Chapter DII: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (19)

_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapter. 55 (volume 2)._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 36._

{3530}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-June: Virginia).
The Campaigning in the Shenandoah Valley, and
Sheridan's raid to Trevillian Station.

"In the spring of 1864, the Department of West Virginia, which
included the Shenandoah Valley, was under the command of
Major-General Franz Sigel. A large portion of his forces was
in the Kanawha region, under Brigadier-General George Crook. …
In opening his Virginia campaign, Lieutenant-General Grant
directed Sigel to form two columns, whereof one, under Crook,
should break the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at the New
River bridge, and should also, if possible, destroy the
salt-works at Saltville; while the other column, under Sigel
himself, proceeding up the Shenandoah Valley, was to distract
attention from Crook by menacing the Virginia Central Railroad
at Staunton."

_G. E. Pond,
The Shenandoah Valley in 1864
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 11),
chapter 2._

"Early in May, General Sigel entered the Valley with a force
of 10,000 or 12,000 men [6,000 or 7,000, according to Pond, as
above], and proceeded to advance toward Staunton. The Valley
at that time was occupied only by a small force under General
Imboden, which was wholly inadequate for its defence. General
Breckenridge was therefore withdrawn from South-Western
Virginia to oppose Sigel. On the 15th of May, Breckenridge
with a force of 3,000 men [4,600 to 5,000—Pond] encountered
Sigel at Newmarket and defeated him and compelled him to
retire behind Cedar Creek. The cadets of the Virginia Military
Institute formed a portion of Breckenridge's division, and
behaved with distinguished gallantry. … After the battle of
Newmarket Breckenridge was withdrawn from the Valley to
reinforce Lee … in the neighborhood of Hanover Junction. In
the meantime Crook and Averill had reached the Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad, where they inflicted some damage, but were
compelled to retire by a force sent against them by General
Sam Jones. They then proceeded to join the main column
operating in the Valley. After the battle of Newmarket, Sigel
was relieved by General David Hunter, who was instructed by
General Grant to advance upon Staunton, thence to
Charlottesville, and on to Lynchburg if circumstances favored
that movement. Breckenridge having been withdrawn, General W.
E. Jones was ordered to the Valley to oppose Hunter, who
slowly advanced, opposed by Imboden with an almost nominal
force. About the 4th of June, Imboden was joined by General
Jones in the neighborhood of Harrisonburg with a force of
between 3,000 and 4,000 men, which he had hastily collected in
Southwestern Virginia. … Although greatly outnumbered, he
[Jones] engaged Hunter near Port Republic [at the village of
Piedmont, which gives its name to the battle], where he was
defeated and killed. … After the fall of Jones, McCauslin
opposed Hunter with gallantry and vigor, but his small force
was no match for the greatly superior force against which he
contended. The affairs in the Valley now began to attract the
attention of the commanding generals of both armies. It was
evident that if Hunter could succeed in taking Lynchburg and
breaking up the canal and Central Railroad, it would only be
necessary to tap the Richmond and Danville and the Petersburg
and Weldon railroads to complete a line of circumvallation
around Richmond and Petersburg. On the 7th of June General
Grant detached General Sheridan, with a large cavalry force,
with instructions to break up the Central Railroad between
Richmond and Gordonsville, then proceed to the James River and
Kanawha Canal, break that line of communication with Richmond,
and then to co-operate with Hunter in his operations against
Lynchburg. About the same time General Lee sent General
Breckenridge with his division, 2,500 strong, to occupy
Rockfish Gap of the Blue Ridge to deflect Hunter from
Charlottesville and protect the Central Railroad as far as
practicable. A few days later General Early was detached by
General Lee to oppose Hunter, and take such other steps as in
his judgment would tend to create a diversion in favor of
Richmond. General Sheridan, in compliance with his
instructions, proceeded by a circuitous route to strike the
railroad somewhere in the neighborhood of Gordonsville. This
movement was, however, discovered by General Hampton, who,
with a considerable force of cavalry encountered Sheridan on
the 12th of June at Travillians [or Trevillian's] Station.
After much severe and varied fighting Sheridan was defeated,
and in order to escape was obliged to make a night-retreat.
[In his 'Memoirs,' Sheridan claims the victory, having forced
Hampton back and taken 500 prisoners; but learning that Hunter
would not meet him, as expected, at Charlottesville, he turned
back to rejoin Grant south of Richmond]. … This was one of the
most masterly and spirited cavalry engagements of the war.
Hunter, finding Rockfish Gap occupied in force, was unable to
comply with that part of his instructions which directed him
to Charlottesville. He therefore continued his march up the
Valley, with the view of reaching Lynchburg by way of some one
of the passes of the Blue Ridge south of the James River. In
the neighborhood of Staunton he was joined by Crook and
Averill, increasing his force to about 20,000 men, including
cavalry and artillery. From Staunton he advanced by way of
Lexington and Buchanan, burning and destroying everything that
came in his way, leaving a track of desolation rarely
witnessed in the course of civilized warfare." Before Hunter's
arrival at Lynchburg, General Early, who withdrew his corps
(formerly Stonewall Jackson's, and lately commanded by Ewell),
from Richmond on the 13th of June, had reached that city and
was prepared to defend it. "Hunter, finding himself
unexpectedly confronted by Early, relinquished his intended
attack upon the city and sought safety in a rapid
night-retreat."

_A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 18._

ALSO IN:
_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1. chapter 21._

[Image: Map of the Atlanta Campaign. Page 331.]

{3532}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-September: Georgia).
Sherman's Movement upon Atlanta: New Hope Church.
Kenesaw.
Peach Tree Creek.
The siege and capture of the city.

From Cassville, for reasons given in his memoirs, Johnston
continued his retreat behind the next spur of mountains to
Allatoona. "Pausing for a few days," writes General Sherman,
"to repair the railroad without attempting Allatoona, of which
I had personal knowledge acquired in 1844, I resolved to push
on toward Atlanta by way of Dallas; Johnston quickly detected
this, and forced me to fight him, May 25th-28th, at New Hope
Church, four miles north of Dallas, with losses of 3,000 to
the Confederates and 2,400 to us. The country was almost in a
state of nature—with few or no roads, nothing that a European
could understand; yet the bullet killed its victim there as
surely as at Sevastopol. Johnston had meantime picked up his
detachments, and had received reënforcements from his rear
which raised his aggregate strength to 62,000 men, and
warranted him in claiming that he was purposely drawing us far
from our base, and that when the right moment should come he
would turn on us and destroy us. We were equally confident,
and not the least alarmed. He then fell back to his position
at Marietta, with Brush Mountain on his right, Kenesaw his
center and Lost Mountain his left. His line of ten miles was
too long for his numbers, and he soon let go his flanks and
concentrated on Kenesaw. We closed down in battle array,
repaired the railroad up to our very camps, and then prepared
for the contest. Not a day, not an hour, not a minute was
there a cessation of fire. Our skirmishers were in absolute
contact, the lines of battle and the batteries but little in
rear of the skirmishers; and thus matters continued until June
27th, when I ordered a general assault, with the full
cooperation of my great lieutenants, Thomas, McPherson and
Schofield, as good and true men as ever lived or died for
their country's cause; but we failed, losing 3,000 men to the
Confederate loss of 630. Still, the result was that within
three days Johnston abandoned the strongest possible position
and was in full retreat for the Chattahoochee River. We were
on his heels; skirmished with his rear at Smyrna Church on the
4th day of July, and saw him fairly across the Chattahoochee
on the 10th, covered and protected by the best line of field
intrenchments I have ever seen, prepared long in advance. … We
had advanced into the enemy's country 120 miles, with a
single-track railroad, which had to bring clothing, food,
ammunition, everything requisite for 100,000 men and 23,000
animals. The city of Atlanta, the gate city, opening the
interior of the important State of Georgia, was in sight; its
protecting army was shaken but not defeated, and onward we had
to go. … We feigned to the right, but crossed the
Chattahoochee by the left, and soon confronted our enemy
behind his first line of intrenchments at Peach Tree Creek,
prepared in advance for this very occasion. At this critical
moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable
service. Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of General
Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to
command the Confederate army [July 18]. Hood was known to us
to be a 'fighter' … and I confess I was pleased at this
change. … I was willing to meet the enemy in the open country,
but not behind well-constructed parapets. Promptly, as
expected, General Hood sallied from his Peach Tree line on the
20th of July, about midday, striking the Twentieth Corps
(Hooker), which had just crossed Peach Tree Creek by
improvised bridges. The troops became commingled and fought
hand to hand desperately for about four hours, when the
Confederates were driven back within their lines, leaving
behind their dead and wounded. These amounted to 4,796 men, to
our loss of 1,710. We followed up and Hood fell back to the
main lines of the city of Atlanta. We closed in, when again
Hood, holding these lines with about one-half his force, with
the other half made a wide circuit by night, under cover of
the woods, and on the 22d of July enveloped our left flank 'in
air,' a movement that led to the hardest battle of the
campaign. He encountered the Army of the Tennessee—skilled
veterans who were always ready to fight, were not alarmed by
flank or rear attacks, and met their assailants with heroic
valor. The battle raged from noon to night, when the
Confederates, baffled and defeated, fell back within the
intrenchments of Atlanta. Their losses are reported 8,499 to
ours of 8,641; but among our dead was McPherson, the commander
of the Army of the Tennessee. While this battle was in
progress, Schofield at the center and Thomas on the right made
efforts to break through the intrenchments at their fronts,
but found them too strong to assault. The Army of the
Tennessee was then shifted, under its new commander (Howard),
from the extreme left to the extreme right, to reach if
possible, the railroad by which Hood drew his supplies, when,
on the 28th of July, he repeated his tactics of the 22d,
sustaining an overwhelming defeat, losing 4,632 men to our
700. These three sallies convinced him that his predecessor,
General Johnston, had not erred in standing on the defensive.
Thereafter the Confederate army in Atlanta clung to its
parapets. I never intended to assault these, but gradually
worked to the right to reach and destroy his line of supplies,
because soldiers, like other mortals, must have food. Our
extension to the right brought on numerous conflicts, but
nothing worthy of note, till about the end of August I
resolved to leave one corps to protect our communications to
the rear, and move with the other five to a point (Jonesboro')
on the railroad 20 miles below Atlanta, not fortified. This
movement was perfectly strategic, was successful, and resulted
in our occupation of Atlanta, on the 2d of September, 1864.
The result had a large effect on the whole country, at the
time, for solid and political reasons. I claim no special
merit to myself, save that I believe I followed the teachings
of the best masters of the 'science of war' of which I had
knowledge. … But I had not accomplished all, for Hood's army,
the chief 'objective,' had escaped. Then began the real
trouble. We were in possession of Atlanta, and Hood remained
at Lovejoy's Station, 30 miles south-east, on the Savannah
Railroad, with an army of about 40,000 veterans inured to war,
and with a fair amount of wagons to carry his supplies,
independent of the railroads."

_W. T. Sherman and others,
Atlanta
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

ALSO IN:
_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapters 15-18 (volume 2)._

_J. D. Cox,
Atlanta
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 9),
chapters 7-16._

_C. C. Chesney,
The Atlanta Campaign
(Fort. Rev., Nov. 1895)._

_J. E. Johnston,
Narrative,
chapters 9-11._

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 38._

_J. B. Hood,
Advance and Retreat,
chapters 12-13._

{3533}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (May-November).
The Twentieth Presidential Election.
Renomination and Re-election of Abraham Lincoln.

"Preparations for the nomination of candidates had begun to be
made, as usual, early in the spring of 1864. Some who saw most
clearly the necessities of the future, had for some months
before expressed themselves strongly in favor of the
renomination of President Lincoln. But this step was contested
with great warmth and activity by prominent members of the
political party by which he had been nominated and elected
four years before. Nearly all the original Abolitionists and
many of the more decidedly anti-slavery members of the
Republican party were dissatisfied, that Mr. Lincoln had not
more rapidly and more sweepingly enforced their extreme
opinions. Many distinguished public men resented his rejection
of their advice, and many more had been alienated by his
inability to recognize their claims to office. The most
violent opposition came from those who had been most
persistent and most clamorous in their exactions. And as it
was unavoidable that, in wielding so terrible and so absolute
a power in so terrible a crisis, vast multitudes of active and
ambitious men should be disappointed in their expectations of
position and personal gain, the renomination of Mr. Lincoln
was sure to be contested by a powerful and organized effort.
At the very outset this movement acquired consistency and
strength by bringing forward the Honorable S. P. Chase,
Secretary of the Treasury, a man of great political boldness
and experience, and who had prepared the way for such a step
by a careful dispensation of the vast patronage of his
department, as the rival candidate. But it was instinctively
felt that this effort lacked the sympathy and support of the
great mass of the people, and it ended in the withdrawal of
his name as a candidate by Mr. Chase himself. The National
Committee of the Union Republican party had called their
convention, to be held at Baltimore, on the 8th of June."
Those who opposed Mr. Lincoln's nomination issued a call for a
convention to be held at Cleveland, Ohio, on the 31st of May.
The Cleveland Convention, attended by about 150 persons, put
in nomination General John C. Fremont, for President, and
General John Cochrane, of New York, for Vice President.
"General Fremont's letter of acceptance was dated June 4th.
Its main scope was an attack upon Mr. Lincoln for
unfaithfulness to the principles he was elected to defend, and
upon his administration for incapacity and selfishness. … He
intimated that if the Baltimore convention would nominate
anyone but Mr. Lincoln he would not stand in the way of a
union of all upon the nominee. … The Convention, the
nomination and the letter of acceptance, fell dead upon the
popular feeling [and Fremont withdrew his candidacy in
September]. … The next form which the effort to prevent Mr.
Lincoln's nomination and election took was an effort to bring
forward General Grant as a candidate." But this was decisively
checked by General Grant, himself. The Convention at
Baltimore, when it assembled on the 8th of June, showed no
hesitation in nominating Abraham Lincoln for reelection, and
it associated with him, Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, as its
candidate for Vice President. The National Convention of the
Democratic party was held at Chicago, beginning August 29th,
The second resolution which it adopted in its platform
declared that, "after four years of failure to restore the
Union by the experiment of war … justice, humanity, liberty
and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made
for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate
convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end
that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be
restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States." On
this issue, having nominated General George B. McClellan for
President, and George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, for Vice
President, the opponents of the war went to the country in the
election, in November, and were overwhelmingly defeated. "Of
all the States which voted on that day, General McClellan
carried but three—New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky."

_H. J. Raymond,
Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln,
chapter 18._

The electoral vote was for Lincoln 212, for McClellan 21. The
popular vote cast was, for Lincoln 2,213,665, for McClellan,
1,802,237. Many of the States had made provision for taking
the votes of soldiers in the field, and the army vote was
116,887 for Lincoln against 33,748 for McClellan.

_E. Stanwood,
History of Presidential Elections,
chapter 21._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June).
Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws.

At every session of Congress from 1861 to 1864 ineffectual
attempts were made in the Senate and in the House of
Representatives to accomplish the repeal of the Fugitive Slave
Laws of 1793 and 1850. It was not until June of the latter
year that the necessary bill was passed—by the House on the
6th, by a vote of 82 to 57, and by the Senate on the 22d by 27
to 12. The President approved it on the 28th, and it became a
law.

_H. Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power,
volume 3, chapter 29._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June).
Revenue Measures.
The War Tariff and Internal Taxes.

See TARIFF LEGISLATION: A. D. 1861-1864 (UNITED STATES).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June).
The destruction of the Alabama by the Kearsarge.

See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1864.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (June: Virginia).
Grant's movement to the south of James River.
The Siege of Petersburg.

"In consequence of the check at Cold Harbor, a restlessness
was becoming general among the people, which the government in
vain pretended not to notice. … Public opinion, shaken in its
confidence, already began to listen to the sinister
interpretations of the opposition journals, when, in the last
half of June, it learned that the lieutenant: general had
boldly crossed the James and laid siege before Petersburg. …
This passage of the James was … a very fine movement, as ably
executed as it was boldly conceived. It inaugurated a new
phase in the campaign. … Henceforth, the battering not having
produced the expected effect, Grant was about to try the
resources of military science, and give precedence to
strategic combinations. In the first place, he took his
measures so well to conceal his intentions from the enemy that
the latter did not recognize the character of the movement
until it was already executed. Warren was ordered to occupy
Lee's attention by the menace of an advance on Richmond from
the direction of White Oak Swamp, while Smith (W. F.)
reëmbarked from White House to return to Bermuda Hundred, and
Hancock, with the Second Corps, would be transferred to the
right bank of the James by a flotilla of large steamers
collected at Wilcox Landing for that purpose.
{3534}
At the same time, a bridge of boats was thrown across a little
below, where there were thirteen fathoms of water in the
channel, and where the river was more than 2,000 feet broad.
The Fifth and Sixth Corps crossed over on the bridge. Grant
hoped to get hold of Petersburg by a 'coup de main.' If he had
succeeded, the fall of Richmond would have soon followed in
all probability. Unfortunately, delays occurred and
contretemps which caused the opportunity to fail and
completely modified the course of events. General Smith (W.
F.), after having carried the first line, which was defended
by militia only, did not know how to take advantage of his
first success. Proceeding methodically and cautiously, where
it was, above all, necessary to act with vigor and promptness,
he put off the serious work until the next morning. Hancock,
in his turn, debarked on the right bank, did not receive the
order to march on Petersburg until he had been delayed to wait
for rations which were behind-hand, and went astray in his
march owing to false indications on a map which had been sent
to him as correct. In short, he lost precious hours in the
afternoon of June 15, and on the morning of the 16th it was
too late; Lee's troops had arrived. Nevertheless, the
intrenchments thrown up hastily by the enemy were not so
formidable that they might not be carried. In the morning, a
fresh attack, with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, met with
some success, but with no decisive results. In the afternoon,
the Ninth Corps having arrived, the attempt was renewed on a
greater scale, and it ended by carrying the line at sundown,
after a hard fight and considerable loss. On the next morning,
a new assault, always by the Second Corps, supported by the
Ninth. The enemy lost more ground and a redoubt of importance.
In the evening, he succeeded in surprising the intrenchments
which Burnside had taken from him. All these fights were not
without cost; the loss of that day alone, on our side,
amounted to 4,000 men. The Confederates defended the ground
step by step, with such determination, only to gain the time
necessary to finish a stronger and better selected line, on
the hills immediately around the city. They retired to these
lines in the following night, and during the whole of the 18th
they sustained in them a series of attacks which met with no
success. From that day, the siege of Petersburg was resolved
upon, and regular works were begun. It must be remarked that
this siege was not a siege, properly speaking. The place was
never even invested. It lies 22 miles south of Richmond, on
the right, bank of the Appomattox, eight miles southwest of
City Point, where that river empties into the James, and where
the new base of supplies of the army was naturally
established. So that we had turned Richmond to put ourselves
across a part of the enemy's communications with the South,
and directly threaten the rest. These communications were: the
railroads to Norfolk, Weldon and Lynchburg, and the Jerusalem
and Boydton roads, all ending at Petersburg. Besides these,
the Confederate capital had only the James River Canal, to the
west, and the Dansville railroad, to the south. The latter did
not extend beyond the limits of Virginia, but it crossed the
Lynchburg railroad at Burksville, which doubled its resources.
If, then, we succeeded in enveloping Petersburg only on the
right bank of the Appomattox, the population and the
Confederate army would be reduced to draw all their supplies
from Richmond by a single-track railroad. To accomplish that
was our effort; to prevent it, the enemy's: that was the point
towards which all the operations of the siege were directed
for nine months. On the day on which we finally succeeded,
Petersburg and Richmond fell at the same blow, and the whole
structure of the rebellion crumbled with these two cities."

_R. de Trobriand,
Four Years with the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 28._

ALSO IN:
_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapters 19-23._

_U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapter 56 (volume 2)._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 40._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July).
The Greeley and the Jaques-Gilmore Peace Missions.

"Two abortive efforts to open a door to accommodation between
the belligerents were made during this gloomy period. One of
these originated with certain Confederates then in Canada, one
of whom wrote [July 5, 1864] to the author of this work
[Horace Greeley], averring that Messrs. Clement C. Clay, of
Alabama, James P. Holcombe, of Virginia, and George N. Sanders
(the writer) would proceed to Washington in the interest of
Peace, if full protection were accorded them. Being otherwise
confidentially assured that the two former had full powers
from Richmond, Mr. Greeley forwarded the application to
President Lincoln, urging that it be responded to, and
suggesting certain terms of reunion and peace which he judged
might be advantageously proffered to the Rebels, whether they
should be accepted or rejected. … The 'Plan of Adjustment,'
which he suggested that the President might advantageously
offer," contemplated the restoration of the Union, abolition
of slavery, with $400,000,000 paid in compensation to the
slave states, and complete amnesty for all political offenses.
"The President hereupon saw fit—alike to the surprise and the
regret of his correspondent—to depute him to proceed to
Niagara, and there communicate with the persons in question.
He most reluctantly consented to go, but under a
misapprehension which insured the failure of the effort in any
event. Though he had repeatedly and explicitly written to the
President that he knew nothing as to what the Confederates in
Canada might or would propose as a basis of adjustment … it
was expected on the President's part that he was virtually and
substantially to negotiate and settle the basis of a
pacification with them; so that their visit to Washington was,
in effect, to be the result, and not the possible occasion, of
adjustment und peace. … The whole matter thus terminated in
failure and disappointment, with some exasperation on the
Rebel side, and very decided condemnation on the part of the
opposition. … Happily, another negotiation—even more irregular
and wholly clandestine—had simultaneously been in progress at
Richmond, with a similar result. Rev. Colonel James F. Jaques,
73d Illinois, with Mr. J. R. Gilmore, of New York, had, with
President Lincoln's knowledge, but without his formal
permission, paid a visit to the Confederate capital on a Peace
errand; being allowed to pass through the lines of both armies
for the purpose.
{3535}
Arrived in Richmond they addressed a joint letter to Judah P.
Benjamin, Secretary of State, requesting an interview with
President Davis, which was accorded; and a long, familiar,
earnest colloquy ensued, wherein the Confederate chief
presented his ultimatum in these terms: … The North was mad
and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the
war came; and now it must go on till the last man of this
generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his
musket and fight our battle, unless you acknowledge our right
to self-government. We are not fighting for Slavery, we are
fighting for Independence; and that or extermination we will
have'. … Thus it was not only incontestably settled but
proclaimed, through the volunteered agency of two citizens,
that the War must go on until the Confederacy should be
recognized as an independent power, or till it should be
utterly, finally overthrown. The knowledge of this fact was
worth more than a victory to the National cause."

_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 30._

ALSO IN:
_E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States
during the Great Rebellion,
pages 301-307._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia-Maryland.)
Early in the Shenandoah Valley.
His invasion of Maryland and approach to Washington.

"… [General Jubal Anderson] Early had forced Hunter into the
Kanawha region far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could
not again be threatened from that direction;

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (MAY-JUNE: VIRGINIA).

[Early then] united to his own corps General John C.
Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry of Generals
J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland, B. T. Johnson, and J. D.
Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and
western Virginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr., and with
the column thus formed, was ready to turn his attention to the
lower Shenandoah Valley. At Early's suggestion General Lee
authorized him to move north at an opportune moment, cross the
upper Potomac into Maryland and threaten Washington. … By
rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and
on the 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of
that place the same day that Hunter's troops, after their
fatiguing retreat through the mountains, reached Charlestown,
West Virginia. Early was thus enabled to cross the Potomac
without difficulty, when, moving around Harper's Ferry,
through the gaps of the South Mountain, he found his path
unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, where Ricketts's
division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that had been
collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the
Confederates till the other reinforcements that had been
ordered to the capital from Petersburg could be brought up.
Wallace contested the line of the Monocacy with obstinacy, but
had to retire finally toward Baltimore. The road was then open
to Washington, and Early marched to the outskirts and began
against the capital the demonstrations [July 11-12] which were
designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its main
purpose in front of Petersburg. Early's audacity in thus
threatening Washington had caused some concern to the
officials in the city, but as the movement was looked upon by
General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisive
issue, the Administration was not much disturbed till the
Confederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the
alarm and consternation of two years before, fears for the
safety of the capital being magnified by the confusion and
discord existing among the different generals in Washington
and Baltimore; and the imaginary dangers vanished only with
the appearance of General Wright, who with the Sixth Corps and
one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushed out to attack
Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops in hand, but
under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement; and
as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury,
retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by
some Union cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County
by Hunter, who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry
by the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early
retired through Winchester toward Strasburg, but when the head
of his column reached this place he found that he was being
followed by General Crook with the combined troops of Hunter
and Sigel only, Wright having returned to Washington under
orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. This reduction of the
pursuing force tempting Early to resume the offensive, he
attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded in administering
such a check as to necessitate this general's retreat to
Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawal
restored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so,
recrossing this stream, he advanced again into Maryland, and
sending McCausland on to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that
town in ashes [July 30] leaving 3,000 non-combatants without
shelter or food. … This second irruption of Early and his
ruthless destruction of Chambersburg led to many
recommendations on the part of General Grant looking to a
speedy elimination of the confusion then existing among the
Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time the
authorities at Washington would approve none of his
propositions. … Finally the manœuvres of Early and the raid to
Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant had
somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to
appoint a commander for the forces in the field that were to
operate against Early. On the 31st of July General Grant
selected me as this commander. … On the evening of August 1, I
was relieved from immediate duty with the Army of the Potomac,
but not from command of the cavalry as a corps organization. I
arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next day
received instructions from General Halleck, to report to
General Grant at Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct
from City Point, in consequence of a characteristic despatch
from the President indicating his disgust with the confusion,
disorder and helplessness prevailing along the upper Potomac,
and intimating that Grant's presence there was necessary."

_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 23._

ALSO IN:
_G. E. Pond,
The Shenandoah Valley in 1864,
chapters 4-6._

_F. Sigel,
Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

{3536}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (July: Virginia).
The siege of Petersburg: The Mine.

"Burnside's corps held a position directly in front of
Petersburg, including a point where our lines, owing to the
nature of the ground, had been pushed up to within 150 yards
of the enemy's, where a fort projected beyond their average
front. Under this fort a mine had been run from a convenient
ravine or hollow within our lines, which was entirely screened
from the enemy's observation; and this mine would seem to have
been completed not only without countermining by the Rebels,
but without being even suspected by them; though a report of
its existence (probably founded on the story of some deserter
or prisoner) was printed in one of the Richmond journals. All
being ready, the morning of July 30th was fixed for springing
the mine; which was to be instantly followed, of course, by
the opening of our guns all along the front, and by an assault
at the chasm opened in the enemy's defences by the explosion.
… The explosion took place; hoisting the fort into the air,
annihilating its garrison of 300 men, and leaving in its stead
a gigantic hollow or crater of loose earth, 150 feet long by
some 60 wide and 25 to 30 deep. Instantly, our guns opened all
along the front; and the astounded enemy may well have
supposed them the thunders of doom. But it was indispensable
to success that a column of assault should rush forward
instantly and resolutely, so as to clear the chasm and gain
the crest before the foe should recover from his surprise;
and, on this vital point failure had already been secured. The
9th corps, as then constituted, was not that from which any
commanding general would have selected a storming party; yet
because it was Burnside's mine, his corps was, without
discussion, allowed to furnish the column of assault. His
inspecting officer had reported that, of its four divisions,
that composed of Blacks was fittest for this perilous service;
but Grant, discrediting this, had directed that one of the
three White divisions should be chosen. Thereupon, the leaders
of these divisions were allowed to cast lots to see which of
them should go in—or rather which two of them should stay
out—and the lot fell on the 1st, Brigadier-General Ledlie—and
no man in the army believed this other than the worst choice
of the three. … Several minutes passed—precious, fatal
minutes!—before Ledlie's division, clearing with difficulty
the obstacles in its path—went forward into the chasm, and
there stopped, though the enemy at that point were still
paralyzed and the deciding crest completely at our mercy. Then
parts of Burnside's two remaining White divisions (Potter's
and Wilcox's) followed; but once in the crater, Ledlie's men
barred the way to a farther advance, and all huddled together,
losing their formation and becoming mixed up; General Potter
finally extricating himself, and charging toward the crest;
but with so slender a following that he was soon obliged to
fall back. Two hours were thus shamefully squandered, while
the Rebels recovering their self-possession, were planting
batteries on either side, and mustering their infantry in an
adjacent ravine; and now—when more men in the crater could
only render the confusion more hopeless and magnify the
disaster—Burnside threw in his Black division; which, passing
beyond and rather to the right of the crater, charged toward
the crest, but were met by a fire of artillery and musketry
which speedily hurled them back into the crater, where all
order was lost, all idea of aught beyond personal safety
abandoned, while the enemy's shells and balls poured into it
like hail, rendering it an arena of unresisted slaughter. … A
first Rebel assault on our unfortunates was repulsed in sheer
desperation; and thousands of course took the risk of darting
out of the death-trap and racing at top speed to our lines;
but our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,400;
while that of the enemy, including 300 blown up in the fort,
was barely 1,000."

_H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, pages 590-591._

ALSO IN:
_W. H. Powell and others,
The Battle of the Petersburg Crater
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4)._

_A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the 9th Army Corps,
part 4, chapter 5._

_A. A. Humphreys,
The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865,
chapter 9._

_Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War,
38th Congress, 2d Session: volume 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Virginia).
The Siege of Petersburg: Fighting for the Weldon Road.
Battle of Reams's Station.
The Dutch Gap Canal.

"Taking advantage of the absence of many of Lee's troops from
Petersburg, Grant made a vigorous movement for securing
possession of the Weldon road, not more than three miles from
the left flank of his lines on the Jerusalem plank road. This
movement was made by Warren, with the Fifth Corps, on the
morning of the 18th of August, and at noon he reached the
coveted railway without opposition, where he left Griffin to
hold the point seized, while with the divisions of Ayres and
Crawford he moved toward Petersburg. He had marched but a
short distance when a division of Confederates suddenly and
heavily fell upon his flank. … Warren held the ground he had
gained at a cost of 1,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners."
The next day (August 19), Lee sent Hill with a heavy force to
drive Warren from the road, and the attempt, desperately made,
was nearly successful, but not quite. Two days later it was
repeated, and the Confederates were repulsed with a loss of
1,200 men. "In his entire movement for the possession of the
road Warren lost, in killed, wounded and missing, 4,450 men.
He now rendered his position almost impregnable, and General
Lee was compelled to see one of his most important lines of
communication wrested from him. On the day of Warren's Victory
[August 21], Hancock, who … had been called from the north
bank of the James [where an unsuccessful demonstration towards
Richmond had been made from Deep Bottom], and who had moved
with part of his corps rapidly toward the Weldon road, in the
rear of Warren, struck that highway north of Reams's Station,
and destroyed the track to that point and some miles south of
it. He formed an intrenched camp at Reams's," and was attacked
there on the 25th by Hill with such determination that he was
forced back to a rear line, "where the troops had been
rallied, and when night fell Hancock withdrew from Reams's
Station. He had lost in the fight 2,400 of his 8,000 men, and
five guns; 1,700 of the men were made prisoners. Hill's loss
was but little less, and he, too, withdrew from Reams's. But
this disaster did not loosen Warren's hold upon the Weldon
road. … For about a month after the battle of Reams's Station
there was comparative quiet along the lines of the opposing
armies. … A strong party of colored soldiers had been set to
work by General Butler on the north side of the James, under
cover of a battery on that side mounting 100-pounder Parrott
guns, in digging a canal across the narrow isthmus of a
peninsula formed by a sharp bend in the river, called Farrar's
Island.
{3537}
By this canal it was intended to secure a nearer base of
operations against Richmond, and afford a passage for the
National war vessels, by which they might flank several
important works of the Confederates." The Dutch Gap Canal, as
it was called, did not prove successful, the necessary depth
of water never being secured during the war, though the canal
has been brought into use since.

_B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 3, chapter 13._

ALSO IN:
_P. S. Michie,
Dutch Gap Canal
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 575)._

_O. B. Willcox,
Actions on the Weldon Railroad
(Battles and Leaders, volume 4, page 568)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August: Alabama).
The Battle of Mobile Bay.
Capture of Confederate forts and fleet.

"After the capitulation of Vicksburg the vessels of the
so-called Gulf Squadron which had been cruising on the lower
Mississippi and its tributaries were in part joined to the
Upper Squadron, under the command of Admiral Porter. The
remainder were recalled to their duties on the outside
blockade. Admiral Farragut was now free to turn his whole
attention to the coast of the Gulf, whither he returned in
January, 1864, after a well-earned rest at the North. Mobile
was now the principal port in the possession of the
Confederates in this quarter, and earnestly did the Admiral
desire to attack and reduce the forts at the entrance of the
bay. But troops were required to invest the forts after the
fleet had passed them, and at this moment it seemed that there
were no troops to be spared. It was also much to be desired
that at least a few monitors should be added to the fleet, but
neither were these as yet available. So the time wore on;
winter passed into spring and spring into summer, but still
the attack was not made. This delay was of incalculable
advantage to the enemy, enabling him to complete his
preparations. The Confederate force afloat in Mobile Bay was
commanded by Admiral Franklin Buchanan. … This force consisted
of only four vessels, but they nevertheless made an important
addition to the defences of the place. Three of them were only
paddle-wheel gun-boats … while the fourth was the iron-clad
ram Tennessee … the most formidable vessel that the
Confederates had ever built. … The City of Mobile lies at the
head of a long bay, which is about 20 miles wide at its lower
end. The greater portion of the bay is very shallow, too
shallow even for vessels of moderate draft. The entrance lies
between a long sandspit … and a shoal. … The ship-channel
between the shoals, five miles in length, is perhaps half a
mile wide at its narrowest point. Two forts guarded the
passage,—on the right hand Fort Morgan, on Mobile Point, and
on the left Fort Gaines, on Dauphin Island. … In addition to
the land and naval defences, additional protection had been
given by obstructions in the water. A line of piles ran out
from Fort Gaines, which was continued nearly across the main
ship-channel by a triple line of torpedoes. The eastern end of
the row of torpedoes was marked by a red buoy, and between the
buoy and Fort Morgan the channel had been left open for
blockade runners. The open space, only 100 yards wide, lay
directly under the guns of the fort, and it was through this
narrow passage that Admiral Farragut intended to carry his
fleet. The ships were gradually assembled toward the latter
part of July. The Admiral's plan of action was simple, but in
the highest degree effective. His fleet consisted of four
monitors and fourteen wooden vessels, seven of the latter
large and seven small. The wooden vessels were arranged in
pairs, as at Port Hudson, each of the larger vessels having a
smaller one lashed to her port side, so that if one was
disabled the engines of the other would carry both past the
forts. The four monitors were placed in a flanking column
inshore, between the fleet and Fort Morgan. … At six o'clock
on the morning of the 5th of August the fleet started with the
flood tide. The Admiral took up his position in the port main
rigging of the Hartford, so that he might have a good post of
observation. [According to accounts given by officers who were
on board the Hartford, Admiral Farragut climbed the rigging,
after the battle began, in order to get above the thickest of
the smoke, and Captain Drayton sent a man to lash him where he
stood, so that, if wounded, he might not fall to the deck]. …
Above the fort, and just beyond the obstructions, lay the
Confederate ram Tennessee and her three attendant gunboats. …
Soon after half-past six the Tecumseh [the leading monitor]
fired the first two shots at Fort Morgan. For half an hour
after this, the ships advanced in silence. Then the fort
opened on the Brooklyn, and presently the whole line of
vessels was hotly engaged. Their concentrated fire kept down
that of the enemy, and all seemed at this time to be going
well with the fleet. The Tecumseh, though all the while
advancing, was now silent, reserving her fire for the
Tennessee, which lay beyond the obstructions. Captain Craven
saw the red buoy, but it seemed so close to the beach that he
thought there must have been a mistake in his orders; and
altering his course, he headed straight for the Tennessee,
passing to the westward of the buoy right over the line of
torpedoes. Suddenly there came a frightful explosion; the huge
mass of iron gave a lurch first to one side, then to the
other; her bow made one downward plunge, her screw was seen
for a moment revolving high in air, and she sank to the bottom
of the channel. Of 120 men on board only 21 were saved. … From
the Brooklyn, leading the main column, something was now
descried in the water ahead which resembled torpedo-buoys, and
the sloop, with the Octorara lashed to her side, suddenly
stopped, and in a moment they were backing down on the vessels
astern of them. The bows of the two ships turned, falling off
towards the fort, so that they blocked up the channel. The
Hartford, the Admiral's flag-ship, which was next astern, also
stopped to prevent a collision, but she was drifting fast with
the Metacomet toward the two vessels ahead, and the Richmond
and Port Royal were close upon them, followed by the others.
At that moment it seemed as if nothing could save the vessels
of the fleet from being thrown into hopeless confusion, massed
together as they were directly under the guns of the fort. It
was in that moment, at the crisis of the battle, that the calm
and dauntless spirit of the Admiral rose to its greatest
height. … 'Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!'
came the command, in clear, ringing tones from the Admiral's
place in the rigging.
{3538}
In a moment the Hartford had turned, and dashing with the
Metacomet past the Brooklyn, rushed straight over the barrier.
Snap, snap, went the primers of the torpedoes under the bottom
of the ship,—the officers and men could hear them,—but no
explosion followed, and the Hartford passed safely into the
waters above. Meanwhile the four ships lay entangled under
Fort Morgan. A collision seemed inevitable, but Captain
Jenkins of the Richmond, an officer of cool head and splendid
courage, backed away from the others, and began a furious
cannonade on the fort with his whole broadside, driving the
enemy out of the water-batteries. The Brooklyn was by this
means able to recover, and presently she steamed ahead,
followed by the Richmond and the rest of the fleet. … No
sooner was the battle with the fort over than a new battle
began with the Tennessee. The moment that the ships had fairly
entered the bay, the Confederate ram … came charging down the
whole line, taking each vessel in turn," but doing no serious
injury to any. On the arrival of the monitors, which had
lagged behind, "the Tennessee took refuge under the guns of
the fort, and the fleet rejoined the Hartford, now four miles
up the bay." Meantime the Hartford and the Metacomet had
disposed of two of the Confederate gunboats: the Selma, which
surrendered, and the Gaines, which had been run ashore and set
on fire. The third, the Morgan, took shelter, with the
Tennessee, near the fort. "The Hartford had by this time come
to anchor, and her crew went to breakfast. The other ships
gradually joined her. But the battle was not yet over. It was
now a little before nine o'clock, and suddenly the Tennessee
was reported approaching." In the battle which ensued, the
stout iron-clad was rammed repeatedly by the Monongahela, the
Lackawanna, the Hartford and the Ossipee, and pounded by the
terrible guns of the monitor Chickasaw, until, with her
commander wounded, her tiller-chains and smoke stack gone, her
port shutters jammed, and her armor starting from the frame,
she raised the white flag. "A few days later the forts
surrendered, and Mobile, as a Confederate port, ceased to
exist. The fall of the city did not come about until some time
afterward; indeed no immediate attempt was made upon it, for
the capture of the forts and the occupation of Mobile Bay
served every purpose of the Federal Government."

_J. R. Soley,
The Sailor Boys of '61,
chapter 13._

"This great victory cost the Union fleet 335 men. … The losses
in the rebel fleet were 10 killed and 16 wounded—confined to
the Tennessee and Selma—and 280 prisoners taken. The loss in
the forts is unknown."

_Loyal Farragut,
Life of David Glasgow Farragut,
chapter 27._

ALSO IN:
_J. O. Kinney and J. D. Johnston;
Farragut at Mobile Bay,
and
The Ram Tennessee at Mobile Bay,
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_A. T. Mahan,
The Gulf and Inland Waters
(The Navy in the Civil War, volume 3),
chapter 8._

_A. T. Mahan,
Admiral Farragut,
chapter 10._

_Official Records,
Series 1, volume 39._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (August-October: Virginia).
Sheridan's Victories in the Shenandoah Valley.
Winchester.
Fisher's Hill.
Cedar Creek.
The famous Ride.