of the gentlemen who have urged this objection, whether a better or further answer is desired.

After having laboriously gone through the estimate of the probable export of fish, it will not be necessary to be equally minute as to the quantity or kind of vessels which are to receive the bounty.

The estimate we believe to be very high. That it is high enough, we suppose very probable from the estimate of the Secretary of State, which is only nineteen thousand one hundred and eighty-five tons.

This mode of paying the bounty on the tonnage is very simple and safe. The measurement is already made and costs nothing; and as it was made to pay a duty on tonnage, we are very sure that Government will not be cheated by an over-measure. The mode of paying the drawback, as the law now stands, is expensive, perplexed and embarrassing; liable to frauds and delays.

This intricate and disgusting detail of calculations was necessary to satisfy the committee that each of the three grounds of defence on which the bill rests, is tenable.

Instead of impoverishing the nation by scattering the treasures of the whole to benefit a part, it appears that we are preserving a mine of treasure. In point of naval protection, we can scarcely estimate the fishery too highly. It is always ready, always equal to the object; it is almost the only sufficient source of security by sea. Our navigation is certainly a precious interest of the country. But no part of our navigation can vie with the fishery in respect to the protection it affords. There is no point which regards our national wealth or national safety, in respect to which it seems practicable to do so much with so little.

We rely on the evidence before you, that the public will not sustain the charge of a dollar. Those ought not to doubt the evidence who cannot invalidate it. If then the fishermen ask you to restore only their own money, will you deny them? Will you return to every other person exporting dutied goods the money he has paid, and will you refuse the poor fisherman?

If there must be an instance of the kind, will you single out for this oppressive partiality, that branch which is described by the Secretary of State as too poor even to bear its own part of the common burden; that branch which nevertheless has borne the neglect of our nation, and the persecution of foreign prohibitions and duties; a branch which, though we have received much and expect more, both of money and services, urges no claims but such as common justice has sanctioned?

Mr. GERRY having moved to strike out the words "bounty allowed" in order to insert _allowance made_, by way of accommodation,

Mr. MURRAY observed, that the question was, whether a bounty should be given for the encouragement of the fishery: the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. GERRY) did not alter the principle--it was still "_the old cocked hat_" on the one hand, and on the other, "_the cocked old hat_:" the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FITZSIMONS) had asserted, that Congress have a right to alter the drawbacks, and allow them in any other mode, by which the citizens may receive back their own money; but this is not a case of that nature; for the bill says, "in case the moneys appropriated (_for the payment of the duties_) shall be inadequate, the deficiency shall be supplied from the Treasury;" here the Treasury is pledged for the payment of the bounties; and the question is, not on the principle of changing the drawback, but the giving encouragement to a particular branch, at the expense of the community at large.

Mr. BARNWELL observed, that those who are best acquainted with the fisheries, look on the proposed mode of encouragement as the best; and that they ought to be allowed to use the gifts of the public in the most advantageous manner: that, if he were himself concerned in the cultivation of any particular commodity, for the encouragement of which a sum were granted, he would be much surprised to meet a refusal, in case he should come forward and propose some more effectual mode of applying that grant: that even if the bounties should happen to exceed the drawbacks, by eight or ten thousand dollars, the number of seamen to be maintained would be well worth that sum: that whenever the two Houses of Congress and the President of the United States are of opinion that the general welfare will be promoted by raising any sum of money, they have undoubted right to raise it, provided that the taxes be uniform; that although it may not at present be an object of great consequence to America to become a maritime power, yet it is of some importance to have constantly at hand a nursery of seamen, to furnish our merchants with the means of transporting their commodities across the sea; that, whatever allowance or bounty is granted upon any particular commodity, must ever be paid by the whole, for the advantage of a part, whether it be upon cotton to the Southward, upon fish to the Eastward, or upon other commodities to the Middle States; that if the people cannot have so much confidence in their Representatives, as to trust them with the power of granting bounties, the Government must be a very paltry one indeed. The object of the bill was only to allow to the fishermen, in the manner that would be most beneficial to them, the same sum that would otherwise be allowed. If, however, from time and experience, it should appear that this bounty proved an imposition on Government, he would not hesitate to revoke it.

Mr. GERRY.--The State of Massachusetts asks nothing more than equal justice. We do not come forward to request favors from the United States, we only wish that the same system which is applied to other parts of the Union, may be applied to us. But, in examining this question, we wish that gentlemen would not make distinctions which will not admit of a difference.

The proposed allowance has been called a bounty on occupation, and is said to be very different from that encouragement, which is the incidental result of a general commercial system; but in reality it is no bounty: a bounty is a grant, made without any consideration whatever, as an equivalent; and I have no idea of a bounty, which admits of receiving from the person, on whom it is conferred, the amount of what is granted. We have imposed a duty on salt, and thereby draw a certain sum of money from the fishermen; the drawback is, in all instances, the amount of the money received; this is all we ask; and we ask it for a set of men who are as well entitled to the regard of Government as any other class of citizens.