Chapter 3 (2)

"The account of Burgoyne's surrender, which was brought to
France by a swift-sailing ship from Boston, threw Turgot and
all Paris into transports of joy. None doubted the ability of
the states to maintain their independence. On the 12th of
December their commissioners had an interview with Vergennes.
'Nothing,' said he, 'has struck me so much as General
Washington's attacking and giving battle to General Howe's
army. To bring troops raised within the year to this, promises
everything. The court of France, in the treaty which is to be
entered into, intend to take no advantage of your present
situation. Once made, it should be durable; and therefore it
should contain no condition of which the Americans may
afterward repent, but such only as will last as long as human
institutions shall endure, so that mutual amity may subsist
forever. Entering into a treaty will be an avowal of your
independence. Spain must be consulted, and Spain will not be
satisfied with an undetermined boundary on the west. Some of
the states are supposed to run to the South Sea, which might
interfere with her claim to California.' It was answered that
the last treaty of peace adopted the Mississippi as a
boundary. 'And what share do you intend to give us in the
fisheries?' asked Vergennes; for in the original draft of a
treaty the United States had proposed to take to themselves
Cape Breton and the whole of the island of Newfoundland.
Explanations were made by the American commissioners that
their later instructions removed all chances of disagreement
on that subject. … The question of a French alliance … was
discussed by Vergennes with the Marquis d'Ossun, the late
French ambassador in Madrid, as the best adviser with regard
to Spain, and the plan of action was formed. Then these two
met the king at the apartment of Maurepas, where the plan,
after debate, was finally settled. Maurepas, at heart opposed
to the war, loved ease and popularity too well to escape the
sway of external opinion; and Louis XVI. sacrificed his own
inclination and his own feeling of justice to policy of state
and the opinion of his advisers. So, on the 6th of February, a
treaty of amity and commerce and an eventual defensive treaty
of alliance were concluded between the king of France and the
United States, on principles of equality and reciprocity, and
for the most part in conformity to the proposals of congress.
In commerce each party was to be placed on the footing of the
most favored nation. The king of France promised his good
offices with the princes and powers of Barbary. As to the
fisheries, each party reserved to itself the exclusive
possession of its own. Accepting the French interpretation of
the treaties of Utrecht and of Paris, the United States
acknowledged the right of French subjects to fish on the banks
of Newfoundland, and their exclusive right to half the coast
of that island for drying-places.
{3257}
On the question of ownership in the event of the conquest of
Newfoundland the treaty was silent. The American proposal,
that free ships give freedom to goods and to persons, except
to soldiers in actual service of an enemy, was adopted.
Careful lists were made out of contraband merchandises. The
absolute and unlimited independence of the United States was
described as the essential end of the defensive alliance; and
the two parties mutually engaged not to lay down their arms
until it should be assured by the treaties terminating the
war. Moreover, the United States guaranteed to France the
possessions then held by France in America, as well as those
which it might acquire by a future treaty of peace; and, in
like manner, the king of France guaranteed to the United
States their present possessions and acquisitions during the
war from the dominions of Great Britain in North America. A
separate and secret act reserved to the king of Spain the
power of acceding to the treaties. Within forty-two hours of
the signature of these treaties of commerce and alliance the
British ministry received the news by special messenger from
their spy in Paris, but it was not divulged." It was
officially communicated to the British government on the 13th
of March, when ambassadors were withdrawn on both sides and
war soon followed.

_G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 5, chapter 17._

ALSO IN:
_Treaties and Conventions of the United States
(edition of 1889),
page 296._

_T. Balch,
The French in America during the War of Independence,
chapter 8._

See, also, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1778.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (June).
Peace-proposals from England.
British evacuation of Philadelphia and march to New York.
Battle of Monmouth.

"On May 11th, Sir Henry Clinton relieved Sir William Howe at
Philadelphia, and the latter took his departure in a blaze of
mock glory. … The new commander was more active than his
predecessor, but no cleverer, and no better fitted to cope
with Washington. … Expecting a movement by the enemy,
Washington sent Lafayette forward to watch Philadelphia.
Clinton, fresh in office, determined to cut him off, and by a
rapid movement nearly succeeded in so doing. Timely
information, presence of mind, and quickness, alone enabled
the young Frenchman to escape, narrowly but completely.
Meantime, a cause for delay, that curse of the British
throughout the war, supervened. A peace commission, consisting
of the Earl of Carlisle, William Eden, and Governor Johnstone,
arrived. They were excellent men, but they came too late.
Their propositions three years before would have been well
enough, but as it was they were worse than nothing. Coolly
received, they held a fruitless interview with a committee of
Congress, tried to bribe and intrigue, found that their own
army had been already ordered to evacuate Philadelphia [in
apprehension of the arrival of the expected French fleet]
without their knowledge, and finally gave up their task in
angry despair, and returned to England to join in the chorus
of fault-finding which was beginning to sound very loud in
ministerial ears. Meanwhile, Washington waited and watched,
puzzled by the delay, and hoping only to harass Sir Henry with
militia on the march to New York. But, as the days slipped by,
the Americans grew stronger, while Sir Henry weakened himself
by sending 5,000 men to the West Indies, and 3,000 to Florida.
When he finally started [evacuating Philadelphia June 17], he
had with him less than 10,000 men, while the Americans had
13,000, nearly all continental troops. Under these
circumstances, Washington determined to bring on a battle. He
was thwarted at the outset by his officers, as was wont to be
the case. Lee had returned more whimsical than ever, and at
the moment was strongly adverse to an attack. … Washington was
harassed of course by all this, but he did not stay his
purpose, and as soon as he knew that Clinton actually had
marched, he broke camp at Valley Forge and started in pursuit.
There were more councils of an old-womanish character, but
finally Washington took the matter into his own hands, and
ordered forth a strong detachment to attack the British
rear-guard. They set out on the 25th, and as Lee, to whom the
command belonged, did not care to go, Lafayette [see above: A.
D. 1777 (JULY)] was put in charge. As soon as Lafayette had
departed, however, Lee changed his mind, and insisted that all
the detachments in front, amounting to 6,000 men, formed a
division so large that it was unjust not to give him the
command. Washington, therefore, sent him forward next day with
two additional brigades, and then Lee by seniority took
command on the 27th of the entire advance. In the evening of
that day, Washington came up, reconnoitred the enemy, and saw
that, although their position was a strong one, another day's
unmolested march would make it still stronger. He therefore
resolved to attack the next morning, and gave Lee then and
there explicit orders to that effect. In the early dawn he
despatched similar orders, but Lee apparently did nothing
except move feebly forward, saying to Lafayette, 'You don't
know the British soldiers; we cannot stand against them.' He
made a weak attempt to cut off a covering party, marched and
countermarched, ordered and countermanded, until Lafayette and
Wayne, eager to fight, knew not what to do, and sent hot
messages to Washington to come to them. Thus hesitating and
confused, Lee permitted Clinton to get his baggage and train
to the front, and to mass all his best troops in the rear
under Cornwallis, who then advanced against the American
lines. Now there were no orders at all, and the troops did not
know what to do, or where to go. They stood still, then began
to fall back, and then to retreat. A very little more and
there would have been a rout. As it was, Washington alone
prevented disaster. … As the ill tidings grew thicker,
Washington spurred sharper and rode faster through the deep
sand and under the blazing mid-summer sun. At last he met Lee
and the main body all in full retreat. He rode straight at
Lee, savage with anger, not pleasant to look at, one may
guess, and asked fiercely and with a deep oath, tradition
says, what it all meant. … Lee gathered himself and tried to
excuse and palliate what had happened, but although the brief
words that followed are variously reported to us across the
century, we know that Washington rebuked him in such a way,
and with such passion, that all was over between them. Lee …
went to the rear, thence to a court-martial, thence to
dismissal and to a solitary life. … Having put Lee aside,
Washington rallied the broken troops, brought them into
position, turned them back, and held the enemy in check.
{3258}
It was not an easy feat, but it was done, and when Lee's
division again fell back in good order the main army was in
position, and the action became general. The British were
repulsed, and then Washington, taking the offensive, drove
them back until he occupied the battlefield of the morning.
Night came upon him still advancing. He halted his army, lay
down under a tree, his soldiers lying on their arms about him,
and planned a fresh attack, to be made at daylight. But when
the dawn came it was seen that the British had crept off, and
were far on their road. The heat prevented a rapid pursuit,
and Clinton got into New York. Between there and Philadelphia
he had lost 2,000 men, Washington said, and modern authorities
put it at about 1,500, of whom nearly 500 fell at Monmouth. …
Monmouth has never been one of the famous battles of the
Revolution, and yet there is no other which can compare with
it as an illustration of Washington's ability as a soldier. …
Its importance lies in the evidence which it gives of the way
in which Washington, after a series of defeats, during a
winter of terrible suffering and privation, had yet developed
his ragged volunteers into a well-disciplined and effective
army. The battle was a victory, but the existence and the
quality of the army that won it were a far greater triumph.
The dreary winter at Valley Forge had indeed borne fruit."

_H. C. Lodge,
George Washington,
volume 1, chapter 7._

ALSO IN:
_H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapters 54-56._

_Mrs. M. Campbell,
Life of General W. Hull,
chapter 14._

_The Lee Papers,
volumes 2-3
(New York Historical Society Collection, 1872-1873)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (June-November).
The war on the border.
Activity of Tories and Indians.
The Massacre at Cherry Valley.

"The Six Nations were stirred to hostility by Sir John Johnson
and the Mohawk chief Joseph Brant, with Walter Butler, of
infamous name. Their tory partisans were more cruel than the
red men. At Cobleskill, Schoharie county, June 1, 1778, Brant
won a savage triumph with a mixed force, and burned and
plundered the settlement. Springfield was also destroyed, and
the assailants retired. A month later the Indians were again
at Cobleskill, and, burning where they went, beat off a force
that attempted to check them. The valley of the Schohariekill
was in the succeeding year subjected to invasions from the
Senecas, and suffered severely. About Fort Stanwix the tories
and red men were continually hovering, and more than once
persons were pounced upon and scalped in sight of the works.
In 1778, in the early autumn, German Flats was visited by
Brant and his followers, and was entirely destroyed, although
all the inhabitants but two were warned in season to escape
with their lives. An expedition was sent after the Indians,
but failed to bring the warriors to battle, and was rewarded
only by laying waste the Indian villages of Unadilla and
Oquaga, and capturing a large supply of cattle and provisions.
At Cherry Valley a fort had been built, and the village was
occupied by a band of colonial troops under Colonel Ichabod
Alden. He rested in security, and the settlers were scattered
in their habitations, regardless of warnings of approaching
foes. Under cover of a severe storm of snow and rain, November
11, Brant and Butler, with 800 Indians and tories, swooped
upon the homes, and 43 persons, including women and children,
were butchered, 40 taken prisoners, all the buildings were
burned, and the domestic animals seized. So brutal was the
massacre that Brant charged Butler and the tories with acting
against his protests. Brant himself was content, July 19,
1779, with destroying the church, mills, houses, and barns at
Minnisink, Orange county, without sacrificing lives, but
turned upon a party sent in pursuit, and, after capturing a
detachment, butchered the wounded, and slew 45 who tried to
escape. Such deeds produced a terror in the colony. No one
knew where the red men and tories would strike next. To check
and counteract them, excursions were made against the tribes
in their homes. One of these was led by Colonels Van Schaick
and Willett from Fort Stanwix in April, 1779). Proceeding by
Wood Creek and Oneida Lake, they penetrated the villages of
the Onondagas, which they destroyed, and seized the provisions
and even the weapons of the red men, who fled into the
wilderness."

_E. H. Roberts,
New York,
chapter 24 (volume 2)._

The following account of the attack on Cherry Valley is from a
pen friendly to Butler and from sources favorable to the Tory
side: "After an exhausting march next day through a blinding
snow-storm and over ground covered with deep wet snow and mud,
Butler halted his men at dark in a pine wood which afforded
them some shelter, six miles from Cherry Valley. He assembled
the chiefs and proposed that as soon as the moon rose, they
should resume their march and surround the house occupied by
the officers, while he made a rush upon the fort with the
rangers. They readily assented, but before the time appointed
arrived it began to rain violently, and they obstinately
refused to move until daybreak. It was then arranged that
Captain McDonnel with 50 picked rangers and some Indians
should storm the house, while Butler with the remainder
assailed the fort. Without tents, blankets or fires, they
spent a sleepless night cowering beneath the pines, and were
glad to move as soon as day appeared. They had approached
unperceived within a mile of the fort by passing through a
dense swamp, when the Indians in front fired at two men
cutting wood. One fell dead; the other, though bleeding, ran
for his life and the entire body of Indians set up a whoop and
followed at full speed. Unhappily the rangers had just been
halted to fix flints and load their rifles, and the Indians
obtained a long start. The Continental officers attempted to
escape to the fort but only two or three reached it. The
colonel, five other officers and twenty soldiers, were killed
on the way and the lieutenant-colonel, three subalterns, and
ten privates were taken. The colors of the regiment were
abandoned in the house and burnt in it. The garrison of the
fort was fully alarmed, and opened a fierce fire of artillery
and small arms. The rangers seized and burnt a detached
block-house, and fired briskly at the loop-holes in the
palisades for ten minutes, when Butler saw with horror and
consternation that the Indians had set their officers at
defiance, and dispersed in every direction to kill and
plunder. Their wretched misconduct forced him to collect all
the rangers into a compact body on an eminence near the
principal entrance to the fort, to oppose a sally by the
garrison, which then undoubtedly outnumbered them
considerably.
{3259}
There he was obliged to remain inactive all day under a
ceaseless, chilling rain, while blazing houses and shrieks of
agony told their pitiful tale in the settlement below. At
nightfall he marched a mile down the valley and encamped. He
then struggled with indifferent success to rescue the
prisoners. Those surrendered were placed next the camp fires
and protected by his whole force. Next morning most of the
Indians and the feeblest men among the rangers were sent away
with a huge drove of captured cattle for the supply of the
garrison at Niagara, and McDonnel and Brant, with 60 rangers
and 50 Indians, swept the valley from end to end, ruthlessly
burning every building and stack in sight, while Butler, with
the remainder, again stood guard at the gate of the fort. He
hoped that this appalling spectacle would provoke the garrison
to sally out and fight, but the lesson of Wyoming had not been
lost on them, and they continued to look on from the walls in
silent fury. Another great herd of cattle was collected, and
Butler leisurely began his retreat, having had only two
rangers and three Indians wounded during the expedition. He
did not disguise the dark side of the story in his letter to
Colonel Bolton of the 17th November. 'I have much to lament,'
he said, 'that notwithstanding my utmost precautions to save
the women and children, I could not prevent some of them
falling victims to the fury of the savages. They have carried
off many of the inhabitants and killed more, among them Colin
Cloyd, a very violent rebel. I could not prevail on the
Indians to leave the women and children behind, though the
second morning Captain Johnson (to whose knowledge of the
Indians and address in managing them I am much indebted) and I
got them to permit twelve, who were loyalists, and whom I
concealed, with the humane assistance of Mr. Joseph Brant and
Captain Jacobs of Ochquaga, to return. The death of the women
and children on this occasion may, I believe, be truly
ascribed to the rebels having falsely accused the Indians of
cruelty at Wyomen. This has much exasperated them, and they
are still more incensed at finding that the colonel and those
who had then laid down their arms, soon after marching into
their country intending to destroy their villages, and they
declared that they would be no more accused falsely of
fighting the enemy twice, meaning they would in future give no
quarter.'"

_E. Cruikshank,
The Story of Butler's Rangers,
pages 55-56._

ALSO IN:
_W. W. Campbell,
Annals of Tryon County,
chapter 5._

_Centennial Celebrations of New York,
pages 359-383._

_W. L. Stone,
Life of Brant,
volume 1, chapter 17._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (July).
The war on the border.
Bloody work of the Tories and their Indian allies.
The Massacre at Wyoming.

"In 1778, according to the plan of campaign as given by Guy
Johnson in his correspondence, the English forces on the
western borders of New York were divided into two bodies: one,
consisting of Indians under Brant, to operate in New York,
while Deputy Superintendent Butler with the other should
penetrate the settled district on the Susquehanna. Brant
[Joseph Brant, the Mohawk chief], who, according to Colonel
Claus, 'had shown himself to be the most faithful and zealous
subject his majesty could have in America,' did his work
unsparingly, and ruin marked his track. In the valley of the
upper Mohawk and the Schoharie nothing but the garrison-houses
escaped, and labor was only possible in the field when muskets
were within easy reach. Occasionally blows were struck at the
larger settlements. … In July, 1778, the threatened attack on
Wyoming took place. This region was at that time formally
incorporated as the county of Westmoreland of the colony of
Connecticut. … In the fall of 1776, two companies, on the
Continental establishment, had been raised in the valley, in
pursuance of a resolution of Congress, and were shortly
thereafter ordered to join General Washington. Several
stockaded forts had been built during the summer at different
points. The withdrawal of so large a proportion of the
able-bodied men as had been enlisted in the Continental
service threw upon the old men who were left behind the duty
of guarding the forts. … In March, 1778, another military
company was organized, by authority of Congress, to be
employed for home defence. In May, attacks were made upon the
scouting parties by Indians, who were the forerunners of an
invading army. The exposed situation of the settlement, the
prosperity of the inhabitants, and the loyalty with which they
had responded to the call for troops, demanded consideration
from Connecticut, to whose quota the companies had been
credited, and from Congress, in whose armies they had been
incorporated; but no help came. On June 30th, an armed labor
party of eight men, which went out from the upper fort, was
attacked by Major Butler, who, with a force estimated by the
American commander in his report at 800 men, Tories and
Indians in equal numbers, had arrived in the valley. This
estimate was not far from correct; but if we may judge from
other raiding forces during the war, the proportion of whites
is too large, for only a few local Tories had joined Butler.
The little forts at the upper end of the valley offered no
resistance to the invaders. On July 3d, there were collected
at 'Forty Fort,' on the banks of the river, about three miles
above Wilkesbarre, 230 Americans, organized in six companies
(one of them being the company authorized by Congress for home
defence), and commanded by Colonel Zebulon Butler, a resident
in the valley and an officer in the Continental army. It was
determined, after deliberation, to give battle. In the
afternoon of that day, this body of volunteers, their number
being swelled to nearly 300 by the addition of old men and
boys, marched up the valley. The invaders had set fire to the
forts of which they were in possession. This perplexed the
Americans, as was intended, and they pressed on towards the
spot selected by the English officer for giving battle. This
was reached about four in the afternoon, and the attack was at
once made by the Americans, who fired rapidly in platoons. The
British line wavered, but a flanking fire from a body of
Indians concealed in the woods settled the fate of the day
against the Americans. They were thrown into confusion. No
efforts of their officers could rally them while exposed to a
fire which in a short time brought down every captain in the
band. The Indians now cut off the retreat of the
panic-stricken men, and pressed them towards the river. All
who could saved their lives by flight. Of the 300 who went out
that morning from Forty Fort, the names are recorded of 162
officers and men killed in the action or in the massacre which
followed.
{3260}
Major Butler, the British officer in command, reported the
taking of 'two hundred and twenty-seven scalps' 'and only five
prisoners.' Such was the exasperation of the Indians,
according to him, that it was with difficulty he saved these
few. He gives the English loss at two whites killed and eight
Indians wounded. During the night the worst passions of the
Indians seem to have been aroused in revenge for Oriskany.
Incredible tales are told of the inhumanity of the Tories.
These measures of vengeance fell exclusively upon those who
participated in the battle, for all women and children were
spared. As soon as the extent of the disaster was made known,
the inhabitants of the lower part of the valley deserted their
homes, and fled in the direction of the nearest settlements.
Few stayed behind who had strength and opportunity to escape.
In their flight many of the fugitives neglected to provide
themselves with provisions, and much suffering and some loss
of life ensued. The fugitives from the field of battle took
refuge in the forts lower down the valley. The next day,
Colonel Zebulon Butler, with the remnants of the company for
home defence, consisting of only fourteen men, escaped from
the valley. Colonel Denison, in charge of Forty Fort,
negotiated with Major Butler the terms of capitulation which
were ultimately signed. In these it was agreed that the
inhabitants should occupy their farms peaceably, and their
lives should be preserved 'intire and unhurt.' With the
exception that Butler executed a British deserter whom he
found among the prisoners, no lives were taken at that time.
Shortly thereafter, the Indians began to plunder, and the
English commander, to his chagrin, found himself unable to
check them. Miner even goes so far as to say that he promised
to pay for the property thus lost. Finding his commands
disregarded, Butler mustered his forces and withdrew, without
visiting the lower part of the valley. The greater part of the
Indians went with him, but enough remained to continue the
devastation, while a few murders committed by straggling
parties of Indians ended the tragedy. The whole valley was
left a scene of desolation."

_A. McF. Davis,
The Indians and the Border Warfare of the Revolution
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 6, chapter 8)._

"Rarely, indeed, does it happen that history is more at fault
in regard to facts than in the case of Wyoming. The remark may
be applied to nearly every writer who has attempted to narrate
the events connected with the invasion of Colonel John Butler.
Ramsay, and Gordon, and Marshall—nay, the British historians
themselves—have written gross exaggerations. Marshall,
however, in his revised edition, has made corrections. … Other
writers, of greater or less note, have gravely recorded the
same fictions, adding, it is to be feared, enormities not even
conveyed to them by tradition. The grossest of these
exaggerations are contained in Thatcher's Military Journal and
Drake's Book of the Indians. The account of the marching out
of a large body of Americans from one of the forts, to hold a
parley, by agreement, and then being drawn into an ambuscade
and all put to death, is false; the account of 70 Continental
soldiers being butchered, after having surrendered, is also
totally untrue. No regular troops surrendered, and all escaped
who survived the battle of the 3d. … There is still another
important correction to be made. … This correction regards the
name and the just fame of Joseph Brant, whose character has
been blackened with all the infamy, both real and imaginary,
connected with this bloody expedition. Whether Captain Brant
was at any time in company with this expedition is doubtful;
but it is certain, in the face of every historical authority,
British and American, that, so far from being engaged in the
battle, he was many miles distant at the time of its
occurrence. … It will, moreover, be seen, toward the close of
the present work, that after the publication of Campbell's
'Gertrude of Wyoming,' in which poem the Mohawk chieftain was
denounced as 'the Monster Brant,' his son repaired to England,
and, in a correspondence with the poet, successfully
vindicated his father's memory."

_W. L. Stone,
Life of Joseph Brant,
volume 1, page 339, foot-note, page 338 and footnote._

"No lives were taken by the Indians after the surrender; but
numbers of women and children perished in the dismal swamp on
the Pokono range of mountains, in the flight. … The whole
number of people killed and missing was about 300. … The
greatest barbarities of this celebrated massacre were
committed by the tories."

_W. L. Stone,
Poetry and History of Wyoming,
chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_W. P. Miner,
History of Wyoming,
Letters 17-18._

_G. Peck,
Wyoming._

_J. Fiske,
The American Revolution,
chapter 11 (volume 2)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (July-November).
The French fleet and army and their undertakings.
Ill fortune and ill-feeling between the new allies.
The failure at Newport.

"The first minister of France to the United States, M. Gérard,
came accompanied by a fleet and army, under D'Estaing, (July.)
'Unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances,' as Washington
wrote, 'lessened the importance of the French services in a
great degree.' In the first place, the arrival was just late
enough to miss the opportunity of surprising the British fleet
in the Delaware, not to mention the British army on its
retreat to New York. In the next place, the French vessels
proved to be of too great draught to penetrate the channel and
cooperate in an attack upon New York. Thus disappointing and
disappointed, D'Estaing engaged in an enterprise against
Newport, still in British hands. It proved another failure.
But not through the French alone; the American troops that
were to enter the island at the north being greatly
behindhand. The same day that they took their place, under
Sullivan, Greene, and Lafayette, the French left theirs at the
lower end of the island, in order to meet the British fleet
arriving from New York, (August 10.) A severe storm prevented
more than a partial engagement; but D'Estaing returned to
Newport only to plead the injuries received in the gale as
compelling his retirement to Boston for repairs. The orders of
the French government had been peremptory, that in case of any
damage to the fleet it should put into port at once. So far
was D'Estaing from avoiding action on personal grounds, that
when Lafayette hurried to Boston to persuade his countrymen to
return, the commander offered to serve as a volunteer until
the fleet should be refitted. The Americans, however, talked
of desertion and of inefficiency,—so freely, indeed, as to
affront their faithful Lafayette.
{3261}
At the same time, large numbers of them imitated the very
course which they censured, by deserting their own army. The
remaining forces retreated from their lines to the northern
end of the island, and, after an engagement, withdrew to the
mainland, (August 30.) It required all the good offices of
Lafayette, of Washington, and of Congress, to keep the peace
between the Americans and their allies. D'Estaing, soothed by
the language of those whom he most respected, was provoked, on
the other hand, by the hostility of the masses, both in the
army and amongst the people. Collisions between his men and
the Bostonians kept up his disgust; and, when his fleet was
repaired, he sailed for the West Indies, (November.) … On the
part of the British, there was nothing attempted that would
not have been far better unattempted. Marauding parties from
Newport went against New Bedford and Fairhaven. Others from
New York went against Little Egg Harbor. Tories and Indians
—'a collection of banditti,' as they were rightly styled by
Washington, descended from the northern country to wreak
massacre at Wyoming and at Cherry Valley. The war seemed to be
assuming a new character: it was one of ravages unworthy of
any cause, and most unworthy of such a cause as the British
professed to be. Affairs were at a low state amongst the
Americans."

_S. Eliot,
History of the United States,
part 3, chapter 5._

ALSO IN:
_S. G. Arnold,
History of Rhode Island,
chapters 21-22 (volume 2)._

_O. W. B. Peabody,
Life of General John Sullivan
(Library of American Biographies,
series 2, volume 3)._

_J. Marshall,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapter 9._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (December).
Anxieties of Washington.
His opinion of Congress.
The serious defects and errors of that body.

"Much of the winter was passed by Washington in Philadelphia,
occupied in devising and discussing plans for the campaign of
1779. It was an anxious moment with him. Circumstances which
inspired others with confidence, filled him with solicitude.
The alliance with France had produced a baneful feeling of
security, which, it appeared to him, was paralyzing the
energies of the country. England, it was thought, would now be
too much occupied in securing her position in Europe, to
increase her force or extend her operations in America. Many,
therefore, considered the war as virtually at an end; and were
unwilling to make the sacrifices, or supply the means
necessary for important military undertakings. Dissensions,
too, and party feuds were breaking out in Congress, owing to
that relaxation of that external pressure of a common and
imminent danger, which had heretofore produced a unity of
sentiment and action. That august body had, in fact, greatly
deteriorated since the commencement of the war. Many of those
whose names had been as watchwords at the Declaration of
Independence had withdrawn from the national councils;
occupied either by their individual affairs, or by the affairs
of their individual States. Washington, whose comprehensive
patriotism embraced the whole Union, deprecated and deplored
the dawning of this sectional spirit."

_W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapter 38._

The following, from a letter written by Washington in
December, 1778, to Benjamin Harrison, Speaker of the Virginia
House of Delegates, intimates the grave anxieties which filled
his mind, and the opinion of Congress with which he had
returned from a visit to Philadelphia:

"It appears as clear to me as ever the Sun did in its meridian
brightness, that America never stood in more eminent need of
the wise, patriotic, and spirited exertions of her Sons than
at this period; and if it is not a sufficient cause for
general lamentation, my misconception of the matter impresses
it too strongly upon me, that the States, separately, are too
much engaged in their local concerns, and have too many of
their ablest men withdrawn from the general council, for the
good of the common weal. … As there can be no harm in a pious
wish for the good of one's Country, I shall offer it as mine,
that each State would not only choose, but absolutely compel
their ablest men to attend Congress; and that they would
instruct them to go into a thorough investigation of the
causes, that have produced so many disagreeable effects in the
army and Country; in a word, that public abuses should be
corrected & an entire reformation worked. Without these, it
does not in my Judgment require the spirit of divination to
foretell the consequences of the present administration; nor
to how little purpose the States individually are framing
constitutions, providing laws, and filling offices with the
abilities of their ablest men. These, if the great whole is
mismanaged, must sink in the general wreck, and will carry
with it the remorse of thinking, that we are lost by our own
folly and negligence, or the desire perhaps of living in ease
and tranquillity during the expected accomplishment of so
great a revolution, in the effecting of which the greatest
abilities, and the honestest men our (i. e. the American)
world affords, ought to be employed. It is much to be feared,
my dear Sir, that the States, in their separate capacities,
have very inadequate ideas of the present danger. Removed
(some of them) far distant from the scene of action, and
seeing and hearing such publications only, as flatter their
wishes, they conceive that the contest is at an end, and that
to regulate the government and police of their own State is
all that remains to be done; but it is devoutly to be wished,
that a sad reverse of this may not fall upon them like a
thunder-clap, that is little expected. I do not mean to
designate particular States. I wish to cast no reflections
upon any one. The Public believe (and, if they do believe it,
the fact might almost as well be so), that the States at this
time are badly represented, and that the great and important
concerns of the nation are horribly conducted, for want either
of abilities or application in the members, or through the
discord & party views of some individuals. … P. S.
Philadelphia: 30th. This letter was to have gone by Post from
Middlebrook but missed that conveyance, since which I have
come to this place at the request of Congress whence I shall
soon return. I have seen nothing since I came here (on the 22d
Inst.) to change my opinion of Men or Measrs., but abundant
reason to be convinced that our affairs are in a more
distressed, ruinous and deplorable condition than they have
been in since the commencement of the War.—By a faithful
laborer then in the cause—By a man who is daily injuring his
private Estate without even the smallest earthly advantage not
common to all in case of a favorable Issue to the dispute—By
one who wishes the prosperity of America most devoutly and
sees or thinks he sees it, on the brink of ruin, you are
beseeched most earnestly, my dear Colonel Harrison, to exert
yourself in endeavoring to rescue your Country by (let me add)
sending your ablest and best Men to Congress—these characters
must not slumber nor sleep at home in such times of pressing
danger—they must not content themselves in the enjoyment of
places of honor or profit in their own Country while the
common interests of America are mouldering and sinking into
irretrievable (if a remedy is not soon applied) ruin in which
theirs also must ultimately be involved.
{3262}
If I was to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and
of Men, from what I have seen, and heard, and in part know, I
should in one word say that idleness, dissipation &
extravagance seems to have laid fast hold of most of
them.—That speculation—peculation—and an insatiable thirst
for riches seems to have got the better of every other
consideration and almost of every order of Men.—That party
disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the
day whilst the momentous concerns of an empire—a great and
accumulated debt—ruined finances—depreciated money—and want
of credit (which in their consequences is the want of
everything) are but secondary considerations and postponed
from day to day—from week to week as if our affairs wear the
most promising aspect—after drawing this picture, which from
my Soul I believe to be a true one, I need not repeat to you
that I am alarmed and wish to see my Countrymen roused.—I
have no resentments, nor do I mean to point at any particular
characters,—this I can declare upon my honor for I have every
attention paid me by Congress that I can possibly expect and
have reason to think that I stand well in their estimation,
but in the present situation of things I cannot help asking—
Where is Mason—Wythe—Jefferson—Nicholas—Pendleton—Nelson—and
another I could name—and why, if you are sufficiently
impressed with your danger do you not (as New York has done in
the case of Mr. Jay) send an extra member or two for at least
a certain limited time till the great business of the Nation
is put upon a more respectable and happy establishment.—Your
Money is now sinking 5 Pr. ct. a day in this city; and I shall
not be surprized if in the course of a few months a total stop
is put to the currency of it.—And yet an Assembly—a concert—a
Dinner—or supper (that will cost three or four hundred pounds)
will not only take Men off from acting in but even from thinking
of this business while a great part of the Officers of ye Army
from absolute necessity are quitting the service and ye more
virtuous few rather than do this are sinking by sure degrees
into beggary and want.—I again repeat to you that this is not
an exaggerated acct.; that it is an alarming one I do not
deny, and confess to you that I feel more real distress on
account of the prest. appearances of things than I have done
at any one time since the commencement of the dispute—but it
is time to bid you once more adieu.—Providence has heretofore
taken me up when all other means and hope seemed to be
departing from me in this."

_George Washington,
Writings,
edited by W: C. Ford,
volume 7, pages 297-303._

"The first Continental Congress enjoyed and deserved in a
remarkable degree the respect and confidence of the country.
The second Congress was composed of eminent men, and
succeeded, for a time, to the honors and reputation of the
first. But when it attempted to pass from discussion to
organization, and to direct as well as to frame the machinery
of administration, its delays and disputes and errors and
contradictions and hesitations excited a well-founded distrust
of its executive skill. Conscious of this distrust, it became
jealous of its authority; and instead of endeavoring to
regain, by correcting its errors, the ground which it had lost
by committing them, it grew suspicious and exacting in
proportion to the decay of its strength. And while this
critical change in its relations to the country was taking
place, important changes took place also in the materials of
which it was composed,—some of its wisest members being
removed by death, or imperative calls to other fields of duty,
or by failing of re-election at the regular expiration of
their terms of office. Among the first elements with which it
was brought into collision were the newly organized
governments of the States. The question of State rights, that
unsolved problem of our history, begins almost with the
beginning of the war. How abundant and active the materials of
disunion were, and how difficult it was even for leading men
to rise above them might be proved by numerous passages in the
letters of Washington and Greene, if it were not still more
evident from the conduct of the local legislatures. How far
this spirit might have been counteracted or controlled if the
policy of the Congress had been that policy of prompt decision
and energetic action which, commanding respect at all times,
commands in times of general danger general and implicit
obedience, it is impossible to say. … Another element with
which it was brought into immediate and constant relations was
the army; and, unfortunately for both, these relations, from
their very nature, brought into immediate and constant
contrast the elements of opposition which they both contained,
rather than the elements of harmonious action, which they also
contained in an almost equal degree. If the Congress was
composed of the representatives of the people, the army was
composed in a large proportion of the constituents of the
Congress. More than once also, during the course of the war,
men who had done good work for their country as soldiers,
withdrawing from their original field of action, did equally
good service for her as statesmen. And more than once, too,
men who had proved themselves wise and eloquent in counsel
were found at the head of a regiment, or even in more
subordinate positions in the army. … The real interest and the
real object of the citizen in arms and of the citizen in the
toga were still the same. But their point of view was
different. The ever-present object of Congress was discussion
as a means of organization. The ever-present object of the
leaders of the army was decision as a means of action.
Congress counted obstacles, weighed difficulties, balanced
opposing advantages, eating and sleeping meanwhile and
refreshing mind and body as nature bade. But while Congress
was deliberating upon the best way of procuring meat, the army
was often brought to the verge of starvation for the want of
it. While Congress was discussing by a warm fire the most
eligible method of providing the army with tents and blankets,
half the army was sleeping on the snow without either blanket
or tent.
{3263}
While Congress was framing elaborate resolutions, and drawing
out and equipping regiments upon paper, officers in the field
were standing disheartened before their thinned and
disheartened ranks. … Errors of statesmanship, like errors of
generalship, would easily have been forgiven and forgotten;
for both statesmen and generals had still much to learn.
Unfortunately, while the best generals strove earnestly to
correct their errors by their experience, Congress, in too
many things, clung obstinately to its errors, in spite of the
most decisive experience. Those errors were twofold,—errors of
policy and errors of principle,—the one tending to undermine
the respect which, in the beginning, was felt for their
wisdom; the other, to awaken a general distrust of their
justice. The first year of the war demonstrated the danger of
short enlistments and temporary levies. But more than half the
second year was allowed to pass before it was decided to raise
an army for the whole duration of the war. The first campaign
demonstrated the necessity of providing by regularly organized
departments for the food, clothing, and transportation of the
army; but it was not till late in the second year that a board
of war was organized; and not till later still that the
Quartermaster-General and Commissary-General were allowed to
devote themselves to their duty in camp, instead of waiting
idly for orders at the door of Congress. All experience and
the simplest reasoning showed the importance of strengthening
the hands of their General by passing promptly all the acts
needed for the conduct of an army in the field, or the support
and instruction of an army in quarters; but, in spite of all
experience and the plainest reason, Congress persisted in its
unseasonable delays. … The policy of the Congress, in the
organization and support of the army, was a policy of
tergiversation and delay. No wonder that the army, leaders and
all, should early lose their confidence in its wisdom! But the
dissatisfaction did not end here. One of the earliest felt of
the numerous wants of the army was the want of good officers.
… To select them in the beginning from the mass of unproved
candidates was impossible; but in the course of two campaigns,
the characters and pretensions of men were well tried, the
chaff thoroughly sifted, and what remained might be
confidently accepted as sound. … It was evidently the policy
of Congress to secure by all proper and reasonable inducements
the services of such officers for the war. It was the duty of
Congress, in its dealings with them, to remember that in
becoming soldiers, and exposing themselves to the dangers and
privations of a soldier's life, they adopted, with the ideas
of subordination that lie at the basis of military discipline,
the ideas of rank and grade which define and circumscribe that
subordination. But Congress remembered nothing of this. It
required of them the service of officers, but gave them a pay
hardly sufficient to enable them to live like private
soldiers. It demanded the present sacrifice of cold, hunger,
hard service, and exposure to sickness, wounds, and death; and
refused the prospective reward of half-pay or pension when
sickness or wounds should have incapacitated them for further
exertion, or death should have made their wives unprotected
widows, and their children helpless orphans. Forgetting that
pride is an essential element of the military character, and
that self-respect is essential to a healthy and sustaining
pride, it trifled with their claims to rank by the accepted
rules of service, and claimed and exercised the power of
dealing with commissions according to its own good pleasure."

_G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathanael Greene,
book 2, chapter 18 (volume 1)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779.
Clark's conquest of the Northwest for Virginia, and its
annexation to the district of Kentucky.