Chapter DIII: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (20)

"The events of July showed the urgent need of unity of command
in Northern Virginia, and the lieutenant-general, in August,
consolidated these four departments [of Washington, the
Susquehanna, West Virginia and the Middle Department] into
one, named the Middle Military Division, under General Hunter.
That officer, however, before entering on the proposed
campaign, expressed a willingness to be relieved, and General
P. H. Sheridan, who had been transferred from the Army of the
Potomac to the command of the forces in the field under
Hunter, was appointed in his stead." General Sheridan was
appointed to the command on the 7th of August, and took the
field with an effective force (which included the Sixth and
Nineteenth Corps) of 40,000 men, 10,000 being cavalry. "His
operations during that month and the fore part of September
were mainly confined to manœuvres having for their object to
prevent the Confederates from gaining the rich harvests of the
Shenandoah Valley. But after once or twice driving Early
southward to Strasburg, he each time returned on his path
towards Harper's Ferry. General Grant had hesitated in
allowing Sheridan to take a real initiative, as defeat would
lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania
before another army could be interposed to check him. Finding,
however, while on a personal visit to General Sheridan, in the
month of September, that that officer expressed great
confidence of success, he authorized him to attack. At this
time the Confederate force held the west bank of Opequan
Creek, covering Winchester; and the Union force lay in front
of Berryville, twenty miles south of Harper's Ferry. The
situation of the opposing armies was peculiar: each threatened
the communications of the other, and either could bring on a
battle at any time. It would appear that General Early had
designed assuming the offensive." He made a movement which
General Sheridan was prompt to take advantage of, on the
morning of September 19th, and a battle ensued—known as the
battle of Winchester, but some times called the battle of
Opequan Creek—which resulted in a victory for the latter. "It
is due to state that there was a great disparity in the
numbers engaged—Early's force consisting of 8,500 muskets and
3,000 sabres, while Sheridan's strength was thrice that of the
aggregate Confederate force. Sheridan's preponderance in horse
enabled him to extend far beyond and overlap the Confederate
left, and when, after several hours of indecisive fighting
between the infantry, a general advance was, at four P. M.,
made by the whole line, the cavalry, by an impetuous charge,
carried the fortified heights: the Confederates … broke in
confusion, retiring from the field and through Winchester,
with the Union forces in pursuit. Night, however, prevented
Sheridan from following up the victory, among the trophies of
which were 2,500 prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and nine
battle-flags. … After his defeat at Winchester, Early did not
pause in his southward retreat till he reached Fisher's Hill,
near Strasburg, 30 miles south of Winchester. This is a very
defensible position, commanding the débouché of the narrow
Strasburg valley between the north fork of the Shenandoah
River and the North Mountain. On these obstacles Early rested
his flank. In front of this position Sheridan arrived on the
morning of the 22d and formed his force for a direct attack,
while he sent Torbert with two divisions of cavalry by the
parallel Luray Valley, to gain New Market, 20 miles in Early's
rear. After much manœuvring, and several ineffectual efforts
to force the position, an attack of cavalry was made from the
right.
{3539}
Under cover of this mask a corps of infantry was moved to that
flank, and by an impetuous assault carried the Confederate
left resting on the North Mountain. A general attack in front
then disrupted Early's whole line, and the Confederates
retired in great disorder, leaving behind 16 pieces of
artillery and several hundred prisoners. … Early's retreat was
not stayed until he reached the lower passes of the Blue
Ridge, whither he retired with a loss of half his army.
Sheridan, after pushing the pursuit as far as Staunton, and
operating destructively against the Virginia Central Railroad,
returned and took position behind Cedar Creek near Strasburg.
Previously to abandoning the country south of Strasburg, it
was laid waste by the destruction of all barns, grain, forage,
farming implements, and mills. The desolution of the
Palatinate by Turenne was not more complete. On the withdrawal
of Sheridan, Early, after a brief respite, and being
re-enforced by Kershaw's division of infantry and 600 cavalry
from Lee's army, again marched northward down the Valley, and
once more ensconced himself at Fisher's Hill. Sheridan
continued to hold position on the north bank of Cedar Creek.
Nothing more important than cavalry combats, mostly favorable
to the Federal arms, took place, until the 19th of October,
when Early assumed a bold offensive that was near giving him a
victory as complete as the defeat he had suffered. … The army
was, at this time, temporarily under the command of General
Wright—Sheridan being absent at Washington. The position held
by the Union force was too formidable to invite open attack,
and Early's only opportunity was to make a surprise. This that
officer now determined on, and its execution was begun during
the night of the 18-19th of October." A flanking column,
"favored by a heavy fog … attained, unperceived, the rear of
the left flank of the Union force, formed by Crook's Corps …
and rushed into the camp—the troops awaking only to find
themselves prisoners. To rally the men in their bewilderment
was impossible, and Crook's Corps, being thoroughly broken up,
fled in disorder, leaving many guns in the hands of the enemy.
As soon as this flank attack was developed, Early, with his
other column, emerged from behind the hills west of Cedar
Creek, and crossing that stream, struck directly the troops on
the right of Crook. This served to complete the disaster, and
the whole Union left and centre became a confused mass,
against which the Confederates directed the captured artillery
(18 guns), while the flanking force swept forward to the main
turnpike. Such was the scene on which the light of day dawned.
The only force not yet involved in the enemy's onset was the
Sixth Corps, which by its position was somewhat in rear. With
this General Ricketts quickly executed a change of front,
throwing it forward at right angles to its former position,
and firmly withstood the enemy's shock. Its chief service was,
however, to cover the general retreat which Wright now
ordered, as the only practicable means of reuniting his force.
… At the first good position between Middletown and Newtown,
Wright was able to rally and reform the troops, form a compact
line, and prepare either to resist further attack, or himself
resume the offensive. It was at this time, about half-past ten
A. M., that General Sheridan arrived upon the field from
Winchester, where he had slept the previous night. Hearing the
distant sounds of battle rolling up from the south, Sheridan
rode post to the front, where arriving, his electric manner
had on the troops a very inspiriting effect. General Wright
had already brought order out of confusion and made
dispositions for attack. … A counter-charge was begun at three
o'clock in the afternoon. … A large part of Early's force, in
the intoxication of success, had abandoned their colors and
taken to plundering the abandoned Federal camps. The refluent
wave was as resistless as the Confederate surge had been. …
The retreat soon became a rout. … In the pursuit all the
captured guns were retaken and 23 in addition, The captures
included, besides, near 1,500 prisoners. … With this defeat of
Early all operations of moment in the Shenandoah forever
ended," and most of the troops on both sides were recalled to
the main field of operations, at Petersburg.

_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 12, part 8._

ALSO IN:
_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 2, chapters 1-4._

_G. E. Pond,
The Shenandoah Valley in 1864,
chapters 7-13._

_M. M. Granger,
The Battle of Cedar Creek
(Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery,
L. L. of the United States, volume 3)._

_W. Merritt,
Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley._

_J. A. Early,
Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

_R. B. Irwin,
History of the 19th Army Corps,
chapters 33-34._

_H. C. King,
The Battle of Cedar Creek
(Personal Recollections of the War:
New York Com. L. L. of the United States)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (September-October: Georgia)
Atlanta cleared of its former inhabitants.
Sherman's Preparations for the March to the Sea.
Hood's Raid to the rear.

"During the month of September, Sherman's army remained
grouped about Atlanta. … The Army of the Cumberland, under
Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee,
commanded by Major-General Howard, was at East Point; and the
Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur. … Sherman now determined to
make Atlanta exclusively a military post. On the 4th of
September he issued the following orders: 'The city of Atlanta
belonging exclusively for warlike purposes, it will at once be
vacated by all except the armies of the United States and such
civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments
of the Government.' … This order fell upon the ears of the
inhabitants of Atlanta like a thunderbolt." To a remonstrance
addressed to him by the mayor and two councilmen of the city,
he replied: "We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in
all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now
desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war,
we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the
laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To
defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in
their recesses. … My military plans make it necessary for the
inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of
services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and
comfortable as possible. … War is cruelty and you cannot
refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve
all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. … You
might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against
these terrible hardships of war." A truce of ten days was
arranged, during which "446 families were moved south,
comprising 705 adults, 860 children and 79 servants, with an
average of 1,651 pounds of furniture and household goods of
all kinds to each family."

_S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin,
Sherman and his Campaigns,
chapter 18._

{3540}

"General Hood, meanwhile, kept his forces in the neighborhood of
Jonesboro, receiving his supplies by the Macon road. His army
numbered about 40,000 men, exclusive of the Georgia militia;
and, as if to show that no immediate offensive movement was
contemplated, the latter were withdrawn from him by Governor
Brown soon after the evacuation of Atlanta. … To allow their
principal Southern army to rust in inactivity, was not however
the intention of the rebel authorities. … Something must be
done, and that speedily, to arrest the progress of the Federal
army, or Georgia and perhaps the Gulf States, would be
irretrievably lost. … The whole army of General Hood, it was
decided, should rapidly move in a compact body to the rear of
Atlanta, and, after breaking up the railroad between the
Chattahoochee and Chattanooga, push on to Bridgeport and
destroy the great railroad bridge spanning the Tennessee river
at that place. Should this be accomplished, Atlanta would be
isolated from Chattanooga, and the latter in turn isolated
from Nashville, and General Sherman, cut off from his primary
and secondary bases, would find Atlanta but a barren conquest
to be relinquished almost as soon as gained, and would be
obliged to return to Tennessee. Atlanta would then fall from
lack of provisions, or in consequence of the successful
attacks of the Georgia militia. In connection with this
movement, General Forrest, confessedly their ablest cavalry
officer, was already operating in Southern Tennessee. … A week
sufficed to complete General Hood's arrangements, and by the
2d of October his army was across the Chattahoochee and on the
march to Dallas, where the different corps were directed to
concentrate. At this point he was enabled to threaten Rome and
Kingston, as well as the fortified places on the railroad to
Chattanooga; and there remained open, in case of defeat, a
line of retreat southwest into Alabama. From Dallas he
advanced east toward the railroad, and, on the 4th, captured
the insignificant stations of Big Shanty and Ackworth,
effecting a thorough destruction of the road between the two
places. He also sent a division under General French to
capture the Federal post at Allatoona Pass, where he had
ascertained that a million and a half of rations for the
Federal army were stored, on which he probably depended to
replenish his commissariat. … General Sherman, … immediately
upon hearing that General Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee,
… despatched General Corse with reënforcements to Rome, which
he supposed the enemy were aiming at. During the previous week
he had sent General Thomas with troops to Nashville to look
after Forrest. His bridges having meanwhile been carried away
by a freshet which filled the Chattahoochee, he was unable to
move his main body until the 4th, when three pontoons were
laid down, over which the armies of the Cumberland, the
Tennessee, and the Ohio crossed, and took up their march in
the direction of Marietta, with 15 days' rations. The 20th
corps, General Slocum, was left to garrison Atlanta. Learning
that the enemy had captured Big Shanty and Ackworth, and were
threatening Allatoona, and alive to the imperative necessity
of holding the latter place, General Sherman at once
communicated by signals instruction to General Corse at Rome
to reënforce the small garrison and hold the defences until
the main body of the Federal army could come to his
assistance. Upon receiving the message General Corse placed
900 men on the cars, and reached Allatoona before the attack
of French. With this addition the garrison numbered 1,700 men,
with six guns. Early on the morning of the 5th, General
French, with 7,000 troops, approached Allatoona, and summoned
the Federal commander, 'in order to save the unnecessary
effusion of blood,' to make an immediate surrender; to which
the latter replied: 'I shall not surrender, and you can
commence the unnecessary effusion of blood whenever you
please.' The battle opened at 8 A. M., and was waged hotly
until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Driven from fort to fort,
until they reached their last defence, the garrison fought
with an obstinacy and desperation worthy of the great stake
for which they contended. Their general was wounded early in
the action, but relaxed in no degree his efforts to repel the
enemy. … During the heat of the contest General Sherman
reached the summit of Kenesaw Mountain, whence he repeatedly
signalled to General Corse to hold out to the last. The
announcement of approaching succor animated the garrison to
renewed exertions, and they threw back the assaulting columns
of the enemy again and again, finally compelling them to
retire, beaten and disheartened, in the direction of Dallas.
Their retreat was hastened by the rapid approach of Stanley's
(4th) corps from the direction of Pine Mountain. The enemy
left 700 to 800 killed, wounded and prisoners in the hands of
the Federals, and their total loss must have exceeded 1,000.
The garrison lost 600 men. The town of Allatoona was reduced
to a mere wreck by the [severe fire of the enemy, and all the
Federal artillery and cavalry horses were killed; but the
valuable stores were saved, and the fort and pass held. The
only important injury done by the rebels, was the destruction
of six or seven miles of railroad between Big Shanty and
Allatoona, which General Sherman immediately commenced to
repair. For several days subsequent to the fight at Allatoona,
General Sherman remained in the latter place, watching the
movements of Hood, who, he suspected, would march for Rome,
and thence toward Bridgeport, or else to Kingston. … General
Hood, however, crossing the Etowah and avoiding Rome, moved
directly north, and on the 12th Stuart's corps of his army
appeared in front of Resaca, the defences of which were held
by Colonel Weaver with 600 men and three pieces of artillery.
… No serious attack was made upon the garrison, the enemy
being more intent upon destroying the railroad toward Dalton
than wasting their time or strength upon the reduction of a
post, the possession of which they wisely considered would be
of no particular advantage to them. … Meanwhile the rebel
army, pursuing its devastating march north, reached Dalton on
the 14th. … The 14th and 15th were employed by the enemy in
continuing the destruction of the railroad as far as Tunnel
Hill. …
{3541}
The approach of the Federal columns now warned General Hood to
move off to the west, and the 16th found him in full retreat
for Lafayette, followed by General Sherman. … From Lafayette
the enemy retreated in a southwesterly direction into Alabama
through a broken and mountainous country, but scantily
supplied with food for man or beast; and passing through
Summerville, Gaylesville, and Blue Pond, halted at Gadsdens,
on the Coosa River, 75 miles from Lafayette. Here he paused
for several days, receiving a few reënforcements brought up by
General Beauregard, who had on the 17th assumed command of the
Confederate military division of the West. … General Hood
still retained his special command, subject to the supervision
or direction of General Beauregard, and his army, after
remaining a few days in Gadsden, moved, about the 1st of
November, for Warrington, on the Tennessee River, 30 miles
distant. General Sherman meanwhile remained at Gaylesville,
which place his main body reached about the 21st, watching the
enemy's movements. … Whatever … might be the final result of
Hood's flanking movement, it had entirely failed to interrupt
the Federal communications to a degree that would compel the
evacuation of Atlanta. … In the light of subsequent events it
would now appear that General Sherman, making only a show of
following his adversary, deliberately lured him into Northern
Alabama, for the purpose of pursuing an uninterrupted march
with his own army through the heart of Georgia. The
ill-advised plan of General Hood had given him the very
opportunity which he desired, and he prepared at once to avail
himself of it."

_W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History in the United States,
chapter 45. _

ALSO IN:
_J. D. Cox,
Atlanta
(Campaigns of the Civil war, volume 9),
chapter 17._

_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapter 19 (volume 2)._

_T. B. Van Horne,
Life of Major-General George H. Thomas,
volume 2, chapter 12._

_J. B. Hood,
Advance and Retreat,
chapter 15._

_Official Records,
1st Series, volume 39._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October).
Admission of Nevada into the Union.

See NEVADA: A. D. 1848-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October).
Report on secret disloyal associations in the North.
Knights of the Golden Circle, etc.

"During more than a year past [this report bears date October
8, 1864], it has been generally known to our military
authorities that a secret and treasonable organization,
affiliated with the Southern Rebellion, and chiefly military
in its character, has been rapidly extending itself throughout
the West. A variety of agencies … have been employed, and
successfully, to ascertain its nature and extent, as well as
its aims and its results; and, as this investigation has led
to the arrest, in several States, of a number of its prominent
members, as dangerous public enemies, it has been deemed
proper to set forth in full the acts and purposes of this
organization. … This secret association first developed itself
in the West in the year 1862, about the period [August] of the
first conscription of troops, which it aimed to obstruct and
resist. Originally known in certain localities as the 'Mutual
Protection Society,' the 'Circle of Honor,' or the 'Circle' or
'Knights of the Mighty Host,' but more widely as the 'Knights
of the Golden Circle,' it was simply an inspiration of the
Rebellion, being little other than an extension, among the
disloyal and disaffected at the North, of the association of
the latter name, which had existed for some years at the South
[see GOLDEN CIRCLE, KNIGHTS OF], and from which it derived all
the chief features of its organization. During the Summer and
Fall of 1863, the Order, both at the North and South,
underwent some modifications as well as a change of name. In
consequence of a partial exposure which had been made of the
signs and ritual of the Knights of the Golden Circle, Sterling
Price had instituted, as its successor in Missouri, a secret
political association, which he called the Corps de Belgique,
or Southern League, his principal coadjutor being Charles L.
Hunt, of St. Louis, then Belgian Consul at that city. …
Meanwhile, also, there had been instituted at the North, in
the autumn of 1863, by sundry disloyal persons, prominent
among whom were Vallandigham and P. C. Wright, of New York, a
secret, Order intended to be general throughout the country …
and which was termed, and has since been widely known as the
O. A. K., or 'Order of American Knights.' … The secret signs
and character of the Order having become known to our military
authorities, further modifications in the ritual and forms
were introduced, and its name was finally changed to that of
the O. S. L., or 'Order of the Sons of Liberty,' or the
'Knights of the Order of the Sons of Liberty.' These later
changes are represented to have been first instituted … in May
last [1864], but the new name was at once generally adopted
throughout the West, though in some localities the association
is still better known as the 'Order of American Knights.'
Meanwhile, also, the Order has received certain local
designations. In parts of Illinois it has been called at times
the 'Peace Organization,' in Kentucky the 'Star Organization,'
and in Missouri the 'American Organization;' these, however,
being apparently names used outside of the lodges of the
Order. Its members have also been familiarly designated as
'Butternuts' by the country people of Illinois, Indiana, and
Ohio. … The 'Temples' or 'Lodges' of the Order are numerously
scattered through the States of Indiana, Illinois, Ohio,
Missouri, and Kentucky. They are also officially reported as
established, to a less extent, in Michigan and the other
Western States, as well as in New York, Pennsylvania, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Delaware, and Tennessee. … It has been asserted by delegates
to the Supreme Council of February last, that the number was
there represented to be from 800,000 to 1,000,000; but
Vallandigham, in his speech last summer at Dayton, Ohio,
placed it at 500,000, which is probably much nearer the true
total. … Although the Order has, from the outset, partaken of
the military character, it was not till the summer or fall of
1863 that it began to be generally organized as an armed
body.' … In March last the entire armed force of the Order
capable of being mobilized for effective service was
represented to be 340,000 men."

_J. Holt,
Judge Advocate General's Report on Secret Associations
and Conspiracies against the Government._

ALSO IN:
_E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States
during the Great Rebellion,
appendix, pages 445-454._

_J. A. Logan,
The Great Conspiracy,
page 499, and appendix chapter B._

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, chapter 1._

See, also, COPPERHEADS.

{3542}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October).
The St. Albans Raid.

"Along the Northern border … the rebel agents, sent thither on
'detached service' by the Rebel Government, were active in
movements intended to terrify and harass the people. On the
19th of October, a party of them made a raid into St. Albans,
Vermont, robbing the banks there, and making their escape
across the lines into Canada with their plunder, having killed
one of the citizens in their attack. Pursuit was made, and
several of the marauders were arrested in Canada. Proceedings
were commenced to procure their extradition [which were
protracted until after the close of the war]. … The Government
received information that this affair was but one of a
projected series, and that similar attempts would be made all
along the frontier. More than this, there were threats,
followed by actual attempts, to set fire to the principal
Northern cities."

_H. J. Raymond,
Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln,
page 611._

ALSO IN:
_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, chapter 1._

_Correspondence relating to the Fenian Invasion
and the Rebellion of the Southern States
(Ottawa, 1869), pages 117-138._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (October: North Carolina).
The destruction of the ram Albemarle.

The ram Albemarle, which had proved in the spring so dangerous
an antagonist to the blockading vessels in the North Carolina
Sounds, was still lying at Plymouth, in the Roanoke River, and
another attack from her was feared by the fleet.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864
(APRIL-MAY: NORTH CAROLINA).

"She was finally destroyed by a brave young lieutenant,
William B. Cushing, who blew her up with a torpedo. Though
only twenty years old, he was one of the most daring officers
in the navy, and he had become noted for his fearlessness in
the expeditions in the sounds and rivers of North Carolina.
One dark night (October 27) he set out from the fleet in a
steam launch—a long open boat used by naval vessels—with a
crew of thirteen officers and men. The launch was fitted with
a torpedo which could be run out forward on the end of a long
boom so as to be thrust under the vessel to be attacked.
Cushing got within sixty feet of the Albemarle before his boat
was seen. The guards then shouted the alarm, rang the boat's
bell, and began firing their muskets at the launch. There was
a raft of logs thirty feet wide around the Albemarle to
protect her from just such attacks, but Cushing ran the bow of
the launch upon the logs, lowered the boom so that the torpedo
came right under the side of the vessel, and fired it. At the
same moment a shot from one of the great guns of the ram
crashed through the launch, and it was overwhelmed by a flood
of water thrown up by the explosion of the torpedo. The
Confederates called out to Cushing to surrender, but he
refused, and ordering his men to save themselves as they best
could, he sprang into the water amid a shower of musket balls
and swam down the river. He succeeded in reaching the shore,
almost exhausted, and hid himself during the next day in a
swamp, where he was cared for by some negroes. From them he
heard that the Albemarle had been sunk by his torpedo. The
next night he found a small boat in a creek, paddled in it
down the river, and before midnight was safe on board one of
the vessels of the fleet. Only one other man of the party
escaped, all the rest being either drowned or captured. The
Albemarle being thus put out of the way, Plymouth was
recaptured a few days afterward."

_J. D. Champlin, Jr.
Young Folks' History of the War for the Union,
chapter 33._

ALSO IN:
_W. B. Cushing, E. Holden, and others,
The Confederate Ram Albemarle
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (November: Tennessee).
Hood's advance Northward.
The Battle of Franklin.

When General Sherman started on his march to the sea General
Thomas was left to oppose Hood. "The force Thomas had for this
purpose was curiously small, considering how formidable Hood's
army had been in the Atlanta Campaign, and still was. All
Thomas had for immediate field service were the Fourth and
Twenty-Third Corps, numbering together about 22,000 infantry,
and also about 3,000 cavalry. These troops were sent to
Pulaski, Tennessee, in command of General Schofield, Thomas,
himself remaining at Nashville. A little after the middle of
November, 1864, Hood crossed the Tennessee River and
inaugurated his campaign by a flank movement. He made a rapid
march upon Columbia, with the view of getting in behind
Schofield, who was at Pulaski. But Schofield retired to
Columbia in time to frustrate Hood's plans. The two armies
remained in close proximity to each other at Columbia until
November 28th, when Hood made another skilfully-planned flank
movement … to Spring Hill, in rear of Schofield. Again Hood
was foiled. … General Thomas at Nashville wanted the
Confederates held back as long as possible, in order that he
might have time to receive there his expected reinforcement of
A. J. Smith's corps. It was, therefore, Schofield's duty to
check Hood's advance as long as he could. … He started General
Stanley, with a division of 5,000 men, and a great part of his
artillery, to Spring Hill (12 miles north of Columbia) early
in the morning. He put two other divisions on the road. He
held one division in front of Columbia, and prevented the
enemy from crossing the river during the entire day, and also
that night. Stanley reached Spring Hill in time to prevent
Hood from occupying that place. He skirmished and fought with
Hood's advance troops at Spring Hill during the afternoon of
November 29th. … Schofield … accomplished exactly what he
believed he could accomplish. He held back his enemy at
Columbia with one hand and fenced off the blow at Spring Hill
with the other. … The beneficial result of all this bold
management of Schofield, November 29th, was apparent the next
day in the battle of Franklin. Hood fought that great battle
practically without his artillery. He only had the two
batteries which he took with him on his detour to Spring Hill.
Those two he used. … But his vast supply of artillery had all
been detained at Columbia too long to be of any service at the
time and place it was most needed. … The Federal troops left
Spring Hill in the night for Franklin, ten miles distant.
Early in the morning of November 30th they began to arrive at
Franklin, and were placed in position covering the town. Early
the same morning the Confederates moved up from Spring Hill,
following hard upon the rearmost of the Federals. …
{3543}
General Stanley says, in his official report: 'From one
o'clock until four in the evening, the enemy's entire force
was in sight and forming for attack. Yet, in view of the
strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course
of the rebels during the campaign, nothing appeared so
improbable as that they would assault.'" The assault was made,
however, with a terrible persistency which proved the ruin of
Hood's army, for it failed. "The Confederate loss in this
dreadful battle can be estimated from data given. There is
good authority for stating the killed at 1,750. The usual
proportion of killed and wounded is four or five to one. This
would make the killed and wounded not less than 7,000 or
8,000. The attacking force numbered full 20,000. … Hood's loss
was, indeed, more than one-third of the attacking force. The
Federal loss was much smaller, being 1,222 killed and wounded.
… One of the features of this battle was the enormous
expenditure of ammunition [100 wagon loads] in the short time
of its duration. … The expenditure of so much ammunition
produced a dense smoke, which hung over the field, and brought
on sudden darkness, like an eclipse. So noticeable was this
phenomenon, it is mentioned in all the official reports. … In
the darkness of the night the battle ended. The Confederates
desisted, and the Federal line became quiet. … In their front,
and so near that the outstretched hand could almost reach
them, were thousands of men in the agonies of death. The wail
that went up from that field as the thunder of the battle
ceased can never be forgotten by those who heard it. … The
[Federal] troops were quietly withdrawn before midnight. A
silent rapid march brought them to Nashville the next morning,
and weary with fighting and marching they bivouacked in the
blue grass pastures under the guns of Fort Negley."

_T. Speed,
The Battle of Franklin
(Sketches of War History,
Ohio Commandery L. L. of the United States, volume 3). _

ALSO IN:
_T. B. Van Horne,
Life of General George H. Thomas,
chapter 13._

_J. B. Hood,
Advance and Retreat,
chapters 10-17._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (November-December: Georgia).
Sherman's March to the Sea.

"It was at Alatoona, probably, that Sherman first realized
that, with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his
line of communications with the North would be impossible if
he expected to retain any force with which to operate
offensively beyond Atlanta.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864
(September-October: Georgia).

He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to
Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter
place garrisoned. … Sherman thought Hood would follow him,
though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the
latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by
making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I
myself [writes General Grant] was thoroughly satisfied that
Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2d of November I
telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to move
according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose
from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to
Chattanooga. … Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it
worthless for military purposes before starting, Sherman
himself remaining over a day to superintend the work and see
that it was well done. Sherman's orders for this campaign were
perfect. Before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled
and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured
soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. … The
army was expected to live on the country. … Each brigade
furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and
provisions for the command to which they belonged. … The skill
of these men, called by themselves and the army 'bummers,' in
collecting their loads and getting back to their respective
commands, was marvellous."

_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapter 59 (volume 2)._

All preparations being completed, General Sherman caused the
foundries, mills and shops of every kind in Rome to be
destroyed on the 10th of November, and "started on the 12th
with his full staff from Kingston to Atlanta. … As Sherman
rode towards Atlanta that night he met railroad trains going
to the rear with furious speed. He was profoundly impressed
with the strange aspect of affairs: two hostile armies
marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that
it was achieving a final and conclusive result in the great
war. 'I was strongly inspired,' he writes, 'with a feeling
that the movement on our part was a direct attack upon the
rebel army and the rebel capital at Richmond, though a full
thousand miles of hostile country intervened; and that for
better or worse it would end the war.' The result was a
magnificent vindication of this soldierly intuition. His army
consisted in round numbers of 60,000 men, the most perfect in
strength, health, and intelligence that ever went to war. He
had thoroughly purged it of all inefficient material, sending
to the rear all organizations and even all individuals that he
thought would be a drag upon his celerity or strength. His
right wing, under Howard, consisted of the Fifteenth Corps,
commanded by Osterhaus, in the absence of John A. Logan; and
the Seventeenth Corps, commanded by Frank P. Blair, Jr. The
left wing, commanded by Slocum, comprised the Fourteenth
Corps, under Jeff. C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, under A.
S. Williams. In his general orders he had not intimated to the
army the object of their march. 'It is sufficient for you to
know,' he said, 'that it involves a departure from our present
base and a long, difficult march to a new one.' His special
field orders are a model of clearness and conciseness. The
habitual order of march was to be, wherever practicable, by
four roads as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at
points to be indicated from time to time. There was to be no
general train of supplies; behind each regiment should follow
one wagon and one ambulance; a due proportion of wagons for
ammunition and provision behind each brigade; the separate
columns were to start at seven in the morning and make about
fifteen miles a day. The army was to subsist liberally on the
country; forage parties, under the command of discreet
officers, were to gather near the routes traveled whatever was
needed by the command, aiming to keep in the wagons a reserve
of at least ten days' provisions; soldiers were strictly
forbidden to enter dwellings of inhabitants or commit
trespasses; the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins,
etc., was intrusted to corps commanders alone.
{3544}
No destruction of property was to be permitted in districts
where the army was unmolested; but relentless devastation was
ordered in case of the manifestation of local hostility by the
shooting of soldiers or the burning of bridges. … Precisely at
seven o'clock on the morning of the 16th of November the great
army started on its march. A band struck up the anthem of
'John Brown's body lies a-moldering in the grave'; the
soldiers caught up the refrain, and, to the swelling chorus of
'Glory, Hallelujah,' the great march was begun. The month that
followed will always remain to those 60,000 men the most
romantic and inspiring memory of their lives. The weather was
favorable all the way; to veterans the marches were of
reasonable length; the work of destroying the Southern
railroads was so easy to their experienced hands that it
hardly delayed the day's march. With the exception of the
affair on the 22d of November, when P. J. Phillips with a
division of Smith's Georgia troops attacked C. C. Walcutt's
Brigade, which was marching as the rear-guard of the right
wing at Griswoldville, and met with a severe repulse, and a
series of cavalry fights between Wheeler and Kilpatrick near
'Waynesboro', there was no fighting to do between Atlanta and
Savannah. A swarm of militia and irregular cavalry hung, it is
true, about the front and flank of the marching army, but were
hardly a source of more annoyance than so many mosquitoes
would have been. The foragers brought in every evening their
heterogeneous supplies from the outlying plantations, and
although they had to defend themselves every day from
scattered forces of the enemy, the casualties which they
reported each evening were insignificant. The utmost efforts
of Sherman and his officers to induce the negroes to remain
quietly at home were not entirely successful. The promise of
freedom which was to come to them from the victory of the
Union cause was too vague and indefinite to content them. …
The simple-hearted freedmen gathered in an ever-increasing
cloud in rear of the army; and when the campaign was over they
peopled the sea-islands of Georgia and furnished, after the
war, the principal employment of the Freedmen's Commission.
The march produced an extraordinary effervescence throughout
the Confederacy. If words could avail anything against heavy
battalions, Sherman would have been annihilated in his first
day's march. … As Sherman drew near to Milledgeville on the
23d of November the Georgia Legislature passed an act to levy
the population en masse; but this act of desperate legislation
had no effect in checking the march of the 'Yankees,' and the
Governor, State officers, and Legislature fled in the utmost
confusion as Sherman entered the place. The Union general
occupied the Executive Mansion for a day; some of the soldiers
went to the State House, organized themselves into a
constituent assembly, and after a spirited mock-serious
debate, repealed the ordinance of secession. Sherman took the
greatest possible pains to prevent any damage to the city and
marched out on the 24th on the way to Millen. … Finding it
impossible to stop him, the Georgia State troops by sharp
marching had made their way directly to the vicinity of
Savannah, where Sherman himself arrived and invested the city
from the Savannah to the little Ogeechee River, on the 10th of
December."

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 9, chapter 20._

On the 13th, Fort McAllister, which commanded the Ogeechee
River, was stormed and taken by Hazen's division, and
communication was opened with Admiral Dahlgren, and with
General Foster, the Union commander at Port Royal. On the
17th, General Hardee, the Confederate commander at Savannah,
refused a demand for the surrender of the city, but on the
night of the 20th he escaped, with his forces, and on the 22d
General Sherman telegraphed to President Lincoln: "I beg to
present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with
150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition; also about 25,000
bales of cotton."

ALSO IN:
_J. D. Cox,
The March to the Sea
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 10),
chapter 3._

_O. O. Howard, and others,
Sherman's March
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapter 20 (volume 2)._

_G. W. Nichols,
The Story of the Great March._

_W. B. Hazen,
Narrative of Military Service,
chapters 21-22._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (December: Tennessee).
The Battle of Nashville and the destruction of Hood's army.

After the battle of Franklin Hood went forward to Nashville,
with his badly shaken army, and invested that place.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (NOVEMBER: TENNESSEE).

Thomas was strongly fortified, and quietly took his time to
make ready before striking his audacious antagonist, unmoved
by repeated demands for an advance, from the War Office, the
President, and General Grant. "With all just confidence in
Thomas' ability, the entire North insisted on instant action,
and Grant finally ordered Thomas either to move upon Hood at
once or else turn over the command to Schofield. Thomas
quietly replied that he would cheerfully do the latter, if
directed, but would not attack Hood until he was satisfied
that the time was ripe. He desired both favorable weather and
to increase his force of mounted men. But the enemy was
devastating a considerable part of Tennessee and was forcing
all the young men into their ranks; and everyone was fearful
of a repetition of Bragg's march to the Ohio in 1862. Logan
was finally ordered to Nashville to supplant Thomas. But
before he could reach the ground, Thomas had struck his blow.
His preparations had been two weeks before substantially
completed. Small detachments were at Murfreesboro',
Chattanooga, and along the railroad. This latter had been,
however, interrupted by Hood for a number of days. A heavy
storm of sleet and ice had made the country almost impassable
and would render the operations of the attacking party
uncertain. Thomas had made up his mind to wait for clearing
weather. Finally came sunshine and with it Thomas' advance.
Hood lay in his front, with Stewart on his left, Lee in the
centre and Cheatham on the right, while a portion of Forrest's
cavalry was operating out upon his left. He had some 44,000
men, but his check and heavy losses at Franklin had seriously
impaired the 'morale' of his army as well as thinned his
ranks. Hood could, however, not retreat. He was committed to a
death-struggle with Thomas. It was his last chance as a
soldier. The Union general had placed A. J. Smith on his
right, the Fourth corps in the centre, and Schofield on the
left. He advanced on Hood, bearing heavily with his right,
while sharply demonstrating with his left. The position of the
Confederate Army had placed A. J. Smith's corps obliquely to
their general line of battle, an advantage not to be
neglected.
{3545}
Smith pushed in, later supported by Schofield, and
successively capturing the field-works erected by the enemy's
main line and reserves, disastrously crushed Hood's left
flank. Meanwhile Wood was making all but equal headway against
Hood's right, and the first day closed with remarkable success
for the amount of loss sustained. Still this was not victory.
The morrow might bring reverse. Hood's fight promised to be
with clenched teeth. Hood seriously missed Forrest, whom he
had detached on a raiding excursion and without whose cavalry
his flanks were naked. Cheatham he moved during the night over
from the right to sustain his left, which had proved the
weaker wing. On the morning of the next day he lay intrenched
upon the hills back of his former line, with either flank
somewhat refused. Thomas sent Wilson with his cavalry to work
his way unobserved around the extreme left flank thus thrown
back. At 4 P. M. a general assault was made all along the
line. Upon our left, Wood's advance did not meet with success.
On the right, however, A. J. Smith's onset, concentrated at
the salient of Hood's left centre, proved heavy enough to
break down the Confederate defense. Sharply following up his
successes, allowing no breathing time to the exultant troops,
Smith pushed well home, and overcoming all resistance, drove
the enemy in wild confusion from the field. Meanwhile Wilson's
troopers, dismounted, fell upon the Confederate flank and rear
and increased the wreck tenfold. This advantage again enabled
Wood to make some headway, and with renewed joint effort the
rout of the enemy became overwhelming. Almost all organization
was lost in Hood's army as it fled across the country towards
Franklin. Pursuit was promptly undertaken, but though
seriously harassed, Hood saved himself beyond the Tennessee
river with the remnants of his army. Thomas' losses were 3,000
men, Hood's were never officially given, but our trophies
included 4,500 prisoners and 53 guns. Thomas had settled all
adverse speculation upon his slowness in attacking Hood by the
next to annihilation he wrought when he actually moved upon
him. No army was so completely overthrown during our war."

_T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War,
chapter 58._

ALSO IN:
_T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapter 35 (volume 2)._

_W. Swinton,
The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War,
chapter 11._

_J. D. Cox,
The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 10),
chapters 6-7._

_H. Stone,
Repelling Hood's Invasion
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

_H. Coppée,
General Thomas,
chapter 11-12._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864-1865 (December-January: North Carolina). The Capture of Fort Fisher.

"In the latter part of 1864 two ports only, Wilmington and
Charleston, remained to the Confederates. … The northward
march of Sherman would cut off Charleston, too, so that the
Confederates would have to abandon it. The National government
now desired to complete its work by capturing Fort Fisher, and
thus finally shutting off the Confederacy from all
communication with the foreign world. The accomplishment of
this task was in no wise easy. … The army and navy co-operated
in the attempts to reduce Fort Fisher. There were more than 50
men-of-war tossing on the waves before the lowering sea-front
of the work. Six thousand five hundred men were in the
military force. They were in command of General B. F. Butler,
whom we saw last in New Orleans. The General's active and
ingenious mind conceived a plan for destroying the fort
without sacrificing a single Federal soldier. He procured an
old gun-boat, painted it white and otherwise disguised it, so
as to look like a blockade-runner, stored 250 tons of
gunpowder in its hold with fuses penetrating every part, ran
the craft in within 1,500 feet of the works and exploded it.
Butler expected that the shock would demolish the seaward face
of the fort altogether, and perhaps bury the guns under great
masses of sand, but in this he was mistaken, for the heavy
bastions were not in the least disturbed by the shock. … The
navy then took its turn, and for some hours the heavy vessels
of Admiral Porter's fleet poured so rapid and well aimed a
fire upon the work, that the garrison were driven from their
guns, and only the occasional report of a heavy cannon told
that the fort was still tenanted. But secure in their heavy
bomb-proofs, the garrison minded the storm of shells and solid
shot no more than the well-housed farmer heeds a hailstorm. It
was very clear that Fort Fisher could not be taken at long
range. … The original plan had contemplated an assault as soon
as the fire of the fleet should have silenced the guns of the
fort, and in pursuance of this 700 men had been landed from
the army transports. But the weather was too rough to permit
of landing more troops that day, and the next morning General
Butler concluded that Fort Fisher was impregnable, withdrew
his men already landed, and sailed away, greatly to the
disgust of the navy. This was on the 25th of December, 1864.
The chagrin of the whole North over the failure of the
expedition was so great that it was speedily determined to
renew the attempt. January 13th saw a new Federal force, this
time under command of General A. H. Terry, landing on the
shore of the sandy neck of land above the fort. … At early
dawn of the 15th the attack was begun. The ships arranged in a
great semicircle poured their fire upon the fort, dismantling
guns, driving the garrison to the bomb-proofs, and mowing down
the stockade. A line of sharp-shooters, each carrying a shovel
in one hand and a gun in the other, spring out from Terry's
most advanced lines, rush forward to within 175 yards of the
fort and dig pits for their protection before the Confederates
can attack them. Then the sharpshooters and the navy occupy
the attention of the enemy, while Curtis's brigade dashes
forward and digs a trench within 500 yards of the fort. By
this time too a party of 2,000 sailors and marines has been
landed from the fleet. They are to storm the sea-wall of the
fort while the army attacks its landward face. Suddenly the
thunder of the naval artillery is stilled. There is a moment
of silence, and then the shrill scream of the whistles rises
from every steamer in the fleet. It is the signal for the
assault. The sailors on the beach spring to their feet and
dash forward at a rapid run; they fire no shot, for they carry
no guns. Cutlasses and pistols, the blue-jackets' traditional
weapons, are their only arms. Toward the other side of the
fort came Terry's troops. … The fate of the naval column is
quickly determined. Upon it is concentrated the fire of the
heaviest Confederate batteries, Napoleon guns, Columbiads, and
rifles shotted with grape and cannister.
{3546}
The blue-jackets, unable to reply to this murderous fire, and
seeing their companions falling fast around them, waver, halt,
and fall back to the beach, throwing themselves upon the
ground to escape the enemy's missiles. But though repulsed
they have contributed largely to the capture of the fort.
While the chief attention of Confederates has been directed
toward them, the troops have been carrying all before them on
the other front. Colonel Lamb turns from his direction of the
defense against the naval column to see three Union flags
waving over other portions of the work. … The Confederates
were determined, even desperate. Long after the fort was
virtually in the hands of its captors they stubbornly clung to
a bomb-proof. Finally they retreated to Battery Buchanan and
there maintained themselves stoutly until late at night when,
all hope being at an end, they surrendered themselves, and the
National victory was complete."

_W. J. Abbot,
Battle-Fields and Victory,
chapter 15._

ALSO IN:
_D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the Civil War,
chapters 49-51._

_W. Lamb and T. O. Selfridge, Jr.,
The Capture of Fort Fisher
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (January).
Congressional adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.