Chapter IV: , VII (102)

The successful retreat of the Ten Thousand from Cunaxa,
through the length of the Persian dominions (B. C. 401-400),
and the account which they brought of the essential hollowness
of the power of the Great King, produced an important change
among the Greeks in their estimate of the Persian monarchy as
an enemy to be feared. Sparta became ashamed of having
abandoned the Greek cities of Asia Minor to their old
oppressors, as she did after breaking the strength of their
protector, Athens, in the Peloponnesian War. When, therefore,
the Persians began to lay siege to the coast cities which
resisted them, Sparta found spirit enough to interfere (B. C.
399) and sent over a small army, into which the surviving
Cyreans were also enlisted. The only immediate result was a
truce with the Persian satrap. But, meantime, the Athenian
general Conon—he who escaped with a few triremes from
Ægospotami and fled to Cyprus—had there established relations
with the Persian court at Susa and had acquired a great
influence, which he used to bring about the creation of a
powerful Persian armament against Sparta, himself in command.
The news of this armament, reaching Sparta, provoked the
latter to a more vigorous prosecution of the war in Asia
Minor. King Agesilaus took the field in Ionia with a strong
army and conducted two brilliant campaigns (B. C. 396-395),
pointing the way, as it were, to the expedition of Alexander a
couple of generations later. The most important victory won
was on the Pactolus, not far from Sardis. But, in the midst of
his successes, Agesilaus was called home by troubles which
arose in Greece. Sparta, by her arrogance and oppressive
policy, had already alienated all the Greek states which
helped her to break down Athens in the Peloponnesian War.
Persian agents, with money, had assisted her enemies to
organize a league against her. Thebes and Athens, first, then
Argos and Corinth, with several of the lesser states, became
confederated in an agreement to overthrow her domination. In
an attempt to crush Thebes, the Spartans were badly beaten at
Haliartus (B. C. 395), where their famous Lysander, conqueror
of Athens, was killed. Their power in central and northern
Greece was virtually annihilated, and then followed a struggle
with their leagued enemies for the control or the Corinthian
isthmus, whence came the name of the Corinthian War. It was
this situation of things at home which called back King
Agesilaus from his campaigns in Asia Minor. He had scarcely
crossed the Hellespont on his return, in July B. C. 394,
before all his work in Asia was undone by an overwhelming
naval victory achieved at Cnydus by the Athenian Conon,
commanding the Persian-Phœnician fleet. With his veteran army,
including the old Cyreans, now returning home after seven
years of incredible adventures and hardships, he made his way
through all enemies into Bœotia and fought a battle with the
league at Coronea, in which he so far gained a victory that he
held the field, although the fruits of it were doubtful. The
Spartans on the isthmus had also just gained a considerable
success near Corinth, on the banks of the Nemea. On the whole,
the results of the war were in their favor, until Conon and
the Persian satrap, Pharnabazus, came over with the victorious
fleet from Cnydus and lent its aid to the league. The most
important proceeding of Conon was to rebuild (B. C. 393), with
the help of his Persian friends, the Long Walls of Athens,
which the Peloponnesians had required to be thrown down eleven
years before. By this means he restored to Athens her
independence and secured for her a new career of commercial
prosperity. During six years more the war was tediously
prolonged, without important or decisive events, while Sparta
intrigued to detach the Persian king from his Athenian allies
and the latter intrigued to retain his friendship. In the end,
all parties were exhausted—Sparta, perhaps, least so—and
accepted a shameful peace which was practically dictated by
the Persian and had the form of an edict or mandate from Susa,
in the following terms: "The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just
that the cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomenae and
Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of the Hellenic
cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small and
great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which
three are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the
parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will
war against him or them with those who share my views.
{1593}
This will I do by land and by sea, with ships and with money."
By this, called the Peace of Antalcidas (B. C. 387) from the
Lacedæmonian who was instrumental in bringing it about, the
Ionian Greeks were once more abandoned to the Persian king and
his satraps, while Sparta, which assumed to be the
administrator and executor of the treaty, was confirmed in her
supremacy over the other Grecian states.

_Xenophon,
Hellenica (translated by Dakyns),
books 3-5 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:
_C. Sankey,
The Spartan and Theban Supremacies,
chapters 7-9._

_W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapters 24-25 (volume 4)._

_G. Rawlinson,
The Five Great Monarchies,
volume 3; Persia, chapter 7._

GREECE: B. C. 385.
Destruction of Mantinea by the Spartans.

The Mantineians, having displayed unfriendliness to Sparta
during the Corinthian War, were required by the latter, after
the Peace of Antalcidas, to demolish their walls. On their
refusal, king Agesipolis was sent to subdue them. By damming
up the waters of the river Ophis he flooded the city and
brought it to terms. "The city of Mantineia was now broken up,
and the inhabitants were distributed again into the five
constituent villages. Out of four-fifths of the population
each man pulled down his house in the city, and rebuilt it in
the village near to which his property lay. The remaining
fifth continued to occupy Mantineia as a village. Each village
was placed under oligarchical government and left
unfortified."

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 76 (volume 9)._

ALSO IN:
_Xenophon,
Hellenica,
book 5, chapter 2._

GREECE: B. C. 383.
The betrayal of Thebes to the Spartans.

When the Spartans sent their expedition against Olynthus, in
383 B. C., it marched in two divisions, the last of which,
under Phoebidas, halted at Thebes, on the way, probably having
secret orders to do so. "On reaching Thebes the troops
encamped outside the city, round the gymnasium. Faction was
rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias
and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, being the
respective heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was
that, while Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the
Lacedaemonians, would not come anywhere near the Spartan
general, Leontiades, on the other hand, was assiduous in
courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was established
between them, he made a proposal as follows: 'You have it in
your power,' he said, addressing Phoebidas, 'this very day to
confer supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your
hoplites, and I will introduce you into the citadel.'"

_Xenophon,
Hellenica
(translated by Dakyns),
book 5, chapter 2 (volume 2)._

"On the day of the Thesmophoria, a religious festival
celebrated by the women apart from the men, during which the
acropolis, or Kadmeia, was consecrated to their exclusive use,
Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, put himself in
march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly rounding the
walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate was
actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat
of a summer's noon had driven everyone out of the streets,
when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on
horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and
conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the
gates of which, as well as those of the town, were opened to
his order as Polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the
streets, but none even in the Kadmeia; no male person being
permitted to be present at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that
Phœbidas and his army became possessed of the Kadmeia without
the smallest opposition. … The news of the seizure of the
Kadmeia and of the revolution at Thebes [was] … received at
Sparta with the greatest surprise, as well as with a mixed
feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere throughout
Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any
event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognised
public law of Greece, it was a flagitions iniquity, for which
Sparta had not the shadow of a pretence. … It stood
condemned by the indignant sentiment of all Greece,
unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon
himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to
Spartan power. … Phœbidas might well claim to have struck
for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving
her from one of her two really formidable enemies."

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 76._

ALSO IN:
_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 37 (volume 5)._

GREECE: B. C. 383-379.
Overthrow of the Olynthian confederacy by Sparta.

Among the Greek cities which were founded at an early day in
that peninsula of Macedonia called Chalcidice, from Chalcis,
in Eubœa, which colonized the greater number of them, Olynthus
became the most important. It long maintained its independence
against the Macedonian kings, on one hand, and against Athens,
when Athens ruled the Ægean and its coasts, on the other. As
it grew in power, it took under its protection the lesser
towns of the peninsula and adjacent Macedonia, and formed a
confederacy among them, which gradually extended to the larger
cities and acquired a formidable character. But two of the
Chalcidian cities watched this growth of Olynthus with
jealousy and refused to be confederated with her. More than
that, they joined the Macedonians in sending an embassy (B. C.
383) to Sparta, then all-powerful in Greece, after the Peace
of Antalcidas, and invoked her intervention, to suppress the
rising Olynthian confederacy. The response of Sparta was
prompt, and although the Olynthians defended themselves with
valor, inflicting one severe defeat upon the Lacedæmonian
allies, they were forced at last (B. C. 379) to submit and the
confederacy was dissolved. "By the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta
had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; by crushing the
Olynthian confederacy, she virtually surrendered the Thracian
Greeks to the Macedonian princes. … She gave the victory to
Amyntas [king of Macedonia], and prepared the indispensable
basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to reduce not
only Olynthus, but … the major part of the Grecian world, to
one common level of subjection."

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 76 (volume 9)._

ALSO IN:
_E. A. Freeman,
History of Federal Government,
chapter 4, section 3._

GREECE: B. C. 379-371.
The liberation of Thebes and her rise to supremacy.
The humbling of Sparta.

For three years after the betrayal of the Acropolis, or
Cadmea, of Thebes to the Spartans, the city groaned under the
tyranny of the oligarchical party of Leontiades, whom the
Spartans supported. Several hundreds of the more prominent of
the democratic and patriotic party found a refuge at Athens,
and the deliverance of Thebes was effected at last, about
December, B. C. 379, by a daring enterprise on the part of
some of these exiles.
{1594}
Their plans were concerted with friends at Thebes, especially
with one Phyllidas, who had retained the confidence of the
party in power, being secretary to the polemarchs. The leader
of the undertaking was Melon. "After a certain interval Melon,
accompanied by six of the trustiest comrades he could find
among his fellow-exiles, set off for Thebes. They were armed
with nothing but daggers, and first of all crept into the
neighbourhood under cover of night. The whole of the next day
they lay concealed in a desert place, and drew near to the
city gates in the guise of labourers returning home with the
latest comers from the fields. Having got safely within the
city, they spent the whole of that night at the house of a man
named Charon, and again the next day in the same fashion.
Phyllidas meanwhile was busily taken up with the concerns of
the polemarchs, who were to celebrate a feast of Aphrodite on
going out of office. Amongst other things, the secretary was
to take this opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking,
which was the introduction of certain women to the polemarchs.
They were to be the most majestic and the most beautiful to be
found in Thebes. … Supper was over, and, thanks to the zeal
with which the master of the ceremonies responded to their
mood, they were speedily intoxicated. To their oft-repeated
orders to introduce their mistresses, he went out and fetched
Melon and the rest, three of them dressed up as ladies and the
rest as their attendant maidens. … It was preconcerted that
as soon as they were seated they were to throw aside their
veils and strike home. That is one version of the death of the
polemarchs. According to another, Melon and his friends came
in as revellers, and so despatched their victims."

_Xenophon,
Hellenica,
(translated by Dakyns),
book 5, chapter 4._

Having thus made way with the polemarchs, the conspirators
surprised Leontiades in his own house and slew him. They then
liberated and armed the prisoners whom they found in
confinement and sent heralds through the city to proclaim the
freedom of Thebes. A general rally of the citizens followed
promptly. The party of the oppression was totally crushed and
its prominent members put to death. The Spartan garrison in
the Cadmea capitulated and was suffered to march out without
molestation. The government of Thebes was reorganized on a
more popular basis, and with a view to restoring the Bœotian
League, in a perfected state, with Thebes for its head.

See THEBES: B. C. 378.

In the war with Sparta which followed, Athens was soon
involved, and the Spartans were driven from all their
footholds in the Bœotian towns. Then Athens and Thebes
quarreled afresh, and the Spartans, to take advantage of the
isolation of the latter, invaded her territory once more. But
Thebes, under the training of her great statesman and soldier,
Epaminondas, had become strong enough to face her Lacedæmonian
enemy without help, and in the momentous battle of Leuctra,
fought July 6, B. C. 371, on a plain not far from Platæa, the
domineering power of Sparta was broken forever. "It was the
most important of all the battles ever fought between Greeks.
On this day Thebes became an independent power in Greece, and
a return of Spartan despotism was henceforth impossible for
all times."

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 6, chapter 1 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN:
_Plutarch,
Pelopidas_.

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapters 77-78._

_C. Sankey,
The Spartan and Theban Supremacies,
chapters 10-11._

GREECE: B. C. 378-357.
The new Athenian Confederacy.
The Social War.

See ATHENS: B. C. 378-357.

GREECE: B. C. 371.
The Arcadian union.
Restoration of Mantinea.
Building of Megalopolis.

One of the first effects of the battle of Leuctra (B. C. 371),
which ended the domination of Sparta in Greek affairs, was to
emancipate the Arcadians and to work great changes among them.
Mantinea, which the Spartans had destroyed, was rebuilt the
same year. Then "the chiefs of the parties opposed to the
Spartan interest in the principal Arcadian towns concerted a
plan for securing the independence of Arcadia, and for raising
it to a higher rank than it had hitherto held in the political
system of Greece. With a territory more extensive than any
other region of Peloponnesus, peopled by a hardy race, proud
of its ancient origin and immemorial possession of the land,
and of its peculiar religious traditions, Arcadia—the Greek
Switzerland—had never possessed any weight in the affairs of
the nation; the land only served as a thoroughfare for hostile
armies, and sent forth its sons to recruit the forces of
foreign powers. … The object was to unite the Arcadian
people in one body, yet so as not to destroy the independence
of the particular states; and with this view it was proposed
to found a metropolis, to institute a national council which
should be invested with supreme authority in foreign affairs,
particularly with regard to peace and war, and to establish a
military force for the protection of the public safety. …
Within a few months after the battle of Leuctra, a meeting of
Arcadians from all the principal towns was held to deliberate
on the measure; and under its decree a body of colonists,
collected from various quarters, proceeded to found a new
city, which was to be the seat of the general government, and
was called Megalepolis, or Megalopolis (the Great City). The
site chosen was on the banks of the Helisson, a small stream
tributary to the Alpheus. … The city was designed on a very
large scale, and the magnitude of the public buildings
corresponded to its extent; the theatre was the most spacious
in Greece. … The population was to be drawn … from a great
number of the most ancient Arcadian towns. Pausanias gives a
list of forty which were required to contribute to it. The
greater part of them appear to have been entirely deserted by
their inhabitants."

_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 39 (volume 5)._

"The patriotic enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis
had first arisen, gradually became enfeebled. The city never
attained that preeminence or power which its founders
contemplated, and which had caused the city to be laid out on
a scale too large for the population actually inhabiting it."

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 78._

GREECE: B. C. 371-362.
Popular fury in Argos.
Arcadian union and disunion.
Restoration of Mantinea.
Expeditions of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus.
His attempts against Sparta.
His victory and death at Mantinea.

"In many of the Peloponnesian cities, when the power of Sparta
seemed visibly on the wane, internal commotions had arisen, and
much blood had been shed on both sides. But now Argos
displayed the most fearful example of popular fury recorded in
Greek annals, red as they are with tales of civil bloodshed.
{1595}
The democratic populace detected a conspiracy among the
oligarchs, and thirty of the chief citizens were at once put
to death. The excitement of the people was inflamed by the
harangues of demagogues, and the mob, arming itself with
cudgels, commenced a general massacre. When 1,200 citizens had
fallen, the popular orators interfered to check the
atrocities, but met with the same fate; and, sated at length
with bloodshed, the multitude stayed the deadly work. But
where the pressure of Spartan interference had been heaviest
and most constant, there the reaction was naturally most
striking. The popular impulses which were at work in Arkadia
[see above] found their first outlet in the rebuilding of
Mantineia." But there was far from unanimity in the Arkadian
national movement. "In Tegea … public opinion was divided.
The city had been treated by Sparta with special
consideration, and had for centuries been her faithful ally;
hence the oligarchical government looked with disfavour upon
the project of union. But the democratical party was powerful
and unscrupulous; and, with the help of the Mantineians, they
effected a revolution, in which many were killed, and 800
exiles fled to Sparta." The Spartans, under Agesilaos, avenged
them by ravaging the plain in front of Mantineia. "This
invasion of Arkadia is chiefly important for the pretext which
it furnished for Theban intervention. The Mantineians applied
for help at first to Athens, and, meeting with a refusal, went
on to Thebes. For this request Epameinondas must have been
thoroughly prepared beforehand, and he was soon on the march
with a powerful army. … On his arrival in the Peloponnese
[B. C. 370], he found that Agesilaos had already retired; and
some of the Theban generals, considering the season of the
year, wished at once to return." But Epameinondas was
persuaded by the allies of Thebes to make an attempt upon
Sparta itself. "In four divisions the invading host streamed
into the land which, according to the proudest boast of its
inhabitants, had felt no hostile tread for 600 years. At
Sellasia, not ten miles distant from Sparta, the army
reunited; and, having plundered and burnt the town, swept down
into the valley of the Eurotas, and marched along the left
bank till it reached the bridge opposite the city. Within
Sparta itself, though a universal terror prevailed, one man
rose equal to the emergency. While the men fainted in spirit
as they thought how few they were, and how wide their unwalled
city, … Agesilaos accepted, not without mistrust, the
services of 6,000 helots, collected reinforcements, preserved
order, suppressed conspiracy, stamped out mutiny, posted
guards on every vantage-ground, and refused to be tempted to a
battle by the taunts of foes or the clamours of over-eager
friends. … After one unsuccessful cavalry skirmish, the
Theban general, who, in a campaign undertaken on his sole
responsibility, dared not risk the chance of defeat, decided
to leave the 'wasps'-nest' untaken. He completed his work of
devastation by ravaging the whole of southern Lakonia, … and
then turned back into Arkadia to devote himself to the more
permanent objects of his expedition." Messene was now rebuilt
(see MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD), and "the descendants of the
old Messenian stock were gathered to form a new nation from
Rhegion and Messene [Sicily], and from the parts of Lybia
round Kyrene. … By thus restoring the Messenians to their
ancient territory, Epameinondas deprived Sparta at one blow of
nearly half her possessions. … At last Epameinondas had done
his work; and, leaving Pammenes with a garrison in Tegea, he
hastened to lead his soldiers home. At the Isthmus he found a
hostile army from Athens," which had been persuaded to send
succor to Sparta; but the Athenians did not care to give
battle to the conquering Thebans, and the latter passed
unopposed. On the arrival of Epameinondas at Thebes, "the
leaders of a petty faction threatened to bring him and his
colleagues to trial for retaining their command for four
months beyond the legal term of office. But Epameinondas stood
up in the assembly, and told his simple tale of victorious
generalship and still more triumphant statesmanship; and the
invidious cavils of snarling intriguers were at once
forgotten." Sparta and Athens now formed an alliance, with the
senseless agreement that command of the common forces "should
be given alternately to each state for five days. … The
first aim of the confederates was to occupy the passes of the
isthmus," but Epameinondas forced a passage for his army,
captured Sikyon, ravaged the territory of Epidauros, and made
a bold but unsuccessful attempt to surprise Corinth. Then, on
the arrival of reinforcements to the Spartans from Syracuse,
he drew back to Thebes (B. C. 368). For a time the Thebans
were occupied with troubles in Thessaly, and their Arkadian
proteges in Peloponnese were carrying on war against Sparta
independently, with so much momentary success that they became
over-confident and rash. They paid for their foolhardiness by
a frightful defeat, which cost them 10,000 men, whilst no
Spartan is said to have fallen; hence the fight was known in
Sparta as the Tearless Battle. "This defeat probably caused
little grief at Thebes, for it would prove to the arrogant
Arkadians that they could not yet dispense with Theban aid;
and it decided Epameinondas to make a third expedition into
the Peloponnese." The result of his third expedition was the
enrolment of a number of Achaian cities as Theban allies,
which gave to Thebes "the control of the coast-line of the
Corinthian gulf." But the broad and statesmanlike terms on
which Epameinondas arranged these alliances were set aside by
his narrow-minded fellow citizens, and a policy adopted by
which Achaia was "converted from a lukewarm neutral into an
enthusiastic supporter of Sparta. In this unsettled state of
Greek politics the Thebans resolved to have recourse, like the
Spartans before them, to the authority of the Great King.
Existing treaties, for which they were not responsible,
acknowledged his right to interfere in the internal affairs of
Greece." Pelopidas and other envoys were accordingly sent to
Susa (E. C. 366), where they procured from Artaxerxes a
rescript "which recognised the independence of Messene and
ordered the Athenians to dismantle their fleet." But the
mandate of the Great King proved void of effect. "After this
the confusion in Greece grew infinitely worse. An accident
transferred the town of Oropos … from the hands of Athens to
those of Thebes; and as the Peloponnesian allies of the
Athenians refused to help them to regain it, they broke with
them, and, in spite of the efforts of Epameinondas, formed an
alliance with Arkadia. …
{1596}
The Athenians made soon after a vain attempt to seize the
friendly city of Corinth, and the disgusted Corinthians,
together with the citizens of Epidauros and Phlious, …
obtained the grudging consent of Sparta, and made a separate
peace with Thebes. As soon as tranquillity was restored in one
quarter, in another the flame of war would again burst forth."
Its next outbreak (B. C. 365) was between Elis and Arkadia,
the former being assisted by Sparta, and its principal event
was a desperate battle fought for the possession of Olympia.
The Arkadians held part of the city and acquired possession of
the sacred treasures in the Olympian temple, which they
determined to apply to the expenses of the war. "Raising the
cry of sacrilege, the Mantineians, who were jealous both of
Tegea and Megalopolis, at once broke loose and shut their
gates." Soon afterwards, Mantineia separated herself wholly
from the Arkadian confederacy and entered the Spartan
alliance. This was among the causes which drew Epameinondas
once more, and for the last time, into the Peloponnese (B. C.
362). "The armies of Greece were now gathering from all
quarters for the great struggle. On the one side stood Sparta,
Athens, Elis, Achaia, and a part of Arkadia, led by Mantineia;
on the other side were ranged Boiotia [Thebes], Argos,
Messenia, and the rest of Arkadia, while a few of the smaller
states—as Phokis, Phlious, and Corinth—remained neutral."
At the outset of his campaign, Epameinondas made a bold
attempt, by a rapid night march, to surprise Sparta; but a
traitorous warning had been given, the Spartans were
barricaded and prepared for defence, and the undertaking
failed. Then he marched quickly to Mantineia, and failed in
his design there, likewise. A pitched battle was necessary to
decide the issue, and it was fought on the plain between
Mantineia and Tegea, on the 3d day of July, B. C. 362. The
fine discipline of the Theban troops and the skilful tactics
of Epameinondas had given the victory into his hands, when,
"suddenly, the aspect of the battle changed. Except among the
light troops on the extreme right, the advance was everywhere
stayed. The Spartan hoplites were in full flight, but the
conquerors did not stir a step in the pursuit. … The fury of
the battle had instantly ceased. … Epameinondas had fallen
wounded to death, and this was the result. … Every heart was
broken, every arm paralysed. … Both sides claimed the
victory in the battle, and erected the usual trophies, but the
real advantage remained with the Thebans. … By the peace
that ensued, the independence of Messenia was secured, and
Megalopolis and the Pan-Arkadian constitution were preserved
from destruction. The work of Epameinondas, though cut short,
was thus not thrown away; and the power of Sparta was confined
within the limits which he had assigned."

_C. Sankey,
The Spartan and Theban Supremacies,
chapter 12._

ALSO IN:
_Xenophon,
Hellenica,
books 5-6._

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 6, chapter 2._

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 80 (volume 10)._

GREECE: B. C. 359-358.
First proceedings of Philip of Macedonia.
His acquisition of Amphipolis.

The famous Philip of Macedon succeeded to the Macedonian
throne in 359 B. C., at the age of 23. In his youth he had
been delivered to the Thebans as one of the hostages given
upon the conclusion of a treaty of peace in 368. "His
residence at Thebes gave him some tincture of Grecian
philosophy and literature; but the most important lesson which
he learned at that city was the art of war, with all the
improved tactics introduced by Epaminondas. Philip …
displayed at the beginning of his reign his extraordinary
energy and abilities. After defeating the Illyrians he
established a standing army, in which discipline was preserved
by the severest punishments. He introduced the far-famed
Macedonian phalanx, which was 16 men deep, armed with long
projecting spears. Philip's views were first turned towards
the eastern frontiers of his dominions, where his interests
clashed with those of the Athenians. A few years before the
Athenians had made various unavailing attempts to obtain
possession of Amphipolis, once the jewel of their empire, but
which they had never recovered since its capture by Brasidas
in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war."

_W. Smith,
Smaller History of Greece,
chapter 19._

The importance of Amphipolis to the Athenians arose chiefly
from its vicinity to "the vast forests which clothed the
mountains that enclose the basin of the Strymon, and afforded
an inexhaustible supply of ship-timber." For the same reason
that the Athenians desired ardently to regain possession of
Amphipolis their enemies were strong in the wish to keep it
out of their hands. Moreover, as the Macedonian kingdom became
well-knitted in the strong hands of the ambitious Philip, the
city of "the Nine Ways" assumed importance to that rising
power, and Philip resolved to possess it. It was at this point
that his ambitions first came into conflict with Athens. But
the Athenians were not aware of his aims until too late. He
deceived them completely, in fact, by a bargain to give help
in acquiring Amphipolis for them, and to receive help in
gaining Pydna for himself. But when his preparations were
complete, he suddenly laid siege to Amphipolis and made
himself master of the city (B. C. 358), besides taking Pydna
as well. At Athens, "Philip was henceforth viewed as an open
enemy, and this was the beginning—though without any formal
declaration—of a state of hostility between the two powers,
which was called, from its origin, the Amphipolitan War."

_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 42 (volume 5)._

GREECE: B. C. 357-336.
Advancement of Philip of Macedonia to supremacy.
The Sacred Wars and their consequences.
The fatal field of Chæronea.
Philip's preparations for the invasion of Asia.
His assassination.

A war between the Thebans and their neighbors, the Phocians,
which broke out in 357 or 356 B. C., assumed great importance
in Greek history and was called the Sacred War,—as two
earlier contests, in which Delphi was concerned, had been
likewise named. It is sometimes called the Ten Years Sacred
War. Thebes, controlling the shadowy Amphictyonic Council, had
brought a charge of sacrilege against the Phocians and
procured a decree imposing upon them a heavy fine. The
Phocians resisted the decree with unexpected energy, and, by a
bold and sudden movement, gained possession of Delphi, where
they destroyed the records of the Amphictyonic judgment
against them. Having the vast accumulation of the sacred
treasures of the Delphic temple in their hands, they did not
scruple to appropriate them, and were able to maintain a
powerful army of mercenaries, gathered from every part of
Greece, with which they ravaged the territories of Bœotia and
Locris, and acquired control of the pass of Thermopylæ.
{1597}
In the midst of their successes they were called upon for help
by the tyrant of Pheræ in Thessaly, then being attacked by
Philip of Macedon (B. C. 353). The Phocians opposed Philip
with such success, at first, that he retreated from Thessaly;
but it was only to recruit and reanimate his army. Returning
presently he overthrew the Phocian army, with great
slaughter—Onomarchus, its leader, being slain—and made
himself master of all Thessaly. Both Athens and Sparta were
now alarmed by this rapid advance into Central Greece of the
conquering arms of the ambitious Macedonian, and both sent
forces to the help of the Phocians. The former was so
energetic that an army of 5,000 Athenian foot-soldiers and 400
horse reached Thermopylæ (May 352 B. C.) before Philip had
been able to push forward from Thessaly. When he did advance,
proclaiming his purpose to rescue the Delphian temple from
sacrilegious robbers, he was repulsed at the pass and drew
back. It was the beginning of the struggle for Greek
independence against Macedonian energy and ambition. A few
months later Demosthenes delivered the first of his immortal
orations, called afterwards Philippics, in which he strove to
keep the already languishing energy of the Athenians alive, in
unfaltering resistance to the designs of Philip. For six years
there was a state of war between Philip and the Athenians with
their allies, but the conquests of the former in Thrace and
the Chalcidian peninsula were steadily pressed. At length (B.
C. 346) Athens was treacherously persuaded into a treaty of
peace with Philip (the Peace of Philocrates) which excluded
the Phocians from its terms. No sooner had he thus isolated
the latter than he marched quickly to Thermopylæ, secured
possession of the pass and declared himself the supporter of
Thebes. The Sacred War was ended, Delphi rescued, Phocis
punished without mercy, and Greece was under the feet of a
master. This being accomplished, the Peace of Philocrates was
doubtfully maintained for about six years. Then quarrels broke
out which led up to still another Sacred War, and which gave
Philip another opportunity to trample on the liberties of
Greece. Curiously, the provoking causes of this outbreak were
an inheritance from that more ancient Sacred War which brought
ruin upon the town of Cirrha and a lasting curse upon its
soil. The Locrians of Amphissa, dwelling near to the accursed
territory, had ventured in the course of years to encroach
upon it with brick-kilns, and to make use of its harbor. At a
meeting of the Amphictyonic Council, in the spring of B. C.
339, this violation of the Sacred Law was brought to notice,
by way of retaliation for some offence which the deputies of
Amphissa had given to those of Athens. Hostilities ensued
between the citizens of Delphi, pushed on by the Amphictyons,
on one side, and the Amphissians on the other. The influence
of Philip in the Amphictyonic Council was controlling, and his
partisans had no difficulty in summoning him to act for the
federation in settling this portentous affair. He marched into
Bœotia, took possession of the strong city of Elatea, and very
soon made it manifest that he contemplated something more than
mere dealing with the refractory trespassers of Amphissa.
Athens watched his movements with terror, and even Thebes, his
former ally, took alarm. Through the exertions of Demosthenes,
Thebes and Athens, once more, but too late, gave up their
ancient enmity and united their strength and resources in a
firm league. Megara, Corinth and other states were joined to
them and common cause was made with the Locrians of Amphissa.
These movements consumed a winter, and war opened in the
spring. Philip gained successes from the beginning. He took
Amphissa by surprise and carried Naupactus by storm. But it
was not until August—the first day of August, B. C. 338—that
the two combatants came together in force. This occurred in
the Bœotian valley of the Cephisus, near the town of Chæronea,
which gave its name to the battle. The Sacred Band of Thebes
and the hoplites of Athens, with their allies, fought
obstinately and well; but they were no match for the veterans
of the Macedonian phalanx and most of them perished on the
field. It was the last struggle for Grecian independence.
Henceforth, practically at least, Hellas was swallowed up in
Macedonia. We can see very plainly that Philip's "conduct
towards Athens after the victory, under the appearance of
generosity, was extremely prudent. His object was, to separate
the Thebans from the Athenians, and he at once advanced
against the former. The Athenian prisoners he sent home, free
and clothed, accompanied by Antipater; he ordered the dead
bodies to be burned, and their ashes to be conveyed to Athens,
while the Thebans had to purchase their dead from him. He then
entered Thebes, which he seems to have taken without any
resistance, placed a Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea, and,
with the same policy which Sparta had followed at Athens after
the Peloponnesian war, he established an oligarchy of 300 of
his partizans, who were for the most part returned exiles, and
who now, under the protection of the garrison in the Cadmea,
ruled like tyrants, and raged in a fearful manner. … Philip
accepted all the terms which were agreeable to the Athenians;
no investigations were to be instituted against his enemies,
and none of them was to be sent into exile. Athens was not
only to remain a perfectly sovereign city, but retain Lemnos,
Imbros, and Scyros, nay even Samos and Chersonnesus, though he
might have taken the latter without any difficulty, and though
the Athenians had most cleruchiae in Samos. Thus he bought
over the Athenians through this peace, against which
Demosthenes and others, who saw farther, could not venture to
protest, because Philip offered more than they could give him
in return. … The only thing which the Athenians conceded to
Philip, was, that they concluded a symmachia with him, and
conferred upon him the supreme command in the Persian war. For
with great cunning Philip summoned an assembly of the Greeks
whom he called his allies, to Corinth, to deliberate upon the
war against Persia. The war of revenge against the Persians
had already become a popular idea in Greece. … Philip now
entered Peloponnesus with his whole army, and went to the diet
at Corinth, where the Greek deputies received his orders. In
Peloponnesus he acted as mediator, for he was invited as such
by the Arcadians, Messenians, and Argives, to decide their
disputes with Lacedaemon, and they demanded that he should
restore to them their ancient territories.
{1598}
The Arcadians had formerly possessed many places on the
Eurotas, and the Messenians were still very far from having
recovered all their ancient territories. He accordingly fixed
the boundaries, and greatly diminished the extent of Laconia.
… The Spartans, on that occasion, behaved in a dignified
manner; they were the only ones who refused to acknowledge
Philip as generalissimo against Persia. … Even the ancients
regarded the day of Chaeronea as the death-day of Greece;
every principle of life was cut off; the Greeks, indeed,
continued to exist, but in spirit, and politically, they were
dead. … Philip was now at the height of his power.
Byzantium, and the other allied cities, had submitted to the
conqueror, when he sent his army against them, and he was
already trying to establish himself in Asia. 'A detachment of
troops, under Attalus, had been sent across, to keep open the
road for the great expedition, and had encamped on mount Ida.'
Philip was thus enabled to commence his passage across the
Hellespont whenever he pleased. But the close of his career
was already at hand." He was assassinated in August, B. C.
336, by a certain Pausanias, at the instigation, it is said,
of Olympias, one of Philip's several wives—and the mother of
his famous son Alexander—whom he had repudiated to please a
younger bride. "Philip was unquestionably an uncommon and
extraordinary man, and the opinion of several among the
ancients, that by the foundation of the Macedonian state he
did something far greater than Alexander by the application of
the powers he inherited, is quite correct. … When we regard
him as the creator of his state, by uniting the most different
nations, Macedonians and Greeks; … when we reflect what a
man he must have been, from whom proceeded the impulse to
train such great generals, … to whom Alexander, it must be
observed, did not add one, for all Alexander's generals
proceeded from the school of Philip, and there is not one whom
Alexander did not inherit from Philip;—when we perceive the
skill with which he gained over nations and states, … we
cannot but acknowledge that he was an extraordinary man."

_B. G. Niebuhr,
Lectures on Ancient History,
lectures 69 and 66 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:
_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapters 43-46 (volumes 5-6)._

_T. Leland,
History of the Life and Reign of Philip of Macedon,
books 2-5._

GREECE: B. C. 351-348.
The Olynthian War.
Destruction of Olynthus by Philip of Macedonia.

After the overthrow of Spartan domination in Greece, Olynthus
recovered its independence and regained, during the second
quarter of the fourth century B. C., a considerable degree of
prosperity and power. It was even helped in its rise by the
cunning, dangerous hand of Philip of Macedon, who secured many
and great advantages in his treacherous diplomacy by playing
the mutual jealousies of Athens and Olynthus against one
another. The Olynthian Confederacy, formed anew, just served
its purpose as a counterpoise to the Athenian Confederacy,
until Philip had no more need of that service. He was the
friend and ally of the former until he had secured Amphipolis,
Methone, and other necessary positions in Macedonia and
Thrace. Then the mask began to slip and Olynthus (B. C. 351)
got glimpses of the true character of her subtle neighbor. Too
late, she made overtures to Athens, and Athens, too late, saw
the vital importance of a league of friendship between the two
Greek confederacies, against the half Hellenic, half barbaric
Macedonian kingdom. Three of the great speeches of
Demosthenes—the "Olynthiac orations"—were made upon this
theme, and the orator succeeded for the first time in
persuading his degenerated countrymen to act upon his clear
view of the situation. Athens and Olynthus were joined in a
defensive league and Athenian ships and men were sent to the
Chalcidian peninsula,—too late. Partly by the force of his
arms and partly by the power of his gold, buying traitors,
Philip took Olynthus (B. C. 348) and all the thirty-two lesser
towns that were federated with her. He took them and he
destroyed them most brutally. "The haughty city of Olynthus
vanished from the face of the earth, and together with it
thirty-two towns inhabited by Greeks and flourishing as
commercial communities. … The lot of those who saved life
and liberty was happy in comparison with the fate of those
who, like the majority of the Olynthians, fell into the hands
of the conqueror and were sold into slavery, while their
possessions were burnt to ashes or flung as booty to the
mercenaries. … The mines continued to be worked for the
royal treasury; with this exception the whole of Chalcidice
became a desert"

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 7, chapter 3 (volume 5)._

ALSO IN:
_A. M. Curteis,
Rise of the Macedonian Empire,
chapters 4-5._

_B. G. Niebuhr,
Lectures on Ancient History,
lectures 66-68 (volume 2)._

GREECE: B. C. 340.
Siege of Byzantium by Philip of Macedonia.

The enmity between Athens and Byzantium yielded in 340 B. C.
to their common fear of Philip of Macedon, and the exertions
of Demosthenes brought about an alliance of the two cities, in
which Perinthus, the near neighbor of Byzantium, was also
joined. Philip, in wrath, proceeded with a fleet and army
against both cities, laying siege, first to Perinthus and
afterwards to Byzantium, but without success in either case.
He was compelled to withdraw, after wasting several months in
the fruitless undertaking. It was one of the few failures of
the able Macedonian.

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 90 (volume 11)._

GREECE: B. C. 336-335.
Northern campaign of Alexander of Macedonia.
Revolt at Thebes.
Destruction of the city.

"Alexander … took up and continued the political and
military schemes which his father had begun. We first make
acquaintance with him and his army during his campaign against
the tribes on the northern frontier of Makedonia. This
campaign he carried out with energy equal to that of Philip,
and with more success (spring of 335 B. C.). The distinctive
feature of the war was that the Makedonian phalanx, the
organization and equipment of which were adapted from Grecian
models, everywhere won and maintained the upper hand. … Even
at this epoch Byzantium was rising into importance. That city
had, owing to its hostility with Persia, deserted the side of
the Greeks for that of the Makedonians. It was from Byzantium
that Alexander summoned triremes to help him against the
island in the Danube on which the king of the Triballi had
taken refuge. … The great successes of Alexander induced all
the neighboring nationalities to accept the proposals of
friendship which he made to them. … In Greece false reports
concerning the progress of events in the north had raised to
fever heat the general ferment which naturally existed.
{1599}
Alexander relied upon the resolutions of the League of the
Public Peace [formed by the Congress at Corinth], which had
recognized his father and afterwards himself as its head. But
he was now opposed by all those who were unable to forget
their former condition, and who preferred the alliance with
Persia which had left them independent, to the league with
Makedonia which robbed them of their autonomy. … Thebes took
the lead of the malcontents, and set about ridding herself of
the garrison which Philip had placed in the Cadmeia. She thus
became the centre of the whole Hellenic opposition. The
enemies of Makedon, who had been exiled from every city,
assembled in Thebes. … The same party was stirring in
Lakedæmon, in Arcadia, in Ætolia, and, above all, at Athens.
From Athens the Thebans were supplied, through the mediation
of Demosthenes, and doubtless by means of Persian gold, with
arms, of which they were likely to stand in need. …
Alexander had no sooner settled with his enemies in the north
than he turned to Hellas. So rapid was his movement that he
found the pass of Thermopylæ still open, and, long before he
was expected, appeared before the walls of Thebes." The fate
of the city was decided by a battle in which the Makedonians
were overwhelmingly victorious. "In the market-place, in the
streets, in the very houses, there ensued a hideous massacre.
… The victors were, however, not satisfied with the
slaughter. Alexander summoned a meeting of his League, by
which the complete destruction of Thebes was decreed, and this
destruction was actually carried out (October, 335 B. C.). [At
the same time Platæa, which Thebes had destroyed, was ordered
to be rebuilt.] In Grecian history it was no unheard-of event
that the members of the defeated nation should be sold into
slavery, and so it happened on this occasion. The sale of the
slaves supplied Alexander with a sum of money which was no
inconsiderable addition to his military chest. But his main
object was to strike terror, and this was spread through
Greece by the ruthless destruction of the city of Œdipus, of
Pindar, and of Epameinondas. … Deep and universal horror
fell upon the Greeks. … The close connection that existed at
this moment between Grecian and Persian affairs forbade him to
lose a moment in turning his arms towards Asia. … A war
between Alexander and Persia was inevitable, not only on
account of the relation of the Greeks to Makedon, whose yoke
they were very loth to bear, but on account of their relation
to Persia, on whose support they leaned. … The career which
Philip had begun, and in which Alexander was now proceeding,
led of necessity to a struggle with the power that held sway
in Asia Minor. Until that power were defeated, the Makedonian
kingdom could not be regarded as firmly established."

_L. von Ranke,
Universal History:
The Oldest Historical Group of Nations and the Greeks,
chapter 10, part 2._

ALSO IN:
_Arrian,
Anabasis of Alexander,
book 1, chapters 1-10._

_T. A. Dodge,
Alexander,
chapters 14-17._

GREECE: B. C. 334-323.
Asiatic conquests of Alexander the Great.

See MACEDONIA: B. C. 334-330; and 330-323.

GREECE: B. C. 323-322.
Attempt to break the Macedonian yoke.
The Lamian War.
Subjugation of Athens.
Suppression of democracy.
Expulsion of poor citizens.
Death of Demosthenes.

On the death of Alexander the Great, B. C. 323, a party at
Athens which still hoped for freedom in Greece set on foot a
vigorous movement designed to break the Macedonian yoke. A
league was formed in which many cities joined—a larger
assemblage of Hellenic states, says Mr. Grote, than that which
resisted Xerxes in 480 B. C. A powerful army of Greek citizens
and mercenaries was formed and placed under the command of a
capable Athenian, Leosthenes, who led it into Thessaly, to
meet the Macedonian general Antipater, who now ruled Greece.

See MACEDONIA: B. C. 323-316.

The latter was defeated in a battle which ensued, and was
driven into the fortified Thessalian town of Lamia, where he
was besieged. Unfortunately, Leosthenes was killed during the
progress of the siege, and a long interval occurred before a
new commander could be agreed on. This gave Antipater time to
obtain succor from Asia. A Macedonian army, under Leonnatus,
crossed the Hellespont, and the besiegers of Lamia were forced
to break up their camp in order to meet it. They did so with
success; Leonnatus was slain and his army driven back. But
meantime Antipater escaped from Lamia, joined the defeated
troops and retreated into Macedonia. The war thus begun, and
which took the name of the Lamian War, was continued, not
unfavorably to the confederates, on the whole, until the
following summer—August, 322 B. C.—when it was ended by a
battle fought on the plain of Krannon, in Thessaly. Antipater,
who had been joined by Kraterus, from Asia, was the victor,
and Athens with all her allies submitted to the terms which he
dictated. He established a Macedonian garrison in Munychia,
and not only suppressed the democratic constitution of Athens,
but ordered all the poorer citizens—all who possessed less
than 2,000 drachmæ's worth of property, being 12,000 out of
the 21,000 who then possessed the Athenian franchise—to be
driven from the city; thus leaving a selected citizenship of
9,000 of the richer and more manageable men. The banished or
deported 12,000 were scattered in Thrace, Illyria, Italy and
even in northern Africa. The leaders of the anti-Macedonian
rising were pursued with unrelenting animosity. Demosthenes,
the great orator, who had been conspicuous among them, was
dragged from a temple at Kalauria, to which he had fled, and
took poison to escape the worse death which probably awaited
him.

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 95 (volume 12)._

GREECE: B. C. 323-301.
Wars of the Diadochi or Successors of Alexander.

See MACEDONIA: B. C. 323-316; 315-310; and 310-301.

GREECE: B. C. 321-312.
The contest for Athens and Peloponnesus, between Cassander and
Polysperchon.
Execution of Phocion.
Restoration of Thebes.

"Antipater, after the termination of the Lamian war, passed
over to Asia and took part in the affairs there.

See MACEDONIA: A. D. 323-316.