Chapter 3: , page 89 (28)

"The thirty years' war made Germany the centre-point of
European politics. … No one at its commencement could have
foreseen the duration and extent. But the train of war was
everywhere laid, and required only the match to set it going;
more than one war was joined to it, and swallowed up in it;
and the melancholy truth, that war feeds itself, was never
more clearly displayed. … Though the war, which first broke
out in Bohemia, concerned only the house of Austria, yet by
its originating in religious disputes, by its peculiar
character as a religious war, and by the measures adopted both
by the insurgents and the emperor, it acquired such an extent,
that even the quelling of the insurrection was insufficient to
put a stop to it. … Though the Bohemian war was apparently
terminated, yet the flame had communicated to Germany and
Hungary, and new fuel was added by the act of proscription
promulgated against the elector Frederic and his adherents.
From this the war derived that revolutionary character, which
was henceforward peculiar to it; it was a step that could not
but lead to further results, for the question of the relations
between the emperor and his states, was in a fair way of being
practically considered. New and bolder projects were also
formed in Vienna and Madrid, where it was resolved to renew
the war with the Netherlands. Under the present circumstances,
the suppression of the Protestant religion and the overthrow
of German and Dutch liberty appeared inseparable; while the
success of the imperial arms, supported as they were by the
league and the co-operation of the Spaniards, gave just
grounds for hope. … By the carrying of the war into Lower
Saxony, the principal scat of the Protestant religion in
Germany (the states of which had appointed Christian IV. of
Denmark, as duke of Holstein, head of their confederacy), the
northern states had already, though without any beneficial
result, been involved in the strife, and the Danish war had
broken out. But the elevation of Albert of Wallenstein to the
dignity of duke of Friedland and imperial general over the
army raised by himself, was of considerably more importance,
as it affected the whole course and character of the war. From
this time the war was completely and truly revolutionary. The
peculiar situation of the general, the manner of the formation
as well as the maintenance of his army, could not fail to make
it such. … The distinguished success of the imperial arms in
the north of Germany unveiled the daring schemes of
Wallenstein. He did not come forward as conqueror alone, but,
by the investiture of Mecklenburg as a state of the empire, as
a ruling prince. … But the elevation and conduct of this
novus homo, exasperated and annoyed the Catholic no less than
the Protestant states, especially the league and its chief;
all implored peace, and Wallenstein's discharge. Thus, at the
diet of the electors at Augsburg, the emperor was reduced to
the alternative of resigning him or his allies: He chose the
former. Wallenstein was dismissed, the majority of his army
disbanded, and Tilly nominated commander-in-chief of the
forces of the emperor and the league. … On the side of the
emperor sufficient care was taken to prolong the war. The
refusal to restore the unfortunate Frederic, and even the sale
of his upper Palatine to Bavaria, must with justice have
excited the apprehensions of the other princes. But when the
Jesuits finally succeeded, not only in extorting the edict of
restitution, but also in causing it to be enforced in the most
odious manner, the Catholic states themselves saw with regret
that peace could no longer exist. … The greater the success
that attended the house of Austria, the more actively foreign
policy laboured to counteract it. England had taken an
interest in the fate of Frederic V. from the first, though
this interest was evinced by little beyond fruitless
negotiations. Denmark became engaged in the quarrel mostly
through the influence of this power and Holland. Richelieu,
from the time he became prime minister of France, had exerted
himself in opposing Austria and Spain. He found employment for
Spain in the contests respecting Veltelin, and for Austria
soon after, by the war of Mantua. Willingly would he have
detached the German league from the interest of the emperor;
and though he failed in this, he procured the fall of
Wallenstein. … Much more important, however, was Richelieu's
influence on the war, by the essential share he had in gaining
Gustavus Adolphus' active participation in it. … The
nineteen years of his [Gustavus Adolphus'] reign which had
already elapsed, together with the Polish war, which lasted
nearly that time, had taught the world but little of the real
worth of this great and talented hero. The decisive
superiority of Protestantism in Germany, under his guidance,
soon created a more just knowledge, and at the same time
showed the advantages which must result to a victorious
supporter of that cause. … The battle at Leipzig was
decisive for Gustavus Adolphus and his party, almost beyond
expectation. The league fell asunder; and in a short time he
was master of the countries from the Baltic to Bavaria, and
from the Rhine to Bohemia. … But the misfortunes and death
of Tilly brought Wallenstein again on the stage as absolute
commander-in-chief, bent on plans not a whit less extensive
than those he had before formed. No period of the war gave
promise of such great and rapid successes or reverses as the
present, for both leaders were determined to effect them; but
the victory of Lutzen, while it cost Gustavus his life,
prepared the fall of Wallenstein.
{209}
… Though the fall of Gustavus Adolphus frustrated his own
private views, it did not those of his party. … The school
of Gustavus produced a number of men, great in the cabinet and
in the field; yet it was hard, even for an Oxensteirn, to
preserve the importance of Sweden unimpaired; and it was but
partially done by the alliance of· Heilbronn. … If the
forces of Sweden overrun almost every part of Germany in the
following months, under the guidance of the pupils of the
king, Bernard of Weimar and Gustavus Horn, we must apparently
attribute it to Wallenstein's intentional inactivity in
Bohemia. The distrust of him increased in Vienna the more, as
he took but little trouble to diminish it; and though his fall
was not sufficient to atone for treachery, if proved, it was
for his equivocal character and imprudence. His death probably
saved Germany from a catastrophe. … A great change took
place upon the death of Wallenstein; as a prince of the blood,
Ferdinand, king of Hungary and Bohemia, obtained the command.
Thus an end was put to plans of revolutions from this quarter.
But in the same year the battle of Nordlingen gave to the
imperial arms a sudden preponderance, such as it had never
before acquired. The separate peace of Saxony with the emperor
at Prague, and soon after an alliance, were its consequences;
Sweden driven back to Pomerania, seemed unable of herself,
during the two following years, to maintain her ground in
Germany: the victory of Wittstock turned the scale in her
favour. … The war was prolonged and greatly extended by the
active share taken in it by France: first against Spain, and
soon against Austria. … The German war, after the treaty
with Bernhard of Weimar, was mainly carried on by France, by
the arming of Germans against Germans. But the pupil of
Gustavus Adolphus preferred to fight for himself rather than
others, and his early death was almost as much coveted by
France as by Austria. The success of the Swedish arms revived
under Baner. … At the general diet, which was at last
convened, the emperor yielded to a general amnesty, or at
least what was so designated. But when at the meeting of the
ambassadors of the leading powers at Hamburg, the
preliminaries were signed, and the time and place of the
congress of peace fixed, it was deferred after Richelieu's
death, (who was succeeded by Mazarin), by the war, which both
parties continued, in the hope of securing better conditions
by victory. A new war broke out in the north between Sweden
and Denmark, and when at last the congress of peace was opened
at Munster and Osnabruck, the negotiations dragged on for
three years. … The German peace was negotiated at Munster
between the emperor and France, and at Osnabruck between the
emperor and Sweden; but both treaties, according to express
agreement, Oct. 24, 1648, were to be considered as one, under
the title of the Westphalian."

_A. H. L. Heeren,
A Manual of the History of the Political System
of Europe and its Colonies,
pages 91-99._

"The Peace of Westphalia has met manifold hostile comments,
not only in earlier, but also in later, times. German patriots
complained that by it the unity of the Empire was rent; and
indeed the connection of the States, which even before was
loose, was relaxed to the extreme. This was, however, an evil
which could not be avoided, and it had to be accepted in order
to prevent the French and Swedes from using their opportunity
for the further enslavement of the land. … The religious
parties also made objections to the peace. The strict
Catholics condemned it as a work of inexcusable and arbitrary
injustice. … The dissatisfaction of the Protestants was
chiefly with the recognition of the Ecclesiastical
Reservation. They complained also that their brethren in the
faith were not allowed the free exercise of their religion in
Austria. Their hostility was limited to theoretical
discussions, which soon ceased when Louis XIV. took advantage
of the preponderance which he had won to make outrageous
assaults upon Germany, and even the Protestants were compelled
to acknowledge the Emperor as the real defender of German
independence."

_A. Gindely,
History of the Thirty Years' War,
volume 2, chapter 10, section 4._

See, also,
GERMANY: A. D. 1618-1620, to 1648;
FRANCE: A. D. 1624-1626; and
ITALY: A. D. 1627-1631.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1621.
Formal establishment of the right of primogeniture in the
Archducal Family.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1636-1637.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1624-1626.
Hostile combinations of Richelieu.
The Valtelline war in Northern Italy.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1624-1626.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1627-1631.
War with France over the succession to the Duchy of Mantua.

See ITALY: A. D. 1627-1631.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1660-1664.
Renewed war with the Turks.
Help from France.
Battle and victory of St. Gothard.
Twenty years truce.

See HUNGARY: A. D. 1660-1664.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1668-1683.
Increased oppression and religious persecution in Hungary.
Revolt of Tekeli.
The Turks again called in.
Mustapha's great invasion and siege of Vienna.
Deliverance of the city by John Sobieski.

See HUNGARY: A. D. 1668-1683.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1672-1714.
The wars with Louis XIV. of France: War of the Grand Alliance.
Peace of Ryswick.

"The leading principle of the reign [in France] of Louis XIV.
… is the principle of war with the dynasty of Charles
V.—the elder branch of which reigned in Spain, while the
descendants of the younger branch occupied the imperial throne
of Germany. … At the death of Mazarin, or to speak more
correctly, immediately after the death of Philip IV., … the
early ambition of Louis XIV. sought to prevent the junior
branch of the Austrian dynasty from succeeding to the
inheritance of the elder branch. He had no desire to see
reconstituted under the imperial sceptre of Germany the
monarchy which Charles V. had at one time wished to transmit
entire to his son, but which, worn out and weakened, he
subsequently allowed without regret to be divided between his
son and his brother. Before making war upon Austria, Louis
XIV. cast his eyes upon a portion of the territory belonging
to Spain, and the expedition against Holland, begun in 1672
[see NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1672-1674, and 1674-1678],
for the purpose of absorbing the Spanish provinces by
overwhelming them, opened the series of his vast enterprises.
His first great war was, historically speaking, his first
great fault. He failed in his object: for at the end of six
campaigns, during which the French armies obtained great and
deserved success, Holland remained unconquered.
{210}
Thus was Europe warned that the lust of conquest of a young
monarch, who did not himself possess military genius, but who
found in his generals the resources and ability in which he
was himself deficient, would soon threaten her independence.
Condé and Turenne, after having been rebellious subjects under
the Regency, were about to become the first and the most
illustrious lieutenants of Louis XIV. Europe, however, though
warned, was not immediately ready to defend herself. It was
from Austria, more directly exposed to the dangers of the
great war now commencing, that the first systematic resistance
ought to have come. But Austria was not prepared to play such
a part; and the Emperor Leopold possessed neither the genius
nor the wish for it. He was, in fact, nothing more than the
nominal head of Germany. … Such was the state of affairs in
Europe when William of Orange first made his appearance on the
stage. … The old question of supremacy, which Louis XIV.
wished to fight out as a duel with the House of Austria, was
now about to change its aspect, and, owing to the presence of
an unexpected genius, to bring into the quarrel other powers
besides the two original competitors. The foe of Louis XIV.
ought by rights to have been born on the banks of the Danube,
and not on the shores of the North Sea. In fact, it was
Austria that at that moment most needed a man of genius,
either on the throne or at the head of affairs. The events of
the century would, in this case, doubtless have followed a
different course: the war would have been less general, and
the maritime nations would not have been involved in it to the
same degree. … The treaties of peace would have been signed
in some small place in France or Germany, and not in two towns
and a village in Holland, such as Nimeguen, Ryswick, and
Utrecht. … William of Orange found himself in a position
soon to form the Triple Alliance which the very policy of
Louis XIV. suggested. For France to attack Holland, when her
object was eventually to reach Austria, and keep her out of
the Spanish succession, was to make enemies at one and the
same time of Spain, of Austria, and of Holland. But if it
afterwards required considerable efforts on the part of
William of Orange to maintain this alliance, it demanded still
more energy to extend it. It formed part of the Stadtholder's
ulterior plans to combine the union between himself and the
two branches of the Austrian family, with the old
Anglo-Swedish Triple Alliance, which had just been dissolved
under the strong pressure brought to bear on it by Louis XIV.
… Louis XIV., whose finances were exhausted, was very soon
anxious to make peace, even on the morrow of his most
brilliant victories; whilst William of Orange, beaten and
retreating, ardently desired the continuance of the war. …
The Peace of Nimeguen was at last signed, and by it were
secured to Louis XIV. Franche-Comté, and some important places
in the Spanish Low Countries on his northern frontier [see
NIMEGUEN, PEACE OF]. This was the culminating point of the
reign of Louis XIV. Although the coalition had prevented him
from attaining the full object of his designs against the
House of Austria, which had been to absorb by conquest so much
of the territory belonging to Spain as would secure him
against the effect of a will preserving the whole inheritance
intact in the family, yet his armies had been constantly
successful, and many of his opponents were evidently tired of
the struggle. … Some years passed thus, with the appearance
of calm. Europe was conquered; and when peace was broken,
because, as was said, the Treaty of Nimeguen was not duly
executed, the events of the war were for some time neither
brilliant or important, for several campaigns began and ended
without any considerable result. … At length Louis XIV.
entered on the second half of his reign, which differed widely
from the first. … During this second period of more than
thirty years, which begins after the Treaty of Nimeguen and
lasts till the Peace of Utrecht, events succeed each other in
complete logical sequence, so that the reign presents itself
as one continuous whole, with a regular movement of ascension
and decline. … The leading principle of the reign remained
the same; it was always the desire to weaken the House of
Austria, or to secure an advantageous partition of the Spanish
succession. But the Emperor of Germany was protected by the
coalition, and the King of Spain, whose death was considered
imminent, would not make up his mind to die. … During the
first League, when the Prince of Orange was contending against
Louis XIV. with the co-operation of the Emperor of Germany, of
the King of Spain, and of the Electors on the Rhine, the
religious element played only a secondary part in the war. But
we shall see this element make its presence more manifest. …
Thus the influence of Protestant England made itself more and
more felt in the affairs of Europe, in proportion as the
government of the Stuarts, from its violence, its
unpopularity, and from the opposition offered to it, was
approaching its end. … The second coalition was neither more
united nor more firm than the first had been: but, after the
expulsion of the Stuarts, the germs of dissolution no longer
threatened the same dangers. … The British nation now made
itself felt in the balance of Europe, and William of Orange
was for the first time in his life successful in war at the
head of his English troops. … This was the most brilliant
epoch of the life of William III. … He was now at the height
of his glory, after a period of twenty years from his start in
life, and his destiny was accomplished; so that until the
Treaty of Ryswick, which in 1698 put an end to his hostilities
with France, and brought about his recognition as King of
England by Louis XIV., not much more was left for him to gain;
and he had the skill to lose nothing. … The negotiations for
the Treaty of Ryswick were conducted with less ability and
boldness, and concluded on less advantageous terms, than the
Truce of Ratisbon or the Peace of Nimeguen. Nevertheless, this
treaty, which secured to Louis the possession of Strasbourg,
might, particularly as age was now creeping on him, have
closed his military career without disgrace, if the eternal
question, for the solution of which he had made so many
sacrifices, and which had always held the foremost place in
his thoughts, had not remained as unsettled and as full of
difficulty as on the day when he had mounted the throne.
{211}
Charles II. of Spain was not dead, and the question of the
Spanish succession, which had so actively employed the armies
of Louis XIV., and taxed his diplomacy, was as undecided as at
the beginning of his reign. Louis XIV. saw two alternatives
before him: a partition of the succession between the Emperor
and himself (a solution proposed thirty years before as a
means to avoid war), or else a will in favour of France,
followed of course by a recommencement of general hostilities.
… Louis XIV. proposed in succession two schemes, not, as
thirty years before, to the Emperor, but to the King of
England, whose power and whose genius rendered him the arbiter
of all the great affairs of Europe. … In the first of the
treaties of partition, Spain and the Low Countries were to be
given to the Prince of Bavaria; in the second, to the Archduke
Charles. In both, France obtained Naples and Sicily for the
Dauphin. … Both these arrangements … suited both France
and England as a pacific solution of the question. … But
events, as we know, deranged all these calculations, and
Charles II., who, by continuing to live, had disappointed so
much impatient expectation, by his last will provoked a
general war, to be carried on against France by the union of
England with the Empire and with Holland—a union which was
much strengthened under the new dynasty, and which afterwards
embraced the northern states of Germany. … William III. died
at the age of fifty-two, on the 9th of March, 1702, at the
beginning of the War of Succession. After him, the part he was
to have played was divided. Prince Eugene, Marlborough, and
Heinsius (the Grand Pensionary) had the conduct of political
and especially of military affairs, and acted in concert. The
disastrous consequences to France of that war, in which
William had no part, are notorious. The battles of Blenheim,
of Ramilies, and of Oudenarde brought the allied armies on the
soil of France, and placed Louis XIV. on the verge of ruin."

_J. Van Praet,
Essays on the Political History of the
15th, 16th, and 17th Centuries,
pages 390-414 and 441-455._

ALSO IN:
_H. Martin,
History of France: Age of Louis XIV:,
volume 2, chapters 2 and 4-6._

_T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 5, chapters 5-6 (volume 3)._

See, also,
GERMANY: A. D. 1686; and
FRANCE: A. D. 1689-1690 to 1697.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1683-1687.
Merciless suppression of the Hungarian revolt.
The crown of Hungary made hereditary in the House of Hapsburg.

See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1687.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1683-1699.
Expulsion of the Turks from Hungary.
The Peace of Carlowitz.

See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1699.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1699-1711.
Suppression of the Revolt under Rakoczy in Hungary.

See HUNGARY: A. D. 1699-1718.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1700.
Interest of the Imperial House in the question of the Spanish
Succession.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1698-1700.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1701-1713.
The War of the Spanish Succession.

See
GERMANY: A. D. 1702, to 1704;
ITALY: A. D. 1701-1713;
SPAIN: A. D. 1702, to 1707-1710, and
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1702-1704, to 1710-1712.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1711.
The War of the Spanish Succession.
Its Circumstances changed.

"The death of the Emperor Joseph I., who expired April 17,
1711, at the age of thirty-two, changed the whole character of
the War of the Spanish Succession. As Joseph left no male
heirs, the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria
devolved to his brother, the Archduke Charles; and though that
prince had not been elected King of the Romans, and had
therefore to become a candidate for the imperial crown, yet
there could be little doubt that he would attain that dignity.
Hence, if Charles should also become sovereign of Spain and
the Indies, the vast empire of Charles V. would be again
united in one person; and that very evil of an almost
universal monarchy would be established, the prevention of
which had been the chief cause for taking up arms against
Philip V. … After an interregnum of half a year, during
which the affairs of the Empire had been conducted by the
Elector Palatine and the Elector of Saxony, as imperial vicars
for South and North Germany, the Archduke Charles was
unanimously named Emperor by the Electoral College (Oct.
12th). … Charles … received the imperial crown at
Frankfort, December 22d, with the title of Charles VI."

_T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 5, chapter 6 (volume 3)._

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1713-1714.
Ending of the War of the Spanish Succession.
The Peace of Utrecht and the Treaty of Rastadt.
Acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands, Naples and Milan.

See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1713-1719.
Continued differences with Spain.
The Triple Alliance.
The Quadruple Alliance.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1714.
The Desertion of the Catalans.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1714.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1714-1718.
Recovery of Belgrade and final expulsion of the Turks from
Hungary.

See HUNGARY: A. D. 1699-1718.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1718-1738.
The question of the Succession.
The Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VI., and its guarantee by
the Powers.

"On the death [A. D. 1711] of Joseph, the hopes of the house
of Austria and the future destiny of Germany rested on Charles
[then, as titular king of Spain, Charles III., ineffectually
contesting the Spanish throne with the Bourbon heir, Philip V.
afterwards, as Emperor, Charles VI.] who was the only
surviving male of his illustrious family. By that event the
houses of Austria, Germany and Europe were placed in a new and
critical situation. From a principle of mistaken policy the
succession to the hereditary dominions had never been
established according to an invariable rule; for it was not
clearly ascertained whether males of the collateral branches
should be preferred to females in lineal descent, an
uncertainty which had frequently occasioned many vehement
disputes. To obviate this evil, as well as to prevent future
disputes, Leopold [father of Joseph and Charles] had arranged
the order of succession: to Joseph he assigned Hungary and
Bohemia, and the other hereditary dominions; and to Charles
the crown of Spain, and all the territories which belonged to
the Spanish inheritance. Should Joseph die without issue male,
the whole succession was to descend to Charles, and in case of
his death, under similar circumstances, the Austrian dominions
were to devolve on the daughters of Joseph in preference to
those of Charles. This family compact was signed by the two
brothers in the presence of Leopold. Joseph died without male
issue; but left two daughters." He was succeeded by Charles in
accordance with the compact.
{212}
"On the 2nd of August, 1718, soon after the signature of the
Quadruple Alliance, Charles promulgated a new law of
succession for the inheritance of the house of Austria, under
the name of the Pragmatic Sanction. According to the family
compact formed by Leopold, and confirmed by Joseph and
Charles, the succession was entailed on the daughters of
Joseph in preference to the daughters of Charles, should they
both die without issue male. Charles, however, had scarcely
ascended the throne, though at that time without children,
than he reversed this compact, and settled the right of
succession, in default of his male issue, first on his
daughters, then on the daughters of Joseph, and afterwards on
the queen of Portugal and the other daughters of Leopold.
Since the promulgation of that decree, the Empress had borne a
son who died in his infancy, and three daughters, Maria
Theresa, Maria Anne and Maria Amelia. With a view to insure
the succession of these daughters, and to obviate the dangers
which might arise from the claims of the Josephine
archduchesses, he published the Pragmatic Sanction, and
compelled his nieces to renounce their pretensions on their
marriages with the electors of Saxony and Bavaria. Aware,
however, that the strongest renunciations are disregarded, he
obtained from the different states of his extensive dominions
the acknowledgement of the Pragmatic Sanction, and made it the
great object of his reign, to which he sacrificed every other
consideration, to procure the guaranty of the European
powers." This guaranty was obtained in treaties with the
several powers, as follows: Spain in 1725; Russia, 1726,
renewed in 1733; Prussia, 1728; England and Holland, 1731;
France, 1738; the Empire, 1732. The inheritance which Charles
thus endeavored to secure to his daughter was vast and
imposing. "He was by election Emperor of Germany, by
hereditary right sovereign of Hungary, Transylvania, Bohemia,
Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, the Tyrol, and the
Brisgau, and he had recently obtained Naples and Sicily, the
Milanese and the Netherlands."

_W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 80, 84-85 (volume 3)._

"The Pragmatic Sanction, though framed to legalize the
accession of Maria Theresa, excludes the present Emperor's
daughters and his grandchild by postponing the succession of
females to that of males in the family of Charles VI."

_J. D. Bourchier,
The Heritage of the Hapsburgs
(Fortnightly Review, March, 1889)._

ALSO IN:
_H. Tuttle,
History of Prussia, 1740-1745,
chapter 2._

_S. A. Dunham,
History of the Germanic Empire,
book 3, chapter 3 (volume 3)._

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1719.
Sardinia ceded to the Duke of Savoy in exchange for Sicily.

See
SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725; and
ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1731.
The second Treaty of Vienna with England and Holland.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1726-1731.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1732-1733.
Interference in the election of the King of Poland.

See POLAND: A. D. 1732-1733.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1733-1735.
The war of the Polish Succession.
Cession of Naples and Sicily to Spain, and Lorraine and Bar to
France.

See
FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735, and
ITALY: A. D. 1715-1735.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1737-1739.
Unfortunate war with the Turks, in alliance with Russia.
Humiliating peace of Belgrade.
Surrender of Belgrade, with Servia, and part of Bosnia.

See RUSSIA: A. D. 1725-1739.

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1740 (October).
Treachery among the Guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction.
The inheritance of Marie Theresa disputed.

"The Emperor Charles VI. … died on the 20th of October,
1740. His daughter Maria Theresa, the heiress of his dominions
with the title of Queen of Hungary, was but twenty-three years
of age, without experience or knowledge of business; and her
husband Francis, the titular Duke of Lorraine and reigning
Grand Duke of Tuscany, deserved the praise of amiable
qualities rather than of commanding talents. Her Ministers
were timorous, irresolute, and useless: 'I saw them in
despair,' writes Mr. Robinson, the British envoy, 'but that
very despair was not capable of rendering them bravely
desperate.' The treasury was exhausted, the army dispersed,
and no General risen to replace Eugene. The succession of
Maria Theresa was, indeed, cheerfully acknowledged by her
subjects, and seemed to be secured amongst foreign powers by
their guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction; but it soon
appeared that such guarantees are mere worthless parchments
where there is strong temptation to break and only a feeble
army to support them. The principal claimant to the succession
was the Elector of Bavaria, who maintained that the will of
the Emperor Ferdinand the First devised the Austrian states to
his daughter, from whom the Elector descended, on failure of
male lineage. It appeared that the original will in the
archives at Vienna referred to the failure not of the male but
of the legitimate issue of his sons; but this document, though
ostentatiously displayed to all the Ministers of state and
foreign ambassadors, was very far from inducing the Elector to
desist from his pretensions. As to the Great Powers—the Court
of France, the old ally of the Bavarian family, and mindful of
its injuries from the House of Austria, was eager to exalt the
first by the depression of the latter. The Bourbons in Spain
followed the direction of the Bourbons in France. The King of
Poland and the Empress of Russia were more friendly in their
expressions than in their designs. An opposite spirit pervaded
England and Holland, where motives of honour and of policy
combined to support the rights of Maria Theresa. In Germany
itself the Elector of Cologne, the Bavarian's brother, warmly
espoused his cause: and 'the remaining Electors,' says
Chesterfield, 'like electors with us, thought it a proper
opportunity of making the most of their votes,—and all at
the expense of the helpless and abandoned House of Austria!'
The first blow, however, came from Prussia, where the King
Frederick William had died a few months before, and been
succeeded by his son Frederick the Second; a Prince surnamed
the Great by poets."

_Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope),
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 23 (volume 3)._

"The elector of Bavaria acted in a prompt, honest, and
consistent manner. He at once lodged a protest against any
disposition of the hereditary estates to the prejudice of his
own rights; insisted on the will of Ferdinand I.; and demanded
the production of the original text. It was promptly produced.
But it was found to convey the succession to the heirs of his
daughter, the ancestress of the elector, not, as he contended,
on the failure of male heirs, but in the absence of more
direct heirs born in wedlock. Maria Theresa could, however,
trace her descent through nearer male heirs, and had,
therefore, a superior title. Charles Albert was in any event
only one of several claimants. The King of Spain, a Bourbon,
presented himself as the heir of the Hapsburg emperor Charles
V. The King of Sardinia alleged an ancient marriage contract,
from which he derived a right to the duchy of Milan. Even
August of Saxony claimed territory by virtue of an antiquated
title, which, it was pretended, the renunciation of his wife
could not affect. All these were, however, mere vultures
compared to the eagle [Frederick of Prussia] which was soon to
descend upon its prey."

_H. Tuttle,
History of Prussia, 1740-1745,
chapter 2._

{213}

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1740 (October-November).
The War of the Succession.
Conduct of Frederick the Great as explained by himself.

"This Pragmatic Sanction had been guarantied by France,
England, Holland, Sardinia, Saxony, and the Roman empire; nay
by the late King Frederic William [of Prussia] also, on
condition that the court of Vienna would secure to him the
succession of Juliers and Berg. The emperor promised him the
eventual succession, and did not fulfil his engagements; by
which the King of Prussia, his successor, was freed from this
guarantee, to which his father, the late king, had pledged
himself, conditionally. … Frederic I., when he erected
Prussia into a kingdom, had, by that vain grandeur, planted
the scion of ambition in the bosom of his posterity; which,
soon or late, must fructify. The monarchy he had left to his
descendants was, if I may be permitted the expression, a kind
of hermaphrodite, which was rather more an electorate than a
kingdom. Fame was to be acquired by determining the nature of
this being: and this sensation certainly was one of those
which strengthened so many motives, conspiring to engage the
king in grand enterprises. If the acquisition of the dutchy of
Berg had not even met with almost insurmountable impediments,
it was in itself so small that the possession would add little
grandeur to the house of Brandenbourg. These reflections
occasioned the king to turn his views toward the house of
Austria, the succession of which would become matter of
litigation, at the death of the emperor, when the throne of
the Cæsars should be vacant. That event must be favourable to
the distinguished part which the king had to act in Germany,
by the various claims of the houses of Saxony and Bavaria to
these states; by the number of candidates which might canvass
for the Imperial crown; and by the projects of the court of
Versailles, which, on such an occasion, must naturally profit
by the troubles that the death of Charles VI. could not fail
to excite. This accident did not long keep the world in
expectation. The emperor ended his days at the palace La
Favorite, on the 26th [20th] day of October, 1740. The news
arrived at Rheinsberg when the king was ill of a fever. … He
immediately resolved to reclaim the principalities of Silesia;
the rights of his house to which [long dormant, the claim
dating back to a certain covenant of heritage-brotherhood with
the duke of Liegnitz, in 1537, which the emperor of that day
caused to be annulled by the States of Bohemia] were
incontestable: and he prepared, at the same time, to support
these pretensions, if necessary, by arms. This project
accomplished all his political views; it afforded the means of
acquiring reputation, of augmenting the power of the state,
and of terminating what related to the litigious succession of
the dutchy of Berg. …The state of the court of Vienna, after
the death of the emperor, was deplorable. The finances were in
disorder; the army was ruined and discouraged by ill success
in its wars with the Turks; the ministry disunited, and a
youthful unexperienced princess at the head of the government,
who was to defend the succession from all claimants. The
result was that the government could not appear formidable. It
was besides impossible that the king should be destitute of
allies. … The war which he might undertake in Silesia was
the only offensive war that could be favoured by the situation
of his states, for it would be carried on upon his frontiers,
and the Oder would always furnish him with a sure
communication. … Add to these reasons, an army fit to march,
a treasury ready prepared, and, perhaps, the ambition of
acquiring renown. Such were the causes of the war which the
king declared against Maria Theresa of Austria, queen of
Hungary and Bohemia."

_Frederick II. (Frederick the Great),
History of My Own Times:
Posthumous Works (translated by Holcroft),
volume 1, chapters 1-2._

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1740-1741.
The War of the Succession: Faithlessness of the King of Prussia.
The Macaulay verdict.

"From no quarter did the young queen of Hungary receive
stronger assurances of friendship and support than from the
King of Prussia. Yet the King of Prussia, the
'Anti-Machiavel,' had already fully determined to commit the
great crime of violating his plighted faith, of robbing the
ally whom he was bound to defend, and of plunging all Europe
into a long, bloody, and desolating war, and all this for no
end whatever except that he might extend his dominions and see
his name in the gazettes. He determined to assemble a great
army with speed and secrecy, to invade Silesia before Maria
Theresa should be apprized of his design, and to add that rich
province to his kingdom. … Without any declaration of war,
without any demand for reparation, in the very act of pouring
forth compliments and assurances of good will, Frederic
commenced hostilities. Many thousands of his troops were
actually in Silesia before the Queen of Hungary knew that he
had set up any claim to any part of her territories. At length
he sent her a message which could be regarded only as an
insult. If she would but let him have Silesia, he would, he
said, stand by her against any power which should try to
deprive her of her other dominions: as if he was not already
bound to stand by her, or as if his new promise could be of
more value than the old one. It was the depth of winter. The
cold was severe, and the roads deep in mire. But the Prussians
pressed on. Resistance was impossible. The Austrian army was
then neither numerous nor efficient. The small portion of that
army which lay in Silesia was unprepared for hostilities.
Glogau was blockaded; Breslau opened its gates; Ohlau was
evacuated. A few scattered garrisons still held out; but the
whole open country was subjugated: no enemy ventured to
encounter the king in the field; and, before the end of
January, 1741, he returned to receive the congratulations of
his subjects at Berlin.
{214}
Had the Silesian question been merely a question between
Frederic and Maria Theresa it would be impossible to acquit
the Prussian king of gross perfidy. But when we consider the
effects which his policy produced, and could not fail to
produce, on the whole community of civilized nations, we are
compelled to pronounce a condemnation still more severe. …
The selfish rapacity of the king of Prussia gave the signal to
his neighbours. … The evils produced by this wickedness were
felt in lands where the name of Prussia was unknown; and, in
order that he might rob a neighbour whom he had promised to
defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel, and red
men scalped each other by the great lakes of North America.
Silesia had been occupied without a battle; but the Austrian
troops were advancing to the relief of the fortresses which
still held out. In the spring Frederic rejoined his army. He
had seen little of war, and had never commanded any great body
of men in the field. … Frederic's first battle was fought at
Molwitz [April 10, 1741], and never did the career of a great
commander open in a more inauspicious manner. His army was
victorious. Not only, however, did he not establish his title
to the character of an able general, but he was so unfortunate
as to make it doubtful whether he possessed the vulgar courage
of a soldier. The cavalry, which he commanded in person, was
put to flight. Unaccustomed to the tumult and carnage of a
field of battle, he lost his self-possession, and listened too
readily to those who urged him to save himself. His English
gray carried him many miles from the field, while Schwerin,
though wounded in two places, manfully upheld the day. The
skill of the old Field-Marshal and the steadiness of the
Prussian battalions prevailed, and the Austrian army was
driven from the field with the loss of 8,000 men. The news was
carried late at night to a mill in which the king had taken
shelter. It gave him a bitter pang. He was successful; but he
owed his success to dispositions which others had made, and to
the valour of men who had fought while he was flying. So
unpromising was the first appearance of the greatest warrior
of that age."

_Lord Macaulay,
Frederic the Great
(Essays, volume 4)._

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (April-May).
The War of the Succession: French responsibility.
The Carlyle verdict.

"The battle of Mollwitz went off like a signal shot among the
Nations; intimating that they were, one and all, to go
battling. Which they did, with a witness; making a terrible
thing of it, over all the world, for above seven years to
come. … Not that Mollwitz kindled Europe; Europe was already
kindled for some two years past;—especially since the late
Kaiser died, and his Pragmatic Sanction was superadded to the
other troubles afoot. But ever since that image of Jenkins's
Ear had at last blazed up in the slow English brain, like a
fiery constellation or Sign in the Heavens, symbolic of such
injustices and unendurabilities, and had lighted the
Spanish-English War [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1739-1741], Europe was
slowly but pretty surely taking fire. France 'could not see
Spain humbled,' she said: England (in its own dim feeling, and
also in the fact of things), could not do at all without
considerably humbling Spain. France, endlessly interested in
that Spanish-English matter, was already sending out fleets,
firing shots,—almost, or altogether, putting her hand in it.
'In which case, will not, must not, Austria help us?' thought
England,—and was asking, daily, at Vienna … when the late
Kaiser died. … But if not as cause, then as signal, or as
signal and cause together (which it properly was), the Battle
of Mollwitz gave the finishing stroke and set all in motion.
… For directly on the back of Mollwitz, there ensued, first,
an explosion of Diplomatic activity, such as was never seen
before; Excellencies from the four winds taking wing towards
Friedrich; and talking and insinuating, and fencing and
fugling, after their sort, in that Silesian camp of his, the
centre being there. A universal rookery of Diplomatists, whose
loud cackle is now as if gone mad to us; their work wholly
fallen putrescent and avoidable, dead to all creatures. And
secondly, in the train of that, there ensued a universal
European War, the French and the English being chief parties
in it; which abounds in battles and feats of arms, spirited
but delirious, and cannot be got stilled for seven or eight
years to come; and in which Friedrich and his War swim only as
an intermittent Episode henceforth. … The first point to be
noted is, Where did it originate? To which the answer mainly
is … with Monseigneur, the Maréchal de Belleisle
principally; with the ambitious cupidities and baseless
vanities of the French Court and Nation, as represented by
Belleisle. … The English-Spanish War had a basis to stand on
in this Universe. The like had the Prussian-Austrian one; so
all men now admit. If Friedrich had not business there, what
man ever had in an enterprise he ventured on? Friedrich, after
such trial and proof as has seldom been, got his claims on
Schlesien allowed by the Destinies. … Friedrich had business
in this War; and Maria Theresa versus Friedrich had likewise
cause to appear in Court, and do her utmost pleading against
him. But if we ask, What Belleisle or France and Louis XV. had
to do there? the answer is rigorously Nothing. Their own windy
vanities, ambitions, sanctioned not by fact and the Almighty
Powers, but by Phantasm and the babble of Versailles;
transcendent self-conceit, intrinsically insane; pretensions
over their fellow-creatures which were without basis anywhere
in Nature, except in the French brain; it was this that
brought Belleisle and France into a German War. And Belleisle
and France having gone into an Anti-Pragmatic War, the unlucky
George and his England were dragged into a Pragmatic
one,—quitting their own business, on the Spanish Main, and
hurrying to Germany,—in terror as at Doomsday, and zeal to
save the Keystone of Nature there. That is the notable point
in regard to this War: That France is to be called the author
of it, who, alone of all the parties, had no business there
whatever."

_T. Carlyle,
History of Friedrich II.,
book 12, chapter 11 (volume 4)._

See, also, FRANCE: A. D. 1733.

{215}

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (May-June).
Mission of Belleisle.
The thickening of the Plot.

"The defeat of Maria Theresa's only army [at Mollwitz] swept
away all the doubts and scruples of France. The fiery
Belleisle had already set out upon his mission to the various
German courts, armed with powers which were reluctantly
granted by the cardinal [Fleury, the French minister], and
were promptly enlarged by the ambassador to suit his own more
ambitious views of the situation. He travelled in oriental
state. … The almost royal pomp with which he strode into the
presence of princes of the blood, the copious eloquence with
which he pleaded his cause, … were only the outward
decorations of one of the most iniquitous schemes ever devised
by an unscrupulous diplomacy. The scheme, when stripped of all
its details, did not indeed at first appear absolutely
revolting. It proposed simply to secure the election of
Charles Albert of Bavaria as emperor, an honor to which he had
a perfect right to aspire. But it was difficult to obtain the
votes of certain electors without offering them the prospect
of territorial gains, and impossible for Charles Albert to
support the imperial dignity without greater revenues than
those of Bavaria. It was proposed, therefore, that provinces
should be taken from Maria Theresa herself, first to purchase
votes against her own husband, and then to swell the income of
the successful rival candidate. The three episcopal electors
were first visited, and subjected to various forms of
persuasion, bribes, flattery, threats,—until the effects of
the treatment began to appear; the count palatine was devoted
to France; and these four with Bavaria made a majority of one.
But that was too small a margin for Belleisle's aspirations,
or even for the safety of his project. The four remaining
votes belonged to the most powerful of the German states,
Prussia, Hanover, Saxony and Bohemia. … Bohemia, if it voted
at all, would of course vote for the grand-duke Francis
[husband of Maria Theresa]. Saxony and Hanover were already
negotiating with Maria Theresa; and it was well understood
that Austria could have Frederick's support by paying his
price." Austria refused to pay the price, and Frederick signed
a treaty with the king of France at Breslau on the 4th of
June, 1741. "The essence of it was contained in four secret
articles. In these the king of Prussia renounced his claim to
Jülich-Berg in behalf of the house of Sulzbach, and agreed to
give his vote to the elector of Bavaria for emperor. The king
of France engaged to guarantee Prussia in the possession of
Lower Silesia, to send within two months an army to the
support of Bavaria, and to provoke an immediate rupture
between Sweden and Russia."

_H. Tuttle,
History of Prussia, 1740-1745,
chapter 4._

ALSO IN:
_W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 99 (volume 3)._

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (June-September).
Maria Theresa and the Hungarians.

"During these anxious summer months Maria Theresa and the
Austrian court had resided mainly at Presburg, in Hungary.
Here she had been occupied in the solution of domestic as well
as international problems. The Magyars, as a manly and
chivalrous race, had been touched by the perilous situation of
the young queen; but, while ardently protesting their loyalty,
insisted not the less on the recognition of their own
inalienable rights. These had been inadequately observed in
recent years, and in consequence no little disaffection
prevailed in Hungary. The magnates resolved, therefore, as
they had resolved at the beginning of previous reigns, to
demand the restoration of all their rights and privileges. But
it does not appear that they wished to take any ungenerous
advantage of the sex or the necessities of Maria Theresa. They
were argumentative and stubborn, yet not in a bargaining,
mercenary spirit. They accepted in June a qualified compliance
with their demands; and when on the 25th of that month the
queen appeared before the diet to receive the crown of St.
Stephen, and, according to custom, waved the great sword of
the kingdom toward the four points of the compass, toward the
north and the south, the east and the west, challenging all
enemies to dispute her right, the assembly was carried away by
enthusiasm, and it seemed as if an end had forever been put to
constitutional technicalities. Such was, however, not the
case. After the excitement caused by the dramatic coronation
had in a measure subsided, the old contentions revived, as
bitter and vexatious as before. These concerned especially the
manner in which the administration of Hungary should be
adjusted to meet the new state of things. Should the chief
political offices be filled by native Hungarians, as the diet
demanded? Could the co-regency of the grand-duke, which was
ardently desired by the queen, be accepted by the Magyars? For
two months the dispute over these problems raged at Presburg,
until finally Maria Theresa herself found a bold, ingenious,
and patriotic solution. The news of the Franco-Bavarian
alliance and the fall of Passau determined her to throw
herself completely upon the gallantry and devotion of the
Magyars. It had long been the policy of the court of Vienna
not to entrust the Hungarians with arms. … But Maria Theresa
had not been robbed, in spite of her experience with France
and Prussia, of all her faith in human nature. She took the
responsibility of her decision, and the result proved that her
insight was correct. On the 11th of September she summoned the
members of the diet before her, and, seated on the throne,
explained to them the perilous situation of her dominions. The
danger, she said, threatened herself, and all that was dear to
her. Abandoned by all her allies, she took refuge in the
fidelity and the ancient valor of the Hungarians, to whom she
entrusted herself, her children, and her empire. Here she
broke into tears, and covered, her face with her handkerchief.
The diet responded to this appeal by proclaiming the
'insurrection' or the equipment of a large popular force for
the defence of the queen. So great was the enthusiasm that it
nearly swept away even the original aversion of the Hungarians
to the grand-duke Francis, who, to the queen's delight, was
finally, though not without some murmurs, accepted as
co-regent. … This uprising was organized not an hour too
early, for dangers were pressing upon the queen from every
side."

_H. Tuttle,
History of Prussia, 1740-1745,
chapter 4._

ALSO IN:
_Duc de Broglie,
Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa,
chapter 4 (volume 2)._

{216}

AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (August-November).
The French-Bavarian onset.

"France now began to act with energy. In the month of August
[1741] two French armies crossed the Rhine, each about 40, 000
strong. The first marched into Westphalia, and frightened
George II. into concluding a treaty of neutrality for Hanover,
and promising his vote to the Elector of Bavaria. The second
advanced through South Germany on Passau, the frontier city of
Bavaria and Austria. As soon as it arrived on German soil, the
French officers assumed the blue and white cockade of
Bavaria, for it was the cue of France to appear only as an
auxiliary, and the nominal command of her army was vested in
the Elector. From Passau the French and Bavarians passed into
Upper Austria, and on Sept. 11 entered its capital, Linz,
where the Elector assumed the title of Archduke. Five days
later Saxony joined the allies. Sweden had already declared
war on Russia. Spain trumped up an old claim and attacked the
Austrian dominions in Italy. It seemed as if Belleisle's
schemes were about to be crowned with complete success. Had
the allies pushed forward, Vienna must have fallen into their
hands. But the French did not wish to be too victorious, lest
they should make the Elector too powerful, and so independent
of them. Therefore, after six weeks' delay, they turned aside
to the conquest of Bohemia."

_F. W. Longman,
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years War,
chapter 4, section 4._