Chapter CCCLXXXVIII: Section 7 (16)

"The death of Peter found the Russian Court divided into two
powerful factions. The reactionary party, filled with Russians
of the old school, who had looked upon the reforms of Peter
with no favourable eye, such as the Golitsins and the
Dolgorukis, were anxious to raise to the throne Peter, the son
of Alexis [Peter the Great's son, whom he had caused to be put
to death], a mere boy; whereas the party of progress, led by
Menshikov, wished that Catherine, the Tsar's widow, should
succeed. … The party of reform finally triumphed. Catherine
was elected the successor of her husband, and the chief
authority fell into the hands of Alexander Menshikov. … The
brief reign of Catherine is distinguished only by two events
which added any glory to Russia. The Academy of Sciences was
founded in 1726, and Behring, a Dane, was sent on an exploring
expedition to Kamchatka. He has left his name indelibly
written on the geography of the world. … The Empress died on
the 17th of May, 1727, a little more than two years after her
accession to the throne, aged about 39 years. … A ukase of
Peter permitted Catherine to choose her successor. She
accordingly nominated Peter, the son of the unfortunate
Alexis, and, in default of Peter and his issue, Elizabeth and
Anne, her daughters. Anne died in 1728, the year after her
mother; she had married Karl Friedrich, the Duke of Holstein,
… and was the mother of the unfortunate Peter III. Menshikov
was appointed the guardian of the young Tsar till he had
reached the age of 17." In four months Menshikov was in
disgrace and the young Tsar had signed a ukase which condemned
him to Siberian banishment. He died in 1729, and was followed
to the grave a year later by the boy autocrat whose fiat had
been his ruin. On the death of Peter II., the will of
Catherine, in favor of her daughters, was set aside, and the
Council of the Empire conferred the crown on Anne [Anne
Ivanovna], the widowed Duchess of Courland, who was a daughter
of Ivan, elder brother of Peter the Great. An attempt was made
to impose on her a constitution, somewhat resembling the Pacta
Conventa of the Poles, but she evaded it. "The Empress threw
herself entirely into the hands of German favourites,
especially a Courlander of low extraction, named Biren, said
to have been the son of a groom. … The Empress was a woman of
vulgar mind, and the Court was given up to unrefined orgies. …
{2763}
Her reign was not an important one for Russia either as
regards internal or foreign affairs. The right of
primogeniture which had been introduced into the Russian law
of real property by Peter the Great, was abolished; it was
altogether alien to the spirit of Slavonic institutions. A
four years' war with Turkey led to no important results."

_W. R. Morfill,
The Story of Russia,
chapter 8._

"The Russians could have no difficulty in finding a pretence
for the war [with Turkey], because the khan of the Turkish
allies and dependents, the Tatars on the coast of the Black
Sea and the Sea of Asof, and in the Crimea, could never wholly
restrain his wandering hordes from committing depredations and
making incursions into the neighbouring pasture-lands of
Russia. … In 1735 a Russian corps marched into the Crimea,
ravaged a part of the country, and killed a great number of
Tatars; but having ventured too far without a sufficient stock
of provisions, they were obliged to retreat, and sustained so
great a loss in men that what had been accomplished bore no
proportion to this misfortune. The almost total failure of
this first attempt, which had cost the Russians 10,000 men, by
no means deterred them from pursuing their designs of
conquest. Count Munich marched with a large army from the
Ukraine into the Crimea (1730). The Tatars … suffered the
Russian troops to advance unmolested, thinking themselves safe
behind their entrenchments. … But entrenchments of that kind
were unable to resist the impetuosity of the Russian troops.
They were surmounted; the Tatars repulsed; and a great part of
the Crimea lay at the mercy of the conquerors. In the month of
June they entered the Crimean fortress of Perekop. The Russian
troops now retaliated the devastations committed by the Tatars
in the Empire; but they found it impossible to remain long. …
Whatever the army was in want of had to be fetched with
extreme difficulty from the Ukraine; so that Munich at length
found himself, towards autumn, under the necessity of
withdrawing with his troops by the shortest way to the
Ukraine. … While Munich was in the Crimea, endeavouring to
chastise the Tatars for their depredations, Lascy had
proceeded with another army against Asof. The attack proved
successful; and on the 1st of July the fort of Asof had
already submitted to his arms. … The Ottomans published a
manifesto against Russia, but they were neither able
afterwards to protect the Crimea nor Moldavia, for they were
soon threatened with an attack from Austria also. By the
treaty with Russia, the emperor was bound to furnish 30,000
auxiliaries in case of a war with the Turks; but a party in
the Austrian cabinet persuaded the emperor that it would be
more advantageous to make war himself. … In the year 1737 a
new expedition was undertaken from the Ukraine at an immense
cost. … A new treaty had been concluded with Austria before
this campaign, in which the two empires agreed to carry on the
war in common, according to a stipulated plan. In order to
gain a pretence for the war, Austria had previously acted as
if she wished to force her mediation upon the Turks. The first
year's campaign was so unfortunate that the Austrians were
obliged to give up all idea of prosecuting their operations,
and to think of the protection and defence of their own
frontiers." But "the Russians were every where victorious, and
made the names of their armies a terror both in the east and
the west. Lascy undertook a new raid into the Crimea. Munich
first threatened Bender, then reduced Otchakof without much
difficulty, and left a few troops behind him when he withdrew
… who were there besieged by a large combined army of Turks
and Tatars, supported by a fleet. The Russians not only
maintained the fortress, which was, properly speaking,
untenable, but they forced the Turks to retire with a loss of
10,000 men. The Russian campaign in 1738 was as fruitless, and
cost quite as many men, as the Austrian, but it was at least
the means of bringing them some military renown." In 1739, the
Russians, under Munich, advanced in the direction of Moldavia,
violating Polish territory. "The Turkish and Tatar army which
was opposed to the Russians was beaten and routed [at
Stavoutchani] on the first attack. … Immediately afterwards
the whole garrison, struck with a panic, forsook the fortress
of Khotzim, which had never been once attacked, and it was
taken possession of by the Russians, who were astonished at
the ease of the conquest. Jassy was also taken, and Munich
even wished to attack Bender, when the news of the peace of
Belgrade … made him infuriate, because he saw clearly enough
that Russia alone was not equal to carry on the war. … By the
peace of Belgrade, Austria not only suffered shame and
disgrace, but lost all the possessions which had been gained
by Eugene in the last war, her best military frontier, and her
most considerable fortresses. … By virtue of this treaty,
Austria restored to Turkey Belgrade, Shabacz, the whole of
Servia, that portion of Bosnia which had been acquired in the
last war, and Austrian Vallachia. Russia was also obliged to
evacuate Khotzim and Otchakof; the fortifications of the
latter were, however, blown up; as well as those of Perekop;
Russia retained Asof, and a boundary line was determined,
which offered the Russians the most favourable opportunities
for extending their vast empire southward, at the cost of the
Tatars and Turks."

_W. K. Kelly,
History of Russia,
chapter 33 (volume 1)._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1726-1740.
The question of the Austrian Succession.
Guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction.

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1718-1738; and 1740.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1732-1733.
Interference in the election of king of Poland.

See POLAND: A. D. 1732-1733.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1740-1762.
Two regencies and two revolutions.
The reign of Empress Elizabeth.

The Empress Anne died in 1740. Her deceased sister, Catherine,
had left a daughter, Anna, married to Anthony Ulrich, Prince
of Brunswick, and this daughter had an infant son, Ivan. By
the will of the Empress the child Ivan was named as her
successor, and Biren was appointed Regent. He enjoyed the
regency but a short time, when he was overcome by a palace
conspiracy and sent in banishment to Siberia. The mother of
the infant Czar was now made Regent; but her rule was brief.
Another revolution, in the latter part of 1741, consigned her,
with her son and husband, to a prison, and raised the Princess
Elizabeth, second daughter of Peter the Great, to the Russian
throne. "The Empress Anna might have ruled without control,
and probably have transmitted the throne to her son Ivan, had
Elizabeth been left to the quiet enjoyment
of her sensual propensities.
{2764}
Elizabeth indulged without concealment or restraint in amours
with subalterns, and even privates of the guard whose barracks
lay near her residence; she was addicted, like them, to strong
drink, and had entirely gained their favour by her good humour
and joviality. Her indolence made her utterly averse to
business, and she would never have thought of encumbering
herself with the cares of government had she not been
restricted in her amusements, reproved for her behaviour, and,
what was worst of all, threatened with a compulsory marriage
with the ugly and disagreeable Anthony Ulrich, of Brunswick
Bevern, brother of the Regent's husband. At the instigation,
and with the money, of the French ambassador, La Chétardie, a
revolution was effected. … Elizabeth, in the manifest which
she published on the day of her accession, declared that the
throne belonged to her by right of birth, in face of the
celebrated ukase issued by her father in 1722, which empowered
the reigning sovereign to name his successor. … On
communicating her accession to the Swedish Government [which
had lately declared war and invaded Finland with no success],
she expressed her desire for peace, and her wish to restore
matters to the footing on which they had been placed by the
Treaty of Nystadt. The Swedes, who took credit for having
assisted the revolution which raised her to the throne,
demanded from the gratitude of the Empress the restitution of
all Finnland, with the town of Wiborg and part of Carelia; but
Elizabeth, with whom it was a point of honour to cede none of
the conquests of her father, would consent to nothing further
than the re-establishment of the Peace of Nystadt. On the
renewal of the war the Swedes were again unsuccessful in every
rencounter, as they had been before."

_T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 6, chapter 3 (volume 3)._

"This war had no result except to show the weakness of the
Sweden of Charles XII. against regenerate Russia. The
Scandinavian armies proved themselves very unworthy of their
former reputation. Elizabeth's generals, Lascy and Keith,
subdued all the forts in Finland. At Helsingfors 17,000 Swedes
laid down their arms before a hardly more numerous Russian
force. By the treaty of Abo [August 17, 1743], the Empress
acquired South Finland as far as the river Kiümen, and caused
Adolphus Frederic, Administrator of the Duchy of Holstein, and
one of her allies, to be elected Prince Royal of Sweden, in
place of the Prince Royal of Denmark. … In her internal policy
… Elizabeth continued the traditions of the great Emperor. She
developed the material prosperity of the country, reformed the
legislation, and created new centres of population; she gave
an energetic impulse to science and the national literature;
she prepared the way for the alliance of France and Russia,
emancipated from the German yoke; while in foreign affairs she
put a stop to the threatening advance of Prussia." Elizabeth
died in January, 1762.

_A. Rambaud,
History of Russia,
volume 2, chapter 6._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1743.
Acquisition of part of Finland from Sweden.

See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1720-1792.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1755.
Intrigue with Austria and Saxony against Frederick the Great.
Causes of the Seven Years War.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1755-1756.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1758.
Invasion of Prussia.
Defeat at Zorndorf.
Retreat.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1758.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1759.
Renewed invasion of Prussia.
Victory at Kunersdorf.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1759 (JULY-NOVEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1761-1762.
Brief reign of Peter III.
His peace with Frederick the Great.
His deposition and death.
His queen, Catherine II., on the throne.

"Charles Peter Ulric, duke of Holstein Gottorp, whom Elizabeth
had nominated her successor, who had embraced the Greek
religion, and who, at his baptism, had received the name of
Peter Fedorovitch, had arrived at St. Petersburg immediately
after her accession: he was then in his fourteenth year. The
education of this unfortunate prince was neglected. … Military
exercises were the only occupation for which he had any
relish, and in them he was indulged. … His potations, which
were frequent and long, were encouraged by his companions;
and, in a few years, he became a complete bacchanalian." In
1744 the young prince was married to "Sophia Augusta, daughter
of the prince of Anhalt Zerbst, who, on her conversion to the
Greek faith,—a necessary preliminary to her marriage,—had
received the baptismal name of Catherine. This union was
entitled to the more attention, as in its consequences it
powerfully affected, not only the whole of Russia, but the
whole of Europe. Shortly before its completion, Peter was
seized with the small-pox, which left hideous traces on his
countenance. The sight of him is said so far to have affected
Catherine that she fainted away. But though she was only in
her sixteenth year, ambition had already over her more
influence than the tender passion, and she smothered her
repugnance. Unfortunately, the personal qualities of the
husband were not of a kind to remove the ill impression: if he
bore her any affection, which appears doubtful, his manners
were rude, even vulgar. … What was still worse, she soon
learned to despise his understanding; and it required little
penetration to foresee that, whatever might be his title after
Elizabeth's death, the power must rest with Catherine. Hence
the courtiers in general were more assiduous in their
attentions to her than to him,—a circumstance which did not
much dispose him for the better. Finding no charms in his new
domestic circle, he naturally turned to his boon companions;
his orgies became frequent; and Catherine was completely
neglected. Hence her indifference was exchanged into absolute
dislike. … Without moral principles; little deterred by the
fear of worldly censure, in a court where the empress herself
was any thing but a model of chastity; and burning with hatred
towards her husband,—she soon dishonoured his bed." Elizabeth
died on the 29th of December, 1761, and Peter III. succeeded
to the throne without opposition. The plotting against him on
behalf of his wife, had long been active, but no plans were
ripe for execution. He was suffered to reign for a year and a
half; but the power which he received at the beginning slipped
quickly away from him. He was humane in disposition, and
adopted some excellent measures. He suppressed the secret
chancery—an inquisitorial court said to be as abominable as
the Spanish inquisition. He emancipated the nobles from the
servility to the crown which Peter the Great had imposed on
them.
{2765}
He improved the discipline of the army, and gave encouragement
to trade. But the good will which these measures might have
won for him was more than cancelled by his undisguised
contempt for Russia and the Russians, and especially for their
religion, and by his excessive admiration for Frederick the
Great, of Prussia, with whom his predecessor had been at war
[but with whom he entered into alliance.]

See GERMANY: A. D. 1761-1762.

The clergy and the army were both alienated from him, and were
easily persuaded to support the revolution, which Catherine
and her favorites planned for his overthrow. Their scheme was
carried out on the morning of the 19th of July, 1762, when
Peter was in the midst of one of his orgies at Oranienbaum,
some miles from the capital. Catherine went to the barracks of
the troops, and regiment after regiment declared for her.
"Accompanied by about 2,000 soldiers, with five times that
number of citizens, who loudly proclaimed her sovereign of
Russia, she went to the church of Our Lady of Kasan. Here
every thing was prepared for her reception: the archbishop of
Novogorod, with a host of ecclesiastics, awaited her at the
altar; she swore to observe the laws and religion of the
empire; the crown was solemnly placed on her head; she was
proclaimed sole monarch of Russia, and the grand-duke Paul her
successor." The dethroned czar, when the news of these events
reached him, doubted and hesitated until he lost even the
opportunity to take to flight. On the day following
Catherine's coronation he signed an act of abdication. Within
a week he was dead. According to accounts commonly credited,
he was poisoned, and then strangled, because the poison did
its deadly work too slowly. "Whether Catherine commanded this
deed of blood, has been much disputed. There can be little
doubt that she did. None of the conspirators would have
ventured to such an extremity unless distinctly authorised by
her." Two years later Catherine added another murder to her
crimes by directing the assassination of Ivan, who had been
dethroned as an infant by Elizabeth in 1741, and who had grown
to manhood in hopeless imprisonment.

_History of Russia
(Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopedia),
volume 2, chapter 10._

ALSO IN:
_History of the Reign of Peter III. and Catherine II.,
volume 1._

_A. Rabbe and J. Duncan,
History of Russia,
volume 1, pages 203-221._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1762-1796.
Character and reign of Catherine II.
Partition of Poland.
Wars with the Turks.
Acquisition of the Crimea and part of the Caucasus.
Extension of boundaries to the Dnieper.

"Thus was inaugurated the reign of Catherine II., a woman
whose capacities were early felt to be great, but were great
for evil as well as for good. … She was without scruple in the
gratification of her passions, and without delicacy in their
concealment; and a succession of lovers, installed
ostentatiously in her palace, proclaimed to the world the
shamelessness of their mistress. Yet she was great undoubtedly
as a sovereign. With a clear and cultivated intellect, with
high aims and breadth of views, and fearless because despising
the opinions of others, she could plan and she could achieve
her country's greatness; and in the extended dominions and
improved civilization which she bequeathed to her successor is
found a true claim to the gratitude of her subjects. The
foreign transactions of the reign begin with the history of
Poland. With Frederick of Prussia, Catherine may be said to
have shared both the scheme of partition and the spoils that
followed.

See POLAND: A. D. 1763-1773.

If it is doubtful which originated the transaction, there is
at least no doubt but that Russian policy had prepared the way
for such a measure. … The war with Turkey [see TURKS: A. D.
1768-1774] was closed with equal profit and yet greater glory
to the Russian Empire. The Russian armies had fought and
conquered upon the soil of Moldavia, and had invaded and
occupied the Crimea. At the same time the Russian fleets, no
longer confining themselves to the Baltic or Black Seas, had
sailed round Europe, and had appeared in the Archipelago. An
insurrection of the Greeks had aided their design; and for a
time the Bosphorus and Constantinople had been threatened. The
great Empress of the North had dazzled Europe by the vastness
of her power and designs; and Turkey, exhausted and unequal to
further contest, was constrained to purchase peace. The
possession of Azof, Kertch, Yenikale, and Kinburn, the free
navigation of the Euxine and the Mediterranean, were the
immediate gains of Russia. A stipulation for the better
treatment of the Principalities, and for the rights of
remonstrance, both in their behalf, and in that of the Greek
church at Constantinople, gave the opening for future
advantages. Another clause assured the independence of the
Khan of the Crimea, and of the Tartars inhabiting the northern
shores of the Black Sea. Under the name of liberty, these
tribes were now, like Poland, deprived of every strength
except their own; and the way was prepared for their
annexation by Russia. The Peace of Kainardji, as this
settlement was called, was signed in 1774. Within ten years
dissensions had arisen within the Crimea, and both Turks and
Russians had appeared upon the scene. The forces of Catherine
passed the isthmus as allies of the reigning Khan; but they
remained to receive his abdication, and to become the masters
of his country.

See TURKS: A. D. 1776-1792.

At the same time the Kuban was entered and subdued by
Souvarof, and thus already the Caucasus was reached. Catherine
was now at the height of her power. In a triumphant progress
she visited her new dominions, and gave the august name of
Sebastopol to a new city which was already destined to be the
scourge of the Turkish Empire. She believed herself to be upon
the road to Constantinople; and, in the interviews which she
held with the Emperor Joseph II., she began to scheme for the
partition of Turkey, as she had done for that of Poland. … The
Empress now found herself assailed in two distinct quarters.
Gustavus III. of Sweden, allying with the Sultan, invaded
Finland; and in her palace at St. Petersburg the Empress heard
the Swedish guns.

See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1720-1792.

She was relieved, however, on the north by the dissension in
the Swedish army, which compelled the King to an inglorious
retreat; and she became able to give an undivided attention to
the affairs of the south. While an Austrian army, which
supported her, was threatening the north-west of Turkey, her
own forces conquered in the north-east. Under Souvarof the
town of Oczakof was taken, and the battle of Rimnik was won.
{2766}
Ismail, that gave the key of the Danube, next fell, and in the
horrors of its fall drew forth a cry from Europe. The triumph
of Catherine was assured; but already the clouds of revolution
had risen in the west; Austria, too busy with the affairs of
the Netherlands, had withdrawn from the fight; and the Empress
herself, disquieted, and satisfied for the time with her
successes, concluded the Peace of Jassy, which extended her
frontiers to the Dniester, and gave her the coast on which so
soon arose the rich city of Odessa. The acquisitions of
Catherine upon the south were completed. Those upon the west
had still to receive important additions. Poland, already once
partitioned was again to yield new provinces to Russia.

See POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792, and 1793-1796.

The internal government of the Empire was meant undoubtedly to
rival these foreign successes, but unhappily fell short of
them. … The long meditated secularization of the estates of
the clergy was at last accomplished; the freedom of the serfs
was now first urged; and, as a unique experiment in Russian
history, the convoking of a kind of States General was made to
discuss the project. But both project and parliament came to
nothing. … There was much that was unreal in everything, and
Europe, as well as the great Empress herself, was deceived.
And so it came to pass that at the close of the reign there
was the spectacle of much that had been begun but little
finished. Before the death of Catherine [1796], in fact, her
greatness may be said to have passed away."

_C. F. Johnstone,
Historical Abstracts,
chapter 6._

"The activity of Catherine was prodigious, and her autocratic
instincts extremely strong, and these impulses, affected by
the French doctrines, which we must not forget set up
despotism, if enlightened, as the perfection of wisdom, made
her government attempt to accomplish all things and to meddle
in every department of the national life. She tried to force
civilisation into premature growths; established modern
institutions of many kinds in a backward and half-barbaric
empire; arranged industrial and economic projects and works in
the minutest details; and rigidly prescribed even court dress
and fashions. Ségur thus describes this omni-present and
ubiquitous interference:—'It is sought to create at the same
time a third estate, to attract foreign commerce, to establish
all kinds of manufactures, to extend agriculture, to increase
paper money, to raise the exchanges, to reduce the interest of
money, to found cities, to people deserts, to cover the Black
Sea with a new navy, to conquer one neighbour and circumvent
another, and finally to extend Russian influence all over
Europe.' These liberal reforms and grand aspirations came,
however, for the most part to nothing; and Catherine's
internal government grew by degrees into a grievous, cruel and
prying despotism. … The antithesis of the liberalism in words
and of the tyranny in deeds in Catherine's reign may be
attributed to four main causes. She gradually found out that
reform and progress were impossible in the Russian Empire—half
Asiatic, backward and corrupt—and she swung back to the old
tyranny of the past. The great rising of the serfs under
Pugacheff, too—a servile outbreak of the worst kind —changed
to a great extent the type of her government, and gave it a
harsh and cruel complexion:—'The domestic policy of Catherine
bore, until the end, the traces of those terrible years, and
showed, as it were, the bloody cicatrices of the blows given
and received in a death struggle.' … The foreign policy of
Catherine was more successful than her government and
administration at home, and the reasons are sufficiently
plain. She found grand opportunities to extend her power in
the long quarrels between France and England, in the alliance
she maintained with Frederick the Great—an alliance she clung
to, though she felt the burden—in the instability and weakness
of the Austrian councils, in the confusion and strife of the
French Revolution, above all in the decay of Islam; and
Russia justly hailed her as a great conqueror. … The
Muscovite race would not see her misdeeds in the march of
conquest she opened for it; and her reputation has steadily
increased in its eyes. 'The spirit of the people passes, in
its fulness, into her. It was this that enabled her to make a
complete conquest of her empire, and by this we do not mean
the power which she wrested from the weakness, the cowardice,
and the folly of Peter III.; but the position which this
German woman attained at the close of her life, and especially
after her death, in the history, and the national life, and
development of a foreign and hostile race. For it may be said
that it is since her death, above all, that she has become
what she appears now—the sublime figure, colossal alike and
splendid, majestic and attractive, before which incline, with
an equal impulse of gratitude, the humble Moujik and the man
of letters, who shakes the dust of reminiscences and legends
already a century old.' In one particular, Catherine gave
proof of being far in advance of the ideas of her day, and of
extraordinary craft and adroitness. She anticipated the
growing power of opinion in Europe, and skilfully turned it to
her side by the patronage of the philosophers of France. In
Napoleon's phrase, she did not spike the battery, she seized
it and directed its fire; she had Voltaire, Diderot, and
D'Alembert, admiring mouthpieces, to apologise for, nay to
extol, her government. This great force had prodigious
influence in throwing a glamour over the evil deeds of her
reign, and in deceiving the world as to parts of her conduct:
—'All this forms part of a system—a system due to the
wonderful intuition of a woman, born in a petty German court,
and placed on the most despotic throne of Europe; due, too—and
so better—to her clear apprehension of the great power of the
modern world—public opinion. It is, we do not hesitate to
believe and affirm, because Catherine discovered this force,
and resolved to make use of it, that she was able to play the
part she played in history. Half of her reputation in Europe
was caused by the admiration of Voltaire, solicited, won,
managed by her with infinite art, nay, paid for when
necessary.'"

_The Empress Catherine II.
(Edinburgh Review, July, 1893)._

"In 1781 Catherine had already sent to Grimm the following
resume of the history of her reign, set forth by her new
secretary and factotum, Besborodko, in the fantastic form of
an inventory:

Governments instituted according to the new form, 29;
Towns built, 144;
Treaties made, 30;
Victories won, 78;
Notable edicts, decreeing laws, 88;
Edicts on behalf of the people, 123;
Total, 492.

{2767}

Four hundred and ninety-two active measures! This astonishing
piece of book-keeping, which betrays so naïvely all that there
was of romantic, extravagant, childish, and very feminine, in
the extraordinary genius that swayed Russia, and in some sort
Europe, during thirty-four years, will no doubt make the
reader smile. It corresponds, however, truly enough, to a
sum-total of great things accomplished under her direct
inspiration. … In the management of men … she is simply
marvellous. She employs all the resources of a trained
diplomatist, of a subtle psychologist, and of a woman who
knows the art of fascination; she employs them together or
apart, she handles them with unequalled 'maestria.' If it is
true that she sometimes takes her lovers for generals and
statesmen, it is no less true that she treats on occasion her
generals and statesmen as lovers. When the sovereign can do
nothing, the Circe intervenes. If it avails nothing to
command, to threaten, or to punish, she becomes coaxing and
wheedling. Towards the soldiers that she sends to death,
bidding them only win for her victory, she has delicate
attentions, flattering forethought, adorable little ways. …
Should fortune smile upon the efforts she has thus provoked
and stimulated, she is profusely grateful: honours, pensions,
gifts of money, of peasants, of land, rain upon the artisans
of her glory. But she does not abandon those who have had the
misfortune to be unlucky. … Catherine's art of ruling was not,
however, without its shortcomings, some of which were due to
the mere fact of her sex, whose dependences and weaknesses she
was powerless to overcome. 'Ah!' she cried one day, 'if heaven
had only granted me breeches instead of petticoats, I could do
anything. It is with eyes and arms that one rules, and a woman
has only ears.' The petticoats were not solely responsible for
her difficulties. We have already referred to a defect which
bore heavily upon the conduct of affairs during her reign:
this great leader of men, who knew so well how to make use of
them, did not know how to choose them. … It seems that her
vision of men in general was disturbed, in this respect, by
the breath of passion which influenced all her life. The
general, the statesman, of whom she had need, she seemed to
see only through the male whom she liked or disliked. … These
mistakes of judgment were frequent. But Catherine did more
than this, and worse. With the obstinacy which characterised
her, and the infatuation that her successes gave her, she came
little by little to translate this capital defect into a
'parti pris,' to formulate it as a system; one man was worth
another, in her eyes, so long as he was docile and prompt to
obey. … And her idea that one man is worth as much as another
causes her, for a mere nothing, for a word that offends her,
for a cast of countenance that she finds unpleasing, or even
without motive, for the pleasure of change and the delight of
having to do with some one new, as she avows naïvely in a
letter to Grimm, to set aside, disgraced or merely cashiered,
one or another of her most devoted servants."

_R. Waliszewski,
Romance of an Empress,
volume 2, book 2, chapter 1._

ALSO IN:
_W. Tooke,
Life of Catherine II._

_Memoirs of Catherine II., by herself._

_Princess Daschkaw,
Memoirs._

_S. Menzies,
Royal Favourites._

_F. C. Schlosser,
History of the 18th Century,
volumes 4-7._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1786.
Establishment of the Jewish Pale.

See JEWS: A. D. 1727-1880.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1791-1793.
Joined in the Coalitions against Revolutionary France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1790-1791;
1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER);
1793 (MARCH-SEPTEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1796.
Accession of Paul.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1798-1799.
The war of the Second Coalition against Revolutionary France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST-APRIL).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1799.
Suwarrow's victorious campaign in Italy
and failure in Switzerland.
Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland.
Its disastrous ending.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER);
(AUGUST-DECEMBER); and (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1800.
Desertion of the Coalition by the Czar.
His alliance with Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (JUNE-FEBRUARY).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1800-1801.
War with England.
The Northern Maritime League and its sudden overthrow
at Copenhagen by the British fleet.
Peace with England.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1801-1802.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1801.
Paul's despotism and assassination.
Accession of Alexander I.

The Emperor Paul's "choice of his Ministers was always
directed by one dominant idea—that of surrounding himself with
servants on whom he could entirely rely; for from the moment
of his accession he foresaw and dreaded a Palace revolution. …
He erred in the selection, and especially in the extent, of
the means which he employed to save his life and his power;
they only precipitated his deplorable end. Among the men whom
he suspected, he persecuted some with implacable rigour, while
he retained others at their posts and endeavoured to secure
their fidelity by presents; this, however, only made them
ungrateful. Never was there a sovereign more terrible in his
severity, or more liberal when he was in a generous mood. But
there was no certainty in his favour. A single word uttered
intentionally or by accident in a conversation, the shadow of
a suspicion, sufficed to make him persecute those whom he had
protected. The greatest favourites of to-day feared to be
driven from the Court on the morrow, and banished to a distant
province. Yet the Emperor wished to be just. … All who
belonged to the Court or came before the Emperor were thus in
a state of continual fear." This fear, and the hatred which it
inspired, produced in due time a conspiracy, headed by Counts
Panin and Pahlen, of the Emperor's Council. Purporting to have
for its object only the deposition of the Czar, the conspiracy
was known and acquiesced in by the heir to the throne, the
Grand-Duke Alexander, who had been persuaded to look upon it
as a necessary measure for rescuing Russia from a demented
ruler. "Paul was precipitating his country into incalculable
disasters, and into a complete disorganisation and
deterioration of the Government machine. … Although everybody
sympathised with the conspiracy, nothing was done until
Alexander had given his consent to his father's deposition."
Then it was hurried to its accomplishment. The conspirators,
including a large number of military and civil officials,
supped together, on the evening of March 3, 1801. At midnight,
most of them being then intoxicated, they went in a body to
the palace, made their way to the Emperor's
bed-chamber—resisted by only one young valet—and found him, in
his night-clothes, hiding in the folds of a curtain. "They
dragged him out in his shirt, more dead than alive; the terror
he had inspired was now repaid to him with usury. …
{2768}
He was placed on a chair before a desk. The long, thin, pale,
and angular form of General Bennigsen [a Hanoverian officer,
just admitted to the conspiracy, but who had taken the lead
when others showed signs of faltering], with his hat on his
head and a drawn sword in his hand, must have seemed to him a
terrible spectre. 'Sire,' said the General, 'you are my
prisoner and have ceased to reign; you will now at once write
and sign a deed of abdication in favour of the Grand-Duke
Alexander.' Paul was still unable to speak, and a pen was put
in his hand. Trembling and almost unconscious, he was about to
obey, when more cries were heard. General Bennigsen then left
the room, as he has often assured me, to ascertain what these
cries meant, and to take steps for securing the safety of the
palace and of the Imperial family. He had only just gone out
when a terrible scene began. The unfortunate Paul remained
alone with men who were maddened by a furious hatred of him. …
One of the conspirators took off his official scarf and tied
it round the Emperor's throat. Paul struggled. … But the
conspirators seized the hand with which he was striving to
prolong his life, and furiously tugged at both ends of the
scarf. The unhappy emperor had already breathed his last, and
yet they tightened the knot and dragged along the dead body,
striking it with their bands and feet." When Alexander learned
that an assassination instead of a forced abdication had
vacated the throne for him, he "was prostrated with grief and
despair. … The idea of having caused the death of his father
filled him with horror, and he felt that his reputation had
received a stain which could never be effaced. … During the
first years of his reign, Alexander's position with regard to
his father's murderers was an extremely difficult and painful
one. For a few months he believed himself to be at their
mercy, but it was chiefly his conscience and a feeling of
natural equity which prevented him from giving up to justice
the most guilty of the conspirators. … The assassins all
perished miserably."

_Prince Adam Czartoryski,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 9 and 11._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1805.
The Third Coalition against France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (JANUARY-APRIL).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1805.
The crushing of the Coalition at Austerlitz.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (MARCH-DECEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1806-1807.
War with Napoleon in aid of Prussia.
Battle of Eylau.
Treaty of Bartenstein with Prussia.
Decisive defeat at Friedland.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER);
1806-1807; and 1807 (FEBRUARY-JUNE).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1807.
Ineffective operations of England as an ally against Turkey.
Treaty of Tilsit.
Secret understandings of Napoleon with the Czar.

See TURKS: A. D.1806-1807;
and GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE-JULY).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1807-1810.
Northern fruits of the Peace of Tilsit.
English seizure of the Danish fleet.
War with England and Sweden.
Conquest of Finland.
Peculiar annexation of the Grand Duchy to the Empire.

See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1807-1810.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1808.
Imperial conference and Treaty of Erfurt.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1809.
Cession of Eastern Galicia by the Emperor of Austria.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

RUSSIA: A. D. 1809-1812.
War with Turkey.
Treaty of Bucharest.
Acquisition of Bessarabia.

See TURKS: A. D. 1789-1812.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1810.
Grievances against France.
Desertion of the Continental System.
Resumption of commerce with Great Britain.
Rupture with Napoleon.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812.

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (June-September).
Napoleon's invasion.
Battles of Smolensk and Borodino.
The French advance to Moscow.

"With the military resources of France, which then counted 130
departments, with the contingents of her Italian kingdoms, of
the Confederation of the Rhine, of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw,
and with the auxiliary forces of Prussia and Austria, Napoleon
could bring a formidable army into the field. On the first of
June the Grand Army amounted to 678,000 men, 356,000 of whom
were French, and 322,000 foreigners. It included not only
Belgians, Dutchmen, Hanoverians, Hanseats, Piedmontese, and
Romans, then confounded under the name of Frenchmen, but also
the Italian army, the Neapolitan army, the Spanish regiments,
natives of Germany. … Besides Napoleon's marshals, it had at
its head Eugene, Viceroy of Italy; Murat, King of Naples;
Jerome, King of Westphalia; the princes royal and heirs of
nearly all the houses in Europe. The Poles alone in this war,
which recalled to them that of 1612, mustered 60,000 men under
their standards. Other Slavs from the Illyrian provinces,
Carinthians, Dalmatians, and Croats, were led to assault the
great Slav empire. It was indeed the 'army of twenty nations,'
as it is still called by the Russian people. Napoleon
transported all these races from the West to the East by a
movement similar to that of the great invasions, and swept
them like a human avalanche against Russia. When the Grand
Army prepared to cross the Niemen, it was arranged thus:—To
the left, before Tilsit, Macdonald with 10,000 French and
20,000 Prussians under General York of Wartenburg; before
Kovno, Napoleon with the corps of Davoust, Oudinot, Ney, the
Guard commanded by Bessières, the immense reserve cavalry
under Murat—in all a total of 180,000 men; before Pilony,
Eugène with 50,000 Italians and Bavarians; before Grodno,
Jerome Bonaparte, with 60,000 Poles, Westphalians and Saxons,
&c. We must add to these the 30,000 Austrians of
Schwartzenberg, who were to fight in Gallicia as mildly
against the Russians as the Russians had against the Austrians
in 1809. Victor guarded the Vistula and the Oder with 30,000
men, Augereau the Elbe with 50,000. Without reckoning the
divisions of Macdonald, Schwartzenberg, Victor, and Augereau,
it was with about 290,000 men, half of whom were French, that
Napoleon marched to cross the Niemen and threaten the centre
of Russia. Alexander had collected on the Niemen 90,000 men,
commanded by Bagration; on the Bug, tributary to the Vistula,
60,000 men, commanded by Barclay de Tolly; those were what
were called the Northern army and the army of the South. On
the extreme right, Wittgenstein with 30,000 men was to oppose
Macdonald almost throughout the campaign; on the extreme left,
to occupy the Austrian Schwartzenberg as harmlessly as
possible, Tormassof was placed with 40,000.
{2769}
Later this latter army, reinforced by 50,000 men from the
Danube, became formidable, and was destined, under Admiral
Tchitchagof, seriously to embarrass the retreat of the French.
In the rear of all these forces was a reserve of 80,000
men—Cossacks and militia. … In reality, to the 290,000 men
Napoleon had mustered under his hand, the Emperor of Russia
could only oppose the 150,000 of Bagration and Barclay de
Tolly. … At the opening of the campaign the head-quarters of
Alexander were at Wilna. … They deliberated and argued much.
To attack Napoleon was to furnish him with the opportunity he
wished; to retire into the interior, as Barclay had advised in
1807, seemed hard and humiliating. A middle course was sought
by adopting the scheme of Pfühl—to establish an intrenched
camp at Drissa, on the Dwina, and to make it a Russian Torres
Vedras. The events in the Peninsula filled all minds. Pfühl
desired to act like Wellington at Torres Vedras." But his
intrenched camp was badly placed; it was easily turned, and
was speedily abandoned when Napoleon advanced beyond the
Niemen, which he did on the 24th of June. The Russian armies
fell back. "Napoleon made his entry into Wilna, the ancient
capital of the Lithuanian Gedimin. He had said in his second
proclamation, 'The second Polish war has begun!' The Diet of
Warsaw had pronounced the re-establishment of the kingdom of
Poland, and sent a deputation to Wilna to demand the adhesion
of Lithuania, and to obtain the protection of the Emperor. …
Napoleon, whether to please Austria, whether to preserve the
possibility of peace with Russia, or whether he was afraid to
make Poland too strong, only took half measures. He gave
Lithuania an administration distinct from that of Poland. … A
last attempt to negotiate a peace had failed. … Napoleon had
proposed two unacceptable conditions—the abandonment of
Lithuania, and the declaration of war against Great Britain.
If Napoleon, instead of plunging into Russia, had contented
himself with organising and defending the ancient principality
of Lithuania, no power on earth could have prevented the
reestablishment of the Polish-Lithuanian State within its
former limits. The destinies of France and Europe would have
been changed. … Napoleon feared to penetrate into the
interior; he would have liked to gain some brilliant success
not far from the Lithuanian frontier, and seize one of the two
Russian armies. The vast spaces, the bad roads, the
misunderstandings, the growing disorganisation of the army,
caused all his movements to fail. Barclay de Tolly, after
having given battle at Ostrovno and Vitepsk, fell back on
Smolensk; Bagration fought at Mohilef and Orcha, and in order
to rejoin Barclay retreated to Smolensk. There the two Russian
generals held council. Their troops were exasperated by this
continual retreat, and Barclay, a good tactician, with a clear
and methodical mind, did not agree with Bagration, impetuous,
like a true pupil of Souvorof. The one held firmly for a
retreat, in which the Russian army would become stronger and
stronger, and the French army weaker and weaker, as they
advanced into the interior; the other wished to act on the
offensive, full of risk as it was. The army was on the side of
Bagration, and Barclay, a German of the Baltic provinces, was
suspected and all but insulted. He consented to take the
initiative against Murat, who had arrived at Krasnoé, and a
bloody battle was fought (August 14). On the 16th, 17th, and
18th of August, another desperate fight took place at
Smolensk, which was burnt, and 20,000 men perished. Barclay
still retired, drawing with him Bagration. In his retreat
Bagration fought Ney at Valoutina; it was a lesser Eylau:
15,000 men of both armies remained on the field of battle.
Napoleon felt that he was being enticed into the interior of
Russia. The Russians still retreated, laying waste all behind
them. … The Grand Army melted before their very eyes. From the
Niemen to Wilna, without ever having seen the enemy, it had
lost 50,000 men from sickness, desertion and marauding; from
Wilna to Mohilef nearly 100,000. … In the Russian army, the
discontent grew with the retreating movement; … they began to
murmur as much against Bagration as against Barclay. It was
then that Alexander united the two armies under the supreme
command of Koutouzof. … Koutouzof halted at Borodino. He had
then 72,000 infantry, 18,000 regular cavalry, 7,000 Cossacks,
10,000 opoltchénié or militiamen, and 640 guns served by
14,000 artillerymen or pioneers; in all, 121,000 men. Napoleon
had only been able to concentrate 86,000 infantry, 28,000
cavalry, and 587 guns, served by 16,000 pioneers or
artillerymen. … On the 5th of September the French took the
redoubt of Chevardino; the 7th was the day of the great
battle: this was known as the battle of Borodino among the
Russians, as that of the Moskowa in the bulletins of Napoleon,
though the Moskowa flows at some distance from the field of
carnage. … The battle began by a frightful cannonade of 1,200
guns, which was heard 30 leagues round. Then the French, with
an irresistible charge, took Borodino on one side and the
redoubts on the other; Ney and Murat crossed the ravine of
Semenevskoé, and cut the Russian army nearly in two. At ten
o'clock the battle seemed won, but Napoleon refused to carry
out his first success by employing the reserve, and the
Russian generals had time to bring up new troops in line. They
recaptured the great redoubt, and Platof, the Cossack, made an
incursion on the rear of the Italian army; an obstinate fight
took place at the outworks. At last Napoleon made his reserve
troops advance; again Murat's cavalry swept the ravine;
Caulaincourt's cuirassiers assaulted the great redoubt from
behind, and flung themselves on it like a tempest, while
Eugène of Italy scaled the ramparts. Again the Russians had
lost their outworks. Then Koutouzof gave the signal to
retreat. … The French had lost 30,000 men, the Russians
40,000. … Koutouzof retired in good order, announcing to
Alexander that they had made a steady resistance, but were
retreating to protect Moscow." But after a council of war, he
decided to leave Moscow to its fate, and the retreating
Russian army passed through and beyond the city, and the
French entered it at their heels.

_A. Rambaud,
History of Russia,
volume 2, chapter 12._

{2770}

"The facts prove beyond doubt that Napoleon did not foresee
the danger of an advance upon Moscow, and that Alexander I.
and the Russian generals never dreamed of trying to draw him
into the heart of the country. Napoleon was led on, not by any
plan,—a plan had never been thought of,—but by the intrigues,
quarrels, and ambition of men who unconsciously played a part
in this terrible war and never foresaw that the result would
be the safety of Russia. … Amid these quarrels and intrigues,
we are trying to meet the French, although ignorant of their
whereabouts. The French encounter Neverovski's division, and
approach the walls of Smolensk. It is impossible not to give
battle at Smolensk. We must maintain our communications. The
battle takes place, and thousands of men on both sides are
killed. Contrary to the wishes of the tsar and the people, our
generals abandon Smolensk. The inhabitants of Smolensk,
betrayed by their governor, set fire to the city, and, with
this example to other Russian towns, they take refuge in
Moscow, deploring their losses and sowing on every side the
seeds of hate against the enemy. Napoleon advances and we
retreat, and the result is that we take exactly the measures
necessary to conquer the French."

_Count L. Tolstoi,
The Physiology of War: Napoleon and the Russian Campaign,
chapter 1._

ALSO IN:
_C. Joyneville,
Life and Times of Alexander I.,
volume 2, chapter 4._

_Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 18 (volume 3)._

_Count P. de Segur,
History of the Expedition to Russia,
books 1-8 (volumes 1-2)._

RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (September).
The French in Moscow.
The burning of the city.