Chapter CXX: Appendix: C

NOTES TO THE MAP OF THE BALKAN PENINSULA. (PRESENT CENTURY.)

The present century has been a remarkable one for the settlement of great political and geographical questions. These questions resolve themselves into two great classes, which indicate the political forces of the present age,—the first, represented in the growth of democratic thought, and the second arising from the awakening of national spirit. The first of these concerns historical geography only incidentally, but the second has already done much to reconstruct the political geography of our time.

RECENT NATIONAL MOVEMENTS.

Within a little over thirty years it has changed the map of central Europe from a medley of small states into a united Italy and a united Germany; it has also led to a reconstruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, In Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary, the national questions may, however, be regarded as settled; and if, in the case of Austria-Hungary, owing to exactly reverse conditions, the settlement has been a tentative one, it has at least removed the question from the more immediate concern of the present. In a different quarter of Europe, however, the rise of the national movements has led to a question, infinitely more complicated than the others, and which, so far from being settled, is becoming ever more pressing year by year. This reference is to the great Balkan problem. That this question has been delayed in its solution for over four centuries, is due, no doubt, to the conquests of the Turk, and it is still complicated by his presence. In the notes to the four previous Balkan maps (1191-1451), attention was especially directed to the national movements, so far as they had opportunity to develop themselves during this period. These movements, feeble in their character, were all smothered by the Turkish conquest. With the decline of this power in the present century these forces once more have opportunity for reappearance. In this regard the history of the Balkans during the nineteenth century is simply the history of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries read backwards.

The Turkish Empire had suffered terrible reverses during the eighteenth century. Hungary (1699), the Crim Tartars (1774), Bukovina (1777), Jedisan (1792), Bessarabia and Eastern Moldavia (1812) were all successively wrested from the Ottomans, while Egypt on one side and Moldavia and Wallachia on another recovered practical autonomy, the one under the restored rule of the Mamelukes (1766), the other under native hospodars.

THE SERVIAN AND GREEK REVOLTS.

All of these losses, though greatly weakening the Ottoman power, did not destroy its geographical integrity. It was with the Servian revolt of 1804 that the series of events pointing to the actual disruption of the Turkish Empire may be said to have begun. The first period of dissolution was measured by the reign of Mahmoud II. (1808-1839), at once the greatest and the most unfortunate of all the later Turkish sultans. Servia, first under Kara Georg, then under Milosch Obrenovitch, the founder of the present dynasty, maintained a struggle which led to the recognition of Servian local autonomy in 1817. The second step in the process of dissolution was the tragic Greek revolution (1821-1828). The Sultan, after a terrible war of extermination, had practically reduced Greece to subjection, when all his work was undone by the intervention of the great powers.

The Turkish fleet was destroyed by the combined squadrons of England, France and Russia at Navarin, October 20, 1827, and in the campaign of the ensuing year the Moscovite arms for the first time in history penetrated south of the Balkans. The treaty of Adrianople, between Russia and Turkey (September 14, 1829), gave to the Czar the protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia. By the treaty of London earlier in this year Greece was made autonomous under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and the protocol of March 22, 1829, drew her northern frontier in a line between the gulfs of Arta and Volo. The titular sovereignty of the Sultan over Greece was annulled later in the year at the peace of Adrianople, though the northern boundary of the Hellenic kingdom was then curtailed to a line drawn from the mouth of the Achelous to the gulf of Lamia. With the accession of the Bavarian king Otho, in 1833, after the failure of the republic, the northern boundary was again adjusted, returning to about the limits laid down in the March protocol of 1829. Greece then remained for over fifty years bounded on the north by Mount Othrys, the Pindus range and the gulf of Arta. In 1863, on the accession of the Danish king George I., the Ionian Isles, which had been under English administration since the Napoleonic wars, were ceded to the Greek kingdom, and in May, 1881, almost the last change in European geography to the present day was accomplished in the cession, by the Sultan, of Thessaly and a small part of Epirus. The agitation in 1886 for a further extension of Greek territory was unsuccessful.

THE TREATY OF UNKIAR SKELESSI.

A series of still greater reverses brought the reign of the Sultan Mahmoud to a close. The chief of these were the defeats sustained at the hands of his rebellious vassal Mehemet Ali, pacha of Egypt, a man who takes rank even before the Sultan himself as the greatest figure in the Mohammedan world during the present century. The immediate issue of this struggle was the practical independence of Egypt, where the descendants of Mehemet still rule, their title having been changed in 1867 from viceroy to that of khedive. An event incidental to the strife between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan is of far greater importance in the history of European Turkey. {xi} Mahmoud in his distress looked for aid to the great powers, and the final issue of the rival interests struggling at Constantinople was the memorable treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July, 1833) by which the Sultan resigned himself completely to the interests of his former implacable foe, the Czar of Russia. In outward appearance this treaty was an offensive and defensive alliance; in practical results it gave the Moscovite, in exchange for armed assistance, when needed, the practical control of the Dardanelles. It is no extravagance of statement to say that this treaty forms absolutely the high watermark of Russian predominance in the affairs of the Levant. During the subsequent sixty years, this influence, taken as a whole, strange paradox as it may seem, has rather receded than advanced. The utter prostration of the Turkish Empire on the death of Mahmoud (1839) compelled Russia to recede from the conditions of Unkiar Skelessi while a concert of the European powers undertook the task of rehabilitating the prostrate power; the Crimean war (1854-1855) struck a more damaging blow at the Russian power, and the events of 1878, though they again shattered the Turkish Empire, did not, as will be shown, lead to corresponding return of the Czar's ascendency.

THE CRIMEAN WAR AND TREATY OF PARIS.

The Crimean War was brought on by the attempt of the Czar to dictate concerning the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire—a policy which culminated in the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia (1853). All Europe became arrayed against Russia on this question,—Prussia and Austria in tacit opposition, while England, France, and afterwards Piedmont, drifted into war with the northern power.

By the treaty of Paris (1856), which terminated the sanguinary struggle, the Danube, closed since the peace of Adrianople (1829), was reopened; the southern part of Bessarabia was taken from Russia and added to the principality of Moldavia; the treaty powers renounced all right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Porte; and, lastly, the Black Sea, which twenty years before, by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, had become a private Russian pond, was swept of the Russian fleets and converted into a neutral sea. The latter condition however was abrogated by the powers (March 13, 1871).

Despite the defeat of Russia, the settlement effected at the congress of Paris was but tentative. The most that the allied powers could possibly have hoped for, was so far to cripple Russia as to render her no longer a menace to the Ottoman Empire. They succeeded only in so far as to defer the recurrence of a Turkish crisis for another twenty years.

The chief event of importance during this interval was the birth of the united Roumania. In 1857 the representative councils of both Moldavia and Wallachia voted for their union under this name. This personal union was accomplished by the choice of a common ruler, John Cuza (1859), whose election was confirmed by a new conference at Paris in 1861. A single ministry and single assembly were formed at Bucharest in 1862. Prince Karl of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was elected hospodar in 1866, and finally crowned as king in 1881.

THE REVIVED EASTERN QUESTION OF 1875-78.

The Eastern question was reopened with all its perplexities in the Herzegovinian and Bosnian revolt of August, 1875. These provinces, almost cut off from the Turkish Empire by Montenegro and Servia, occupied a position which rendered their subjugation almost a hopeless task. Preparations were already under way for a settlement by joint action of the powers, when a wave of fanatical fury sweeping over the Ottoman Empire rendered all these efforts abortive. Another Christian insurrection in Bulgaria was suppressed in a series of wholesale and atrocious massacres. Servia and Montenegro in a ferment declared war on Turkey (July 2, 1876). The Turkish arms, however, were easily victorious, and Russia only saved the Servian capital by compelling an armistice (October 30). A conference of the representatives of the powers was then held at Constantinople in a final effort to arrange for a reorganization of the Empire, which should include the granting of autonomy to Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. These conditions, though subsequently embodied in a general ultimatum, the London protocol of March 31, 1877, were rejected by the Porte, and Russia, who had determined to proceed alone in the event of this rejection, immediately declared war (April 24). Into this war, owing to the horror excited in England by the Bulgarian massacres, and the altered policy of France, the Turk was compelled to go without allies, and thus unassisted his defeat was assured. Then followed the sanguinary campaigns in Bulgaria, the memories of which are still recent and unobscured. Plevna, the central point of the Turkish resistance, fell on December 10th; Adrianople was occupied by the Russians on January 20th, 1878; and on January 31st., an armistice was granted.

Great Britain now seemed roused to a sense of the danger to herself in the Russian approach to Constantinople, and public opinion at last permitted Lord Beaconsfield to send a fleet to the Bosporus.

By the Russo-Turkish peace of San Stephano (March 3, 1878) Turkey recognized the complete independence of Servia, Roumania and Montenegro, while Bulgaria became what Servia and Roumania had just ceased to be, an autonomous principality under nominal Turkish sovereignty. Russia received the Dobrutcha in Europe, which was to be given by the Czar to Roumania in exchange for the portion of Bessarabia lost in 1856. Servia and Montenegro received accessions of territory, the latter securing Antivari on the coast, but the greatest geographical change was the frontier assigned to the new Bulgaria, which was to include all the territory bounded by an irregular line beginning at Midia on the Black Sea and running north of Adrianople, and, in addition, a vast realm in Macedonia, bounded on the west only by Albania, approaching Salonica, and touching the Ægean on either side of the Chalcidice.

It was evident that the terms of this treaty involved the interests of other powers, especially of Great Britain. An ultimate settlement which involved as parties only the conqueror and conquered was therefore impossible. A general congress of the Powers was seen to be the only solvent of the difficulty; but before such a congress was possible it was necessary for Great Britain and Russia to find at least a tangible basis of negotiation for the adjustment of their differences.

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By the secret agreement of May 30th, Russia agreed to abandon the disputed points—chief among these the creation of a Bulgarian seaboard on the Ægean—and the congress of Berlin then assembled (June 13-July 13, 1878).

ARRANGEMENTS OF THE TREATY OF BERLIN.

Great Britain was represented at the congress by the Marquis of Salisbury and the premier, the Earl of Beaconsfield. The treaty of Berlin modified the conditions of San Stephano by reducing the Russian acquisitions in Asia Minor and also by curtailing the cessions of territory to Servia and Montenegro. A recommendation was also made to the Porte to cede Thessaly and a part of Epirus to Greece, a transfer which was accomplished in 1881. A more important provision was the transfer of the administrative control of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. This cession was the outcome of the secret agreement between Russia and Austria at Reichstadt, in July of the previous year, by which the former had secured from her rival a free hand in the Turkish war. These districts were at once occupied by Austria, despite the resistance of the Mohammedan population, and the sanjak of Novibazar, the military occupation of which was agreed to by the Porte, was also entered by Austrian troops in September of the following year. England secured as her share of the spoil the control of the island of Cyprus.

The greatest work accomplished at Berlin, however, was the complete readjustment of the boundaries of the new Bulgarian principality. This result was achieved through the agency of Great Britain. The great Bulgarian domain, which by the treaty of San Stephano would have conformed almost to the limits of the Bulgarian Empire of the tenth century, was, with the exception of a small western strip including the capital, Sofia, pushed entirely north of the Balkans. This new principality was to enjoy local autonomy; and immediately south of the Balkans was formed a new province, Eastern Roumelia, also with local autonomy, although under the military authority of the Sultan.

The result of the Berlin Congress was the apparent triumph of the Beaconsfield policy. It is doubtful, however, if the idea of this triumph has been fully sustained by the course of subsequent events. The idea of Beaconsfield appears to have been that the new Bulgaria could not become other than a virtual dependency of Russia, and that in curtailing its boundaries he was checking by so much the growth of Russian influence. If he could have foreseen, however, the unexpected spirit with which the Bulgarians have defended their autonomy, not from Turkish but from Russian aggression, it is doubtful if he would have lent himself with such vigor to that portion of his policy which had for its result the weakening of this "buffer" state. The determination to resist Russian aggression in the Balkans continues to form the purpose of English politicians of nearly all schools; but the idea that this policy is best served by maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in Europe has been steadily losing adherents since Beaconsfield's day. The one event of importance in Balkan history since 1878 has served well to illustrate this fact.

LATER CHANGES.

In September, 1885, the revolt of Eastern Roumelia partially undid the work of the Berlin treaty. After the usual negotiations between the Powers, the question at issue was settled by a conference of ambassadors at Constantinople in November, by which Eastern Roumelia was placed under the rule of the Bulgarian prince as vassal of the Sultan. This result was achieved through the agency of England, and against the opposition of Russia and other continental powers. England and Russia had in fact exchanged policies since 1878, now that the real temper of the Bulgarian people was more generally understood.

The governments of Greece and Servia, alarmed at the predominance thus given to Bulgaria among the liberated states, sought similar compensation, but were both foiled.

Servia, which sought this direct from Bulgaria, was worsted in a short war (Nov.-December 1885), and Greece was checked in her aspiration for further territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey by the combined blockade of the Powers in the spring of 1886.

Since then, no geographical change has taken place in the old lands of European Turkey. Prince Alexander of Bulgaria was forced to abdicate by Russian intrigue in September 1886; but under his successor, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg (crowned in 1887), und his able minister Stambouloff, Bulgaria has successfully preserved its autonomy.

THE PRESENT-DAY PROBLEM.

A general statement of the Balkan problem as it exists to-day may be briefly given. The non-_Turkish_ populations of European Turkey, for the most part Christian, are divided ethnically into four groups: the _Roumans_ or _Vlachs_, the _Greeks_, the _Albanians_ and the _Slavs_. The process of liberation, as it has proceeded during the present century, has given among these people the following separate states. The _Vlachs_ are represented in the present kingdom of Roumania ruled by a Hohenzollern prince; the _Greeks_ are represented in the little kingdom of Greece ruled by a prince of the house of Denmark; while the _Slavs_ are represented by three autonomous realms: Bulgaria under Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, Servia under the native dynasty of Obrenovitch, and the little principality of Montenegro, the only one of all which had never yielded to Turkish supremacy, under the Petrovic house, which is likewise native.

The _Albanians_ alone of the four races, owing in part, perhaps, to their more or less general acceptance of Mohammedanism, have not as yet made a determined effort for separate national existence.

To these peoples, under any normal process of development, belongs the inheritance of the Turkish Empire in Europe. The time has long passed when any such process can be effectually hindered on the Turkish side. It will be hindered, if at all, either by the aggressive and rival ambitions of their two great neighbors, Austria and Russia, or by the mutual jealousies and opposing claims of the peoples themselves. The unfortunate part which these jealousies are likely to play in the history of the future was dimly foreshadowed in the events of 1885.

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It is indeed these rival aspirations, rather than the collapse of the Turkish power, which are most likely to afford Russia and even Austria the opportunity for territorial extension over the Balkan lands. A confederation, or even a tacit understanding between the Balkan states, would do much to provide against this danger; but the idea of a confederation, though often suggested and even planned, belongs at present only to the realm of possibilities. On the one hand Servia, menaced by the proximity of Austria, leans upon Russian support; on the other, Bulgaria, under exactly reverse conditions, yields to the influence of Austria. It will be seen at once that these are unfavorable conditions on which to build up any federative action. If at the next crisis, however, the liberated states are fated to act independently, it will be seen at once that Greece and Bulgaria possess the better chance. Not only are they the most remote from any of the great powers, but they alone possess a geography which is entirely open on the Turkish side. Moreover, what is of still greater consequence, it is they who, from an ethnic standpoint, have the most legitimate interest in the still unliberated population of European Turkey. The unliberated _Greek_ population predominates in southern Macedonia, the Chalcidian peninsula and along almost the entire seaboard, both of Thrace and Asia Minor; on the other hand the ethnographical limits of the _Bulgarian_ people conform almost exactly to the boundaries of Bulgaria as provided for at San Stephano. The creation of a political Bulgaria to correspond to the ethnic Bulgaria was indeed the purpose of the Russian government in 1878, though with the repetition of the same conditions it would hardly be its purpose again. Barring, therefore, the Albanians of the west, who as yet have asserted no clearly defined national claim, the _Greeks_ and the Bulgarians are the logical heirs to what remains of European Turkey.

These observations are not intended as a fore-cast; they merely indicate what would be an inevitable outcome, were the question permitted a natural settlement.

Concerning the _Turks_ themselves a popular fallacy has ever been to consider their destiny as a whole. But here again an important division of the subject intrudes itself.

In Asia Minor, where the Turkish population overwhelmingly preponderates, the question of their destiny, barring the ever threatened Russian interference, ought not to arouse great concern in the present. But in European Turkey the utter lack of this predominance seems to deprive the Ottoman of his only legitimate title. The _Turkish_ population in Thrace and the Balkans never did in fact constitute a majority; and with its continual decline, measured indeed by the decline of the Ottoman Empire itself, the greatest of all obstacles to an equitable and final settlement has been removed. (See the ethnic map of Europe at the present day.)

The historical geography of the Balkans during the present century is not so intricate that it may not be understood even from the current literature of the subject. The best purely geographical authority is E. Hertslet's "Map of Europe by Treaty." Of text works A. C. Fyffe's. "History of Modern Europe," and J. H. Rose's "A Century of Continental History" afford excellent general views. The facts concerning the settlement of the first northern boundary of free Greece are given in Finlay's "History of Greece," Volume VII. Of excellent works dealing more or less directly with present Balkan politics there is hardly an end. It is necessary to mention but a few: E. de Laveleye's "The Balkan Peninsula," E. A. Freeman's "The Ottoman Power in Europe," the Duke of Argyll's "The Eastern Question," and James Baker's "Turkey." See also the general bibliography of historical geography.

A. C. Reiley.

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