Chapter XXXVI: Introduction (35)

The terms of the contract, between the officers and the United States, depended, he said, on the decision of the sovereign power; that was authorized alone to determine when the war should cease. That power was vested in the then existing Congress, who, although they entered into provisional articles in November, 1783, did not, however, think proper immediately to disband their armies or put an end to the war, as it was yet uncertain whether those provisional articles would be ratified by Great Britain, or a treaty of peace concluded between Great Britain and France; a circumstance which was necessary before those articles could be definitively binding. It was only when the definitive treaty was made, that Congress determined the period of the war. The army, when finally disbanded and paid up to that day, acknowledged, by accepting their pay, that it was then only the war ended; and, as far as was in their power, assented to the principle which he maintained, that the provisional articles had not before put an end to the war. Suppose that, on the arrival of the definitive treaty, Congress had not agreed to the terms, would the war have then been considered as at an end? Would not Congress have been in the same situation as before the signing of the provisional articles? It was necessary that Congress should, by a definitive act, determine when the war ceased. Congress had passed such an act; and the House at present cannot with propriety enter into a resolution to alter the period. The argument of inconvenience ought also to have some weight with the House; for if any alteration were now to be made in the law, it must have a retrospect to all the widows and children of deceased officers, who have received half pay for years past. Besides, many officers who have not hitherto considered themselves as entitled to half pay, would, in consequence of such an alteration, have a right to apply for it.

Mr. LAURANCE said, he doubted not the gentleman who supported the petition was fully satisfied as to the justice of the claim which he advocated with so much ardor; he begged leave to state his opinion, however, on the subject, in which he should differ from that gentleman.

The contract with the officers of the late army was, that those should be entitled to certain benefits who served to the end of the war. But Major Torrey was not thus circumstanced, as he died previous to the period when the war ceased, and left neither widow nor orphan to receive the benefit of the provisions allowed by law; his case is not contemplated by any existing resolution of Congress.

It is well known that hostilities ceased at the time of publishing the provisional articles which formed the basis for the treaty of peace; but can any man say that every soldier had a right on that event to demand a discharge? Surely not. The provisional articles had the peace in contemplation, but the army was not to be discharged till the articles of the definitive treaty were ratified by the belligerent powers. The army of the United States was, therefore, only furloughed, and Congress retained the power of recalling them into service; and had the officers and soldiers been recalled from their furloughs to take the field, it would have been a continuance of the same war; but if the definitive treaty had been signed, and hostilities had commenced the very next day, it would have been a new war, and would have been prosecuted on entirely new principles. The second article of the provisional treaty looks forward to a _future_ period for a conclusion of the war; and he inferred, that the definitive articles being ratified, and the ratifications exchanged, alone constituted a termination of the war. Mr. L. added some observations on the legal ideas of Mr. Ames, in which he also differed from that gentleman; and concluded by expressing his approbation of the Report of the Secretary of War.

Mr. AMES's remarks were further combated by Mr. WILLIAMSON, Mr. DAYTON, Mr. HILLHOUSE, Mr. WADSWORTH, Mr. CLARK, and Mr. WHITE.

Mr. WAYNE was opposed to the report, and stated certain particulars to show that the army was not furloughed by Congress because it was apprehended there would be any further demand for their services, but because it was inconvenient to give them an absolute discharge at that period.

The motion for accepting the Secretary's Report was carried by a large majority.

WEDNESDAY, November 9.

Two other members, to wit: from Maryland, WILLIAM VANS MURRAY; and from South Carolina, THOMAS SUMTER; appeared, produced their credentials, and took their seats in the House.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Governor of Maryland, enclosing a letter to him from WILLIAM PINKNEY, a member returned to serve in this House for the said State, containing his resignation of that appointment; also a return of JOHN FRANCIS MERCER, elected a member to serve in this House, in the room of the said WILLIAM PINKNEY: which were read, and ordered to be referred to the standing Committee of Elections.

THURSDAY, November 10.

_The Census._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.

Mr. LAURANCE had previously moved, that until the next enumeration the number of Representatives should be one for every thirty thousand persons.

Mr. DAYTON moved to strike out "thirty," before "thousand." This amendment was under consideration.

Mr. GERRY observed, that in all the decisions of the Legislature, we ought to follow as far as possible the opinion of the great body of the people. If this opinion should be found to be against the ratio of thirty thousand, the amendment ought to be adopted; but if we refer to the amendments, proposed by the Conventions to the constitution, we shall find that five States are in favor of one Representative to every thirty thousand persons, till the number should amount to two hundred. None of the propositions now moved as amendments to the motion of the gentleman from New York, amount to that number. Several others of the Conventions were of opinion that the representation was too small to secure the liberties of this country. This Government, said he, is a Government of representation; the people may control their Representatives, but their influence is small in respect to the Senate and the Executive, and still less over the officers of Government. On what then do the people depend for checking encroachments, or preventing abuses? On their Representatives? If these should be too few, or if they should fail them, they never can redress their grievances without having recourse to violence. If the number is small, a majority may be the more easily corrupted. On the other hand, too large a number will be attended with difficulties; a medium then is most eligible. An adequate number is absolutely necessary; and to show that one to thirty thousand would not produce more than an adequate number, he referred to the ratio of representation in England and France, in which there was a greater proportion of Representatives than in the Legislature of the United States.

He then adverted to the objection arising from the additional expense; but, he observed, after Congress shall have passed a few more of the most important acts, it is not probable that the public business will in future require that the sessions should be for more than four months annually; this would reduce the expense greatly, in the first instance; and, agreeably to a calculation, an addition of forty-seven members to the present number, would make the aggregate expense but about one-eighteenth part more than at present, supposing the sessions to be four months long. But he considered the objection on account of the expense as merely speculative.

Although Congress is not positively bound by the constitution to give one member for every thirty thousand inhabitants, yet he would ask, whether the citizens of the United States did not expect that this ratio would be adopted? and whether they would not consider it as an abuse of power, if Congress, instead of one to thirty thousand, should settle the representation at one to forty thousand? Eight States have already adopted the first article of the proposed amendments to the constitution: and if the House should either settle the number of the Representative body, as it now stands, or reduce it, or establish it at one hundred, perhaps they might, before the end of the session, be obliged to repeal their act--as they would be bound by the amendment, as soon as it is ratified by a sufficient number of States. If gentlemen thought it probable that the proposed amendment would be ratified by the several States, they ought already to consider it as a rule for their conduct, and be restrained by it, from giving less than one Representative for thirty thousand inhabitants. After the representation amounts to one hundred, Congress will, no doubt, have a right to fix it there, until it is increased by the ratio of one to forty thousand: but that is a power which, he presumed, Congress will not exercise; but that they then will establish some ratio, by which the increase of representation shall keep pace with the increase of population, until the House consists of two hundred members.

Mr. BOUDINOT was convinced of the propriety of striking out the word "thirty." The House ought to consider what would be an adequate number for doing the business of the Union; and that number ought not to be exceeded, except to answer some very valuable purpose. Business would proceed with difficulty, if the representation was so numerous as it would become by the ratio of one to thirty thousand. The present representation of the United States is in a ratio very different from that of one to thirty thousand; and yet he thought it fully adequate. From a rough calculation, the ratio of thirty thousand would produce one hundred and thirteen members; thirty-five thousand would give ninety-seven; and forty thousand would produce eighty-one. If the number once settled was to rest there, he would not be over anxious to oppose the increase; but if gentlemen would take into view the increase consequent on the next enumeration, they would find that the number will by far exceed the due bounds.

He thought the people of the United States would be duly represented, and to their entire satisfaction, if the ratio was set higher than thirty thousand; nor could he imagine that such an exact proportion, between the Representatives and the represented, was at all requisite to secure their liberties, or to do the necessary business of Government. This indeed might be the case, if the power vested in Congress was proportionate to their number; but, since the House would possess the same powers, whether it consisted of a greater or a smaller number, he thought the people equally secure in either case. The ratio of thirty-five thousand, which would produce ninety-seven members, would, in his opinion, be a very proper one. If, however, the people should think otherwise, they had it in their power to correct the mistake, by ratifying the proposed amendment. Their not having as yet ratified it, was to him an argument that they thought the ratio too low; or, at least, that they considered the question as doubtful. Some of the States, he observed, have postponed the consideration of the amendment; and eight only have as yet agreed to it. On the whole, the House might safely adopt the ratio of one to thirty-five thousand; for that the increasing population of the United States would ever supply a representation sufficiently numerous to answer every good purpose.

Mr. CLARK observed, that his objection was not merely on account of the pay of the members, but an increase in the representation would bring an additional expense on the people, by increasing the number of public officers; as almost every man would wish to see his friend provided for. The liberties of America could be in no danger from the present ratio of representation. The doors of the House are open, and the people know what their Representatives are doing.

Mr. STEELE was in favor of the motion for striking out _thirty_. In discussing the important subject before the committee, he observed that there were two inquiries to be attended to: What is the proper number to constitute a Representative body for the United States, and what ratio will leave the fewest fractions in the respective States? One member to thirty thousand, he conceived, would give too numerous a representation. According to the present number of inhabitants, it will almost double the present number; it will divide and diminish the responsibility, make the House too unwieldy, retard public business, and increase the public expenses unnecessarily. An adequate representation, he thought, would be comprised within a much smaller number.

Gentlemen have called our attention to the House of Commons of Great Britain, and the National Assembly of France; but God forbid that we should draw our precedents from such examples as may be cited from European representation.

He was opposed to thirty thousand as the ratio: it would, in fractions, throughout the United States, leave above three hundred and sixty-nine thousand citizens unrepresented. Thirty-five thousand he thought the most eligible number, as it would leave the fewest fractions.

Mr. LAURANCE agreed that an adequate number was the great object to be attended to; but he contended that the original motion would give this number more completely than a larger ratio: and it ought to be considered, that, before the next enumeration, it will not be probably more than one to fifty thousand. As to the increase of expense, he observed that the great objects being accomplished, the future sessions will be short; besides which, the compensation of the members may be diminished. But he considered a necessary increase in the expense to be fully counterbalanced by affording greater security to the liberties of the people. The firmness of a government depends on a strong Executive; but this Executive should be founded on a broad bottom; and the broader the basis, the more secure is the public freedom under a vigorous Executive.

The existence of the Union may depend on the fullness of the representation. The inequality in the proportional increase of the number of inhabitants in different States, ought also to be taken into consideration; for it is very probable that in a short time, while some of the smaller States had a Representative for every thirty thousand, others would not have one to forty thousand. He was governed by general principles, and not by any calculations of fractional numbers: the constitution contemplates the ratio he had proposed, and therefore he hoped the motion for striking out would not obtain.

Mr. GOODHUE observed, that the situation and circumstances of the Government of the United States are so different from those of France or Great Britain, that no parallel could be drawn respecting them. Nor is there an absolute similarity between this Government and those of the State Governments. The objects of legislation which come under the cognizance of Congress, are but few compared with those which engage the British House of Commons and the National Assembly of France. A much larger representation for them, and in our State Legislatures, is therefore more proper, than is necessary for us in the General Government. He doubted the opinion that a large representation was less liable to corruption than a small one: some facts appear to confirm the former sentiment. He did not consider the expense as a material objection, if an increase of the number be necessary to doing more ample justice, or for the greater security of the liberties of the people; but, as he thought this was by no means the case, he was in favor of striking out "thirty," in order to insert a larger number.

Mr. BARNWELL agreed with the gentleman last up. He should vote for striking out "thirty," in order to substitute the largest number that had been mentioned. Mr. B. entered into an abstract and philosophical discussion of the principle of representation in Government. The leading sentiment was, that a large proportion of Representatives is not necessary to obtain the best objects of legislation, in expressing the will of the people, or to secure the liberties of the constituent body. The great point, he observed, was, to combine the greatest portion of honesty with a due degree of activity. That number which would comprise a due proportion of these, would be competent to all the purposes of legislation, whether the number for which it legislates is ten thousand, or five hundred thousand. On this principle, he was decidedly against a large number, and in favor of a small one. Adverting to the British House of Commons and the National Assembly of France, with respect to the former, he said, their corruption is, in a great degree, owing to their numbers: as to the latter, he observed, that the National Assembly had acted, in his opinion, politically and wisely. They set out with a large representation, in conformity to the sentiments of the people at the moment; but, on experience, finding the number too great, they have reduced it from twelve hundred to about two hundred and fifty. He believed that the general sense of the people was against a large representation in Congress; the inconveniences experienced from numerous bodies in the State Legislatures have led several of the States to lessen the number. He instanced Georgia, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania.

Mr. BALDWIN was opposed to the motion. One Representative for thirty thousand appeared to him by no means a great representation. The opinion that, of late, had been so often advanced from the press, and in public discussion, for reducing the Representative branch in Government to a small number, he held to be full of dangerous error. He was sensible that the terms great and small were so merely relative in their signification, that it was difficult precisely to understand each other in the use of them. Perhaps they may most properly, both of them, be considered as extremes. No doubt representation, which of late seems to be used as the character of Republican Government, is a great improvement upon Democracy, or legislation by the whole body of the people. He could conceive that a representation might be so large as to partake of the evils of assembling the whole body of the people; but it was a very improbable and not a dangerous extreme: the other extreme was full of danger. These observations acquire much force, when applied particularly to the Governments of this country: enfeeble the representative part of them, and you sap the very principles of life. They stand on a different basis from the Governments which have gone before them, and may justly be said to be new experiments in government; time, as yet, has scarcely given room to judge of the probable issue; but this we may pronounce with much certainty--Let the principles of representation languish, and they have no chance of success.

It had not been found practicable to ground representation in the Federal Constitution upon any other principle than that of numbers; but extent of territory is unquestionably one of the natural principles on which it rests, and should if possible be regarded. One for thirty-four or thirty-five thousand may be deemed a proper representation in the Kingdom of France, or of Great Britain. The four millions which compose the United States, compactly settled where there was great sameness in the country, and pretty equally distant from a common centre, would be properly represented by a smaller number than in their present sparse settlement. But still further: the settlement of the United States is a fillet stretched along the sea-coast for seventeen hundred miles, comprehending as great a variety of climate and interests as one of the other quarters of the globe. It is difficult to conceive of a situation which calls for a greater extension of the principle of representation.

It has been said, that one for thirty thousand will make too large and unwieldy a body. He was sensible that was a point that did not admit of being determined by any conclusive reasoning; it was a mere matter of opinion; sound judgment only is to be used, time and experience will come on and confirm or correct the opinion. In such a case, it is wise to inquire how this has been judged of by others who have had a Representative body. In France, one thousand two hundred was not thought too great a representation in forming their National Assembly; and the number established by their new constitution for their stated Legislature was not two hundred and fifty, as the member last up had stated, but, if he had not been misinformed by the publications in this country, it was nearly seven hundred and fifty.

In the Kingdom of Great Britain, five hundred is not thought too great a representation: and can one hundred and thirteen, which is the greatest number contended for, be considered in this country as a huge and impracticable mass of representation?

It had ever appeared to him to be among the strongest marks of our youth and inexperience, that we grow wise too suddenly. He was afraid this instantaneous wisdom which sprung up so at once, and set at nought, or removed to the extreme of absurdity and folly, the deliberate and tried opinions of the most profound and enlightened among men, in circumstances peculiarly favorable to honest decision, will itself be left by time on that extreme.

The Federal Government, it must be admitted, is in fact pretty highly seasoned with prerogative; practice has already evinced the necessity, in many instances, of increasing it, by devolving much of the Legislative power upon the Executive Department, arising from the difficulty of making particular provisions and details in our laws, and accommodating them to the various interests of so extensive a country.

The other branch of the Legislature has many traits of a perpetual--at least of a very solid constituent part of the Government. He did not mention these as imperfections in the Government; they are perfections, if the other parts can be in due proportion: but it is surely a sound reason against taking positive measures at this time to diminish the Representative branch. For his own part, he was not well satisfied as to the intention. If there is any reason to apprehend that the Government will depart from the point on which it was first placed, he could scarcely suppose that any one could be honestly alarmed with the fear that the departure would be towards Democracy. He concluded, by expressing his hopes that the representation to the next Congress would be fixed at one for thirty thousand, as it had hitherto been, and that the motion for striking out would not prevail.

FRIDAY, November 11.

JOHN W. KITTERA, from Pennsylvania, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House to-day.

MONDAY, November 14.

A petition of James Jackson, of the State of Georgia, was presented to the House and read, complaining of the undue election and return of ANTHONY WAYNE, one of the members returned to serve in this House for the said State.

_Ratio of Representation._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.

Mr. FINDLAY declared himself to be in favor of one Representative for every thirty thousand persons. The opinion of the people should be the guide of the committee; that opinion, he conceived, to be in favor of the ratio he had mentioned.

The representation ought as nearly as possible to express not only the will, but to participate in the wishes and interests of the people. A large representation embraces these interests more fully, and is more competent to giving and receiving information. The objects of legislation are such as come home to the doors, to the feelings of every man; the Government ought therefore to secure the confidence of the people by a large representation. The expense he considered as trifling compared to the benefits--and the people expect and are willing to pay for being well governed, and having their liberties secured. An increased representation is an additional security against corruption. As to delays occasioned by a numerous body, he observed that the Representatives were chosen to deliberate and to mature every subject before decision; he instanced the advantages derived from the numerous representations in France and in Ireland; the former had framed a constitution in two years for twenty-six millions of citizens, and provided for securing the liberties of their country--and the latter had proved a successful barrier against the encroachments of the arbitrary power of England. He concluded, by asserting that the voice of the people was in favor of the amendment proposed to the constitution, which would give one Representative to every thirty thousand persons.

Mr. GILES said this subject had struck him in two points of view: whether Congress are not precluded from exercising any discretion on the subject? and whether, if they are not, it is expedient for them to exercise this discretion at this time? The ratio of representation is a constitutional, and not a Legislative act. He referred to the constitution, in which it is said that there shall be one Representative to every State; and, secondly, that until the enumeration, the number should be as therein appointed to each State. After the enumeration, the number is mentioned below which it shall not be placed; but there is a negative power to increase the ratio, and from this negative power, a positive discretionary power is inferred. But, he observed that Congress had precluded itself from a right to exercise this discretionary power, by sending out to the several State Legislatures an amendment on this very subject. This amendment he considered in a serious point of view; and had this idea been attended to at the commencement of the discussion, he conceived that it would have prevented the opinion from being brought forward whether it was expedient that any change in the ratio of the representation should take place. The idea of one to thirty thousand, he considered as fully settled in the minds of the people; and a change on the part of the Government would indicate a changeable disposition, and a mutability of counsels, which is but another name for weakness.

Mr. G. then took a view of the objects of legislation to the State Assemblies, and of those of the General Government. In the former, above one thousand persons are employed, though their attention is confined to their internal police. Those of the General Government, on the other hand, are on the great objects of the whole finance of the Union, a sum of more than eighty millions of dollars, &c., &c.

It is said that we shall want abilities, but I should be sorry if a representation of ten times the present number of this House should comprise the abilities of a single State.

He assigned different causes than numbers, for the corruption in the British House of Commons; among these were the frequent mortgages of the funds, and the immense appropriations at the disposal of the Executive, the mode of their elections, &c. A large number is not so easily corrupted as a small body.

An inequality of circumstances, he then observed, produces revolutions in Government, from Democracy to Aristocracy and Monarchy. Great wealth produces a desire of distinctions, rank, and titles. The revolutions in property in this country have created a prodigious inequality of circumstances. Government has contributed to this inequality; the Bank of the United States is a most important machine in promoting the objects of this moneyed interest. This bank will be the most powerful engine to corrupt this House. Some of the members are directors of this institution; and it will only be by increasing the representation that an adequate barrier can be opposed to this moneyed interest. He next adverted to certain ideas which he said had been disseminated through the United States; and here he took occasion to observe, that the Legislature ought to express some public disapprobation of these opinions. The strong Executive of this Government ought to be balanced by a full representation in this House. He hoped the motion to strike out thirty thousand would not obtain.

Mr. BOUDINOT closed the debate of this day by a few remarks, reinforcing his former observations in favor of an increased ratio.

TUESDAY, November 15.

_Ratio of Representation._

The House again resolved itself into a committee of the whole House on the Schedule of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.

Mr. PAGE addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I can no longer refrain from expressing my sentiments respecting the question before the committee; not only because I wish if possible to remove the error which I think several members, for whom I have the highest respect, have fallen into, but because I feel myself more interested in the question than I ever was in any one I have had to decide on.

Sir, it gave me pain to find those worthy members calculating and coldly applying the rules of arithmetic to a subject beyond the power of numbers to express the degree of its importance to their fellow-citizens. I was distressed, sir, to find that, in their honest zeal for securing order, despatch of business, and dignity in respectability of members in the General Legislature, they used arguments which have been applied in other countries to the establishment of insolent aristocracies--in some, tyrannical despotisms--and in others, kings; those countries which were most on their guard with a semblance of a free Government.

Sir, the errors I wish to correct are these. They think that because it is _proposed_, by a _proposed_ amendment to the constitution, to authorize them to interfere in the business of ascertaining and fixing the ratio of representation to the population of the States, that Congress ought, without any hesitation, to enter on that business; but I humbly conceive that Congress, as this is a delicate question in which their own weight and importance must unite with the weight and substantial interest of their constituents, ought to listen to the suggestions of delicacy, and leave its discussion to a disinterested convention of the States. I say it appears to me no small error to quit the plain path of legislation, marked out for us by the constitution, needlessly to wander into the field of political speculation respecting its supposed defects.

Let me, therefore, advise to leave the restriction of the numbers of members of this House to the people, or to some future Congress, which can see more plainly than can now be descried, the evils of a too numerous representation. By so doing, we shall avoid, if not an improper measure, at least a rash step--at least we shall stand clear of a charge of indelicacy, and deprive our enemies of the triumph they expected in the completion of their predictions, that Congress would never propose any amendments to the constitution but such as would be subservient to their own views and aggrandizement. Let us not give the enemies of our new Government cause to exult, and its friends to sigh and mourn. Let us not give our friends occasion to repeat what many have said, that so many of our citizens have been led away by theoretical writers on government, as to render it problematical whether the American States are not at this time as much indebted to the National Assembly for its remains of Republican principles, as France was to Congress, in 1776, for their first ideas of that liberty which they now enjoy. Let us not, in this moment of general exultation of the friends to the rights of man, take a step which may damp their joy, and lead them to fear that Americans, who were foremost in the glorious career of liberty, have stopped short.

But, not to take up the precious time of this House with relations of facts to show what was and is the opinion of our fellow-citizens on this interesting subject, I will only state a few arguments which have weight with me as being in themselves evident truths, viz: Our constitution being framed by the people, and introduced to us in their name, and Congress being the creatures of their will, spoken into existence by the word of their power, for Congress to lessen _their_ weight, to diminish their importance, and to exclude them from as full a share in their own Government as can be consistent with the nature of it, and indeed from that share which they claim, must be impolitic and dangerous.

But, granting that the people wished not a greater share in the General Government than is proposed by the amendment, as it is impossible, in a country like the United States, that one man can be sufficiently informed of the opinions, wishes, and real interests of thirty-five thousand of his fellow-citizens, and therefore laws might be enacted contrary to the opinions, wishes, and interests of the people, in which they might nevertheless acquiesce, sacrificing their interests for the sake of peace and quiet to the wills of their Representatives, one thirty-five-thousandth part of their own number, what friend to his country would wish to see such a dangerous influence on the one hand, and such a blind submission on the other? How long could an enlightened people remain in such a state of insensibility and torpor? And what might not be the consequence of their awakening from their lethargy? If not an expensive revolution, an expensive repeal of laws. And here I will remark, that the smallest number of Legislators, and they, too, well selected for their wisdom and respectability, if unacquainted with their constituents, might pass well-framed laws, founded on the wisdom of other countries, and yet find them disagreeable to their constituents, and be under a necessity of repealing them; but this could not be the case, if the people had in that Legislature a sufficient number of Representatives on whose fidelity, attachment, and disinterestedness they could rely. This, sir, is a truth worthy of our attention--an ignorance of which, or inattention thereto, I suspect has been the occasion of much political evil in the world. Happily for France, the people had such a number of Representatives in the National Assembly as could engage their feeling, inform their judgment, attach their interest, and establish their confidence in their fidelity and disinterestedness; had that number been much smaller, it is probable France would never have been delivered from oppression by their exertions.

I know, sir, that many friends of our constitution thought that the convention did not pay a sufficient attention to the interests of their constituents, when they restrained them from having more than one Representative for every thirty thousand citizens. I know that there is a report that the people are indebted to their President, even for this share in their Government; and I believe, sir, if this report be true, that whatever has been so justly said of him, as compared to Fabius, to Hannibal, to Alexander, may be forgotten, when this instance of his wisdom, disinterestedness, and attachment to the interests of his fellow-citizens, will be more and more known and applauded, and be for ever engraved on the hearts of their posterity. Shall we, then, Mr. Chairman, the direct Representatives of the people, be less attentive to their interest, and that too respecting their share in the deliberations of their own House of Representatives, than the President of their convention was? I trust not.

I will not pretend to say, however, whether in an Assembly where attempts are frequently made to carry into effect the projects of monarchical or aristocratical juntos, the virtuous struggles of patriotic members may not produce mob-like disorders; but in an Assembly like Congress, where I should suppose no such question can be agitated; none which may not be discussed with temper and decency, such disorder need not be apprehended. I should suppose there would be less clanger of animosities and disorderly debates in Congress, amongst twelve hundred members, than in the British Parliament, if it consisted but of one hundred. Where we have all but one and the same great object in view, the happiness of our country, (not the interests of a particular body of men born with privileges insulting to the feelings and rights of freemen, nor the whims of an individual, born to trample on his fellow-creatures,) we can have no cause to be dissatisfied with one another.

Surely, sir, unless these gentlemen suppose the members of Congress void of sense, or of every idea of decency and propriety, they cannot suppose that even five hundred members would not be easily restrained within the bounds of order.

Mr. CLARK said, he did not rise to trouble the House with a lengthy discourse, for he had always believed that long speeches answer no valuable purpose. He meant only to offer a few remarks on what had been said in opposition to his former observations, and he hoped that, although the gentlemen contend for the ratio of 30,000 as the only basis whereon to found the liberties of the people, he should not be stigmatized with the name of an aristocrat for voting in favor of a large ratio. Hitherto he had not borne that character, and he could not suppose himself yet infected, unless he had caught the disorder since he became a member of the present House. Much has been said about the influence of the bank, and that bank directors are members of the House of Representatives. The bank (said he) is public property, and therefore he could not see the force of the gentleman's arguments respecting the dangerous influence of that institution, unless it was that he was displeased at the distribution of the shares, so much of the stock being held at New York and to the eastward, and so little at Conococheague. In the same predicament he viewed the other objections respecting the influence of speculators; for he did not know that any members of the House were speculators, neither could he see any danger from bribery.

In reply to Mr. FINDLAY'S observation, that more wisdom would be brought into the House by increasing the ratio, he asked whether this would not also bring in more folly? For the probability is, that the ratio of both wisdom and folly will increase with the increase of numbers, and likewise of honesty and dishonesty; and with respect to the smallness of the district, or that it was safer for a small number to send a member than a greater, he was of a different opinion, as he believed that if ever the practice of bribery should come into play in America, it would be easier for a Representative to purchase a small district than a large one. If ever the liberties of the people are endangered, it will not be by the smallness of the representation, but by the corruption of electors and elections. This is the door which Congress should guard in the strictest manner, and that will secure the people against corruption in the House.

A gentleman from Georgia has observed, that the disposition of a great many millions of dollars has been in the hands of a quorum of this House, of whom it requires only seventeen to form a majority. On this Mr. C. observed, that the old Congress, which was composed of a much smaller number, were intrusted with the disposal of larger sums, although there were sometimes only two members from the largest State, Virginia, and no complaints were heard of their conduct.

But there is an argument which ought to have weight in the present question. The Senate, although a much smaller body than this House, are fully competent to judge of our proceedings, and of the safety of the country. Indeed, (said Mr. C.,) it appears very evident to me that we are not in want of a larger number in the House of Representatives to debate any question, if it be considered how much has already been said on the subject now before us.

Mr. VINING expressed much surprise that the subject, which to him appeared perfectly definable, should have occasioned the debate to travel so widely from the line marked out by the constitution. The pendulum seems to vibrate between the numbers 81, 96, and 113; and should that pendulum rest on any one of them in preference to the others, he could not suppose that it would affect the liberties of America. Why, therefore, all this extraneous argument about a point of so easy decision? We are sent here to administer the Government, the first principles of which are already fixed, so that neither branch can encroach on the other. The Senate, the House of Representatives, the President, have each defined powers; and whilst those remain, I shall always believe the liberties of America are invulnerable.

Under this impression, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for striking out 30,000, in order to accommodate the question to a medium. But I shall do this on different principles from some other gentlemen; notwithstanding, I at the same time confess that the ratification of the first amendment to the constitution ought to govern us in deciding this question. The spirit of the amendment appears to me clearly to imply that we should not suffer the number of Representatives to exceed one for 30,000. I am here, not as a person who shall exercise discretionary opinions, but judge by the letter of the constitution. And in this case we may increase the number, but we cannot make it less after the enumeration. In the mean time, until that enumeration is complete, the representation remains as it has been hitherto, which I believe may be about one member to every 40,000 or 41,000.

If we go upon theory only, I would enlarge the representation to its greatest extent, and hand down the principle to futurity, in letters of gold, that a very great representation--that Democracy is the very best Government that can possibly be devised, provided it were practicable to give it stability. Next to a government as free as theory could extend, we have the freest in the world--a Government of representation, which will increase with the population of the country, and the ten new States will always preserve an equilibrium; but if you increase it to an extreme, you may render it tumultuous, although it may be safe.

I cannot, however, see the propriety of comparing this to the Government of Great Britain, although that is called a Government of Representation, consisting of two Houses of Parliament, one of which is elective, the Lords are hereditary, and the King can do no wrong; and it has hitherto been, I believe, the next best Government, after our own, in the world. And yet we know with how much reluctance Ireland obtained a participation of the trade and commerce of Great Britain; although a FLOOD bellowed forth with the voice of liberty like a Demosthenes, still nothing could induce the British Ministry to give way, until the _volunteers_ effected it. And have we not the volunteers, sir, in this country to protect our rights? Yes, sir, the American volunteers are perfectly competent to this service.

I am under no apprehensions from the stockholders of the bank, or the speculators in the funds; for it is their interest to have a wise and good representation. The people who are employed in the more simple path of agriculture, removed at a great distance, are not more interested in the security of the Government than the more informed stockholder. As an example of the discernment of the great commercial people of London and Bristol, I need only mention their choice of a FOX and a BURKE, for until a late day Mr. Burke was the champion of the people and the friend of liberty.

If our Senate should take any unwarrantable stride towards aristocracy, have we not the power to check them? No President can very well attempt it at any time hereafter; and we are perfectly secure in the present time from all suspicion of corruption.

Mr. HILLHOUSE said he had ever been a friend to a Republican form of Government, and God forbid, that he should ever give his vote for any measure that should endanger the liberties of his country. He was in favor of an energetic government, as that alone can secure the blessings of liberty. As to the dread of corruption in this House, which some gentlemen appeared to entertain, he thought there was no foundation for such an apprehension; at least as the idea refers to one or two hundred Representatives--two hundred he contended, were as easily corrupted as one. But the corruption contemplated was a mere matter of opinion; no facts, he presumed, existed in this country to justify a positive assertion; and as to foreign countries, it seems to be conceded that a larger number than any that has been mentioned is susceptible of undue influence. He then adverted to the restrictions on the President of the United States, and the Senate, in respect to the means of corrupting the Legislature. The constitution has also made provision to secure the independence of the members, &c. He then urged some difficulties which would be occasioned by a small ratio. He observed that the population of some of the States is nearly stationary: if a small ratio is now established, the consequence will be, when it is augmented, that the representation of those States must be diminished. This would be a measure that would be greatly disliked. With respect to the proposed amendment, he thought it was entirely out of the question, till it was ratified by three-fourths of the States. A very numerous representation would tend to weaken, if not destroy the State Governments, and, in the issue, would destroy the General Government. For, said he, they mutually depend on each other for support.

Mr. KITCHELL was in favor of a numerous representation. He thought the amendment proposed to the constitution ought to be the guide to the House on this occasion. He did not draw his ideas of what should constitute a proper representation, from the examples cited from foreign countries; nor was he actuated by an apprehension of corruption, as more applicable to a small number than to a large one; but when he considered the various objects, views, denominations, professions, callings and interests of the citizens of the United States, he was fully convinced that a large representation was necessary to embrace the wishes and answer the expectations of the people. He should, therefore, vote against the motion for striking out thirty thousand.

Mr. GERRY took a general survey of the arguments against the proposed ratio of one to thirty thousand. In noticing the objection from the instability of the State Legislatures, he said it was not owing to their numbers, but to the mode in which they are elected. Were the Senates and Executives of the several States chosen as those of the General Government, there would have been as much stability and consistency in their transactions, as in those of the Government of the Union. A gentleman had said that the proposed amendments to the constitution had been adopted with reluctance by some of the States which had accepted them. He called on the gentleman to produce his authorities for this assertion. A relative proportion between the members of the House and the Senate had been suggested; this idea had no foundation in the constitution. And he further observed, that the constitution has so completely guarded and secured the rights and independence of the Senate, that he could not conceive of the apprehensions of gentlemen, who appear to think that an increase of the members of this House will overwhelm that branch of the Legislature. In all events, the privileges of that body will remain the same. The States, it is said, have reduced their Representative Assemblies. This, so far from being an argument against the proposed ratio, was directly in favor of it. The diminution of the State Legislatures has been occasioned by the idea which the people entertain of the increasing importance of the General Government. The objects of legislation to both Governments are nearly similar; they relate to those important concerns which interest the feelings of every citizen of the United States; all the difference lies in the magnitude of their respective spheres of action. Hence, it must evidently be the wish and expectation of the people, that their interests in every point of view, should be fully and adequately represented in this House.

The resolution being again read, in the following words:

"_Resolved_, That the number of Representatives shall,
until the next enumeration, be one for thirty thousand."

The question was taken thereupon and agreed to by the House; yeas 35, nays 23, as follows:

YEAS.--Abraham Baldwin, Egbert Benson, John Brown, William Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, William B. Giles, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Daniel Heister, Daniel Huger, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, James Madison, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, Upton Sheridine, Thomas Sumter, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Anthony Wayne, Alexander White, and Francis Willis.

NAYS.--Fisher Ames, John Baptist Ashe, Robert Barnwell, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, William Barry Grove, James Hillhouse, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon, Nathaniel Niles, Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William Smith, John Steele, Jonathan Sturges, George Thatcher, John Vining, and Artemas Ward.

_Ordered_, That a bill or bills be brought in pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. PAGE, Mr. MURRAY, and Mr. MACON do prepare and bring in the same.

TUESDAY, November 22.

A memorial of the committee of the counties of Washington, Westmoreland, Fayette, and Alleghany, in the State of Pennsylvania, was presented to the House and read, stating their objections to an act, passed at the last session, imposing a duty on spirits distilled within the United States, and praying that the same may be repealed. Referred to the Secretary of the Treasury for his information.

_Representative from Maryland._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the report of the standing Committee of Elections, to whom was referred the Letter from the Executive of the State of Maryland, containing the resignation of WILLIAM PINKNEY, a member returned to serve in this House for the said State; and also a certificate of the election of JOHN FRANCIS MERCER, in the room of the said WILLIAM PINKNEY.

The law of the State of Maryland regulating elections being called for, was produced and read; by which it appeared that the Governor and Council of that State were authorized to fill up vacancies in the representation of that State in Congress.

Some objections having been offered against accepting the report,

Mr. SENEY observed, that the case appeared to him to be so plain that he was surprised to find gentlemen objecting to an acceptation of the report of the committee. He then stated the whole process of the business, in the resignation of Mr. PINKNEY and the election of Mr. MERCER, in which the law of the State had been strictly adhered to. He concluded by saying, that two cases in point had already occurred in the State of Connecticut, and no difficulty respecting them had taken place in the House.

Mr. GILES said, that he was a member of the select committee which had made the report; and from an accurate attention to all the circumstances of the case, he was led to think the report a very improper one. From recurring to the constitution, he was of opinion that a resignation did not constitute a vacancy. The constitution speaks only of vacancies in general, and does not contemplate one as resulting from a resignation. Adverting to the British House of Commons, he observed that in that body there could be no resignation. This is an established principle. The people having once chosen their representatives, their power ceases, and consequently the body to which the resignation ought to be made no longer exists. From the experience of the British Government in this respect, he argued against a deviation from this rule. He showed from the constitution, that the Executives of the States who are empowered to fill vacancies, are not at all authorized to declare the existence of such vacancies; for, if they are to judge in the case, the whole power is invested in them of determining the whole business of vacancies--an idea that materially and essentially affects the privileges of the members of the House. He remarked that, even by the law of Maryland, the requisite steps had not been pursued by the Executive of that State. He concluded by saying that, if the principles he had advanced were just, he hoped the report would not be accepted.