Chapter 3 (3)

"Virginia … had more western enterprise than any other colony.
In 1774 Dunmore's war gave her the 'back-lands,' into which
her frontiersmen had been for some time pressing. Boone was a
Carolinian, but Kentucky was a distinctively Virginia colony.
In 1776 the Virginia legislature erected the County of
Kentucky, and the next year a Virginia judge dispensed justice
at Harrodsburg. Soon the colony was represented in the
legislature of the parent state. While thus extending her
jurisdiction over the region southwest of the Ohio, the Old
Dominion did not forget the language of [her charter] of 1609,
'up into the land throughout from sea to sea, west and
northwest.' George Rogers Clark, a Virginian who had made
Kentucky his home, was endowed with something of the general's
and statesman's grasp. While floating down the Ohio in 1776,
being then 24 years of age, he conceived the conquest of the
country beyond the river. … Clark says he had since the
beginning of the war taken pains to make himself acquainted
with the true situation of the Northwestern posts; and in 1777
he sent two young hunters to spy out the country more
thoroughly, and especially to ascertain the sentiments of the
'habitants.' On the return of these hunters with an
encouraging report, he went to Williamsburg, then the capital
of Virginia, where he enlisted Governor Patrick Henry and
other leading minds in a secret expedition to the Illinois.
Acting under a vaguely worded law, authorizing him to aid 'any
expedition against their Western enemies,' Governor Henry gave
Clark some vague public instructions, directing him to enlist,
in any county of the commonwealth, seven companies of men who
should act under his command as a militia, and also private
instructions that were much more full and definite. … Both the
public and private instructions are dated January 2, 1778. The
governor also gave the young captain a small supply of money.
Clark immediately re-crossed the mountains and began to
recruit his command. … Overcoming as best he could the
difficulties that environed him, he collected his feeble
command at the Falls of the Ohio. On June 26, 1778, he began
the descent of the river. Leaving the Ohio at Fort Massac,
forty miles above its mouth, he began the march to Kaskaskia.
This fell into his hands, July 5th, and Cahokia soon after,
both without the loss of a single life. Clark found few
Englishmen in these villages, and the French, who were weary
of British rule, he had little difficulty in attaching to the
American interest. Vincennes, soon after, surrendered to a
mere proclamation, when there was not an American soldier
within one hundred miles of the place. … Clark prevailed upon
100 men to re-enlist for eight months; he then filled up his
companies with recruits from the villages, and sent an urgent
call to Virginia for re-enforcements. The salutary influence
of the invasion upon the Indians was felt at once; it 'began
to spread among the nations even to the border of the lakes;'
and in five weeks Clark settled a peace with ten or twelve
different tribes. …
{3264}
And now Clark began really to feel the difficulties of his
situation. Destitute of money, poorly supplied, commanding a
small and widely scattered force, he had to meet and
circumvent an active enemy who was determined to regain what
he had lost. Governor Hamilton [the British governor at
Detroit] projected a grand campaign against the French towns
that had been captured and the small force that held them. The
feeble issue was the capture, in December, 1778, of Vincennes,
which was occupied by but two Americans. Clark, who was in the
Illinois at the time of this disaster, at once put his little
force in motion for the Wabash, knowing, he says, that if he
did not take Hamilton, Hamilton would take him; and, February
25, 1779, at the end of a march of 250 miles, that ranks in
peril and hardship with Arnold's winter march to Canada, he
again captured the town, the fort, the governor, and his whole
command. Hamilton was sent to Virginia a prisoner of war,
where he was found guilty of treating American prisoners with
cruelty, and of offering the Indians premiums for scalps, but
none for prisoners." Clark was ambitious to extend his march
to Detroit, but could not compass the necessary means.
"'Detroit lost for a few hundred men,' was his pathetic lament
as he surrendered an enterprise that lay near his heart. Had
he been able to achieve it, he would have won and held the
whole Northwest. As it was he won and held the Illinois and
the Wabash in the name of Virginia and of the United States.
The bearing of this conquest on the question of western
boundaries will be considered in another place, but here it is
pertinent to remark that the American Commissioners, in 1782,
at Paris, could plead 'uti possidetis' in reference to much of
the country beyond the Ohio, for the flag of the Republic,
raised over it by George Rogers Clark, had never been lowered.
It would not be easy to find in our history a case of an
officer accomplishing results that were so great and
far-reaching with so small a force. Clark's later life is
little to his credit, but it should not be forgotten that he
rendered the American cause and civilization a very great
service. All this time the British were not idle. War-party
after war-party was sent against the American border. In 1780
a grand expedition was organized at Detroit and sent to
Kentucky under the command of Captain Bird. But it
accomplished nothing commensurate with its magnitude and cost.
… The Northwest had been won by a Virginia army, commanded by
a Virginia officer, put in the field at Virginia's expense.
Governor Henry had promptly announced the conquest to the
Virginia delegates in Congress. … But before Patrick Henry
wrote this letter, Virginia had welded the last link in her
chain of title to the country beyond the Ohio. In October,
1778, her Legislature declared: 'All the citizens of the
commonwealth of Virginia, who are actually settlers there, or
who shall hereafter be settled, on the west side of the Ohio,
shall be included in the district of Kentucky which shall be
called Illinois County.' Nor was this all. Soon after,
Governor Henry appointed a lieutenant-commandant for the new
county, with full instructions for carrying on the government.
The French settlements remained under Virginia jurisdiction
until March, 1784."

_B. A. Hinsdale,
The Old Northwest,
chapter 9._

ALSO IN:
_Clark's Campaign in the Illinois
(Ohio Valley History Series, 3)._

_J. H. Perkins,
Annals of the West,
chapter 7._

_A. Davidson and B. Stuvé,
History of Illinois,
chapters 16-18._

_T. Roosevelt,
The Winning of the West,
volume 2, chapters 2-3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779.
The French Alliance.
Peril of France.
Doubtful feeling in America.
Spanish mediation with England.

"From the third volume of Doniol's comprehensive work on the
'Participation de la France a l'etablissement des Ètats Unis,'
published in 1888, we are able to learn for the first time the
extreme peril of France in 1778-1779. When Vergennes advised
the recognition of the independence of the United States, it
was on the same grounds that Canning advised the recognition
of the independence of the Spanish South American States many
years afterwards. The fair distribution of power in the
civilized world, which was threatened in the latter period by
the Holy Alliance, was threatened in the former period by the
assumption of maritime supremacy by Britain. In each the
object was to call up a new sovereignty in America, so as to
check an undue concentration of sovereignty in Europe,
Undoubtedly Vergennes was aided, as Canning was aided, by the
enthusiasm felt by men of liberal views for a revolution that
was expected to extend the domain of liberalism; but with
Vergennes, as with Canning, the object was the establishing of
a power abroad which could resist a dangerous aggression at
home. When in February, 1778, France acknowledged the
independence of the United States, Vergennes had good reason
to hold either that Britain would not resent the insult by
war, or that she would find that in such a war the odds were
against her. A British army had just capitulated at Saratoga.
America, so it was reported to Vergennes and so he believed,
was unanimous in determining to defend her liberties to the
last. In Holland there was a strong party which was expected
to force the States-General into a recognition of their sister
republic. Spain had already secretly advanced a million of
francs to the American commissioners. From Frederick the
Great, delighted to see his British relatives, who had not
always supported him in his troubles, annoyed by a revolt in
their own domain, came words very encouraging to the American
envoys. Catharine II listened with apparent satisfaction to a
scheme which would relieve her infant shipping from British
oppression. It looked as if, should Britain declare war
against France, she would have against her the armies and
navies of all continental Europe, aided by the people of her
American Colonies in a compact mass. But in a few months there
came a great change. The British army under Howe was so
largely reenforced as for the immediate present to give it a
great superiority over any army Congress could bring against
it in open field. … It is true that the news in April of the
French treaty revived the energies of the revolutionists; but
this treaty had its drawbacks, as the old dislike of France,
in part inherited from England, in part the product of the
Seven-years war, intensified the yearning for the mother
country which in many hearts still remained. French officers
complained that on their first arrival in New England they
were received with sullen aversion by the people, though
welcomed by the revolutionary leaders.
{3265}
The French army and navy, for the first year in which they
were engaged in America, did no good to the American cause;
and so great was the popular irritation at their inactivity,
so strong, it was said, continued to be the old race
attachment to England, that intelligent French observers in
America advised Vergennes that he must move warily, for at any
moment America might make a separate peace with Britain and
then join the British forces against France. No doubt these
reports, so far as they pronounced this to be the drift of a
large minority in Congress, were unfounded in fact. They were
nevertheless communicated under high sanction to Vergennes,
and produced in his mind the liveliest anxiety. … English
influence had for a time regained its ascendency in Holland.
Prussia and Russia, having tasted the delights of neutral
commerce, let it be plainly understood that they would not
abandon a neutrality so profitable for the risks of
belligerency. And Spain had taken alarm and was backing out
not merely from the family compact, but from her recent
promise to aid the insurgents. Aiding the insurgents, her
minister declared, would be cutting her own throat, and no aid
to the insurgents should be given except on a very heavy
equivalent. If France was to meet the shock of the British
navy alone she might be swept from the seas, and, aside from
this danger, her finances were in such a ruinous condition
that her bankruptcy was imminent. One of two courses must be
adopted, not only to save France but to save the independence
of the United States and the consequent equipoise of power for
which France has gone to war. There must be either a general
peace, which would include the independence of the United
States, or there must be war, with Spain joining the allies. …
It was in this condition of affairs that the position of Spain
in 1778-1779 became of commanding importance. She offered
herself as mediator between the allies and their common enemy,
and through her the terms of pacification were discussed. In
the negotiations, protracted and on both sides largely
insincere, between Spain and Britain relative to the proposed
pacification, the winter of 1778-1779 was consumed."

_F. Wharton,
Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States,
chapter 5, section 86 (volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779.
The War carried into the South.
Savannah taken and Georgia subdued.

Towards the end of November, 1778, a "body of troops, under
Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, sailed [from New York] for
Georgia In the squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker; the British
cabinet having determined to carry the war into the Southern
States. At the same time General Prevost, who commanded in
Florida, was ordered by Sir Henry Clinton to march to the
banks of the Savannah River, and attack Georgia in flank,
while the expedition under Campbell should attack it in front
on the seaboard. … The squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker
anchored in the Savannah River towards the end of December. An
American force of about 600 regulars, and a few militia under
General Robert Howe, were encamped near the town, being the
remnant of an army with which that officer had invaded
Florida, in the preceding summer, but had been obliged to
evacuate it by a mortal malady which desolated his camp.
Lieutenant-colonel Campbell landed his troops on the 29th of
December, about three miles below the town. The whole country
bordering the river is a deep morass, cut up by creeks, and
only to be traversed by causeways. Over one of these, 600
yards in length, with a ditch on each side, Colonel Campbell
advanced, putting to flight a small party stationed to guard
it. General Howe had posted his little army on the main road,
with the river on his left and a morass in front. A negro gave
Campbell information of a path leading through the morass, by
which troops might get unobserved to the rear of the
Americans. Sir James Baird was detached with the light
infantry by this path, while Colonel Campbell advanced in
front. The Americans, thus suddenly attacked in front and
rear, were completely routed; upwards of 100 were either
killed on the spot, or perished in the morass; 38 officers and
415 privates were taken prisoners, the rest retreated up the
Savannah River and crossed into South Carolina. Savannah, the
capital of Georgia, was taken possession of by the victors,
with cannon, military stores and provisions; their loss was
only seven killed and nineteen wounded. Colonel Campbell
conducted himself with great moderation; protecting the
persons and property of the inhabitants, and proclaiming
security and favor to all that should return to their
allegiance. Numbers in consequence flocked to the British
standard: the lower part of Georgia was considered as subdued,
and posts were established by the British to maintain
possession. While Colonel Campbell had thus invaded Georgia in
front, General Prevost" entered the State from Florida, "took
Sunbury, the only remaining fort of importance, and marched to
Savannah, where he assumed the general command, detaching
Colonel Campbell against Augusta. By the middle of January
(1779) all Georgia was reduced to submission. A more
experienced American general than Howe had by this time
arrived to take command of the Southern Department,
Major-general Lincoln, who had gained such reputation in the
campaign against Burgoyne, and whose appointment to this
station had been solicited by the delegates from South
Carolina and Georgia. He had received his orders from
Washington in the beginning of October."

_W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapter 37._

ALSO IN:
_W. B. Stevens,
History of Georgia,
book 4, chapter 4 (volume 2)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779.
Washington guarding the Hudson.
The storming of Stony Point.
Marauding warfare of the British.

"After Clinton slipped away from Monmouth and sought refuge in
New York, Washington took post at convenient points and
watched the movements of the enemy. In this way the summer
passed. As always, Washington's first object was to guard the
Hudson, and while he held this vital point firmly, he waited,
ready to strike elsewhere if necessary. It looked for a time
as if the British intended to descend on Boston, seize the
town, and destroy the French fleet, which had gone there to
refit. Such was the opinion of Gates, then commanding in that
department, and as Washington inclined to the same belief, the
fear of this event gave him many anxious moments.
{3266}
He even moved his troops so as to be in readiness to march
eastward at short notice; but he gradually became convinced
that the enemy had no such plan. … The main army, therefore,
remained quiet, and when the autumn had passed went into
winter-quarters in well-posted detachments about New York. In
December Clinton made an ineffectual raid [in New Jersey], and
then all was peaceful again, and Washington was able to go to
Philadelphia and struggle with Congress, leaving his army more
comfortable and secure than they had been in any previous
winter. … He now hoped and believed that the moment would come
when, by uniting his army with the French, he should be able
to strike the decisive blow. Until that time came, however, he
knew that he could do nothing on a great scale, and he felt
that meantime the British, abandoning practically the eastern
and middle States, would make one last desperate struggle for
victory, and would make it in the south. Long before anyone
else, he appreciated this fact, and saw a peril looming large
in that region. … All this, however, did not change his own
plans one jot. He believed that the south must work out its
own salvation, as New York and New England had done with
Burgoyne, and he felt sure that in the end it would be
successful. But he would not go south, nor take his army
there. … The British might overrun the north or invade the
south, but he would stay where he was, with his grip upon New
York and the Hudson River. The tide of invasion might ebb and
flow in this region or that, but the British were doomed if
they could not divide the eastern colonies from the others.
When the appointed hour came, he was ready to abandon
everything and strike the final and fatal blow; but until then
he waited and stood fast with his army, holding the great
river in his grasp. He felt much more anxiety about the south
than he had felt about the north, and expected Congress to
consult him as to a commander, having made up his mind that
Greene was the man to send. But Congress still believed in
Gates, who had been making trouble for Washington all winter;
and so Gates was sent, and Congress in due time got their
lesson, and found once more that Washington understood men
better than they did. In the north the winter was
comparatively uneventful. The spring passed, and in June
Clinton came out and took possession of Stony Point and
Verplanck's Point, and began to fortify them. It looked a
little as if Clinton might intend to get control of the Hudson
by slow approaches, fortifying, and then advancing until he
reached West Point. With this in mind, Washington at once
determined to check the British by striking sharply at one of
their new posts. Having made up his mind, he sent for Wayne
and asked him if he would storm Stony Point. Tradition says
that Wayne replied, 'I will storm hell, if you will plan it.'
A true tradition, probably, in keeping with Wayne's character,
and pleasant to us to-day as showing with a vivid gleam of
rough human speech the utter confidence of the army in their
leader, that confidence which only a great soldier can
inspire. So Washington planned, and Wayne stormed [July 15,
1779], and Stony Point fell. It was a gallant and brilliant
feat of arms, one of the most brilliant of the war. Over 500
prisoners were taken, the guns were carried off, and the works
destroyed, leaving the British to begin afresh with a good
deal of increased caution and respect. Not long after, Harry
Lee stormed Paulus Hook with equal success, and the British
were checked and arrested, if they intended any extensive
movement. On the frontier, Sullivan, after some delays, did
his work effectively. … In these various ways Clinton's circle
of activity was steadily narrowed, but it may be doubted
whether he had any coherent plan. The principal occupation of
the British was to send out marauding expeditions and cut off
outlying parties. Tryon burned and pillaged in Connecticut [at
New Haven, Fairfield and Norwalk], Matthews in Virginia [at
Norfolk, Portsmouth and elsewhere], and others on a smaller
scale elsewhere in New Jersey and New York. … It was enough
for Washington to hold fast to the great objects he had in
view, to check Clinton and circumscribe his movements.
Steadfastly he did this through the summer and winter of
1779."

_H. C. Lodge,
George Washington,
volume 1, chapter 8._

ALSO IN:
_W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapters 38-40,
and volume 4, chapter 1._

_B. J. Lossing,
Field-book of the Revolution,
volume 1, chapter 31._

_J. Armstrong,
Life of Anthony Wayne
(Library of American Biographies, volume 4)._

_C. J. Stillé,
Major-General Anthony Wayne,
chapter 5_

_G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathaniel Greene,
book 3, chapters 3-7 (volume. 2)._

See, also, WEST POINT.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (August-September).
General Sullivan's expedition against the Senecas.

For the purpose of putting an end to the destructive and
bloody incursions of Tories and Indians from western New York,
directed against the border settlements of that state and
Pennsylvania—as at Cherry Valley and Wyoming—General
Washington, in the early part of the year 1779, determined
upon a measure for carrying the war into the home of the
invaders. "The command was entrusted to General Sullivan. The
army organized for the expedition was in three divisions. That
part of it under the immediate command of General Sullivan,
coming from Pennsylvania, ascended the Susquehannah to Tioga
Point. Another division under the command of General James
Clinton, constructing batteaux at Schenectady, ascended the
Mohawk and rendezvoused at Canajoharrie, opened a road to the
head of Otsego Lake, and from thence proceeded in a formidable
fleet of over 200 batteaux, to Tioga Point, forming a junction
with the force under General Sullivan, on the 22d of August.
Previous to the arrival of General Clinton, Sullivan had sent
forward a detachment which fell in with a scouting party of
Indians, and a skirmish ensued. The combined forces amounted
to 5,000 men. The expedition had been so long preparing, and
upon the march, that the enemy were well apprized of an that
was going on. Their plan of defence contemplated a decisive
engagement upon the Chemung river. For this purpose the
Rangers and regular British troops, under the command of
Colonel John Butler, Colonels Guy and Sir John Johnson, Major
Walter N. Butler and Captain M'Donald, and the Indians under
Brant, had concentrated their forces upon a bend of the river,
near the present village of Elmira [then called Newtown],
where they had thrown up a long breast work of logs. The
united forces of the British allies, as computed by General
Sullivan, was about 1,500.
{3267}
Having ascertained their position, General Sullivan marched in
full force and attacked them in the forenoon of the 29th of
August. … The battle had been waged about two hours, when the
British and Indians perceiving their forces inadequate, and
that a maneuver to surround them was likely to be successful,
broke and fled in great disorder. 'This,' says John Salmon, of
Livingston county, who belonged to the expedition and gave an
account of it to the author of the Life of .Mary Jemison, 'was
the only regular stand made by the Indians. In their retreat
they were pursued by our men to the Narrows, where they were
attacked and killed in great numbers, so that the sides of the
rocks next the River looked as if blood had been poured on
them by pailfuls.' The details of all that transpired in this
campaign are before the public in so many forms, that their
repetition here is unnecessary. The route of the army was via
'French Catherine's Town,' head of Seneca Lake, down the east
shore of the Lake to the Indian village of Kanadesaga (Old
Castle), and from thence to Canandaigua, Honeoye, head of
Conesus Lake, to Groveland. The villages destroyed (with the
apple trees and growing crops of the Indians,) were at
Catherinestown, Kendai, or 'Apple Town' on the east side of
the Lake, eleven miles from its foot, Kanadesaga, Honeoye,
Conesus, Canascraga, Little Beard's Town, Big Tree, Canawagus,
and on the return of the army, Scawyace, a village between the
Cayuga and Seneca Lakes, and several other Cayuga villages. …
The march of Sullivan, the devastations committed by his army,
would at this distant period seem like Vandalism, in the
absence of the consideration that he was acting under strict
orders; and that those orders were approved, if not dictated,
by Washington. The campaign was a matter of necessity; to be
effectual, it was not only necessary that its acts should be
retaliatory and retributive, but that the haunts, the
retreats, of a foe so ruthless, must be broken up. The object
was to destroy all the means of subsistence of the Senecas,
desolate their homes, prevent their return to them, and if
possible, induce their permanent retreat beyond the Niagara
River. The imprudence, the want of sagacity, which Colonel
Stone has imputed to General Sullivan in alarming every
village he approached by the sound of his cannon, the author
conceives a misapprehension of his motives. Stealthy, quiet
approaches, would have found as victims, in every village, the
old men, the women and children—the warriors away, banded with
their British allies. Humanity dictated the forewarning, that
those he did not come to war against could have time to flee.
… The march of General Sullivan, after leaving the Chemung,
was bloodless, except in a small degree—just as it should have
been, if he could not make victims of those he was sent to
punish. The third expedition of this campaign, which has
generally been lost sight of by historians, was that of
General Broadhead. He left Fort Pitt in August with 600 men,
and destroyed several Mingo and Muncey tribes living on the
Allegany, French Creek, and other tributaries of the Ohio. The
heavy artillery that General Sullivan brought as far as
Newton, would indicate that Niagara was originally the
destination. There the General and his officers, seeing how
long it had taken to reach that point, in an probability
determined that too much of the season had been wasted, to
allow of executing their tasks in the Indian country, making
their roads and moving the army and all its appointments to
Niagara before the setting in of winter. Besides, before the
army had reached the valley of the Chemung, the fact was
ascertained that there would be a failure in a contemplated
junction with the army under General Broadhead. After the
expedition of General Sullivan, the Indians never had any
considerable permanent re-occupancy of their villages east of
the Genesee river. They settled down after a brief flight, in
their villages on the west side of the river in the
neighborhood of Geneseo, Mt. Morris and Avon, and at Gardeau,
Canadea, Tonawanda, Tuscarora, Buffalo Creek, Cattaraugus and
Allegany."

_O. Turner,
History of the Pioneer Settlement
of Phelps and Gorham's Purchase,
part 1, chapter 4._

"In his general orders of the 17th of October, General
Washington announced to the army the result of the expedition,
as follows: 'The Commander-in-chief has now the pleasure of
congratulating the army on the complete and full success of
Major General Sullivan, and the troops under his command,
against the Seneca and other tribes of the Six Nations, as a
just and necessary punishment for their wanton depredations,
their unparalleled and innumerable cruelties, their deafness
to all remonstrances and entreaty, and their perseverance in
the most horrid acts of barbarity. Forty of their towns have
been reduced to ashes, some of them large and commodious; that
of the Genesee alone containing one hundred and twenty-eight
houses. Their crops of corn have been entirely destroyed,
which, by estimation, it is said, would have provided 160,000
bushels, besides large quantities of vegetables of various
kinds. Their whole country has been overrun and laid waste,
and they themselves compelled to place their security in a
precipitate flight to the British fortress at Niagara. And the
whole of this has been done with the loss of less than forty
men on our part, including the killed, wounded, captured, and
those who died natural deaths. The troops employed in this
expedition, both officers and men, throughout the whole of it,
and in the action they had with the enemy, manifested a
patience, perseverance and valor that do them the highest
honor. In the course of it, when there still remained a large
extent of the enemy's country to be prostrated, it became
necessary to lessen the issues of provisions to half the usual
allowance. In this the troops acquiesced with a most general
and cheerful concurrence, being fully determined to surmount
every obstacle, and to prosecute the enterprise to a complete
and successful issue. Major General Sullivan, for his great
perseverance and activity, for his order of march and attack,
and the whole of his dispositions; the Brigadiers and officers
of all ranks, and the whole of the soldiers engaged in the
expedition, merit and have the Commander-in-chief's warmest
acknowledgements for their important services upon this
occasion.' On the 9th of November, 1779, General Sullivan
wrote to the President of Congress: 'It is with the deepest
regret I find myself compelled to request from Congress
liberty to retire from the army. My health is so much impaired
by a violent bilious disorder, which seized me in the
commencement and continued during the whole of the western
expedition, that I have not the smallest hope of a perfect
recovery.' …
{3268}
General Sullivan, in transmitting to Congress an official
account of his operations, reported that … 'Every creek and
river has been traced, and the whole country explored in
search of Indian settlements, and I am well persuaded that,
except one town situated near the Alleghany, about fifty-eight
miles from Chinesee, there is not a single town left in the
country of the Five Nations. … I flatter myself that the
orders with which I was entrusted are fully executed, as we
have not left a single settlement or field of corn in the
country of the Five Nations, or is there even the appearance
of an Indian on this side of Niagara. Messengers and small
parties have been constantly passing, and some imprudent
soldiers who straggled from the army mistook the route and
went back almost to Chinesee without discovering even the
track of an Indian.' Sullivan was mistaken in regard to the
destruction of all the Indian towns as there were several
small villages undiscovered by his troops. The principal
villages, however, and probably nine-tenths of the growing
crops, upon which the Indians had depended for sustenance
during the following winter, were effectually destroyed. …
While Sullivan fully accomplished the task given him to
perform, the results expected were not fully realized. The
power of the savages had been weakened, but they were not
entirely subdued until years afterward, when 'Mad Anthony
Wayne' defeated the confederated bands of the Indians of the
west, in 1794, a measure which thoroughly humbled the Indians
of Western New York, and gave to the settlers peace and
security. Sullivan's expedition was fruitful of great results
in other ways, however, than the temporary subjugation of the
Indians. The fertile and beautiful country now forming the
western part of the State of New York, was then an unknown
wilderness, and its value and attractiveness were first made
known to the white people through this expedition. … Soon
after the close of the war the tide of emigration commenced to
flow westward. From the New England States, Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, came hardy pioneers, led on by the glowing
accounts they had heard of the new country, and the vicinity
of the inland lakes, the borders of the flowing streams, the
forest-covered hills became the dwelling places of a rapidly
growing band of settlers. The road which Sullivan had opened
from the Susquehanna valley was followed by many of the
settlers, even to the banks of the Genesee. Thus many of those
who had shared the perils and privations of Sullivan's
expedition against the Indian tribes of Western New York,
afterward became settlers of the land they had aided to
conquer."

_A. T. Norton,
History of Sullivan's Campaign against the Iroquois,
chapter 11._

ALSO IN:
_L. L. Doty,
History of Livingston County, New York,
chapter 7._

_O. W. B. Peabody,
Life of John Sullivan
(Library of American Biographies,
series 2, volume. 3), chapter 7._

_Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John
Sullivan, with records of Centennial Celebrations
(including Historical Address by Reverend David Craft,
pages 331-388)._

_J. E. Seaver,
Life of Mary Jemison,
appendix 2._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (September).
Paul Jones' great sea-fight.
The Bon Homme Richard and the Serapis.

"Near the end of July [1779], Paul Jones, a Scot by birth, in
the service of the United States, sailed from l'Orient as
commander of a squadron, consisting of the Poor Richard ['Bon
Homme Richard,' Jones named her, in compliment to Franklin and
to the language of the country from which Franklin's influence
procured the ship] of 40 guns, many of them unserviceable; the
Alliance of 36 guns, both American ships-of-war; the Pallas, a
French frigate of 32; and the Vengeance, a French brig of 12
guns. They ranged the western coast of Ireland, turned
Scotland, and, cruising off Flamborough Head, descried the
British merchant fleet from the Baltic, under the convoy of
the Serapis of 44 guns and the Countess of Scarborough of 20
guns. An hour after sunset, on the 23d of September, the
Serapis, having a great superiority in strength, engaged the
Poor Richard. Paul Jones, after suffering exceedingly in a
contest of an hour and a half within musket-shot, bore down
upon his adversary, whose anchor he hooked to his own quarter.
The muzzles of their guns touched each other's sides. Jones
could use only three nine-pounders beside muskets from the
round-tops, but combustible matters were thrown into every
part of the Serapis, which was on fire no less than ten or
twelve times. There were moments when both ships were on fire.
After a two-hours' conflict in the first watch of the night,
the Serapis struck its flag. Jones raised his pendant on the
captured frigate, and the next day had but time to transfer to
it his wounded men and his crew before the Poor Richard went
down. The French frigate engaged and captured the Countess of
Scarborough. The Alliance, which from a distance had raked the
Serapis during the action, not without injuring the Poor
Richard, had not a man injured. On the fourth of October the
squadron entered the Texel with its prizes. The British
ambassador, of himself and again under instructions, reclaimed
the captured British ships and their crews, 'who had been
taken by the pirate Paul Jones of Scotland, a rebel and a
traitor.' 'They,' he insisted, 'are to be treated as pirates
whose letters of marque have not emanated from a sovereign
power.' The grand pensionary would not apply the name of
pirate to officers bearing the commissions of congress. In
spite of the stadholder, the squadron enjoyed the protection
of a neutral port."

_G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 5, page 350._

ALSO IN.
_A. S. Mackenzie,
Life of Paul Jones,
chapters 8-9 (volume 1)._

_Life and Correspondence of John Paul Jones,
pages 179-235._

_W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 3, chapter 24._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (September-October).
Unsuccessful attack on Savannah by the Americans and French.

"The state of affairs in the South had called so imperatively
for the attention of Congress that a portion of Washington's
army had been detached to join General Lincoln. Washington
solicited more powerful aid from D'Estaing, who then commanded
in the West Indies an army sufficiently powerful to crush
entirely the English in Georgia. The French admiral received
this application just after having fought a hard battle
against Commodore Byron without any decisive result, yet such
as obliged the latter to go into port to refit. The former,
being thus for a time master of the sea, determined at once to
comply with the request, took on board 6,000 land-troops, and
steered direct for Savannah, where, arriving quite
unexpectedly, he captured by surprise a fifty-gun ship and
three frigates. Prevost, too, was very unprepared, having his
force broken up into detachments distributed along the
frontier; but these being instantly ordered in, obeyed with
such promptitude that, before the French had landed and formed
a junction with Lincoln, nearly all had arrived.
{3269}
On the 16th of September, D'Estaing appeared before the place
and summoned it to surrender. Prevost, under pretext of
negotiation, obtained a suspension for twenty-four hours,
during which Colonel Maitland entered with the last and
largest detachment, eluding the Americans by a route supposed
impassable; and the full determination to resist was then
announced. The opinion of all military men now is that
D'Estaing was guilty of the most outrageous folly in not
marching at once to the attack of the city, without summoning
the weakened garrison to surrender at all. The surprise would
have then been complete, and the victory sure. … A regular
siege was now commenced. Heavy ordnance and stores were
brought up from the fleet, and the besieging army broke
ground. By the 1st of October they had pushed their sap within
300 yards of the abattis, on the left of the British lines.
Several batteries were opened on the besieged, which played
almost incessantly upon their works, but made no impression on
them. The situation of D'Estaing was becoming critical. More
time had already been consumed on the coast of Georgia than he
had supposed would be necessary for the destruction of the
British force in that State. He became uneasy for the
possessions of France in the West Indies, and apprehensive for
the safety of the ships under his command. The naval officers
remonstrated strenuously against longer exposing his fleet on
an insecure coast, at a tempestuous season of the year, and
urged the danger of being overtaken by a British squadron when
broken and scattered by a storm." D'Estaing accordingly
decided that he must either raise the siege or attempt the
enemy's works by storm. "The latter part of the alternative
was adopted. … On the morning of the 9th of October, before
day, … about 3,500 French and 1,000 Americans, of whom between
600 and 700 were regulars and the residue militia of
Charleston, advanced in three columns, led by D'Estaing and
Lincoln, aided by the principal officers of both nations, and
made a furious assault on the British lines. Their reception
was warmer than had been expected. … Both the French and
Americans planted their standards on the walls, and were
killed in great numbers while endeavoring to force their way
into the works. For about fifty minutes the contest was
extremely obstinate." Then the assailants gave way and a
retreat was ordered. "In this unsuccessful attempt the French
lost in killed and wounded about 700 men. Among the latter
were the Count D'Estaing himself, Major General De Fontanges,
and several other officers of distinction. The continental
troops lost 234 men, and the Charleston militia, who, though
associated with them in danger, were more fortunate, had one
captain killed and six privates wounded. Count Pulaski was
among the slain. The loss of the garrison was astonishingly
small. In killed and wounded it amounted only to 55. So great
was the advantage of the cover afforded by their works. …
Count D'Estaing, having committed a blunder at the beginning,
had committed a worse blunder at the end, by insisting on the
assault, as unnecessary as it was rash. … He [now] insisted on
raising the siege, and both the French and American armies
moved from their ground on the evening of the 18th of October.
D'Estaing sailed for the West Indies; and Lincoln recrossed
the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry and again encamped in South
Carolina."

_C. B. Hartley,
Life of General Marion
(Heroes and Patriots of the South),
chapter 11._

ALSO IN:
_C. C. Jones, Jr.,
History of Georgia,
volume 2, chapters 20-21._

_J. Sparks,
Life of Pulaski
(Library of American Biographies,
series 2, volume 4)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (January-April).
The gloomy winter at Morristown.
Depreciation to worthlessness of the Continental Currency.
Consequent sufferings of the army and the country.

"The year 1780 opened upon a famishing camp. 'For a fortnight
past,' writes Washington, on the 8th of January, 'the troops,
both officers and men, have been almost perishing with want.
Yet,' adds he, feelingly, 'they have borne their sufferings
with a patience that merits the approbation, and ought to
excite the sympathies, of their countrymen.' The severest
trials of the Revolution, in fact, were not in the field,
where there were shouts to excite and laurels to be won; but
in the squalid wretchedness of ill-provided camps, where there
was nothing to cheer and everything to be endured. To suffer
was the lot of the revolutionary soldier. A rigorous winter
had much to do with the actual distresses of the army, but the
root of the evil lay in the derangement of the currency.
Congress had commenced the war without adequate funds, and
without the power of imposing direct taxes. To meet pressing
emergencies, it had emitted paper money, which, for a time,
passed currently at par; but sank in value as further
emissions succeeded, and that already in circulation remained
unredeemed. The several States added to the evil by emitting
paper in their separate capacities: thus the country gradually
became flooded with a 'continental currency,' as it was
called; irredeemable, and of no intrinsic value. The
consequence was a general derangement of trade and finance.
The continental currency declined to such a degree that forty
dollars in paper were equivalent to only one in specie.
Congress attempted to put a stop to this depreciation by
making paper money a legal tender, at its nominal value, in
the discharge of debts, however contracted. This opened the
door to knavery, and added a new feature to the evil. The
commissaries now found it difficult to purchase supplies for
the immediate wants of the army, and impossible to provide any
stores in advance. They were left destitute of funds, and the
public credit was prostrated by the accumulating debts
suffered to remain uncancelled. The changes which had taken
place in the commissary department added to this confusion.
The commissary-general, instead of receiving, as heretofore, a
commission on expenditures, was to have a fixed salary in
paper currency, and his deputies were to be compensated in
like manner, without the usual allowance of rations and
forage. No competent agents could be procured on such terms. …
In the present emergency Washington was reluctantly compelled,
by the distresses of the army, to call upon the counties of
the State for supplies of grain and cattle, proportioned to
their respective abilities. … Wherever a compliance with this
call was refused, the articles required were to be impressed:
it was a painful alternative, yet nothing else could save the
army from dissolution or starving. … As the winter advanced,
the cold increased in severity.
{3270}
It was the most intense ever remembered in the country. The
great bay of New York was frozen over. … The insular security
of the place was at an end. … Washington was aware of the
opportunity which offered itself for a signal 'coup de main,'
but was not in a condition to profit by it."

_W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapters 1 and 4._

"Paper for $9,000,000 was issued before any depreciation
began. The issues of the separate colonies must have affected
it, but the popular enthusiasm went for something. Pelatiah
Webster, almost alone as it seems, insisted on taxation, but a
member of Congress indignantly asked if he was to help tax the
people when they could go to the printing-office and get a
cartload of money. In 1776, when the depreciation began,
Congress took harsh measures to try to sustain the bills.
Committees of safety also took measures to punish those who
'forestalled' or 'engrossed,' these being the terms for
speculators who bought up for a rise. … The enemy, perceiving
the terrible harm the Americans were doing themselves, thought
it well to help on the movement. They counterfeited the bills
and passed them through the lines. At the end of 1779 Congress
was at its wit's end for money. Its issues had put specie
entirely out of reach, and the cause was in danger of being
drowned under the paper sea. … The French alliance helped more
by giving means of procuring loans in Europe than by military
assistance. Congress promised to limit its issues to
$200,000,000, and tried a new form of note; also loan offices
and lotteries. Over 350,000,000 were issued in all, but it is
doubtful if more than 200,000,000 were out at any one time. In
the spring of 1780 the bills were worth two cents on the
dollar, and then ceased to circulate. Specie now came into
circulation, being brought by the French, and also that
expended by the English passing the lines. The paper was now
worth more for an advertisement or a joke than for any
prospect of any kind of redemption. A barber's shop in
Philadelphia was papered with it, and a dog, coated with tar,
and with the bills stuck all over him, was paraded in the
streets."

_W. G. Sumner,
History of American Currency,
pages 44-47._

ALSO IN:
_W. G. Sumner,
The Financier and Finances of the American Revolution,
chapter 4 (volume 1)._

_A. S. Bolles,
Financial History of the United States, 1774-1789,
book 1._

_J. J. Knox,
United States Notes,
chapter 2._

See, also, MONEY AND BANKING, A. D. 1775-1780.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (February-August).
The siege and capture of Charleston by the British.
Defeat of Gates at Camden.
South Carolina subdued.

"After the failure of the attack on Savannah was learned by
Sir Henry Clinton, he sent a large additional force to the
South. Reinforcements were also sent on to Lincoln, while the
main body of the American army went into winter quarters near
Morristown, New Jersey. Sir Henry Clinton, as soon as his
forces, which had been dispersed by a storm, had been
collected at Savannah, proceeded to invest Charleston,"
landing his troops on St. John's Island in February. The
blockading of the port and operations for the investment of
the city were conducted cautiously and with success. On the
12th of May, the American commander, General Lincoln, "finding
himself incapable of defending Charleston, decided on
capitulating; and he acceded to the terms which the besiegers
had first offered. The fortifications, shipping, artillery,
and public stores were all surrendered. The garrison, and all
who had borne arms, were prisoners of war. The militia were
allowed to return home on parole. In the siege the British
lost 76 killed, and 189 wounded. The Americans about an equal
number. The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to
5,618, counting all the adult males of the town. To bring the
country entirely under subjection, Clinton sent forth three
detachments. The first and largest, in the northern part of
the State, was under Lord Cornwallis. He detached Colonel
Tarleton with his legion of cavalry and mounted infantry, to
disperse Colonel Buford, then encamped near the North Carolina
line. [Buford] was overtaken at the Waxhaws, and, on his
refusal to surrender, Tarleton made a furious charge on
Buford's men, when some, in dismay, threw down their arms and
asked for quarter, and some fired on the enemy. After this
partial resistance, no quarter was given. Colonel Buford, with
a few of the horse, and about 100 infantry, escaped; 113 were
killed on the spot; 150 so badly wounded as to be incapable of
being moved; and 53 were brought away as prisoners. The
American officers deny (what the British assert), that any who
had laid down their arms had again taken them up. All further
resistance to the enemy in South Carolina and Georgia seems
then to have ceased. The two other detachments of the British
army every where received the submission of the inhabitants,
who either gave their parole not again to bear arms against
the king, or took the oath of allegiance. In a proclamation
for settling the government, Sir Henry Clinton required all to
return to their allegiance on pain of being treated as rebels
and enemies. He then returned to New York, leaving Lord
Cornwallis in command, with 4,000 troops. … Lord Cornwallis,
considering South Carolina as entirely reannexed to Great
Britain, would admit of no neutrality among the inhabitants;
but insisted on their taking the oath of allegiance, which,
however, was generally taken with reluctance by the people of
the lower country. … A considerable force, under Baron de
Kalb, had been ordered for the Southern army by Congress; but,
for want of money, and a sufficient Commissary department,
they were so delayed in their march, that it was late in July
before they reached Cape Fear River. Here they were joined by
General Gates, who had been appointed to the command of the
Southern army. The men of this detachment, ill-fed, suffered
greatly from dysentery. In South Carolina, Gates was joined by
Porterfield's Virginia regiment, Rutherford's corps of North
Carolina militia, and Armaud's legion. … Gates having under
him about 4,000 men, of whom the regulars were less than
1,000, took post at Clermont. As the force of the Americans
was daily increasing, Cornwallis, having under him about 2,000
men, of whom 1,900 were regulars, decided on attacking the
American army. It so happened, that the period chosen by
Cornwallis to surprise Gates, was the very moment in which
Gates proposed to surprise his adversary; and thus the
advanced corps of both armies unexpectedly met at two o'clock
in the morning [August 6, near Camden].
{3271}
After some skirmishing, in which the British seemed to have
had a decided advantage, both parties suspended their
operations till the morning. On the first onset of the
British, the Virginia militia under General Stevens fled with
precipitation, and were followed by the infantry of Armstrong;
and, except Colonel Dixon's regiment, the whole South Carolina
division followed the example. Very few of the militia of
either State discharged a single musket. Gates was borne away
by the torrent, and, with General Caswell, retreated to
Clermont, in the hope of collecting a sufficient number of the
fugitives to cover the retreat of the regulars; but the hope
was vain. He was fain to proceed to Hillsborough, to concert
the future plan of operations. Thus left with an inadequate
force on the field, De Kalb made a stout resistance; but in an
impetuous charge he fell, after having received twelve wounds.
His troops were then unable to rally, and their discomfiture
was complete. Their loss, in killed, wounded and prisoners,
could not have been less than 1,000 men. The British lost 325
men. Just before the action, Sumter had captured a convoy, and
made 200 prisoners; but was subsequently surprised by
Tarleton, who recaptured the stores, killed 150, and took 300
prisoners. Sumter escaped with difficulty. There was no longer
any armed American force in South Carolina, and Cornwallis
resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All
those who were found in arms after they had submitted to
British protection were considered as having forfeited their
lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these
severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a
strong reaction; and Sumter was able to collect a new force,
with which he greatly annoyed the north-western parts of the
State."

_G. Tucker,
History of the United States,
chapter 3 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_D. Ramsey,
History of South Carolina,
section 7 (volume l)._

_H. Lee,
Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department,
chapter 17._

_F. Bowen,
Life of Benjamin Lincoln,
chapter 5._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (July).
Fresh help from France.
The arrival of Rochambeau and his army, with a fleet.