Chapter XL: Introduction (39)

It has been supposed, that the allowance made to the fishermen, will amount to a greater sum than the drawback on the exportation of the fish; but I think it has been clearly shown that this will not be the case: on the contrary, it is presumable, that the drawback on the fish would on the whole exceed the sum which is proposed to be allowed to the fishermen; sometimes it might be more, sometimes less. The calculation is made on general principles; and it is impossible to calculate to a single cent: the quantity of salt to be expended on the fish, cannot be minutely ascertained; but this was not heretofore considered as a sufficient reason why Congress should refuse to allow the drawback; they allowed it, though in a different shape. It is now proposed to make a further commutation: gentlemen call this a bounty on occupation; but is there any proposition made for paying to the fishermen, or other persons concerned in the fishery, any sums which we have not previously received from them? If this were the case, it would indeed be a bounty; but if we beforehand receive from them as much as the allowance amounts to, there is no bounty granted at all.

If, however, it really was a bounty on occupation, it would after all be only an indulgence similar to what has been granted to the landed and agricultural interest. We have laid on hemp a duty of fifty-four cents per hundredweight; and on beer, ale, and porter, five cents per gallon. Now, I ask gentlemen, whether the professed design of those duties was to raise a revenue, or to prevent the importation of those articles? They were laid for no other purpose, than to prevent foreigners from importing them, and thereby to encourage our own manufactures; and was not that encouragement a bounty to the persons concerned in producing such articles in this country? If the duties had not been laid, the importer could sell much cheaper than he now can; and the landed interest would be under a necessity of selling cheaper in proportion. If those prohibitory duties operate as a bounty in favor of raising hemp, and of brewing beer, ale, and porter, I ask, whether, if a bounty were proposed on every quintal of fish, it might not, with the same propriety, be granted? If we have not a right to grant a bounty in the one case, we have as little right to grant it in the other.

A calculation has been offered to show that the proposed allowance will exceed the amount of the present drawbacks, by ten thousand dollars a year; but that calculation has been proved to be erroneous. Suppose, however, that this was the fact, what comparison is there between such a tax on the citizens of the United States, and the tax borne by the citizens of Massachusetts, for the defence of the Western frontier? A commercial war is waged against the American fisheries, by foreign nations, who lay heavy duties on the American fish, and apply the produce of those duties in bounties to their own fishermen; and their fisheries being less extensive than ours, the duty thus imposed on our fish, and bestowed in bounties to their vessels, operate in a twofold proportion to the discouragement of our fishermen, and the encouragement of theirs.

I wish to know on what principle gentlemen can expect, that the citizens of Massachusetts should contribute two hundred thousand dollars, or perhaps a greater sum, for the protection of the Western frontier against the Indians, when no contribution is made to support the commerce of Massachusetts, which, without this support, will be as effectually ruined, as if their vessels were captured by an enemy. The principle is carried farther with respect to the protection of the frontier: we have voted large sums as presents to the savages, to keep them friends to the frontier settlers; there is, however, no clause in the constitution that will authorize a measure of this kind: it is true, indeed, we have a power to regulate trade and commerce with the Indian tribes; but does that give us a power to render the United States tributary to the savages? and if we make them such grants every year, do we not in fact become tributary to them?

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) says that although this plan of encouraging the fisheries may be wise policy in Britain, as being on all sides surrounded by the sea, yet the United States will not equally find their account in pursuing the same plan. The State of Virginia is, in point of exposure from the sea, very differently circumstanced from the State of Massachusetts: _we_ have a vast extent of country four hundred and fifty miles of sea-coast, exposed; the citizens of all the towns along the coast are obliged to pursue marine occupations and I hope the gentleman does not wish that the country should be depopulated, and the inhabitants driven off to settle the Western territory.

The State of Virginia is very happily circumstanced with respect to a marine war: should such an event take place, that State is pretty secure from depredations; but when we consider how much the inhabitants of Massachusetts are exposed in a case of that kind, we ought to look forward, and make some provision for their defence: they have as good a right to expect that Government will make some arrangements for their protection, as that they shall be obliged to contribute for the defence of the Western frontier.

But their commerce, it seems, must not be supported! Taxes however must be laid; and those taxes applied to encourage the former, and to bribe the Indians into peace! Is this fair? Is this pursuing a liberal system of politics? Will this reconcile the minds of our people to the General Government? If so reasonable a proposition be neglected by the House, it will convince the citizens of that State, that it is the object of Government to destroy their commerce, and to make them entirely dependent on the agricultural interest.

Here Mr. GERRY read a statement, to show the diminution of the revenue in consequence of the failure of the fisheries; and added,

To support the fisheries, is to support the revenue: by that staple, the citizens of Massachusetts are enabled to pay the revenue that is expected from them; and, by an attempt to save ten thousand dollars, Government will probably sacrifice a hundred thousand; and besides, lose the confidence of the citizens of that State.

The only question now is, whether this be a direct bounty, or simply a commutation of the allowance already granted by Congress? If the latter be the case, I can see no reason why we should refuse our assent to a proposition, which is only calculated to do justice to the people concerned, and to give encouragement to a very important branch in the United States; especially as the proposition will even have a tendency to increase the revenue.

Mr. WILLIAMSON.--It has been urged with great propriety, in favor of the bill now submitted to our consideration, that the operation of our laws should in all cases tend to encourage useful industry; that while we are giving back the duties on all other foreign goods which are exported, it would be unjust and cruel to refuse a full drawback of the duties on salt which may be exported, especially when the circumstances of its exportation are attended with an increase of riches and strength to the nation. Impressed as I am with the force of these arguments, and desirous as I am to protect and encourage the native seamen of America, by all prudent, practicable, and constitutional means, I shall nevertheless find it my duty to vote for striking out the first section of the bill, because it proposes to give a bounty for the encouragement of the vessels employed in the fisheries.

We have been told that the name is improper; that it is simply a drawback of the duty upon salt; and gentlemen have produced a very ingenious calculation, by which they attempt to prove, that in some years it may happen that the whole duty on the salt will not be repaid; but they admit that in some years the drawback or bounty will exceed the duty. It is certainly their opinion--and in this we are perfectly agreed--that the money to be paid will be more than that received, else there had been no use for so large an appropriation. We shall not trouble the committee with calculations on this subject. It is conceded, that the encouragement to be given, probably will exceed the full drawback of the duty on salt. In other words, a douceur or a proper bounty is to be given: let us call it one thousand dollars per annum. Is it within the powers of this Congress to grant bounties? I think not; and on this single position I would rest the argument.

In the constitution of this Government there are two or three remarkable provisions, which seem to be in point. It is provided, that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers. It is also provided, that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States; and it is provided, that no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another. The clear and obvious intention of the articles mentioned was, that Congress might not have the power of imposing unequal burdens; that it might not be in their power to gratify one part of the Union by oppressing another. It appeared possible, and not very improbable, that the time might come, when, by greater cohesion, by more unanimity, by more address, the Representatives of one part of the Union might attempt to impose unequal taxes, or to relieve their constituents at the expense of other people. To prevent the possibility of such a combination, the articles that I have mentioned were inserted in the constitution. Suppose a poll-tax should be attempted; suppose it should be enacted that every poll in the Eastern States shall pay a tax of half a dollar, and every poll in the Southern States should pay a tax of one dollar. Do you think we should pay the tax? No certainly. We should plead the constitution, and tell you that the law was impotent and void.

But we have been told, that Congress may give bounties for useful purposes; that is to say, they may give bounties for all imaginable purposes; because the same majority that votes the bounty will not fail to call the purpose a good one. Establish the doctrine of bounties, and let us see what may follow. Uniform taxes are laid to raise money, and that money is distributed--not uniformly; the whole of it may be given to the people in one end of the Union. Could we say, in such a case, that the tax had been uniform? I think not. There is certainly a majority in this House who think that the nation would be stronger and more independent, if all our labor was performed by free men. This object might be promoted by a bounty. Let a poll-tax be laid, according to the constitution, of one dollar per poll: in this case, sixty cents must be paid for each slave; and the number of slaves being 680,186, their tax would amount to $334,911. To encourage the labor of citizens, let Congress then give an annual bounty of one dollar to every free man who is a mechanic, or who labors in the field. We might be told that the bounty was small, and the object was good; but the measure would be most oppressive, for it would be a clear tax of rather more than three hundred thousand dollars on the Southern States.

Perhaps the case I have put is too strong--Congress can never do a thing that is so palpably unjust--but this, sir, is the very mark at which the theory of bounties seems to point. The certain operation of that measure is the oppression of the Southern States, by superior numbers in the Northern interest. This was to be feared at the formation of this Government, and you find many articles in the constitution, besides those I have quoted, which were certainly intended to guard us against the dangerous bias of interest, and the power of numbers. Wherefore was it provided that no duty should be laid on exports? Was it not to defend the great staples of the Southern States--tobacco, rice, and indigo--from the operation of unequal regulations of commerce, or unequal indirect taxes, as another article had defended us from unequal direct taxes?

I do not hazard much in saying, that the present constitution had never been adopted without those preliminary guards in it. Establish the general doctrine of bounties, and all the provisions I have mentioned become useless. They vanish into air, and like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a trace behind. The common defence and general welfare, in the hands of a good politician, may supersede every part of our constitution, and leave us in the hands of time and chance. Manufactures, in general, are useful to the nation; they promote the public good and general welfare. How many of them are springing up in the Northern States? Let them be properly supported by bounties, and you will find no occasion for unequal taxes. The tax may be equal in the beginning--it will be sufficiently unequal in the end.

We are told, that a nursery of seamen may be of great use to the nation, and the bounty proposed is a very small one. These, sir, are the reasons why I have marked this as a dangerous bill; the most dangerous innovations are made under these circumstances. To begin with a great bounty would be imprudent, and to give a small bounty for a doubtful purpose, might deserve a worse epithet. Half a million of dollars per annum would have been too much for a beginning, and perhaps a bounty on the use of sleighs, though they are convenient for travelling in winter; or a bounty on stone fences, though they are durable, would not at this time be prudent. The object of the bounty, and the amount of it, are equally to be disregarded in the present case; we are simply to consider whether bounties may safely be given under the present constitution. For myself, I would rather begin with a bounty of one million per annum than one thousand. I wish that my constituents may know whether they are to put any confidence in that paper called the constitution.

You will suffer me to say, that the Southern States have much to fear from the progress of this Government, unless your strength is governed by prudence. The operation of the funding system has translated at least two millions of dollars from the Southern States, that is to say, from Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia, to the Northern States. The interest of that sum, when it shall be six per cent., will be $120,000; but the quota of those States is at least one-third of the whole; whence it follows, that they must pay forty thousand dollars every year, in the form of interest to the Northern States. This, it seems, is not sufficient, and other measures are to be adopted for draining the Southern States. Bounties to promote the general welfare are already brought forward. We shall not hear of a bounty for raising rice, or preparing naval stores. If that was the question, the general welfare would not have such prominent features. Unless the Southern States are protected by the constitution, their valuable staples, and their visionary wealth, must occasion their destruction. Three short years has this Government existed--it is not three years--but we have already given serious alarms to many of our fellow-citizens. Establish the doctrine of bounties, set aside that part of the constitution which requires equal taxes and demands similar distributions, destroy this barrier, and it is not a few fishermen that will enter, claiming ten or twelve thousand dollars, but all manner of persons--people of every trade and occupation--may enter at the breach, until they have eaten up the bread of our children.

Perhaps I have viewed this project in too serious a light; but if I am particularly solicitous on the subject of finance, that we do not even seem to depart from the spirit of the constitution, it is because I wish that the Union may be perpetual. The several States are now pretty well relieved from their debts, and our fellow-citizens in the Southern States have very little interest in the national funds; press them a little with unequal taxes, and the remedy is plain.

While I would shun bounties, as leading to dangerous measures, I am not inattentive to every argument that has been advanced by the honorable member who first rose in defence of the bill. That gentleman tells us, that more than a bushel of salt is used in curing a quintal of fish. If this fact be established, the former act should be amended, by giving a greater drawback. He says the drawback, as it is now paid to the merchant, does not operate so as to encourage the seamen, who have most need of such assistance. This is very probable, and the parties may be relieved by dividing the drawback in the very manner that is proposed by the bill. If it is true that the proposed bounties will not exceed the average of the drawback that should be paid on salt, why do they contend about names, unless they are solicitous about the precedent? If our object is to encourage industry, and to increase our commerce, by sending fish to a foreign market, we must adhere to the drawback; for, according to the terms of the bill, the bounty is to be paid, though every fish that is caught should be consumed in the country; in which case we should be paying a visionary drawback, when nothing was exported. According to the terms of the bill, there is no proportion between the labor and the reward, so far as the bank fishery is concerned; the bounty in all cases being the same.

Having exercised your patience in objecting to this new system of bounties, and having hinted on some objections to the general operations of the bill, so far as industry and enterprise may be desired, I shall, in a few words, submit the outline of a plan that seems to comprehend all the useful parts of the bill, without any speculation upon bounties.

If the drawback on dried fish exported, is not equal to the duty on the salt used in curing such fish, let the drawback be increased to eleven cents or twelve cents, as the case may be. Let us suppose that the drawback for the next year will be equal to the drawback on the last year; and let that sum of money, being the expected drawback, be divided between the seamen and owners, according to the terms of the bill. The accounts must be made up annually. If the drawback exceeds the allowance that had been made, the difference will be considered as advanced to the fishery, and the allowance for the next year must be somewhat reduced, according to the actual amount of the drawback. If the fishermen are more fortunate or more active, and the exports are increased, the allowance for the next year must be raised. The rule being fixed by law, all that remains, being pure calculation, may be done from year to year by the Executive. Every important object of this bill, that has been presented to our view, may be obtained by safe and constitutional steps. Why should a man take a dangerous and a doubtful path, when a safe one presents itself? If nothing more is desired than to regulate and protect the fishery, the bill may be altered and accommodated to that purpose. If the theory of bounties is to be established, by which the Southern States must suffer while others gain, the bill informs us what we are to expect.

The committee now rose, without taking any question.

MONDAY, February 6.

A member from Maryland, to wit, JOHN FRANCIS MERCER, returned to serve in the room of WILLIAM PINKNEY, resigned, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

A petition of the tanners of the town of Newark, in the State of New Jersey, was presented to the House and read, stating the inconveniences they suffer from the erection of mills for the purpose of grinding tanners' bark for exportation, and praying that Congress will adopt such measures for their relief as may appear just and right. Ordered to lie on the table.

_The Cod Fisheries._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."

Mr. GOODHUE.--The gentleman last up (Mr. WILLIAMSON) says, that an appropriation of money being made by the bill now before us, and the Treasury standing pledged for the payment, therefore a direct bounty is granted. At present, we pay in drawbacks about $45,000; but we cannot say that this sum will be adequate to the payment of the drawbacks next year; for, if a greater quantity of fish be taken, a greater sum, of course, must be allowed; and, as the sum depends entirely on the quantity of fish, it is impossible to ascertain beforehand the precise amount. There is not, however, in the whole bill, any thing of a bounty except the bare name. The gentleman allows that we may commute the present drawbacks, and give them to the fisherman instead of the merchant; but it is impossible to do this with safety in any other mode than that pointed out in the bill. Shall we leave it to the fisherman, to be determined by his oath? This would not be advisable.

The plan proposed is a much less exceptionable one. It is founded on a calculation that a certain quantity of tonnage is employed in taking a certain quantity of fish. On this calculation the allowance is apportioned to the tonnage. If gentlemen think the allowance too high, let the sum be reduced; but let it not be stigmatized as a bounty. It is no such thing. The word "bounty" is an unfortunate expression, and I wish it were entirely out of the bill.

Mr. LIVERMORE.--The bill now under consideration has two important objects in view. The one is, to give encouragement to our fishermen, and, by that encouragement, to increase their numbers; the other is to govern those fishermen by certain laws, by which they will be kept under due restraint. Both these objects are of great importance to such persons as choose to employ their capitals in the fishery business. And I believe it will not be disputed that the business itself is of considerable importance to the United States, insomuch as it affords a certain proportion of remittance or exportation to foreign countries, and does not impoverish the country, but enriches it by the addition of so much wealth drawn from the sea.

It is the object of those gentlemen who favor the bill that the fishermen should have some encouragement, not given to them at the expense of the United States, but directed to them out of what was in the former law called a drawback of the duty on salt. The calculation, as I understand it, has been made as nearly as possible to give that drawback, not to the merchants who export the fish, but to the fishermen who take it, in order to increase that description of men, without whose assistance it is vain to expect any benefit from the fisheries; for, if the merchants at present engaged in that branch possessed the whole capital of the United States, yet, if they cannot get fishermen, they cannot carry on the fishery. This is done by a particular class of men, who must be not only expert seamen, but also accustomed to taking the fish and curing it. If these men cannot be had, the capital cannot be employed, and those who undertake the business cannot carry it on, or reap any profit from it.

Whilst the drawback is payable only to the merchant who exports the fish, it is impossible to convince the fishermen that they reap from it any advantage whatever; or, if the more discerning among them do perceive any advantage in it, the others who are not so clear-sighted cannot discern it, and are therefore not disposed to undertake the business. It is, however, of considerable importance to the merchants that the fisherman should receive a proper encouragement, even if they were obliged to allow him a bounty out of their own pocket.

The government of the fishermen, after their engagement in this business, is also necessary to be provided for; otherwise, frequent instances may occur among that class of men of quitting one vessel to embark on board another, or of shipping themselves for a foreign voyage, before the expiration of the fishing season. In the latter case, the vessel lies useless on the owner's hands, and he, together with the whole expense of the outfit, loses all his prospects of future gain.

The two objects here mentioned are fully provided for in the bill. Still, however, it is objected to. But what is the objection? It is, that the word "_bounty_" is twice used in this clause. Let us now see what advantage will result from striking out this obnoxious "_bounty_." None at all. The bill says it shall cease; and have gentlemen any objection to the bounty's ceasing? Since the bounty is to cease by this bill, what advantage in striking it out? The sense would still remain the same; and I do not know why we should make a law expressly to strike out the word "bounty," but to strike out the bounty itself.

It is strange to me that any gentleman, whether he is for giving a great bounty or no bounty at all, should quarrel with this unfortunate word. There is, indeed, one part of the section which I will readily consent to strike out, and I believe every other gentleman who is in favor of the bill will consent to it likewise; and that is the clause which provides that the bounty to be allowed and paid on every vessel for one season, shall not exceed one hundred and seventy dollars. If, when the vote is taken on the section, there does not appear a majority of the House in favor of striking out the whole, we may then move for striking out the _proviso_, if it be offensive to any gentleman. If it be not offensive, it may remain.

If gentlemen are disputing only because the word "_bounty_" is in the bill, they may be perfectly relieved from their uneasiness on that score; for the bill expressly says, "that the bounty now allowed upon the exportation of dried fish of the fisheries of the United States shall cease, and in lieu thereof," a different kind of encouragement is to be given. Here is no reason to dispute about a word. If gentlemen are disposed to consent to the principle of the bill, that the drawback of the duties on salt shall be commuted for a certain sum, to encourage the fishermen, they will vote in favor of the bill; if not, they will vote against it. But it is impossible for me to conceive why any gentleman under heaven should be against it. It is only fixing, for the merchants engaged in this branch, a clear and equitable ratio for distributing among the fishermen that encouragement which they think necessary in order to attach those people to the business, and to prevent them from going to other occupations on land. The bill is an important one, and will increase that branch of business, which is very useful to the community. It does not lay a farthing of bounty or duty on any other persons than those who are immediately concerned in it. It will serve them, and will not injure any body.

Mr. LAURANCE said, from examining the section, he conceived it contemplated no more than what the merchant is entitled to by existing laws. The merchant is now entitled to the drawback; but it is found by experience that the effect has not been to produce that encouragement to the fishermen which was expected; and he presumed the way was perfectly clear to give a new direction to the drawback, and this is all that is aimed at in the bill. He supposed that the clause had no necessary connection with the question which had been started respecting the right of the Government to grant bounties; but, since the question has been brought forward, it may be proper to consider it. In discussing the question, he inquired, What has Congress already done? Have we not laid extra duties on various articles, expressly for the purpose of encouraging various branches of our own manufactures? These duties are _bounties_ to all intents and purposes, and are founded on the idea only of their conducing to the _general interest_. Similar objections to those now advanced were not made to these duties. They were advocated, some of them, by gentlemen from the Southward. He traced the effects of these duties, and showed that they operated fully as indirect bounties.

Mr. L. then adverted particularly to the constitution, and observed that it contains _general_ principles and powers only. These powers depend on _particular_ laws for their operation; and on this idea, he contended that the powers of the Government must, in various circumstances, extend to the granting bounties. He instanced, in case of a war with a foreign power, will any gentleman say that the General Government has not a power to grant a bounty on arms, ammunition, &c., should the general welfare require it? The general welfare is inseparably connected with any object or pursuit which in its effects adds to the riches of the country. He conceived that the argument was given up by gentlemen in opposition to the bill, when they admit of encouragement to the fishermen in any possible modification of it. He then adverted particularly to the fisheries, stated the number of men employed, the tons of shipping necessary to export the fish taken, and inferred the sound policy of encouraging so important a branch of business.

Gentlemen say that we do not want a navy. Grant it; but can they say that we shall never have a war with any European power? May not the time arrive when the protection to the commerce of this country, derived from this source, may be of the utmost necessity to its existence? Adverting to Mr. WILLIAMSON's objection from the unequal operation of bounties, and who had referred to the article of the constitution which says that taxes shall be equal in all the States, Mr. L. observed, that this article in the constitution could only respect the _rates_ of the duties, and that the _same_ duties should be paid in Virginia that are paid in New York--at the Northward as at the Southward. It surely could not mean that every individual should pay exactly the same sum in every part of the Union. This was a provision that no law could possible contemplate.

He concluded by a summary recapitulation of his arguments, and saying he hoped the section would be retained.

Mr. MADISON.--In the conflict I feel between my disposition on one hand to afford every constitutional encouragement to the fisheries, and my dislike, on the other, of the consequences apprehended from some clauses of the bill, I should have forborne to enter into this discussion, if I had not found, that over and above such arguments as appear to be natural and pertinent to the subject, others have been introduced which are, in my judgment, contrary to the true meaning, and even strike at the characteristic principles of the existing constitution. Let me premise, however, to the remarks which I shall briefly offer, on the doctrine maintained by these gentlemen, that I make a material distinction, in the present case, between an allowance as a mere commutation and modification of a drawback, and an allowance in the nature of a real and positive bounty. I make a distinction also, as a subject of fair consideration at least, between a bounty granted under the particular terms in the constitution, "a power to regulate trade," and one granted under the indefinite terms which have been cited as authority on this occasion. I think, however, that the term "bounty," is in every point of view improper as it is here applied, not only because it may be offensive to some, and in the opinion of others carries a dangerous implication, but also because it does not express the true intention of the bill, as avowed and advocated by its patrons themselves. For if, in the allowance, nothing more is proposed than a mere reimbursement of the sum advanced, it is only paying a debt; and when we pay a debt, we ought not to claim the merit of granting a bounty.

It is supposed by some gentlemen, that Congress have authority not only to grant bounties in the sense here used, merely as a commutation for drawbacks, but even to grant them under a power by virtue of which they may do any thing which they may think conducive to the "general welfare." This, sir, in my mind, raises the important and fundamental question, whether the general terms which had been cited, are to be considered as a sort of caption or general description of the specified powers, and as having no further meaning, and giving no further power than what is found in that specification; or as an abstract and indefinite delegation of power extending to all cases whatever; to all such, at least, as will admit the application of money, which is giving as much latitude as any government could well desire.

I, sir, have always conceived--I believe those who proposed the constitution conceived, and it is still more fully known, and more material to observe that those who ratified the constitution conceived--that this is not an indefinite Government, deriving its powers from the general terms prefixed to the specified powers, but a limited Government, tied down to the specified powers which explain and define the general terms. The gentlemen who contend for a contrary doctrine are surely not aware of the consequences which flow from it, and which they must either admit or give up their doctrine.

It will follow, in the first place, that if the terms be taken in the broad sense they maintain, the particular powers afterwards so carefully and distinctly enumerated would be without any meaning, and must go for nothing. It would be absurd to say, first, that Congress may do what they please, and then that they may do this or that particular thing; after giving Congress power to raise money, and apply it to all purposes which they may pronounce necessary to the general welfare, it would be absurd, to say the least, to superadd a power to raise armies, to provide fleets, &c. In fact, the meaning of the general terms in question must either be sought in the subsequent enumeration which limits and details them, or they convert the Government from one limited, as hitherto supposed, to the enumerated powers, into a Government without any limits at all.

It is to be recollected, that the terms "common defence and general welfare," as here used, are not novel terms, first introduced into this constitution. They are terms familiar in their construction, and well known to the people of America. They are repeatedly found in the old Articles of Confederation, where, although they are susceptible of as great latitude as can be given them by the context here, it was never supposed or pretended that they conveyed any such power as is now assigned to them. On the contrary, it was always considered as clear and certain, that the old Congress was limited to the enumerated powers, and that the enumeration limited and explained the general terms. I ask the gentlemen themselves, whether it ever was supposed or suspected that the old Congress could give away the moneys of the States in bounties, to encourage agriculture, or for any other purpose they pleased? If such a power had been possessed by that body, it would have been much less impotent, or have borne a very different character from that universally ascribed to it.

The novel idea now annexed to these terms, and never before entertained by the friends or enemies of the Government, will have a further consequence, which cannot have been taken into the view of the gentlemen. Their construction would not only give Congress the complete Legislative power I have stated--it would do more--it would supersede all the restrictions understood at present to lie on their power with respect to the Judiciary. It would put it in the power of Congress to establish courts throughout the United States, with cognizance of suits between citizen and citizen, and in all cases whatsoever. This, sir, seems to be demonstrable; for if the clause in question really authorizes Congress to do whatever they think fit, provided it be for the general welfare, of which they are to judge, and money can be applied to it, Congress must have power to create and support a Judiciary Establishment, with a jurisdiction extending to all cases favorable, in their opinion, to the general welfare, in the same manner as they have power to pass laws and apply money, providing in any other way for the general welfare. I shall be reminded, perhaps, that according to the terms of the constitution, the Judicial Power is to extend to certain cases only, not to all cases. But this circumstance can have no effect in the argument, it being presupposed by the gentlemen that the specification of certain objects does not limit the import of general terms. Taking these terms as an abstract and indefinite grant of power, they comprise all the objects of Legislative regulation, as well such as fall under the Judiciary article in the constitution, as those falling immediately under the Legislative article; and if the partial enumeration of objects in the Legislative article does not, as these gentlemen contend, limit the general power, neither will it be limited by the partial enumeration of objects in the Judiciary article.

There are consequences, sir, still more extensive, which, as they follow clearly from the doctrine combated, must either be admitted, or the doctrine must be given up. If Congress can apply money indefinitely to the general welfare, and are the sole and supreme judges of the general welfare, they may take the care of religion into their own hands; they may establish teachers in every State, county, and parish, and pay them out of the public Treasury; they may take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout the Union; they may undertake the regulation of all roads, other than post roads. In short, every thing, from the highest object of State legislation, down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown under the power of Congress; for every object I have mentioned would admit the application of money, and might be called, if Congress pleased, provisions for the general welfare.

The language held in various discussions of this House, is a proof that the doctrine in question was never entertained by this body. Arguments, wherever the subject would permit, have constantly been drawn from the peculiar nature of this Government, as limited to certain enumerated powers, instead of extending, like other Governments, to all cases not particularly excepted. In a very late instance--I mean the debate on the Representation bill--it must be remembered, that an argument much urged, particularly by a gentleman from Massachusetts, against the ratio of one for thirty thousand, was, that this Government was unlike the State Governments, which had an indefinite variety of objects within their power; that it had a small number of objects only to attend to, and therefore that a smaller number of Representatives would be sufficient to administer it.

Several arguments have been advanced to show, that because, in the regulation of trade, indirect and eventual encouragement is given to manufactures, therefore Congress have power to give money in direct bounties, or to grant it in any other way that would answer the same purpose. But surely, sir, there is a great and obvious difference, which it cannot be necessary to enlarge upon. A duty laid on imported implements of husbandry, would, in its operation, be an indirect tax on exported produce; but will any one say, that by virtue of a mere power to lay duties on imports, Congress might go directly to the produce or implements of agriculture, or to the articles exported? It is true, duties on exports are expressly prohibited; but if there were no article forbidding them, a power directly to tax exports could never be deduced from a power to tax imports, although such a power might directly and incidentally affect exports.

In short, sir, without going further into the subject, which I should not have here touched on at all but for the reasons already mentioned, I venture to declare it as my opinion, that were the power of Congress to be established in the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very foundation, and transmute the very nature of the limited Government established by the people of America; and what inferences might be drawn, or what consequences ensue from such a step, it is incumbent on us all well to consider.

With respect to the question before the House, for striking out the clause, it is immaterial whether it be struck out, or so amended as to rest on the avowed principle of a commutation for the drawback; but as a clause has been drawn up by my colleague, in order to be substituted, I shall concur in a vote for striking out, reserving to myself a freedom to be governed in my final vote by the modification which may prevail.

Mr. BOURNE, of Massachusetts--

Mr. Chairman: I think little can be added after so full a discussion of the subject before you. The object of the first section in this bill is intended for the relief of the fishermen and their owners. They complain that the law now in force was meant for their benefit, by granting a drawback on the fish exported; this they find by experience is not the case, for they say, that neither the fishermen who catch the fish, nor the importer of the salt, receive the drawback; and I rather suppose, sir, it is the case. The owners of the greater part of the fishing vessels are not merchants, neither do they import the salt they consume; but when the fish they take are cured for market, they are sold at the market price; and it frequently happens that those persons who purchase the fish are not the exporters of them, or the importers of the salt, but a third person, who purchases with a prospect of selling them at a profit, is the exporter; and when it so happens, neither the fisherman who catches the fish, nor the importer of the salt, receives any benefit from the drawback, unless the purchaser (the third person) give a greater price in contemplation of the drawback, which I think is not to be supposed.

Is it worthy the attention of Government that the cod fishery should be preserved? It appears to me that it is. When we consider the labor and assiduity bestowed on this object by our Ministers, at the settlement of peace between us and Great Britain, and the care then taken to secure this privilege, as appears by the treaty--[here Mr. B. read that part of the treaty which secures to us the fishery, he then proceeded]--and consider the struggle made to deprive us of this inestimable branch of commerce, I cannot suppose that any one would, at this day, voluntarily relinquish it, and suffer Great Britain to monopolize this branch, and supply the Mediterranean, French, and other markets. Great Britain, at present, enjoys a sufficient portion of this commerce, while France is confined to the narrow limits of St. Peters and Miquelon. If we relinquish this branch of the cod fishery, what is left us? Our whale fishery is nearly at an end, and unless Government speedily interpose, by granting relief, we shall totally lose it. Does not the British Government wish to deprive us of this branch also? Have not letters of agents been sent to the island of Nantucket, as well as New Bedford, where this branch of business is principally prosecuted, inviting the whale fishermen to remove, and offering them permanent settlements at Milford-Haven, at the expense of their Government? This must be viewed as a great encouragement, in addition to their bounties on oil, to a class of poor men employed in that business. If the cod fishery is relinquished, the fishermen have only to remove to the opposite shore of Nova Scotia, where they will find encouragement fully adequate to their services--of all which they are not unapprised. By encouraging this class of men, your revenue will be increased; for in return for the fish exported, you will receive sugar, coffee, cocoa, indigo, molasses, pimento, cotton, dye-woods, rum, wine, salt, fruit, and other articles subject to duty, and consumed in the country. And again, your Treasury will receive an excess by the provision in this bill; for I presume the greater proportion of vessels employed in this business are from twenty to forty tons; the town of Marblehead, perhaps, has principally large ones. Suppose, then, a vessel of thirty tons obtains, in a season, six hundred quintals of fish? (a very moderate voyage indeed,) her tonnage is seventy-five dollars; the drawback on exportation would be seventy-eight dollars; so that your Treasury retains three dollars gain by this bill, which would be a loss on the drawback.

Mr. Chairman, I think, upon the whole, that granting the encouragement to the fishermen and their owners, held out in the bill, would prove very beneficial to the United States; I hope, therefore, the section before you will not be struck out.

At this point, the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.

TUESDAY, February 7.

_Ordered_, That the petitions of the tanners of the town of Newark, in the State of New Jersey, which was presented yesterday, be referred to Mr. BOUDINOT, Mr. WHITE, Mr. THATCHER, Mr. BOURNE, of Rhode Island, and Mr. NILES; that they do examine the matter thereof, and report the same, with their opinion thereupon, to the House.

Mr. BENSON, from the committee appointed, presented a bill for an apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first enumeration, and making provision for another enumeration, and apportionment of Representatives thereon, to compose the House of Representatives after the third day of March, 1797; which was received and read the first time.

The SPEAKER laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, accompanying his report stating the amount of the subscriptions to the loans proposed by the act making provision for the public debt, as well in the debts of the respective States as in the domestic debt of the United States, and of the parts which remain unsubscribed, together with such measures as are, in his opinion, expedient to be taken on the subject, pursuant to an order of this House of the 1st of November last; which were read, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.

_The Fishery Bill_

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein."