Chapter CDLXXVI: Section 4: And be it further enacted, That this act shall (8)

"The torrents of paper-money issued during the revolutionary
war, which sunk in value to nothing, converted the old
prejudice against paper promises-to-pay into an aversion that
had the force of an instinct. To this instinctive aversion, as
much as to the constitutional objections urged by Mr.
Jefferson and his disciples, was owing the difficulty
experienced by Alexander Hamilton in getting his first United
States bank chartered. Hence, also, the refusal of Congress to
recharter that bank in 1811. Hence the unwillingness of Mr.
Madison to sanction the charter of the second bank of the
United States in 1816. But the bank was chartered in 1816, and
went into existence with the approval of all the great
republican leaders, opposed only by the extreme Jeffersonians
and by the few federalists who were in public life. … But,
long before General Jackson came into power, the bank appeared
to have lived down all opposition. In the presidential
campaign of 1824 it was not so much as mentioned, nor was it
mentioned in that of 1828. … At the beginning of the
administration of General Jackson, the Bank of the United
States was a truly imposing institution. Its capital was
thirty-five millions. The public money deposited in its vaults
averaged six or seven millions; its private deposits, six
millions more; its circulation, twelve millions; its
discounts, more than forty millions a year; its annual
profits, more than three millions. Besides the parent bank at
Philadelphia, with its marble palace and hundred clerks, there
were 25 branches in the towns and cities of the Union. … Its
bank-notes were as good as gold in every part of the country.
… The bank and its branches received and disbursed the entire
revenue of the nation. … There is a tradition in Washington to
this day, that General Jackson came up from Tennessee to
Washington, in 1829, resolved on the destruction of the Bank
of the United States, and that he was only dissuaded from
aiming a paragraph at it in his inaugural address by the
prudence of Mr. Van Buren. … General Jackson had no thought of
the bank until he had been President two months. He came to
Washington expecting to serve but a single term, during which
the question of re-chartering the bank was not expected to
come up.
{3372}
The bank was chartered in 1816 for twenty years, which would
not expire until 1836." But, in 1829, the influence of Isaac
Hill, one of the so-called "Kitchen Cabinet" at Washington,
involved the irascible President in an endeavor to bring about
the removal of Jeremiah Mason, a political opponent, who had
been appointed to the presidency of the branch of the United
States Bank at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. "The correspondence
began in June and ended in October. I believe myself warranted
in the positive assertion, that this correspondence relating
to the desired removal of Jeremiah Mason was the direct and
real cause of the destruction of the bank."

_J. Parton,
Life of Andrew Jackson,
volume 3, chapter 20._

"As soon as the issue between him and the Bank of the United
States was declared, Jackson resolved that the bank must be
utterly destroyed. The method was suggested by Kendall and
Blair, of the Kitchen Cabinet. It was to cripple the available
means of the bank by withdrawing from it and its branches the
deposits of public funds. In the message of December, 1832,
Jackson had expressed his doubt as to the safety of the
government deposits in the bank, and recommended an
investigation. The House, after inquiry, resolved on March 2,
by 109 to 46 votes, that the deposits were safe. The bank was
at that period undoubtedly solvent, and there seemed to be no
reason to fear for the safety of the public money in its
custody. But Jackson had made up his mind that the bank was
financially rotten; that it had been employing its means to
defeat his reëlection; that it was using the public funds in
buying up members of Congress for the purposes of securing a
renewal of its charter, and of breaking down the
administration; and that thus it had become a dangerous agency
of corruption and a public enemy. Therefore the public funds
must be withdrawn, without regard to consequences. But the law
provided that the public funds should be deposited in the Bank
of the United States or its branches, unless the Secretary of
the Treasury should otherwise 'order and direct,' and in that
case the Secretary should report his reasons for such
direction to Congress. A willing Secretary of the Treasury was
therefore needed. In May, 1833, Jackson reconstructed his
Cabinet for the second time. … For the Treasury Department
Jackson selected William J. Duane of Philadelphia, who was
known as an opponent of the bank. Jackson, no doubt, expected
him to be ready for any measure necessary to destroy it. In
this he was mistaken. Duane earnestly disapproved of the
removal of the deposits as unnecessary, and highly dangerous
to the business interests of the country. … A majority of the
members of the Cabinet thought the removal of the deposits
unwise. … In the business community there seemed to be but one
voice about it. The mere rumor that the removal of the
deposits was in contemplation greatly disturbed the money
market. But all this failed to stagger Jackson's resolution. …
The Cabinet, with the exception of the Secretary of the
Treasury, bowed to Jackson's will. But Duane would not shelter
himself behind the President's assumed responsibility to do an
act which, under the law, was to be his act. He also refused
to resign. If he had to obey or go, he insisted upon being
removed. Jackson then formally dismissed him, and transferred
Roger B. Taney from the attorney generalship to the treasury.
Benjamin F. Butler of New York, a friend of Van Buren, was
made Attorney General. Taney forthwith ordered the removal of
the deposits from the Bank of the United States; that is to
say, the public funds then in the bank were to be drawn out as
the government required them, and no new deposits to be made
in that institution. The new deposits were to be distributed
among a certain number of selected state banks, which became
known as the 'pet banks.' … The money market became stringent.
Many failures occurred. The general feeling in business
circles approached a panic." But the very disturbance was
charged upon the Bank, itself; the people rallied to the
support of their favorite, "Old Hickory," and when the
national charter of the Bank expired, in March, 1836, there
was no hope of its renewal. It obtained a charter from the
State of Pennsylvania, and continued business as a State
institution until it went to pieces in the general commercial
shipwreck of 1837-41.

_C. Schurz,
Life of Henry Clay,
chapter 15 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:
_W. G. Sumner,
Andrew Jackson as a Public Man,
chapters 11-14._

_T. H. Benton,
Thirty Years' View,
volume 1, chapters 49, 56, 64-67, 77, and 92-111._

_M. St. C. Clarke and D. A. Hall,
History of the Bank of the United States._

See, also, MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1817-1833.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1834.
Organization of the Whig Party.

The largest section of the opposition to the Jacksonian
Democracy "was organized in 1834 as the Whig party. According
to the 'Whig Almanac' for 1838, the party as then constituted
comprised: '(1) Most of those who, under the name of National
Republicans, had previously been known as supporters of Adams
and Clay, and advocates of the American system [of
tariff-protection]; (2) Most of those who, acting in defence
of what they deemed the assailed or threatened rights of the
States, had been stigmatized as Nullifiers, or the less
virulent State Rights' men, who were thrown into a position of
armed neutrality towards the administration by the doctrines
of the proclamation of 1832 against South Carolina; (3) A
majority of those before known as Anti-Masons; (4) Many who
had up to that time been known as Jackson men, but who united
in condemning the high-handed conduct of the Executive, the
immolation of Duane, and the subserviency of Taney; (5)
Numbers who had not before taken any part in politics, but who
were now awakened from their apathy by the palpable
usurpations of the Executive and the imminent peril of our
whole fabric of constitutional liberty and national
prosperity.' It was not to be expected that a party composed
of such various elements would be able to unite on one
candidate with heartiness; and, as the event proved, it was
necessary that some time should elapse before anything like
homogeneity could be given to the organization. Nullification
was not popular among the Whigs of the North, nor did the
State Rights' people of South Carolina and other States care
about the war on the bank and the removal of the deposits."

_E. Stanwood,
History of Presidential Elections,
chapter 14._

{3373}

"It was now felt instinctively that, in the existing struggle
between the parties actually arrayed against each other, and
in the principles and doctrines of those who were in power,
there was a peculiar fitness in the revival of a term which,
on both sides of the Atlantic, had been historically
associated with the side of liberty against the side of power.
The revival of the name of Whigs was sudden, and it was a
spontaneous popular movement. In progress of time, it enabled
the public men who were leading the opposition to the party of
the Administration to consolidate an organization of distinct
political principles, and to strengthen it by accessions from
those who had found reason to be dissatisfied with the
opinions prevailing among the friends of the President."

_G. T. Curtis,
Life of Daniel Webster,
volume 1, page 499._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1835.
First Petitions for the Abolition of Slavery
in the District of Columbia.
Exclusion of Antislavery literature from the Mails.

"It was during the Twenty-third Congress, 1835, that the
abolition of slavery, especially in the District of Columbia,
may be said to have begun to move the public mind at the
North. The first petitions presented to Congress for the
abolition of slavery, at least the first to attract attention,
were presented by Mr. Dickson, from the Canandaigua district,
New York, who addressed the House in support of the prayer of
the petitioners. Perhaps his speech, more than the petition he
presented, served to stir up a feeling on the part of Southern
men, and to cause other and numerous similar petitions to be
gotten up at the North and sent to Congress. … The labors of
the enemies of slavery, or 'Abolitionists,' had commenced, and
by indefatigable men who believed they were serving God and
the cause of humanity, and consequently it was with them a
labor of conscience and duty, with which nothing should be
allowed to interfere. Instead of petitions to Congress, they
now sent large boxes of tracts, pamphlets, and various
publications which the Southern people denominated
'incendiary,' to the post-office at Charleston, South
Carolina, and other cities, to be distributed, as directed, to
various persons. This increased the complaints and
inflammatory articles in the Southern papers. The publications
thus sent were stopped in the post-office, and the postmasters
addressed the head of the department, Amos Kendall, on the
subject, who replied that though the law authorized the
transmission of newspapers and pamphlets through the mail, yet
the law was intended to promote the general good of the
public, and not to injure any section; and intimated that,
such being the effect of these publications at the South,
postmasters would be justified in withholding them."

_N. Sargent,
Public Men and Events, 1817-1853,
volume 1, page 294-295._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1835-1837.
The inflation of credits, and Speculation.
The great collapse.

"When the United States Bank lost the government deposits,
late in 1833, they amounted to a little less than $10,000,000.
On January 1, 1835, more than a year after the state banks
took the deposits, they had increased to a little more than
$10,000,000. But the public debt being then paid and the outgo
of money thus checked, the deposits had by January 1, 1836,
reached $25,000,000, and by June 1, 1836, $41,500,000. This
enormous advance represented the sudden increase in the sales
of public lands, which were paid for in bank paper, which in
turn formed the bulk of the government deposits. … The
increase in the sales of public lands was the result of all
the organic causes and of all the long train of events which
had seated the fever of speculation so profoundly in the
American character of the day. … The increase of government
deposits was only fuel added to the flames. The craze for
banks and credits was unbounded before the removal of the
deposits had taken place, and before their great increase
could have had serious effect. … The insanity of speculation
was in ample though unobserved control of the country while
Nicholas Biddle [President of the United States Bank] still
controlled the deposits, and was certain to reach a climax
whether they stayed with him or went elsewhere. … The
distribution of the surplus among the states by the law of
1836 was the last and in some respects the worst of the
measures which aided and exaggerated the tendency to
speculation. By this bill, all the money above $5,000.000 in
the treasury on January 1, 1837, was to be 'deposited' with
the states in four quarterly installments commencing on that
day. … From the passage of the deposit bill in June, 1836,
until the crash in 1837, this superb donation of thirty-seven
millions was before the enraptured and deluded vision of the
country. Over nine millions and a quarter to be poured into
'improvements' or loaned to the needy,—what a luscious
prospect! The lesson is striking and wholesome, and ought not
to be forgotten, that, when the land was in the very midst of
these largesses, the universal bankruptcy set in. During 1835
and 1836 there were omens of the coming storm. Some perceived
the rabid character of the speculative fever. William L.
Marcy, governor of New York, in his message of January, 1836,
answering the dipsomaniac cry for more banks, declared that an
unregulated spirit of speculation had taken capital out of the
state; but that the amount so transferred bore no comparison
to the enormous speculations in stocks and in real property
within the state. … The warning was treated contemptuously;
but before the year was out the federal administration also
became anxious, and the increase in land sales no longer
signified to Jackson an increasing prosperity. … So Jackson
proceeded with his sound defense of the famous specie
circular, long and even still denounced as the 'causa cansans'
of the crisis of 1837. By this circular, issued on July 11,
1836, the secretary of the treasury had required payment for
public lands to be made in specie, with an exception until
December 15, 1836, in favor of actual settlers and actual
residents of the state in which the lands were sold. …
Jackson's specie circular toppled over the house of cards,
which at best could have stood but little longer. … An
insignificant, part of the sales had been lately made to
settlers. They were chiefly made to speculators. … Of the real
money necessary to make good the paper bubble promises of the
speculators not one tenth part really existed. Banks could
neither make their debtors pay in gold and silver, nor pay
their own notes in gold and silver. So they suspended. The
great and long concealed devastation of physical wealth and of
the accumulation of legitimate labor by premature improvements
and costly personal living, became now quickly apparent.
Fancied wealth sank out of sight."

_E. M. Shepard,
Martin Van Buren,
chapter 8._

ALSO IN:
_W. G. Sumner,
History of American Currency,
pages 102-161._

_F. A. Walker,
Money,
chapter 21._

_C. Juglar,
Brief History of Panics,
page 58._

{3374}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1835-1843.
The Second Seminole War.

See FLORIDA: A. D. 1835-1843.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1836.
The Atherton Gag.

"At this time [1835-36], the Northern abolitionists sent
petitions to Congress for the abolition of slavery in the
District of Columbia. They contended that as this territory
was under the control of the United States' Government, the
United States was responsible for slavery there; and that the
Free States were bound to do what they could to have slavery
brought to an end in that District. But the Slave States were
not willing to have anything said on the subject, so they
passed what was called a 'gag' law in the House of
Representatives, and ruled that all petitions which had any
relation to slavery should be laid on the table without being
debated, printed or referred. John Quincy Adams opposed this
rule resolutely, maintaining that it was wrong and
unconstitutional. … He continued to present petitions, as
before, for the abolition of slavery in the District. When the
day came for petitions he was one of the first to be called
upon; and he would sometimes occupy nearly the whole hour in
presenting them, though each one was immediately laid on the
table. One day he presented 511."

_J. F. Clarke,
Anti-Slavery Days,
page 45._

The gag-law has sometimes taken the name of the Atherton gag
from its New Hampshire author.

_W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 4, page 338._

ALSO IN:
_J. H. Gidding,
History of the Rebellion,
pages 104-124._

_J. T. Morse, Jr.,
John Quincy Adams,
pp. 246-280._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1836.
Admission of Arkansas into the Union.

See ARKANSAS: A. D. 1819-1836.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1836.
Jackson's administration reviewed.

"What of the administration as a whole? Parton's view is as
follows: 'I must avow explicitly the belief that,
notwithstanding the good done by General Jackson during his
presidency, his elevation to power was a mistake on the part
of the people of the United States. The good which he effected
has not continued, while the evil which he began remains.'
Sumner, in commenting on 'Jackson's modes of action in his
second term,' says: 'We must say of Jackson that he stumbled
along through a magnificent career, now and then taking up a
chance without really appreciating it; leaving behind him
disturbed and discordant elements of good and ill just fit to
produce turmoil and dis·aster in the future.' Later he adds:
'Representative institutions are degraded on the Jacksonian
theory just as they are on the divine-right theory, or on the
theory of the democratic empire. There is not a worse
perversion of the American system of government conceivable
than to regard the President as the tribune of the people.'
The view of von Holst may be inferred from the following
passages: 'In spite of the frightful influence, in the real
sense of the expression, which he exercised during the eight
years of his presidency, he neither pointed out nor opened new
ways to his people by the superiority of his mind, but only
dragged them more rapidly onward on the road they had long
been travelling, by the demoniacal power of his will.' The
meaning of the bank struggle is thus defined: 'Its
significance lay in the elements which made Jackson able
actually and successfully to assert his claims, in conflict
both with the constitution and with the idea of republicanism,
to a position between Congress and the people as patriarchal
ruler of the republic.' Elsewhere he tells us that the 'curse
of Jackson's administration' is that it weakened respect for
law; that 'the first clear symptom' of 'the decline of a
healthy political spirit' was the election and re-election of
Jackson to the presidency; that his administration paved a
'broad path for the demoralizing transformation of the
American democracy'; and that 'his "reign" receives the stamp
which characterizes it precisely from the fact that the
politicians knew how to make his character, with its texture
of brass, the battering-ram with which to break down the last
ramparts which opposed their will.' According to Parton,
Sumner, and von Holst, as I understand them, the net result of
Jackson's influence upon the American people was to hasten
their progress toward political ruin. I think this conclusion
erroneous. The gravest accusation against Jackson is, that his
influence undermined respect for law. It is plausibly argued
that, since he himself was impatient of authority, his example
must have stimulated lawlessness in his followers. It may be
urged, in reply, that the history of the country does not
support the charge. The worst exhibitions of general
lawlessness which have disgraced the United States were the
anti-abolitionist mobs of Jackson's own day—for which he was
not responsible. Since then, the American people, in spite of
the demoralizations of the war and reconstruction periods,
have steadily grown in obedience to law. … It is a curious
circumstance that the relation of Jackson to sectionalism has
received very little attention; and yet the growth of
sectionalism, i. e., the tendency to divide the Union into two
portions, politically separate and independent, is the fact
which, from the Missouri Compromise of 1820 to the ordinances
of secession in 1860, gives our political history its
distinctive character. The one important question concerning
Jackson, as indeed concerning every public man during the
forty years which precede the Civil War, is: What did he do
towards saving the Union from sectionalism? … Jackson came
before the country as a disciple of Jefferson, and therefore
as a believer in state rights. There was, it is true, much in
his temper and situation which favored centralization;
nevertheless, he was an honest, though moderate and somewhat
inconsistent Jeffersonian, and he won and retained the
confidence of the state-rights element in the democratic
party. Moreover, he identified himself with the newly
enfranchised and poorer citizens just rising to political
self-consciousness. In these ways, his following came to
include a large majority of his fellow-citizens, and, what was
of the utmost importance, by far the larger proportion of
those whose political character and opinions were as yet
plastic. … Jackson became, to a degree never realized by any
other man in our history, the trusted leader and teacher of
the masses. … This intimate relation to the people, and this
unparalleled power over the people, Jackson used to impress
upon them his own love of the Union and his own hatred of
sectionalism. … His character was altogether national. It is
easy to think of Calhoun as a southerner and a South
Carolinian; but it would not be easy to think of Jackson as
belonging to Tennessee or to the border states.
{3375}
The distribution of his support in the election of 1832 is
instructive. New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania, as well
as Tennessee, Georgia, Missouri, were Jackson's states. He was
not looked upon as the representative of any particular
section. His policy as President showed no trace of
sectionalism. Its aim was the welfare of the masses
irrespective of section. To him state lines had little
meaning; sectional lines, absolutely none. There is another
way in which he rendered great though unconscious service to
the cause of national unity: he made the government, hitherto
an unmeaning abstraction, intelligible and attractive to the
people. … The chief value, then, of Jackson's political
career, was its educational effect. His strong conviction of
the national character of the Union, his brave words and acts
in behalf of the rights of the Union, sank deep into the
hearts of followers and opponents."

_A. D. Morse,
Political Influence of Andrew Jackson
(Political Science Quarterly, June, 1886)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1836.
Thirteenth Presidential Election.
Martin Van Buren chosen.

"As Vice-president, Van Buren was at the side of Jackson
during his second term as President. It was the period of the
first experiment in producing panics; of reckless expansions
of the currency; of extravagant speculation; of an
accumulating surplus revenue; of the last struggles of the
Bank of the United States for the continuance of its powers.
There was not a difficult question on which Jackson did not
open his mind to the Vice-president with complete and
affectionate confidence. He has often been heard to narrate
incidents illustrating the prompt decision and bold judgment
of his younger friend; and in those days of vehement conflicts
between the power of the people and interests embodied against
that power, the daring energy of the one was well united with
the more tranquil intrepidity of the other. How fully this was
recognized by the people appears from the action of the
Democratic party of the Union. In May, 1835, it assembled in
convention at Baltimore, and by a unanimous vote placed Van
Buren in nomination as their candidate for the Presidency. …
The Democracy of the Union supported Van Buren with entire
unanimity. Out of two hundred and eighty-six electoral votes
he received one hundred and seventy; and, for the first time,
the Democracy of the North saw itself represented in the
Presidential chair. Electoral votes were given for Van Buren
without regard to geographical divisions: New York and
Alabama, Missouri and Maine, Virginia and Connecticut, were
found standing together. His election seemed friendly to the
harmony and the perpetuity of the Union."

_G. Bancroft,
Martin Van Buren.
chapter 5._

Mr. Van Buren received a clear majority of the popular vote
cast at the election, namely, 762,678, against 735,651 cast in
opposition, but divided between four Whig candidates, namely,
William H. Harrison, who received 73 electoral votes, Hugh L.
White, who received 26, Daniel Webster who received 14, and
Willie P. Mangum, who received 11. Richard M. Johnson was
chosen Vice President.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1837.
Admission of Michigan into the Union.

See MICHIGAN: A. D. 1837.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1837.
The introduction of the Sub-treasury system.

"When the banks went down, they had the government deposits:
this was in May, 1837. Van Buren's administration was only two
months old. The President was a warm admirer of Jackson, and
had formally announced that he would continue his
predecessor's policy with respect to the management of the
deposits. But the 'experiment' had suddenly culminated. The
government deposits were not in its control, and could not be
regained; their transfer from one part of the country to
another had ceased. … Once more, therefore, the government was
confronted with a grave question touching its deposits and the
circulating medium. It now essayed a brand-new experiment.
This was nothing less than keeping the deposits itself, and
transferring and paying them as occasion required; while the
people were left to regulate the currency themselves. This was
a very wide departure from any former policy. The mode
proposed of keeping the public deposits may be briefly
described. The treasury building at Washington was to
constitute the treasury of the United States, and the public
money was to be kept within its vaults. The mint at
Philadelphia, the branch at New Orleans, the new custom-houses
in New York and Boston, were also to contain branch treasury
vaults. Places were also to be prepared at Charleston, St.
Louis, and elsewhere. The treasurer of the United States at
Washington, and the treasurers of the mints at Philadelphia
and New Orleans, were to be 'receivers-general,' to keep the
public money. … At the extra session of Congress in 1837, the
Executive recommended the sub-treasury experiment. Congress
refused to try it, although a majority in both Houses belonged
to the same political party as the President. Nevertheless,
the system was continued, without legislative sanction, until
1840, when Congress finally passed a bill legalizing the
measure. At the presidential election in 1840 a party
revolution occurred, and the sub-treasury system, which had
formed a prominent issue in the campaign, was unqualifiedly
condemned by the people. Congress repealed the law, and passed
a bill creating another national bank," which President Tyler
vetoed.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1841.

"Thus the keeping of the public money remained in the hands of
the government officials, without legislative regulation,
until the passage of the sub-treasury bill, in 1846. The
system established at that time has been maintained ever
since."

_A. S. Bolles,
Financial History of the United States, 1789-1860,
book 3, chapter 2._

ALSO IN:
_T. H. Benton,
Thirty Years' View,
volume 2, chapters 29, 41, 64-65._

_D. Kinley,
The Independent Treasury of the United States._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1837-1838.
Antislavery Petitions in the Senate.
Calhoun's Resolutions, forcing the issue.

"The movements for and against slavery in the session of
1837-1838 deserve to be noted, as of disturbing effect at the
time; and as having acquired new importance from subsequent
events. Early in the session a memorial was presented in the
Senate from the General Assembly of Vermont, remonstrating
against the annexation of Texas to the United States, and
praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of
Columbia—followed by many petitions from citizens and
societies in the Northern States to the same effect; and,
further, for the abolition of slavery in the Territories—for
the abolition of the slave trade between the States—and for
the exclusion of future slave States from the Union. …
{3376}
The question which occupied the Senate was as to the most
judicious mode of treating these memorials, with a view to
prevent their evil effects: and that was entirely a question
of policy, on which senators disagreed who concurred in the
main object. Some deemed it most advisable to receive and
consider the petitions—to refer them to a committee—and
subject them to the adverse report which they would be sure to
receive; as had been done with the Quakers' petitions at the
beginning of the government. Others deemed it preferable to
refuse to receive them. The objection raised to this latter
course was, that it would mix up a new question with the
slavery agitation which would enlist the sympathies of many
who did not co-operate with the Abolitionists—the question of
the right of petition. … Mr. Clay, and many others were of
this opinion; Mr. Calhoun and his friends thought otherwise;
and the result was, so far as it concerned the petitions of
individuals and societies, what it had previously been—a
half-way measure between reception and rejection—a motion to
lay the question of reception on the table. This motion,
precluding all discussion, got rid of the petitions quietly,
and kept debate out of the Senate. In the case of the memorial
from the State of Vermont, the proceeding was slightly
different in form, but the same in substance. As the act of a
State, the memorial was received; but after reception was laid
on the table. Thus all the memorials and petitions were
disposed of by the Senate in a way to accomplish the two-fold
object, first, of avoiding discussion; and, next, condemning
the object of the petitioners. It was accomplishing all that
the South asked; and if the subject had rested at that point,
there would have been nothing in the history of this session,
on the slavery agitation, to distinguish it from other
sessions about that period: but the subject was revived; and
in a way to force discussion, and to constitute a point for
the retrospect of history. Every memorial and petition had
been disposed of according to the wishes of the senators from
the slaveholding States; but Mr. Calhoun deemed it due to
those States to go further, and to obtain from the Senate
declarations which should cover all the questions of federal
power over the institution of slavery: although he had just
said that paper reports would do no good. For that purpose, he
submitted a series of resolves—six in number—which derive
their importance from their comparison, or rather contrast,
with others on the same subject presented by him in the Senate
ten years later; and which have given birth to doctrines and
proceedings which have greatly disturbed the harmony of the
Union, and palpably endangered its stability. The six
resolutions of this period (1837-1838) undertook to define the
whole extent of the power delegated by the States to the
federal government on the subject of slavery; to specify the
acts which would exceed that power; and to show the
consequences of doing anything not authorized to be done—
always ending in a dissolution of the Union. The first four of
these related to the States; about which, there being no
dispute, there was no debate. The sixth, without naming Texas,
was prospective, and looked forward to a case which might
include her annexation; and was laid upon the table to make
way for an express resolution from Mr. Preston on the same
subject. The fifth related to the territories, and to the
District of Columbia, and was the only one which excited
attention, or has left a surviving interest. It was in these
words: 'Resolved that the intermeddling of any State, or
States, or their citizens, to abolish slavery in this
District, or any of the territories, on the ground or under
the pretext that it is immoral or sinful, or the passage of
any act or measure of Congress with that view, would be a
direct and dangerous attack on the institutions of all the
slaveholding States.' The dogma of 'no power in Congress to
legislate upon the existence of slavery in territories' had
not been invented at that time; and, of course, was not
asserted in this resolve, intended by its author to define the
extent of the federal legislative power on the subject. The
resolve went upon the existence of the power, and deprecated
its abuse." Mr. Clay offered an amendment, in the nature of a
substitute, consisting of two resolutions, the first of which
was in these words: "'That the interference by the citizens of
any of the States, with the view to the abolition of slavery
in this District, is endangering the rights and security of
the people of the District; and that any act or measure of
Congress, designed to abolish slavery in this District, would
be a violation of the faith implied in the cessions by the
States of Virginia and Maryland—a just cause of alarm to the
people of the slaveholding States—and have a direct and
inevitable tendency to disturb and endanger the Union.' The
vote on the final adoption of the resolution was: (Yeas 37,
Nays 8]. … The second resolution of Mr. Clay applied to
slavery in a territory where it existed, and deprecated any
attempt to abolish it in such territory, as alarming to the
slave States, and as violation of faith towards its
inhabitants, unless they asked it; and in derogation of its
right to decide the question of slavery for itself when
erected into a State. This resolution was intended to cover
the case of Florida, and ran thus: 'Resolved that any attempt
of Congress to abolish slavery in any territory of the United
States in which it exists would create serious alarm and just
apprehension in the States sustaining that domestic
institution, and would be a violation of good faith towards
the inhabitants of any such territory who have been permitted
to settle with, and hold, slaves therein; because the people
of any such territory have not asked for the abolition of
slavery therein; and because, when any such territory shall be
admitted into the Union as a State, the people thereof shall
be entitled to decide that question exclusively for
themselves.' And the vote upon it was—[Yeas 35, Nays 9]. …
The general feeling of the Senate was that of entire
repugnance to the whole movement—that of the petitions and
memorials on the one hand, and Mr. Calhoun's resolutions on
the other. The former were quietly got rid of, and in a way to
rebuke, as well as to condemn their presentation; that is to
say, by motions (sustained by the body) to lay them on the
table. The resolutions could not so easily be disposed of,
especially as their mover earnestly demanded discussion, spoke
at large, and often himself; and 'desired to make the
question, on their rejection or adoption, a test question.'"

_T. H. Benton,
Thirty Years' View,
volume 2, chapter 33._

{3377}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1840.
The Sixth Census.

Total population, 17,069,453 (exceeding that of 1830 by nearly
33 per cent.), classed and distributed as follows:

North.

White. Free black. Slave. Connecticut. 301,856 8,105 17 Illinois. 472,254 3,598 331 Indiana. 678,698 7,165 3 Iowa. 42,924 172 16 Maine. 500,438 1,355 0 Massachusetts. 729,030 8,669 0 Michigan. 211,560 707 0 New Hampshire. 284,036 537 1 New Jersey. 351,588 21,044 674 New York. 2,378,890 50,027 4 Ohio. 1,502,122 17,342 3 Pennsylvania. 1,676,115 47,854 64 Rhode Island. 105,587 3,238 5 Vermont. 291,218 730 0 Wisconsin. 30,749 185 11

Total 9,557,065 170,728 1,129

South.

White. Free black. Slave. Alabama. 335,185 2,039 253,532 Arkansas. 77,174 465 19,935 Delaware. 58,561 16,919 2,605 District of Columbia. 30,657 8,361 4,694 Florida. 27,943 817 25,717 Georgia. 407,695 2,753 280,944 Kentucky. 590,253 7,817 182,258 Louisiana. 158,457 25,502 168,452 Maryland. 318,204 62,078 89,737 Mississippi. 179,074 1,366 195,211 Missouri. 323,888 1,574 58,240 North Carolina. 484,870 22,732 245,817 South Carolina. 259,084 8,276 327,038 Tennessee. 640,627 5,524 183,059 Virginia. 740,858 49,852 449,087

Total 4,632,530 215,575 2,486,326

The number of immigrants arriving in the United States between
1830 and 1840, according to official reports, was 599,125, of
whom 283,191 were from the British Islands, and 212,497 from
other parts of Europe.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1840.
Fourteenth Presidential Election.
The Log-cabin and Hard-cider campaign.

William Henry Harrison, Whig, was elected President, over
Martin Van Buren, Democrat, and James G. Birney, candidate of
the "Liberty Party." The popular vote cast was: Harrison
1,275,016, Van Buren 1,129,102, Birney 7,069. The electoral
vote stood: Harrison 234, Van Buren 60, Birney none. John
Tyler was elected Vice President. In the early part of the
campaign, a Baltimore newspaper, making a foolish attempt to
cast ridicule on General Harrison, said that a pension of a
few hundred dollars and a barrel of hard cider would content
him in his log cabin for life. This fatuous remark gave the
Whigs a popular cry which they used with immense effect, and
"the log-cabin and hard-cider campaign," as it is known in
American history, was memorable for its song-singing
enthusiasm.—"If one could imagine a whole nation declaring a
holiday or season of rollicking for a period of six or eight
months, and giving themselves up during the whole time to the
wildest freaks of fun and frolic, caring nothing for business,
singing, dancing, and carousing night and day, he might have
some faint notion of the extraordinary scenes of 1840. It
would be difficult, if not impossible, otherwise to form even
a faint idea of the universal excitement, enthusiasm,
activity, turmoil, and restlessness which pervaded the country
during the spring, summer, and fall of that memorable year.
Log cabins large enough to hold crowds of people were built in
many places. Small ones, decorated with 'coon-skins, were
mounted on wheels and used in processions. The use of the
'coon-skins soon led to the adoption of the 'coon (raccoon)
itself as an emblem and adjunct of the log cabin, and its
'counterfeit presentment' was hoisted in all the Whig papers.
Meetings were everywhere, and every day, held in
neighborhoods, school-houses, villages, towns, counties,
cities, States, varying in number from ten to one hundred
thousand; and wherever there was a gathering there were also
speaking and singing. Ladies attended these meetings, or
conventions, in great numbers, and joined in the singing.
Farmers, with big teams and wagons, would leave their fields
and travel ten, twenty, or thirty miles, accompanied by their
families and neighbors, to attend a convention or a barbecue
and listen to distinguished orators. Crowds on the road,
multitudes in big wagons drawn by four, six, or eight horses,
made the welkin ring with their log-cabin songs. Nobody slept,
nobody worked, nobody rested; at least so it seemed, for all
were on the 'qui vive' and in motion. The entire population
seemed to be absorbed in the great duty of electing General
Harrison and thus changing the government. …

What has caused this great commotion, motion, motion,
Our country through?
It is the ball a rolling on
For Tippecanoe and Tyler too,
For Tippecanoe and Tyler too.'

The original or special friends of General Harrison very
naturally claimed that it was his popularity which produced
such an unprecedented 'commotion' 'our country through.' But
in this they were mistaken. The popularity of no one man could
have produced such a universal outpouring of the people from
day to day for weeks and months unceasingly, abandoning
everything else, and giving time and money unstintedly to
carry the election. General Harrison was but the
figure-head,—the representative of the Whig party for the time
being. Few had ever heard of him. The people knew from history
and the campaign papers that he had been a general in the then
late war with England; that he had won a victory at the battle
of Tippecanoe over the British and Indians, and also at the
battle of the Thames, in Canada, where Tecumseh, the noted
Indian warrior, was killed. This was enough to make a hero of
him by those who had a purpose to serve in doing so. As to his
fitness for the Presidency, the people knew nothing and cared
nothing. A change in the government was what they desired and
were determined to have."

_N. Sargent,
Public Men and Events,
volume 2, pages 107-110._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1840-1841.
The McLeod case.

See CANADA: A. D. 1840-1841.

{3378}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1841.
The Death of President Harrison.
Breach between President Tyler and the Whig Party
which elected him.

President Harrison died suddenly on the 4th of April, 1841,
and Vice President John Tyler became President. Tyler was a
Calhoun Democrat in politics, although nominated and elected
by the Whigs, and the financial measures favored by the latter
were especially obnoxious to him. "Congress met May 31st,
1841. … A bill to abolish the Sub-Treasury of the previous
Administration was passed by both Houses and signed by the
President. A bill to incorporate 'The Fiscal Bank of the
United States' was passed by both Houses. It was weeded of
many of the objectionable features of the old United States
Bank, but was hardly less odious to the Democrats. It was
vetoed by the President. … An effort to pass the bill over the
veto did not receive a two-thirds majority. The Whig leaders,
anxious to prevent a party disaster, asked from the President
an outline of a bill which he would sign. After consultation
with the Cabinet, it was given, and passed by both Houses.
September 9th the President vetoed this bill also, and an
attempt to pass it over the veto did not receive a two-thirds
majority. The action of the President, in vetoing a bill drawn
according to his own suggestions, and thus apparently
provoking a contest with the party which had elected him,
roused the unconcealed indignation of the Whigs. The Cabinet,
with one exception [Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, who
remained in President Tyler's cabinet until May, 1843], at
once resigned. The Whig members of Congress issued Addresses
to the People, in which they detailed the reforms designed by
the Whigs and impeded by the President, and declared that 'all
political connection between them and John Tyler was at an end
from that day forth.' … The President filled the vacancies in
the Cabinet by appointing Whigs and Conservatives. His
position was one of much difficulty. His strict
constructionist opinions, which had prevented him from
supporting Van Buren, would not allow him to approve a
National Bank, and yet he had accepted the Vice-Presidency
from a party pledged to establish one. The over hasty
declaration of war by the Whigs put a stop to his
vacillations, and compelled him to rely upon support from the
Democrats. But only a few members of Congress, commonly known
as 'the corporal's guard,' recognized Tyler as a leader."

_A. Johnston,
History of American Politics, 2d ed.,
chapter 15, sections 2-4._

ALSO IN:
_L. G. Tyler,
Letters and Times of the Tylers,
volume 2, chapters 1-4._

_C. Colton,
Life and Times of Henry Clay,
chapters 14-15._

_T. H. Benton,
Thirty Years' View,
volume 2, chapters 80-85._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1842.
Victory of John Quincy Adams in defending the Right of Petition.

"January 21, 1842, Mr. Adams presented a petition from 45
citizens of Haverhill, Massachusetts, praying for the
dissolution of the Union, and moved it be referred to a select
committee, with instructions to report why the petition should
not be granted. There was at once great excitement and members
called out, 'Expel him,' 'Censure him.' After a good deal of
fruitless endeavor to accomplish something, the House
adjourned, and forty or fifty slaveholders met to decide what
kind of resolutions should be presented to meet the case.
Thomas F. Marshall of Kentucky was selected by this caucus
from Congress to propose the resolutions, which were to the
effect that for presenting such a petition to a body each of
whom had taken an oath to maintain the Constitution, Mr. Adams
was virtually inviting them to perjure themselves, and that
therefore he deserved the severest censure. Marshall supported
this with a very violent speech. Mr. Wise followed in another.
Then Mr. Adams arose and asked the clerk to read the first
paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, being the one
which recognizes the right of every people to alter or abolish
their form of Government when it ceases to accomplish its
ends. He said that those who believed that the present
Government was oppressive had the right (according to the
Declaration of Independence, on which the whole of our
national unity reposes), to petition Congress to do what they
believed was desirable; and all that Congress could properly
do would be to explain to them why such an act could not be
performed. He replied with great severity to Mr. Wise and said
that Mr. Wise had come into that Hall a few years before with
his hands dripping with the blood of one of his fellow beings.
In this he alluded to the part which Mr. Wise had taken in the
duel between Mr. Graves of Kentucky, and Cilley of Maine, in
which the latter had been killed. As for Mr. Marshall, who had
accused him of treason, he spoke of him with great scorn. 'I
thank God!' said he 'that the Constitution of my country has
defined treason, and has not left it to the puny intellect of
this young man from Kentucky to say what it is. If I were the
father of this gentleman from Kentucky, I should take him from
this House and put him to school where he might study his
profession for some years until he became a little better
qualified to appear in this place.' Mr. Adams had on his desk
a great many books and references prepared for his use by some
anti-slavery gentlemen then in Washington; after he had gone
on for some time with his speech he was asked how much more
time he would probably occupy. He replied 'I believe Mr. Burke
took three months for his speech on Warren Hastings'
indictment. I think I may probably get through in ninety days,
perhaps in less time.' Thereupon they thought it just as well
to have the whole thing come to an end and it was moved that
the matter should be laid on the table. Mr. Adams consented,
and it was done."

_J. F. Clarke,
Anti-Slavery Days,
pages 57-59._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1842.
The tariff act.

See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1842.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1842.
The Ashburton Treaty with England.
Settlement of Northeastern boundary questions.

"It was arranged in December by the Peel ministry that Lord
Ashburton should be sent to Washington as a special minister
from Great Britain, with full powers to settle the boundary,
and all other pending disputes with the United States. …
Ashburton, formerly Alexander Baring, of the eminent banking
firm of Baring Brothers, and a son of its original founder,
was now an old man, who had retired on a princely fortune, and
being indifferent to fame, aspired only to bring these two
countries to more friendly terms. Like his father before him,
he had tact and plain good sense, and understood well the
American character, having married here during his youth. Lord
Ashburton arrived early the next April, and on the 13th of
June entered upon the duties of his mission.
{3379}
Maine and Massachusetts, the States most interested in the
disputed boundary, sent commissioners of their own to yield an
assent in this branch of the business. The whole business as
conducted at our capital had an easy and informal character.
Webster and Lord Ashburton represented alone their respective
governments; no protocols were used, nor formal records; and
the correspondence and official interviews went on after a
friendly fashion in the heat of summer, and while Congress was
holding its long regular session. … This Washington or
Ashburton treaty, as it is called to this day, bore date of
the day [August 9] when it was formally signed. It passed by
the Oregon or north-western boundary, a point on which harmony
was impossible, and this was the most pregnant omission of
all; it passed by the 'Caroline' affair; it ignored, too, the
'Creole' case, for Great Britain would not consent to
recognize the American claim of property in human beings. Nor,
on the other side, were the debts of delinquent States assumed
by the United States, as many British creditors had desired.
Mutual extradition in crimes under the law of nations, and the
delivery of fugitives from justice, were stipulated. But the
two chief features of this treaty were: a settlement of the
boundary between Great Britain and the United States on the
north-east, extending westward beyond the great lakes, and a
cruising convention for the mutual suppression of the
slave-trade. As to the northeast territory in dispute, which
embraced some 12,000 square miles, seven-twelfths, or about as
much as the King of the Netherlands had awarded, were set off
to the United States; Great Britain taking the residue and
securing the highlands she desired which frown upon the
Canadian Gibraltar, and a clear though circuitous route
between Quebec and Halifax. Our government was permitted to
carry timber down the St. John's River, and though becoming
bound to pay Maine and Massachusetts $300,000 for the strip of
territory relinquished to Great Britain, gained in return
Rouse's Point, on Lake Champlain, of which an exact survey
would have deprived us. By the cruising convention clause,
which the President himself bore a conspicuous part in
arranging, the delicate point of 'right of search' was
avoided; for instead of trusting Great Britain as the police
of other nations for suppressing the African slave-trade, each
nation bound itself to do its full duty by keeping up a
sufficient squadron on the African coast. It so happened that
Great Britain, by softening the old phrase 'right of search'
into 'right of visitation,' had been inducing other nations to
guarantee this police inspection of suspected slave vessels.
In December, 1841, ambassadors of the five great European
powers arranged in London a quintuple league of this
character. But France, hesitating to confirm such an
arrangement, rejected that league when the Ashburton treaty
was promulgated, and hastened to negotiate in its place a
cruising convention similar to ours on the slave-trade
suppression; nor was the right of search, against which
America had fought in the war of 1812, ever again invoked,
even as a mutual principle, until by 1862 the United States
had grown as sincere as Great Britain herself in wishing to
crush out the last remnant of the African traffic. This
cruising convention, however, left the abstract question of
search untouched, and in that light Sir Robert Peel defended
himself in Parliament. The Ashburton treaty was honorable, on
the whole, for each side; what it arranged was arranged
fairly, and what it omitted was deferred without prejudice. …
So satisfactory, in fine, was the treaty, despite all
criticism, that the Senate ratified it by more than a
three-fourths vote, and at a time, too, when the Whig Congress
was strongly incensed against the administration, and Webster
had made bitter enemies."

_J. Schouler,
History of the United States,
volume 4, chapter 17, pages 400-403._

ALSO IN:
_D. Webster,
Diplomatic and Official Papers._

_G. T. Curtis,
Life of Webster,
chapters 28-29 (volume 2)._

_Treaties and Conventions between the United States and
other countries (edition of 1889),
pages 432-438._

_I. Washburn, Jr.,
The Northeastern Boundary
(Maine Historical Society Collections, volume 8)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1844.
Fifteenth Presidential Election.
Choice of James K. Polk.