Chapter LXX: Introduction (69)

Mr. J. SMITH supposed that the sum should be sufficient to cover the amount of the goods which may at any time be found in the hands of the agents; from ten to fifteen or twenty thousand dollars, he supposed, might be sufficient for this purpose.

Mr. DEARBORN suggested the idea of leaving this part of the business to the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. He moved to amend the clause accordingly.

Mr. VENABLE's motion was lost. Mr. DEARBORN's motion was agreed to.

The committee then rose, and the Chairman reported the amendment, which was adopted by the House. It was then ordered that the bill be again engrossed and read the third time to-day.

[The bill was subsequently read a third time and passed--58 members rising in the affirmative.]

TUESDAY, February 2.

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_Gentlemen of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives:_

I transmit herewith the copy of a letter, dated the 19th of
December last, from Governor Blount to the Secretary of
War, stating the avowed and daring designs of certain
persons to take possession of lands belonging to the
Cherokees, and which the United States have, by treaty,
solemnly guaranteed to that nation. The injustice of such
intrusions, and the mischievous consequences which must
necessarily result therefrom, demand that effectual
provision be made to prevent them.

G. WASHINGTON.

UNITED STATES, _February_ 2, 1796.

The said Message and letter were read, and ordered to be referred to the Committee of the whole House, to whom is committed the bill to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the frontiers.

WEDNESDAY, February 3.

LEMUEL BENTON, from South Carolina, appeared, was qualified, and took his seat.

MONDAY, February 8.

_Compensation of Members._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill for allowing a compensation to the members of both Houses, which proposes an annual salary of one thousand dollars to each member, instead of six dollars per day.

Mr. GILES moved that the word "annually" be expunged from the bill. He thought the present mode of compensating the members of the Legislature a good one, and could not conceive why an alteration should be made. Such a mode of payment as was now proposed ought to be sanctioned only upon the maturest deliberation.

Mr. GOODHUE explained the reasons which induced the committee to propose an annual instead of a daily payment to members, which was, that members might be induced to greater despatch in business, and to do away an idea which had gone abroad amongst many people, that, being paid by the day, the members of that House protracted their session to an unreasonable length.

Mr. GILES thought there ought to be no pecuniary inducement to members to push forward business in too rapid a manner, or to shorten their sessions. An annual salary would doubtless have this effect, and business, in consequence, would most certainly be neglected. It would be an evil of the greatest importance; it would be a constant temptation to members to neglect their duty; it would tend to embarrass all their deliberations. Indeed, it was a perfectly new mode of requiting Representatives, and would be supposed to be introduced for the purpose of advancing their pay--an idea which he did not wish to prevail, as he thought the present allowance sufficient. He therefore hoped the principle would not be agreed to.

Mr. SWANWICK was against the bill, and said, that to pay members in the way proposed would be to offer them a bounty to neglect the business of the Legislature.

Mr. HILLHOUSE was in favor of the bill. He said, that the constitution had provided that Congress should meet once a year, and that more time was spent during their sitting than was taken up by the Circuits of the Judges. Yet the Judges had a salary allowed them, and it was not found to have any bad effect. Complaints are now made out of doors that their sessions are protracted for the sake of the daily allowance paid to them. Persons who said this, said he, do not know that we are all the time deeply engaged in business, which is much lengthened by clashing interests of different States. A yearly salary would do away this idea, without making any real difference in the amount paid by the Treasury for their services. If he thought the mode of payment would cause members to neglect their duty, as has been observed, he too would be against the adoption of it; but surely it cannot be supposed that members would not sit as long as business should require them. He observed, they had now been in session two months, and but very little important business had been done. He thought the mode proposed would tend to remedy this evil: it was an experiment at least worth trying.

Mr. FINDLAY did not object to the bill merely as a novelty, but because it offered no advantage. Many persons, no doubt, would think one thousand dollars a year too much; but he believed it best for members to do their duty, without regarding the misapprehensions and prejudices of they know not whom. He did not think the pay of members influenced their sittings. The greatest difficulty, towards the close of the session, was to keep members together. If, indeed, members would attend better at the beginning of a session, and take up less time in speaking, sessions might be shorter; but there must, however, be full liberty given to every member to express his sentiments in his own way. No law can regulate people's conceptions. He thought it best that the members should be paid by the day. He should never boast of passing laws in a short time, but of passing good laws.

Mr. NICHOLAS was in favor of the present mode of compensating members, as the period of their sessions was uncertain, and wherever salaries were paid, they were for certain business. Give members one thousand dollars, and he did not doubt but some of them would wish to return home sooner than if they had been paid in proportion to the time spent in business. Water, though insensibly, wears away stones; and such an influence, he feared, would have a tendency to undermine the integrity of members. It was better to be slow than too hasty in business. He hoped this bill would not pass as an experiment, for the effect must be corruption; and when once this enemy of all governments is suffered to take root, it is difficult to eradicate it. Indeed, this bill would be supposed by many as a cover to advance the pay of members. If there were any such view, he wished members to propose the measure openly. He thought the present pay too much, and if the people thought it influenced the length of their sittings, they were of the same opinion.

Mr. WILLIAMS was against the bill, though he believed it to be brought in by the committee from the best of motives. It was their opinion it would shorten the sessions, and, if carried into effect, it might do so. If our wages were lowered, the measure would shorten our sessions. Every penny beyond expenses is too much: a medium salary was desirable. If the pay of members was increased, officers of Government will do the same. At present, it was true, all the necessaries of life were at a high price; but when the war in Europe ceases, the case will be different. Whenever we adjourn our sessions, (said he,) much business is necessarily left unfinished; and if members were paid by the year instead of by the day, all those whose business was not completed would be ready to say that members were hastened away to enjoy their salary at home.

Mr. SEDGWICK did not think the business before the House important. He was inclined, however, to favor the bill, not that he would grant a larger amount in that way than the amount of the present allowance per day. The argument of novelty, he said, would not apply: we are in the business of experiment. He would observe a fact well known, that every member in the House was deprived of the opportunity of pursuing his occupations at home, and of the emoluments arising therefrom, by his attendance to public business. He did not believe a yearly allowance would shorten the sessions, but it would remove the charge brought against members of protracting the sessions for the sake of their pay. Whether it is necessary to increase or diminish the present pay is not the question.

Mr. LIVINGSTON expected stronger motives for the bill than he had heard. It is acknowledged a perfect novelty. This, though by no means decisive, is an objection against the measure, and there is nothing else to recommend it. It has, indeed, been said, it will shorten our sessions; but would this be a benefit? If to continue in session be an evil, why are we here? If it could have been proved that expense would have been saved by the measure, that would have been a real advantage; but this has not been hinted at. It has, indeed, been said, it will remove from our constituents a suspicion that we are living here too long. It has been said, that an idea has gone abroad that we receive six dollars a day through the year. Few, he believed, were so ill informed; but this bill, if passed, will cause much more discontent than the present pay occasions. Deliberation in a Legislative body is necessary. The dearest interests of the people, he said, were committed to their charge, and he trusted they would watch over them, and never suffer them to be injured; and then, it was his opinion their constituents would not think much of their pay.

Mr. BALDWIN said, that it was a disagreeable business to be employed in discussing the subject of paying themselves for their services: it would be a desirable thing to supersede the necessity of doing so. The committee doubtless thought one thousand per annum would be an improvement upon the present mode of paying members, but he could not think so. He thought it best that the allowance should be paid in the old way.

Mr. GILBERT was willing to try the experiment of the bill proposed. He did not believe that either the present daily allowance lengthened, or that an annual salary would shorten, the sessions. He thought to say the contrary was a base insinuation.

Mr. BOURNE never heard it was the wish of their constituents that their payment should be annual instead of per day. He had heard it complained that their pay was too high; but now, since the price of living is so much advanced, he believed the people were satisfied. He saw no advantages from the proposed change. It cannot be thought that the pay is an inducement to members to prolong their sessions: he had not heard such a complaint. He was in favor of striking out the word "annually," and for recommitting the bill.

Mr. MADISON observed, that the present bill proposed no alteration with respect to the amount of money to be drawn from the Treasury, and it can make but little difference to members. What had been mentioned as the advantages of this bill, in his opinion, would operate against it. A novelty, he said, always called for hesitation.

Mr. SWANWICK thought, if they enacted good laws--laws that should encourage agriculture and commerce--their constituents would not trouble themselves about their salary.

Mr. GILES rose to remark upon an expression which fell from Mr. GILBERT, viz: that, to say members were likely to be influenced by the proposed salary, was a vile insinuation. He declared that it was a recommendation of the bill in the committee, that it would tend to shorten their sessions.

Mr. GILBERT explained, and justified the expression.

The motion for striking out the word "annually" was called for, and passed.[68]

TUESDAY, February 9.

FISHER AMES, of Massachusetts, appeared, was qualified, and took his seat.

THURSDAY, February 11.

_Post Roads from Maine to Georgia._

Mr. MADISON moved that the resolution laid upon the table some days ago be taken up, relative to the survey of the post roads between the province of Maine and Georgia; which, being read, he observed that two good effects would arise from carrying this resolution into effect; the shortest route from one place to another would be determined upon, and persons, having a certainty of the stability of the roads, would not hesitate to make improvements upon them.

Mr. BALDWIN was glad to see this business brought forward; the sooner it could be carried into effect, the better. In many parts of the country, he said, there were no improved roads, nothing better than the original Indian track. Bridges and other improvements are always made with reluctance whilst roads remain in this state, because it is known as the country increases in population and wealth, better and shorter roads will be made. All expense of this sort, indeed, is lost. It was properly the business of the General Government, he said, to undertake the improvement of the roads, for the different States are incompetent to the business, their different designs clashing with each other. It is enough for them to make good roads to the different seaports; the cross roads should be left to the government of the whole. The expense, he thought, would not be very great. Let a surveyor point out the shortest and best track, and the money will soon be raised. There was nothing in this country, he said, of which we ought to be more ashamed than our public roads.

Mr. BOURNE thought very valuable effects would arise from the carrying of this resolution into effect. The present roads may be much shortened. The Eastern States had made great improvements in their roads, and he trusted the best effects would arise from having regular mails from one end of the Union to the other.

Mr. WILLIAMS did not think it right for the revenues of the Post Office to be applied to this end. He acknowledged the propriety of extending the post roads to every part of the Union; he thought the House had better wait for the report of the committee to which business relative to the Post Office had been referred, which was preparing to be laid before the House.

Mr. MADISON explained the nature and object of the resolution. He said it was the commencement of an extensive work. He wished not to extend it at present. The expense of the survey would be great. The Post Officer, he believed, would have no objection to the intended regulation.

After some observations from Mr. THATCHER, on the obtaining of the shortest distance from one place to another, and the comparing old with new roads, so as to come at the shortest and best, the resolution was agreed to, as follows:

_Resolved_, That a committee be appointed to report a bill authorizing the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES to cause to be examined, and, where necessary, to be surveyed, the general route most proper for the transportation of the mail between ----, in Maine, and ----, in the State of Georgia, and to cause to be laid before Congress the result of such examination and survey, with an estimate of the expense of rendering such route fit, in all its parts, to be the established route of the post; the expense of such examination and survey to be defrayed out of the surplus revenues of the Post Office.[69]

_Ordered_, That Mr. MADISON, Mr. THATCHER, Mr. BALDWIN, Mr. HENDERSON, and Mr. SHERBURNE, be appointed a committee pursuant to the said resolution.

MONDAY, February 22.

_Washington's Birth-Day._

Mr. W. SMITH moved that the House adjourn for half an hour.

This motion occasioned a good deal of conversation upon its propriety. In favor of it, it was said, that it had been a practice ever since the commencement of the Government, for that House to make a short adjournment on that day in order to pay their compliments to the PRESIDENT, and that several members were absent, from an idea that the House would adjourn at 12 o'clock as usual. On the other hand, it was objected that it was the business of the members of that House first to do their duty, and then attend to the paying of compliments; that just at that time the house of the PRESIDENT was filled with militia and others; and that, therefore, it would be better, upon the whole, to wait upon the PRESIDENT after the business of the day was finished.

Mr. GALLATIN moved that the words "half an hour" be struck out.

The sense of the House was first taken on the amendment, which was lost, without a division. The motion was then put and negatived, being 38 for it, and 50 against it.

FRIDAY, February 26.

_Compensation to Members._

Mr. GILES moved that the bill for allowing compensation to the members of the Senate and House of Representatives, and certain officers of both Houses, be taken up, which being agreed to, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole; and the bill being read,

Mr. SWIFT wished to strike out the words making the Speaker a greater allowance than other members.

Mr. GILES thought a larger allowance ought to be made to the Speaker than to other members, as his duty was double that of any other member; but if gentlemen wished to do away the incidental expenses of the office, he had no objection.

Mr. SWIFT consented to vary his motion according to the ideas of the member from Virginia. If the Speaker had more duty to perform than other members, he should be willing to make him a greater allowance, but he doubted it.

Mr. W. SMITH hoped no alteration would be made in the allowance heretofore made; he saw no reason for it.

Mr. GOODHUE said, he voted against the additional pay allowed the Speaker when the act first passed, as he saw no necessity for the Speaker to give dinners to the members of that House; but though he objected to this, he was willing to allow him recompense for his additional services. He hoped, however, the gentleman who now so ably filled the office, would not consider any thing said on this subject as alluding personally to him.

Mr. SEDGWICK was willing to give the money to the Speaker which had heretofore been paid him, and for the same purpose, although he and his colleague were both against the measure when it originally passed.

Mr. DAYTON wished the business might be discussed without reference to him personally. Indeed he believed he should not be materially affected by any regulations which might be agreed to, as, if he might judge by his present feelings, his health would not permit him to remain in the chair after this session.

Mr. GILES was confident that no one meant to hurt the feelings of the gentleman who now filled the chair. The member from Massachusetts had said, when the measure passed, he was against it, but now he was in favor of it. He could see no ground for this change of sentiment. Mr. G. said, he was against the money being paid for incidental expenses, but not against making the Speaker ample allowance for his services.

Mr. KITCHELL was also for striking out the words, but for making ample compensation to the Speaker.

Mr. BOURNE did not suppose that the incidental expenses of the Speaker were confined to the dinners which he gave them; he was put to more expense in receiving company than other members. He did not think six dollars a day too much for this.

Mr. MADISON said, it was customary in all the State Governments to make the Speaker a greater allowance than other members: his services were far greater; they were uninterrupted. Besides, it was necessary to do so to invite men of talents to accept of the office; and every one knew the advantages arising from having a man of talents as Speaker. Without inquiring whether the compensation was too large or too small, he doubted whether it was constitutional to make any alteration in it which might affect the present Speaker. To support his opinions he read a clause of the constitution.

Mr. HILLHOUSE was of opinion that nothing in the constitution extended to the present question. He hoped they should agree to strike out the words alluded to, as the sooner the practice of feasting was abolished, the better. If members wished to form social acquaintances, it was far preferable to visit each other at their lodgings. He said, this was the first time the law had come under review since it had passed, and it was proper to have the matter settled. He wished to allow a reasonable sum for the services of the Speaker, but no more. He did not think there was any weight in the observation, that a large compensation was necessary to induce men of talents to accept of the chair--he thought the honor was a sufficient inducement.

Mr. WILLIAMS said there was no office appertaining to the Speaker which included expense; the words ought therefore to be struck out.

Mr. PAGE was in favor of striking out the words, as he did not understand their meaning, but in favor of keeping the allowance of the Speaker the same as usual. The Speaker, he said, ought to be placed in an independent situation, by a handsome salary. His duties were fourfold to those of any other member. Indeed, said he, nothing but a sense of duty could induce a man to undertake such an office.

Mr. GILES said, if it was agreed to strike out the words _for the incidental expenses of his office_, he should move to introduce in their place, "_on account of extra services annexed to his office_."

Mr. JEREMIAH SMITH liked the words proposed better than those in the bill, but did not think it of the importance it was made.

The motion for striking out was put and carried.

Mr. GILES then proposed his motion.

Mr. HILLHOUSE was against the introduction of these words.

Mr. VARNUM hoped the motion would prevail. The services of the Speaker are extraordinary and laborious. The State Legislatures, he said, always allowed their Speaker double the pay of other members.

Mr. MURRAY hoped the words would not obtain. He considered the Speakership of that House as a very elevated situation. In certain contingencies he believed he was the Chief Executive of the United States. He thought the calculation of pay too mechanical. The dignity of the office was sufficient, without extraordinary compensation; the duties of it were well known.

The question was put, and negatived.

Mr. GILES moved to fill up the blank for the daily allowance of members of the Senate with six dollars.

Mr. PAGE proposed seven; when, after a few observations from Mr. WILLIAMS in favor of six, the sense of the House was taken, which was in favor of six dollars--only twenty-one members rising in favor of seven.

The allowance of the Speaker again coming into consideration, Mr. SWIFT wished an inquiry might be made into the duties of the office. It was his opinion that many members upon committees performed greater services than he; and if the Speaker had an extra allowance, they ought to have an extra allowance also. Some gentlemen thought, on the score of dignity, a high salary ought to be paid. He thought differently. Can it be supposed it would be necessary, said he, to give any member of this House double pay to accept of the office? No such thing. Being now discharged from any obligation to treat members, he could not agree to allow him the usual sum. He should not object to two or three dollars a day extra, but no more.

Mr. GILES thought the duty of the Speaker three times as arduous as that of any other member of the House.

Mr. CRABB voted for striking out the words, but he was not for diminishing the salary of the Speaker.

The motion for the usual allowance was put and carried, and the other blanks of the bill were filled up with the same sums as heretofore allowed to the different officers. The committee rose; the bill then went through the House, and was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time on Monday.

MONDAY, March 7.

_The Treaty with Great Britain._

[The debate on the subject of the Treaty with Great Britain, and of the constitutional powers of the House with respect to treaties, having occupied the time of the House nearly every day for a month, (commencing the 7th of March and ending on the 7th of April,) it is deemed preferable, and as being more acceptable to the reader, to present the whole in one body consecutively, rather than to spread it in detached parts intermixed with other subjects, through the general proceedings of each day. This debate, as here given, possesses a character for authenticity and correctness which does not belong to the newspaper reports of the day, it having undergone the careful revision of the Speakers themselves. The debate which took place on making the provision for carrying the Treaty into effect, will be found subsequently, in the proceedings of each day as the subject came up before the House.][70]

On the second of March, Mr. LIVINGSTON, after stating that the late British Treaty must give rise in the House to some very important and constitutional questions, to throw light upon which every information would be required, laid the following resolution upon the table.

"_Resolved_, That the President of the United States be
requested to lay before this House a copy of the
instructions to the Minister of the United States, who
negotiated the Treaty with the King of Great Britain,
communicated by his Message of the first of March, together
with the correspondence and other documents relative to the
said Treaty."

MARCH 7.--Mr. LIVINGSTON said he wished to modify the resolution he had laid on the table, requesting the PRESIDENT to lay before the House sundry documents respecting the Treaty. It was calculated to meet the suggestions of gentlemen to whose opinions he paid the highest respect, and was founded in the reflection that the negotiations on the twelfth article were probably unfinished; and therefore, he said, a disclosure of papers relative to that or any other pending negotiation, might embarrass the Executive. He wished, therefore, to add, at the end of his former motion, the following words: "Excepting such of said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed."

The motion of Mr. LIVINGSTON was then taken up.

Mr. TRACY requested gentlemen in favor of the resolution to give their reasons why the application for papers was to be made.

Mr. LIVINGSTON said, he had no wish to conceal his intentions. The motives that impelled him to make the motion, were not such as to make him wish to conceal them, or such as he ought to blush at when discovered. The gentleman from Connecticut wished to know why he had brought this resolution before the House? He did it for the sake of information. That gentleman wished to know to what point this information was to apply? Possibly to all the points he had enumerated. It was impossible, however, to say to which or how many of these points without a recurrence to those very papers. He could not determine now, he said, that an impeachment would be deemed advisable; yet, when the papers are obtained, they may make such a step advisable. It was impossible to declare an impeachment advisable, without having the necessary lights as to the conduct of officers. The House were, on every occasion, the guardians of their country's rights. They are, by the constitution, the accusing organ of the officers employed. The information called for they ought to possess, as it would tend to elucidate the conduct of the officers. His principal reason, however, for proposing the measure, was a firm conviction that the House were vested with a discretionary power of carrying the Treaty into effect, or refusing it their sanction.

Mr. MURRAY said, that he was against the resolution for two reasons, which then struck his mind forcibly. The first was the want of a declared object within the acknowledged cognizance of the House; the other was because he believed it was designed as the groundwork of a very dangerous doctrine, that the House had a right to adjudge, to adopt, or to reject Treaties generally. Had the gentlemen stated the object for which they called for the papers to be an impeachment, or any inquiry into fraud, as a circumstance attending the making of the Treaty, the subject would be presented under an aspect very different from that which it has assumed. He considered a Treaty, constitutionally made, to be the supreme law of the land. The Treaty in view has been negotiated and ratified, he thought, agreeably to the constitution. It has been issued, by the PRESIDENT's proclamation, as an act obligatory upon the United States. If the House mean to go into the merits of that instrument, and the information be called for with that view, he should feel himself bound by the constitution to give it every opposition.

Mr. BALDWIN thought the resolution so unexceptionable that he had expected it would have been agreed to without debate. The PRESIDENT has sent the House the Treaty; petitions have come forward on the subject; the House must act in the business. It is yet unaccompanied with any documents to throw light upon it. No person concerned in the negotiation has a seat on the floor of the House; so that no oral information can be expected. Implicit faith was not to be reposed, he imagined, in public officers. It would be unfair to take up the subject naked and unexplained.

Mr. GALLATIN said, he should not now enter into the merits of the question, but merely state that pertain powers are delegated by the constitution to Congress. They possess the authority of regulating trade. The Treaty-making power delegated to the Executive may be considered as clashing with that. The question may arise, whether a Treaty made by the PRESIDENT and Senate, containing regulations touching objects delegated to Congress, can be considered binding, without Congress passing laws to carry it into effect. A difference of opinion may exist as to the proper construction of the several articles of the constitution, so as to reconcile those apparently contradictory provisions. But all those questions would occur in future discussions. What is now wanted is information on the subject, to elucidate the different views which may be taken of the Treaty. It must do good to obtain it, and could do no harm to ask for it. If it would be improper to communicate any part of the information on the subject, the PRESIDENT will say so. He had hoped, he said, that the resolution would have passed without objection. He concluded by observing, that the House were the grand inquest of the nation, and that they had the right to call for papers on which to ground an impeachment; but he believed, that if this was intended, it would be proper that the resolution should be predicated upon a declaration of that intention. At present, he did not contemplate the exercise of that right.

Mr. MADISON admitted that every proposition, however distantly related to a question on the Treaty, drew from the importance of that subject considerable importance to itself. In a discussion of this subject, he felt strongly the obligation of proceeding with the utmost respect to the decorum and dignity of the House, with a proper delicacy to the other departments of Government, and, at the same time, with fidelity and responsibility for our constituents. The proposition now before the House, he conceived, might be considered as closely connected with this important question. It was to be decided whether the general power of making Treaties supersedes the powers of the House of Representatives, particularly specified in the constitution, so as to take to the Executive all deliberative will, and leave the House only an Executive and ministerial instrumental agency?

Mr. SMITH (of South Carolina) said, that he had listened attentively to the reasons advanced in favor of this resolution, and that he had heard nothing to convince him of its propriety. The PRESIDENT and Senate have, by the constitution, the power of making Treaties, and the House have no agency in them, except to make laws necessary to carry them into operation; he considered the House as bound, in common with their fellow-citizens, to do every thing in their power to carry them into full execution. He recognized but one exception to this rule, and that was, when the instrument was clearly unconstitutional. In this case, he remarked, it had not been said that the Treaty was unconstitutional. When the resolution was first brought forward, it had indeed been observed, that the discussion might involve certain constitutional points, and, therefore, the papers called for by the resolution were necessary; but it was obvious, the question of constitutionality should be determined from the face of the instrument, and that a knowledge of the preparatory steps which led to its adoption, could throw no light upon it; that ground was therefore abandoned even by the friends of the resolution, and others were resorted to.

He was surprised that gentlemen who displayed such zeal for the constitution should support a proposition, the tendency of which went indirectly to break down the constitutional limits between the Executive and Legislative Departments. The constitution had assigned to the Executive the business of negotiation with foreign powers; this House can claim no right by the constitution to interfere in such negotiations; every movement of the kind must be considered as an attempt to usurp powers not delegated, and will be resisted by the Executive; for a concession would be a surrender of the powers specially delegated to him, and a violation of his trust. The proposition calls upon the PRESIDENT to lay before the House the instructions given to Mr. Jay, and the correspondence between him and Lord Grenville; and for what purpose? Is this House to negotiate the Treaty over again? Has the constitution made this House a diplomatic body, invested with the powers of negotiation? Is not this House excluded? for, if the maxim that "the expression of one is the exclusion of another," applies to this case, the assignment of the Treaty-making power to the PRESIDENT and Senate, is a manifest exclusion of this House. This call, then, on the PRESIDENT, is an attempt to obtain indirectly what the constitution has expressly assigned to others.

After Mr. S. had sat down, it was moved by Mr. GILES, to take the resolution up in Committee of the Whole for the purpose of more ample discussion.

This motion was agreed to; sixty-one members rising in the affirmative.

The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the resolution.

Mr. NICHOLAS remarked, that the member from Connecticut, first up, when inquiring for the reason of a call for papers, had suggested two. The one, relating to the merits of the instrument; the other, an inquiry into the conduct of officers concerned. On the latter ground, gentlemen conceded that the House had a right to require the papers, and yet seemed willing to adhere to that, on which they conceived a call could not be, with propriety, grounded, as the one that influenced the conduct of the friends to the resolution. All gentlemen admitted, that the House had the superintendence over the officers of Government, as the grand inquest of the nation; but persisted that the resolution calling for papers, if intended for the purpose of exercising that authority, must be predicated on an expression of the intention.

He took a view of the prominent features of the arguments of the members up before him. It had been said that, if the power of the PRESIDENT and Senate, as to Treaties, was complete, then the House had no right to claim a participation; this could not be denied; but the question was, whether the Executive had that right unqualifiedly, in all cases. In the present case, he contended, the House had a voice. To elucidate: Suppose that, in the constitution of the United States, which has been so guarded about the expenditure of money, a clause had been inserted, positively declaring that the House have a control over the money matters stipulated in a Treaty; would not this constitute a qualification of the powers of the PRESIDENT and Senate with respect to Treaties? The constitution, on this head, he contended, though less explicit than his supposed case would make it, was not the less positive, if tested by all the fair rules of construction; and if compared with the practice of the government from which we had borrowed, with many other matters, this part of our constitution. In England, the country alluded to, their House of Parliament had exercised a control over the moneyed articles of Treaties; and he contended, the House of Representatives had an equal authority here, as chief guardians of the purse-strings. It was unnecessary, at this time, he said, to touch on the other parts of the Treaty which clashed with the constitutional powers of the House.

He again adverted to the power of control that the House of Commons have over Treaties; and contended, that that provision of the British constitution had been accurately copied in our own with this deviation only, that the Senate have the power of making amendments to money bills here, which the House of Lords there have not. He could show, from the best authority, the acknowledgment of the British Crown officers themselves, that the Parliament has a right to discuss and decide on Treaties which involved moneyed stipulations.

The same power, he argued, resided in the House here; for shall it be said, that we have borrowed only the form from Great Britain, and not touched the substance? Shall it be said, that the House have a discretion as to appropriations, and yet they must make them as directed by a Treaty? If the House have no discretion to use in the business, they are the most unfit body to regulate money-matters; for complete regularity in so large a body must be one of the least of their valuable properties. But, with the power of appropriating money, the House have certainly the right to judge of the propriety of the appropriation. The constitution explains itself fully on this head. He instanced the specific power in the constitution, with respect to appropriations for the army, to explain from that instrument its meaning in other parts.

The constitution says, that no appropriations for the support of armies shall be for more than two years; this is, no doubt, that the House may periodically have before them the question of the propriety of supporting an armed force, with all its consequences, and that they may, by refusing or granting an appropriation, determine on its existence. The power thus cautiously lodged must have been for some purpose, and that he had suggested could alone explain this clause of the constitution. This will show what was expected of this House in appropriating money; that they should judge of the usefulness of the expenditure. In the case of the army, the constitution does not say that we may disband an army by withholding money; but for the purpose of investing us with the same power, only requires that the appropriation should recur every two years; taking it for granted, that in this as well as in every other Legislative act, we will duly weigh every consequence.

Having thus explained from the constitution itself the true meaning of this power of appropriation, he proceeded to elucidate it by a reference to the practice of the Government. He found an instance in the permanent appropriations made for the payment of the public debt. If the House in this and analogous cases, could exercise no discretion as to appropriations, why this permanent provision, in preference to an annual appropriation? The permanency of the provision took its rise from the idea, that the House possessed a discretionary power as to appropriations. Thus, he had shown that the practice of the Government, the provisions of the constitution, and the example of the British, from whom we had exactly copied the control over money transactions, all proved a discretion in the House as to appropriations. This must be considered as a sufficient answer to the gentleman from South Carolina, when he said, that the PRESIDENT and Senate possessed the Treaty-making power; for they possessed it with qualification, in matters of money; and unless the House chose to grant that money, it was so far no Treaty.

It was said, that if the Treaty was not the law of the land, the PRESIDENT should be impeached for declaring it as such. Parts of the Treaty the PRESIDENT and Senate had, no doubt, a right to make without any control of the House--those parts he might be considered as proclaiming; he proclaims it, limited as his authority, and under the qualifications provided by the constitution. It was said, that no instance of such a call as that now contemplated could be produced. No; nor of such a Treaty, he answered.

Mr. SWANWICK expressed his sense of the importance of the subject before the House, and the pleasure which he experienced at observing the calmness and temper with which the discussion had been carried on. He had not conceived, however, that the decision of the present question involved the sense of the House as to the merits of the Treaty; the object of the resolution was only to obtain that knowledge necessary for an enlightened decision; it had been observed, that the Treaty had been censured by assemblages of people with precipitancy, and without proper information. They did this on the best information that could by them be obtained. But if the House should go into a Committee of the Whole, to take into consideration the Treaty, without obtaining all the information in their power, they would be justly to blame.

He adverted to the constitution; according to that instrument, the Legislative power is completely vested in Congress. By the 8th section of the 1st article, not only a certain specification of powers are granted to Congress, to lay and collect taxes, regulate commerce, &c., but the very extensive further power, not only to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, but, also, all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. If, then, Congress have the power to pass laws to carry into execution all powers vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof, how is it possible that there can be any authority out of the purview of this general and extensive Legislative control? Is the Treaty-making power not a power vested by the constitution in the Government of the United States, or in a department or officer thereof? If it is, is the conclusion not obvious, that Congress have power to pass laws for carrying these powers into effect? But in the power to pass laws, discretion is necessarily implied; of course, this House must judge when it is to act; whether it will, or will not, carry into effect the object in question. It is a power, it is true, of great delicacy and responsibility, but it is not less a power constitutionally given.

The member from South Carolina construed this part of the constitution in a different way, and insisted that, as the PRESIDENT and Senate had the power of making Treaties, the House were divested of the right of exercising their judgment upon the subject. If this doctrine prevails, to what a situation would the Representatives of a free people be reduced? The constitution especially gives them the power of originating money bills; but to what purpose would this power be granted, if another authority may make a contract, compelling the House to raise money? Suppose that authority were in this way to grant millions upon millions, must the House, at all events, be compelled to provide for their payment? In this case the House become mere automatons, mere mandarine members, like those who nod on a chimney-piece, as directed by a power foreign to themselves.

Great stress is laid upon the constitution declaring Treaties laws of the land. This article has often been quoted partially, but not at large. It is in these words: "This constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." Had the clause stopped here, there might have been some plea for the gentlemen's doctrine; but, unfortunately for them, the article goes on to say: "And the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding." Hence, it is obvious that the supremacy of the law is over the constitution and laws of the separate States, which was necessary to prevent these interfering with those. But it does not affect the powers of this House, as a component part of the General Legislature, and authority of the United States. It is also worth while to notice the gradation in the article.

First. This constitution.

Secondly. The laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, clothed with the highest sanction of the nation, the consent of the three branches.

Thirdly. Treaties. How absurd the doctrine, then, that these last, third in order, can repeal the second: at that rate, all power whatever would remain vested in two branches only of the Government; the third, with all its powers of originating bills for raising revenue, would be dwindled into a mere board of assessors.

The gentleman from Vermont said, yesterday, that if the PRESIDENT and Senate were to make a Treaty, and that House were to refuse to make due appropriations for carrying it into effect, it would become a nullity, and no foreign nation would in future treat with such an uncertain Government. Mr. S. observed, that that gentleman would probably be surprised, when he was told, that the British House of Commons possesses the same power which he reprobates in the Legislative Assembly of the United States. This, Mr. S. proved, by reading the King's Speech to both Houses of Parliament, in which he informs them of this Treaty, and promises to lay it before them when ratified, in order that they might judge of the propriety of making provision to carry it into effect. What, judge of the propriety of passing laws to carry into effect a Treaty ratified! And shall it be said, exclaimed he, that the Representative Assembly of the United States does not possess a privilege enjoyed by an English House of Commons! He hoped not.

Mr. HARPER said, that it had not been his intention to trouble the committee, in this stage of the debate at least; nor should he now depart from his resolution on that head, had he not observed that the discussion was turning more and more on points, which it appeared to him unnecessary to decide. He did not conceive that the powers of the House respecting Treaties were necessary to be considered; the question appeared capable of a satisfactory decision on different grounds.

When the motion was first proposed, he thought it innocent at least, and was in doubt whether it might not be proper, because he was in doubt how far these papers might be necessary for enabling the House to exercise that discretion on the subject of Treaties, which he admitted it to possess; but on a more accurate and extensive view of the subject, and after carefully attending to the discussion which had already taken place, he was thoroughly persuaded that these papers were no way necessary, and, that being unnecessary, to call for them was an improper and unconstitutional interference with the Executive department. Could it be made to appear that these papers are necessary for directing or informing the House on any of those Legislative questions respecting the Treaty which came within its powers, he should propose to change the milk-and-water style of the present resolution. The House, in that case, would have a right to the papers; and he had no idea of requesting as a favor what should be demanded as a right. He would demand them, and insist on the demand. But, being persuaded that no discretion hitherto contended for, even by the supporters of the resolution themselves, made these papers necessary to the House, to call for them would be an unconstitutional intermeddling with the proper business of the Executive.

It had been said, that this motion was of little consequence; that it was only a request which might be refused, and that the privileges of that House were narrow indeed, if it could not request information from the Executive department. But it would be observed, he said, that requests from bodies like that, carry the force of demands, and imply a right to receive. Legislative bodies often make the most formidable expressions of their will in the shape of requests. It would be further observed, that an honorable member from Pennsylvania, (Mr. GALLATIN,) after declaring that this indeed was only a request which might be refused, had added, that in case it were refused, it would then be proper to consider how far we ought to make the demand, and insist on receiving these papers as a matter of right. After this avowal of the system, after this notice that the present request is no more than a preliminary measure, a preparatory step, and in case of a refusal, is to be followed up by a demand, could it be wondered that they who think the measure improper, should oppose it in the threshold?

Mr. GALLATIN conceived that, whether the House had a discretionary power with respect to Treaties, or whether they were absolutely bound by those instruments, and were obliged to pass laws to carry them fully into effect, still there was no impropriety in calling for the papers. Under the first view of the subject, if the House has a discretionary power, then no doubt could exist that the information called for is proper; and, under the second, if bound to pass laws, they must have a complete knowledge of the subject, to learn what laws ought to be passed. This latter view of the subject, even, must introduce a discussion of the Treaty, to know whether any law ought to be repealed, or to see what laws ought to be passed. If any article in the instrument should be found of doubtful import, the House would most naturally search for an explanation, in the documents which related to the steps which led to the Treaty. If one article of the Treaty only be doubtful, the House would not know how to legislate without the doubt being removed, and its explanation could certainly be found nowhere with so much propriety as in the correspondence between the negotiating parties.

Gentlemen had gone into an examination of an important constitutional question upon this motion. He hoped this would have been avoided in the present stage of the business; but as they had come forward on that ground, he had no objection to follow them in it, _and to rest the decision of the constitutional powers of Congress on the fate of the present question_. He would, therefore, state his opinion, that the House had a _right_ to ask for the papers proposed to be called for, because their co-operation and sanction was necessary to carry the Treaty into full effect, to render it a binding instrument, and to make it, properly speaking, a law of the land; because they had a full discretion either to give or to refuse that co-operation; because they must be guided, in the exercise of that discretion, by the merits and expediency of the Treaty itself, and therefore had a _right_ to ask for every information which could assist them in deciding that question.