Chapter 3 (6)

"The radical difference between Franklin and his colleagues
was in the question of trust. Franklin saw no reason to
distrust the fidelity of France at any time to her engagements
to the United States during the revolutionary war. His
colleagues did not share this confidence, and yet, while
impressed by this distrust of their ally, they made no appeal
for explanation. The weight of opinion, as will hereafter be
more fully seen, is now that Franklin was right, and they in
this respect wrong. But whatever may have been the correctness
of their view, it was proper that, before making it the basis
of their throwing off the burden of treaty obligation and
their own instructions, they should have first notified France
of their complaint. Obligations cannot be repudiated by one
party on the ground of the failure of the other party to
perform some condition imposed on him, without giving him
notice of the charge against him, so that he could have the
opportunity of explanation. It may be added, on the merits,
that the extenuation set up by Jay and Adams, that France was
herself untrue to her obligations, however honestly they
believed it, can not now be sustained. Livingston, who knew
more of the attitude of France than any public man on the
American side except Franklin, swept it aside as groundless.
Edward Everett, one of the most accomplished historical
writers and diplomatists the country has ever produced,
speaks, as we shall see, to the same effect, and other
historical critics of authority, to be also hereafter cited,
give us the same conclusion. Yet there are other reasons which
may excuse their course, and that of Franklin, who concurred
with them rather than defeat a peace. In the first place, such
was their isolation, that their means of communication with
Congress was stopped; and they might well have argued that if
Congress knew that the English envoys refused to treat with
them except in secret conference their instructions would have
been modified. In the second place we may accept Adams'
statement that Vergennes was from time to time informally
advised of the nature of the pending propositions. In the
third place, the articles agreed on in 1782 were not to be a
definite treaty except with the assent of France. … It now
appears that the famous Marbois letter, handed to Jay by one
of the British loyalists, and relied on by him as showing
France's duplicity, was disavowed by Marbois; and there are,
aside from this, very strong reasons to distrust its
genuineness. In the second place, we have in the
correspondence of George III a new light thrown, on the action
taken by Jay in consequence of this letter. … Benjamin
Vaughan, while a gentleman of great amiability and personal
worth, was, when Jay sent him without Franklin's knowledge on
a confidential mission to the British ministry, in the employ
of that ministry as secret agent at Paris. It is due to Jay to
say that he was ignorant of this fact, though he would have
been notified of it had he consulted Franklin. One of the most
singular incidents of this transaction is that George III,
seeking double treachery in thus sending back to him his own
agent in the guise of an agent from the American legation,
regarded it as a peculiarly subtle machination of Franklin,
which it was his duty to baffle by utterly discrediting
Benjamin Vaughan. It should be added that Franklin's
affection for Benjamin Vaughan was in no wise diminished by
Vaughan's assumption, with an honesty which no one who knew
him would question, of this peculiar kind of mediatorship. And
in Jay Franklin's confidence was unabated. He more than once
said that no one could be found more suited than Jay to
represent the United States abroad. And when, in view of
death, he prepared to settle his estate, he selected; Jay as
his executor."

_F. Wharton,
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence
of the United States,
chapter 9, section 111,
and chapter 13, section 158 (volume 1)._

Writing to M. de la Luzerne, the French Minister in the United
States, under date of December 19, 1782, Count de Vergennes
expressed himself on the conduct of the American Commissioners
as follows: "You will surely be gratified, as well as myself,
with the very extensive advantages, which our allies, the
Americans, are to receive from the peace; but you certainly
will, not be less surprised than I have been, at the conduct
of the Commissioners. According to the instructions of
Congress, they ought to have done nothing without our
participation. I have informed you, that the King did not seek
to influence the negotiation any further than his offices
might be necessary to his friends. The American Commissioners
will not say that I have interfered, and much less that I have
wearied them with my curiosity. They have cautiously kept
themselves at a distance from me. Mr. Adams, one of them,
coming from Holland, where he had been received and served by
our ambassador, had been in Paris nearly three weeks, without
imagining that he owed me any mark of attention, and probably
I should not have seen him till this time, if I had not caused
him to be reminded of it. Whenever I have had occasion to see
anyone of them, and inquire of them briefly respecting the
progress of the negotiation, they have constantly clothed
their speech in generalities, giving me to understand that it
did not go forward, and that they had no confidence in the
sincerity of the British ministry. Judge of my surprise, when,
on the 30th of November, Dr. Franklin informed me that the
articles were signed. The reservation retained on our account
does not save the infraction of the promise, which we have
mutually made, not to sign except conjointly.
{3287}
I owe Dr. Franklin the justice to state, however, that on the
next day he sent me a copy of the articles. He will hardly
complain that I received them without demonstrations of
sensibility. It was not till some days after, that, when this
minister had come to see me, I allowed myself to make him
perceive that his proceeding in this abrupt signature of the
articles had little in it, which could be agreeable to the
King. He appeared sensible of it, and excused, in the best
manner he could, himself and his colleagues. Our conversation
was amicable."

_J. Bigelow,
Life of Benjamin Franklin,
volume 3, page 207, note._

ALSO IN:
_J. Jay,
The Peace Negotiations of 1782-3
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 7, chapter 2)._

_E. Fitzmaurice,
Life of the Earl of Shelburne,
volume 3, chapter 6._

_E. E. Hale,
Franklin in France,
volume 2, chapters 5-8._

_H. Doniol,
Histoire de la Participation de la France
à l'établissement des États-Unis d'Amérique, tome 5._

See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.

[Image: Map of the United States.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782-1783.
Grievances of the Army.
The Newburgh Addresses.

"Nothing had been done by Congress for the claims of the army,
and it seemed highly probable that it would be disbanded
without even a settlement of the accounts of the officers, and
if so, that they would never receive their dues. Alarmed and
irritated by the neglect of Congress; destitute of money and
credit and of the means of living from day to day; oppressed
with debts; saddened by the distresses of their families at
home, and by the prospect of misery before them,—they
presented a memorial to Congress in December [1782], in which
they urged the immediate adjustment of their dues, and offered
to commute the half-pay for life, granted by the resolve of
October, 1780, for full pay for a certain number of years, or
for such a sum in gross as should be agreed on by their
committee sent to Philadelphia to attend the progress of the
memorial through the house. It is manifest from statements in
this document, as well as from other evidence, that the
officers were nearly driven to desperation, and that their
offer of commutation was wrung from them by a state of public
opinion little creditable to the country. … The committee of
the officers were in attendance upon Congress during the whole
winter, and early in March, 1783, they wrote to their
constituents that nothing had been done. At this moment, the
predicament in which Washington stood, in the double relation
of citizen and soldier, was critical and delicate in the
extreme. In the course of a few days, all his firmness and
patriotism, all his sympathies as an officer, on the one side,
and his fidelity to the government, on the other, were
severely tried. On the 10th of March, an anonymous address was
circulated among the officers at Newburgh, calling a meeting
of the general and field officers, and of one officer from
each company, and one from the medical staff, to consider the
late letter from their representatives at Philadelphia, and to
determine what measures should be adopted to obtain that
redress of grievances which they seemed to have solicited in
vain. It was written with great ability and skill [by John
Armstrong, afterwards General]. … Washington met the crisis
with firmness, but also with conciliation. He issued orders
forbidding an assemblage at the call of an anonymous paper,
and directing the officers to assemble on Saturday, the 15th,
to hear the report of their committee, and to deliberate what
further measures ought to be adopted as most rational and best
calculated to obtain the just and important object in view.
The senior officer in rank present [General Gates] was
directed to preside, and to report the result to the
Commander-in-chief. On the next day after these orders were
issued, a second anonymous address appeared from the same
writer. In this paper he affected to consider the orders of
General Washington, assuming the direction of the meeting, as
a sanction of the whole proceeding which he had proposed.
Washington saw, at once, that he must be present at the
meeting himself, or that his name would be used to justify
measures which he intended to discountenance and prevent. He
therefore attended the meeting, and under his influence,
seconded by that of Putnam, Knox, Brooks, and Howard, the
result was the adoption of certain resolutions, in which the
officers, after reasserting their grievances, and rebuking all
attempts to seduce them from their civil allegiance, referred
the whole subject of their claims again to the consideration
of Congress. Even at this distant day, the peril of that
crisis can scarcely be contemplated without a shudder. Had the
Commander-in-chief been other than Washington, had the leading
officers by whom he was surrounded been less than the noblest
of patriots, the land would have been deluged with the blood
of a civil war."

_G. T. Curtis,
History of the Constitution of the United States,
book 2, chapter 1 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_J. Marshall,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapter 11._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782-1784.
Persecution and flight of the Tories or Loyalists.

See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (April).
Formation of the Society of the Cincinnati.

See CINCINNATI, THE SOCIETY OF THE.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (September).
The definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and
the United States.

The four difficult questions on which the British and American
negotiators at Paris arrived, after much discussion and wise
compromise, at a settlement of differences originally wide,
were
(1) Boundaries;
(2) Fishing rights;
(3) Payment of debts from American to British merchants that
were outstanding when the war began;
(4) Amnesty to American loyalists, or Tories, and restoration
of their confiscated property.

Within two months after the separate negotiations with England
opened an agreement had been reached, and preliminary or
provisional articles were signed on the 30th of November,
1782. The treaty was not to take effect, otherwise than by the
cessation of hostilities, until terms of peace should be
agreed upon between England and France. This occurred in the
following January, and on the 3d of September, 1783, the
definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the
United States was signed [at Paris]. Its essential provisions
were the following:

"Article 1.
His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States,
viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, and
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and
independent States; that he treats with them as such, and for
himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to
the Government, propriety and territorial rights of the same,
and every part thereof.

{3288}

Article II.
And that all disputes which might arise in future, on the
subject of the boundaries of the United States may be
prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the
following are, and shall be their boundaries, viz: From the
north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz. that angle which is
formed by a line drawn due north from the source of Saint
Croix River to the Highlands; along the said Highlands which
divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St.
Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to
the northwestern most head of Connecticut River; thence down
along the middle of that river, to the 45th degree of north
latitude; from thence, by a line due west on the said
latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraquy;
thence along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario,
through the middle of said lake until it strikes the
communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie; thence
along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through
the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water
communication between that lake and Lake Huron; thence along
the middle of said water communication into the Lake Huron;
thence through the middle of said lake to the water
communication between that lake and Lake Superior; thence
through Lake Superior northward of the Isles Royal and
Philipeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of
said Long Lake, and the water communication between it and the
Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through
the said lake to the most northwestern point thereof, and from
thence on a due west course to the river Mississippi; thence
by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river
Mississippi until it shall intersect the northernmost part of
the 31st degree of north latitude. South, by a line to be
drawn due east from the determination of the line last
mentioned, in the latitude of 31 degrees north of the Equator,
to the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence
along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River;
thence strait to the head of St. Mary's River; and thence down
along the middle of St. Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean.
East, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St.
Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its source, and
from its source directly north to the aforesaid Highlands,
which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from
those which fall into the river St. Lawrence; comprehending all
islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the
United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east
from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova
Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall
respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean;
excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been,
within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia.

Article III.
It is agreed that the people of the United States shall
continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every
kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of
Newfoundland; also in the Gulph of Saint Lawrence, and at all
other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both
countries used at any time heretofore to fish. And also that
the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to
take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of
Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or
cure the same on that island) and also on the coasts, bays, and
creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in
America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to
dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and
creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long
as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or
either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for
the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement,
without a previous agreement for that purpose with the
inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.

Article IV.
It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no
lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in
sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.

Article V.
It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to
the legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the
restitution of all estates, rights, and properties which have
been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also
of the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in
districts in the possession of His Majesty's arms, and who
have not borne arms against the said United States. …

Article VI.
That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any
prosecutions commenced, against any person or persons for, or
by reason of the part which he or they may have taken in the
present war. …

Article VII.
There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between His
Britannic Majesty and the said States, and between the
subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore
all hostilities, both by sea and land, shall from henceforth
cease: All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty,
and His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed,
and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any
negroes or other property of the American inhabitants,
withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said
United States. …

Article VIII.
The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to
the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects
of Great Britain, and the citizens of the United States."

_Documents Illustrative of American History,
edited by H. W. Preston,
page 232._

ALSO IN:
_Treaties and Conventions between the United States
and other Powers (edition of 1889),
pages 370-379._

_Parliamentary History of England,
volume 23._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (November-December).
The British evacuation of New York.
Dissolution of the Continental Army and Washington's
farewell to it.

"The definitive treaty had been signed at Paris on the 3d of
September, 1783, and was soon to be ratified by the United
States in Congress assembled. The last remnant of the British
army in the east had sailed down the Narrows on the 25th of
November, a day which, under the appellation of Evacuation
Day, was long held in grateful remembrance by the inhabitants
of New York, and was, till a few years since, annually
celebrated with fireworks and with military display. Of the
continental army scarce a remnant was then [at the beginning
of 1784] in the service of the States, and these few were
under the command of General Knox. His great work of
deliverance over, Washington had resigned his commission, had
gone back to his estate on the banks of the Potomac, and was
deeply engaged with plans for the improvement of his
plantations.
{3289}
The retirement to private life of the American Fabius, as the
newspapers delighted to call him, had been attended by many
pleasing ceremonies, and had been made the occasion for new
manifestations of affectionate regard by the people. The same
day that witnessed the departure of Sir Guy Carleton from New
York also witnessed the entry into that city of the army of
the States. Nine days later Washington bid adieu to his
officers. About noon on Thursday, the 4th of December, the
chiefs of the army assembled in the great room of Fraunces's
Tavern, then the resort of merchants and men of fashion, and
there Washington joined them. Rarely as he gave way to his
emotions, he could not on that day get the mastery of them. …
He filled a glass from a decanter that stood on the table,
raised it with a trembling hand, and said: 'With a heart full
of love and gratitude I now take leave of you, and most
devoutly wish your latter days may be as prosperous and happy
as your former ones have been glorious and honorable.' Then he
drank to them, and, after a pause, said: 'I cannot come to
each of you to take my leave, but shall be obliged if you will
each come and shake me by the hand.' General Knox came forward
first, and Washington embraced him. The other officers
approached one by one, and silently took their leave. A line
of infantry had been drawn up extending from the tavern to
Whitehall ferry, where a barge was in waiting to carry the
commander across the Hudson to Paulus Hook. Washington, with
his officers following, walked down the line of soldiers to
the water. The streets, the balconies, the windows, were
crowded with gazers. All the churches in the city sent forth a
joyous din. Arrived at the ferry, he entered the barge in
silence, stood up, took off his hat and waved farewell. Then,
as the boat moved slowly out into the stream amid the shouts
of the citizens, his companions in arms stood bareheaded on
the shore till the form of their illustrious commander was
lost to view."

_J. B. McMaster,
History of the People of the United States,
chapter 2 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapter 33._

_Mrs. M. J. Lamb,
History of the City of New York,
volume 2, chapters 6-7._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1787.
After the war.
Resistance to the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace.
National feebleness and humiliation.
Failure of the Articles of Confederation.
Movements toward a firmer Constitution.

"The revolution was at last accomplished. The evils it had
removed, being no longer felt, were speedily forgotten. The
evils it had brought pressed heavily upon them. They could
devise no remedy. They saw no way of escape. They soon began
to grumble, became sullen, hard to please, dissatisfied with
themselves and with everything done for them. The States,
differing in habits, in customs, in occupations, had been
during a few years united by a common danger. But the danger
was gone; old animosities and jealousies broke forth again
with all their strength, and the union seemed likely to be
dissolved. In this state of public discontent the House met at
Philadelphia early in January, 1784. Some days were spent in
examining credentials of new members, and in waiting for the
delinquents to come in. It was not till the 14th of the month
that the definitive treaty was taken under consideration and
duly ratified. Nothing remained, therefore, but to carry out
the stipulations with as much haste as possible. But there
were some articles which the people had long before made up
their minds never should be carried out. While the treaty was
yet in course of preparation the royal commissioners had
stoutly insisted on the introduction of articles providing for
the return of the refugees and the payment of debts due to
British subjects at the opening of the war. The commissioners
on behalf of the United States, who well knew the tempers of
their countrymen, had at first firmly stood out against any
such articles. But some concessions were afterward made by
each party, and certain stipulations touching the debts and
the refugees inserted. Adams, who wrote in the name of his
fellow-commissioners, … hoped that the middle line adopted
would be approved. The middle line to which Adams referred was
that Congress should recommend the States to make no more
seizures of the goods and property of men lately in arms
against the Confederation, and to put no bar in the way of the
recovery of such as had already been confiscated. It was
distinctly understood by each side that these were
recommendations, and nothing more than recommendations. Yet no
sooner were they made known than a shout of indignation and
abuse went up from all parts of the country. The community in
a moment was divided between three parties. The smallest of
the three was made up of the Tories, who still hoped for place
and power, and still nursed the delusion that the past would
be forgotten. Yet they daily contributed to keep the
remembrance of it alive by a strong and avowed attachment to
Great Britain. Opposed to these was the large and influential
body of violent Whigs, who insisted vehemently that every
loyalist should instantly be driven from the States. A less
numerous and less violent body of Whigs constituted the third
party." The fury of the violent Whigs proved generally
irresistible and great numbers of the obnoxious Tories fled
before it.

See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

Some "sought a refuge in Florida, then a possession of Spain,
and founded settlements which their descendants have since
raised to prosperous and beautiful villages, renowned for
groves of orange-trees and fields of cane. Others embarked on
the British ships of war, and were carried to Canada or the
island of Bermuda; a few turned pirates, obtained a sloop, and
scoured the waters of Chesapeake bay. Many went to England,
beset the ministry with petitions for relief, wearied the
public with pathetic stories of the harsh ingratitude with
which their sufferings had been requited, and were accused,
with much show of reason, by the Americans of urging the
severe restrictions which England began to lay on American
commerce. Many more … set out for Nova Scotia. … The open
contempt with which, in all parts of the country, the people
treated the recommendation of Congress concerning the refugees
and the payment of the debts, was no more than any man of
ordinary sagacity could have foretold. Indeed, the state into
which Congress had fallen was most wretched. … Each of the
thirteen States the Union bound together retained all the
rights of sovereignty, and asserted them punctiliously against
the central government.
{3290}
Each reserved to itself the right to put up mints, to strike
money, to levy taxes, to raise armies, to say what articles
should come into its ports free and what should be made to pay
duty. Toward the Continental Government they acted precisely
as if they were dealing with a foreign power. In truth, one of
the truest patriots of New England had not been ashamed to
stand up in his place in the Massachusetts House of Deputies
and speak of the Congress of the States as a foreign
government. Every act of that body was scrutinized with the
utmost care. The transfer of the most trivial authority beyond
the borders of the State was made with protestations, with
trembling, and with fear. Under such circumstances, each
delegate felt himself to have much the character, and to be
clothed with very much of the power, of ambassadors. He was
not responsible to men, he was responsible to a State. … From
beginning to end the system of representation was bad. By the
Articles of Confederation each of the thirteen little
republics was annually to send to Congress not more than seven
and not less than two delegates. No thought was taken of
population. … But this absolute equality of the States was
more apparent than real. Congress possessed no revenue. The
burden of supporting the delegates was cast on those who sent
them, and, as the charge was not light, a motive was at once
created for preferring a representation of two to a
representation of seven, or, indeed, for sending none at all.
While the war was still raging and the enemy marching and
counter-marching within the border of every State, a sense of
fear kept up the number of delegates to at least two. Indeed,
some of the wealthier and more populous States often had as
many as four congressmen on the floor of the House. But the
war was now over. The stimulus derived from the presence of a
hostile army was withdrawn, and the representation and
attendance fell off fast. Delaware and Georgia ceased to be
represented. From the ratification of the treaty to the
organization of the Government under the Constitution six
years elapsed, and during those six years Congress, though
entitled to 91 members, was rarely attended by 25. The House
was repeatedly forced to adjourn day after day for want of a
quorum. On more than one occasion these adjournments covered a
period of thirteen consecutive days. … No occasion, however
impressive or important, could call out a large attendance.
Seven States, represented by twenty delegates, witnessed the
resignation of Washington. Twenty-three members, sitting for
eleven States, voted for the ratification of the treaty. … It
is not surprising, therefore, that Congress speedily
degenerated into a debating club, and a debating club of no
very high order. Neglected by its own members, insulted and
threatened by its mutinous troops, reviled by the press, and
forced to wander from city to city in search of an abiding
place, its acts possessed no national importance whatever. It
voted monuments that never were put up, rewarded meritorious
services with sums of money that never were paid, formed wise
schemes for the relief of the finances that never were carried
out, and planned on paper a great city that never was built.
In truth, to the scoffers and malcontents of that day, nothing
was more diverting than the uncertain wanderings of Congress.
… In the coffee-houses and taverns no toasts were drunk with
such uproarious applause as 'A hoop to the barrel' and 'Cement
to the Union'; toasts which not long before had sprung up in
the army and come rapidly into vogue. … The men who, in after
years, came to eminence as the framers of the Constitution,
who became renowned leaders of the Federalists, presidents,
cabinet ministers, and constitutional statesmen, were then in
private life, abroad, or in the State Assemblies. Washington
was busy with his negroes and tobacco; Adams was minister to
Holland; Jefferson still sat in Congress, but was soon to be
sent as minister to France; Madison sat in the Virginia House
of Deputies; Hamilton was wrangling with Livingston and Burr
at the bar of New York; Jay was minister to Spain."

_J. B. McMaster,
History of the People of the United States,
volume 1, chapter 2._

Hamilton's description, in one of the papers of the
Federalist, of the state of the country in 1787, is very
graphic: "We may indeed, with propriety," he wrote, "be said
to have reached almost the last stage of National humiliation.
There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or
degrade the character of an independent nation, which we do
not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of
which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These
are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we
owe debts to foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted
in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our
political existence! These remain without any proper or
satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable
territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign
power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to
have been surrendered! These are still retained, to the
prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are we
in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have
neither troops, nor treasury, nor Government. Are we even in a
condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on
our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to
be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free
participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain
excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable
resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned
its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of
importance to National wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of
declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a
safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our
Government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors
abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a
violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom
of National distress? The price of improved land in most parts
of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the
quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully
explained by that want of private and public confidence, which
are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a
direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is
private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most
useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced
within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an
opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money.
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To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford
neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be
demanded what indication is there of National disorder,
poverty, and insignificance, that could befall a community so
peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which
does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public
misfortunes? … The great and radical vice in the construction
of the existing Confederation is in the principle of
legislation for States or Governments, in their corporate or
collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the
individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does
not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it
pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest
depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United
States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for
men and money, but they have no authority to raise either, by
regulations extending to the individual citizens of America.
The consequence of this is, that, though in theory their
resolutions concerning those objects are laws,
constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in
practice they are mere recommendations, which the States
observe or disregard at their option. … There is nothing
absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance
between independent nations, for certain defined purposes
precisely stated in a treaty; regulating all the details of
time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to
future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good
faith of the parties. … If the particular States in this
country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each
other, and to drop the project of a general discretionary
superintendence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and
would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been
enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit
of being, at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all
views towards a Confederate Government, this would bring us to
a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us
in a situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each
other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by
the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. But
if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation;
if we still will adhere to the design of a National
Government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending
power, under the direction of a common Council, we must
resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which
may be considered as forming the characteristic difference
between a league and a Government; we must extend the
authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,—the
only proper objects of Government."

_Alexander Hamilton,
The Federalist,
number 15._

"Many of the States refused or neglected to pay even their
allotted shares of interest upon the public debt, and there
was no power in Congress to compel payment. Eighteen months
were required to collect only one-fifth of the taxes assigned
to the States in 1783. The national credit became worthless.
Foreign nations refused to make commercial treaties with the
United States, preferring a condition of affairs in which they
could lay any desired burden upon American commerce without
fear of retaliation by an impotent Congress. The national
standing army had dwindled to a corps of 80 men. In 1785
Algiers declared war against the United States. Congress
recommended the building of five 40-gun ships of war. But
Congress had only power to recommend. The ships were not
built, and the Algerines were permitted to prey on American
commerce with impunity. England still refused to carry out the
Treaty of 1783, or to send a Minister to the United States.
The Federal Government, in short, was despised abroad and
disobeyed at home. The apparent remedy was the possession by
Congress of the power of levying and collecting internal taxes
and duties on imports, but, after long urging, it was found
impossible to gain the necessary consent of all the States to
the article of taxation by Congress. In 1786, therefore, this
was abandoned, and, as a last resort, the States were asked to
pass an Amendment intrusting to Congress the collection of a
revenue from imports. This Amendment was agreed to by all the
States but one. New York alone rejected it, after long debate,
and her veto seemed to destroy the last hope of a continuance
of national union in America. Perhaps the dismay caused by the
action of New York was the most powerful argument in the minds
of many for an immediate and complete revision of the
government. The first step to Revision was not so designed. In
1785 the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, in pursuance
of their right to regulate commerce, had appointed
Commissioners to decide on some method of doing away with
interruptions to the navigation of Chesapeake Bay. The
Commissioners reported their inability to agree, except in
condemning the Articles of Confederation. The Legislature of
Virginia followed the report by a resolution, inviting the
other States to meet at Annapolis, consider the defects of the
government, and suggest some remedy. In September, 1786,
delegates from five of the Middle States assembled, but
confined themselves to discussion, since a majority of the
States were not represented. The general conclusion was that
the government, as it then stood, was inadequate for the
protection, prosperity or comfort, of the people, and that
some immediate and thorough reform was needed. After drawing
up a report for their States and for Congress, recommending
another Convention to be held at Philadelphia, in May, 1787,
they adjourned. Congress, by resolution, approved their report
and the proposed Convention. The Convention met, as proposed,
May 14th, 1787."

_A. Johnston,
History of American Politics,
2d edition, chapter 1._

"Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the
downfall of a government which had been framed with the hope
and promise of perpetual duration. … But this brief interval
was full of suffering and peril. There are scarcely any evils
or dangers, of a political nature, and springing from
political and social causes, to which a free people can be
exposed, which the people of the United States did not
experience during that period."

_G. T. Curtis,
History of the Constitution,
book 3, chapter 1_.

"It is not too much to say that the period of five years
following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in
all the history of the American people."

_J. Fiske,
Critical Period of American History,
page 55._

ALSO IN:
_J. S. Landon,
Constitutional History and Government of the United States,
lecture 3._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1789.
Depressed state of Trade and Industry.
Commercial consequences of the want of nationality.

"The effect of the Revolutionary War on the merchant marine of
the colonies, which thereby secured their independence as the
United States, was not so disastrous as might have been
expected. Many ships were lost or captured, and the gains of
maritime commerce were reduced; but to offset these losses an
active fleet of privateers found profitable employment in the
seizure of English merchantmen, and thus kept alive the
maritime spirit of the country, and supplied a revenue to the
shipowners whose legitimate pursuits were suspended by the
war. In 1783, therefore, the American merchant marine was in a
fairly healthy condition. During the next six years the
disadvantages of the new situation made themselves felt.
Before the Revolution the colonies had had open trade with
their fellow-subjects in the British West India Islands. The
commerce thus carried on was a very profitable business. The
island colonies were supplied with lumber, corn, fish, live
stock, and surplus farm produce, which the continent furnished
in abundance, together with rough manufactured articles such
as pipe staves, and in return the ships of New York and New
England brought back great quantities of coffee, sugar,
cotton, rum, and indigo. … As a result of independence, the
West India business was entirely cut off. The merchantmen of
the United States then came in on the footing of foreign
vessels, and all such vessels, under the terms of the
Navigation Act, were rigorously excluded from trade with the
British colonies. It was evident, however, that the sudden
cessation of this trade, whatever loss it might inflict on the
newly created state, would be tenfold more harmful to the
islands, which had so long depended upon their neighbors of
the mainland for the necessaries of life. Pitt, then
Chancellor of the Exchequer, appreciated this difficulty, and
in 1783 brought a bill into Parliament granting open trade as
to articles that were the produce of either country. The
measure failed, owing to Pitt's resignation, and the next
ministry, in consequence of the violent opposition of British
shipowners, passed a merely temporary act, vesting in the
crown the power of regulating trade with America. This power
was occasionally exercised by suspending certain provisions of
the navigation laws, under annual proclamations, but it did
not serve to avert the disaster that Pitt had foreseen.
Terrible sufferings visited the population of the West India
colonies, and between 1780 and 1787 as many as 15,000 slaves
perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the
necessary supply of food when their own crops had been
destroyed by hurricanes. Apart from the unfavorable condition
of the West India trade, another and more important cause had
operated to check the prosperous development of American
commerce. The only bond of political union at this time was
that formed by the Articles of Confederation, constituting a
mere league of independent States, any one of which could pass
laws calculated to injure the commerce of the others."

_J. R. Soley,
Maritime Industries of America
(The United States of America, edition by N. S. Shaler,
volume 1, chapter 10)._

"The general commerce of the granulated mass of communities
called the United States, from 1783 to 1780, was probably the
poorest commerce known in the whole history of the country.
England sent America £3,700,000 worth of merchandise in 1784,
and took in return only £750,000. The drain of specie to meet
this difference was very severe, and merchants could not meet
the engagements so rashly made. They had imported luxuries for
customers who were poor, and non-payment through all the
avenues of trade was the consequence. One circumstance and
detail of the internal management of this commerce added to
the distress and to the necessary difficulties of the time.
Immediately after the peace, British merchants, factors, and
clerks came across the seas in streams, to take advantage of
the new opportunities for trade. It seemed to the citizens to
be a worse invasion of their economic rights than the coming
of the troops had been to the political rights of the old
colonists. The whole country was agitated, but action was
initiated in Boston in 1785. The merchants met and discussed
all these difficulties. They pledged themselves to buy no more
goods of British merchants or factors in Boston. In about
three weeks the mechanics and artisans met in the old Green
Dragon Tavern and committed themselves to the same policy. But
the merchants went beyond mere non-intercourse with traders at
home. The root of the difficulty was in the ill-regulation or
want of regulation of our commerce with all foreign countries.
The confederation was giving and not getting. Where it should
have gotten, foreigners were getting, because the parts of the
country had not agreed to unite in acquiring for the common
benefit, lest some part should be injured in the process.
Congress made treaties for the Confederation. But if unable to
treat with any} power which excluded American shipping from
its ports, or laid duties on American produce, Congress did
not control our ports in an equivalent manner. Each individual
state was to decide whether the unfriendly power should trade
at its own ports. This in effect nullified any retaliatory
action. England, being the best market, virtually controlled
any change in commerce, as it was then conducted. Her ports
were closed to American products unless they were brought in
British vessels. France admitted our vessels to her ports, but
her merchants cried out against the competition. It was feared
that the ministers would be obliged to yield to their clamor
and close the ports. Probably the poor economic condition of
the country affected the foreign trade even more than the bad
adjustment of foreign relations. All causes combined to form
two parties, one advocating imposts upon foreign trade or a
Navigation Act, the other opposing this scheme, and insisting
upon absolute freedom of commerce. It was in this direction
that the Boston people moved, after they had instituted
non-intercourse in their own market with British traders. They
petitioned Congress to remedy these embarrassments of trade,
and sent a memorial to their own legislature. This document
urged that body to insist on action by Congress. They formed a
Committee of Correspondence to enforce these plans upon the
whole country."

_W. B. Weeden,
Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1780,
chapter 22 (volume 2)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784.
Plans for new States in the Northwest Territory.

See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: A. D. 1784.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784.
Revolt in Tennessee against the
territorial cession to Congress.
The State of Franklin.

See TENNESSEE; A. D. 1776-1784; and 1785.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784.
The first daily Newspaper publication.

See PRINTING and PRESS; A. D. 1784-1813.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784.
The financial administration of Robert Morris.
Cost of the war.

From May, 1781, until April, 1785, the burden of the financial
management of the revolutionary struggle rested upon Robert
Morris, of Philadelphia, who held the office which Congress
had created and entitled "the Superintendent of Finances."
Morris's detractors argued that he deserved no great credit
for his management of the finances as compared with his
predecessors, because in his time everything turned in his
favour. It is true that if things had remained as before, he
could not have restored the finances; for the miracle of
carrying on a war without means has never yet been performed
by anybody. The events which gave him an opportunity to
restore the finances, by intelligent and energetic action,
were as follows. The first was the collapse of the paper
currency and its absolute removal from circulation, in May,
1781, just before he took office. As soon as it was out of the
way, specie came in. He was able to throw aside all the
trammels in which the treasury operations had been entangled
by the paper system. It is true that he did not succeed in his
attempt to relieve himself entirely from these anticipations,
which, inasmuch as they were anticipations, would have used up
the revenues of his time; but it was a great gain for him to
be able to conduct his current operations at least in terms of
specie. The second thing in his favour was the great help
granted by France in 1781, and especially the importation of a
part of this in specie. This enabled him to found the bank,
from which he borrowed six times what he put into it. The
chief use of the bank to him, however, was to discount the
notes which he took for bills of exchange. Then also it was
possible for him to reduce the expenses in a way which his
predecessors had not had the courage or the opportunity to
accomplish, because in their time the abuses of the old method
had not gone far enough to force acquiescence in the reforms.
In Morris's time, and chiefly, as it appears, by his exertions
and merit, the expenditures were greatly reduced for an army
of a given size. When the war came to an end, it was possible
for him to reduce the entire establishment to a very low
scale. Next we notice that the efforts to introduce taxation
bore fruit which, although it was trivial in one point of
view, was large enough to be very important to him in his
desperate circumstances. Finally, when his need was the
greatest, and these advantages and opportunities proved
inadequate, the rise of American credit made the loan in
Holland possible, and this carried him through to the result.
… By the Report of 1790 the total amount of expenditures and
advances at the treasury of the United States, during the war,
in specie value, was estimated as follows;
1775 and 1776, $20,064,666.
1777, $24,986,646.
1778, $24,289,438.
1779, $10,794,620.
1780, $3,000,000.
1781, $1,942,465.
1782, $3,632,745.
1783, $3,226,583.
1784, $548,525 to November 1.
Total $92,485,693.

This table shows how the country lapsed into dependence on
France after the alliance was formed. The round number
opposite 1780 is very eloquent. It means anarchy and
guesswork. … According to the best records we possess, the
cost of the war to the United States, reduced to specie value
year by year at the official scale of depreciation, which,
being always below the truth, makes these figures too high,
was, as above stated, $92,485,693, at the treasury. There were
also certificates of indebtedness out for $16,708,009. There
had been expended in Europe, which never went through the
treasury, $5,000,000. The States were estimated to have
expended $21,000,000. Total, $135,000,000. Jefferson
calculated it at $140,000,000, by adding the debts incurred
and the continental currency. The debt contracted by England
during the war was £115,000,000, for which £91,000,000 were
realized. The Comptroller of the Treasury of France said that
it cost 60,000,000 livres a year to support the army in
America. Vergennes told Lafayette, in November, 1782, that
France had expended 250,000,000 livres in the war. There is an
often-repeated statement that the war cost France
1,200,000,000 livres, or 1,280,000,000, or 1,500,000,000.
Arthur Young put it at £50,000,000, sterling. Probably if
60,000,000 a year for five years, or $60,000,000, was taken as
the amount directly expended for and in America by France, it
would be as fair a computation as could be made of her
contribution to American independence. She had large
expenditures elsewhere in the prosecution of her war against
Great Britain, and her incidental losses of ships, etc., were
great. When England abandoned the effort to subdue the
colonies, she was in a far better position for continuing it
than either of her adversaries. George III. was by no means
stupid in his comments and suggestions about the war. No
Englishman of the period said things which now seem wiser in
the retrospect. As early as September, 1780, he said: 'America
is distressed to the greatest degree. The finances of France,
as well as Spain, are in no good situation: This war, like the
last, will prove one of credit.' This opinion was fully
justified in 1782. French finances were then hastening toward
bankruptcy, so that France could not continue the war expenses
or the loans and subsidies to America. English credit was
high. October 2, 1782, Vergennes wrote to Montmorin, that the
English fleet was stronger than at the beginning of the war,
while the fleets of France and Spain were weaker; that French
finances were greatly weakened, while English credit was high;
that England had recovered influence in Russia, and through
Russia on Prussia and Austria. He wanted peace and
reconciliation with England in order to act with her in
eastern Europe. If England had chosen to persevere in the war,
the matter of credit would have been the most important
element in her chances of success, aside from the natural
difficulties of the enterprise."

_W. G. Sumner,
The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution,
chapter 23 (volume 2)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784-1788.
Disputes with England over the execution of the Treaty of Peace.
Difficulties with Spain.
The question of the Navigation of the Mississippi.
Eastern jealousy and Western excitement.

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