Chapter 3 (4)

"La Fayette's second visit to his native country [1770], was
most opportune. He arrived in Paris at the moment when the war
for the independence of America was in high popularity
throughout France. He was put in arrest a week for his
disobedience to the order not to leave France, but this was a
mere formality. Vergennes received him in private. His example
had roused the spirit of the French nobles. The stage
resounded with his applauses. Crowds followed his steps. Marie
Antoinette, with her quick, enthusiastic spirit, joyed at his
distinction. The council of state, the Parliament, the towns,
the corporations mingled in the noble excitement. The Royal
Treasury was assured support by patriotic offers of
contributions, and then was formed the auxiliary army that was
to bear succor to America. This public enthusiasm triumphed
over the hesitating reluctance of Maurepas, and the economical
prudence of Necker. The army, placed under the command of the
veteran Rochambeau, commended for his 'steadiness, wisdom,
ability and prudence,' a pupil of the Marshal de Belle Isle,
distinguished in frequent service, was to be composed of 6,000
troops. Among these shone forth the most brilliant of the
nobility."

_J. C. Hamilton,
History of the United States,
as traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton,
chapter 20 (volume 2)._

"La Fayette … made the ministers understand that if he was not
placed in command of the expedition, which would surprise the
Americans, at least it was imperative to place over it a
French general who would consent to serve under the American
commander-in-chief. But he knew well that his old companions
in arms in France were jealous of his rapid military fortune
and brilliant renown. He knew still better that the officers
who were his seniors in rank would be unwilling to serve under
him. His first proposition, therefore, was only made to
satisfy public feeling in America, which left the management
of this affair almost entirely in his hands. In view of the
serious difficulties that necessarily would result from the
adoption of such a decision—difficulties that might have most
disastrous consequences for the cause to which he had devoted
himself—he promised to make the Americans understand that he
had preferred remaining at the head of one of their divisions
and that he had refused the command of the French forces. But
he insisted upon this point, that, in order to avoid wounding
the self-respect of the Americans, it was indispensable to
choose a general to command the expedition, whose promotion
had been recent and whose talents were certainly equal to his
mission, but who, considering this mission as a distinction,
would consent to acknowledge General Washington's supremacy.
The choice that was made, under these conditions, of the Count
de Rochambeau was perfectly satisfactory to him, and, without
waiting for the departure of the expedition, he embarked at
Rochefort, on February the 18th, 1780, on board the frigate
Hermione, which the king had given him as being a swift
sailer. … He was anxious to inform Washington of the good news
himself, and immediately upon his landing at Boston, on April
the 28th, he hastened to Morristown to rejoin his well-beloved
and revered friend, as he called him in his letters. … General
Heath, who commanded the militia in the State of Rhode Is]and,
announced on the 11th of July, the arrival of the French
squadron to General Washington, who was then with his staff at
Bergen. La Fayette set out almost immediately, provided with
instructions from the commander-in-chief, dated the 15th, to
repair to the French general and admiral to confer with them.
For some time Washington had been considering a plan of
offensive operation for the capture of the city and the
garrison of New York. This plan, which conformed with the
wishes of the French government, was only to be carried out
upon certain conditions. First, it was necessary that the
French troops should unite with the American forces, and,
secondly, that the French should have a naval superiority over
the forces of Admirals Graves and Arbuthnot, who had effected
their junction at New York the day after the arrival of the
French at Newport. This last condition was far from being
fulfilled. … It had been foreseen that the English, who had
concentrated their land and naval forces at New York, would
not give the French time to establish themselves on Rhode
Island; and Washington informed Rochambeau that Sir Henry
Clinton was embarking his troops and would come shortly to
attack the forces of the expedition with the squadrons
assembled under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot, which were
anchored at Sandy Hook, beyond New York, at the mouth of the
Hudson River.
{3272}
The American general watched these movements, and, while he
gave frequent information to the French of the projected
attack upon them, he tried to prevent it. … At the same time,
Washington crossed the Hudson above West Point with the
greater part of his troops, and proceeded to King's Bridge, at
the northern end of the island, where he made some hostile
demonstrations. This manœuvre detained General Clinton, who
had already embarked eight thousand men upon the ships of
Arbuthnot. He landed his troops and gave up his project.
Nevertheless, the English admiral set sail and appeared before
Rhode Island with eleven ships of the line and a few frigates,
twelve days after the French had landed. … On August the 9th,
when La Fayette had returned to the headquarters of
Washington, which were at Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's
Bridge, on the right bank of the North River, he wrote to
Rochambeau and de Ternay an urgent dispatch, in which he
finished, in the name of the American general, by proposing to
the French generals to come at once to attempt an attack on
New York. … On the other hand, the same courier brought a
letter from Washington which made no mention of this project,
but which only replied by a kind of refusal to the request of
Rochambeau for a conference, 'wherein in an hour of
conversation they could agree upon more things than in volumes
of correspondence.' Washington said with truth that he did not
dare to leave his army in front of New York, for it might be
attacked at any moment, and that by his presence he prevented
the departure of the large body of the English forces that
might have been sent against Rhode Island. Indeed, it is
certain that if some differences had not arisen between
General Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot, the French might have
found themselves in a dangerous position at the beginning.
From the earliest letters exchanged upon this occasion some
discord resulted between La Fayette, Rochambeau and
Washington, but, owing to the good sense of Rochambeau,
matters were soon smoothed over. He wrote in English to the
American general to ask him thereafter to address himself
directly to him, and to explain the reasons that induced him
to postpone assuming the offensive. At the same time he
urgently requested a conference. From that moment the
relations between the two leaders were excellent. The mere
presence of the French squadron and army, though they were
still paralyzed and really blockaded by Admiral Arbuthnot, had
effected a useful diversion, since the English had not been
able to profit by all the advantages resulting from the
capture of Charleston, and, instead of carrying on operations
in the Carolinas with superior forces, they had had to bring
the greater part of them back to New York."

_T. Balch,
The French in America in the War of Independence,
chapters 10-11._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (August-September).
The Treason of Benedict Arnold.

"Washington contemplated the aspect of affairs with the
greatest alarm. Doubtful if the army could be kept together
for another campaign, he was exceedingly anxious to strike
some decisive blow. He proposed to Rochambeau, commanding the
French troops at Newport, an attack upon New York; but that
was not thought feasible without a superior naval force.
Letters were sent to the French admiral in the West Indies
entreating assistance; and Washington presently proceeded to
Hartford, there to meet Rochambeau, to devise some definite
plan of operations. During Washington's absence at Hartford, a
plot came to light for betraying the important fortress of
West Point and the other posts of the Highlands into the hands
of the enemy, the traitor being no other than Arnold, the most
brilliant officer and one of the most honored in the American
army. The qualities of a brilliant soldier are unfortunately
often quite distinct from those of a virtuous man and a good
citizen. … Placed in command at Philadelphia, … he [Arnold]
lived in a style of extravagance far beyond his means, and he
endeavored to sustain it by entering into privateering and
mercantile speculations, most of which proved unsuccessful. He
was even accused of perverting his military authority to
purposes of private gain. The complaints on this point, made
to Congress by the authorities of Pennsylvania, had been at
first unheeded; but, being presently brought forward in a
solemn manner, and with some appearance of offended dignity on
the part of the Pennsylvania council, an interview took place
between a committee of that body and a committee of Congress,
which had resulted in Arnold's trial by a court martial.
Though acquitted of the more serious charges, on two points he
had been found guilty, and had been sentenced to be
reprimanded by the commander-in-chief. Arnold claimed against
the United States a large balance, growing out of the
unsettled accounts of his Canada expedition. This claim was
greatly cut down by the treasury officers and when Arnold
appealed to Congress, a committee reported that more had been
allowed than was actually due. Mortified and soured, and
complaining of public ingratitude, Arnold attempted, but
without success, to get a loan from the French minister. Some
months before, he had opened a correspondence with Sir Henry
Clinton under a feigned name, carried on through Major Andre,
adjutant general of the British army. Having at length made
himself known to his correspondents, to give importance to his
treachery, he solicited and obtained from Washington, who had
every confidence in him, the command in the Highlands, with
the very view of betraying that important position into the
hands of the enemy. To arrange the terms of the bargain, an
interview was necessary with some confidential British agent;
and Andre, though not without reluctance, finally volunteered
for that purpose. Several previous attempts having failed, the
British sloop-of-war Vulture, with Andre on board, ascended
the Hudson as far as the mouth of Croton River, some miles
below King's Ferry. Information being sent to Arnold under a
flag, the evening after Washington left West Point for
Hartford he dispatched a boat to the Vulture, which took Andre
on shore, for an interview on the west side of the river, just
below the American lines. Morning appeared before the
arrangements for the betrayal of the fortress could be
definitely completed, and Andre was reluctantly persuaded to
come within the American lines, and to remain till the next
night at the house of one Smith, a dupe or tool of Arnold's,
the same who had been employed to bring Andre from the ship.
{3273}
For some reason not very clearly explained, Smith declined to
convey Andre back to the Vulture. … Driven thus to the
necessity of returning by land, Andre laid aside his uniform,
assumed a citizen's dress, and, with a pass from Arnold in the
name of John Anderson, a name which Andre had often used in
their previous correspondence, he set off toward sunset on
horseback, with Smith for a guide. They crossed King's Ferry,
passed all the American guards in safety, and spent the night
near Crom Pond, with an acquaintance of Smith's. The next
morning, having passed Pine's Bridge, across Croton River,
Smith left Andre to pursue his way alone. The road led through
a district extending some thirty miles above the island of New
York, not included in the lines of either army, and thence
known as the 'Neutral Ground,' a populous and fertile region,
but very much infested by bands of plunderers called 'Cow
Boys' and 'Skinners.' The 'Cow Boys' lived within the British
lines, and stole or bought cattle for the supply of the
British army. The rendezvous of the 'Skinners' was within the
American lines. They professed to be great patriots, making it
their ostensible business to plunder those who refused to take
the oath of allegiance to the State of New York." On the
morning of Andre's journey, the road to Tarrytown, on which he
rode, was being guarded by a small party of men, who watched
for cattle thieves, and for suspicious travelers generally.
Three of these intercepted the unfortunate young officer and
discovered his character. Arnold received intelligence of what
had happened in time to make his escape to the Vulture. Andre
was examined before a board of which Lafayette, Steuben and
Greene were members, and on his own statements was executed as
a spy. The sympathy with him was very great, among Americans
as well as among his own countrymen; but lenity in the case
appeared too dangerous to Washington and his military
advisers.

_R. Hildreth,
History of the United States,
chapter 41 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN:
_W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapters 2, 7, and 9-11._

_B. J. Lossing,
The Two Spies._

_J. Sparks,
Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold
(Library of American Biographies,
volume 3, chapters 8-15)._

_W. Sargent,
Life of Major John André,
chapters 11-21._

_I. N. Arnold,
Life of Benedict Arnold,
chapters 13-18._

_J. H. Smith,
Authentic Narrative of the Causes which led
to the Death of Major André._

_B. J. Lossing,
Field-book of the Revolution,
volume 1, chapters 30-32._

See, also, WEST POINT.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (August-December).
Partisan warfare in South Carolina.
Sumter and Marion.

A name "which recalls thrilling tales of desperate enterprise,
surprises at midnight, sudden attacks in the gray twilight of
morning, lurking-places in the depths of forests, restless
activity, and untiring perseverance, is the name of Thomas
Sumter. He comes before us tall, vigorous, dauntless, with a
bold bearing, and imperious brow, stern to look upon, fierce
in his self-will, arrogant in his decisions, tenacious in his
prejudices, resolute and vigorous in the execution of his own
plans, remiss and almost luke-warm in carrying out the plans
of others. Born in South Carolina just as that colony had
passed from the control of the Proprietaries to the control of
the King, he lived to see her take the first decided step
towards passing out of the Union. Little has been preserved of
his early life, although his subsequent career in the Senate
of the United States proves that he was not deficient in
education then, wherever or whenever acquired. In the
Revolution be took an early part, and soon made himself
conspicuous as a bold and enterprising officer. But it was not
till after the siege of Charleston that his talents were
brought fully into play. Then at the head of a body of
volunteers he moved rapidly from point to point, keeping alive
the hopes of the Whigs and the fears of the Tories in the
regions watered by the Broad River, the Ennoree, and the
Tiger. … History, like tradition, has her favorite characters,
on which she dwells with peculiar fondness, delighting herself
in preserving the memory of every exploit, and giving the
brightest tints to every circumstance connected with their
career. … Of these children of a happy star, no one holds in
our Revolutionary history the same place as Francis Marion.
His story, irregularly told by a friend and companion, took an
early hold upon the heart of the people; and the romantic
traits of his career, warming the imagination of a great poet,
have been recorded in beautiful verse. Impartial judgment and
sober research have left his own laurels unimpaired, although
they have dissipated the halo which tradition and fancy had
shed around his men. His life forms one of those pictures upon
which the mind loves to dwell, from the singular combination
of rare qualities which it displays. His ancestors were
Huguenot exiles, who took refuge in South Carolina, from the
dragonnades of Louis XIV. His father was a planter near
Georgetown, who, portioning out his estate to his children as
they came of age, had nothing left for Francis, the youngest,
and his next nearest brother, while they were yet children. At
sixteen Francis found himself compelled to choose a pursuit
for his support. With only a common English education, and no
money to carry him through the preparatory courses, he could
neither be a physician nor a lawyer. He resolved to be a
sailor, and started upon a voyage to the West Indies. But his
ship was burnt in a gale, and after tossing about eight days
in an open boat, without water and with nothing but the raw
flesh and skin of a single dog to eat, and seeing several of
his companions die of hunger, he, with the starving survivors,
were rescued, barely alive. He renounced the sea, returned to
Georgetown, and engaged in farming. The Cherokee war of 1759
found him hard at his work. He was now twenty-six, small in
frame, low in stature, but vigorous, active, and healthy. By
nature he was taciturn and reticent, with nothing in the
expression of his face to attract or interest a casual
observer, but still inspiring confidence and commanding
respect in those who were brought into intimate relations with
him. When, therefore, a company of volunteers was raised to
serve against the Indians, he was chosen lieutenant. In a
second expedition, which soon after became necessary, he was
made captain. Next came the War of Independence; and joining
the first South Carolina levies, he was presently made a
major; and with this rank took part in the gallant defense of
Fort Moultrie in 1776. His next promotion was to the command
of a regiment as lieutenant-colonel.
{3274}
During the siege of Charleston his leg was accidentally
broken, a lucky accident, which left him free when the city
fell, to engage in an adventurous system of warfare which was
the only possible system in that low state of our fortunes.
In the course of this he was promoted by Governor Rutledge to
a brigadiership. When he first appeared in Gates's camp, he
had but twenty men with him, or rather twenty between men and
boys. Some of them were negroes. With these he rescued 150 of
the prisoners of Camden, coming upon the British escort by
surprise and overpowering it. Early in September a body of 200
Tories attempted to surprise him. He had 53 men with him when
he heard of their intention, and instantly setting forward,
surprised an advance party of 45, killing or wounding all but
15, and then attacked the main body of 200, and put them to
flight. Before the end of the month he surprised another body
of 60 men; and in October one of 200. His force was constantly
fluctuating between 20 men and 70. Up to the 18th of October
he had never had over 70. They went and came as they chose,
their number ever ebbing and flowing like the tide. Sometimes
the very men who had fought with him were ranged in arms
against him; a few only serving from honest zeal and true love
of country. … As his slender form concealed a lion heart, so
under his cold, impassive face, there was a perpetual glow of
tender sympathies. … Without claiming for Marion those powers
of combination which belong to the highest order of military
genius, he must be allowed to have excelled in all the
qualities which form the consummate partisan,—vigilance,
promptitude, activity, energy, dauntless courage, and unshaken
self-control. … Two principles controlled all his actions, and
shaped all his ends; the love of country, pure, earnest, and
profound; the love of right, sincere, undeviating, and
incorruptible."

_G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathanael Greene,
book 4, chapter 7 (volume 3)._

"The other partisans … had been compelled to take refuge in
the mountains. Marion found his security in the swamps. This
able partisan maintained his ground below and along the Santee
river, and managed, among the defiles and swamps of that
region, to elude all the activity of his enemies. His force
had been collected chiefly among his own neighbors, were
practised in the swamps, and familiar with the country. Like
Sumter, utterly unfurnished with the means of war at first, he
procured them by similar means. He took possession of the saws
from the mills, and converted them into sabres. So much was he
distressed for ammunition that he has engaged in battle when
he had not three rounds of powder to each man of his party. …
Various were the means employed to draw off or drive away his
followers. The houses on the banks of the Pedee, Lynch's
Creek, and Black river, from whence they were chiefly taken,
were destroyed by fire, the plantations devastated, and the
negroes carried away. But the effect of this wantonness was
far other than had been intended. Revenge and despair
confirmed the patriotism of these ruined men, and strengthened
their resolution. … For months, their only shelter was the
green wood and the swamp—their only cover the broad forest and
the arch of heaven. … With a policy that nothing could
distract—a caution that no artifice could mislead—Marion led
his followers from thicket to thicket in safety, and was never
more perfectly secure than when he was in the neighborhood of
his foe. He hung upon his flanks along the march—he skirted
his camp in the darkness of the night—he lay in wait for his
foraging parties—he shot down his sentries, and, flying or
advancing, he never failed to harass the invader, and extort
from him a bloody toll at every passage through swamp,
thicket, or river, which his smaller parties made. In this
sort of warfare—which is peculiarly adapted to the
peculiarities of the country in Carolina, and consequently to
the genius of her people—he contrived almost wholly to break
up the British communications by one of the most eligible
routes between the seaboard and the interior."

_W. G. Simms,
History of South Carolina,
book 5, chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
C. B. Hartley,
Life of General Francis Marion
(Heroes and Patriots of the South),
chapters 14-15.

_W. G. Simms,
Life of Francis Marion._

_Horry and Weems,
Life of Marion._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780-1781.
Vermont as an independent State negotiating with the British.

See VERMONT: A. D. 1781.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780-1781.
Greene's campaign in the south.
King's Mountain.
The Cowpens.
Guilford Court House.
Hobkirk's Hill.
Eutaw Springs.
The British shut up in Charleston.
Cornwallis withdrawn to Virginia.

"After his victory at Camden, Lord Cornwallis found it
necessary to give his army some rest from the intense August
heat. In September he advanced into North Carolina, boasting
that he would soon conquer all the states south of the
Susquehanna river. … In traversing Mecklenburg county
Cornwallis soon found himself in a very hostile and dangerous
region, where there were no Tories to befriend him. One of his
best partisan commanders, Major Ferguson, penetrated too far
into the mountains. The back-woodsmen of Tennessee and
Kentucky, the Carolinas, and western Virginia were aroused;
and under their superb partisan leaders—Shelby, Sevier,
Cleaveland, McDowell, Campbell, and Williams—gave chase to
Ferguson, who took refuge upon what he deemed an impregnable
position on the top of King's Mountain. On the 7th of October
the backwoodsmen stormed the mountain, Ferguson was shot
through the heart, 400 of his men were killed and wounded, and
all the rest, 700 in number, surrendered at discretion. The
Americans lost 28 killed and 60 wounded. … In the series of
events which led to the surrender of Cornwallis, the battle of
King's Mountain played a part similar to that played by the
battle of Bennington in the series of events which led to the
surrender of Burgoyne. It was the enemy's first serious
disaster, and its immediate result was to check his progress
until the Americans could muster strength enough to overthrow
him. The events, however, were much more complicated in
Cornwallis's case, and took much longer to unfold themselves.
… As soon as he heard the news of the disaster he fell back to
Winnsborough, in South Carolina, and called for
reinforcements. While they were arriving, the American army,
recruited and reorganized since its crushing defeat at Camden,
advanced into Mecklenburg county. Gates was superseded by
Greene, who arrived upon the scene on the 2d of December.
Under Greene were three Virginians of remarkable
ability,—Daniel Morgan; William Washington, who was a distant
cousin of the commander-in-chief; and Henry Lee, familiarly
known as 'Light-horse Harry,' father of the great general,
Robert Edward Lee.
{3275}
The little army numbered only 2,000 men, but a considerable
part of them were disciplined veterans, fully a match for the
British infantry." To increase this small force, Baron
Steuben, the military organizer and disciplinarian of the
Revolutionary armies, was sent down to Virginia, for the
purpose of recruiting and organizing troops.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (JANUARY-DECEMBER).

Thereupon detachments from the British army at New York were
dispatched by sea to Virginia, and Arnold, the traitor, was
given command of them. "The presence of these subsidiary
forces in Virginia was soon to influence in a decisive way the
course of events. Greene, on reaching South Carolina, acted
with boldness and originality. He divided his little army into
two bodies, one of which cooperated with Marion's partisans in
the northeastern part of the state, and threatened
Cornwallis's communications with the coast. The other body he
sent under Morgan to the southwestward, to threaten the inland
posts and their garrisons. Thus worried on both flanks,
Cornwallis presently divided his own force, sending Tarleton
with 1,100 men to dispose of Morgan. Tarleton came up with
Morgan on the 17th of January, 1781, at a grazing-ground known
as the Cowpens, not far from King's Mountain. The battle which
ensued was well fought, and on Morgan's part it was a
wonderful piece of tactics. With only 900 men in open field he
surrounded and nearly annihilated a superior force. The
British lost 230 in killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and all
their guns. Tarleton escaped with 270 men. The Americans lost
12 killed and 61 wounded. The two battles, King's Mountain and
the Cowpens, deprived Cornwallis of nearly all his light-armed
troops, and he was just entering upon a game where swiftness
was especially required. It was his object to intercept Morgan
and defeat him before he could effect a junction with the
other part of the American army. It was Greene's object to
march the two parts of his army in converging directions
northwards across North Carolina and unite them in spite of
Cornwallis. By moving in this direction Greene was always
getting nearer to his reinforcements from Virginia, while
Cornwallis was always getting further from his supports in
South Carolina. … The two wings of the American army came
together and were joined by the reinforcements; so that at
Guilford Court House, on the 15th of March, Cornwallis found
himself obliged to fight against heavy odds, 200 miles from
the coast and almost as far from the nearest point in South
Carolina at which he could get support. The battle of Guilford
was admirably managed by both commanders and stubbornly fought
by the troops. At nightfall the British held the field, with
the loss of nearly one third of their number, and the
Americans were repulsed. But Cornwallis could not stay in such
a place, and could not afford to risk another battle. There
was nothing for him to do but retreat to Wilmington, the
nearest point on the coast. There he stopped and pondered. His
own force was sadly depleted, but he knew that Arnold in
Virginia was being heavily reinforced from New York. The only
safe course seemed to march northward and join the operations
in Virginia; then afterwards to return southward. This course
Cornwallis pursued, arriving at Petersburg and taking command
of the troops there on the 20th of May. Meanwhile Greene,
after pursuing Cornwallis for about 50 miles from Guilford,
faced about and marched with all speed upon Camden, 160 miles
distant. … Lord Rawdon held Camden. Greene stopped at
Hobkirk's Hill, two miles to the north, and sent Marion and
Lee to take Fort Watson, and thus cut the enemy's
communications with the coast. On April 23 Fort Watson
surrendered; on the 25th Rawdon defeated Greene at Hobkirk's
Hill, but as his communications were cut the victory did him
no good. He was obliged to retreat toward the coast, and
Greene took Camden on the 10th of May. Having thus obtained
the commanding point, Greene went on until he had reduced
every one of the inland posts. At last, on the 8th of
September, he fought an obstinate battle at Eutaw Springs, in
which both sides claimed the victory. … Here, however, as
always after one of Greene's battles, it was the enemy who
retreated and he who pursued. His strategy never failed. After
Eutaw Springs the British remained shut up in Charleston under
cover of their ships, and the American government was
reëstablished over South Carolina. Among all the campaigns in
history that have been conducted with small armies, there have
been few, if any, more brilliant than Greene's."

_J. Fiske,
The War of Independence,
chapter 7._

ALSO IN:
_J. Fiske,
The American Revolution,
chapter 15 (volume 2)._

_H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapters 65-71._

_G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathanael Greene,
volume 3, chapters 1-23._

_L. C. Draper,
King's Mountain and its Heroes._

_H. Lee,
Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department,
chapters 18-34._

_J. Graham,
Life of General Daniel Morgan,
chapters 13-17._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January).
The Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line.

"As the year 1781 opened and the prospect of a new year of
struggle became certain, and the invasion of the Southern
States began to indicate the prospect of a southern campaign,
which was at all times unpopular with northern troops, a
disaffection was developed which at last broke forth in open
mutiny, and a peremptory demand for discharge. This irritation
was aggravated by hunger, cold, and poverty. Marshall says:
'The winter brought not much relaxation from toil, and none
from suffering. The soldiers were perpetually on the point of
starvation, were often entirely without food, were exposed
without proper clothing to the rigors of winter; and had now
served almost twelve months without pay.' … On the 1st of
January the Pennsylvania line revolted; Captain Billings was
killed in an attempt to suppress the mutiny; General Wayne was
powerless to restore order, and 1,300 men, with six guns,
started to Princeton, with the declared purpose to march to
Philadelphia, and obtain redress. They demanded clothing, the
residue of their bounty, and full arrears of pay. A committee
from Congress and the State authorities of Pennsylvania at
once entered into negotiations with the troops for terms of
compromise. The American Commander-in-chief was then at New
Windsor. A messenger from General Wayne informed him on the 3d
of January of the revolt, and the terms demanded. It appears
from Washington's letters that it was his impulse, at the
first intimation of the trouble, to go in person and attempt
its control. His second impression was to reserve his
influence and authority until all other means were exhausted.
{3276}
The complaint of the mutineers was but a statement of the
condition of all the army, so far as the soldiers had served
three years; and the suffering and failure to receive pay were
absolutely universal. Leaving the preliminary discussion with
the civil authorities who were responsible for much of the
trouble, the Commander-in-chief appealed to the Governors of
the northern States for a force of militia to meet any attacks
from New York, and declined to interfere until he found that
the passion had passed and he could find troops who would at
all hazards execute his will. It was one of the most difficult
passages in the war, and was so handled that the
Commander-in-chief retained his prestige and regained control
of the army. … General Clinton received information of the
revolt as early as Washington, on the morning of the 23d, and
sent messengers to the American army with propositions,
looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely
misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents
were retained in custody. It is sufficient to say that a
portion of the troops were discharged without critical
examination of their enlistments, on their own oath; that many
promptly reenlisted, that as soon as Washington found that he
had troops who did not share in the open mutiny, he used force
and suppressed the disaffection, and that the soldiers
themselves hung several agents who brought propositions from
General Clinton which invited them to abandon their flag and
join his command. The mutiny of the American army at the
opening of the campaign of 1781, was a natural outbreak which
human nature could not resist, and whatever of discredit may
attach to the revolt, it will never be unassociated with the
fact that, while the emergency was one that overwhelmed every
military obligation by its pressure, it did not affect the
fealty of the soldiers to the cause for which they took up
arms. … La Fayette thus wrote to his wife, 'Human patience has
its limits. No European army would suffer the tenth part of
what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens to support
hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which
constitute the condition of our soldiers, the hardiest and
most patient that are to be found in the world.'"

_H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapter 67._

ALSO IN:
_W. H. Egle,
History of Pennsylvania,
chapter 12._

_C. J. Stillé,
Major-General Anthony Wayne,
chapter 6._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January-May).
Benedict Arnold and the British in Virginia.
Opening of Lafayette's campaign in that state.

"In January, 1781, the news reached headquarters in the
Highlands of New York that General [Benedict] Arnold had
landed in Virginia with a considerable force, was laying waste
the country, and had already destroyed the valuable stores
collected at Richmond; opposed to him were only the small
commands of Steuben and Muhlenberg. The situation was very
alarming, and threatened to place all the Southern States in
the hands of the British. If Arnold succeeded in destroying
the few American troops in Virginia, he could then march to
the assistance of Cornwallis, who, with a superior force, was
pressing General Greene very hard in the Carolinas. To defeat
or capture Arnold before he could further prosecute his
designs was, therefore, of the utmost importance. For this
purpose it was necessary to send a detachment from the main
army against Arnold by land, and a naval force to Chesapeake
Bay to prevent his escape by sea. Washington at once
communicated the state of affairs to Rochambeau, who, with the
French fleet, had long been blockaded at Newport. Taking
advantage of the serious injuries lately suffered by the
blockading English fleet in consequence of a storm, Admiral
Destouches despatched M. de Tilly to the Chesapeake with a
ship-of-the-line and two frigates. To cooperate with these
French vessels, Washington detached 1,200 light infantry from
the main army, and placed them under the command of Lafayette.
That officer was particularly chosen for this important trust,
because the confidence reposed in him by both the American and
French troops made him, in Washington's opinion, the fittest
person to conduct a combined expedition. Thus opened the only
campaign in America which afforded Lafayette an opportunity to
show what abilities he possessed as an independent commander,
and on this campaign his military reputation must chiefly
rest. Lafayette moved rapidly southward," to Annapolis; but,
the coöperating movement of the French fleet having, meantime,
been frustrated by an attack from the English squadron, his
instructions required him to abandon the expedition and
return. He had already set his troops in motion northward when
different instructions reached him. Two more British regiments
had been sent to Virginia, under General Philips, who now took
command of all the forces there, and this had increased the
anxiety of Washington. "The situation of the Southern States
had become extremely perilous. General Greene had all he could
do to fight Lord Cornwallis's superior force in North
Carolina. Unless a vigorous opposition could be made to
Philips, he would have no difficulty in dispersing the militia
of Virginia, and in effecting a junction with Cornwallis.
With their forces so combined, the British would be masters in
the South. Washington at once determined to place the defence
of Virginia in Lafayette's hands. … Lafayette marched with
such rapidity … that he reached Richmond, where there were
valuable stores to be protected, a day in advance of General
Philips. From his post on the heights of the town he saw the
British set fire to the tobacco warehouses at Manchester, just
across the river, but there were neither men nor boats enough
to make an attack possible. Philips, on his part, was too much
impressed with the show of strength made by the Americans to
prosecute his plans on Richmond, and retreating down the James
river, burning and laying waste as he went, he camped at Hog
Island. Lafayette followed, harassing the enemy's rear, as far
as the Chickahominy. Here the situation underwent a
considerable change. Lord Cornwallis, after his long and
unsuccessful campaign against Greene in North Carolina, made
up his mind that his exhausting labors there would prove
unprofitable until Virginia should be subjugated. His men were
worn out with incessant marching and fighting, while no
substantial advantage had been gained. Hearing that General
Greene had marched to attack Lord Rawdon at Camden in South
Carolina, he determined to join Philips.
{3277}
That officer, accordingly, received orders while at Hog Island
to take possession of Petersburg and there await Cornwallis's
arrival. … On the 13th of May, General Philips died at
Petersburg of a fever. … Cornwallis arrived at Petersburg on
the 20th of May. His forces now amounted to over 5,000 men,
which number was soon increased to 8,000."

_B. Tuckerman,
Life of Lafayette,
chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_J. E. Cooke,
Virginia,
part 3, chapter 17._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (May-October).
Cornwallis in Virginia and the trap into which he fell.
Siege of Yorktown by the French and Americans.
Surrender of the British army.

"On the 24th of May, Cornwallis, having rested his troops,
marched from Petersburg, and endeavored to engage the American
forces. But Lafayette, having removed the military stores from
Richmond, retreated across the Chickahominy to Fredericksburg,
where he expected to meet General Wayne and a battalion of
Pennsylvania troops, without whose assistance he could not
venture any fighting. … Cornwallis … moved between Lafayette
and the town of Albemarle, where had been placed a great part
of the military stores from Richmond, which now seemed doomed
to destruction. But on the 10th of June Lafayette had received
his expected reënforcement of Wayne's Pennsylvanians, and thus
strengthened felt able to assume the offensive. Rapidly
crossing the Rapidan he approached close to the British army
which blocked the road to Albemarle. Nothing could have better
suited Cornwallis, who prepared for a conflict in which he
felt sure of a decisive victory. Lafayette, however, had not
lost sight of the vital feature of his campaign,—to protect
the property of the State without losing his army. Through his
scouts he discovered an old unused road to Albemarle, unknown
to the enemy. While Cornwallis was preparing for battle, he
had the road cleared, and under cover of the night marched his
men through it and took up a strong position before the town.
There he was joined by militia from the neighboring mountains,
and he showed so strong a front that the British commander did
not venture an attack. … The British commander, so far foiled
in his objects, had to march back to Richmond and thence to
Williamsburg, near the coast, thus practically abandoning
control over any part of Virginia except where naval forces
gave possession. Lafayette effected a junction with Baron
Steuben on the 18th of June, and thus increased his force to
about four thousand men. The Americans had now become the
pursuers instead of the pursued, and followed the British,
harassing their rear and flanks."

_B. Tuckerman,
Life of General Lafayette,
volume 1, chapter 6._

"There now came a pause in the Virginia Campaign, at least in
daily operations and excitements. The State north of the James
was relieved. Cornwallis crossed to the south side, at Cobham,
on the 7th [July]; and Lafayette, retiring up the river,
encamped, about the 20th, on the now historic Malvern Hill,
then described as one of the healthiest and best watered spots
in the State. … The entire British army was soon after
concentrated at Portsmouth, and preparations made to transport
a considerable portion of it to New York. Lafayette,
meanwhile, at Malvern Hill, could only await developments. He
thought of sending re-enforcements to Greene, and asked
Washington if, in case Cornwallis left Virginia, he might not
return to the Northern army. … But while the marquis and
Washington and Greene were speculating on the future movements
of Cornwallis and were persuaded, from embarkations at
Portsmouth, that he was to be deprived of a large part of his
force by Clinton, unexpected intelligence came to hand.
Instead of any part going to New York, the British force
suddenly made its appearance, during the first days in August,
at Yorktown, on the Virginia peninsula, which it had abandoned
but three weeks before. Here again was a new situation.
Cornwallis, at last, at Yorktown—the spot he was not to leave
except as a prisoner of war. Why he went there is a simple
explanation. Clinton decided, upon certain dissenting opinions
expressed by Cornwallis respecting the situation in Virginia,
not to withdraw the force in the Chesapeake which he had
called for, and which was about to sail for New York, but
permitted Cornwallis to retain the whole—all with which he had
been pursuing Lafayette and the large garrison at Portsmouth,
a total of about seven thousand, rank and file. His new
instructions, conveyed at the same time, were to the effect
that his Lordship should abandon Portsmouth, which both
generals agreed was too unhealthy for the troops, and fortify
Old Point Comfort, where Fort Monroe now stands, as a naval
station for the protection of the British shipping. In
addition, if it appeared necessary, for the better security of
the Point, to occupy Yorktown also, that was to be done.
Obeying these instructions, Cornwallis ordered a survey of Old
Point Comfort; but, upon the report of his engineers, was
obliged to represent to Clinton that it was wholly unfit and
inadequate for a naval station, as it afforded little
protection for ships, and could not command the channel, on
account of its great width. Then, following what he believed
to be the spirit of his orders, Cornwallis, before hearing
from Clinton, moved up to Yorktown, and began to fortify it in
connection with Gloucester, on the opposite shore, as the best
available naval station. Clinton made no subsequent
objections, and there Cornwallis remained until his surrender.
His occupation of the place was simply an incident of the
campaign—a move taken for convenience and in the interests of
the navy and the health of his command."

_H. P. Johnston,
The Yorktown Campaign,
chapter 3._

"The march of Lord Cornwallis into Virginia was the first
emphatic fact which enabled General Washington to plan an
efficient offensive. The repeated detachment of troops from
New York so sensibly lessened the capacity of its garrison for
extensive field service at the north, that the American
Commander-in-chief determined to attack that post, and as a
secondary purpose, thereby to divert General Clinton from
giving further aid to troops in the Southern States. As a
matter of fact, the prudent conduct of the Virginia campaign
eventually rallied to the support of General La Fayette an
army, including militia, nearly as large as that of
Washington, and the nominal strength of the allied army near
Yorktown, early in September, was nearly or quite as great as
that of Lord Cornwallis. There were other elements which, as
in previous campaigns, hampered operations at the north. The
Indians were still troublesome in Western New York, and the
Canadian frontier continued to demand attention. The American
navy had practically disappeared.
{3278}
The scarcity of money and a powerless recruiting service,
increased the difficulties of carrying on the war in a manner
that would use to the best advantage the troops of France. …
The position of the American Commander-in-chief at this time
was one of peculiar personal mortification. Appeals to State
authorities failed to fill up his army. Three thousand Hessian
reinforcements had landed at New York, and the government as
well as himself would be compromised before the whole world by
failure to meet the just demands which the French auxiliaries
had a right to press upon his attention. Relief came most
opportunely. The frigate Concorde arrived at Newport, and a
reiteration of the purpose of Count de Grasse to leave St.
Domingo on the 3d of August, for the Chesapeake direct, was
announced by a special messenger. The possibilities of the
future at once quickened him to immediate action. With a
reticence so close that the army could not fathom his plans,
he re-organized his forces for a false demonstration against
New York and a real movement upon Yorktown. … Letters to the
Governors of northern States called for aid as if to capture
New York. Letters to La Fayette and the Count de Grasse
embodied such intimations of his plans as would induce proper
caution to prevent the escape of Lord Cornwallis, and secure
transportation at Head of Elk. Other letters to authorities in
New Jersey and Philadelphia, expressly defining a plan of
operations against New York via Staten Island, with the
assurance of ample naval support, were exposed to interception
and fell into the hands of General Clinton. As late as the
19th, the roads leading to King's Bridge were cleared of
obstructions, and the army was put in readiness to advance
against New York Island. On the same day the New Jersey
regiment and that of Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson at
Dobb's Ferry, to threaten Staten Island, and ostensibly to
cover some bake-houses which were being erected for the
purpose of giving color to the show of operations against New
York. The plan of a large encampment had been prepared, which
embraced Springfield and the Chatham Pass to Morristown, and
this was allowed to find its way to Clinton's headquarters.
General Heath was assigned to command of the Hudson-river
posts, with two regiments from New Hampshire, ten from
Massachusetts, five from Connecticut, the Third artillery,
Sheldon's dragoons, the invalid corps, all local companies,
and the militia. The following forces were selected to
accompany the Commander-in-chief, viz., the light infantry
under Colonel Scammel, four light companies from New York and
Connecticut, the Rhode Island regiment, under the new army
establishment, two New York regiments, that of New Jersey and
Hazen's regiment, (the last two already across the Hudson) and
Lamb's artillery, in all about 2,000 men. The American troops
crossed on the 21st, at King's Ferry, and encamped near
Haverstraw. The French army followed, and the army was united
on the 25th. … General Washington and suite reached
Philadelphia about noon, August 30th. The army had already
realized the fact that they were destined southward. Some
dissatisfaction was manifested; but Count de Rochambeau
advanced $20,000 in gold upon the pledge of Robert Morris that
he would refund the sum by the 1st of October, and the effect
upon the troops, who had long been without any pay, was
inspiring."

_H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapter 74._