Chapter IV: , VII (100)

Crippled by the great earthquake of 464 B. C., and harassed by
the succeeding Messenian War, "nothing could be done, on the
part of Sparta, to oppose the establishment and extension of
the separate alliance between Athens and Argos; and
accordingly the states of Northern Peloponnesus commenced
their armaments against Athens on their own account, in order
to obtain by force what formerly they had achieved by secret
intrigues and by pushing forward Sparta. To stop the progress
of the Attic power was a necessary condition of their own
existence; and thus a new warlike group of states formed
itself among the members of the disrupted confederation. The
Corinthians entered into a secret alliance with Ægina and
Epidaurus, and endeavored to extend their territory and obtain
strong positions beyond the Isthmus at the expense of Megara.
This they considered of special importance to them, inasmuch
as they knew the Megareans, whose small country lay in the
midst between the two hostile alliances, to be allies little
deserving of trust. … The fears of the Corinthians were
realized sooner than they had anticipated. The Megareans,
under the pressure of events, renounced their treaty
obligations to Sparta, and joined the Attico-Argive alliance.
… The passes of the Geranea, the inlets and outlets of the
Doric peninsula, now fell into the hands of the Athenians;
Megara became an outwork of Athens; Attic troops occupied its
towns; Attic ships cruised in the Gulf of Corinth, where
harbors stood open to them at Pegæ and Ægosthena. The
Athenians were eager to unite Megara as closely as possible to
themselves, and for this reason immediately built two lines of
walls, which connected Megara with its port Nisæa, eight
stadia off, and rendered both places impregnable to the
Peloponnesians. This extension of the hostile power to the
boundaries of the Isthmus, and into the waters of the western
gulf, seemed to the maritime cities of Peloponnesus to force
them into action. Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina commenced an
offensive war against Athens—a war which opened without
having been formally declared; and Athens unhesitatingly
accepted the challenge thrown out with sufficient distinctness
in the armaments of her adversaries. Myronides, an experienced
general and statesman, … landed with an Attic squadron near
Halieis (where the frontiers of the Epidaurians and Argives
met), and here found a united force of Corinthians,
Epidaurians, and Æginetans awaiting him. Myronides was
unsuccessful in his campaign. A few months later the hostile
fleets met off the island of Cecryphalea, between Ægina and
the coast of Epidaurus. The Athenians were victorious, and the
struggle now closed round Ægina itself. Immediately opposite
the island ensued a second great naval battle. Seventy of the
enemy's ships fell into the hands of the Athenians, whose
victorious fleet without delay surrounded Ægina. The
Peloponnesians were fully aware of the importance of Ægina to
them. Three hundred hoplites came to the relief of the island,
and the Corinthians marched across the Geranea into Megaris to
the relief of Ægina. It seemed impossible that, while the
fleet of the Athenians was fighting in the land of the Nile,
and another was lying before Ægina, they should have a third
army in readiness for Megara. But the Peloponnesians had no
conception of the capabilities of action belonging to the
Athenians. True, the whole military levy was absent from the
country, and only enough men were left at home for the mere
defence of the walls. Yet all were notwithstanding agreed that
neither should Ægina be given up nor the new allies be left in
the lurch. Myronides advanced to meet the Corinthians with
troops composed of those who had passed the age of military
service or not yet reached it. In the first fight he held his
ground: when the hostile forces returned for the second time,
they were routed with tremendous loss. Megara was saved, and
the energy of the Athenians had been most splendidly
established.
{1578}
In attestation of it the sepulchral pillars were erected in
the Ceramicus, on which were inscribed the names of the
Athenian soldiers who had fallen in one and the same year (Ol.
lxxx 3; B. C. 458-7) off Cyprus, in Egypt, Phœicia, Halieis,
Ægina, and Megara. A fragment of this remarkable historical
document is preserved to this day. While thus many years'
accumulation of combustible materials had suddenly broken out
into a flame of the fiercest war in Central Greece, new
complications also arose in the north. The Thebans, who had
suffered so deep a humiliation, believed the time to have
arrived when the events of the past were forgotten, and when
they could attain to new importance and power. In opposition
to them the Phocians put forth their strength. … After the
dissolution of the Hellenic Confederation, and the calamities
which had befallen the Spartans, the Phocians thought they
might venture an attack upon the Dorian tetrapolis, in order
to extend their frontiers in this direction. … For Sparta it
was a point of honor not to desert the primitive communities
of the Dorian race. She roused herself to a vigorous effort,
and, notwithstanding all her losses and the continuance of the
war in Messenia, was able to send 11,500 men of her own troops
and those of the confederates across the Isthmus before the
Athenians had time to place any obstacles in their way [B. C.
457]. The Phocians were forced to relinquish their conquests.
But when the Spartan troops were about to return home across
the Isthmus they found the mountain-passes occupied by Athens,
and the Gulf of Corinth made equally insecure by the presence
of hostile ships. Nothing remained for the Lacedæmonians but
to march into Bœotia, where their presence was welcome to
Thebes. They entered the valley of the Asopus, and encamped in
the territory of Tanagra, not far from the frontiers of
Attica. Without calculating the consequences, the Athenians
had brought themselves into an extremely dangerous situation.
… Their difficulties increased when, contemporaneously, evil
signs of treasonable plots made their appearance in the
interior of the city. …

See ATHENS: B. C. 460-449.

Thus, then, it was now necessary to contend simultaneously
against foes within and foes without, to defend the
constitution as well as the independence of the state. Nor was
the question merely as to an isolated attack and a transitory
danger; for the conduct of the Spartans in Bœotia clearly
showed that it was now their intention to restore to power
Thebes … because they were anxious to have in the rear of
Athens a state able to stop the extension of the Attic power
in Central Greece. This intention could be best fulfilled by
supporting Thebes in the subjugation of the other Bœotian
cities. For this purpose the Peloponnesians had busily
strengthened the Theban, i. e. the oligarchical party, in the
whole of the country, and encircled Thebes itself with new
fortifications. Thebes was from a country town to become a
great city, an independent fortified position, and a base for
the Peloponnesian cause in Central Greece. Hence Athens could
not have found herself threatened by a more dangerous
complication. The whole civic army accordingly took the field,
amounting, together with the Argives, and other allies, to
14,000 men, besides a body of Thessalian cavalry. In the low
ground by the Asopus below Tanagra the armies met. An arduous
and sanguinary struggle ensued, in which for the first time
Athens and Sparta mutually tested their powers in a regular
battle. For a long time the result was doubtful; till in the
very thick of the battle the cavalry went over to the enemy,
probably at the instigation of the Laconian party. This act of
treason decided the day in favor of Sparta, although patriotic
Athenians would never consent to count this among the battles
lost by Athens. The Spartans were far from fulfilling the
expectations of the party of the Oligarchs. As soon as they
knew that the passes of the Isthmus were once more open, they
took their departure, towards the fall of the year, through
Megara, making this little country suffer for its defection by
the devastation of its territory. … They reckoned upon
Thebes being for the present strong enough to maintain herself
against her neighbors; for ulterior offensive operations
against Athens, Tanagra was to serve as a base. The plan was
good, and the conjuncture of affairs favorable. But whatever
the Spartans did, they did only by halves: they concluded a
truce for four months, and quitted the ground. The Athenians,
on the other hand, had no intention of allowing a menacing
power to establish itself on the frontiers of their country.
Without waiting for the return of the fair season, they
crossed Mount Parnes two months after the battle, before any
thoughts of war were entertained in Bœotia; Myronides, who was
in command, defeated the Theban army which was to defend the
valley of the Asopus, near Œnophyta. This battle with one blow
put an end to all the plans of Thebes; the walls of Tanagra
were razed. Myronides continued his march from town to town;
everywhere the existing governments were overthrown, and
democratic constitutions established with the help of Attic
partisans. … Thus, after a passing humiliation, Athens was
soon more powerful than ever, and her sway extended as far as
the frontiers of the Phocians. Nay, during the same campaign
she extended her military dominion as far as Locris. …
Meanwhile the Æginetans also were gradually losing their power
of resistance. For nine months they had resisted the Attic
squadron. … Now their strength was exhausted; and the proud
island of the Æacidæ, which Pindar had sung as the mother of
the men who in the glorious rivalry of the festive games shone
out before all other Hellenes, had to bow down before the
irresistible good fortune of the Athenians, and was forced to
pull down her walls, to deliver up her vessels of war, and
bind herself to the payment of tribute. Contemporaneously with
this event, the two arms of walls [at ATHENS] … between the
upper and lower town were completed. Athens was now placed
beyond the fear of any attack. … The Peloponnesian
confederation was shaken to its very foundations; and Sparta
was still let and hindered by the Messenian revolt, while the
Athenians were able freely to dispose of their military and
naval forces."

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 2 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:
_G. W. Cox,
History of Greece,
book 2, chapter 9 (volume 2)._

_Thucydides,
Peloponnesian War
(translated by Jowett),
book 1, sections 107-108._

{1579}

GREECE: B. C. 449-445.
Quarrel of Delphians and Phocians.
Interference of Sparta and Athens.
Bœotian revolution.
Defeat of Athenians at Coroneia.
Revolt of Eubœa and Megara.
The Thirty Years Truce.

In 449 B. C. "on occasion of a dispute between the Delphians
and the Phocians as to which should have the care of the
temple and its treasures, the Lacedæmonians sent an army, and
gave them to the former; but as soon as they were gone,
Pericles led thither an Athenian army, and put the Phocians in
possession. Of this the Lacedæmonians took no notice. The
right of Promanty, or first consulting the oracle, which had
been given to Sparta by the Delphians, was now assigned to
Athens by the Phocians; and this honor was probably the cause
of the interference of both states. As the Athenians had given
the upper hand to the democratic party in Bœotia, there was of
course a large number of the opposite party in exile. These
had made themselves masters of Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some
other places, and if not checked in time, might greatly
endanger the Athenian influence. Tolmidas, therefore, led an
army and took and garrisoned Chæroneia; but, as he was
returning, he was attacked at Coroneia by the exiles from
Orchomenus, joined by those of Eubœa and their other friends.
Tolmidas fell, and his troops were all slain or made
prisoners. (Ol. 83, 2.) [B. C. 447.] The Athenians, fearing a
general war, agreed to a treaty, by which, on their prisoners
being restored, they evacuated Bœotia. The exiles returned to
their several towns, and things were placed on their old
footing. … Eubœa was now (Ol. 83, 3) [B. C. 446] in revolt:
and while Pericles was at the head of an army reducing it, the
party in Megara adverse to Athens rose and massacred all the
Athenian garrisons except that of Nisæa. Corinthians,
Sicyonians, and Epidaurians came to their aid: and the
Peloponnesians, led by one of the Spartan kings, entered and
wasted the plain of Eleusis. Pericles led back his army from
Eubœa, but the enemy was gone; he then returned and reduced
that island, and having expelled the people of Hestiæa, gave
their lands to Athenian colonists; and the Athenians, being
unwilling to risk the chance of war with the Dorian
confederacy, gladly formed (Ol. 83, 4) [B. C. 445] a truce for
thirty years, surrendering Nisæa and Pegæ, and withdrawing a
garrison which they had in Trœzen, and ceasing to interfere in
Achaia."

_T. Keightley,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 1._

"The Athenians saw themselves compelled to give up their
possessions in Peloponnesus, especially Achaia, as well as
Trœzene and Pagæ, an important position for their
communication with the peninsula. Even Nisæa was abandoned.
Yet these losses, sensibly as they affected their influence
upon the Grecian continent, were counterbalanced by a
concession still more significant, the acknowledgment of the
Delian League. It was left open to states and cities which
were members of neither confederacy to join either at
pleasure. These events happened in Ol. 83,3 (B. C. 445)—the
revolt of Megara and Eubœa, the invasion of Pleistoanax, the
re-conquest of Eubœa, and the conclusion of the treaty, which
assumed the form of an armistice for thirty years. Great
importance must be attributed to this settlement, as involving
an acknowledgment which satisfied both parties and did justice
to the great interests at stake on either side. If Athens
renounced some of her possessions, the sacrifice was
compensated by the fact that Sparta recognized the existence
of the naval supremacy of Athens, and the basis on which it
rested. We may perhaps assume that the compromise between
Pericles and Pleistoanax was the result of the conviction felt
by both these leading men that a fundamental dissociation of
the Peloponnesian from the Delian league was a matter of
necessity. The Spartans wished to be absolutely supreme in the
one, and resigned the other to the Athenians."

_L. von Ranke,
Universal History:
The Oldest Historical Group of Nations and the Greeks,
chapter 7, section 2._

_ALSO IN:
Sir E. B. Lytton,
Athens: Its Rise and Fall,
book 5, chapter 1._

GREECE: B. C. 445-431.
Splendor of Athens and greatness of the Athenian Empire under
the rule of Pericles.

See ATHENS: B. C. 445-431.

GREECE: B. C. 440.
Subjugation of revolted Samos by the Athenians.
Spartan interference prevented by Corinth.

See ATHENS: B. C. 440-437.

GREECE: B. C. 435-432.
Causes of the Peloponnesian War.

"In B. C. 431 the war broke out between Athens and the
Peloponnesian League, which, after twenty-seven years, ended
in the ruin of the Athenian empire. It began through a quarrel
between Corinth and Kerkyra [or Korkyra, or Corcyru], in which
Athens assisted Kerkyra. A congress was held at Sparta;
Corinth and other States complained of the conduct of Athens,
and war was decided on. The real cause of the war was that
Sparta and its allies were jealous of the great power that
Athens had gained. A far greater number of Greek States were
engaged in this war than had ever been engaged in a single
undertaking before. States that had taken no part in the
Persian war were now fighting on one side or the other. Sparta
was an oligarchy, and the friend of the nobles everywhere;
Athens was a democracy, and the friend of the common people;
so that the war was to some extent a struggle between these
classes all over Greece."

_C. A. Fyffe,
History of Greece (History Primer),
chapter 5._

"The Peloponnesian War was a protracted struggle, and attended
by calamities such as Hellas had never known within a like
period of time. Never were so many cities captured and
depopulated—some by Barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves
fighting against one another; and several of them after their
capture were re-peopled by strangers. Never were exile and
slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about
by civil strife. … There were earthquakes unparalleled in
their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous
than are recorded to have happened in any former age; there
were also in some places great droughts causing famines, and
lastly the plague which did immense harm and destroyed numbers
of the people. All these calamities fell upon Hellas
simultaneously with the war, which began when the Athenians
and Peloponnesians violated the thirty years' truce concluded
by them after the recapture of Euboea. Why they broke it and
what were the grounds of quarrel I will first set forth, that
in time to come no man may be at a loss to know what was the
origin of this great war. The real though unavowed cause I
believe to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which
terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war."

_Thucydides,
History
(translated by Jowett),
book 1, section 23._

The quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, out of which, as an
immediate excitement, the Peloponnesian War grew, concerned
"the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the Roman times,
as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo—a colony founded by
the Korkyreans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf,
considerably to the north of their own island."
{1580}
The oligarchy of Epidamnus, driven out by the people, had
allied themselves with the neighboring Illyrians and were
harassing the city. Korkyra refused aid to the latter when
appealed to, but Corinth (of which Korkyra was itself a
colony) promptly rendered help. This involved Corinth and
Korkyra in hostilities, and Athens gave support to the latter.

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
volume 3, book 4._

ALSO IN:
_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapters 19-30._

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapters 47-48 (volume 5)._

GREECE: B. C. 432.
Great Sea-fight of the Corinthians
with the Korkyrians and Athenians.
Revolt of Potidæa.

"Although Korkyra became the ally of Athens, the force sent to
her aid was confined to the small number of ten ships, for the
express purpose of making it clear to the Corinthians that no
aggressive measures were intended; and the generals received
precise instructions to remain strictly neutral unless the
Corinthians should attempt to effect a landing either on
Korkyra or on any Korkyraian settlements. The Corinthians lost
no time in bringing the quarrel to an issue. With a fleet of
150 ships, of which 60 were furnished by their allies, they
sailed to the harbor of Cheimerion near the lake through which
the river Acheron finds its way into the sea about thirty
miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Korkyra.
The conflict which ensued exhibited a scene of confusion which
the Athenian seamen probably regarded with infinite contempt.
After a hard struggle the Korkyraians routed the right wing of
the enemy's fleet, and chasing it to its camp on shore, lost
time in plundering it and burning the tents. For this folly
they paid a terrible price. The remainder of the Korkyraian
fleet, borne down by sheer force of numbers, was put to
flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open
interference of the Athenians, who now dashed into the fight
without scruple, and came into direct conflict with the
Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their
advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships,
they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes, but
of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own
people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they
conveyed their disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and,
still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was
now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle cry, had already
rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty
Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians,
supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force,
hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of
this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness
was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own
ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had
thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own
kinsfolk. On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to
Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service,
supported by the thirty Athenian ships. But the Corinthians,
far from wishing to come to blows with the newcomers, were
anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the
Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they
were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their
homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what
they meant to do. The answer of the Athenians was plain and
decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the
Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did
not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to
her. … Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the
hands of the Corinthians. Of these 250 were conveyed to
Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like
the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard
to their own interests. Their object was to send these
prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a
heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted
to put down the Demos, and thus to insure the hearty alliance
of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up
the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic
city.

_G. W. Cox,
General History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1._

"The evils of this imprudent interference of the Athenians
began now to be seen. In consequence of the Corcyrian
alliance, the Athenians issued an order to Potidæa, a
Macedonian town acknowledging their supremacy, to demolish its
walls; to send back certain officers whom they had received
from Corinth, and to give hostages for their good conduct.
Potidæa, although an ally of Athens, had originally been a
colony of Corinth, and thus arose the jealousy which
occasioned these harsh and peremptory orders. Symptoms of
universal hostility to Athens now appeared in the states
around. The Corinthians and their allies were much irritated;
the oppressed Potidæans were strongly instigated to revolt;
and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who had some time since been
at open war with the Athenians, now gladly seized the
opportunity to distress them, by exciting and assisting the
malcontents. The Potidæans, however, deputed ambassadors to
Athens to deprecate the harsh orders which had been sent them;
but in the mean time to prepare for the worst, they also sent
messengers to Sparta entreating support, where they met
deputies from Corinth and Megara. By these loud and general
complaints Sparta was at length roused to head the conspiracy
against Athens, and the universal flames of war shortly
afterwards broke forth throughout Greece." The revolt of
Potidæa followed immediately; the Corinthians placed a strong
force in the town, under Aristeus, and the Athenians sent an
army under Phormion to lay siege to it.

_Early History of Greece
(Enc. Metropolitana),
page 283._

GREECE: B. C. 432-431.
Charges brought by Corinth against Athens.
The hearing and the Congress at Sparta.
Decision for war.
Theban attack on Platæa.
The Peloponnesian War begun.

The Corinthians "invited deputies from the other states of the
confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there charged the
Athenians with having broken the treaty, and trampled on the
rights of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans held an assembly to
receive the complaints of their allies, and to discuss the
question of peace or war. Here the Corinthians were seconded
by several other members of the confederacy, who had also
wrongs to complain of against Athens, and urged the Spartans
for redress. … It happened that at this time Athenian
envoys, who had been sent on other business, were still in
Sparta.
{1581}
They desired permission to attend and address the assembly.
… When the strangers had all been heard, they were desired
to withdraw, that the assembly might deliberate. The feeling
against the Athenians was universal; most voices were for
instant war. … The deputies of the allies were then informed
of the resolution which the assembly had adopted, and that a
general congress of the confederacy would shortly be summoned
to deliberate on the same question, in order that war, if
decided on, might be decreed by common consent. … The
congress decided on the war; but the confederacy was totally
unprepared for commencing hostilities, and though the
necessary preparations were immediately begun and vigorously
prosecuted, nearly a year elapsed before it was ready to bring
an army into the field. In the meantime embassies were sent to
Athens with various remonstrances and demands, for the double
purpose of amusing the Athenians with the prospect of peace,
and of multiplying pretexts for war. An attempt was made, not,
perhaps, so foolish as it was insolent, to revive the popular
dread of the curse which had been supposed to hang over the
Alcmæonids. The Athenians were called upon, in the name of the
gods, to banish all who remained among them of that
blood-stained race. If they had complied with this demand,
they must have parted with Pericles, who, by the mother's
side, was connected with the Alcmæonids. This, indeed, was not
expected; but it was hoped that the refusal might afford a
pretext to his enemies at Athens for treating him as the
author of the war. The Athenians retorted by requiring the
Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had profaned
the sanctuary of Tænarus, by dragging from it some Helots who
had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of
Pausanias. … Still, war had been only threatened, not
declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free
from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the
two confederacies. But early in the following spring, B. C.
431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an
event took place which closed all prospects of peace,
precipitated the commencement of war, imbittered the animosity
of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most
tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night
the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of 300 Thebans,
commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs. They
had been invited by a Platæan named Nauclides, and others of
the same party, who hoped, with the aid of the Thebans, to rid
themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the
relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and
transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that
a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in
strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might
be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded,
as in time of peace, and one of them was secretly opened to
the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the
marketplace. … The Platæans, who were not in the plot,
imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to
be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile
treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered
into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these
conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the
enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered. … Having
barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such other
preparations as they thought necessary, a little before
daybreak they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band
made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the
assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and
were assisted by the women and slaves, who showered stones and
tiles from the houses on the enemy, all, at the same time,
raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the
confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their
presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to
find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several
were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet.
… The main body, which had kept together, entered a large
building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which
they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The
Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but
at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans,
who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered
at discretion. Before their departure from Thebes it had been
concerted that as large a force as could be raised should
march the same night to support them. The distance between the
two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were
expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning; but
the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the
rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise
retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they
heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not
know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that
some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first
inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find
without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. … The
Thebans afterward alleged that they had received a promise,
confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring
from the Platæan territory, the prisoners should be released;
and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The
Platæans denied that they had pledged themselves to spare the
lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on
the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely
that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans
would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is
certain, however, that they retired, and that the Platæans, as
soon as they had transported their movable property out of the
country into the town, put to death all the prisoners—
amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal
author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the
greatest influence in Thebes. On the first entrance of the
Thebans into Platæa, a messenger had been despatched to Athens
with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid
all the Bœotians in Attica under arrest; and when another
messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the
Platæans, they sent a herald to request that they would
reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The
herald came too late to prevent the execution; and the
Athenians, foreseeing that Platæa would stand in great need of
defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it
with provisions, and removed the women and children and all
persons unfit for service in a siege.
{1582}
After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only
be decided by arms. Platæa was so intimately united with
Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made
on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for
immediate hostilities. Sparta, too, instantly sent notice to
all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed
day for the invasion of Attica."

_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 19 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_Thucydides,
History,
books 1-2._

GREECE: B. C. 431-429.
The Peloponnesian War: How Hellas was divided.
The opposing camps.
Peloponnesian invasions of Attica.
The Plague at Athens.
Death of Pericles.
Surrender of Potidæa to the Athenians.

"All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two
chief cities. … The feeling of mankind was strongly on the
side of the Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the
liberators of Hellas. … The general indignation against the
Athenians was intense; some were longing to be delivered from
them, others fearful of falling under their sway. … The
Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with
the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans—they were both
neutral; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the
Lacedaemonians at first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined
them. Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians,
Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and
Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians,
Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and
Leucadians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and
Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only infantry.
The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the
Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania,
Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which
were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of
Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the
Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the
line of Peloponnesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades
with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos and
Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land forces and money.
Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character
of their respective forces. Immediately after the affair at
Plataea the Lacedaemonians determined to invade Attica, and
sent round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies,
bidding them equip troops and provide all things necessary for
a foreign expedition. The various states made their
preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time,
with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces of each,
met at the Isthmus." Then followed the invasion of Attica, the
siege of Athens, the plague in the city, the death of
Pericles, and the success won by the indomitable Athenians, at
Potidaea, in the midst of their sore distress.

_Thucydides,
History
(translated by Jowett),
book 2, sections 8-70 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_E. Abbott,
Pericles,
chapters 13-15._

See ATHENS: 431 B. C. 431 and 430-429.

GREECE: B. C. 429-427.
The Peloponnesian War:
Siege, capture and destruction of Platæa.

"In the third spring of the war, the Peloponnesians changed
their plan of offence. By the invasion and ravage of Attica
for two following summers, tho much injury had been done to
the Athenians, little advantage had accrued to themselves: the
booty was far from paying the expense of the expedition; the
enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk a battle,
and the great purpose of the war was little forwarded. The
Peloponnesians were yet very unequal to attempt naval
operations of any consequence. Of the continental dependencies
of Athens none was so open to their attacks, none so
completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by
its danger to superinduce that war of the field which they
wished, as Platæa. Against that town therefore it was
determined to direct the principal effort. … Under the
command still of Archidamus, the confederate army accordingly
entered the Platæid, and ravage was immediately begun. … The
town was small, as may be judged from the very small force
which sufficed for an effectual garrison; only 400 Platæans,
with 80 Athenians. There were besides in the place 110 women
to prepare provisions, and no other person free or slave. The
besieging army, composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian
youth, was numerous. The first operation was to surround the
town with a palisade, which might prevent any ready egress;
the neighboring forest of Cithæron supplying materials. Then,
in a chosen spot, ground was broken, according to the modern
phrase, for making approaches. The business was to fill the
town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, on which a
force sufficient for assault might ascend. … Such was at
that time the inartificial process of a siege. Thucydides
appears to have been well aware that it did no credit to the
science of his age. … To oppose this mode of attack, the
first measure of the besieged was to raise, on that part of
their wall against which the mound was forming, a strong
wooden frame, covered in front with leather and hides; and,
within this, to build a rampart with bricks from the
neighboring houses. The wooden frame bound the whole, and kept
it firm to a considerable height: the covering of hides
protected both work and workmen against weapons discharged
against them, especially fiery arrows. But the mound still
rising as the superstructure on the wall rose, and this
superstructure becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing
height, while the mound was liable to no counterbalancing
defect, it was necessary for the besieged to devise other
opposition. Accordingly they broke through the bottom of
their wall, where the mound bore against it, and brought in
the earth. The Peloponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of
loose earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed in
baskets. This requiring more labor to remove, the besieged
undermined the mound; and thus, for a long time unperceived,
prevented it from gaining height. Still, however, fearing that
the efforts of their scanty numbers would be overborne by the
multitude of hands which the besiegers could employ, they had
recourse to another device. Within their town-wall they built,
in a semilunar form, a second wall, connected with the first
at the extremities. These extended, on either side, beyond the
mound; so that should the enemy possess themselves of the
outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a far less
favorable situation. … A ram, advanced upon the
Peloponnesian mound, battered the superstructure on the
Platæan rampart, and shook it violently; to the great alarm of
the garrison, but with little farther effect.
{1583}
Other machines of the same kind were employed against
different parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose.
… No means however were neglected by the besiegers that
either approved practice suggested, or their ingenuity could
devise, to promote their purpose; yet, after much of the
summer consumed, they found every effort of their numerous
forces so completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and
resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair
of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to
the tedious method of blockade, they determined to try one
more experiment, for which their numbers, and the neighboring
woods of Cithæron, gave them more than ordinary facility.
Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with
them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and
disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever
ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage. On the
faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on fire.
The conflagration was such as was never before known, says
Thucydides, to have been prepared and made by the hands or
men. … But fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain,
brought on by a thunderstorm without wind, extinguished the
fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable
than any they had before experienced. This attempt failing,
the Peloponnesians determined immediately to reduce the siege
to a blockade. … To the palisade, which already surrounded
the town, a contravallation was added; with a double ditch,
one without, and one within. A sufficient body of troops being
then appointed to the guard of these works, the Bœotians
undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments
drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy,
and, a little after the middle of September, the rest of the
army was dismissed for the winter."

_W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapter 15, section 1 (volume 2)._

When the blockade had endured for more than a year, and food
in the city grew scarce, about half of the defending force
made a bold dash for liberty, one stormy night, scaled the
walls of circumvallation, and escaped. The remainder held out
until some time in the next year, when they surrendered and
were all put to death, the city being destroyed. The families
of the Platæans had been sheltered at Athens before the siege
began.

_Thucydides,
History,
books 2-3._

GREECE: B. C. 429-427.
The Peloponnesian War:
Phormio's sea-fights.
Revolt of Lesbos.
Siege and capture of Mitylene.
The ferocious decree of Cleon reversed.

"At the same time that Archidamus laid siege to Plataea, a
small Peloponnesian expedition, under a Spartan officer named
Cnemus, had crossed the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, and
joined the land forces of the Leucadians and Ambraciots. They
were bent on conquering the Acarnanians and the Messenians of
Naupactus, the only continental allies whom Athens possessed
in Western Greece. … When Cnemus had been joined by the
troops of Leucas and the other Corinthian towns, and had
further strengthened himself by summoning to his standard a
number of the predatory barbarian tribes of Epirus, he
advanced on Stratus, the chief city of Acarnania. At the same
time a squadron of Peloponnesian ships collected at Corinth,
and set sail down the gulf towards Naupactus. The only
Athenian force in these waters consisted of twenty galleys
under an able officer named Phormio, who was cruising off the
straits of Rhium, to protect Naupactus and blockade the
Corinthian Gulf. Both by land and by sea the operations of the
Peloponnesians miscarried miserably. Cnemus collected a very
considerable army, but as he sent his men forward to attack
Stratus by three separate roads, he exposed them to defeat in
detail. … By sea the defeat of the Peloponnesians was even
more disgraceful; the Corinthian admirals Machaon and
Isocrates were so scared, when they came across the squadron
of Phormio at the mouth of the gulf, that, although they
mustered 47 ships to his 20, they took up the defensive.
Huddling together in a circle, they shrank from his attack,
and allowed themselves to be hustled and worried into the
Achaian harbour of Patrae, losing several ships in their
flight. Presently reinforcements arrived; the Peloponnesian
fleet was raised to no less than 77 vessels, and three Spartan
officers were sent on board, to compel the Corinthian
admirals, who had behaved so badly, to do their best in
future. The whole squadron then set out to hunt down Phormio.
They found him with his 20 ships coasting along the Aetolian
shore towards Naupactus, and at once set out in pursuit. The
long chase separated the larger fleet into scattered knots,
and gave the fighting a disconnected and irregular character.
While the rear ships of Phormio's squadron were compelled to
run on shore a few miles outside Naupactus, the 11 leading
vessels reached the harbour in safety. Finding that he was now
only pursued by about a score of the enemy—the rest having
stayed behind to take possession of the stranded Athenian
vessels—Phormio came boldly out of port again. His 11
vessels took 6, and sunk one of their pursuers; and then,
pushing on westward, actually succeeded in recapturing most of
the 9 ships which had been lost in the morning. This
engagement, though it had no great results, was considered the
most daring feat performed by the Athenian navy during the
whole war. … The winter passed uneventfully, and the war
seemed as far as ever from showing any signs of producing a
definite result. But although the Spartan invasion of 428 B.
C. had no more effect than those of the preceding years, yet
in the late summer there occurred an event so fraught with
evil omens for Athens, as to threaten the whole fabric of her
empire. For the first time since the commencement of
hostilities, an important subject state made an endeavour to
free itself by the aid of the Spartan fleet. Lesbos was one of
the two Aegean islands which still remained free from tribute,
and possessed a considerable war-navy. Among its five towns
Mitylene was the chief, and far exceeded the others in wealth
and resources. It was governed by an oligarchy, who had long
been yearning to revolt, and had made careful preparation by
accumulating war-like stores and enlisting foreign
mercenaries. … The whole island except Methymna, where a
democracy ruled, rose in arms, and determined to send for aid
to Sparta. The Athenians at once despatched against Mitylene a
squadron of 40 ships under Cleïppides, which had just been
equipped for a cruise in Peloponnesian waters. This force had
an engagement with the Lesbian fleet, and drove it back into
the harbour of Mitylene.
{1584}
To gain time for assistance from across the Aegean to arrive,
the Lesbians now pretended to be anxious to surrender, and
engaged Cleïppides in a long and fruitless negotiation, while
they were repeating their demands at Sparta. But at last the
Athenian grew suspicious, established a close blockade of
Mitylene by sea, and landed a small force of hoplites to hold
a fortified camp on shore. … Believing the revolt of the
Lesbians to be the earnest of a general rising of all the
vassals of Athens, the Peloponnesians determined to make a
vigorous effort in their favour. The land contingents of the
various states were summoned to the Isthmus—though the
harvest was now ripe, and the allies were loath to leave their
reaping—while it was also determined to haul over the
Corinthian Isthmus the fleet which had fought against Phormio,
and then to despatch it to relieve Mitylene. … The Athenians
were furious at the idea that their vassals were now about to
be stirred up to revolt, and strained every nerve to defend
themselves. While the blockade of Mitylene was kept up, and
100 galleys cruised in the Aegean to intercept any succours
sent to Lesbos, another squadron of 100 ships sailed round
Peloponnesus and harried the coastland with a systematic
ferocity that surpassed any of their previous doings. To
complete the crews of the 250 ships now afloat and in active
service proved so great a drain on the military force of
Athens, that not only the Thetes but citizens of the higher
classes were drafted on shipboard. Nevertheless the effect
which they designed by this display of power was fully
produced. To defend their own harvests the confederates who
had met at the Isthmus went homewards, while the dismay at the
strength of the Athenian fleet was so great that the plan of
sending naval aid to Lesbos was put off for the present. …
All through the winter of 428-7 B. C. the blockade of Mitylene
was kept up, though its maintenance proved a great drain on
the resources of Athens. On the land side a considerable force
of hoplites under Paches strengthened the troops already on
the spot, and made it possible to wall the city in with lines
of circumvallation. … When the spring of 427 B. C. arrived,
the Spartans determined to make a serious attempt to send aid
to Lesbos; but the fear of imperiling all their naval
resources in a single expedition kept them from despatching a
fleet of sufficient size. Only 42 galleys, under an admiral
named Alcidas, were sent forth from Corinth. This squadron
managed to cross the Aegean without meeting the Athenians, by
steering a cautious and circuitous course among the islands.
But so much time was lost on the way, that on arriving off
Embatum in Ionia, Ælia found that Mitylene had surrendered
just seven days before. … Learning the fall of Mitylene, he
made off southward, and, after intercepting many merchant
vessels off the Ionian coast and brutally slaying their crews,
returned to Corinth without having struck a single blow for
the cause of Sparta. Paches soon reduced Antissa, Eresus, and
Pyrrha, the three Lesbian towns which had joined in the revolt
of Mitylene, and was then able to sail home, taking with him
the Laconian general Salaethus, who had been caught in hiding
at Mitylene, together with the other leaders of the revolt.
When the prisoners arrived at Athens Salaethus was at once put
to death without a trial. But the fate of the Lesbians was the
subject of an important and characteristic debate in the
Ecclesia. Led by the demagogue Cleon, the Athenians at first
passed the monstrous resolution that the whole of the
Mitylenaeans, not merely the prisoners at Athens, but every
adult male in the city, should be put to death, and their
wives and families sold as slaves. It is some explanation but
no excuse for this horrible decree that Lesbos had been an
especially favoured ally, and that its revolt had for a moment
put Athens in deadly fear of a general rising of Ionia and
Aeolis. Cleon the leather-seller, the author of this infamous
decree, was one of the statesmen of a coarse and inferior
stamp, whose rise had been rendered possible by the democratic
changes which Pericles had introduced into the state. … On
the eve of the first day of debate the motion of Cleon had
been passed, and a galley sent off to Paches at Mitylene,
bidding him slay all the Lesbians; but on the next morning …
the decree of Cleon was rescinded by a small majority, and a
second galley sent off to stay Paches from the massacre. …
By extraordinary exertions the bearers of the reprieve
contrived to reach Lesbos only a few hours after Paches had
received the first despatch, and before he had time to put it
into execution. Thus the majority of the Mitylenaeans were
saved; but all their leaders and prominent men, not less than
1,000 in number, were put to death. … The land of the
Lesbians was divided into 3,000 lots, of which a tenth was
consecrated to the gods, while the rest were granted out to
Athenian cleruchs, who became the landlords of the old
owners."

_C. W. C. Oman,
History of Greece,
chapter 28._

ALSO IN:
_Thucydides,
History,
book 2, sections 80-92,
and book 3, sections 1-50._

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 425.
The Peloponnesian War:
Spartan catastrophe at Sphacteria.
Peace pleaded for and refused by Athens.

In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War (B. C. 425), the
enterprising Athenian general, Demosthenes, obtained
permission to seize and fortify a harbor on the west coast of
Messenia, with a view to harassing the adjacent Spartan
territory and stirring up revolt among the subjugated
Messenians. The position he secured was the promontory of
Pylus, overlooking the basin now called the Bay of Navarino,
which latter was protected from the sea by the small island of
Sphacteria, stretching across its front. The seizure of Pylus
created alarm in Sparta at once, and vigorous measures were
taken to expel the intruders. The small force of Demosthenes
was assailed, front and rear, by a strong land army and a
powerful Peloponnesian fleet; but he had fortified himself
with skill and stoutly held his ground, waiting for help from
Athens. Meantime his assailants had landed 420 men on the
island of Sphacteria, and these were mostly hoplites, or
heavy-armed soldiers, from the best citizenship of Sparta. In
this situation an Athenian fleet made its sudden and
unexpected appearance, defeated the Peloponnesian fleet
completely, took possession of the harbor and surrounded the
Spartans on Sphacteria with a ring from which there was no
escape. To obtain the release of these citizens the Spartans
were reduced to plead for peace on almost any terms, and
Athens had her opportunity to end the war at that moment with
great advantage to herself. But Cleon, the demagogue,
persuaded the people to refuse peace. The beleaguered hoplites
on Sphacteria were made prisoners by force, and little came of
it in the end.

{1585}

_Thucydides,
History,
book 4, sections 2-38._

Pylus remained in the possession of the Athenians until
B. C. 408, when it was retaken by the Spartans.

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 52._

ALSO IN:
_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 424-421.
The Peloponnesian War:
Brasidas in Chalcidice.
Athenian defeat at Delium.
A year's Truce.
Renewed hostilities.
Death of Brasidas and Cleon at Amphipolis.
The Peace of Nikias (Nicias).