Chapter 3: , page 89 (20)

"With Sparta it was obvious that the Athenians now had a
deadly quarrel, and on the other side they knew that Hippias
was seeking to precipitate on them the power of the Persian
king. It seemed therefore to be a matter of stern necessity to
anticipate the intrigues of their banished tyrant; and the
Athenians accordingly sent ambassadors to Sardeis to make an
independent alliance with the Persian despot. The envoys, on
being brought into the presence of Artaphernes, the Satrap of
Lydia, were told that Dareios would admit them to an alliance
if they would give him earth and water,—in other words, if
they would acknowledge themselves his slaves. To this demand
of absolute subjection the envoys gave an assent which was
indignantly repudiated by the whole body of Athenian citizens.
… Foiled for the time in his efforts, Kleomenes was not cast
down. Regarding the Kleisthenian constitution as a personal
insult to himself, he was resolved that Isagoras should be
despot of Athens. Summoning the allies of Sparta [including
the Bœotian League headed by Thebes, and the people of Chalcis
in Eubœa], he led them as far as Eleusis, 12 miles only from
Athens, without informing them of the purpose of the campaign.
He had no sooner confessed it than the Corinthians, declaring
that they had been brought away from home on an unrighteous
errand, went back, followed by the other Spartan King,
Demaratos, the son of Ariston; and this conflict of opinion
broke up the rest of the army. This discomfiture of their
enemy seemed to inspire fresh strength into the Athenians, who
won a series of victories over the Boiotians and
Euboians"—completely overthrowing the latter—the
Chalcidians—taking possession of their city, and making it a
peculiar colony and dependency of Athens.—See KLERUCHS. The
anger of Kleomenes "on being discomfited at Eleusis by the
defection of his own allies was heightened by indignation at
the discovery that in driving out his friend Hippias he had
been simply the tool of Kleisthenes and of the Delphian
priestess whom Kleisthenes had bribed. It was now clear to him
and to his countrymen that the Athenians would not acquiesce
in the predominance of Sparta, and that if they retained their
freedom, the power of Athens would soon be equal to their own.
Their only safety lay, therefore, in providing the Athenians
with a tyrant. An invitation was, therefore, sent to Hippias
at Sigeion, to attend a congress of the allies at Sparta, who
were summoned to meet on the arrival of the exiled despot."
The appointed congress was held, and the Spartans besought
their allies to aid them in humbling the Athenian Democracy,
with the object of restoring Hippias to power. But again the
Corinthians protested, bluntly suggesting that if the Spartans
thought tyranny a good thing they might first try it for
themselves. Hippias, speaking in his own behalf, attempted to
convince them that the time was coming "in which they would
find the Athenians a thorn in their side. For the present his
exhortations were thrown away. The allies protested
unanimously against all attempts to interfere with the
internal administration of any Hellenic city; and the banished
tyrant went back disappointed to Sigeion."

_G. W. Cox,
The Greeks and the Persians,
chapter 4._

ALSO IN:
_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 31 (volume 4)._

{151}

ATHENS: B. C. 501-490.
Aid to Ionians against Persia.
Provocation of King Darius.
His wrath and attempted vengeance.
The first Persian invasions.
Battle of Marathon.

"It is undeniable that the extension of the Persian dominion
over Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt gave a violent check to the
onward movement of Greek life. On the other hand, it seemed as
if the great enterprise of Darius Hystaspis against the
Scythians ought to have united the Greeks and Persians. It was
of a piece with the general policy of Darius that, after
defeating so many other adversaries, he undertook to prevent
for all succeeding time a repetition of those inroads with
which, some centuries before, the Scythians had visited Asia
and the civilized world. He possessed authority enough to
unite the different nations which obeyed his sceptre in a
great campaign against the Scythians. … The Greeks were his
best allies in his campaign; they built him the bridge by
which he crossed the Bosporus, and also the bridge of boats
over the Danube by which he made his invasion into the enemy's
territory. The result was not one which could properly be
called unfortunate; yet it was certainly of a very doubtful
character. … A great region, in which they had already
obtained very considerable influence, was closed to them once
more. The Persian army brought the populations upon the
Strymon, many in number and individually weak, under the
dominion of Persia; and even Amyntas, the king of Makedonia,
one of a race of rulers of Greek origin, was compelled to do
homage to the Great King. Thus the movement which had thrust
back the Greeks from Egypt and Asia Minor made advances even
into the regions of Europe which bordered upon Northern
Hellas. It was an almost inevitable consequence of this that
the Greeks were menaced and straitened even in their proper
home. A pretext and opportunity for an attack upon the Greek
islands was presented to the Persians by the questions at
issue between the populations of the cities and the tyrants.
… The instrument by whom the crisis was brought about was
not a person of any great importance. It is not always great
natures, or natures strong in the consciousness of their own
powers, that bring on such conflicts; this is sometimes the
work of those flexible characters which, being at the point of
contact between the opposing forces, pass from one side to the
other. Such a character was Aristagoras of Miletus. …
Morally contemptible, but gifted intellectually with a range
of ideas of unlimited extent, Aristagoras made for himself an
imperishable name by being the first to entertain the thought
of a collective opposition to the Persians on the part of all
the Greeks, even contemplating the possibility of waging a
great and successful offensive war upon them. … He announced
in Miletus his own resignation of power and the restoration to
the people of their old laws. … A general overthrow of
tyranny ensued [B. C. 501], involving a revolt from Persia,
and Strategi were everywhere appointed. The supreme power in
the cities was based upon a good understanding between the
holders of power and the Persians; the fact that one of these
rulers found the authority of the Persians intolerable was the
signal for a universal revolt. Aristagoras himself voluntarily
renounced the tyranny, the other tyrants were compelled to
take the same course; and thus the cities, assuming at the
same time a democratic organization, came into hostility with
Persia. … The cities and islands which had so often been
forced to submission could not hope to resist the Persians by
their own unaided efforts. Even Aristagoras could not have
expected so much. … He visited Lakedæmon, the strongest of
the Greek powers, in person, and endeavored to carry her with
him in his plans. … Rejected by Sparta, Aristagoras betook
himself to Athens. … The Athenians granted Aristagoras
twenty ships, to which the Eretrians, from friendship to
Miletus, added five more. The courage of the Ionians was thus
revived, and an attack upon the Persian dominion commenced,
directed, not indeed against Susa, but against Sardis, in
their immediate neighborhood, the capital of the satrapy which
imposed on them their heaviest burdens. … By the burning of
Sardis, in which a sanctuary of Kybele had been destroyed, the
Syrian nations had been outraged in the person of their gods.
We know that it was part of the system of the Persians to take
the gods of a country under their protection. Nor would the
great king who thought himself appointed to be master of the
world fail to resent an invasion of his dominions as an insult
calling for revenge. The hostile attempts of the Ionians made
no great impression upon him, but he asked who were the
Athenians, of whose share in the campaign he had been
informed. They were foreigners, of whose power the king had
scarcely heard. … The enterprise of Aristagoras had
meanwhile caused general commotion. He had by far the larger
part of Cyprus, together with the Carians, on his side. All
the country near the Propontis and the Hellespont was in
revolt. The Persians were compelled to make it their first
concern to suppress this insurrection, a task which, if
attempted by sea, did not promise to be an easy one. In their
first encounter with the Phœnicians the Ionians had the
advantage. When, however, the forces of the great empire were
assembled, the insurrection was everywhere put down. … It
must be reckoned among the consequences of the battle of Lade,
by which the combination against the Persian empire had been
annihilated, that King Darius, not content with having
consolidated his dominion in Ionia, once more resumed the plan
of pushing forward into Europe, of which his enterprise
against the Scythians formed part. With the execution of this
project he commissioned one of the principal persons of the
empire and the court, … Mardonius by name, whom he united to
his family by marrying him to his daughter. … This general
crossed the Hellespont with a large army, his fleet always
accompanying him along the shore whilst he pushed on by the
mainland. He once more subdued Makedonia, probably the
districts which had not yet, like the Makedonian king, been
brought into subjection, and gave out that his aim was
directed against Eretria and Athens, the enemies of the king.
… In the stormy waters near Mount Athos, which have always
made the navigation of the Ægean difficult, his fleet suffered
ship-wreck. But without naval supports he could not hope to
gain possession of an island and a maritime town situated on a
promontory. Even by land he encountered resistance, so that he
found it advisable to postpone the further execution of his
undertakings to another time. … In order to subdue the
recalcitrants, especially Athens and Eretria, another attempt
was organized without delay. Under two generals, one of whom,
Datis, was a Mede, the other, Artaphernes, the son of the
satrap of Sardis of the same name, and brother of the Darius
who was in alliance with Hippias, a maritime expedition was
undertaken for the immediate subjugation of the islands and
the maritime districts.
{152}
It was not designed for open hostility against the Greeks in
general. … Their design was to utilize the internal
dissensions of Greece in conquering the principal enemies upon
whom the Great King had sworn vengeance, and presenting them
as captives at his feet. The project succeeded in the case of
Eretria. In spite of a brave resistance it fell by treachery
into their hands, and they could avenge the sacrilege
committed at Sardis by plundering and devastating Grecian
sanctuaries. They expected now to be able to overpower Athens
also without much trouble. … It was a circumstance of great
value to the Athenians that there was a man amongst them who
was familiar with the Persian tactics. This was Miltiades, the
son of Kimon. … Although a Thracian prince, he had never
ceased to be a citizen of Athens. Here he was impeached for
having held a tyranny, but was acquitted and chosen strategus,
for the democracy could not reject a man who was so admirably
qualified to be at their head in the interchange of
hostilities with Persia. Miltiades was conducting his own
personal quarrel in undertaking the defence of Attica. The
force of the Persians was indeed incomparably the larger, but
the plains of Marathon, on which they were drawn up, prevented
their proper deployment, and they saw with astonishment the
Athenian hoplites displaying a front as extended as their own.
These troops now rushed upon them with an impetus which grew
swifter at every moment. The Persians easily succeeded in
breaking through the centre of the Athenian army; but that was
of no moment, for the strength of the onset lay in the two
wings, where now began a hand-to-hand fight. The Persian
sword, formidable elsewhere, was not adapted to do good
service against the bronze armor and the spear of the
Hellenes. On both flanks the Athenians obtained the advantage,
and now attacked the Persian centre, which was not able to
withstand the onslaught of men whose natural vigor was
heightened by gymnastic training. The Persians, to their
misfortune, had calculated upon desertion in the ranks of
their opponents; foiled in this hope, they retreated to the
shore and to their ships. Herodotus intimates that the
Persians had secret intelligence with a party in Athens, and
took their course round the promontory of Sunium toward the
city, in the hope of surprising it. But when they came to
anchor the Athenians had arrived also, and they saw themselves
once more confronted by the victors of Marathon."

_L. von Ranke,
Universal History,
chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_Herodotus,
History,
book 6._

_V. Duruy,
History of Greece,
chapter 16 (volume 2)_.

See, also, PERSIA: B. C. 521-493,
and GREECE: B. C. 492-491, and 490.

ATHENS: B. C. 489-480.
Condemnation and death of Miltiades.
The Æginetan war.
Naval power created by Themistocles.

"The victory of Marathon was chiefly due to Miltiades; it was
he who brought on the engagement, and he was chief in command
on the day when the battle was fought. Such a brilliant
success greatly improved his position in the city, and excited
in his enemies a still deeper hatred. Ever on the watch for an
opportunity to pull down their rival, it was not long before
they found one. Soon after his victory, Miltiades came before
the Athenians with a request that a squadron of 70 ships might
be placed at his disposal. The purpose for which he required
them he would not disclose, though pledging his word that the
expedition would add largely to the wealth and prosperity of
the city. The request being granted, he sailed with the ships
to Paros, an island which at this time was subject to Persia.
From the Parians he demanded 100 talents, and when they
refused to pay he blockaded the city. So vigorous and
successful was the resistance offered that, after a long
delay, Miltiades, himself dangerously wounded, was compelled
to return home. His enemies, with Xanthippus at their head, at
once attacked him for misconduct in the enterprise. …
Miltiades was unable to reply in person; he was carried into
court, while his friends pleaded his cause. The sentence was
given against him, but the penalty was reduced from death to a
fine of 50 talents. So large a sum was more than even
Miltiades could pay; he was thrown into prison as a public
debtor, where he soon died from the mortification of his
wound. … His condemnation was one in a long series of
similar punishments. The Athenians never learnt to be just to
those who served them, or to distinguish between treachery and
errors of judgment. … We have very little information about
the state of Athens immediately after the battle of Marathon.
So far as we can tell, for the chronology is most uncertain,
she was now engaged in a war with Ægina. … Meanwhile, a man
was rising to power, who may be said to have created the
history of Athens for the rest of the century,—Themistocles,
the son of Neocles. … On the very day of Marathon,
Themistocles had probably made up his mind that the Persians
would visit Greece again. What was to keep them away, so long
as they were masters of the Ægean? … With an insight almost
incredible he perceived that the Athenians could become a
maritime nation; that Athens possesses harbours large enough
to receive an enormous fleet, and capable of being strongly
fortified; that in possession of a fleet she could not only
secure her own safety, but stand forth as a rival power to
Sparta. But how could Themistocles induce the Athenians to
abandon the line in which they had been so successful for a
mode of warfare in which even Miltiades had failed? After the
fall of the great general, the conduct of affairs was in the
hands of Xanthippus … and Aristides. … They were by no
means prepared for the change which Themistocles was
meditating. This is more especially true of Aristides. He had
been a friend of Clisthenes; he was known as an admirer of
Spartan customs. … He had been second in command at
Marathon, and was now the most eminent general at Athens. From
him Themistocles could only expect the most resolute
opposition. Xanthippus and Aristides could reckon on the
support of old traditions and great connections. Themistocles
had no support of the kind. He had to make his party …
conscious of their own position, Aristides and Xanthippus
looked with contempt upon the knot of men who began to gather
round their unmannerly and uncultivated leader. And they
might, perhaps, have maintained their position if it had not
been for the Æginetan war. That unlucky struggle had begun,
soon after the reforms of Clisthenes, with an unprovoked
attack of the Æginetans on the coast of Attica (506 B. C.),
[Ægina being allied with Thebes in the war mentioned
above—B.C. 509-506].
{153}
It was renewed when the Æginetans gave earth and water to the
heralds of Darius in 491, and though suspended at the time of
the Persian invasion, it broke out again with renewed ferocity
soon afterwards. The Æginetans had the stronger fleet, and
defeated the Athenian ships. "Such experiences naturally
caused a change in the minds of the Athenians. … It was
clear that the old arrangements for the navy were quite
inadequate to the task which was now required of them. Yet the
leaders of the state made no proposals." Themistocles now
"came forward publicly with proposals of naval reform, and, as
he expected, he drew upon himself the strenuous opposition of
Aristides. … It was clear that nothing decisive could be
done in the Æginetan war unless the proposals of Themistocles
were carried; it was equally clear that they never would be
carried while Aristides and Xanthippus were at hand to oppose
them. Under these circumstances recourse was had to the
safety-valve of the constitution. Ostracism was proposed and
accepted; and in this manner, by 483 B. C., Themistocles had
got rid of both of his rivals in the city. He was now master
of the situation. The only obstacle to the realization of his
plans was the expense involved in building ships. And this he
was able to meet by a happy accident, which brought into the
treasury at this time a large surplus from the silver mines
from Laurium. … By the summer of 480, the Athenians … were
able to launch 180 vessels, besides providing 20 for the use
of the Chalcideans of Eubœa. … At the same time Themistocles
set about the fortification of the Peiræus. … Could he have
carried the Athenians with him, he would have made the Peiræus
the capital of the country, in order that the ships and the
city might be in close connection. But for this the people
were not prepared."

_E. Abbott,
Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens,
chapter 2._

ALSO IN: Plutarch, _Aristides. Themistocles._

ATHENS: B. C. 481-479.
Congress at Corinth.
Organized Hellenic Union, under the headship of Sparta.

See GREECE: B. C. 481-479.

ATHENS: B. C. 480-479.
The second Persian invasion.
Thermopylæ, Artemisium, Salamis, Platæa.
Abandonment of the City.

"The last days of Darius were clouded by the disaster of
Marathon; 'that battle formed the turning point of his good
fortune,' and it would seem that the news of it led to several
insurrections, particularly that of Egypt; but they were soon
put down. Darius died (Olymp. 73, 3), and Xerxes, who
succeeded him, was prevented from taking revenge on the
Athenians by the revolt of Egypt, which engaged his attention
during the first years of his reign. But he completely
conquered the insurgents after they had maintained themselves
about four or five years; and he then made preparations for
that vengeance on Athens for which his barbarian pride was
longing. The account of the three years' preparations of
Xerxes, how he assembled his army in Asia Minor, how he made a
bridge across the Hellespont, how he cut a canal through the
isthmus of Mount Athos to prevent his fleet being destroyed by
storms—all this is known to everyone who has read Herodotus.
History is here so much interwoven with poetry, that they can
no longer be separated. … The Greeks awaited the attack
(Olymp. 75, 1), 'but they were not agreed among themselves.
The Argives from hatred of Sparta joined the Persians, and the
miserable Boeotians likewise supported them. The others kept
together only from necessity; and without the noble spirit of
the Athenians Greece would have been lost, and that from the
most paltry circumstances. A dispute arose as to who was to be
honoured with the supreme command; the Athenians gave way to
all, for their only desire was to save Greece. Had the
Persians moved on rapidly, they would have met with no
resistance, but they proceeded slowly, and matters turned out
differently.' A Greek army was encamped at Tempe, at the
entrance of Thessaly, and at first determined on defending
Thessaly. But they must have seen that they could be entirely
surrounded from Upper Thessaly; and when they thus discovered
the impossibility of stopping the Persians, they retreated.
The narrative now contains one inconceivable circumstance
after another. … It is inconceivable that, as the Greeks did
make a stand at Thermopylae, no one else took his position
there except King Leonidas and his Spartans, not including
even the Lacedaemonians, for they remained at home! Only 1,000
Phocians occupied the heights, though that people might surely
have furnished 10,000 men; 400 of the Boeotians were posted in
the rear, as a sort of hostages, as Herodotus remarks, and 700
Thespians. Where were all the rest of the Greeks? …
Countless hosts are invading Greece; the Greeks want to defend
themselves, and are making active preparations at sea; but on
land hundreds of thousands are met by a small band of
Peloponnesians. 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans as hostages, and
1,000 Phocians, stationed on the heights! A pass is occupied,
but only that one, and the others are left unguarded. … All
this is quite unintelligible; it would almost appear as if
there had been an intention to sacrifice Leonidas and his men;
but we cannot suppose this. These circumstances alone suggest
to us, that the numbers of the Persian army cannot have been
as great as they are described; but even if we reduce them to
an immense extent, it still remains inconceivable why they
were not opposed by greater numbers of the Greeks, for as
afterwards they ventured to attack the Persians in the open
field, it was certainly much more natural to oppose them while
marching across the hills. But however this may be, it is an
undoubted fact, that Leonidas and his Spartans fell in the
contest, of which we may form a conception from the
description of Herodotus, when after a resistance of three
days they were surrounded by the Persians. A few of the
Spartans escaped on very excusable grounds, but they were so
generally despised, that their life became unendurable, and
they made away with themselves. This is certainly historical.
… After the victory of Thermopylae all Hellas lay open
before the Persians, and they now advanced towards Athens, a
distance which they could march in a few days. Thebes opened
her gates, and joyfully admitted them from hatred of Athens.
Meantime a portion of the army appeared before Delphi. It is
almost inconceivable that the Persians did not succeed in
taking the temple. … The miracles by which the temple is
said to have been saved, are repeated in the same manner
during the attack of the Gauls.
{154}
But the temple of Delphi was certainly not
plundered.' … The city of Athens had in the meantime been
abandoned by all the people; the defenceless had taken refuge
in the small island of Salamis, or of Troezen, 'and all the
Athenians capable of bearing arms embarked in the fleet.' …
The Persians thus took Athens without any resistance. …
During the same days on which the battle of Thermopylae was
fought, the Greek fleet was engaged in two indecisive but
glorious battles near the promontory of Artemisium. 'In a
third the Persians gained the upper hand, and when the Greeks
at the same time heard of the defeat at Thermopylae, they
withdrew, and doubling Cape Sunium sailed towards Salamis.'
God sent them a storm whereby the Persians in their pursuit
suffered shipwreck. … While the Greek fleet was stationed in
the channel between the island of Salamis and Attica, towards
Piraeeus, discord broke out among the Greeks. The
Peloponnesians thought only of themselves; they had fortified
the Isthmus; there they were assembled, and there they wanted
to offer resistance to the Persians. In their folly they
forgot, that if the enemy with his superior fleet, should turn
against Peloponnesus, they might land wherever they liked. …
But Themistocles now declared, that all the hopes of the
Athenians were directed towards the recovery of their own
city; that, if the Peloponnesians should sacrifice them, and,
thinking of themselves only, should abandon Attica to the
barbarians, the Athenians would not be so childish as to
sacrifice themselves for them, but would take their women and
children on board their ships, and sail far away from the
Persians to the island of Sardinia, or some other place where
Greek colonies were established; that there they would settle
as a free people, and abandon Peloponnesus to its fate; and
that then the peninsula would soon be in the hands of the
enemy. This frightened the Peloponnesians, and they resolved
to stand by Athens. It is evident that, throughout that time,
Themistocles had to struggle with the most intolerable
difficulties, which the allies placed in his way, as well as
with their jealousy, meanness, and insolence. 'The rudeness of
the Spartans and Corinthians is nowhere more strongly
contrasted with the refinement of the Athenians, than on that
occasion.' But after he had tried everything, and overcome by
every possible means a hundred different difficulties, he yet
saw, that he could not rely on the perseverance of the
Peloponnesians, and that they would turn to the Isthmus as
soon as Xerxes should proceed in that direction. He
accordingly induced the Persian king, by a false message, to
surround the Greek fleet, for the purpose of cutting off the
retreat of the Peloponnesians. He declared himself ready to
deliver the whole of the Greek fleet into his hands. This
device was quite to the mind of the Persians; Xerxes believed
him, and followed his advice. When Themistocles was thus sure
of the Peloponnesians, the ever-memorable battle of Salamis
commenced, which is as certainly historical as that of Cannae,
or any modern battle, 'whatever the numbers may be.' The
battle proceeded somewhat in the manner of the battle of
Leipzig: when the issue was decided, a portion of those who
ought to have joined their countrymen before, made common
cause with the Greeks. … Their accession increased the
victory of the Greeks. … Certain as the battle of Salamis
is, all the accounts of what took place after it, are very
doubtful. This much is certain, that Xerxes returned, 'leaving
a portion of his army under Mardonius in Greece;' … Winter
was now approaching, and Mardonius withdrew from ravaged
Attica, taking up his winter-quarters partly in Thessaly and
partly in Boeotia. … The probability is, that the Athenians
remained the winter in Salamis in sheds, or under the open
sky. Mardonius offered to restore to them Attica uninjured, so
far as it had not already been devastated, if they would
conclude peace with him. They might at that time have obtained
any terms they pleased, if they had abandoned the common cause
of the Greeks; and the Persians would have kept the peace; for
when they concluded treaties they observed them: they were not
faithless barbarians. But on this occasion again, we see the
Athenian people in all its greatness and excellence; it
scorned such a peace, and preferred the good of the
Peloponnesians. … Mardonius now again advanced towards
Athens; the Spartans, who ought to have proceeded towards
Cithaeron, had not arrived, and thus he again took possession
of Attica and ravaged it completely. At length, however
(Olymp. 75, 2), the Athenians prevailed upon the
Peloponnesians to leave the Isthmus, and they gradually
advanced towards Boeotia. There the battle of Plataeae was
fought. … In regard to the accounts of this battle, it is
historically certain that it was completely won by the Greeks,
and that the remnants of the Persian army retreated without
being vigorously pursued. It must have reached Asia, but it
then disappears. It is also historically certain, that
Pausanias was the commander of the allied army of the Greeks.
… After their victory, the Greeks advanced towards Thebes.
In accordance with a vow which they had made before the war,
Thebes ought to have been destroyed by the Greeks. But their
opinions were divided. … On the same day on which the battle
of Plataeae was fought, the allied Greeks gained as complete a
victory at sea. … After this victory of Mycale, the Ionian
cities revolted against the Persians."

_B. G. Niebuhr,
Lectures on Ancient History,
volume 1, lectures 37 and 38._

ALSO IN:
_Herodotus,
History;
translated and edited by H. Rawlinson,
book 7 (volume 4)_.

_Plutarch,
Themistocles._

_G. W. Cox,
The Greeks and Persians._

ATHENS: B. C. 479-478.
Protection of Ionia assumed.
Siege and capture of Sestus.
Rebuilding and enlargement of the city and its walls.
Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles.

"The advantages obtained by the Hellenes [in their war with
Persia] came upon them so unexpectedly as to find them totally
unprepared, and accordingly embarrassed by their own
victories. What was to be done with Ionia? Was the whole
country to be admitted into the Hellenic confederation? Too
great a responsibility would, in the opinion of the
Peloponnesians, be incurred by such a step. … It would be
better to sacrifice the country, and establish the Ionians in
settlements in other parts, at the expense of those who had
favoured the Medes, i. e., of the Argives, Bœotians, Locrians,
and Thessalians. … The Athenians, on the other hand,
espoused the cause of the cities. … Ionia ought to be a
bulwark against the Barbarians, and to belong to the Hellenes.
{155}
… The Athenians found a support in the feeling prevalent
among the Ionians, who were naturally opposed to any forced
settlement. Accordingly, in the first instance, Samos, Lesbos,
Chios, and a number of other island-towns, were admitted into
the confederation … and a new Hellas was formed, a Greek
empire comprehending both sides of the sea. Considerations of
caution made it necessary, above all, to secure the passage
from Asia to Europe; for it was universally believed that the
bridge over the Hellespont was either still in existence or
had been restored. When it was found to have been destroyed,
the Peloponnesians urged the termination of the campaign. …
The Athenians, on the other hand, declared themselves resolved
… not to leave unfinished what they had begun. Sestus, the
strongest fortress on the Hellespont, ought not to be left in
the hands of the enemy; an attack on it ought to be risked
without delay, before the city had prepared for a siege. They
allowed the Peloponnesians to take their departure, and under
the command of Xanthippus united with the ships of the Ionians
and Hellespontians for the purpose of new undertakings." The
Persians in Sestus resisted obstinately, enduring a long
siege, but were forced to surrender at last. "Meanwhile, the
main point consisted in the Athenians having remained alone in
the field, in their having fraternized with the Ionians as one
naval power, and having after such successes attained to a
confidence in victory, to which no enterprise any longer
seemed either too distant or too difficult. Already they
regarded their city as the centre of the coast-lands of
Greece. But what was the condition of this city of Athens
itself? A few fragments of the ancient city wall, a few
scattered houses, which had served the Persian commanders as
their quarters, were yet standing; the rest was ashes and
ruins. After the battle of Platææ the inhabitants had returned
from Salamis, Trœzene, and Ægina; not even the fleet and its
crews were at hand to afford them assistance. They endeavoured
to make shift as best they could, to pass through the trials
of the winter. As soon as the spring arrived, the restoration
of the city was commenced with all possible activity. … But
even now it was not the comforts of domesticity which occupied
their thoughts, but, above all, the city as a whole and its
security. To Themistocles, the founder of the port-town,
public confidence was in this matter properly accorded." It
was not possible "to carry out a new and regular plan for the
city; but it was resolved to extend its circumference beyond
the circle of the ancient walls, … so as to be able, in case
of a future siege, to offer a retreat to the
country-population within the capital itself. … But the
Athenians were not even to be permitted to build their walls
undisturbed; for, as soon as their grand plan of operations
became known, the envy and insidious jealousy of their
neighbours broke out afresh. … The Peloponnesian states,
above all Ægina and Corinth, hastened to direct the attention
of Sparta to the situation of affairs. … As at Sparta city
walls were objected to on principle, and as no doubts
prevailed with regard to the fact that z well-fortified town
was impregnable to the military art of the Peloponnesians, it
was actually resolved at any price to prevent the building of
the walls in Attica." But, for shame's sake, the interference
undertaken by Sparta was put upon the ground that in the event
of a future invasion of the country, only the peninsula could
be successfully defended; that central Greece would
necessarily be abandoned to the enemy; and that every
fortified city in it would furnish him a dangerous base. "At
such a crisis craft alone could be of avail. When the Spartans
made their imperious demand at Athens, Themistocles ordered
the immediate cessation of building operations, and with
assumed submissiveness, promised to present himself at Sparta,
in order to pursue further negotiations in person. On his
arrival there, he allowed one day after the other to go by,
pretending to be waiting for his fellow envoys." In the
meantime, all Athens was toiling night and day at the walls,
and time enough was gained by the audacious duplicity of
Themistocles to build them to a safe height for defence. "The
enemies of Athens saw that their design had been foiled, and
were forced to put the best face upon their discomfiture. They
now gave out that they had intended nothing beyond good
advice."

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 2 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN
_G. W. Cox,
History of Greece,
book 2, chapter 7-8 (volume 1-2)._

ATHENS: B. C. 478-477.
Alienation of the Asiatic Greeks from Sparta.
Formation of the Confederacy of Delos.
The founding of Athenian Empire.

See GREECE: B. C. 478-477.

ATHENS: B. C. 477-462.
Constitutional gains for the democracy.
Ascendency of Aristeides.
Declining popularity and ostracism of Themistokles.
The sustentation of the commons.
The stripping of power from the Areopagus.

At the time when the Confederacy of Delos was formed, "the
Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on
the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, but also several other
posts in that country which are not specified to us. We may
thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic
peninsula … were not less anxious to seek protection in the
bosom of the new confederacy than the Dorian islands of Rhodes
and Cos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic
Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Miletus and
Byzantium. … Some sort of union, organised and obligatory
upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all.
Indeed, even with that aid, at the time when the Confederacy
of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the
Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out, especially as the
Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also
from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian
states—traitors within, as well as exiles without. Among
these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most
formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias." Pausanias, whose
treasonable intrigues with the Persian king began at Byzantium
(See GREECE: B. C. 478-477) was convicted some nine or ten
years later, and suffered a terrible fate, being shut within a
temple to which he had fled, and starved. "His treasonable
projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater
than himself—the Athenian Themistokles. … The charge
[against Themistokles] of collusion with the Persians connects
itself with the previous movement of political parties. …
The rivalry of Themistokles and Aristeides had been greatly
appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both
the peremptory necessity of cooperation against a common enemy.
{156}
And apparently it was not resumed during the times which
immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their
country: at least we hear of both in effective service and in
prominent posts. Themistokles stands forward as the contriver
of the city walls and architect of Peiraeus: Aristeides is
commander of the fleet and first organiser of the Confederacy
of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character
of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian
old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistokles as the
originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had
now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact.
… From henceforth the fleet is endeared to every man as the
grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which
character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. …
The triremes, and the men who manned them, taken collectively,
were now the determining element in the state. Moreover, the
men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from
a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory,
which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers,
as combatants, and as patriots. … The political change
arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the
military. 'The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of
Salamis,' and instruments of the new vocation at Athens as
head of the Delian Confederacy, appear now ascendant in the
political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or
privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass,
strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting
against all recognised political inequalities. … Early after
the return to Attica, the Kleisthenian constitution was
enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According
to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian
census, including the considerable majority of freemen, were
not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed
votes in common with the rest; no person was eligible to be a
magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher
classes. This restriction was now annulled and eligibility
extended to all the citizens; We may appreciate the strength
of feeling with which such reform was demanded when we find
that it was proposed by Aristeides. … The popularity thus
ensured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his
previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from
his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought
into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new
Delian Confederacy. On the other hand, the ascendency of
Themistokles, though so often exalted by his unrivalled
political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of
his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his
duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New
political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathising
with Aristeides. … Of these the chief were Kimon [Cimon],
(son of Miltiades), and Alkmæon." In 471 B. C. Themistokles
was sent into exile by a vote of ostracism, and retired to
Argos. Five years later he was accused of complicity in the
treasonable intrigues of Pausanias, and fled to the court of
the Persian king, where he spent the remainder of his days.
"Aristeides died about three or four years after the ostracism
of Themistokles."

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 44 (volume 5)_.

The constitutional effects of the Persian war, and the
political situation of Athens immediately after the war, are
represented somewhat differently from the account above, in
the lately discovered work on the Constitution of Athens which
is attributed to Aristotle. The following is quoted from one
of the translations of the latter: "After the Median war the
council of Areopagus [See AREOPAGUS] recovered strength and
ruled the state, not that any law conferred the hegemony on
them, but because the aristocratic party had the credit of the
victory at Salamis. For when the generals had despaired of the
country and proclaimed a sauve qui peut, the Areopagus raised
funds, gave every man eight drachmas (6s. 6d.) and induced
them to man the ships. In consequence of this public service
the Ecclesia yielded the ascendency to the Areopagus, and
public affairs were admirably administered during the
following epoch. For they acquired the art of war, made their
name honoured throughout the Hellenic world, and possessed
themselves of the sovereignty of the sea with the consent of
Lakedaimon. At this time the leaders of the commons were
Aristeides, son of Lusimachos, and Themistokles, son of
Neokles; the latter studious of the arts of war, the former
reputed eminent in statesmanship and honest beyond his
contemporaries; which characters made their countrymen employ
the one as a general, the other as a councillor. The
rebuilding of the walls of Athens was their joint work, though
they were otherwise at feud. The detachment of the Ionians
from Persia and the formation of an alliance with Sparta were
due to the counsels of Aristeides, who seized the opportunity
afforded by the discredit cast on the Lakonians by the conduct
of Pausanias. He too originally apportioned, two years after
the battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes (478
B. C.), the contribution to be paid by the islanders. …
Subsequently, when lofty thoughts filled every bosom and
wealth was accumulating, Aristeides advised them to administer
the hegemony with their own hands, to leave their country
occupations and fix their domicile in the city. Sustentation,
he promised, would be provided for all, either as soldiers or
sailors in active service, or as troops in garrison or as
public servants; and then they could increase the vigour of
their imperial sway. They followed his advice, and, taking the
rule into their own hands, reduced their allies to the
position of vassals, except the Chians, Lesbians, and Samians,
whom they kept as satellites of their power, and permitted to
retain their own constitutions and to rule their own
dependencies: and they provided for their own sustentation by
the method which Aristeides indicated; for in the end the
public revenues, the taxes and the tributes of the allies gave
maintenance to more than 20,000. There were 6,000 dicasts or
jurors, 1,600 archers, 1,200 cavalry, 500 senators, 500
soldiers of the dockyard garrison, 50 city guards, 700 home
magistrates, 700 foreign magistrates, 2,500 heavy armed
soldiers (this was their number at the beginning of the
Peloponnesian war), 4,000 sailors manning 20 guardships, 2,000
sailors appointed by lot, manning 20 tribute-collecting ships,
and in addition to these the Prutaneion, the orphans, the
gaolers; and all these persons were maintained at the expense
of the national treasury. The sustentation of the commons was
thus secured.
{157}
The 17 years which followed the Median war were about the
period during which the country continued under the ascendency
of the Areopagus, though its aristocratic features were
gradually on the wane. When the masses had grown more and more
preponderant, Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, reputed
incorruptible in his loyalty to democracy, became leader of
the commons, and began to attack the Areopagus. First, he put
to death many of its members, by impeaching them of offences
committed in their administration. Afterwards in the
archonship of Konon (462 B. C.) he despoiled the council
itself of all its more recently acquired attributes, which
were the keystone of the existing constitution, and
distributed them among the Senate of 500, the Ecclesia, and
the courts of law. In this work he had the co-operation of
Themistokles, who was himself an Areopagite, but expecting to
be impeached for treasonable correspondence with Persia. …
Ephialtes and Themistokles kept accusing the Areopagus before
the Senate of 500, and again before the commons, till finally
they stripped it of all its principal functions. The
assassination of Ephialtes by the instrumentality of
Aristodikos of Tanagra followed not long after. Such were the
circumstances of the overthrow of the Areopagus. After this
the degradation of the constitution proceeded without
intermission from the eagerness of politicians to win popular
favour; and at the same time there happened to be no organizer
of the aristocratic party, whose head, Kimon, the son of
Miltiades, was too young for some years to enter political
life; besides which their ranks were much devastated by war.
Expeditionary forces were recruited by conscription; and as
the generals had no military experience and owed their
appointment to the reputation of their ancestors, each
expedition entailed the sacrifice of 2,000 or 3,000 lives,
chiefly of the noblest sons of Athens, whether belonging to
the wealthy classes or to the commons."—Aristotle, On the
Constitution of Athens (translated by E. Poste.) chapter
23-26.—On the above, Dr. Abbott comments as follows: "So much
of this account as refers to Themistocles may be at once
dismissed as unhistorical. … If the evidence of Thucydides
is to count for anything, it is quite certain that
Themistocles finally left Greece for Persia about 466 B. C.
… Plutarch says not a word about Themistocles. But the
remainder of the account [of the attack on the Areopagus] is
supported by all our authorities—if indeed it is not merely
repeated by them."

_E. Abbott,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 11, section 5._

ALSO IN
_J. P. Mahaffy,
Problems in Greek History,
page 96._

_Plutarch,
Themistocles._

See, also, below: B. C. 466-454.

ATHENS: B. C. 470-466.
Continued war against the Persians.
Cimon's victories at the Eurymedon.
Revolt and subjugation of Naxos.

"Under the guidance of Athens, the war against the Persians
was continued. Cimon [Kimon] sailed with a fleet to the coast
of Thrace, and laid siege to Eion on the Strymon [B. C. 470].
The Persian garrison made a gallant defence; and finally
Boges, the governor, rather than surrender, cast all his gold
and silver into the river; and, having raised a huge pile of
wood, slew his wives, children and slaves, and laid their
bodies on it; then setting fire to it, he flung himself into
the flames: the garrison surrendered at discretion. Doriscus
was attacked in vain, but all the other Persian garrisons in
Europe were reduced. Cimon then, as executor of an
Amphictyonic decree, turned his arms against the piratic
Dolopians of the Isle of Scyros, whom he expelled, and filled
the island with Athenian colonists. On this occasion he sought
and found (as was supposed) the bones of the hero Theseus, who
had died in this island 800 years before; and he brought them
in his own trireme to Athens,—an act which gained him great
favour with the people. By this time, some of the confederates
were grown weary of war, and began to murmur at the toils and
expense to which it put them. The people of Naxos were the
first who positively refused to contribute any longer; but the
Athenians, who had tasted of the sweets of command, would not
now permit the exercise of free will to their allies. Cimon
appeared (Ol. 78,3) [B. C. 466] with a large fleet before
Naxos; the Naxians defended themselves with vigour, but were
at length forced to submit; and the Athenians had the
hardihood to reduce them to the condition of subjects to
Athens—an example which they soon followed in other cases.
… After the reduction of Naxos, Cimon sailed over to the
coast of Asia, and learning that the Persian generals had
assembled a large fleet and army in Pamphylia, he collected a
fleet of 200 triremes at Cnidos, with which he proceeded to
the coast of that country, and laid siege to the city of
Phaselis, which, though Greek, obeyed the Persian monarch.
Having reduced it to submission, he resolved to proceed and
attack the Persian fleet and army, which he learned were lying
at the river Eurymedon. On his arrival, the Persian fleet, of
350 triremes, fearing at first to fight till 80 Phoenician
vessels, which they were expecting, should come up, kept in
the river; but finding that the Greeks were preparing to
attack, they put out to sea and engaged them. The action did
not continue long: the Barbarians fled to the land; 200 ships
fell into the hands of the victors, and several were
destroyed. Without a moment's delay, Cimon disembarked his
men, and led them against the land forces: the resistance of
the Persians was obstinate for some time, but at last they
turned and fled, leaving their camp a prey to the conquerors;
and Cimon had thus the rare glory of having gained two
important victories in the one day. Hearing then that the 80
Phoenician vessels were at Hydros, in the Isle of Cyprus, he
immediately sailed thither and took or destroyed the whole of
them. The victory on the Eurymedon may be regarded as the
termination of the conflict between Greece and Persia. The
year after it (Ol. 78,4) [B. C. 465], Xerxes was assassinated,
and the usual confusion took place in the court of Susa."

_T. Keightley,
History of Greece,
part 1, chapter 13._

ALSO IN
_W. W. Lloyd,
The Age of Pericles,
chapter 27 (volume 1)._

See also PERSIA: B. C. 486-405.

{158}

ATHENS: B. C. 466-454.
Leadership in the Delian confederacy changed to sovereignty.
Revolt and subjugation of Thasos.
Help to Sparta and its ungracious requital.
Fall and exile of Cimon.
Rise of Pericles and the democratic anti-Spartan policy.
Removal of the federal treasury from Delos.
Building the Long Walls.