Chapter CDLXXI: Section 4: And be it further enacted, That this act shall (3)

"It had not yet come to be the acknowledged law of nations
that free ships make free goods. But nearly the same purpose
was answered, if the property of belligerents could be safely
carried in neutral ships under the pretense of being owned by
neutrals. The products of the French colonies, for example,
could be loaded on board of American vessels, taken to the
United States and reshipped there for France as American
property. England looked upon this as an evasion of the
recognized public law that property of belligerents was good
prize. … It was denied that neutrals could take advantage of a
state of war to enter upon a trade which had not existed in
time of peace; and American ships were seized on the high
seas, taken into port, and condemned in the Admiralty Courts
for carrying enemy's goods in such a trade. The exercise of
that right, if it were one by the recognized law of nations,
would be of great injury to American commerce, unless it could
be successfully resisted. … A war with England must be a naval
war; and the United States not only had no navy of any
consequence, but it was a part of Mr. Jefferson's policy, in
contrast with the policy of the preceding administrations,
that there should be none, except … gunboats kept on wheels
and under cover in readiness to repel an invasion. But there
was no fear of invasion, for by that England could gain
nothing. 'She is renewing,' Madison wrote in the autumn of
1805, 'her depredations on our commerce in the most ruinous
shapes, and has kindled a more general indignation among our
merchants than was ever before expressed.' These depredations
were not confined to the seizing and confiscating American
ships under the pretense that their cargoes were contraband.
Seamen were taken out of them on the charge of being British
subjects and deserters, not only on the high seas in larger
numbers than ever before, but within the waters of the United
States. No doubt these seamen were often British subjects and
their seizure was justifiable, provided England could
rightfully extend to all parts of the globe and to the ships
of all nations the merciless system of impressment to which
her own people were compelled to submit at home. … But even if
it could be granted that English naval officers might seize
such men without recourse to law, wherever they should be
found and without respect for the flag of another nation, it
was a national insult and outrage, calling for resentment and
resistance, to impress American citizens under the pretense
that they were British subjects. But what was the remedy? As a
last resort in such cases, nations have but one. Diplomacy and
legislation may be first tried, but if these fail, war must be
the final ordeal. For this the Administration made no
preparation, and the more evident the unreadiness the less was
the chance of redress in any other way. … The first measure
adopted to meet the aggressions of the English was an act
prohibiting the importation of certain British products. This
had always been a favorite policy with Madison. … The
President and Secretary were in perfect accord; for Jefferson
preferred anything to war, and Madison was persuaded that
England would be brought to terms by the loss of the best
market for her manufactures. … But the Administration did not
rely upon legislation alone in this emergency. The President
followed up the act prohibiting the introduction of British
goods by sending William Pinkney to England in the spring of
1806, to join Monroe, the resident minister, in an attempt at
negotiation. These commissioners soon wrote that there was
good reason for hoping that a treaty would be concluded, and
thereupon the non-importation act was for a time suspended. In
December came the news that a treaty was agreed upon, and soon
after it was received by the President. … Monroe and Pinkney
were enjoined, in tho instructions written by the Secretary of
State, to make the abandonment of impressment the first
condition of a treaty. A treaty, nevertheless, was agreed
upon, without this provision. … Without consulting the Senate,
though Congress was in session when the treaty was received,
and although the Senate had been previously informed that one
had been agreed upon, the President rejected it. … As
England's need of seamen increased, the captains of her
cruisers, encouraged by the failure of negotiation, grew
bolder in overhauling American ships. … In the summer of 1807
an outrage was perpetrated on the frigate Chesapeake, as if to
emphasize the contempt with which a nation must be looked upon
which only screamed like a woman at wrongs which it wanted the
courage and strength to resent, or the wisdom to compound for.
The Chesapeake was followed out of the harbor of Norfolk by
the British man-of-war Leopard, and when a few miles at sea,
the Chesapeake being brought to under the pretense that the
English captain wished to put some dispatches on board for
Europe, a demand was made for certain deserters supposed to be
on the American frigate. Commodore Barron replied that he knew
of no deserters on his ship, and that he could permit no
search to be made, even if there were. After some further
altercation the Englishman fired a broadside, killing and
wounding a number of the Chesapeake's crew. Commodore Barron
could do nothing else but surrender, for he had only a single
gun in readiness for use, and that was fired only once and
then with a coal from the cook's galley. The ship was then
boarded, the crew mustered, and four men arrested as
deserters. Three of them were negroes,—two natives of the
United States, the other of South America. The fourth man,
probably, was an Englishman. … For this direct national
insult, explanation, apology, and reparation were demanded,
and at the same time the President put forth a proclamation
forbidding all British ships of war to remain in American
waters. … Some preparation was made for war, but it was only
to call upon the militia to be in readiness, and to order Mr.
Jefferson's gunboats to the most exposed ports. Great Britain
was not alarmed. The captain of the Leopard, indeed, was
removed from his command, as having exceeded his duty; but a
proclamation on that side was also issued, requiring all ships
of war to seize British seamen on board foreign merchantmen,
to demand them from foreign ships of war, and if the demand
was refused to report the fact to the admiral of the fleet. …
New perils all the while were besetting American commerce.
{3334}
In November, 1806, Napoleon's Berlin decree was promulgated,
forbidding the introduction into France of the products of
Great Britain and her colonies, whether in her own ships or
those of other nations. … The decree, it was declared, was a
rightful retaliation of a British order in council of six
months before, which had established a partial blockade of a
portion of the French coast. … In the autumn of 1807 [the
President] called a special session of Congress. … He sent a
special message to the Senate, recommending an embargo. An act
was almost immediately passed, which, if anything more was
needed to complete the ruin of American commerce, supplied
that deficiency. A month before this time the English ministry
had issued a new order in council—the news of which reached
Jefferson as he was about to send in his message—proclaiming a
blockade of pretty much all Europe, and forbidding any trade
in neutral vessels, unless they had first gone into some
British port and paid duties on their cargoes; and within 24
hours of the President's message, recommending the embargo,
Napoleon proclaimed a new decree from Milan, by which it was
declared that any ship was lawful prize that had anything
whatever to do with Great Britain. … Within four months of its
enactment, Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts declared, in a
debate in Congress, that 'an experiment, such as is now
making, was never before—I will not say tried—it never before
entered into the human imagination. There is nothing like it
in the narrations of history or in the tales of fiction.' …
The prosperity and tranquillity which marked the earlier years
of Jefferson's administration disappeared in its last year. …
The mischievous results of the embargo policy were evident
enough to a sufficient number of Republicans to secure, in
February, 1809, the repeal [by the Non-intercourse Bill] of
that measure, to take effect the next month as to all
countries except England and France."

_S. H. Gay,
James Madison,
chapter 17._

The Non-intercourse Bill which repealed the general provisions
of the Embargo Act "excluded all public and private vessels of
France and England from American waters; forbade under severe
penalties the importation of British or French goods; … and
gave the President authority to reopen by proclamation the
trade with France or England in case either of these countries
should cease to violate neutral rights. … Such a
non-intercourse merely sanctioned smuggling."

_H. Adams,
History of the United States:
Second Administration of Jefferson,
volume 2, page 445._

ALSO IN:
_H. S. Randall,
Life of Jefferson,
volume 3, chapters 3-7._

_E. Schuyler,
American Diplomacy,
chapters 5 and 7._

_A. T. Mahan,
Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution,
chapters 17-18 (volume 2)._

_F. Wharton,
Digest of the International Law of the United States,
chapters 7, 16, and 21 (volume 2-3)._

See, also,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1803;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1812,
and FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1806-1807.
Aaron Burr's filibustering scheme.
His arrest and trial.

Aaron Burr had been chosen vice-president in 1800. But he had
lost all his friends in both parties in the election. In the
course of a bitter political quarrel in New York, in 1804, he
challenged Hamilton to a duel. Hamilton was mad enough to
accept the challenge and was killed. Burr, "after his duel
with General Hamilton, and after the term of his office as
vice-president had expired, … seemed to be left alone, and
abandoned by all political parties. The state of public
feeling in New York was such, after the death of Hamilton,
that his presence in that city could not be endured. In New
Jersey he had been indicted by a grand jury for murder. Thus
situated, his ambitious, active and restless spirit rendered
his condition intolerable to himself. On the 22nd March, but a
few days after he left forever the presidency of the United
States senate, he wrote to his son-in-law, Mr. Joseph Alston,
that he 'was under ostracism. In New York,' said he, 'I am to
be disfranchised, and in New Jersey to be hanged. Having
substantial objections to both, I shall not, for the present,
hazard either, but shall seek another country.' Accordingly,
early in May, he left Philadelphia for the western country,
and arrived at Lexington, in Kentucky, on the 20th of that
month. After travelling with great rapidity through that
state, he directed his course to Nashville, in Tennessee, and
from thence he journied through the woods to Natchez. From
Natchez he went by land to New Orleans, where he arrived on
the 25th June, 1805. At that time, General Wilkinson was in
that city, or in its neighborhood, and commanded the United
States troops stationed there. It does not appear that he
remained long in New Orleans, but soon again returned to
Lexington, in Kentucky, by the way of Nashville. He was at
Cincinnati, and at several places in Ohio, but in a very short
time made his appearance at St. Louis, in Missouri, and from
thence he travelled to Washington, at which place he arrived
on the 29th day of November. These immense journies he
performed in a little more than six months; before the great
western rivers were rendered navigable by steam, and when the
roads were badly constructed; and through a considerable part
of the country traversed by him there were no roads at all.
His movements were veiled in mystery, and all men wondered
what could be the motive which induced these extraordinary
journies. From January, 1806, to the month of August
following, he spent his time principally in Washington and
Philadelphia; but, in the month of August, he again set his
face towards the west, and was soon afterwards found in
Kentucky. About this time boats were provided, provisions and
munitions of war were collected, and men were gathering at
different points on the Ohio and Cumberland rivers. Government
now began to be alarmed. Mr. Tiffin, governor of Ohio, under
the advice of the president (Jefferson), seized the boats and
their cargo, and Burr was arrested in Kentucky; but no
sufficient proof appearing against him he was discharged. On
the 23d January, 1807, Mr. Jefferson sent a message to
congress, accompanied by several affidavits, in which he gave
the history of Burr's transactions, so far as they had come to
the knowledge of the administration. The message stated that,
on the 21st of October, General Wilkinson wrote to the
president that, from a letter he had received from Burr, he
had ascertained that his objects were, a severance of the
union on the line of the Allegany mountains, an attack upon
Mexico, and the establishment of an independent government in
Mexico, of which Burr was to be the head. That to cover his
movements, he had purchased, or pretended to have purchased,
of one Lynch, a tract of country claimed by Baron Bastiop,
lying near Natchitoches, on which he proposed to make a
settlement.
{3335}
That he had found, by the proceedings of the governor and
people of Ohio and Kentucky, that the western people were not
prepared to join him; but notwithstanding, there was reason to
believe that he intended, with what force he could collect, to
attack New Orleans, get the control of the funds of the bank,
seize upon the military and naval stores which might be found
there, and then proceed against Mexico. The president assured
congress that there was no reason to apprehend that any
foreign power would aid Colonel Burr. A considerable part of
the evidence going to show that Burr entertained criminal
designs, depended on the affidavit of Wilkinson. It is not my
intention to examine into the proofs of the guilt or innocence
of Burr, further than to remark, that from the character of
the vain, vaporing and unprincipled Wilkinson, as before and
since developed, no dependence can safely be placed upon his
statements, unless supported by strong circumstances, or other
evidence; and I believe it will not at this day be doubted,
that if Burr plotted treason, Wilkinson, in the first
instance, agreed to be his accomplice; that, as their
operations progressed, he began seriously to doubt of success,
and then communicated his knowledge of the affair to the
government, in order to save himself, and perhaps obtain a
reward. … That Burr himself was deceived by Wilkinson, there
can be no doubt. … But there was other evidence besides that
of Wilkinson, against Burr, which has never been explained. …
If his object was merely an attack upon Mexico, why did he not
openly avow it, when charged and indicted for treason against
his country? … Again, unless Colonel William Eaton, the man
who had then recently so gallantly distinguished himself on
the Barbary coasts, has perjured himself, Burr did form a
treasonable plot against his country. Colonel Eaton, on the
26th January, deposed, in open court, held before Judge Cranch
and others, at Washington, that during the preceding winter
(1806), Burr called upon him, and, in the first instance,
represented that he was employed by the government to raise a
military force to attack the Spanish Provinces in North
America, and invited Eaton to take a command in the
expedition; that Eaton, being a restless, enterprising man,
readily acceded to the proposal; that Burr made frequent calls
upon him, and in his subsequent interviews complained of the
inefficiency and timidity of the government, and, eventually,
fully developed his project; which was to separate the western
states from the union, and establish himself as sovereign of
the country. … Burr did not succeed in collecting and
organizing a force on the western waters; but, on the 1st day
of March, he was discovered wandering alone in the Tombigbee
country, near the line of Florida. … The trial of the
indictment against Burr, for treason, occupied many weeks, but
he was finally acquitted by the jury, without swearing any
witness in his defence. The acquittal seems to have been on
technical grounds. … After his acquittal, Colonel Burr appears
still to have persevered in the project of making an effort to
detach Mexico from the Spanish government. On the 7th of June,
1808, he sailed from New York for Europe, it would seem in the
hope of engaging the British government to fit out an
expedition against Mexico, in which he would take a part. In
this he was entirely unsuccessful. His application to the
French government was equally vain and useless. He spent four
years wandering about in Europe."

_J. D. Hammond,
History of Political Parties in the State of New York,
chapter 12 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_W. H. Safford,
The Blennerhassett Papers,
chapters 6-15._

_M. L. Davis,
Memoirs of Burr,
volume 2, chapters 17-20._

_J. Parton,
Life of Burr,
chapters 21-26 (volume 2)._

_H. Adams,
History of the United States:
Second Administration of Jefferson,
volume 1, chapters 10-14 and 19._

_D. Robertson,
Report of Trials of Burr._

See BLENNERHASSETT'S ISLAND.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1806-1812.
The Cumberland Road.
The first National work of "Internal Improvement."

"In 1806 the United States began the Cumberland Road, its
first work of the kind; but it was intended to open up the
public lands in Ohio and the country west, and was nominally
paid for out of the proceeds of those public lands. Just as
the embargo policy was taking effect, Gallatin, encouraged by
the accumulation of a surplus in the Treasury, brought in a
report, April 4, 1808, suggesting the construction of a great
system of internal improvements: it was to include coastwise
canals across the isthmuses of Cape Cod, New Jersey, upper
Delaware and eastern North Carolina; roads were to be
constructed from Maine to Georgia, and thence to New Orleans,
and from Washington westward to Detroit and St. Louis. He
estimated the cost at twenty millions, to be provided in ten
annual instalments. Jefferson himself was so carried away with
this prospect of public improvement that he recommended a
constitutional amendment to authorize such expenditures. The
whole scheme disappeared when the surplus vanished; but from
year to year small appropriations were made for the Cumberland
Road, so that up to 1812 more than $200,000 had been expended
upon it."

_A. B. Hart,
Formation of the Union
(Epochs of American History),
section 121._

"The Cumberland Road was always a pet enterprise with Mr.
Clay. … Its eastern terminus was Cumberland on the Potomac,
from which it takes its name. Thence it was projected to
Wheeling on the Ohio, crossing the Alleganies; from Wheeling
to Columbus, Ohio; and thence westward through Indiana,
Illinois, and Missouri, to Jefferson, the capital of the
latter State. … After Mr. Clay went to Congress in 1806, and
while he was there, this great national work required and
realized his constant attention and zealous advocacy. It was
owing to his exertions chiefly that it ever reached Wheeling,
and passed on so far into the State of Ohio. The last
appropriations made for this road were in 1834 and 1835, with
a view of repairing it, and giving it over to the States
through which it passed, if they would accept it, and keep it
in repair."

_C. Colton,
Life, Correspondence, and Speeches of Henry Clay,
volume 6, page 7._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1807.
Practical beginning of steam-boat navigation.

See STEAM NAVIGATION.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1807.
Abolition of the Slave-Trade.
The measure in Congress.
Significance of Southern action.

By the terms of the Constitution, Congress was deprived of
power to interfere with the importation of slaves before the
year 1808, but no longer. The time now approached when that
restraint would cease, and the President in his annual message
brought the subject to notice.
{3336}
"It was referred to a committee of which Mr. Early of Georgia
was the chairman. There was no difference of opinion as to the
prohibition of the traffic, or at least no expression of any;
but the practical details of the law, the penalties by which
it was to be enforced, and, above all, the disposition to be
made of such negroes as might be brought into the country in
violation of it, gave rise to violent and excited debates. The
committee reported a law prohibiting the slave-trade after the
31st of December, 1807, imposing certain penalties for its
breach, and providing that all negroes imported after that
date should be forfeited. The object of this provision
undoubtedly was to obtain directly what the Constitution only
gave indirectly and by implication,—the sanction of the
government of the United States to the principle of
slave-holding, by making it hold and sell men as property. The
astuteness of the slave-holding mind on all points touching
slavery was shown in this proposition, and all the tactics of
bullying and bluster with which later Congressional campaigns
have made us familiar, were employed in the debate to which it
gave rise. It having been moved that the words 'shall be
entitled to his or her freedom' should be inserted after the
word 'forfeited,' a furious fight ensued over this amendment.
The Southern members resisted it, on the ground that the
emancipation of the imported Africans would increase the
number of free negroes, who, as Mr. Early affirmed, 'were
considered in the States where they are found in considerable
numbers as instruments of murder, theft, and conflagration.'
And so craftily was this proposition of forfeiture to the
government qualified, that its drift was not at first
discerned by the Northern members. For, strong as was their
disapprobation of slavery in the abstract, they felt no
disposition to expose their Southern brethren to all the
horrors of insurrection which it was assumed would follow the
multiplication of free negroes. Indeed, Mr. Early candidly
said, that, if these negroes were left free in the Southern
States, not one of them would be alive in a year. And although
the Federalists as a party, and Mr. Quincy eminently among
them, regarded the political element of slavery as full of
dangers to the future of the nation, these opinions had worked
no personal and social alienation between Northern and
Southern men, such as has since taken place. … There was,
therefore, quite disposition enough to arrange this matter in
the way the most satisfactory to the masters, without so rigid
a regard to the rights of the negroes as, it is to be hoped,
would have been had in later times. Mr. Quincy at first
opposed striking out the forfeiture clause, on the ground that
this was the only way in which the United States could get the
control of the Africans, so as to dispose of them in the
manner most for their own interest. … These views influenced a
majority of the Northern members until the question of the
final passage of the bill approached. At last they came to a
sense of the disgrace which the forfeiture of the negroes to
the government, and the permission to it to sell them as
slaves if it so pleased, would bring upon the nation, and the
whole matter was recommitted to a committee of one from each
State. … This committee reported a bill providing that such
imported negroes should be sent to such States as had
abolished slavery, there to be bound out as apprentices for a
term of years, at the expiration of which they should be free.
This bill produced a scene of great and violent excitement on
the part of the slaveholders. Mr. Early declared that the
people of the South would resist this provision with their
lives! This resistance to a measure which proposed doing all
the slaveholders had demanded for their own safety, to wit,
removing the imported negroes from the slaveholding domain and
providing for them in the Free States, showed that their
purpose was, at least in part, to have the negroes sold as
slaves to themselves. This object they did virtually gain at
last, as the final settlement was by a bill originating in the
Senate, providing that, though neither importer nor purchaser
should have a title to such negroes, still the negroes should
be subject to any regulation for their disposal that should be
made by the States into which they might be brought. The
design of the slaveholding party to make the United States
recognize the rightfulness of property in man was thus
avoided, but it was at the cost of leaving the imported
Africans to the tender mercies of the Slave States. The fact
that the slaveholders were greatly incensed at the result, and
regarded it as an injury and an affront, does not make this
disposition of these unfortunates any the less discreditable
to Congress or the nation."

_E. Quincy,
Life of Josiah Quincy,
chapter 5._

See, also, SLAVERY, NEGRO: A. D. 1792-1807.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1808.
The effects of the Embargo.

"The dread of war, radical in the Republican theory, sprang
not so much from the supposed waste of life or resources as
from the retroactive effects which war must exert upon the
form of government; but the experience of a few months showed
that the embargo as a system was rapidly leading to the same
effects. … Personal liberties and rights of property were more
directly curtailed in the United States by embargo than in
Great Britain by centuries of almost continuous foreign war. …
While the constitutional cost of the two systems was not
altogether unlike, the economical cost was a point not easily
settled. No one could say what might be the financial expense
of embargo as compared with war. Yet Jefferson himself in the
end admitted that the embargo had no claim to respect as an
economical measure. … As the order was carried along the
seacoast, every artisan dropped his tools, every merchant
closed his doors, every ship was dismantled. American
produce—wheat, timber, cotton, tobacco, rice—dropped in value
or became unsalable; every imported article rose in price;
wages stopped; swarms of debtors became bankrupt; thousands of
sailors hung idle round the wharves trying to find employment
on coasters, and escape to the West Indies or Nova Scotia. A
reign of idleness began; and the men who were not already
ruined felt that their ruin was only a matter of time. The
British traveller, Lambert, who visited New York in 1808,
described it as resembling a place ravaged by pestilence:—'The
port indeed was full of shipping, but they were dismantled and
laid up; their decks were cleared, their hatches fastened
down, and scarcely a sailor was to be found on board. Not a
box, bale, cask, barrel, or package was to be seen upon the
wharves.' … In New England, where the struggle of existence
was keenest, the embargo struck like a thunderbolt, and
society for a moment thought itself at an end.
{3337}
Foreign commerce and shipping were the life of the people,
—the ocean, as Pickering said, was their farm. The outcry of
suffering interests became every day more violent, as the
public learned that this paralysis was not a matter of weeks,
but of months or years. … The belief that Jefferson, sold to
France, wished to destroy American commerce and to strike a
deadly blow at New and Old England at once, maddened the
sensitive temper of the people. Immense losses, sweeping away
their savings and spreading bankruptcy through every village,
gave ample cause for their complaints. Yet in truth, New
England was better able to defy the embargo than she was
willing to suppose. She lost nothing except profits which the
belligerents had in any case confiscated; her timber would not
harm for keeping, and her fish were safe in the ocean. The
embargo gave her almost a monopoly of the American market for
domestic manufactures; no part of the country was so well
situated or so well equipped for smuggling. … The growers of
wheat and live stock in the Middle States were more hardly
treated. Their wheat, reduced in value from two dollars to
seventy-five cents a bushel, became practically unsalable. …
The manufacturers of Pennsylvania could not but feel the
stimulus of the new demand; so violent a system of protection
was never applied to them before or since. Probably for that
reason the embargo was not so unpopular in Pennsylvania as
elsewhere, and Jefferson had nothing to fear from political
revolution in this calm and plodding community. The true
burden of the embargo fell on the Southern States, but most
severely upon the great State of Virginia. Slowly decaying,
but still half patriarchal, Virginia society could neither
economize nor liquidate. Tobacco was worthless; but 400,000
negro slaves must be clothed and fed, great establishments
must be kept up, the social scale of living could not be
reduced, and even could not clear a large landed estate
without creating new encumbrances in a country bankruptcy
where land and negroes were the only forms of property on
which money could be raised. Stay-laws were tried, but served
only to prolong the agony. With astonishing rapidity Virginia
succumbed to ruin, while continuing to support the system that
was draining her strength."

_H. Adams,
History of the United States:
Second Administration of Jefferson,
volume 2, chapter 12._

"'Our passion,' said Jefferson, 'is peace.' He not only
recoiled as a philanthropist from bloodshed, but as a
politician he with reason dreaded military propensities and
sabre sway. Such preparations for war as he could be induced
to make were scrupulously defensive, and his fleet of
gun-boats for the protection of the coast to be launched when
the invader should appear excited a smile. Alone among all
statesmen he tried to make war without bloodshed by means of
an embargo on trade. … It is not the highest of his titles to
fame in the eyes of his countrymen, but it may be not the
lowest in the court of humanity, that he sacrificed his
popularity in the attempt to find a bloodless substitute for
war. His memory recovered from the shock and his reign over
American opinion endured."

_Goldwin Smith,
The United States:
An outline of Political History, 1492-1871,
chapter 3._

ALSO IN:
_H. A. Hill,
Trade and Commerce of Boston, 1780-1880
(Memorial History of Boston,
volume 4, part 2, chapter 8)._

_E. Quincy,
Life of Josiah Quincy,
chapters 6-7._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1808.
Sixth Presidential Election.
Jefferson succeeded by Madison.

"In anticipation of Jefferson's retirement there had been … no
little dispute and lively canvassing as to the next incumbency
of the presidential chair. … Upon Madison, it was generally
considered that Jefferson had fixed his personal preference. …
But Madison had many political enemies in the Republican ranks
among Virginians themselves. … Monroe was the growing
favorite. Republicans in Congress, who, from one cause or
another, had become disaffected to the Secretary of State,
made their new choice manifest. The Quids [see QUIDS], having
courted Monroe by letter when he was abroad, crowded about him
when he passed through Washington on his way home, just as the
Embargo became a law. … Monroe hesitated, unwilling to make a
breach; and rather than hazard the Republican cause, or the
future prospects of their favorite, his more temperate friends
took him off the list of candidates, so that at the usual
Congressional caucus, held at the capital, Madison was
nominated almost unanimously for President, and George Clinton
for Vice-President. But out of 139 Republican Senators and
Representatives only 89 were present at this caucus, some
being sick or absent from the city, and others keeping away
because dissatisfied. Clinton had been a disappointed
candidate, as well as Monroe, for the highest honors. … His
ambition was pursued beyond the caucus, notwithstanding his
renomination as Vice-President, until the friends of Madison,
who had profited by the diversion among competitors,
threatened to drop Clinton from the regular ticket unless he
relinquished his pretensions to a higher place than that
already assigned him. Meantime the schismatic Republicans had
united in protesting to the country against Congressional
dictation, at the same time pronouncing that the caucus which
had nominated Madison was irregularly held. This open letter
was signed by 17 Republican members of Congress. …
Unfortunately for their influence in the canvass, however,
they could not agree as to whether Monroe or Clinton should
head the ticket. Objectionable, moreover, as the Congressional
caucus might be, many more Presidential terms elapsed before
other nominating machinery superseded it. National delegates,
the national congress or convention of a party, was an idea
too huge as yet for American politics to grasp in these days
of plain frugality. … Harassed with foes within and without,
with dissensions among the friends of rival candidates for the
succession, with an odious and profitless measure to execute,
against which citizens employed both cunning and force, it
seemed, at one time, as if the administration party would go
down in the fall elections. But Jefferson's wonderful
popularity and the buoyancy of Republican principles carried
the day. The regular Presidential ticket prevailed, not
without a diminished majority."

_J. Schouler,
History of the United States,
chapter 6, section 2 (volume 2)._

James Madison, Democratic Republican, was elected, receiving
122 votes in the Electoral College; George Clinton, of the
same party, receiving 6, and Charles C. Pinckney, Federalist,
47. George Clinton was chosen Vice President.

{3338}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1808-1810.
Substitution of Non-intercourse for Embargo.
Delusive conduct of Napoleon.

"All through the year 1808 and the first two months of 1809,
the heavy hand of the embargo was laid on American commerce.
The close of Jefferson's administration was signalized by an
important change in the policy of the American Government.
Almost the last act which Jefferson performed as President was
to sign the new law which repealed the embargo, and
substituted non-intercourse—a law which instead of universal
prohibition of trade, merely prohibited commerce with Great
Britain and with the countries under French control. The
statute further authorized the President to suspend this
prohibition as to either Great Britain or France as soon as
one or the other should desist from violating neutral rights.
An excuse for renewing commercial relations was not long
delayed. On April 21, 1809, immediately upon the rather
unexpected conclusion of a liberal and satisfactory diplomatic
arrangement with Erskine, the British minister in Washington,
the non-intercourse act was suspended as to Great Britain; and
foreign trade, long dormant, suddenly sprang into excessive
activity. This happy truce was short-lived. Erskine had
effected his arrangement by a deliberate and almost defiant
disregard of Canning's instructions; and his acts were
promptly disavowed by his government. His recall was followed
by a renewal of non-intercourse under a presidential
proclamation of August 9, 1809. But notwithstanding the
disavowal of Erskine, the British Government had made an
apparent concession to the United States by the adoption of
new orders in council which revoked the stringent prohibitions
of the orders of 1807, and substituted a paper blockade of all
ports and places under the government of France—a distinction
which, on the whole, was perhaps without any important
difference. France, on the other hand, entered upon a course
of further aggressions. Louis Bonaparte was driven from his
kingdom of Holland because he refused to attack neutral
commerce, and all American ships found lying at Amsterdam were
seized. Finally, by the decree of Rambouillet, every American
ship found in any French port was confiscated and ordered
sold. England and the United States thus seemed for the moment
to be slowly drawing together in the presence of a common
enemy, when suddenly the whole situation of affairs was
changed by the formal announcement on August 5, 1810, of the
Emperor's intended revocation of the decrees of Berlin and
Milan, such revocation to take place on the first day of the
following November, provided the British Government revoked
their orders in council, or (and this was the important
provision) the United States caused their rights to be
respected. This promise, as Napoleon had privately pointed out
a few days before, committed him to nothing; but it was
accepted with all seriousness on the part of the United
States. In reliance upon the imperial word, commercial
intercourse with Great Britain—which had been once more
resumed in May, 1810—was for the third time suspended. This,
it was thought, was 'causing American rights to be respected';
and although the condemnation of American ships went on
without a pause in every continental port, the Government of
the United States clung with the strongest pertinacity to the
belief that Napoleon's declarations were sincere. The
practical effect of all this was to bar the door against any
possible settlement with Great Britain. Commerce was now
permanently suspended; there was a long list of grievances to
be redressed, and negotiation was exhausted."

_G. L. Rives, editor,
Selections from the Correspondence of Thomas Barclay,
chapter 6._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1810.
The Third Census.

Total population, 7,215,791 (being an increase of nearly 36½
per cent. over the population shown in 1800), classed and
distributed as follows:

North.

White. Free black. Slave. Connecticut. 255,279 6,453 310 Illinois. 11,501 613 168 Indiana. 23,890 393 237 Maine. 227,736 969 0 Massachusetts. 465,303 6,737 0 Michigan. 4,618 120 24 New Hampshire. 213,390 970 0 New Jersey. 226,861 7,843 10,851 New York. 918,699 25,333 15,017 Ohio. 228,861 1,899 0 Pennsylvania. 786,804 22,492 795 Rhode Island. 73,314 3,609 108 Vermont. 216,963 750 0 ------- ------ ------ Total 3,653,219 78,181 27,510

South.

White. Free black. Slave. Delaware. 55,361 13,136 4,177 District of Columbia. 16,079 2,549 5,395 Georgia. 145,414 1,801 105,218 Kentucky. 324,237 1,713 80,561 Louisiana. 34,311 7,585 34,660 Maryland. 235,117 33,927 111,502 Mississippi. 23,024 240 17,088 Missouri. 17,227 607 3,011 North Carolina. 376,410 10,266 168,824 South Carolina. 214,196 4,554 196,365 Tennessee. 215,875 1,317 44,535 Virginia. 551,534 30,570 392,518 ------- ------- ------- 2,208,785 108,265 1,163,854

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1810-1812.
Continued provocation from England and France.
The "War of 1812" against Great Britain declared.

"Congress, on May 1, 1810, passed an act providing that
commercial non-intercourse with the belligerent powers should
cease with the end of the session, only armed ships being
excluded from American ports; and further, that, in case
either of them should recall its obnoxious orders or decrees,
the President should announce the fact by proclamation, and if
the other did not do the same within three months, the
non-intercourse act should be revived against that one,—a
measure adopted only because Congress, in its helplessness,
did not know what else to do. The conduct of France had
meanwhile been no less offensive than that of Great Britain.
On all sorts of pretexts American ships were seized in the
harbors and waters controlled by French power. A spirited
remonstrance on the part of Armstrong, the American Minister,
was answered by the issue of the Rambouillet Decree in May,
1810, ordering the sale of American vessels and cargoes
seized, and directing like confiscation of all American
vessels entering any ports under the control of France.
{3339}
This decree was designed to stop the surreptitious trade that
was still being carried on between England and the continent
in American bottoms. When it failed in accomplishing that end,
Napoleon instructed his Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Champagny, to inform the American Minister that the Berlin and
Milan Decrees were revoked, and would cease to have effect on
November 1, 1810, if the English would revoke their Orders in
Council, and recall their new principles of blockade, or if
the United States would 'cause their rights to be respected by
the English,'—in the first place restore the non-intercourse
act as to Great Britain. … The British government, being
notified of this by the American Minister, declared on
September 29 that Great Britain would recall the Orders in
Council when the revocation of the French decrees should have
actually taken effect, and the commerce of neutrals should
have been restored. … Madison, … leaning toward France, as was
traditional with the Republican party, and glad to grasp even
at the semblance of an advantage, chose to regard the
withdrawal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees as actual and done
in good faith, and announced it as a matter of fact on
November 1, 1810. French armed ships were no longer excluded
from American ports. On February 2, 1811, the non-importation
act was revived as to Great Britain. In May the British Court
of Admiralty delivered an opinion that no evidence existed of
the withdrawal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, which resulted
in the condemnation of a number of American vessels and their
cargoes. Additional irritation was caused by the capture, off
Sandy Hook, of an American vessel bound to France, by some
fresh cases of search and impressment, and by an encounter
between the American frigate President and the British sloop
Little Belt, which fired into one another, the British vessel
suffering most. But was American commerce safe in French
ports? By no means. … Outrages on American ships by French
men-of-war and privateers went on as before, … The pretended
French concession was, therefore, a mere farce. Truly, there
were American grievances enough. Over 900 American ships had
been seized by the British, and more than 550 by the French. …
By both belligerents the United States had been kicked and
cuffed like a mere interloper among the nations of the earth,
who had no rights entitled to respectful consideration. Their
insolence seemed to have been increased by the irresolution of
the American government, the distraction of counsel in
Congress, and the division of sentiment among the people. …
But … young Republican leaders came to the front to interpret
the 'national spirit and expectation.' They totally eclipsed
the old chiefs by their dash and brilliancy. Foremost among
them stood Henry Clay; then John C. Calhoun, William Lowndes,
Felix Grundy, Langdon Cheves, and others. They believed that,
if the American Republic was to maintain anything like the
dignity of an independent power, and to preserve, or rather,
regain, the respect of mankind in any degree,—ay, its
self-respect,—it must cease to submit to humiliation and
contemptuous treatment; it must fight,—fight somebody who had
wronged or insulted it. The Republicans having always a tender
side for France, and the fiction of French concessions being
accepted, the theory of the war party was that, of the two
belligerents, England had more insolently maltreated the
United States. Rumors were spread that an Indian war then
going on, and resulting in the battle of Tippecanoe on
November 7, 1811, was owing to English intrigues. Adding this
to the old Revolutionary reminiscences of British oppression,
it was not unnatural that the national wrath should generally
turn against Great Britain. … Not only the regular army was
increased, but the President was authorized to accept and
employ 50,000 volunteers. Then a bill was introduced providing
for the building of ten new frigates. … The war spirit in the
country gradually rose, and manifested itself noisily in
public meetings, passing resolutions, and memorializing
Congress. It was increased in intensity by a sensational
'exposure,' a batch of papers laid before Congress by the
President in March, 1812. They had been sold to the government
by John Henry, an Irish adventurer, and disclosed a
confidential mission to New England, undertaken by Henry in
1809 at the request of Sir James Craig, the governor of
Canada, to encourage a disunion movement in the Eastern
States. This was the story. Whatever its foundation, it was
believed, and greatly increased popular excitement." On the
4th of April the President signed a bill laying an embargo on
commerce with Great Britain for ninety days. "All over the
country the embargo was understood as meaning an immediate
preparation for war. … In May, 1812, President Madison was
nominated for reelection by the congressional caucus. It has
been said that he was dragooned into the war policy by Clay
and his followers with the threat that, unless he yielded to
their views, another candidate for the presidency would be
chosen. This Clay denied, and there was no evidence to
discredit his denial. Madison was simply swept into the
current by the impetuosity of Young America. … On June 1 the
President's war message came. On June 18 a bill in accordance
with it, which had passed both Houses, was signed by the
President, who proclaimed hostilities the next day. Thus Young
America, led by Henry Clay, carried their point. But there was
something disquieting in their victory. The majority they
commanded in Congress was not so large as a majority for a
declaration of war should be. In the House, Pennsylvania and
the states south and west of it gave 62 votes for the war, and
32 against it; the states north and east of Pennsylvania gave
17 yeas and 32 nays,—in all 79 for and 49 against war. This
showed a difference of sentiment according to geographical
divisions. Not even all the Republicans were in favor of war.
… Nor were the United States in any sense well prepared for a
war with a first-class power."

_C. Schurz,
Life of Henry Clay,
volume 1, chapter 5._

ALSO IN:
_S. Perkins,
History of the Late War,
chapters 1-2._

_C. J. Ingersoll,
Historical Sketch of the Second War between
the United States and Great Britain,
volume 1, chapter 1._

_E. Quincy,
Life of Josiah Quincy,
chapters 9-12._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1811.
Refusal to re-charter the Bank of the United States.

See MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1791-1816.

{3340}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1811.
General Harrison's campaign against Tecumseh and his league.
The Battle of Tippecanoe.

"During the interval between the Tripolitan war and the war of
1812, one noticeable campaign was made against the Indians.
The operation took place in 1811, under General William H.
Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory, and was directed
against the Shawnees and other tribes which adhered to
Tecumseh. This chief, with his brother, known as 'the
Prophet,' had been engaged since 1806 in planning a species of
crusade against the whites, and had acquired great influence
among the northwestern Indians. For the previous two years
Harrison's suspicions had been aroused by reports of
Tecumseh's intrigues, and attempts had been made from time to
time to negotiate with him, but without satisfactory results.
In the summer of 1811 it was decided to strike a decisive blow
at the Indians, and in the autumn Harrison, with a regiment of
regulars under Colonel Boyd, and a force of militia, marched
upon Tecumseh's town, situated on the Tippecanoe River. On the
7th of November the Indians, in Tecumseh's absence, attempted
to surprise Harrison's camp, but in the battle which followed
they were driven off, and presently abandoned their town,
which Harrison burned. The invading force then retired. The
importance of the expedition was largely due to the military
reputation which Harrison acquired by it."

_J. R. Soley,
The Wars of the United States
(Narrative and Critical History of the United States,
volume 7, chapter 6)._

ALSO IN:
_American State Papers: Indian Affairs,
volume 1, page 776._

_E. Eggleston and L. E. Seelye,
Tecumseh,
chapters 12-23._

_H. Adams,
History of the United States:
First Administration of Madison,
volume 2, chapters 4-5._

_J. B. Dillon,
History of Indiana,
chapters 35-38._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1812 (April).
Admission of Louisiana into the Union.

See LOUISIANA: A. D. 1812.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1812 (June-October).
Rioting at Baltimore.
The opening of the war and the unreadiness of the nation for it.
Hull's disastrous campaign and surrender, at Detroit.