Chapter CDLII: Act 8: Parliament 1. repeated in Act 99. Parliament 7 (49)

"On March 17, 1776, Vergennes presented to his associates in
the cabinet—Maurepas, Turgot (controller-general), Sartine
(secretary of the navy), and St. Germain (secretary of war)—a
paper entitled 'Considerations,' which, after for many years
evading the search of historians, … was brought to light by De
Witt and republished by Doniol. In this important paper
Vergennes, after some general reflections on the advantages
which the two crowns of France and Spain derived from the
continuance of the civil war in America, and, on the other
hand, on the inconveniences which might arise from the
independence of the Colonies, and the probability that, in
case of failure in North America, England would, to recover
its credit, turn its arms against the French and Spanish
possessions in America, proceeds to consider the course at
once to be pursued. He bitterly attacks the English for their
habitual breach of good faith, violation of treaties, and
disregard of that observance of the sacred laws of morality
which distinguish the French, and infers that they will take
the first opportunity to declare war against France or invade
Mexico. No doubt, if the kings of France and Spain had martial
tendencies; if they obeyed the dictates of their own
interests, and perhaps the justice of their cause, which was
that of humanity, so often outraged by England; if their
military resources were in a sufficiently good condition, they
would feel that Providence had evidently chosen that very hour
for humiliating England and revenging on her the wrongs she
had inflicted on those who had the misfortune to be her
neighbors and rivals, by rendering the resistance of the
Americans as desperate as possible. The exhaustion produced by
this internecine war would prostrate both England and her
Colonies, and would afford an opportunity to reduce England to
the condition of a second-rate power; to tear from her the
empire she aimed at establishing in the four quarters of the
world with so much pride and injustice, and relieve the
universe of a tyranny which desires to swallow up both all the
power and all the wealth of the world. But the two crowns not
being able to act in this way, they must have recourse to a
circumspect policy." Vergennes "draws the following
inferences:
(1) That they should continue dexterously to keep the English
ministry in a state of false security with respect to the
intentions of France and Spain.
(2) That it would be politic to give the insurgents secret
assistance in military stores and money; that the admitted
utility would justify this little sacrifice, and no loss of
dignity or breach of equity would be involved in it.
(3) That it would not be consistent with the king's dignity or
interest to make an open contract with the insurgents until
their independence was achieved.
(4) That in case France and Spain should furnish assistance,
they should look for no other return than the success of the
political object they had at that moment in view, leaving
themselves at liberty to be guided by circumstances as to any
future arrangements.
(5) That perhaps a too-marked inactivity at the present crisis
might be attributed by the English to fear, and might expose
France to insults to which it might not be disposed to submit.
The English, he adds, respect only those who can make
themselves feared.
(6) That the result to which all these considerations led was
that the two crowns should actively prepare means to resist or
punish England, more especially as, of all possible issues,
the maintenance of peace with that power was the least
probable.
… It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the French
support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the
humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and
exercised a decisive influence. There was a conviction, and a
right one, in France that for Britain to hold under control
the whole of North America as well as of India would give her
a maritime supremacy, as well as a superiority in wealth,
which would constitute a standing menace to the rest of the
civilized world. There was, again, an enthusiasm among the
young nobility and among officers in the army for America,
which, even aside from the bitterness towards Britain with
which it was mingled, had great effect on people as well as on
court; and to this was added the sympathy of doctrinaire
political philosophers who then and for some time afterwards
had great power in forming French public opinion. By the
enthusiasm of the young nobility the queen—brilliant, bold,
weary of the traditions of the old court, inconsiderate as to
ultimate political results—was affected, and through her her
husband was reached. But above this was the sense of right
which was uppermost in the breast of the unfortunate sovereign
who then, with little political experience but high notions of
duty as well as of prerogative, occupied the throne."

_F. Wharton, editor,
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence
of the United States,
Introduction, chapter 4 (volume 1)._

"From the earliest moment France had been hopefully regarded
by the colonists as probably their friend and possibly their
ally. To France, therefore, the first American envoy was
dispatched with promptitude [receiving his instructions in
March and reaching Paris in the following June, 1776] even
before there was a declaration of independence or an
assumption of nationality. Silas Deane was the man selected.
He was the true Yankee jack-at-all-trades; he had been
graduated at Yale College, then taught school, then practiced
law, then engaged in trade, had been all the while advancing
in prosperity and reputation, had been a member of the first
and second congresses, had failed of reëlection to the third,
and was now without employment. Mr'. Parton describes him as
'of somewhat striking manners and good appearance, accustomed
to live and entertain in liberal style, and fond of showy
equipage and appointment.' Perhaps his simple-minded
fellow-countrymen of the provinces fancied that such a man
would make an imposing figure at an European court.
{3242}
He developed no other peculiar fitness for his position; he
could not even speak French; and it proved an ill hour for
himself in which he received this trying and difficult honor.
… Deane arrived in France in June, 1776. He had with him a
little ready money for his immediate personal expenses, and
some letters of introduction from Franklin. It was intended to
keep him supplied with money by sending cargoes of tobacco,
rice, and indigo consigned to him, the proceeds of which would
be at his disposal for the public service. He was instructed
to seek an interview with de Vergennes, the French minister
for foreign affairs, and to endeavor with all possible
prudence and delicacy to find out what signs of promise the
disposition of the French government really held for the
insurgents. He was also to ask for equipment for 25,000
troops, ammunition, and 200 pieces of field artillery, all to
be paid for—when Congress should be able! In France he was to
keep his mission cloaked in secure secrecy, appearing simply
as a merchant conducting his own affairs. … Before the arrival
of Deane the interests of the colonies had been already taken
in hand and substantially advanced in France by one of the
most extraordinary characters in history. Caron de
Beaumarchais was a man whom no race save the French could
produce, and whose traits, career, and success lie hopelessly
beyond the comprehension of the Anglo-Saxon. Bred a
watchmaker, he had the skill, when a mere youth, to invent a
clever escapement balance for regulating watches; had he been
able to insert it into his own brain he might have held more
securely his elusive good fortunes. From being an ingenious
inventor he became an adventurer general, watchmaker to the
king, the king's mistresses, and the king's daughters, the
lover, or rather the beloved, of the wife of the controller of
the king's kitchen, then himself the controller, thence a
courtier, and a favorite of the royal princesses. Through a
clever use of his opportunities he was able to do a great
favor to a rich banker, who in return gave him chances to
amass a fortune, and lent him money to buy a patent of
nobility. This connection ended in litigation, which was near
ruining him; but he discovered corruption on the part of the
judge, and thereupon wrote his Memorials, of which the wit,
keenness, and vivacity made him famous. He then rendered a
private, personal, and important service to Louis XV., and
soon afterwards another to the young Louis XVI. … He became
frenzied in the American cause. In long and ardent letters he
opened upon King Louis and his ministers a rattling fire of
arguments sound and unsound, statements true and untrue,
inducements reasonable and unreasonable, forecastings probable
and improbable, politics wise and unwise, all designed to show
that it was the bounden duty of France to adopt the colonial
cause."

_J. T. Morse, Jr.,
Benjamin Franklin,
chapter 9._

Soon after the arrival of Deane in Paris, the American
Congress, having determined to declare the independence of the
states represented in it, appointed a committee "to prepare
the plan of a treaty to be proposed to foreign powers, which,
after a long discussion, was at length agreed to, and
ministers were appointed to negotiate the treaties proposed.
Mr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Jefferson, were elected; but,
the last mentioned gentleman having declined accepting the
appointment offered him, Mr. Arthur Lee, then in London, was
chosen in his place. These transactions were placed on the
secret journals, and no member was permitted to give any
specific information concerning them; or to state more than,
'that congress had taken such steps as they judged necessary
for obtaining foreign alliances.' The secret committee were
directed to make an effectual lodgment in France of £10,000
sterling, subject to the order of these commissioners. They
assembled in Paris early in the winter, and had an immediate
interview with the count De Vergennes. It was perceived that
the success of the American cruisers, whose captures had been
so considerable as to raise the price of insurance higher than
it had been at any time during the war with both France and
Spain, had excited a very favourable opinion of the capacities
and energies of the nation. They were assured that the ports
of France would remain open to their ships, and that the
American merchants might freely vend in them every article of
commerce, and purchase whatever might be useful for their
country. But it was apparent that the minister wished to avoid
a rupture with England, and was, therefore, unwilling to
receive them openly as the ministers of the United States, or
to enter into any formal negotiation with them."

_J. Marshall,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapter 7._

"It is … a settled rule of diplomacy that a minister should
not be pressed upon a foreign court by which it is understood
that he will not be received. To this may be added the rule
that applications for loans should, unless as part of a treaty
alliance, be made through business channels. In disregard of
these rules the majority of Congress, under the influence of
Richard H. Lee and Samuel Adams, instituted a series of
missions to European courts for the bare purpose of borrowing
money, when the courts so addressed not only gave no
intimation that they would receive these envoys, but when,
from the nature of things, as well as from unofficial
intimation, it should have been known that such reception
would be refused. With France there was no difficulty, as
France had intimated unofficially that such envoys would be
received, at least in a private capacity, France being then
ready to take the consequence of war with Britain. And this
reception was accorded … first to Silas Deane, then to
Franklin, and then to Arthur Lee. Here Franklin thought
Congress should stop, saying that ministers should not be sent
to sovereigns without first having some sort of assurance of
recognition of the United States as an independent
sovereignty, and that a 'virgin' republic, as he called it,
should wait till there was some such recognition before
thrusting embassies on foreign courts with demands for money.
Congress thought differently. Arthur Lee was instructed to go
to Madrid with an alternate commission to Berlin; William Lee
was sent to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The
Hague, Izard to Florence, and the instructions in each case
were to demand not only recognition, but subsidy. … The policy
of sending ministers to European courts where such ministers
were not received worked injuriously to the United States from
the mere fact of their non-reception. Another difficulty arose
from the circumstance that several of these ministers took up
their residence in Paris, and, without specific authority,
considered it their duty to take part in the counsels of the
American legation.
{3243}
Thus Ralph Izard, commissioned to Tuscany, never went there,
but remained in Paris, claiming a right to be informed of all
the details of the negotiations with France, and occupying no
small share of the time and care of Franklin with discussions
of this claim, which Franklin could not accede to, but on
which Izard continued to insist. When the triple legation of
Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee (and afterwards Franklin,
Arthur Lee, and Adams), was commissioned, it was understood
that its members were to divide, so that one (Franklin) should
remain in Paris, while the others should take charge of the
missions to other capitals. But Arthur Lee, when he found that
he could not be received in Madrid, or in Vienna, or in
Berlin, made but brief excursions to Spain, to Austria, and to
Berlin, reporting himself after each short trip promptly at
Paris, there to differ from Franklin not only as to important
business details, but as to the whole policy of the mission.
When Adams was in Paris, during their joint mission, he
concurred with Arthur Lee in what turned out to be the
disastrous measure of removing Williams as commercial agent
and putting in his place William Lee, with a nephew of William
and Arthur Lee as clerk; while on the whole question of
sending legations to foreign courts which had not consented to
receive them, and in the still more important question of the
attitude to be assumed by the commissioners to the French
court, Adams agreed with Lee. … It is due to Adams to say that
he saw the inherent difficulties of permanent missions
conducted by three joint commissioners; that he recommended
that there should be but one permanent minister to France; and
that he recognized Franklin's great influence with the French
ministry as a strong reason for his retention though without
colleagues. But there can be no doubt that down to the period
when Franklin became sole minister, the American cause in
Europe was much embarrassed by the fact that he had colleagues
associated with him."

_F. Wharton,
Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of The United States,
chapter 1, sections 16-17,
and chapter 9, section 106 (volume 1)._

Before Franklin or Lee reached France, Silas Deane had already
entered into negotiations with Beaumarchais and opened a train
of dealings which proved unfortunate for both. Leaving aside
"all the long controversy about the rights and wrongs of
Beaumarchais, which have never been completely and
satisfactorily solved, … it appears that a large part of the
misunderstanding between him and Deane and Arthur Lee is
attributable to a change of plan between April and July, 1776.
Beaumarchais's scheme of operation, when he saw Lee in London,
was to expend money which should, at least in pretence and
form, be obtained from the voluntary contributions of wealthy
Frenchmen in aid of the American cause; but in July, when he
saw Deane, that scheme had been dropped, and the project was
that he should appear as a merchant. … In May, there was a
plan on the part of the French government to employ a real
merchant; now the plan was to employ a comedy merchant. This
was exactly the role which Beaumarchais was qualified to fill,
and he proceeded to establish and open a large house, with all
the accessories of a house of business, as the same are
understood and represented on the stage, At that time it was
believed that the colonists had plenty of exportable products
which they could and would contribute for the purpose
[purchase?] of arms and ammunition. It was thought that their
main difficulty would be to find any market in which they
could purchase contraband of war. The chief assistance,
therefore, which they would need from France would be secret
permission to make this exchange in France. Beaumarchais's
commercial operations would be real commercial operations, and
at worst could only issue in some expenses and losses, on the
balance of account, which the French government might have to
make good. Beaumarchais approached Deane with all the forms
and reality of a commercial proposition, and Deane assured him
that he should have some returns in six months, and full pay
for everything which he supplied in a year. Two days later
they made a contract by which Congress was to pay the current
price of the goods in America when they should arrive, or take
them at the cost price, with insurance, charges, and
commission 'proportioned to the trouble and care, which cannot
now be fixed.' … August 18, Beaumarchais writes to the
Committee of Secret Correspondence that, led by esteem for a
people struggling for liberty, he has established an extensive
commercial house, solely for the purpose of supplying them
with all things useful, even gold for the payment of troops;
and that without waiting for their consent he has already
procured 200 cannons, 200,000 pounds of powder, 20,000 guns,
with balls, lead, clothing, etc. He wants the cargoes
consigned to him in return, and promises that he has great
power to use any consignments whatsoever; but he wants
especially tobacco. He signs this letter Roderique Hortales &
Co. … A million livres were advanced by Spain to Beaumarchais,
August 11, 1776, and the Farmers-general of France advanced a
million livres, but took advantage of the distress of the
Americans to stipulate that it should be paid for in tobacco
at half its then current price. Beaumarchais also advanced
money to Deane for his personal expenses; and it has never
been doubted that he exerted himself with the utmost energy,
if not always with the greatest prudence, to expedite the
shipment of the goods. Of the three ships which he despatched
at the end of the year, two were captured by the English; but
the one which arrived was of the greatest possible value to
the cause. … When Arthur Lee received his appointment as
Commissioner to France and entered upon the discharge of his
duties, he found that the promises made to him by Beaumarchais
… had not been kept. He reported to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence that a change in the mode of sending had been
settled between Deane and Hortales. … Arthur Lee always held
the attitude of suspicion that Deane and Beaumarchais were in
a conspiracy to levy contributions for themselves on the free
gifts of France to the United States. Franklin always affected
to ignore the dealings with Beaumarchais, and to treat them as
exclusively in the hands of Deane; while Congress always
showed themselves very careful not to pay for anything which
possibly was intended as a gift. Therefore Deane and
Beaumarchais were left for years to claim and protest that
there had been genuine mercantile contracts which had not been
fulfilled, and they could scarcely obtain attention. … September
8, 1777, Congress voted that Deane had no authority to make
contracts with persons to come to America.
{3244}
November 21, they voted to recall him. Undoubtedly the
vexation which Deane had caused them by sending over a great
number of persons to serve in the army, under contracts which
enabled them to demand large pay and high rank, was the chief
cause of irritation against him; but Arthur Lee had also been
poisoning the mind of his brother, and through him, of the
whole Lee-Adams faction in Congress, with suspicions of
Deane's honesty. Deane had found himself transferred, within a
period of two or three years, from an utterly obscure
existence at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to the position of a
quasi-ambassador at the court of France. He adopted a large
and expensive style of living, and kept open house for the
Americans at Paris. It is very reasonable to suppose that this
large expenditure on his part was one of the chief grounds of
belief that he was making great gain out of his position. …
The affair of Silas Deane has importance far beyond the merits
or the fate of that individual. The quarrel over him and his
rights and wrongs, as will presently be seen, entered into the
hottest party contests in Congress during the next two or
three years, and it comes up again often subsequently. It has
even been asserted that the intimacy into which John Adams was
thrown with the Lees, in this connection, was what made him
President of the United States, by winning him votes from
Virginia in 1796. January 1, 1778, Beaumarchais, having heard
that money had been given to the Americans through Grand, the
banker, writes to Vergennes: 'So I have lost the fruit of the
most noble and incredible labour by those very exertions which
conduct others to glory.' … He is in terror of bankruptcy.
Inasmuch as a treaty of alliance between France and the United
States was now made, matters had entered upon a new stage.
Beaumarchais, with his fictitious firm of Hortales, was no
longer necessary or useful. The French government dealt
directly with the American envoys in granting supplies and
subsidies. April 7, Congress made a contract with Hortales
that they should pay, for all the cargoes already shipped and
those to be shipped, the first cost, charges, and freight, in
France. The contract between Beaumarchais and Deane is
recognized. Hortales is to pay bills drawn every two months at
double usance for twenty-four million livres annually. This
article, however, is subject to ratification by the house in
Paris and the American Commissioners at Paris. American
produce is to be exported and consigned to this house.
Interest is to be paid on all sums due, with a commission of
two and a half per cent. From this time Beaumarchais falls out
of sight as an agent of aid and supplies to the American
cause, and becomes a claimant, who considers that he has been
treated with injustice and ingratitude by the United States."

_W. G. Sumner,
The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution,
chapter 8 (volume 1)._

"The episode of Beaumarchais … was a survival of the secret
diplomacy of Louis XV, for a short time exercising an
extraordinary influence in the first period of the reign of
Louis XVI. Louis XVI, on reaching the throne, found the
machinery of secret diplomacy so ingeniously constructed by
his predecessor in full operation; and, … for one or two
delicate inquiries at the outset of the new reign,
Beaumarchais, who of all the diplomatists of this peculiar
breed was the most adroit and fertile in expedients, was well
fitted. Hence came his employment, and from his employment
came his suggestions, full of brilliant wit and effective
reasoning, as to America. But the antagonism between him and
Vergennes was too marked to permit sustained political
relationship; and when Franklin entered into diplomatic life
in Paris Beaumarchais ceased to take a prominent political
position. And even during the period of Beaumarchais' greatest
activity it must be remembered that he was not technically
Vergennes' subordinate. It was one of the peculiarities of the
secret diplomacy of Louis XIV and Louis XV, as depicted by
Broglie in his admirable treatise on that topic, that even the
existence of the secret agent was not to be supposed to be
known to the king's ostensible ministers. This was not the
case with Beaumarchais; but at the same time Beaumarchais'
political influence ceased … when, on the arrival of Franklin,
Vergennes, with Franklin's aid, took control of Anglo-American
diplomacy."

_F. Wharton,
Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States,
chapter 4, section 55 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_E. E. Hale,
Franklin in France._

_J. Bigelow, editor,
Life of Franklin, by himself,
volume 2, chapters 13-15._

_J. Parton,
Life of Franklin,
part 6 (volume 2)._

_L. de Lomenie,
Beaumarchais and his Times,
chapters 20-23 (volume 3)._

_Papers in relation to the Case of Silas Deane
(Seventy-Six Society, 1855)._

_C. Tower, Jr.,
The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution,
volume 1, chapter 5._

See, also,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (FEBRUARY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1779.
The Thirteen Colonies become States.
The framing and adoption of State Constitutions.

"The recommendations to form governments proceeded from the
general congress; the work was done by the several states, in
the full enjoyment of self-direction. Each of them claimed to
be of right a free, sovereign, and independent state; each
bound its officers to bear to it true allegiance, and to
maintain its freedom and independence. Massachusetts, which
was the first state to frame a government independent of the
king, deviated as little as possible from the letter of its
charter; and, assuming that the place of governor was vacant
from the 19th of July 1775, it recognised the council as the
legal successor to executive power. On the 1st day of May
1776, in all commissions and legal processes, it substituted
the name of its 'government and people' for that of the king.
In June 1777, its legislature assumed power to prepare a
constitution; but, on a reference to the people, the act was
disavowed. In September 1779, a convention, which the people
themselves had specially authorized, framed a constitution. It
was in a good measure the compilation of John Adams, who was
guided by the English constitution, by the bill of rights of
Virginia, and by the experience of Massachusetts herself; and
this constitution, having been approved by the people, went
into effect in 1780. On the 5th of January 1776, New Hampshire
shaped its government with the fewest possible changes from
its colonial forms, like Massachusetts merging the executive
power in the council. Not till June 1783 did its convention
agree upon a more perfect instrument, which was approved by
the people, and established on the 31st of the following
October.
{3245}
The provisional constitution of South Carolina dates from the
26th of March 1776. In March 1778, a permanent constitution
was introduced by an act of the legislature. Rhode Island
enjoyed under its charter a form of government so thoroughly
republican that the rejection of monarchy, in May 1776,
required no change beyond a renunciation of the king's name in
the style of its public acts. A disfranchisement of Catholics
had stolen into its book of laws; but, so soon as it was
noticed, the clause was expunged. In like manner, Connecticut
had only to substitute the people of the colony for the name
of the king; this was done provisionally on the 14th of June
1776, and made perpetual on the 10th of the following October.
Before the end of June of the same year Virginia, sixth in the
series, first in the completeness of her work, by a
legislative convention without any further consultation of the
people, framed and adopted a bill of rights, a declaration of
independence, and a constitution. On the second of July 1776,
New Jersey perfected its new, self-created charter. Delaware
next proclaimed its bill of rights, and, on the 20th of
September 1776, the representatives in convention having been
chosen by the freemen of the state for that very purpose,
finished its constitution. The Pennsylvania convention adopted
its constitution on the 28th of September 1776; but the
opposition of the Quakers whom it indirectly disfranchised,
and of a large body of patriots, delayed its thorough
organization for more than five months. The delegates of
Maryland, meeting on the 14th of August 1776, framed its
constitution with great deliberation; it was established on
the 9th of the following November. On the 18th of December
1776, the constitution of North Carolina was ratified in the
congress which framed it. On the 5th of February 1777, Georgia
perfected its organic law by the unanimous agreement of its
convention. Last of the thirteen came New York, whose
empowered convention, on the 20th of April 1777, established a
constitution that, in humane liberality, excelled them all.
The privilege of the suffrage had been far more widely
extended in the colonies than in England; by general consent,
the extension of the elective franchise was postponed. The age
of twenty-one was a qualification universally required. So,
too, was residence, except that in Virginia and South Carolina
it was enough to own in the district or town a certain
freehold or 'lot.' South Carolina required the electors to
'acknowledge the being of a God, and to believe in a future
state of rewards and punishments.' 'White men alone could
claim the franchise in Virginia, in South Carolina, and in
Georgia; but in South Carolina a benign interpretation of the
law classed the free octaroon as a white, even though
descended through an unbroken line of mothers from an imported
African slave; the other ten states raised no question of
color. In Pennsylvania, in New Hampshire, and partially in
North Carolina, the right to vote belonged to every resident
taxpayer; Georgia extended it to any white inhabitant 'of any
mechanic trade'; with this exception, Georgia and all the
other colonies required the possession of a freehold, or of
property variously valued, in Massachusetts at about $200, in
Georgia at £10. Similar conditions had always existed, with
the concurrence or by the act of the colonists themselves.
Maryland prescribed as its rule that votes should be given by
word of mouth; Virginia and New Jersey made no change in their
usage; in Rhode Island each freeman was in theory summoned to
be present in the general court; he therefore gave his proxy
to his representative by writing his own name on the back of
his vote; all others adopted the ballot, New York at the end
of the war, the other eight without delay."

_G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 5, chapter 9._

ALSO IN:
_American Archives,
series 5, volumes 2-3 (as indexed)._

See, also,
VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776;
SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1776 (FEBRUARY-APRIL);
NEW YORK: A. D. 1777;
CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776;
NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1774-1776;
PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1776;
MARYLAND: A. D. 1776;
GEORGIA: A. D. 1775-1777;
NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1775-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (January-December).
The campaign on the Delaware.
Lord Howe in possession of Philadelphia.
Battles on the Brandywine and at Germantown.
The winter of Washington's army at Valley Forge.

"Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January
until the 28th of May, during which time no military movement
of importance took place. His men left for their homes as soon
as their terms of service expired, and as few militia entered
the camp to take their places, at times it seemed as if the
army would be so reduced as to be unworthy of the name. It was
not until late in the spring that the new levies reached
headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to
Middlebrook and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th
of June Howe marched from Brunswick and … endeavored to bring
on a general engagement, … but Washington refused to leave the
strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy. Early
in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its
object the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark
his troops and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or
Chesapeake, and march directly on the city. … On the 23d of
July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks on the vessels,
the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly. … Signal
fires were lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from
time to time by those who were watching for it, and messengers
carried inland the news of its progress. At last, on the 30th,
it was spoken off the capes of Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed
it too hazardous to sail up that river, and after consulting
with his brother, the general, continued on his course
southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay,
and on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry."
Meantime, Washington had been in great uncertainty as to the
destination and intentions of his antagonist, but had drawn
his army near to Philadelphia. It had just been joined by
several distinguished foreign officers, Lafayette, De Kalb and
Pulaski in the number. At Philadelphia there was consternation
on the approach of the enemy, but "the pacific influence which
the presence of a large Quaker population exercised seemed to
bear down all military efforts. … To impress the lukewarm with
the strength of his forces, and to inspire hopes in the
breasts of the patriotic, on the 24th of August Washington
marched his army through the streets of Philadelphia.
{3246}
The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them some
uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats." The
advance of Howe from Elk Ferry was slow, and it was not until
the 11th of September that the Americans encountered him, at
Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine, where they had taken position.
In the battle which occurred that day the British gained a
clear victory, by means of a successful flank movement which
Cornwallis executed, crossing the river some miles above,
while General Knyphausen made feigned attempts at Chad's Ford.
"The American loss was about 1,000, killed, wounded, and
prisoners; that of the British, 579. … The day after the
battle Washington marched from Chester to Philadelphia. He
rested his army two days at Germantown, and then recrossed the
Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle
should be risked before the city should be given up. On the
16th the two armies met on the high ground south of Chester
Valley and prepared for action. The skirmishing had actually
begun, when a violent storm stopped the engagement by ruining
the ammunition of both armies. Washington withdrew to the
hills north of the valley, and, finding it impossible to
repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again over the
Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and
attack their rear should they attempt to follow." But Wayne
was surprised at Paoli, and Washington was deceived by a
feigned movement, so that Howe succeeded in entering
Philadelphia without another battle, on the 26th, having
occupied Germantown the day before. "The main portion of
Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of a single
street, two miles in length, and five from the city." Here, on
the morning of October 4th, Washington attacked him, and, for
a time, with great success; but confusion and
misunderstandings on the part of the attacking columns arose,
which turned the half-won victory into a defeat. "The
Americans lost nearly 1,100 killed, wounded, and prisoners;
the British 521. … While the Americans were defeated in their
object, the moral results of the battle were in their favor.
It inspired them with confidence, and showed the world that,
though driven from the field of Brandywine, they were still
aggressive." The next few weeks were employed by Howe in
reducing the forts which commanded the Delaware. Fort Mifflin
was taken after a severe siege, and this compelled the
abandonment of Fort Mercer, from which the British had been
repulsed with heavy loss. Early in December Howe moved upon
Washington's lines, at Whitemarsh, intending an attack; but
found them so strong that he dared not venture the attempt,
and returned to Philadelphia. "As the season was advancing,
and the Americans were in no condition to keep the field, it
was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley Forge, on the
west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek empties
into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods
and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was
severely criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness.
But the position was central and easily defended. The army
arrived there about the middle of December, and the erection
of huts began. They were built of logs, and were 14 by 15 feet
each. The windows were covered with oiled paper, and the
openings between the logs were closed with clay. The huts were
arranged in streets, giving the place the appearance of a
city. It was the first of the year, however, before they were
occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the army had
become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the men
were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support
life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes
at the open fires. … The horses died of starvation by
hundreds, and the men were obliged to haul their own
provisions and firewood. As straw could not be found to
protect the men from the cold ground, sickness spread through
their quarters with fearful rapidity. 'The unfortunate
soldiers,' wrote Lafayette in after-years, 'were in want of
everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes;
their feet and their legs froze till they became black, and it
was often necessary to amputate them. … The army frequently
remained whole days without provisions, and the patient
endurance of both soldiers and officers was a miracle which
each moment served to renew.' … While the country around
Valley Forge was so impoverished by the military operations of
the previous summer as to make it impossible for it to support
the army, the sufferings of the latter were chiefly owing to
the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster after
leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its
sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the
congresses which had preceded it. 'The Continental Congress
and the currency,' wrote Gouverneur Morris in 1778, 'have
greatly depreciated.'"

_F. D. Stone,
The Struggle for the Delaware
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 6, chapter 5)._

The sufferings of the army at Valley Forge, and the shameful
neglect which it experienced, were indignantly described by
Washington, in a letter addressed to the President of
Congress, December 23, 1777: "Since the month of July," he
wrote, "we have had no assistance from the
quartermaster-general, and to want of assistance from this
department the commissary-general charges great part of his
deficiency. To this I am to add, that, notwithstanding it is a
standing order, and often repeated, that the troops shall
always have two days' provisions by them, that they might be
ready at any sudden call; yet an opportunity has scarcely ever
offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy, that has not
been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded on this
account. And this, the great and crying evil, is not all. The
soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by Congress, we see
none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of
Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have now little occasion
for; few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety
of one, and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof
of the little benefit received from a clothier-general, and as
a further proof of the inability of an army, under the
circumstances of this, to perform the common duties of
soldiers, (besides a number of men confined to hospitals for
want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same
account,) we have, by a field-return this day made, no less
than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men now in
camp unfit for duty, because they are barefoot and otherwise
naked.
{3247}
By the same return it appears, that our whole strength in
Continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have
joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive
of the Mary]and troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to more
than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty;
notwithstanding which; and that since the 4th instant, our
numbers fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they
have undergone, particularly on account of blankets (numbers
having been obliged, and still are, to sit up all night by
fires, instead of taking comfortable rest in a natural and
common way), have decreased near two thousand men. We find
gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going
into winter-quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution of
mine would warrant the Remonstrance), reprobating the measure
as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or
stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and
moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an
inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours
to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a
superior one, in all respects well-appointed and provided for
a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to
cover from depredation and waste the States of Pennsylvania
and Jersey. But what makes this matter still more
extraordinary in my eye is, that these very gentlemen,—who
were well apprized of the nakedness of the troops from ocular
demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than
others, and who advised me near a month ago to postpone the
execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a
resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong
assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days
agreeably to a decree of the State (not one article of which,
by the by, is yet come to hand),—should think a winter's
campaign, and the covering of these States from the invasion
of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I can assure
those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing
thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good
fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under
frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although
they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed
soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and, from my soul,
I pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to
relieve or prevent. It is for these reasons, therefore, that I
have dwelt upon the subject; and it adds not a little to my
other difficulties and distress to find, that much more is
expected of me than is possible to be performed, and that upon
the ground of safety and policy I am obliged to conceal the
true state of the army from public view, and thereby expose
myself to detraction and calumny."

_George Washington,
Writings,
edited by W. C. Ford,
volume 6, pages 259-262._

It was during this trying winter, while the army suffered at
Valley Forge, that it was joined by Baron Steuben, an
accomplished Prussian officer, trained in the school of
Frederick the Great, with a record of distinguished service in
the Seven Years War. He came as a volunteer, and was welcomed
by Washington, who found in him the organizer, the
disciplinarian, the instructor, which the rudely formed
American army so greatly needed. The services rendered by
Baron Steuben during that first winter of his stay in America
were especially valuable, beyond measure. In his own account
of the state of things which he found he says: "'My
determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon
my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied,
but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first
place, I informed myself relative to the military
administration. I found that the different branches were
divided into departments. There were those of the
quarter-master general, war commissary, provisions commissary,
commissary of the treasury, or paymaster of forage, etc., etc.
But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to
say, they had imitated the English administration, which is
certainly the most imperfect in Europe. The general asked me
to give him some statements concerning the arrangements of the
departments, and their various branches in the European
armies. I gave them to him, and, detailing therein the duties
of each department and of its different branches, dilated upon
the functions of the quarter-masters (maréchaux généraux de
logis) in particular, in which branch I had served myself for
a long time in the Seven Years' War. But the English system,
bad as it is, had already taken root. Each company and
quarter-master had a commission of so much per cent. on all
the money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense
was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were
none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were
those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the
depreciation of our currency—hence the expense of so many
millions. I pointed out to General Washington and several
members of Congress the advantages of the contract system. I
even drew up a memorandum on the subject, which Colonel
Laurens translated into English, showing the way in which
things were contracted for in the Prussian and French armies.
But whether it was that they thought such a system
impracticable in this country, or whether they were unable to
check the torrent of expense, things remained as they were. I
directed my attention to the condition of the troops, and I
found an ample field, where disorder and confusion were
supreme. … The number of men in a regiment was fixed by
Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry,
and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for
three, six, and nine months, who went and came every day,
rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company
complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and
division, were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon
which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or
of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number,
that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers.
Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen
a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one
corporal! … The soldiers were scattered about in every
direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants,
and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several
thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more
commissaries and quarter-masters at that time than all the
armies of Europe together; the most modest had only one
servant, but others had two and even three.
{3248}
If the captains and colonels could give no account of their
men, they could give still less an account of their arms,
accouterments, clothing, ammunition, camp equipage, etc.
Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all
the articles. A company, which consisted, in May, of fifty
men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then
consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits,
who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the
clothes, but the arms were carried off by those who had
completed their time of service. General Knox assured me that,
previous to the establishment of my department, there never
was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish
from 5,000 to 8,000 muskets to replace those which were lost
in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was
still greater. The American soldier, never having used this
arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his
beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not
astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the
States engaged their soldiers for from six to nine months.
Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his
successor received another from the public store. No captain
kept a book. Accounts were never furnished nor required. As
our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture
to say that during an entire campaign there have not been
twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. … The men
were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of
the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color
and make. I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge,
mounting guard in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old
blanket or woolen bed-cover. With regard to their military
discipline, I may safely say no such thing existed. … I
commenced operations by drafting 120 men from the line, whom I
formed into a guard for the general-in-chief. I made this
guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day;
and to remove that English prejudice which some officers
entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's
duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the
musket myself to show the men the manual exercise which I
wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each
drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., etc., and in a
fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a
military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy,
and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision. …
I paraded them in presence of all the officers of the army,
and gave them an opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They
formed in column; deployed; attacked with the bayonet; changed
front, etc., etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for
the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I
dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was
eagerly embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations on
a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterward to
brigades, and in less than three weeks I executed maneuvers
with an entire division in presence of the
commander-in-chief.' … The most interesting narrative of the
energy employed by Steuben, and the success of his system, is
given by his favorite aid-de-camp and intimate friend, William
North, who was with him from the beginning. He says in his
biographical sketch: 'Certainly it was a brave attempt!
Without understanding a word of the English language, to think
of bringing men, born free, and joined together to preserve
their freedom, into strict subjection; to obey without a word,
a look, the mandates of a master! that master once their
equal, or possibly beneath them, in whatever might become a
man! It was a brave attempt, which nothing but virtue, or
high-raised hopes of glory, could have supported. At the first
parade, the troops neither understanding the command, nor how
to follow in a changement to which they had not been
accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were
getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Captain B.
Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from
his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the
orders and interpret to the troops. "If," said the baron, "I
had seen an angel from heaven, I should not have more
rejoiced." … Walker became from that moment his aid-de-camp,
and remained to the end of the baron's life his dear and most
worthy friend. From the commencement of instruction, no time,
no pains, no fatigue were thought too great, in pursuit of
this great object. Through the whole of each campaign, when
troops were to maneuver, and that was almost every day, the
baron rose at three o'clock; while his servant dressed his
hair he smoked a single pipe and drank one cup of coffee, was
on horseback at sunrise, and, with or without his suite,
galloped to the parade. There was no waiting for a tardy
aid-de-camp, and those who followed wished they had not slept.
Nor was there need of chiding; when duty was neglected, or
military etiquette infringed, the baron's look was quite
sufficient.' … Steuben enjoyed the confidence of both officers
and men, and every thing he proposed was executed with as much
precision as if it were an order from the commander-in-chief.
Although he was only a volunteer, without any specific rank in
the army, he had greater power and authority than any general
could boast of."

_F. Kapp,
Life of Frederick William von Steuben,
chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapters 13, 18-19, and 23-27._

_G. W. Greene,
Life of General Nathanael Greene,
book 2, chapters 16-25 (volume l)._

_J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott,
History of Philadelphia,
chapter 17 (volume l)._

_C. J. Stille,
Major-General Anthony Wayne,