Chapter LXXII: Introduction (71)

Mr. S. repeated his former assertion, that there were cases where that House had not the right of withholding appropriations; if they had the power, indeed, they might stop the proceedings of Government altogether; and so, individuals had the power of resisting the laws. Gentlemen had said, that if this doctrine prevailed, the House would lose its capacity of judging. He denied it; they would still retain, in such cases, a discretion, guided by morality, good faith, and the constitution; the members were as much bound by the laws in their Legislative, as in their individual capacity; if an existing law (or Treaty, which was a law of the highest nature) prescribed a certain duty, they were bound to perform it, and their discretion could only be called in to regulate the mode and circumstances of discharging that duty; it could not be a matter of discretion whether or not they should perform that duty. Thus, unless they intended to arrest the operations of Government, their discretion could not be requisite to determine whether they should appropriate the moneys necessary for its support; but out of what fund, and when the moneys shall be paid, and other matters of detail. So, when a Treaty was concluded, and became a compact binding the nation, the discretion of the House (unless it was intended to violate our faith) could not determine whether the moneys contracted for should be paid, but the mode, the fund, and such questions of detail, would alone be considered. The distinction, which was an obvious one, between power and right, had not been attended to. The House had certainly the power to do many things which they had not the right to do; they had the power to do wrong, but they certainly had not the right to do wrong; and whether the wrong was committed by acting where they ought not to act, or refusing to act where they ought, was immaterial; both were equally reprehensible. It had been boldly said, that there was no case which could possibly come before them, where they would not be at liberty to answer aye or no: he would produce a case--by the constitution, on the application of a certain number of States, wishing for amendments, Congress must call a Convention; where is this boasted discretion, of which so much has been said? Could the House, in this case, exercise its discretion, whether or no a Convention should be called? Why not? Because the constitution says it must call a Convention: and does not the constitution say, "Treaties made by the PRESIDENT and Senate are laws, and that laws must be obeyed?" The same injunctions of the constitution are imposed in both cases; and as in the first, all this House could do, would be to regulate the time and place of holding the Convention; so, in the latter, their discretion would be limited to the mode, and fund, and other details. The gentleman had mentioned the article in the constitution respecting appropriations for military services--they were to be limited to two years; this article proved itself that appropriations might be unlimited in every other case. When a Military Establishment was instituted, it was known that an appropriation law for that purpose could not be in force more than two years; no inconvenience, then, could result. But there was no such limitation in respect to any other branch of expenditure; from custom, appropriations for the support of Government were annual; appropriations even for pensions were annual, and yet no one doubted that, as the pension was a contract, the appropriation for it was always a thing of course; no discretion could be exercised, in respect to the payment, without a breach of faith.

MARCH 11.--In Committee of the Whole, on Mr. LIVINGSTON's resolution.

Mr. GILES said, he expected, when the present motion was made, that it would not be opposed. The expected agency of the House respecting the Treaty, or some subjects relating to it, made him imagine that the propriety of having the papers called for could not be denied. The Treaty has been referred to a Committee of the Whole, surely in order to act on it in some shape or other. Indeed, the PRESIDENT, in his Speech, at the opening of the session, expressly says, that he will lay the subject before them. This he considered as full evidence, that the PRESIDENT conceived it must come under the notice of the House. If the papers could serve to explain any point relative to that instrument, surely the possession of them was desirable.

The right of the House to consider of the expediency of Treaties, so far as the provisions of them clash with their specific powers, had been indirectly brought in in considering the present motion. He regretted that this important constitutional question should be about to be decided indirectly; but, this being the situation of the debate, he should state his reasons why he conceived the argument on this ground ought not to be considered as of sufficient strength to cause a negative of the motion before the committee.

The question is, whether there be any provisions in the constitution by which this House can in any case check the Treaty-making power; and, of consequence, whether it can question the merits of Treaties under any circumstances?

Various considerations had been advanced to show that the House cannot question the merits of a Treaty. Some of these considerations had grown out of the subject extrinsically, others from the provisions of the constitution. Though at first he had intended to have stated simply his own opinion of the constitution on the important question now in view, yet, as gentlemen had gone fully into the question in that shape, and others had stated a variety of objections to the construction the friends of the motion contended for, he should proceed to answer them, and suffer his opinion of the meaning of the constitution to be incidental.

The gentleman from South Carolina had referred to the opinions of the Conventions of the States at the time of adopting the constitution. As to Virginia, the gentleman had stated that that State had considered the checks as provided by the constitution as inadequate, and proposed an amendment, purporting to require two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, instead of two-thirds of the number present. This was true, he believed; but how would it apply in the sense the gentleman wished? The objection of that State was, that the check in the Senate, provided in the Treaty-making power, was not sufficient, and they proposed a greater: from which he would argue that they conceived the Treaty-making power to be a subject of extreme delicacy, and that they wished additional checks consequently added. How this was to prove that the Convention of Virginia did not construe the present clauses of the constitution under debate as the friends of the present motion did, he was at a loss to determine. The gentleman who cited this instance had not quoted any part of the proceeding on the subject, or of the reasons that led to the amendment. He had merely mentioned the result to the House.

The practice of the House had been referred to yesterday by the member last up, (Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina.) He had remarked that the House had passed a general resolution directing the Clerk to place in the code of laws of the United States Treaties made under the authority of the United States. Was this, he asked, an exposition of the meaning of the constitution? He believed the resolution a very proper one, and would vote now for its adoption, if it was yet to be passed. It is certainly proper, when a Treaty is concluded under the authority of the United States, that it should be annexed to their code of laws; but this could not weigh against the exercise of discretion in the House on important Legislative subjects.

The practice of the House, with respect to appropriation laws, in the cases of Indian Treaties, had been mentioned by the member from South Carolina. In the first place, observing upon this, he would remark, that he always conceived there was a distinction between an Indian Treaty and a Treaty with a foreign nation. The English had always made a distinction when we were Colonies. The constitution establishes an express difference. He should not, however, found his objections to the inference of the gentleman upon this, but would examine it unconnected with this distinction. Provisions had been made by this House to carry Indian Treaties into effect; but why? No doubt because the House conceived it wise so to do, not because they had not a right to use their discretion in the business. Suppose, on any of those occasions, a motion had been made to strike out the sum proposed to be appropriated, would it have been said that the motion was out of order? A similar motion was made lately with respect to the Mint, and it was not considered as out of order. If, on that occasion, it had been the opinion of the House that the Mint was an improper establishment, by refusing the appropriation they could have defeated the law. It was certainly the opinion of the House that they could exercise their discretion in the business, for it was not even hinted that the motion for striking out was out of order.

On another head the gentleman appeared to plume himself much. He had asked, why, since the PRESIDENT had proclaimed a Treaty as the law of the land, which was not the law of the land, why he was not impeached? This question, the member exultingly remarked, had not been answered, because, he imagined, it could not be answered.

Suppose I should tell the gentleman, said Mr. G., that I could not now give him an answer, would it show that the House had not the authority contended for by the friends of the present motion? Why was the subject mentioned? Not with a view, I believe, to the discovery of the truth. I fear it is calculated to produce an opposite effect--to check investigation. It is too often the case that the names of persons are brought into view, not to promote the development of principles, but as having a tendency to destroy freedom of inquiry. I will go further with the gentleman, and admit for a moment (a position, however, I shall by and by controvert) that the PRESIDENT conceived that he had a right, after the exchange of ratifications, to promulgate the Treaty as the supreme law of the land; what would this amount to? Why, only that this was his opinion; but is that authority here? In any other case rather than the present, I should be inclined to pay a greater respect to opinions from that source; but now, when the question is about the division of powers between two departments, are we to be told of the opinions of one of those departments, to show that the other has no right to the exercise of power in the case. Such appeals are not calculated to convince, but to alarm.

Having examined the objections to the construction contended for by the friends of the motion, drawn from collateral sources, he should turn his attention next, he said, to the intrinsic meaning of the constitution. He would attempt to interpret the constitution from the words of it. It was a misfortune the clauses were not more clear and explicit, so far as to force the same meaning upon every mind, however they might differ in opinion in other respects. However, from the imperfection of language, it was no wonder, he observed, that on an instrument providing for so many different objects, and providing such a variety of checks, various opinions as to construction should arise; but he considered the present clauses of as plain import as any part of the instrument. The construction contended for by the opposers of the motion is, beyond denial, the most dangerous in its effects, and the least probable, as he thought, in its meaning. It is contended by them that the Treaty-making power is undefined in its nature, unlimited as to its objects, and supreme in its operation; that the Treaty-making power embraces all the Legislative powers; operates by controlling all other authorities, and that it is unchecked. When he had asserted this power, as contended by the gentlemen to be unlimited in its objects, he meant, however, that they had confined it only within the limits of the constitution; but even admitting it in that extent, is certainly a doctrine sufficiently alarming. When the gentlemen contend for its supremacy, they also admit in this point some qualifications; according to their doctrine, it is not to be supreme over the head of the constitution, but in every other respect they contend that it shall be unlimited, supreme, undefined. Gentlemen who insist that Treaties are supreme, next to the constitution, must also grant that there is no necessity for the House to trouble themselves with making laws.

The construction contended for by the friends of the resolution is derived from two sources--from the constitution, and the nature of things. The constitution says, the PRESIDENT, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present, shall make Treaties. Perhaps, if there was no other clause, the Treaty-making power might be considered as unlimited. Another clause declares that the constitution, the laws made under it, and Treaties, shall be the supreme law of the land. Here the gentlemen, when they quote this clause, stop, as if there were no other words in it; and from all this it would appear that the people had, in fact, delegated an unchecked power. But, if we go on, it will be found that the last-mentioned clause adds that the judges in the respective States shall cause them to be executed, any thing in the constitution or laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding. From the jealousy which individual States showed under the Old Confederation for the preservation of their powers, and the inconveniences which were experienced in consequence, it was found necessary, when organizing a new Government, to declare, explicitly, that their constitutions and laws must yield to the _Constitution_, _laws_ and _Treaties_ of the United States, and for this purpose this clause was introduced.

The checks on the Treaty-making power he considered as divisible into two classes; the first, consists in the necessary concurrence of the House to give efficacy to Treaties; which concurrent power they derive from the enumeration of the Legislative powers of the House. Where the Treaty-making power is exercised, it must be under the reservation, that its provisions, so far as they interfere with the specified powers delegated to Congress, must be so far submitted to the discretion of that department of the Government. The PRESIDENT and Senate, by the constitution, have the power of making Treaties, Congress the power of regulating commerce, raising armies, &c.; and these, he contended, must form so many exceptions to the general power. Gentlemen had said that the constitution was the exposition of the will of the people, and, as such, that they would obey its injunctions. There could be no difference of opinion on this ground; for his own part, he confessed if he adored any thing on earth, it is that will. But the question is, what is that will, as expressed in the constitution? That instrument, to his mind, explained this question very clearly. It enumerates certain powers which it declares specifically vested in Congress; and where is the danger to be apprehended from the doctrine laid down by the friends of the resolution? The contrary construction must produce the most pernicious consequences; agreeably to that, there would remain no check over the most unlimited power in the Government. The gentlemen contend, that the House must remain silent spectators in the business of a Treaty, and that they have no right to the exercise of an opinion in the matter; they must then abandon their constitutional right of legislation; they must abandon the constitution and cling to Treaties as supreme.

The other check over the Treaty-making power, he noticed, was the power of making appropriations, the exercise of which is specifically vested in Congress. He begged leave to call the particular attention of the committee to this part of the subject. The constitution says, that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law. This is no doubt intended as a check in addition to those possessed by the House. It is meant to enable the House, without the concurrence of the other branches, to check, by refusing money, any mischief in the operations carrying on in any department of the Government. But what is a law? It is a rule prescribed by competent authority. The word law in the clause of the constitution he had last noticed, was not meant in reference to the Treaty-making power; but in reference to Congress. A law prescribes a rule of conduct; it is the expression of the will of the proper authority; it is the result of discretion. Legislation implies deliberation. If a law is the expression of the will, must not an appropriation law be equally so? But gentlemen had found out a new-fashioned exposition of the word discretion, and, according to their definition in fact, it was no discretion at all. They had mentioned a part of the constitution which provides that the salaries of the Judicial Department shall be fixed; and asked, whether the House should conceive itself at liberty to use a discretion in appropriations for that department? Before he could consider this case, and that before the House, now parallel, he must beg gentlemen would point out any part of the constitution that declared the House should not exercise their discretion when called upon to make appropriations to carry into effect a Treaty. He could find nowhere, that, in this case, the right of opinion of the House is constrained.

The uniform practice of the British Government had been cited to have been, in the case of Treaties, the same as that contended for by the friends of the present motion. The greatest security for the liberties of the people established in that Government, depends on the control which their Parliament has over the purse-strings. In England, this power rests merely on custom; here, the House are expressly intrusted with it; what is custom in England, is reduced to writing in our constitution. Then, if this power is in England a ground for Parliament to judge of Treaties, it is a fair inference that it ought to be exercised here. The practice of the British Government, he observed, had often been quoted here, in support of doctrines very different from those in aid of which it is now cited; it has been deemed orthodox when it favored Executive prerogative. He confessed, he never did expect that, as early as 1796, a reference would be made to practices, under the British Government, in support of the rights of the popular branch of our Government. It was painful to be obliged to have resort to that Government on such an occasion; but the authority of that Government should not be rejected for once, because its practice could be quoted in favor of the popular branch. The ground of the practice in England, and of the right claimed here, rests upon the sound maxim, that all public money is from the pockets of the people, and that it should be expended by none but their Representatives. No maxim had been more instrumental than this, in preserving the remnants of British freedom; and thus early is the House called upon to abandon it here.

Treaties are contended to be paramount to the laws; the PRESIDENT and Senate make these Treaties, and when made and proclaimed as the supreme law, there is a predestinated necessity in the House to make the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect. The danger of this doctrine, he said, could not be better exemplified, than by a reference to the circumstances that attended the late Treaty in its progress. Three years ago, a difference took place between the different branches of Government, as to the policy that should obtain in reference to the conduct of one foreign nation. The House were unwilling to trust solely to the magnanimity of the King, and wished to make some exertions themselves for self-protection. With this view several measures were proposed, viz: commercial restrictions, non-importation, embargo, sequestration, or rather arrestation upon the ground of the _status quo_. One of the measures passed the House by a respectable majority, but was rejected in the Senate by the casting vote of the VICE PRESIDENT. The PRESIDENT appointed an Envoy Extraordinary, who entered into certain stipulations, which, being sanctioned by two-thirds of the Senate, it is now contended, are to operate the destruction of the powers specifically vested in the House.

If the above was a true statement, he said, and he did not see in what particular it could be contradicted, then the Executive had been exerted as a check upon the Legislative power, for the negotiation necessarily foreclosed any further Legislative proceedings. It did more than this; the Executive legislated against legislation, and overruled them on the subject in contest. He should not advert at this time, he said, to the collateral circumstances which attended this business, nor go further in detail; he wished only to remark generally on the dangerous operation of the doctrines contended for. Now, it is said, the House have nothing to do but to obey, to appropriate the necessary money, leaving all deliberation aside.

If the PRESIDENT, said Mr. GILES, can, by the assistance of a foreign power, legislate against the rights of the House to legislate, and his proceedings are to be binding on the House, it necessarily destroys their right to the exercise of discretion. If he can by Treaty declare, that commerce shall not be regulated, that property shall not be sequestrated, and that piracies shall be judged and punished as he thinks fit; if he is to exercise the unlimited Treaty-making power contended for, what security have we that he may not go further when the negotiations are renewed with Great Britain, agreeably to the stipulations of the present Treaty? What security have we that he will not agree with Great Britain, that if she will keep up an army of ten thousand men in Canada, he will do the same here? How could such a stipulation be got over by the House, when they are told that in matters of Treaty they must not pretend to exercise their will, but must obey? How will this doctrine operate upon the power of appropriation? A military establishment may be instituted for twenty years, and as their moral sense is to prevent their withholding appropriations, they can have no power over its existence.

Gentlemen had gone so far as to declare, that an attempt to examine the merits of the Treaty was rebellion, was treason against the constitution. What justifies these harsh epithets? Such assertions could only create ill-will, and could not tend to the investigation of truth. Another argument of the same nature had been used. It was said, that the attempt at exercising a control over the Treaty-making power was disorganizing the Government. He believed the contrary would be found to be the case. The doctrine advocated by the friends to the motion, only goes to claim a negative voice in the business of Treaty-making; whereas the doctrine of its opposers claims the exercise of a power, that would supersede the specific authority delegated to the Legislature in all cases whatever.

Mr. SEDGWICK said, that, after the length of time which had been consumed, and the talents which had been so ably exerted in the discussion of this subject, he should not think himself authorized to call the attention of the committee to any observations of his; but, that he considered it in principle, and in its consequences, as the most important question which had ever been debated in this House. It was no less than whether this House should, by construction and implication, extend its controlling influence to subjects which were expressly, and he thought exclusively, delegated by the people to another department of the Government. We had heretofore been warned emphatically against seizing on power by construction and implication. He had known no instance in which the caution that warning enforced, deserved more attention than on the present occasion.

It would be taken for granted, and it would be conceded on all hands, that we were to resort to the constitution, to know the extent and limits of our power, and if we found not there a clear evidence of its existence, we ought to abandon the exercise. It was certain we had not any express delegation to make or to control the public will in any of our relations with foreign nations. On the other hand, we found it declared, that the PRESIDENT should have power to make Treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concurred. Treaties, to attain the ends for which they were designed, were, from their nature, supreme laws; but the constitution had, in another place, declared, Treaties made under the authority of the United States should be supreme laws. Gentlemen had said, that it was not declared that Treaties made by the PRESIDENT and Senate should have this effect; but those made under the authority of the United States. The question then recurred, what Treaties were made under the authority of the United States? The true answer undoubtedly was, Treaties made by those to whom the people, by their constitution, had delegated the power. The PRESIDENT, qualified as had been mentioned, had expressly, and none else had such power. If we were to rest the subject here, it would seem to follow irresistibly, and to be incapable almost of higher proof, that whenever a compact was formed by the PRESIDENT with a foreign nation, and had received the advice and consent of the Senate, if it was of such a nature as to be properly denominated a Treaty, all its stipulations would thereby, and from that moment, become "supreme laws."

The power of treating between independent nations might be classed under the following heads: 1. To compose and adjust differences, whether to terminate or to prevent war. 2. To form contracts for mutual security or defence; or to make Treaties, offensive or defensive. 3. To regulate an intercourse for mutual benefit, or to form Treaties of commerce. Without the first, war and contention could only be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties; without the second, there could be no defence, by means of union and concert, against superior force; and without the last, a profitable and beneficial intercourse could not be arranged on terms of reciprocity. Hence, then, it must be evident to every unprejudiced mind, that by a grant of power to make Treaties, authority was given to bind the nation by stipulations; to preserve peace or terminate war; to enter into alliances, offensive and defensive, and to form commercial Treaties.

This power, he held, unlimited by the constitution, and he held, too, that in its nature, to the extent he had mentioned, it was illimitable. Did a serious difference exist with a foreign nation, in determining on the nature and extent of the stipulations which might be necessary to adjust it, the cause of injury, national rights and honor, the evils of war, and all circumstances of relation between the two countries, must be taken into account. In forming alliances, the threatened pressure, your own and your enemy's relative strength, the objects of acquisition or defence, must be considered. And, in adjusting an equitable intercourse for commercial purposes, a thousand circumstances present themselves for nice calculations. A thousand circumstances of foreign relations would occur in the history of every country, under which nothing short of unlimited powers of negotiation would be adequate to a prevention of enormous, perhaps ruinous evils.

But it might be objected that a power so enormous, and comprehending such essential interests, might be abused, and thence asked, where is the remedy? To this he answered, that a national association required, for the great purpose of preservation, an unlimited confidence on many subjects. Hence, not only this, but perhaps every other national government, had delegated to it an unlimited control over the persons and property of the nation.

It might, by the express power given to it of raising armies, convert every citizen into a soldier, and, by a single assessment of a tax, it might command the use of all the property in the country.

The power to raise armies and taxes was limited in its exercise by nothing but the discretion of the Legislature, under the direction of its prudence, wisdom, and virtue. Was there no security against a wanton abuse of these enormous powers? Yes, it was to be hoped that the people, in electing the members of this House, and the States in choosing those of the other, would not select characters, who, regardless of the public good, would wantonly impose on their constituents unnecessary burdens. It would be an additional security, that the interests of the rulers were inseparably connected with those of the people; that they could impose no burdens in which themselves did not equally participate. But, should all these guards be insufficient, was there no dependence to be placed in the PRESIDENT?--the man elected by a refined process, pre-eminent in fame and virtue as in rank! Was there no security in the watchful guardianship of such a character? Responsible by every thing dear and valuable to man--his reputation, his own and his fellow-citizens' happiness--was there no well-founded reliance on all these considerations, for security against oppression? If not, we had not the requisite materials by which to administer a republican government, and the project might be abandoned. After all, however, should the unlimited powers he had mentioned (and such powers must always be unlimited) be wantonly abused, was there no remedy? Yes, in the good sense and manly independent spirit of the people. If intolerable burdens were wantonly imposed; if necessary to defeat the oppression, opposition and insurrection would not only be authorized, but become a duty. And if any man could honestly lay his hand on his heart, and in sincerity declare, that a compliance with any existing Treaty was worth more than our Government, our constitution, our Union, and the liberty protected by them; to that man he was ready to declare, that opposition had become a duty. But, in every instance of opposition, whether in defeat of a Legislative act, or of a Treaty, the right of resistance resulted not from the constitution itself, for it had declared no such right; no constitution could declare it. It existed in original principles, and never could be exercised but by resorting to them.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MADISON) had stated five different constructions which possibly might be given to the constitution on this subject; three of which, (and for none of them to Mr. S.'s knowledge had any man ever contended,) the gentleman had proved to be unfounded. The fourth, that which he had given to the constitution, if admitted, and it should be abused, might produce mischievous effects. Was not this true of all the great and essential powers of government? If the controlling influence of this House was added, would the power be less? And if, under these circumstances, abused, would the injury be more tolerable? In short, was not this a kind of argument infinitely more tending to the production of prejudice than to the discovery of truth?

The gentleman has really given no decisive opinion what was the true construction. He had, however, seemed to incline to a belief that to the stipulations of a Treaty relative to any subject committed to the control of the Legislature, to give them validity, Legislative co-operation was necessary. Of consequence, if this was withheld, the operation of the Treaty would be defeated. That it was at the will, and within the discretion, of the Legislature to withhold such co-operation, and of course the House might control and defeat the solemn engagements of the PRESIDENT and Senate.

The gentleman who had suggested this opinion was well known to the committee, and throughout America. Mr. S. could not but observe that it was perfectly unaccountable to his mind, that that gentleman had yet to form an opinion to whom was delegated that power, the nature, extent, and effects of which he had so strongly and perspicuously detailed. The capacity of that gentleman's mind, long exercised on political subjects, his known caution and prudence, would authorize a request that he or his friends would explain how it was possible, if such as he states should have been the intention of those who framed the constitution, that the true meaning should not have been expressed in the instrument? That when the gentleman went from the Assembly which framed the constitution, immediately afterwards, to one of those which ratified it, he should have admitted an opposite construction? As Mr. S. would undertake, by and by, to prove that, in the Convention of Virginia, he did admit the very construction for which we now contended, he would take the liberty further to inquire, how it happened, that, if such was really the intention of the instrument, that such was the meaning of the people, no man had heard of it until the discovery was produced by the British Treaty? Strange national intention, unknown for years to every individual!

As the gentleman had been pleased to dwell on the idea of a co-operation between the powers of the Government, he would take the liberty to state, what had been ably explained by other gentlemen, that the power of making Treaties was wholly different from that of making ordinary laws; originating from different motives; producing different effects, and operating to a different extent. In all those particulars, the difference had been perfectly understood. For instance, the ordinary legal protection of property, and the punishment of its violation, could never be extended beyond your own jurisdiction; but, by Treaty, the same protection could be extended within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. You could not legislate an adjustment of disputes, nor a peace with another country; but, by Treaty, both might be effected. Your laws, in no instance, could operate except in your own jurisdiction, and on your own citizens. By Treaty, an operation was given to stipulations within the jurisdiction of both the contracting parties.

It had been said that Treaties could not operate on those subjects which were consigned to Legislative control. If this be true, said he, how impotent in this respect is the power of the Government! What, then, permit me to inquire, can the power of treating effect? I will tell you what it cannot do; it can make no alliances, because any stipulations for offensive or defensive operations, will infringe on the Legislative power of declaring war, laying taxes, or raising armies, or all of them. No Treaty of peace can probably be made, which will not either ascertain boundaries, stipulate privileges to aliens, the payment of money, or a cession of a territory, and certainly no Treaty of commerce can be made.

Was it not strange, that, to this late hour, it should have been delayed, and that now, all at once, it should have been discovered, that no power was delegated to any person to regulate our foreign relations? That, although a power was granted to the PRESIDENT and Senate to form Treaties, that yet there were such reservations and restrictions, that there remained nothing on which this power could operate? Or was it true, that this power was competent to treat with every government on earth but that of Great Britain? Might he not be permitted further to inquire, if this Treaty had been formed with any other power, with the precise stipulations it now contained, whether there ever would have existed this doubt of constitutionality.

MARCH 14.--In Committee of the Whole on Mr. LIVINGSTON's resolution:

Mr. SAMUEL LYMAN said he rose only to make a few observations. He was against the resolution now on the table, as involving a doctrine, in his opinion, not only inconsistent with the principles of the constitution, but also inconsistent with the laws of nations. In debating the merits of this resolution, an exceedingly important abstract constitutional question had arisen, viz: How far that House had a right to exercise their Legislative discretion and judgment relative to carrying a Treaty into effect. In order to answer this question, he would raise two premises. And, first, by the constitution, the Legislative powers of that House, in co-operation with the other branches of the Legislature, extend to all objects within the reach of their sovereignty, excepting the reservations to the distinct sovereignties of the several States which compose the Union; but beyond those boundaries their powers could not extend. Secondly, there is, by the constitution, attached to the Legislature a subordinate kind of power, of a limited and ministerial, or Executive nature. At present, it did not occur to him that this subordinate power was to be exercised in its simplicity, excepting in two instances, viz: 1st, for calling a Convention under certain circumstances to amend the constitution; and, 2dly, for carrying into effect Treaties which are constitutionally made; for these two purposes, the people, who are the source of power, had stripped that House of all Legislative authority, and made them only the executors of their will; therefore, upon these premises he answered, if a Treaty was unconstitutional, they had an undoubted right to exercise a Legislative discretion and judgment relative to carrying it into operation, for they were sent there as the guardians of the rights of their fellow-citizens, and, for that purpose, are sworn to support the constitution; but if the Treaty was constitutional, they had not a right to exercise that discretion; for, without their intervention, it becomes the supreme law of the land, and virtually repeals all laws which are repugnant to it; and in that case that House is bound to obey it, and to carry it into complete execution; for, by the constitution, the power of making Treaties is vested solely and exclusively in the Executive Department. In the former case, they have a right to exercise a deliberative or Legislative power, but not in the latter case; they could there only exercise a ministerial or Executive power. So that herein, said he, lies the true distinction, and it arises from the nature and principles of the constitution.

He had not the least doubt of the constitutionality of a treaty, when the stipulations in it were of such a nature as not to respect objects of legislation, but only objects which lay beyond the bounds of their sovereignty; for beyond those limits their laws could not extend as rules to regulate the conduct of subjects of foreign Powers; and although some stipulations in a Treaty may respect objects which were within the reach of their sovereignty, yet it may be in such manner as to be strictly constitutional; for such stipulations may be not only pertinent, but absolutely necessary in forming the Treaty. This conclusion, he thought, was the natural and necessary result of a fair and liberal construction of the principles of the constitution, and especially of that paragraph which vests the power of making Treaties in the Supreme Executive, with the advice of the Senate.

Mr. L. said he was sensible he had been delivering an unpopular doctrine, but that he was deeply impressed with its truth, its reality, and its importance; and that the obligations of an oath had prevented his silence on the occasion.

Mr. BALDWIN said he had before expressed his opinion, in general terms, in favor of this question. It must have been observed that he had been for several days noting the debates, and preparing to take part in them. He had intended to have introduced the debate on Friday morning last, but a singular incident prevented him, which he felt it to be his duty to take this earliest opportunity to state to the House. Mr. B. then said: about five minutes before I expected to rise on the question, I was called out of the House by a person then unknown to me, who said his name was FRELINGHUYSEN, and whom I found to be a Senator of the United States. After a number of interviews, he observed, with great expressions of pain and regret, that he was at last obliged to the unwelcome office of delivering me that letter, which I opened and found to be a challenge directed to me from JAMES GUNN, who is also a Senator of the United States. The pretext for this transaction was, to extort from me some private letters which I had received early in the session from a number of my constituents, expressing their wish that I would endeavor to prevent any thing being done in Congress to validate the Mississippi Yazoo Land Speculation before the meeting of the State Legislature. There was no complaint of any personal indecorum or disrespect at all; whether they were actuated in their conduct solely by interest in Yazoo speculations, I will not pretend to judge. The revival of a transaction of so old a date at that particular moment, was to me surprising. Not knowing their degree of relation to this question between the two Houses, and not knowing the cast of character but of one of them, I am left only to conjecture. It was so peculiarly timed, and the professed object also of so peculiar a nature, to interrupt the channels of confidence for free communication between me and my constituents, that I have thought it my duty not to let the treatment of it depend on my own individual discretion. I consider it as in the discretion of the House. Mr. B. also observed that he felt himself under the necessity of using this as an apology for the apparent neglects of Friday, after the particular attention he had before appeared to pay to the discussion; and for his not being able to notice any of the proceedings in the debate of Friday, he had supposed he had lost the opportunity of offering his opinion, but was glad to find the question had not been taken, as he was unwilling to suffer this, or even a greater interruption, to prevent him from declaring his opinion, as he had before intended.

He said, it was remarkable that several gentlemen rose with very different expressions which had been said to contain the subject in discussion. It was certainly important to agree exactly on that point. The least variation in the point of departure would soon diverge till they were out of sight of each other, and yet each one keep a straight direction. One gentleman had stated, that the question was, whether this House should feel itself at liberty to judge over the heads of PRESIDENT and Senate on the subject of Treaties without restraint: his reasoning seemed to be built on that proposition. Another gentleman had said that the question was, whether the power of making Treaties was given by the constitution to the PRESIDENT and two-thirds of the Senate, or to the PRESIDENT and both branches of the Legislature. He might mention several others, but he called the attention of the House to the fact, to settle the point, that they might at least agree what they were talking about. The question, said he, on the table is, to request of the PRESIDENT papers respecting the Treaty: the objection is, you ought not to ask for the papers, because you have no right to touch the subject. He begged leave then to ask, with the utmost candor and respect, whether the real question now depending and brought into dispute by this motion, is not whether all questions relating to this subject are not so definitely and perfectly settled by the constitution, that there was nothing for that House to deliberate upon on the occasion, but only punctually to provide the funds to carry the Treaty into effect. If it were allowed that there might be any possible or extraordinary cases on the subject of Treaty-making, in which it might ever be proper for that House to deliberate--as, for instance, offensive Treaties which might bring the country into a war--subsidies and support of foreign armies--introduction of an established religion from a foreign country, or any other of those acts which are by the constitution prohibited to Congress, but not prohibited to the makers of Treaties; if it were allowed that there might possibly exist any such case, in which it might ever be proper for Congress to deliberate, it would seem to be giving up the ground on which the discussion of the present question has been placed; what agency the House should take, and when, would be other questions. Whether a case would probably occur once in a hundred years that would warrant the House in touching the subject, is of no consequence to the debate. The right is denied in the largest sense. The assertion is, that the House has no right to deliberate or to look into any papers on the subject; that the people have, by the constitution, reposed the whole of their confidence on this subject elsewhere; that, to attempt to deliberate upon it, or to ask for any papers respecting it, is treason and anarchy.

If this ground were once given up, he should be infinitely less anxious what the House might do in any particular case: these would rest on their individual merits. For his own part, he was by no means disposed to carry the interference of the House to any extreme; but he could not express his abhorrence of the doctrine in the extent to which some gentlemen have carried it in this discussion. He begged leave to entreat gentlemen again candidly to review the few words in the constitution on which they rested so much, and to ask whether they appeared to be such labored expressions as they supposed--so apt and definite as to mean exactly what they contend for, and nothing else; and whether all the words may not well be satisfied without, and stand more harmoniously connected with the other parts of the constitution.

How much they intended to incorporate with this power of Treaty-making, under cover of contract with foreign nations, he had not heard any one attempt to explain; it seemed designed to stand distinguished as an indefinite, uncontrolled branch of the Government, the extent of whose powers was to be known only by its own acts. Its definition was to be, that it was indefinite--like what is said of some branches of the powers of Parliament; that no one has pretended or ought to pretend to know their extent; that they are not to be submitted to the judgment of any one but themselves; and that they never develope them but by the particular exercise of them; that they were to be left in this state, because, if they were defined, they might be eluded. However this might be found respecting a foreign constitution, it is making a monster of our own. There was not another part or lineament in it which appeared to be in the same mould or proportion.

Mr. B. then undertook to state his own view of the subject, and what he thought ought to be done. Much, he said, depended on the words "make Treaties and supreme law of the land;" as to the words supreme law of the land, he had not much doubt for what purpose solely they were introduced. The words were satisfied, and he thought most naturally, by not suffering them to disturb the balance of the Federal Constitution, for that is not the subject which the section where these words are used is speaking of; but to consider them as giving to the Treaty-making power the same paramount authority over the laws and constitutions of the several States, that they give at the same time to the Constitution and laws of the United States. The words appear to be introduced for the express purpose of making the Constitution, laws, and Treaties of the United States, paramount to the constitutions and laws of the several States, and for no other purpose; this is all that the section appears to be speaking of; it satisfies the words, is the most obvious and natural meaning, and leaves the other parts of the constitution harmonious and undisturbed. As to the words "power to make Treaties," it was more difficult to ascertain precisely what the constitution meant to give by them. It had been argued that from the nature of governmental powers, the Treaty-making power must be paramount, and from the nature of contract it must be paramount. The truth is, the Treaty-making power must be what the constitution has made it. He did not hesitate to say, that the most natural meaning to give these words, was to consider them as borrowed from former use, and to give them the meaning which they had always before given them. Gentlemen had said that nothing useful could be derived from English books and explanations on these terms. This seemed to him an unreasonable assertion. It might as well be said that they could not use an English Dictionary to ascertain the meaning of words. In many sciences, said he, there are definite and appropriate phrases as well as definite and appropriate words; and, in fact, books which are dictionaries of phrases, ascertain the meaning of phrases with as much precision as dictionaries ascertain the meaning of words. It is exceedingly useful that it should be so. When such a precise meaning is fixed to a phrase, and publicly known, it is apt to remain a long time exact, as it is frequently employed, and is very useful as a medium of certainty. Many instances of this kind might be quoted, particularly from English books on law and government. He would observe further, these appropriate phrases had been for their certainty in many instances transferred into our constitution, and their meaning must be manifestly sought in those sources as in a dictionary. One remarkable instance occurred to him, and which, from the singularity of its garb, would be very discernible in the constitution--he meant the definition of treason in the third section of the third article of the constitution. The phrase is levying war, adhering to enemies, giving them aid and comfort. These are the very words of the English books, which have been so critically judged that they are not capable of the least variation in their meaning on that tremendous subject; but this meaning is to be sought from those sources; he might mention several instances, but it was unnecessary. He thought the phrase, power to make Treaties, should be ascertained in the same manner; and the English meaning, as it would naturally be understood at the time of making the constitution, should be affixed to it; that it should be considered as giving to the PRESIDENT and two-thirds of the Senate the same kind of power as the King of England possesses on the subject of Treaties, which it is known is in several cases subject to the control of Parliament. Here it is qualified by the powers specifically given to Congress.

Mr. HOLLAND said: It is with great diffidence I rise on this important subject, to submit some considerations to this committee. As it has now become a constitutional question, not with respect to the merits of the Treaty, but with respect to the constitutional right of this House to request the Executive to furnish us with papers that related to the Treaty antecedent to its ratification.

To this it is objected that this House has no discretionary power over the Treaty, and, on that account, has nothing to do with the papers.

The question is not whether the Treaty is a good or bad Treaty, but it is whether we have a right to exercise our judgments upon it. Then, without any regard to the Treaty, we must be governed by the rational construction of the fundamental principles of government.

To illustrate which, it may be necessary to examine what has been incident to the different kinds of government, according to the histories of those nations governed by despotism, monarchs, or republics; and from the Constitution of the United States as the fundamental maxims of the Republic, draw that construction that is most rational and natural.

It will also be proper to examine which of those governments preserves the most power in the people.