Chapter CXVII: Section 2 (22)

The city of Alexandria had become "such a scene of pillage,
massacre, and wanton destruction as to make the world shudder.
It was the old tale of horrors. Houses were plundered and
burned; the European quarter, including the stately buildings
surrounding the Great Square of Mehemet Ali, was sacked and
left a heap of smoldering ruins; and more than two thousand
Europeans, for the most part Levantines, were massacred with
all the cruelty of oriental fanaticism. This was on the
afternoon of the 12th. It was the second massacre that had
occurred under the very eyes of the British fleet. The
admiral's failure to prevent it has been called unfortunate by
some and criminal by others. It seems to have been wholly
without excuse. … The blue-jackets were landed on the 13th,
and cleared the way before them with a Gatling gun. The next
day, more ships having arrived, a sufficient force was landed
to take possession of the entire city. The khedive was
escorted back to Ras-el-Tin from Ramleh, and given a strong
guard. Summary justice was dealt out to all hostile Arabs who
had been captured in the city. In short, English intervention
was followed by English occupation. The bombardment of
Alexandria had defined clearly the respective positions of
Arabi and the khedive toward Egypt and the Egyptian people.
… The khedive was not only weak in the eyes of his people,
but he was regarded as the tool of England. … From the
moment the first shot was fired upon Alexandria, Arabi was the
real ruler of the people. … The conference at Constantinople
was stirred by the news of the bombardment of Alexandria. It
presented a note to the Porte, July 15, requesting the
dispatch of Turkish troops to restore the status quo in Egypt.
But the sultan had no idea of taking the part of the Christian
in what all Islam regarded as a contest between the Moslem and
the unbeliever. … In Egypt, the khedive had been prevailed
upon, after some demur, to proclaim Arabi a rebel and
discharge him from his cabinet. Arabi had issued a
counter-proclamation, on the same day, declaring Tewfik a
traitor to his people and his religion.
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Having received the news of the khedive's proclamation, Lord
Dufferin, the British ambassador at Constantinople, announced
to the conference that England was about to send an expedition
to Egypt to suppress the rebellion and to restore the
authority of the khedive. Thereupon the sultan declared that
he had decided to send a Turkish expedition. Lord Dufferin
feigned to accept the sultan's cooperation, but demanded that
the Porte, as a preliminary step, should declare Arabi a
rebel. Again the sultan was confronted with the danger of
incurring the wrath of the Moslem world. He could not declare
Arabi a rebel. … In his desperation, he sent a force of
3,000 men to Suda bay with orders to hold themselves in
readiness to enter Egypt at a moment's notice. … In the
meantime, however, the English expedition had arrived in Egypt
and was proceeding to crush the rebellion, regardless of the
diplomatic delays and bickerings at Constantinople. … It was
not until the 15th of August that Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived
with his force in Egypt. The English at that time held only
two points, Alexandria and Suez, while the entire Egyptian
interior, as well as Port Said and Ismailia, were held by
Arabi, whose force, it was estimated, now amounted to about
70,000 men, of whom at least 50,000 were regulars. The
objective point of General Wolseley's expedition to crush
Arabi was, of course, the city of Cairo. There were two ways
of approaching that city, one from Alexandria, through the
Delta, and the other from the Suez canal. There were many
objections to the former route. … The Suez canal was
supposed to be neutral water. … But England felt no
obligation to recognize any neutrality, … acting upon the
principle, which is doubtless sound, that 'the neutrality of
any canal joining the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans will be maintained, if at all, by the nation which can
place and keep the strongest ships at each extremity.' In
other words, General Wolseley decided to enter Cairo by way of
the Suez canal and Ismailia. But he kept his plan a profound
secret. Admiral Seymour alone knew his purpose. … On the
19th, the transports moved eastward from Alexandria, as if to
attack Abukir; but under the cover of darkness that night,
they were escorted on to Port Said, where they learned that
the entire canal, owing to the preconcerted action of Admiral
Seymour, was in the hands of the British. On the 21st, the
troops met Sir Henry McPherson's Indian contingent at
Ismailia. Two days were now consumed in rest and preparation.
The Egyptians cut off the water supply, which came from the
Delta by the Sweet Water Canal, by damming the canal. A sortie
to secure possession of the dam was therefore deemed
necessary, and was successfully made on the 24th. Further
advances were made, and on the 26th, Kassassin, a station of
some importance on the canal and railway, was occupied. Here
the British force was obliged to delay for two weeks, while
organizing a hospital and a transport service. This gave Arabi
opportunity to concentrate his forces at Zagazig and
Tel-el-Kebir. But he knew it was for his interest to strike at
once before the British transports could come up with the
advance. He therefore made two attempts, one on August 28, and
the other on September 9, to regain the position lost at
Kassassin. But he failed in both, though inflicting some loss
upon his opponents. On the 12th of September preparations were
made by General Wolseley for a decisive battle. He had become
convinced from daily reconnoissance and from the view obtained
in the engagement of September 9, that the fortifications at
Tel-el-Kebir were both extensive and formidable. … It was
therefore decided to make the approach under cover of
darkness. … At 1.30 on the morning of the 13th General
Wolseley gave the order for the advance, his force consisting
of about 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalrymen, and sixty
field-guns. They had only the stars to guide them, but so
accurately was the movement conducted that the leading
brigades of each division reached the enemy's outposts within
two minutes of each other. 'The enemy (says General Wolseley)
were completely surprised, and it was not until one or two of
their advanced sentries fired their rifles that they realized
our close proximity to their works.' … The intrenchments
were not carried without a severe struggle. The Egyptians
fought with a desperate courage and hundreds of them were
bayoneted at their posts. … But what could the rank and file
accomplish when 'each officer knew that he would run, but
hoped his neighbor would stay.' At the first shot Arabi and
his second in command took horse and galloped to Belbeis,
where they caught a train for Cairo. Most of the other
officers, as the reports of killed and wounded show, did the
same. The Egyptians fired their first shot at 4.55 A. M., and
at 6.45 the English had possession of Arabi's headquarters and
the canal bridge. The British loss was 57 killed, 380 wounded,
and 22 missing. The Egyptian army left about 2,000 dead in the
fortifications. … A proof of the completeness of the success
was the entire dissipation of Arabi's army. Groups of
soldiers, it is true, were scattered to different parts of
Egypt; but the army organization was completely broken up with
the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. … 'Major-General Lowe was
ordered to push on with all possible speed to Cairo. …
General Lowe [reached] the great barracks of Abbassieh, just
outside of Cairo, at 4.45 P. M., on the 14th instant. The
cavalry marched sixty-five miles in these two days. … A
message was sent to Arabi Pasha through the prefect of the
city, calling upon him to surrender forthwith, which he did
unconditionally.' … Before leaving England, Wolseley had
predicted that he would enter Cairo on the 16th of September;
but with still a day to spare the feat was accomplished, and
Arabi's rebellion was completely crushed. England now stood
alone. Victory had been won without the aid of France or the
intervention of Turkey. In Constantinople negotiations
regarding Turkish expeditions were still pending when Lord
Dufferin received the news of Wolseley's success, and
announced to the Porte that there was now no need of a Turkish
force in Egypt, as the war was ended. France at once prepared
to resume her share in the control; but England, having borne
the sole burden of the war, did not propose now to share the
influence her success had given her. And it was for the
interest of Egypt that she should not. … England's first
duty, after quiet was assured, was to send away all the
British troops except a force of about 11,000 men, which it
was deemed advisable to retain in Egypt until the khedive's
authority was placed on a safe footing throughout the land. …
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What should be done with Arabi was the question of paramount
interest, when once the khedive's authority was re-established
and recognized. Tewfik and his ministers, if left to
themselves, would unquestionably have taken his life. … But
England was determined that Arabi should have a fair trial.
… It was decided that the rebel leaders should appear before
a military tribunal, and they were given English counsel to
plead their cause. … The trial was a farce. Everything was
'cut and dried' beforehand. It was arranged that Arabi was to
plead guilty to rebellion, that he was forthwith to be
condemned to death by the court, and that the khedive was
immediately to commute the sentence to perpetual exile. In
fact, the necessary papers were drawn up and signed before the
court met for Arabi's trial on December 3. … On the 26th of
December Arabi and his six companions … upon whom the same
sentence had been passed, left Cairo for the Island of Ceylon,
there to spend their life of perpetual exile. … Lord
Dufferin … had been sent from Constantinople to Cairo, early
in November, with the special mission of bringing order out of
governmental chaos. In two months he had prepared a scheme of
legislative reorganization. This was, however, somewhat
altered; so that it was not until May, 1883, that the plan in
its improved form was accepted by the decree of the khedive.
The new constitution provided for three classes of assemblies:
the 'Legislative' Council,' the 'General Assembly,' and the
'Provincial Councils,' of which there were to be fourteen, one
for each province. … Every Egyptian man, over twenty years
of age, was to vote (by ballot) for an 'elector-delegate' from
the village in the neighborhood of which he lived, and the
'electors-delegate' from all the villages in a province were
to form the constituency that should elect the provincial
council. … The scheme for reorganization was carried forward
to the extent of electing the 'electors-delegate' in
September; but by that time Egypt was again in a state of such
disquietude that the British advisers of the khedive
considered it unwise to put the new institutions into
operation. In place of legislative council and general
assembly, the khedive appointed a council of state, consisting
of eleven Egyptians, two Armenians, and ten Europeans. The
reforms were set aside for the time being in view of impending
troubles and dangers in the Sudan."

_J. E. Bowen,
The Conflict of East and West in Egypt,
chapter 5-6._

ALSO IN:
_Colonel J. F. Maurice,
Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt._

_C. Royle,
The Egyptian Campaigns,
volume 1, chapters 22-44._

EGYPT: A. D. 1884-1885.
General Gordon's Mission to Khartoum.
The town beleaguered by the Mahdists.
English rescue expedition.
The energy that was too late.

"The abandonment of the Soudan being decided upon, the British
Government confided to General Gordon the task of extricating
the Egyptian garrisons scattered throughout the country. …
Gordon's original instructions were dated the 18th January,
1884. He was to proceed at once to Egypt, to report on the
military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it
might be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian
garrisons and for the safety of the European population in
Khartoum. … He was to be accompanied by Colonel Stewart. …
Gordon's final instructions were given him by the Egyptian
Government in a firman appointing him Governor-General. …
Gordon arrived at Khartoum on the 18th February. … While
Gordon was sending almost daily expressions of his view as to
the only way of carrying out the policy of eventual
evacuation, it was also becoming clear to him that he would
very soon be cut off from the rest of Egypt. His first remark
on this subject was to express 'the conviction that I shall be
caught in Khartoum'; and he wrote,—'Even if I was mean enough
to escape I have no power to do so.' The accuracy of this
forecast was speedily demonstrated. Within a few days
communications with Khartoum were interrupted, and although
subsequently restored for a time, the rising of the riparian
tribes rendered the receipt and despatch of messages
exceedingly uncertain. … Long before the summer of 1884, it
was evident that the position of Gordon at Khartoum had become
so critical, that if he were to be rescued at all, it could
only be by the despatch of a British force. … Early in May,
war preparations were commenced in England, and on the 10th of
the month the military authorities in Cairo received
instructions to prepare for the despatch in October of an
expedition for the relief of the Soudanese capital. 12,000
camels were ordered to be purchased and held in readiness for
a forward march in the autumn. On the 16th May a
half-battalion of English troops was moved up the Nile to Wady
Halfa. A few weeks later some other positions on the Nile were
occupied by portions of the Army of Occupation. Naval officers
were also sent up the river to examine and report upon the
cataracts and other impediments to navigation. Still it was
not till the 5th August that Mr. Gladstone rose in the House
of Commons to move a vote of credit of £300,000 to enable the
Government to undertake operations for the relief of Gordon.
… It was agreed that there were but two routes by which
Khartoum could be approached by an expedition. One by way of
the Nile, and the other via Souakim and Berber. … The Nile
route having been decided on, preparations on a large scale
were begun. … It was at first arranged that not more than
5,000 men should form the Expedition, but later on the number
was raised to 7,000. … The instructions given to Lord
Wolseley stated that the primary object of the Expedition was
to bring away Gordon and Stewart from Khartoum; and when that
purpose should be effected, no further offensive operations of
any kind were to be undertaken."

_C. Royle,
The Egyptian Campaigns, 1882-1885,
volume 2, chapters 12-18._

"First, it was said that our troops would be before the gates
of Khartoum on January 14th; next it was the middle of
February; and then the time stretched out to the middle of
March. … Lord Wolseley offered a hundred pounds to the
regiment covering the distance from Sarras to Debbeh most
expeditiously and with least damage to boats. … He also
dispatched Sir Herbert Stewart on the immortal march to
Gakdul. Stewart's force, composed principally of the Mounted
Infantry and Camel Corps, and led by a troop of the 19th
Hussars, acting as scouts—numbering about 1,100 in all—set
out from Korti on December 30th. Its destination was about 100
miles from headquarters, and about 80 from the Nile at Shendy.
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The enterprise, difficult and desperate as it was, was
achieved with perfect success. … On the 17th January Sir
Herbert Stewart engaged the enemy on the road to Metemneh, and
after defeating some 10,000 Arabs—collected from Berber,
Metemneh, and Omdurman—pushed forward to the Abu Klea Wells.
His tactics were much the same as those of General Graham at
Elteb, and those of the Mahdi's men—of attacking when thirst
and fatigue had well-nigh prostrated the force—were at all
points similar to those adopted against Hicks. Our losses were
65 non-commissioned officers and men killed and 85 wounded,
with 9 officers killed—among them Colonel Burnaby—and 9
wounded. Stewart at once pushed on for Metemneh and the Nile.
He left the Wells on the 18th January to occupy Metemneh, if
possible, but, failing that, to make for the Nile and entrench
himself. After a night's march, some five miles south of
Metemneh, the column found itself in presence of an enemy said
to have been about 18,000 strong. Stewart halted and formed a
zareba under a deadly fire. He himself was mortally hurt in
the groin, and Mr. Cameron, of the Standard, and Mr. Herbert,
of the Morning Post, were killed. The zareba completed, the
column advanced in square, and the Arabs, profiting by Abu
Klea, moved forward in echelon, apparently with the purpose of
charging. At thirty yards or so they were brought to bay, so
terrific was the fire from the square, and so splendidly
served was Norton's artillery. For two hours the battle raged;
and then the Arabs, 'mown down in heaps,' gave way. Meantime
Sir Charles Wilson had made a dash for the Nile, where he
found steamers and reinforcements from Gordon, and the laconic
message, 'An right at Khartoum. Can hold out for years.' …
In the joy at the good news, none had stopped to consider the
true meaning of the message, 'All right. Can hold out for
years,' for none was aware that nearly two months before
Gordon had said he had just provisions enough for 40 days, and
that what he really meant was that he had come to his last
biscuit. The message—which was written for the enemy—was
dated December 20, and Sir Charles Wilson would reach Khartoum on
January 28, just a month after its despatch. … The public,
carefully kept in ignorance … and hopeful beyond their wont,
were simply stupefied to hear, on February 5, that Khartoum was in
the hands of the Mahdi and Gordon captured or dead."

_A. E. Hake,
The Story of Chinese Gordon,
volume 2, chapter 10._

ALSO IN:
_H. M. Stanley,
In Darkest Africa,
chapter 1._

_Colonel H. E. Colvile,
History of the Soudan Campaign._

_Colonel C. W. Wilson,
From Korti to Khartoum._

_Colonel Sir W. F. Butler,
The Campaign of the Cataracts._

_W. M. Pimblett,
The Story of the Soudan War._

_General C. G. Gordon,
Journals at Khartoum._

_H. W. Gordon,
Events in the Life of Charles George Gordon,
chapters 14-20._

EGYPT: A. D. 1893.
The reigning khedive.

Mohamed Tewfik died in January, 1802 and was succeeded by his
son Abbas, born in 1874.

_Statesman's Year-book, 1893._

----------EGYPT: End----------

EGYPTIAN EDUCATION.

See EDUCATION, ANCIENT.

EGYPTIAN TALENT.

See TALENT.

EIDGENOSSEN.

The German word Eidgenossen, signifying "confederates," is
often used in a special sense, historically, as applied to the
members of the Swiss Confederation/

See SWITZERLAND: THE THREE FOREST CANTONS.

The name of the Huguenots is believed by some writers to be a
corruption of the same term.

EIGHT SAINTS OF WAR, The.

See FLORENCE: A. D. 1375-1378.

EIKON BASILIKE, The.

See ENGLAND: A. D. 1649 (FEBRUARY).

EION, Siege and capture of (B. C. 470).

See ATHENS: B. C. 470-466.

EIRE.

See IRELAND: THE NAME.

EKKLESIA.

See ECCLESIA.

EKOWE, Defence of (1879).

See SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1877-1870.

ELAGABALUS, Roman Emperor, A. D. 218-222.

ELAM.

"Genesis calls a tribe dwelling on the Lower Tigris, between
the river and the mountains of Iran, the Elamites, the oldest
son of Shem. Among the Greeks the land of the Elamites was
known as Kissia [Cissia], and afterwards as Susiana, from the
name of the capital. It was also called Elymais."

_M. Duncker,
History of Antiquity,
book 2, chapter 1._

About 2300 B. C. Chaldea, or Babylonia, was overwhelmed by an
Elamite invasion—an invasion recorded by king Asshurbanipal,
and which is stated to have laid waste the land of Accad and
desecrated its temples. "Nor was this a passing inroad or raid
of booty-seeking mountaineers. It was a real conquest.
Khudur-Nankhundi and his successors remained in Southern
Chaldea. … This is the first time we meet authentic
monumental records of a country which was destined through the
next sixteen centuries to be in continual contact, mostly
hostile, with both Babylonia and her northern rival, Assyria,
until its final annihilation by the latter [B. C. 649, under
Asshurbanipal, the Sardanapulus of the Greeks, who reduced the
whole country to a wilderness]. Its capital was Shushan
(afterwards pronounced by foreigners Susa), and its own
original name Shushinak. Its people were of Turanian stock,
its language was nearly akin to that of Shumir and Accad. …
Elam, the name under which the country is best known, both
from the Bible and later monuments, is a Turanian word, which
means, like 'Accad,' 'Highlands.' … One of
Khudur-Nankhundi's next successors, Khudur-Lagamar, was not
content with the addition of Chaldea to his kingdom of Elam.
He had the ambition of a born conqueror, and the generalship
of one. The Chapter xiv, of Genesis—which calls him
Chedorlaomer—is the only document we have descriptive of this
king's warlike career, and a very striking picture it gives of
it, … Khudur-Lagamar … lived, according to the most
probable calculations, about 2200 B. C."

_Z. A. Ragozin,
Story of Chaldea,
chapter 4._

It is among the discoveries of recent times, derived from the
records in clay unearthed in Babylonia, that Cyrus the Great
was originally king of Elam, and acquired Persia, as he
acquired his later dominions, by conquest.

See PERSIA, B. C. 549-521.

See, also, BABYLONIA.

EL ARISH, Treaty of.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1800 (JANUARY-JUNE).

ELBA: A. D. 1735.
Ceded to Spain by Austria.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735.

ELBA: A. D. 1802.
Annexation to France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1802 (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER).

ELBA: A. D. 1814.
Napoleon in exile.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (MARCH-APRIL),
and (APRIL-JUNE).

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