Chapter XXXVIII: Introduction (37)

Mr. SUMTER.--With respect to the resolution as it now stands, I feel myself obliged to oppose it. Nothing that has fallen from the gentleman over the way (Mr. WAYNE) has convinced me that the measure is proper or just. It is necessary to be cautious in the manner of discussing a matter of so much delicacy. I rise, not to make any pointed objections that can in any degree injure the reputation of the officer, whose abilities I respect, or to hurt the feelings of his family or connections. I suppose that no gentleman will decide in favor of the resolution without examining the merits of the case. The committee will have that information which they shall deem to be requisite on the occasion. I am sorry to differ in opinion with the gentleman from Georgia, and am therefore disposed to make sacrifices of my own feelings of past injuries, and will not suffer them to warp my judgment, but will endeavor to decide in conformity with the opinions of the people of the State of South Carolina, and in particular of the district which I have the honor to represent. In going into the investigation of this matter, I will give my reasons why I do not think the country, although in extreme distress, was in that deplorable situation which has been represented; neither was its credit reduced so low but that relief might have been obtained, and that so small an army might have been accommodated, had a proper application been made in time to the Government. The gentleman must therefore be mistaken in stating those circumstances; for if the proper documents be examined, it will appear that the army received very ample supplies from the same source, some months previous to the contract made by Mr. Banks, which must have been in November, or early in December, and previous to the evacuation of Charleston. Whether it was better to adopt the means used by General Greene, or those within the power of the Government, I shall not pretend to determine; but I have no doubt that the Government possessed both the means and the inclination to find supplies. The contract was first made by Banks in November or December, and General Greene did not become the guarantee until the April following; whether there were any reasons for preferring this mode to that of an application to Government, will perhaps appear in the course of the investigation.

Mr. Chairman, this contract has been considered to have operated rather as a misfortune, although it may have afforded a temporary relief; it was the occasion of much complaint, vexation, and distrust, rather than of conciliation; and that this discontent ran through the army is within the knowledge of several officers whose names could be mentioned. It is therefore necessary to bring the matter into the full view of the committee, and to have recourse to the files of the public offices, before we agree to the resolution on the table. At the same time, it is my sincere wish to render justice to the family of the deceased in every reasonable accommodation; but it does not appear to me that the family is reduced to that disagreeable situation which has been represented. The large grants that have been made by the States of Georgia, North and South Carolina, are still in the possession of the heirs of the deceased, and I have been informed that a gentleman offered $30,000 for that granted by North Carolina, so late as last summer; neither have I heard that any distress has been levied upon any of these estates, or that they are so much affected, in reality, but that the claims made against them are rather of a nominal and visionary nature. But admitting that General Greene was security for the United States, and that the operation had been beneficial, (which I deny;) does it appear that executions have been levied to any considerable amount, or to such an extent as to justify the present application? To me it does not appear this has been the case, neither do I believe that the estate has been reduced in the manner represented; and, whilst I say it, I honestly and sincerely hope it; under which impression, I can never accede to the resolution on the table.

Mr. WADSWORTH.--The gentleman last up has said many things to me utterly unintelligible, and others which directly militate with what has been said by the gentleman from Georgia. He has, however, declared that no real or supposed personal injury shall influence him in giving his opinion or vote. I hope, sir, he will not now feel or resent those real or supposed injuries. I do believe they are not real; and from my long and intimate acquaintance with General Greene, I had good opportunity to know him; a better man I never did know. That he had enemies is not to be wondered at; the nature of his command to the southward was important, critical, and difficult, and he might be constrained to do things that necessity only would justify. If he has injured any man, he has atoned for it; neither the tongue nor pen of malice have been able to affix a stigma on his character. If I ever knew a man whose heart was pure and without guile, it was General Greene. Yet he had enemies; no man deserved them so little. More honest fame is due to no man. And if his fortune is to be sacrificed, and his family beggared, it is a consolation that his good name will last for ever. Being one of his executors, I know something of his affairs; but it was with reluctance I rose, as my attachments to him and concern for his family render it extremely difficult for me to enter on the subject. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us he is acquainted with the affairs of the estates in the Carolinas, and has said they are without any executions against them, the bonds on good credit, and the family in no danger of poverty, &c. I can hardly allow, sir, that he is acquainted with the affairs of General Greene, even in South Carolina and Georgia; but if he is, I will ask him if he does not know that all the negroes from the South Carolina estate are sold, and that the land is totally unproductive? that Mr. Rutledge has prevented executions from taking the Georgia estate by his personal interference? that all the estates in Rhode Island and New Jersey are sold? and that the hope of the justice we now ask for has delayed the sale of all the rest, to satisfy his creditors--his Southern creditors?

The proofs and documents alluded to by the gentleman (Mr. SUMTER) have been before Congress for several years, and the friends and executors of General Greene have challenged his enemies, in every part of the Union, to disprove them; and I hope no delay will now take place. The subject is fully before Congress. I hope justice will be done to the widow and orphans of the late General Greene, and that the investigation will now be finished, his honest fame vindicated and established, and his family saved from the ruin that awaits them.

Mr. HARTLEY, in support of Mr. WAYNE's motion, observed, that he had paid some attention to the report and the documents referred to in it, as well as the objections made to the resolutions under consideration. Many of the objections, said he, have been answered by gentlemen who were nearer to the scene of action than myself; I shall strive to obviate others. The mode of conducting our affairs in South Carolina does not seem to have been agreeable to the gentleman opposite to me from that State, (Mr. SUMTER,) and he expresses his high disapprobation of many parts of it. When I disagree with that gentleman, I do it with great reluctance; for no one on this floor has a greater respect for him than myself. In a hazardous and difficult situation, or in carrying on war, or even in great political questions, the best friends may differ in the mode of conducting them; and it has too frequently happened, that such difference has tended to lessen the friendship which formerly existed. Upon the whole, our arms to the southward were crowned with success; we must presume the means generally used were right. If supplies could have been furnished by the State of South Carolina, it is a pity they were not granted. I say, it is possible General Greene might have pursued a different mode to obtain clothing and provisions. He did not. He was of opinion no other plans could have been successfully followed but those which were adopted. The idea of his being a partner with Banks & Co., seems to be given up by the opposition. The mere insinuation of Mr. Banks and some others can have no influence against such a cloud of evidence and documents. These are so strong for the General, that they would work conviction on the greatest infidel. I shall barely advert to a part of them, as mentioned in the report, and on this head give a few observations of my own. And, first, the application to the Legislature of South Carolina, in order to create a competition: Had he been concerned as a partner, or intended to be so, no competition through that channel would have been proposed. If he was to be a partner, the more secret the transaction, the higher the advantage. The bond of indemnity to General Greene, oaths of Banks and Hunter, certificate from Major Forsyth, Nathaniel Pendleton's oath, Charles C. Pinckney's oath, (now Governor of South Carolina,) and the certificates of the two Chancellors of South Carolina, who were both high in the Executive, when these transactions should have happened. Besides, sir, if we consider how many partners there were concerned with Banks in the different transactions, had General Greene been one of the company, it must long since have been manifested to the world. The secret could not have been kept; nor can we possibly think that General Greene, who was undoubtedly a man of understanding, would have expressed himself in the manner he has done, in the close of his letter from Newport, dated the 24th of August, 1785, had he been a partner. He says there, "Thus have I given your Excellency a short narration of the origin and situation of this matter, and have only to add on this subject, that I never held any commercial connection with the company, other than what concerned the public, either directly or indirectly, or ever received one farthing profit or emolument, or the promise of any one from them; and my bond of indemnity expressly declares that I have no interest, connection, or concern, in the debts for which I became bound, all which I am willing to verify on oath." Would he have pledged his honor, his reputation, had he been interested? No, it is impossible! He would have been silent had he been a culprit, and not have challenged the world, as the power of detection would have laid with so many, and the shaft of envy always ready. I hope every man must be satisfied that the General was no partner.

The great points of contest before the committee seem now to be--

1st. Did the General enter into these engagements out of personal regard to individuals, without a view to the public interest?

2dly. Was not the good of the public his principal object?

3dly. Under all circumstances, should not his estate be indemnified?

As to the first, I cannot think that the General, out of mere personal regard to individuals, without a view to the public good, would have been bail. He had been esteemed a man of prudence, and was not a person of large fortune. How would he embarrass his family and property in such engagements? Who, under mere motives of friendship, would have done so? The sum was too large; he had no interest. He got no goods or money for himself. He might have had a favorable opinion of some of the company, but his responsibility was become necessary with a view to the public good.

As to the second, public good must have been his principal object. The contracts before made would not have been carried into execution, without the aid of the contract, for which the indemnity was made in April, 1783. A great many articles were absolutely necessary to the army; they were connected with others; the necessaries could not at that critical period, or for the moment, be obtained elsewhere. The merchants, as I understand, insisted upon two conditions before they would deliver the goods: 1st, that all the goods should go together; 2d, that the commanding officer should become security. There was a necessity for an additional capital to furnish the means for supporting the army; and as most of the goods were useful and necessary, the residue might be disposed of to the best advantage, and the money arising from them be applied to the payment of the debt. Public necessity and the state of things would oblige the General to agree to the first condition. The compliance with the second condition became a necessary consequence. The General's letter from Newport, and General Wayne's oath, Nathaniel Pendleton's oath, and other evidence, prove the situation of the army. As to the third point, should not his estate be indemnified? Through his zeal for the public good, he has unfortunately involved his estate in difficulty. Whatever the conduct of the company might be, the creditors were not to be affected either by the fraud or failure of Banks and the purchasers. General Greene was liable. The General, when he hears of misconduct, does all he can to save and indemnify himself, and through him the United States. Securities were taken in as ample a manner as they could he obtained from the delinquents; and General Greene never wished to call upon the public, until every other means failed. So late as the year 1785 he had still hopes there would be no loss; but when he found the danger, a sense of duty obliged him to come forward to save himself and family, to ask the protection of the public to indemnify him from a debt that he had contracted to save an army from mutiny and disbanding; to protect a country which otherwise would have been exposed. Many exertions had he to make to feed the hungry and cover the naked; were not these for the public good, and shall his private property suffer? Shall his family be reduced to beggary, be stripped of their all, to discharge what the United States are in honor and in justice bound to pay?

Retrospective laws, to affect rights attacked, ought never to pass; but laws have frequently been enacted to indemnify persons for a conduct, though not strictly legal, yet founded on the special circumstances of the case--the safety or honor of a nation or army, where the constitutional authority could not come forward in time. Such was the treaty or system formed by the Duke of Marlborough and the great De Witt. The Dutch, instead of punishing their minister, approved the measure; it eventually tended to the safety and honor of the allies. The individual who undertakes risks for his country's good, a magnanimous Government will always sanctify. We should consider the case upon substantial principles, not according to the letter, not act as the Lacedæmonians did to one of their leaders; they fined him for the infringement of the letter of the law, yet for the same act rewarded the hero with a garland. The fine here ruins the General's estate, and the garland alone, I fear, in this country, will not give his children bread or a becoming education.

In our late contest, the common maxims of old nations could not always be adhered to. We were obliged to act according to emergencies. In the case of General Greene, he seems to have intended for the best. He helped to serve and save a country. His merit stands high indeed. I need not repeat the number of his great and glorious actions, which mark him the General and the hero. His name will be handed down with honor to succeeding ages.

Under all circumstances, I think his estate should be indemnified. If the committee do not like the whole of the resolution, let there be a division, as proposed by one of the gentlemen from South Carolina; though I should think we might safely vote for the whole of the resolution, and let the bill make any other provisions which it may be thought necessary.

Mr. LEE, Mr. BARNWELL, Mr. WAYNE, and Mr. BOURNE, R. I., spoke in favor of agreeing to the resolutions, and Mr. MACON and Mr. STURGES against the motion. Mr. SUMTER closed the debate in sundry remarks on extracts from letters wrote by General Greene during the late war, inserted in Gordon's History of the American Revolution, which extracts contain unfavorable reflections on the militia of South Carolina, and the patriotism of the inhabitants of that State. These reflections, Mr. SUMTER said, were gross calumnies on, and misrepresentations of the character of that people, which he said were invalidated by facts that at that time took place, and by the general tenor of the conduct of South Carolina throughout the whole course of the war.

MONDAY, January 23.

_Petition of Catharine Greene._

The order of the day being called for, on the report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the petition of Catharine Greene, several members objected to taking up this subject, being of a private nature, while matters of the greatest public importance demand the immediate attention of Congress. The question being taken, the motion for going into Committee of the Whole was carried, 21 to 16; and Mr. LIVERMORE took the chair.

After considerable debate, the question was put for agreeing to the first resolution, in the following words:

_Resolved_, as the opinion of this committee, That the
estate of the late Major General Greene ought to be
indemnified for the engagements entered into by that
General, with certain persons in the State of South
Carolina, for the purpose of obtaining supplies for the
Army of the United States, under his command, in the year
1783.

Which was negatived, 28 to 25.

The committee then rose, and the Chairman reported that the Committee of the whole House had had under consideration a report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the petition of Catharine Greene, and had come to no resolution thereon.

Mr. MACON then moved that the Committee of the Whole should be discharged from any further proceedings on the subject; which motion was agreed to.

Mr. BOURNE then laid on the table a resolution for referring the Secretary's Report, together with Mrs. Greene's petition, and the vouchers accompanying it, to a select committee, with instruction to inquire into the facts which rendered it necessary for General Greene to become security to Banks & Co., and the nature, circumstances, and amount of the original debt, and the obligation entered into by General Greene for payment thereof; with an account of the moneys or collateral security received by the obligees, or by General Greene in his lifetime, or his representatives since his death, in part thereof; and the eventual loss which his estate will sustain in consequence of the said securities; and after examining all the circumstances and such further evidence as may be offered relative to the transaction, to report their opinion thereon to the House.

THURSDAY, January 26.

An engrossed bill to ascertain and regulate the claims to half-pay and to invalid pensions was read the third time and passed.

_Protection of the Frontiers._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill for making further and more effectual provision for the Protection of the Frontiers of the United States.

A motion being made to strike out the second section of the bill, which contemplates the raising of three additional regiments of infantry and a squadron of light dragoons, amounting in all to three thousand and forty men, exclusive of commissioned officers--

It was urged in favor of the motion, that the Indian war, in which the United States are at present involved, was, in its origin, as unjustly undertaken as it has since been unwisely and unsuccessfully conducted; that depredations had been committed by the whites as well as by the Indians; and the whites were most probably the aggressors, as they frequently made encroachments on the Indian lands, whereas the Indians showed no inclination to obtain possession of our territory, or even to make temporary invasions, until urged to it by a sense of their wrongs. A proof of this unencroaching disposition on their part plainly appeared in their conduct, after the victory they lately obtained over our troops; for, when flushed with success, they might have swept the country before them, and penetrated as far as Pittsburg, they contented themselves with the advantage they had gained over their invaders, and did not attempt to invade our territories in return, although there was nowhere at hand a sufficient force to check their career.

The mode of treating the Indians in general was reprobated as unwise and impolitic. The Indians are with difficulty to be reduced by the sword, but may easily be gained by justice and moderation;[41] and, although their cruelties are alleged as reasons for a different conduct, and the sufferings of the white people pathetically deplored, these narratives, it was said, are at best but _ex parte_ evidence--we hear nothing of the sufferings of the Indians--but if Cornplanter's speech were read, it would set the matter in a very different point of view, and furnish a complete answer to all the charges of their accusers.

Peace, it was said, may be obtained from the Indian tribes at a much less expense than would be necessary for the support of the war. To persevere in hostilities would be wasting the public money to a very bad purpose indeed; for, supposing our arms crowned with victory, what are the advantages we may expect to reap from our success? We can only gain possession of their lands--a possession that must long continue unproductive of the smallest benefit, as we already possess land sufficient--more, in fact, than we will be able to cultivate for a century to come.

Instead of being ambitious to extend our boundaries, it would answer a much better national purpose to check the roving disposition of the frontier settlers, and prevent them from too suddenly extending themselves to the Western waters. If kept closer together, and more nearly connected with the old settlements, they would be more useful to the community at large, and would not so frequently involve us in unnecessary and expensive wars with the Indians; but if permitted to rove at pleasure, they will keep the nation embroiled in perpetual warfare as long as the Indians have a single acre of ground to rest upon.

If the citizens of the United States were recalled within their proper boundaries, there they might, for years to come, cultivate the soil in peace, neither invaded nor invading. As the country progresses in population, and our limits are found too narrow, it will then be soon enough to contemplate a gradual extension of our frontier; but, in the mean time, it is an idle profusion of blood and treasure to carry war beyond our present line of forts. It is only exposing our arms to disgrace, betraying our own weakness, and lessening the public confidence in the General Government, to send forth armies to be butchered in the forests, while we suffer the British to keep possession of the posts within our territory.

As long as Britain is suffered to retain these posts, we can never hope to succeed against the Indians; nor ought we to trace our late misfortune to any other source than her still holding them in her possession. Were they in our hands, the Indians could not carry on their operations against us with the same degree of vigor as they now do; for it is from those forts that they obtain their supplies of arms and ammunition, with which they can be at all times plentifully furnished, as long as things continue on their present footing.

Until those posts are in our possession, it will be in vain to send our armies into the wilderness. A body of five thousand men, sent out against the Indians, under the present circumstances, would be as effectually defeated as the smaller ones have already been. In those wilds, our troops have no friend at hand to furnish them with supplies, or to give them intelligence of the approach and operations of the enemy; whereas, the Indians, receiving both aid and information from their friendly neighbors, can preconcert their plans, and choose, according to their own convenience, the place and the hour of attack, as they did before.

It was here observed, by an honorable gentleman on the other side of the question, that we ought undoubtedly to get possession of those posts; and that we might have long since obtained it, if we had only laid a seasonable embargo on all the British shipping in our ports; though he doubted whether it would at present be worth while to take such a step, as the English have lost so great a portion of our carrying trade, in consequence of the additional tonnage laid on their vessels.

In favor of the motion, it was further urged, that, supposing even the war to have been originally undertaken with justice on our side--supposing, also, that the national honor and interest called for a continuance of hostilities--yet, as it was by no means either necessary or prudent to invade the Indian territory, as this had been attempted in two successive campaigns, and the event had, in both instances, been such as to afford no very flattering prospect from a third expedition of the same kind, it was thought much more advisable to content ourselves with defending the frontier; and this might be done without making so great an augmentation in the military establishment.

The only use of regular troops on the frontier is to garrison the forts, and to have a standing force in the neighborhood to form a station, to which the militia may resort either for protection or supplies; but as to active service, the frontier militia and rangers were pronounced to be by far preferable to the regular troops, as being more expert woodsmen, and better habituated to the Indian mode of fighting. To defend the forts, a small number of regulars would be sufficient. The present establishment of two regiments would, if completed, be amply adequate to the purpose, and, when assisted by such forces as might at all times be collected on the frontier, would be able to repel every inroad of the enemy.

Experience has proved that the sudden and desultory attacks of the frontier militia and rangers are ever attended with better success than the methodical operations of a regular force. The former are better calculated for expedition and surprise, making unexpected sallies, scouring the country in small bodies, harassing the Indians, and intercepting their straggling parties, by whom their motions are unobserved; whereas, when a body of regulars take the field, encumbered with baggage and heavy artillery, the unavoidable slowness of their movements affords the enemy an opportunity of watching all their operations, collecting their whole force, and skulking in the woods around them till they can seize the favorable moment to strike a sudden blow, which they generally do with success, but which they could never attempt if exposed every hour to the unforeseen attacks of our woodsmen, who would keep their attention constantly engaged in all quarters, and thus prevent them from uniting in large bodies.

It was further observed by some gentlemen, who even admitted the propriety of invading the Indian territory, that, to effect this with success, it was by no means necessary to make such an increase in the military establishment as that contemplated in the bill. The miscarriage of the former expeditions could not (they said) be alleged as a sufficient reason; for it is well known that the former establishment was far from being complete. The regulars intended for the service of the last campaign were to have been above two thousand two hundred; the President was, besides, empowered to raise two thousand five hundred levies, in addition to the regulars; and these would, together, have constituted an army of about four thousand seven hundred men. Had such a body been employed, we might reasonably have expected much better success against the Indians, whose numbers were so far inferior; the whole force of the Wabash tribes not amounting to above eleven or twelve hundred warriors, who never could keep the field for any length of time, but must be soon obliged to disperse, without venturing an attack upon an army of such superior strength.

Instead of this, our army consisted of only about twelve hundred men, and of these not above four or five hundred were regular troops; besides, had even this force been sufficient, if employed in season, the delays that had taken place in the execution of the plan would alone have been sufficient to defeat the intended purpose. During the winter, the law was passed for raising the additional troops for carrying on the war with greater vigor. The whole summer was spent in the business, and the few men that we did enlist were not raised till late in the fall. Collected at length at the head of the Ohio, they fruitlessly loitered away their time, till they finally erected a monument to our eternal disgrace and infamy.

Whatever troops are to be employed, ought to be raised with diligence and despatch, if we wish to avoid a similar miscarriage in our next attempt. The army ought not to enter the Indian country till their whole force is complete. Difficulties, however, and delay, equal to those of last year, may be expected in enlisting the men; and we shall have the officers in pay a considerable time without any soldiers. Perhaps the former pay of the troops was too low, and proper effective men were unwilling to accept of it; if so, let it be raised, let the men be well clothed and fed, and they will more readily engage in the service. Probably, also, the term of three years was an objection with many, who would otherwise have joined our standard. If enlisted only for six months, the ranks will be sooner filled; and this ought to have considerable weight with those who advocate the augmentation of the military establishment, as they cannot but know that, if we set about enlisting the number of men contemplated in the bill, and in the manner there prescribed, they cannot be raised time enough to render any service in the next campaign.

The information contained in the report on the table was not, it was said, to be implicitly relied on. That report was made by a man who had not personally visited the frontier. Others, who had been on the spot, were of opinion that, if two thousand levies had been raised last year, they would have been sufficient, not only for the defence of the frontier, but even for any offensive operations that might have been thought necessary. Such troops, collected in the vicinity, are more competent to the undertaking than the troops now in contemplation. No complaint had been made of their conduct. Whenever they were tried, they behaved as well as the regulars, and, in the action under General St. Clair, they gave equal proofs of their valor.

It was further urged, that the frontier militia are not only equal, but infinitely superior to any regular troops whatever, for the defence of the borders, and that they are, in fact, the only force that can be effectually employed in expeditions against the hostile Indians, whose mode of fighting is familiar to them, and does not strike them with that degree of terror with which it inspires those men who enlist on the regular establishment. These latter being collected in the heart of populous cities, where the face of an Indian is seldom seen, hardly know whether the Indian and his horse are not the same animal. And when they approach the enemy, at the very first shout, even before he is in view, they are terrified at the idea of savage barbarity, which they have ever been taught to reflect on with horror, and, being incapable of resistance, they commit their safety to flight. To prove the superiority of the militia, gentlemen need only contrast the despatch and success of the expedition conducted by General Scott, with the delays, disgrace, and mortification, which attended that under General St. Clair, and consider the difference of the expense on those two occasions.

The expense of such an army as the bill contemplates is an object well worthy of serious consideration, especially at the present moment, when there is scarcely a dollar in the Treasury. Gentlemen would also do well to advert to the progress of this business, and consider where they were likely to stop, if they went on at the present rate. At first, only a single regiment had been raised, and the expense was about $100,000; a second was afterwards added, which swelled the expense to about $300,000; and now a standing force of 5,168 men is contemplated, at an annual expense of above a million and a quarter of dollars. Can this be justified in the present state of our finances, when it is well known that the Secretary of the Treasury, having been requested by the members from a particular State to build a light-house on a part of their coast, declined the undertaking, and alleged the want of funds as the reason?

Our resources, however, might be made to answer for the support of such a force as that which was intended for the service of the preceding year, and there would be little complaint or dissatisfaction among the people. Very few murmurings were heard against the former establishment; but such a one as is now contemplated will be thought extravagant, will breed discontent among the citizens of the United States, and perhaps afford our neighbors in Canada an opportunity to take advantage of our divided situation, and involve us in a war more dangerous than the former which separated us from Great Britain.

Apprehensions, it is said, are entertained that the object contemplated in raising these additional troops is not so much to punish and coerce the Indians, as to have a standing regular force equal to what the British have on this continent. This is said to amount to about six thousand men, including those in Canada. But it is to be remarked, that the British nation has not above _one thousand_ men within the limits of the United States; and yet, with this handful of troops, they not only keep the Indians in awe, but even, in opposition to the wishes of the United States, retain possession of those posts which should have been ceded to us pursuant to the terms of the treaty. Why, then, is it necessary, for the purpose of establishing posts and garrisoning them, to increase the standing force to so large a number as that contemplated in the clause under consideration? During our late arduous struggle for liberty, when we had to cope with the most powerful nation under heaven, the commander-in-chief had never at any one time above ten thousand men under his own immediate command; and if, with so small a force, we were able to effect so glorious a revolution, there can be no necessity of going such lengths at present, for the sake of establishing a military character. It is strange policy, indeed, to raise five or six thousand men to oppose a handful of Indian banditti, whose utmost amount does not, from the documents on the table, appear to exceed twelve hundred.

We are preparing to squander away money by millions; and no one, except those who are in the secrets of the Cabinet, knows for what reason the war has been thus carried on for three years. But what funds are to defray the increased expense of maintaining such a force as is now contemplated? The excise is both unpopular and unproductive. The impost duties have been raised as high as is consistent with prudence. To increase them, would be but to open a door for smuggling, and thus diminish their productiveness. And if those sources of revenue fail--if our finances be thus exhausted in unnecessary wars--we shall be unable to satisfy, the public creditors, unless recourse be had to new taxes, the consequence of which may, with just reason, be deplored; whereas, if we but keep our expenses within bounds--if we nurse our finances--we shall be respectable among the nations of the earth, nor will any nation dare to insult us, or be able to do it with impunity.

During the course of these observations, an honorable gentleman asked, whether this was a day set apart for rhetorical flourishes, as the galleries were open, and he saw the short-hand writers stationed at their different posts?

At an early stage of the debate, an honorable gentleman had suggested, that, instead of passing a law for raising at all events the additional regiments, which, for his part, he did not think necessary, the House, if they finally determined the present establishment to be insufficient, would perhaps do better to appropriate a certain sum of money, to enable the Executive to call in such additional aid as circumstances may require.

To this it was objected, that it is the duty of the Representatives of the people, in all appropriations of the public money, to make them for certain specific purposes. To act otherwise on the present occasion would be setting a precedent that might, in its consequences, prove highly injurious; for, although the greatest confidence may safely be reposed in the virtue and integrity of him who now fills the Presidential chair, it is impossible to foresee what use may hereafter be made of the precedent by his successors, or how far it may be carried.

Against the motion for striking out, and in favor of the proposed augmentation of the military establishment, it was urged: That, as to the justice of the war carried on against the Indian tribes, that was a question which could not admit of a doubt in the mind of any man who would allow that self-preservation and indispensable necessity are sufficient causes to justify a nation in taking up arms. If the present war be not in every respect justifiable, then there never was, nor ever will be, a just war. It was originally undertaken, and since carried on, not for the sake of conquest, but to defend our fellow-citizens, our friends, our dearest connections, who are daily exposed, in the frontier settlements, to all the rage of savage barbarity, to which they, with their wives and children, must soon fall victims, unless we speedily fly to their assistance; and, although there are some people who utterly deny the justice of any war whatever, this doctrine, however fine in theory, will hardly ever obtain in practice; for, is it to be imagined, that any set of men are of such a passive disposition as calmly to look on whilst their friends and relations are butchered before their eyes, and to refuse giving them every assistance in their power?

The murders and depredations which have for years past been repeatedly committed by the savages, loudly call for redress. From various documents of unquestionable authority, now in the hands of the Secretary of War, signed and attested by the Executive and Legislature of Kentucky, by the District Judge, and the Captains of the militia, it appears, that, from the year 1783 to 1790, there have been, of the inhabitants of that District, or of emigrants on their way thither, no less than fifteen hundred persons either massacred by the savages, or dragged into captivity, two thousand horses taken away, and other property plundered or destroyed to the amount of fifty thousand dollars. And there is good reason to suppose that on the other frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania the number of persons murdered or taken prisoners during the above-mentioned period would furnish a list of one thousand or fifteen hundred more.

The white people, it is true, have sometimes committed depredations on the Indians; but the instances have been rare (the honorable gentleman who spoke did not recollect above one or two) of their making unjust attacks upon the savages; nor did they, on those occasions, commence hostilities against them till exasperated by the strongest provocations that could possibly stimulate the human heart. This circumstance may be justly allowed as some palliation of the offence. Even in these instances, however, a few individuals only were concerned; and, when the affair came to the knowledge of the State, ample reparation was made to the injured party. The General Government, too, had shown an equal disposition to do justice to the Indian tribes. Witness the affair of the Cherokees; for, as soon as Congress had heard their complaints of an encroachment made on them by some of the people from the frontier of the Carolinas, immediate orders were issued for obliging the intruders to evacuate the Indian territory.

But, notwithstanding the disposition that prevails, as well in the Legislatures of those States whose frontiers are most exposed, as in the General Government, to cultivate peace and amity with the neighboring Indians, that desirable object is become utterly unattainable in the present posture of affairs. The frontier Indians have killed a number of whites; the whites, in their turn, have made retaliation. Both parties are in the highest degree exasperated against each other, and likely to continue so, in spite of every endeavor that can be made to effect a reconciliation. With minds thus irritated, it is vain to hope for peace, as long as they continue in each other's neighborhood. It is therefore necessary to form a strong barrier, to keep them asunder, unless, indeed, the advocates for a cessation of hostilities would oblige the frontier settlers to abandon their lands. But by what new-invented rule of right should the inhabitants of Kentucky, and the other frontier settlers, be laid under a greater obligation than any other citizens of the United States to relinquish a property legally acquired by their purchase? Were it even proposed to pacify the savages, by purchasing the lands anew, such a measure would answer no other purpose than that of procuring a temporary peace, which would soon again be interrupted by a war that would reproduce the necessity of again having recourse to the same expedient. We should have to purchase the lands again and again, without end. By thus squandering the public money, year after year, we should swell the national debt to an amount that we cannot possibly foresee. Better at once to make a vigorous effort, to act in a manner becoming the national dignity, and to maintain our ground by war, since we cannot obtain a durable or an honorable peace.

Attempts have, at various times, been made to effect treaties of peace with the Indian tribes with whom we are now at war; and, although these efforts have constantly proved ineffectual, they yet show, that neither the United States nor the State of Virginia were backward on their part to adopt conciliatory measures, and to do away that animosity which had commenced on the part of the savages at an early period of the late war with Great Britain, and had continued to break out at intervals ever since. In the years, 1783, '84, '85, '87, '88, and '90, offers of peace were made to them. On the last-mentioned occasion, when a treaty was proposed at the Miami village, the Indians at first refused to treat. They next required thirty days to deliberate; and, in the interim, the inhabitants of Kentucky were expressly prohibited by the President of the United States from carrying on any offensive operations against them; yet, notwithstanding this forbearance on the part of the whites, no less than one hundred and twenty persons were killed or captured by the savages, and several prisoners roasted alive, during that short period, at the expiration of which, the Indians refused to give any answer at all.

On another occasion, the Indians, not content with rejecting our offers of peace, proceeded even so far as to insult us, by telling us we have lands within the British posts, and asking us why we did not go and take possession of them? Will it be said that we are unable to do it? Is this language to be used within the United States? No! We _are_ able, abundantly able to do it, whenever we please; and if we would but retrench our expenses in some instances, which might well admit of a reduction, our ability would still increase; our finances are not quite so insufficient as some gentlemen seem to imagine, nor so easily deranged. We are still able to prove that the boasted efficiency of the General Government is something more than an empty name--we can yet raise both men and money sufficient to defend the nation from either injury or insult.

It is now too late to inquire whether the war was originally undertaken on the principles of justice or not. We are actually involved in it, and cannot recede, without exposing numbers of innocent persons to be butchered by the enemy; for, though we should determine to discontinue the war, can it he said that the savages will also agree to a cessation of hostilities? It is well known that they are averse to peace; and even the warmest advocate of pacific measures must therefore allow that the war is a war of necessity, and must be supported. We cannot, without impeachment both to our justice and our humanity, abandon our fellow-citizens on the frontier to the rage of their savage enemies. And although the excise may be somewhat unpopular, although money may still be wanted; what is the excise? what is money, when put in competition with the lives of our friends and brethren?

A sufficient force must be raised for their defence; and the only question now to be considered is, what that force shall be? Experience has proved, that the force employed in the last campaign was inadequate. It is true the establishment was not complete; but who will venture to assert that, if it had been complete, it would have been sufficient for the intended purpose? Are gentlemen who assert this so well acquainted with the circumstances of the enemy, as to be able to give an accurate statement of the amount of their forces on the frontier? There are stronger opinions in favor of an augmentation of the army than can be adduced against it--opinions given by men of judgment and experience, who have themselves been on the spot, and are well acquainted with the situation of affairs in that quarter. These gentlemen, who must be allowed to be competent judges, are decidedly of opinion that the present establishment, though completed to the last man, will not furnish an adequate force to carry on the war with effect; and that it will be a hopeless attempt to open another campaign, with less than about five thousand regular troops, the number contemplated in the bill.

Nor ought that number to be deemed extravagant, under an idea that we have only a contemptible handful of banditti to contend with. Their numbers were, last year, from authentic documents, stated at about twelve hundred warriors, from twenty-three different tribes: such was the opposition then contemplated; but it is impossible to ascertain what accessions of strength they have since received, or even what force they had engaged in the late unfortunate action, as the very men who were in the engagement do not pretend to form any just or accurate estimate of the number of their assailants; but there is good reason to suppose that they had previously entered into an association with various tribes, that have not as yet come within our knowledge. The bows and arrows used against our troops on that occasion, afford a convincing proof that they had foes to encounter from distant nations, as yet unacquainted with the use of fire-arms. Nor does the account of the bows and arrows depend, for its authenticity, on newspaper evidence alone; gentlemen of unquestionable veracity, who were personally engaged in the action, have declared that they had themselves noticed the arrows flying.

When we consider the warlike disposition of the Indians in general, and the alacrity with which the victors are ever sure to be joined by numerous allies, we have every reason to expect a much more formidable opposition in the next campaign. It is well known that the savages place all their glory in deeds of war; and that, among them, a young man cannot make his appearance in company till he has signalized his valor by some martial achievement. When, to this powerful incentive, a new stimulus is added by the trophies obtained in the late action, it is presumable that numbers will crowd to their standard; and it strongly behooves us to prepare in time for a much more vigorous effort than any we have yet made against them.

The objections drawn from the increased expense, must entirely vanish from before the eyes of any man who looks forward to the consequences of one more unsuccessful campaign. Such a disaster would eventually involve the nation in much greater expense than that which is now made the ground of opposition. Better, therefore, at once to make a vigorous and effectual exertion to bring the matter to a final issue, than to continue gradually draining the Treasury, by dragging on the war, and renewing hostilities from year to year.

If we wish to bring the war to a speedy and a happy conclusion, and to secure a permanent peace to the inhabitants on the frontier, we must employ such troops and adopt such measures as appear best calculated to ensure success. If we delay our determination until the force of the enemy be ascertained, we can make no provision at all; for the nature and circumstances of the case preclude us from the very possibility of obtaining a knowledge of their strength and numbers. And are we, meanwhile, to remain inactive and irresolute, and make no efforts to repel their intended attacks? No! Whatever their numbers may be, prudence calls aloud for provision of some kind. And if experience is to have any weight with us, the example of the French and of the British points out the true mode of securing our frontier, and rendering it invulnerable to an Indian foe. Let us occupy posts in the vicinity of the enemy, let them be properly garrisoned and well provided, and the business is done.

These will afford an opportunity of trading with the friendly tribes, and will prevent all intercourse between the whites and the Indians, except under proper regulations. Should hostilities be meditated by any tribes who are not in amity with us, early intelligence of their movements can be obtained; their marauding parties may either be beaten off on their approach, or intercepted on their return; opportunities may be taken of separately attacking the hostile tribes; their old men, their squaws, their children, will be exposed a great part of the year, whilst the others are out hunting. In short, if fear, hope, interest, can be supposed to have any influence on the Indians, this mode of defence must be allowed to be preferable to any other, as giving the fullest scope to the operation of all those motives.

A different mode has long been pursued in Virginia, and adopted by the inhabitants of Kentucky, but its success has not been such as to offer any inducement to the General Government to follow the same plan. Rangers have there been employed for a number of years to scour the frontiers; and those rangers, too, were expert woodsmen, perfectly inured to the Indian mode of warfare; yet, notwithstanding their utmost vigilance, these savages still found means to commit all the murders and depredations already enumerated. It is true, however, that a frontier militia man, trained up in the woods, may be, in many respects, preferable to a regular soldier, who has not the same knowledge of the country, and of the mode of fighting; but with equal experience, (and proper men possessed of that experience, may be enlisted on the establishment,) regular troops will be found infinitely superior to any militia upon earth.