Chapter IV: , VII (75)

"While the German invasion had thus been rolling from Lorraine
into the flats of Champagne, the shattered right wing of the
army of the Rhine, with reinforcements sent off from Paris,
had been drawn together in the well-known plains made
memorable by the defeat of Attila. By 20 August the first and
fifth French corps marched rapidly from the Upper Moselle to
the Marne, had been joined by the seventh corps from Belfort
and by the twelfth formed in and despatched from Paris; and
this force, numbering perhaps 130,000 men, with from 400 to
500 guns, had been concentrated round the great camp of
Châlons. Macmahon was given the supreme command, and the first
operations of the experienced chief showed that he understood
the present state of affairs, and were in accord with the
rules of strategy. Bazaine, he knew, was in peril near Metz,
and certainly had not attained the Meuse; and he was at the
head of the last army which France could assemble for the
defence of her capital.
{1383}
In these circumstances, impressed perhaps by the grand
memories of the campaign of 1814, he most properly resolved to
fall back towards Paris; but as Bazaine was possibly not far
distant, and a position on the flank of the German advance
might afford a favourable opportunity to strike, he withdrew
northwards on the 21st to Rheims, in the double hope that he
would approach his colleague and threaten the communications
of the advancing enemy. This, we repeat, was following the art
of war, and had Macmahon firmly adhered to his purpose, there
would have been no Sedan and no treaty of Frankfort. Unhappily
the marshal, a hero in the field, was deficient in real
strength of character, and at this critical moment evil
counsels and false information shook, and at last changed, a
resolve that ought to have never faltered. A new
administration had been formed in Paris, and Palikao, the
minister of war, devoted to the Empire, and especially bent on
satisfying the demands of the excited capital, which
passionately insisted on the relief of Bazaine, had conceived
a project by which he hoped that this great object would be
effected and the 'dynasty' be restored in popular opinion. The
army of the Meuse, he argued, was near that stream, round
Verdun; the third army was far away to the south; there was a
considerable interval between the two masses; and the army of
Châlons, then at Rheims, was not far from the Upper Meuse. In
those circumstances it was quite practicable, should Macmahon
rapidly advance to the Meuse, to overpower with his largely
superior force the army of the Meuse before support could be
sent from the distant third army; and the enemy in his path
being swept aside, the marshal could then descend on Metz,
fall with the collected strength of the army of Châlons on the
divided fragments of the investing force, and triumphantly
effect his junction with Bazaine, having routed, perhaps, the
first and second armies before the third could appear on the
scene. The defiles and woods of the Argonne and the Ardennes,
stretching between the French and the German armies, Palikao
insisted, would form a screen to conceal the advance of the
army of Chãlons, and would greatly facilitate the proposed
movement. This project reached Macmahon on 21 August, and may
be pronounced one of the most reckless ever designed by a
desperate gambler in war. … Macmahon at first refused to
listen to what he condemned as a hopeless project; but bad
advisers found their way to him, and his resolution was
already yielding when a calamitous event fixed his shifting
purpose. A despatch from Bazaine, obscure and untrue,
announced that he was on his way northward. Macmahon inferred
that his beleaguered colleague had left Metz and eluded his
foes, and, thinking that he would reach Bazaine before long,
in an evil hour for France and for himself, he consented to
attempt the march to the Meuse."

_W. O'C. Morris,
The Campaign of Sedan
(English Historical Review., April, 1888)._

"It was not until the afternoon of August 23 that MacMahon's
army passed through Rheims. Anxious, and knowing that
everything depended on speed, he addressed some columns as
they toiled onwards, reminding them that French soldiers had
marched thirty miles a day under the sun of Africa. The
difference, however, was great between raids made by a few
light regiments and the advance of a raw unwieldy mass; and
though the marshal endeavoured to hurry them forward, he was
confronted with almost insurmountable obstacles. Scarcely had
the army made a march towards establishing itself at
Bethniville, on the Suippe, when commissariat difficulties
obliged him to re-approach the line of the railway. He made a
movement on his left, and reached Rethel on the 24th, in order
to obtain for his troops several days' subsistence. This
distribution occupied the whole of the 25th. … As the
direction of the French movement could not now be concealed,
at this point MacMahon made arrangements for marching with all
possible rapidity. It may be doubted, however, whether
Napoleon himself, at the head of the grand army could have
made the haste which the marshal designed with his raw and
partly demoralized troops. … His army was altogether unequal
to forced marches, and moved at this critical moment with the
sluggishness inherent in its defective organization.
Encumbered with stragglers, badly pioneered, and checked by
hindrances of every kind, it made hardly ten miles a day; and
it was the 27th of August before its right column, still far
from the Meuse, passed through Vouziers, and the left reached
Le Chêne. … On the 27th it was openly boasted of in Paris
that MacMahon had gained at least forty-eight hours' start of
the Crown Prince, and his coming success was firmly counted on
by the imperialist cabinet, whereas, in reality, the whole
scheme was foiled beforehand by Von Moltke's and General
Blumenthal's prompt combination. … If in fighting, in the
boldness of their cavalry, the activity of their staff, the
cool firing of their infantry, and the skilful tactical use of
their guns, the superiority of the Germans to their
antagonists had been already proved; it only required the
contrast now presented between the movements of the two armies
to show, that in no point had the difference of training and
moral feeling told more in favour of the invaders than in that
of the marching, on which the elder Napoleon so often relied
for his advantage over these very Germans. … Between the
27th and the morning of the 29th, the right column of the
French army had only its outposts at Buzancy, while the left,
though its outposts touched Stenay, was only at Stonne and
Beaumont, both columns spreading a long way backward; in other
words, they were still a march from the Meuse, which they
ought to have passed three days before, and their rearward
divisions were yet distant. The German armies, from the 26th
to the 29th, made astonishing exertions to close on MacMahon
as he crossed towards the Meuse, and success was already
within their grasp. The force of the Crown Prince of Saxony,
in two columns, had reached the Meuse at Dun on the 27th, and
was thus in a position to arrest and retard the vanguard of
the French whenever it attempted to cross the river. Meanwhile
the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, hastening forward by
Varennes and Grand Prè, and to the left by Senuc and Suippe,
had arrived close to the line of march of MacMahon's right
column, and by the evening of the 28th had occupied it about
Vouziers. A step farther, and this immense army would be upon
the positions of the luckless French, who, assailed in flank
and rear by superior numbers, could not fail to be involved in
terrible disaster. … MacMahon [on the 27th], observing that
the enemy so completely surrounded him, felt more than ever
satisfied that it would be impossible to carry out the plan
which had been prescribed to him at Paris; and to save, if
possible, the sole army which France had at her disposal, he
accordingly resolved to turn back in a westerly direction. …
{1384}
The same evening he sent … [a] telegram to the Count
Palikao, at Paris. … In reply to this, the government sent a
telegram to the emperor at eleven o'clock the same night,
telling him that if they abandoned Bazaine there would
certainly be a revolution in Paris, and they would themselves
be attacked by all the enemy's forces. … The emperor admits
that he could unquestionably have set this order aside, but
'he was resolved not to oppose the decision of the regency,
and had resigned himself to submit to the consequences of the
fatality which attached itself to all the resolutions of the
government.' 'As for MacMahon, he again bowed to the decision
intimated to him from Paris, and once more turned towards
Metz. These orders and counter-orders naturally occasioned
further delay, and the French headquarters had reached no
farther than Stonne on the 28th. … On Monday, August 29, De
Failly occupied the country between Beaumont and Stonne, on
the left bank of the Meuse; while the main body of the French
army, under MacMahon in person, had crossed the river, and
were encamped on the right bank at Vaux, between Mouzon and
Carignan, and on the morning of the 30th the emperor
telegraphed to Paris that a brilliant victory might be
expected. MacMahon's position was in a sharp wedge of country
formed by the confluence of the rivers Meuse and Chiers, and
it was his intention to advance towards Montmèdy. The other
part of his army was close to the river on its left bank. …
The battle—or rather series of battles, for the fighting
extended over three days—which was to decide whether or not
he would reach Metz and liberate Bazaine, began in earnest a
little before noon on Tuesday, August 30."

_H. M. Hozier,
The Franco-Prussian War,
volume 1, chapter 13._

"The retreating French were concentrated, or rather massed,
under the walls of Sedan, in a valley commonly called the Sink
of Givonne. The army consisted of twenty-nine brigades,
fifteen divisions, and four corps d'armée, numbering ninety
thousand men. 'It was there,' says Victor Hugo, 'no one could
guess what for, without order, without discipline, a mere
crowd of men, waiting, as it seemed, to be seized by an
immensely powerful hand. It seemed to be under no particular
anxiety. The men who composed it knew, or thought they knew,
that the enemy was far away. Calculating four leagues as a
day's march, they believed the Germans to be at three days'
distance. The commanders, however, towards nightfall, made
some preparations for safety. The whole army formed a sort of
horse-shoe, its point turning towards Sedan. This disposition
proved that its chiefs believed themselves in safety. The
valley was one of those which the Emperor Napoleon used to
call a "bowl," and which Admiral Van Tromp designated by a
less polite name. No place could have been better calculated
to shut in an army. Its very numbers were against it. Once in,
if the way out were blocked, it could never leave it again.
Some of the generals,—General Wimpfen among them—saw this,
and were uneasy; but the little court around the emperor was
confident of safety. "At worst," they said, "we can always
reach the Belgian frontier." The commonest military
precautions were neglected. The army slept soundly on the
night of August 31. At the worst they believed themselves to
have a line of retreat open to Mézières, a town on the
frontier of Belgium. No cavalry reconnoissance was made that
night; the guards were not doubled. The French believed
themselves more than forty miles from the German army. They
behaved as if they thought that army unconcentrated and
ill-informed, attempting vaguely several things at once, and
incapable of converging on one point, namely, Sedan. They
thought they knew that the column under the Prince of Saxony
was marching upon Châlons, and that the Crown Prince of
Prussia was marching upon Metz. But that night, while the
French army, in fancied security, was sleeping at Sedan, this
is what was passing among the enemy. By a quarter to two A. M.
the army of the Prince of Saxony was on its march eastward
with orders not to fire a shot till five o'clock, and to make
as little noise as possible. They marched without baggage of
any kind. At the same hour another division of the Prussian
army marched, with equal noiselessness, from another direction
on Sedan, while the Würtemburgers secured the road to
Mézières, thereby cutting off the possibility of a retreat
into Belgium. At the same moment, namely, five o'clock,—on
all the hills around Sedan, at all points of the compass,
appeared a dense dark mass of German troops, with their
commanders and artillery. Not one sound had been heard by the
French army, not even an order. Two hundred and fifty thousand
men were in a Circle on the heights round the Sink of Givonne.
They had come as stealthily and as silently as serpents. They
were there when the sun rose, and the French army were
prisoners.'

_Victor Hugo,
Choses Vues._

The battle was one of artillery. The German guns commanded
every part of the crowded valley. Indeed the fight was simply
a massacre. There was no hope for the French, though they
fought bravely. Their best troops, the Garde Impériale, were
with Bazaine at Metz. Marshal MacMahon was wounded very early
in the day. The command passed first to General Ducrot, who
was also disabled, and afterwards to Wimpfen, a brave African
general who had hurried from Algeria just in time to take part
in this disastrous day. He told the emperor that the only hope
was for the troops to cut their way out of the valley; but the
army was too closely crowded, too disorganized, to make this
practicable. One Zouave regiment accomplished this feat, and
reached Belgium. That night—the night of September 1—an
aide-de-camp of the Emperor Napoleon carried this note to the
camp of the king of Prussia:—Monsieur Mon Frère,—Not having
been able to die in midst of my troops, it only remains for me
to place my sword in the hands of your Majesty. I am your
Majesty's good brother, Napoleon. … With Napoleon III. fell
not only his own reputation as a ruler, but the glory of his
uncle and the prestige of his name. The fallen emperor and
Bismarck met in a little house upon the banks of the Meuse.
Chairs were brought out, and they talked in the open air. It
was a glorious autumn morning. The emperor looked care-worn,
as well he might. He wished to see the king of Prussia before
the articles of capitulation were drawn up: but King William
declined the interview. When the capitulation was signed,
however, he drove over to visit the captive emperor at a
château where the latter had taken refuge.
{1385}
Their interview was private; only the two sovereigns were
present. The French emperor afterwards expressed to the Crown
Prince of Prussia his deep sense of the courtesy shown him. He
was desirous of passing as unnoticed as possible through
French territory, where, indeed, exasperation against him, as
the first cause of the misfortunes of France, was so great
that his life would have been in peril. The next day he
proceeded to the beautiful palace at Cassel called
Wilhelmshöhe, or William's Rest. It had been built at ruinous
expense by Jerome Bonaparte while king of Westphalia, and was
then called Napoleon's Rest. … Thus eighty thousand men
capitulated at Sedan, and were marched as prisoners into
Germany; one hundred and seventy-five thousand French soldiers
remained shut up in Metz, besides a few thousand more in
Strasburg, Phalsbourg, Toul, and Belfort. But the road was
open to Paris, and thither the various German armies marched,
leaving the Landwehr, which could not be ordered to serve
beyond the limits of Germany, to hold Alsace and Lorraine,
already considered a part of the Fatherland."

_E. W. Latimer,
France in the Nineteenth Century,
chapter 12._

"The German army had lost in the battle of Sedan about 460
officers and 8,500 men killed and wounded. On the French side
the loss sustained in the battle and at the capitulation
amounted according to their returns to the following: Killed
3,000 men; wounded 14,000; prisoners (in the battle) 21,000;
prisoners (at the capitulation) 83,000; disarmed in Belgium
3,000; total 124,000."

_The Franco-German War: German Official Account,
part 1, volume 2, page 408._

ALSO IN:
_Capt. G. Fitz-George,
Plan of the battle of Sedan, with Memoir._

_A. Forbes,
My Experiences of the War between France and Germany,
part 1, chapter 4 (volume l)._

_Colonel. A. Borbstaedt and Major F. Dwyer,
The Franco-German War,
chapters 30-40._

_G. B. Malleson,
The Refounding of the German Empire,
chapter 14._

FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (September).
Revolution at Paris.
Collapse of the empire.
Self-constitution of the Government of National Defense.

At Paris, the whole truth of the tremendous disaster at Sedan
was but slowly learned. On the afternoon of Saturday,
September 3, Count de Palikao intimated a little part of it,
only, "in a statement to the Corps Législatif, announcing that
Marshal Bazaine, after a vigorous sally, had been obliged to
retire again under the walls of Metz, and that Macmahon, after
a series of combats, attended by reverses and successes—
having at the outset driven a part of the enemy's army into
the Meuse—had been compelled to retreat to Sedan and
Mézières, a portion of his army having taken refuge in
Belgium. The junction of the two armies had therefore not been
made. The situation was serious, calmly observed the Minister
of War, but not hopeless. Not hopeless! when the truth was
that one army was blockaded and the other prisoner, and that
there were no reserves. … At a midnight sitting Count de
Palikao, still determined to conceal a portion of the truth,
intimated that part of Marshal Macmahon's army had been driven
back into Sedan, that the remainder had capitulated, and that
the Emperor had been made prisoner. M. Jules Favre met this
announcement of fresh disasters by a motion, declaring the
Emperor and his dynasty to have forfeited all rights conferred
by the Constitution, demanding the appointment of a
Parliamentary Committee invested with the governing power, and
having for its special mission the expulsion of the enemy from
French territory, and further maintaining General Trochu in
his post as Governor of Paris. The Chamber then adjourned till
the morrow. But Paris had touched one of those crises when, as
Pascal says, a grain of sand will give a turn to history and
change the life of nations, and the morrow brought with it the
downfall of the Ministry, of the dynasty, of the Empire, and of
that bizarre constitutional edifice which had been kept
waiting so long for its complemental crown. … It had been
intimated that the Corps Législatif would reassemble at noon,
before which time numerous groups collected on the Place de la
Concorde, and eventually swelled to a considerable crowd. The
bridge leading to the Palais Bourbon was guarded by a
detachment of mounted gendarmes, and numerous
sergents-de-ville. … Battalions of National Guards having,
however, arrived, the gendarmes, after flourishing their
swords, opened their ranks and allowed them to pass, followed
by a considerable portion of the crowd, shouting 'Vive la
République!' and singing the 'Chant du Départ.' The iron gates
of the Palais Bourbon having been opened to admit a deputation
of National Guards, the crowd precipitated itself forward, and
in a few minutes the steps and courtyard were alike invaded.
Cries of 'Vive la Garde Nationale!' 'Vive la Ligne!' 'Vive la
République!' resounded on all sides, and the soldiers who
occupied the court of the Palais Bourbon, after making a show
of resistance, ended by hoisting the butt ends of their rifles
in the air in sign of sympathy, joining at the same time in the
shouts of the crowd, while the latter, encountering no further
opposition, proceeded to invade the passages of the Chamber,
at the moment Count de Kératry was attacking the Ministry for
surrounding the Corps Législatif with troops and
sergents-de-ville, contrary to the orders of General Trochu.
Count de Palikao, having explained the relative positions of
the Governor of Paris and the Minister of War, introduced a
bill instituting a Council of Government and National Defence,
composed of five members elected by the Legislative Body, the
ministers to be appointed with the approval of the members of
this Council, and he, Count de Palikao, to occupy the post of
Lieutenant-General. M. Jules Favre having claimed priority for
the motion which he had introduced the day before, M. Thiers,
pleading the necessity for union, next moved that:—'In view
of existing circumstances, the Chamber appoints a Commission
of Government and National Defence. A Constituent Assembly
will be convoked as soon as circumstances permit.' The Chamber
having declared in favour of their urgency, these several
propositions were eventually referred to the Bureau, and the
sitting was suspended. It was during this period that the
crowd penetrated into the Salles des Quatre Colonnes and de la
Paix. … At half-past two, when the sitting was resumed, the
galleries were crowded and very noisy. The members of the Left
only were in their places. It was in vain the President
attempted to obtain silence, in vain the solemn huissiers
commanded it. MM. Gambetta and Crémieux appeared together at
the tribune, and the former begged of the people to remain
quiet. …
{1386}
A partial silence having been secured, Count de Palikao,
followed by a few members of the majority, entered the
Chamber, but did not essay to speak. … A minute or two
afterwards, the clamour arose again, and a noisy multitude
commenced invading the floor of the hall. … Nothing was left
to the President but to put on his hat and retire, which he
did, together with Count de Palikao and the members by whom
the latter had been accompanied. By this time the Chamber was
completely invaded by National and Mobile Guards, in company
with an excited crowd, whose advance it was in vain now to
attempt to repel. M. Jules Favre, having mounted the tribune,
obtained a moment's silence. 'No scenes of violence,' cried
he; 'let us reserve our arms for our enemies.' Finding it
utterly impossible to obtain any further hearing inside the
Chamber, M. Gambetta, accompanied by the members of the Left,
proceeded to the steps of the peristyle, and there announced
the dethronement of the Emperor to the people assembled
outside. Accompanied by one section of the crowd, they now
hurried to the Hôtel de Ville, and there installed themselves
as a Provisional Government, whilst another section took
possession of the Tuileries—whence the Empress had that
morning taken flight—as national property. A select band of
Republicans, mindful of what Count—now Citoyen—Henri
Rochefort had done to bring Imperialism into disrepute,
proceeded to the prison of Sainte Pélagie and conducted the
author of the Lanterne, and other political prisoners, in
triumph to the Hôtel de Ville. The deputies who quitted the
Chamber when it was invaded by the mob, met that same
afternoon at the President's residence, and sent a deputation
to the Hôtel de Ville, with a proposal to act in common with
the new Government. This proposition was, however, declined,
on the score of the Republic having been already proclaimed
and accepted by the population of Paris. At an evening meeting
of nearly two hundred deputies, held under the presidency of
M. Thiers, MM. Jules Favre and Simon attended on the part of
the Provisional Government to explain that they were anxious
to secure the support of the deputies, whom they hinted,
however, could best serve their country in the departments.
After this unequivocal rebuff, the deputies, who had in the
meantime been apprised that seals had been placed on the doors
of the Corps Législatif, saw that nothing remained to them but
to protest, and protest they accordingly did against the
events of the afternoon. … Not one of the two hundred
deputies present so much as dared suggest the breaking of the
seals and the assembling in the Legislative Chamber. … The
Government which grasped the reins of power on the utter
collapse of Imperial institutions was a mob-named one in the
fullest sense of the term, the names having been chalked by
the populace on the pillars of the portico of the Palais
Bourbon during that invasion of the Chamber on the Sunday
afternoon which resulted in the overthrow of the Imperial
regime. The list appears to have been accepted by the
principal members of the Left, who, although they would have
preferred disassociating themselves from M. Rochefort,
nevertheless felt that it was impossible to leave him out of
the combination, and therefore adroitly—and not
inappropriately, as the safety of Paris was especially in
their keeping—made it embrace all the deputies for Paris,
save, as M. Jules Simon observed, the most illustrious
—meaning M. Thiers, who refused to join it. … The
Government of National Defence, as it elected to style itself,
on M. Rochefort's suggestion, was composed of the following
members:—General Trochu, president; Jules Favre, Vice
President and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Emanuel Arago;
Crémieux, Minister of Justice; Jules Ferry, Secretary; Leon
Gambetta, Minister of the Interior; Garnier-Pagès;
Glais-Bizoin; Eugene Pelletan; Ernest Picard, Minister of
Finance; Henri Rochefort; and Jules Simon, Minister of Public
Instruction. Subsequently it associated with it General Le
Flô, Minister of War; Admiral Fourichon, Minister of Marine;
M. Dorian, Minister of Public Works; and M. Magnin, Minister
of Agriculture and Commerce. These, with Count de Kératry,
charged with the Prefecture of Police, M. Etienne Arago,
appointed Mayor of Paris, composed altogether no less than
eighteen members, upwards of two-thirds of whom were Bretons,
advocates, or journalists. … For some days the new
Government was prodigal of proclamations and decrees. Its
first acts were to close the doors of the Palais Bourbon and
the Palais du Luxembourg, and dissolve the Corps Législatif
and abolish the Senate as bouches inutiles politiques, to
issue proclamations to the army, or rather the debris of one,
justifying the Revolution and appealing to the troops to
continue their heroic efforts for the defence of the country,
and to the National Guard, thanking them for their past, and
asking for their future patriotism. It released all
functionaries from their oaths, dismissed the ambassadors at
foreign courts, appointed prefects in all the departments, and
new mayors in the twenty arrondissements of the capital,
proclaimed the complete liberty of the press, ordered all
Germans not provided with special permission to remain, to
quit the departments of the Seine and Seine-et-Oise within
four-and-twenty hours. … It pressed forward the provisioning
of the city and its works of defence, increased the herds of
sheep and oxen and the stores of corn and flour, provisionally
abolished all local customs and octroi dues, and fixed the price
of butcher's meat, armed the outer forts and the enceinte,
blew up or mined all the bridges and fired all the woods in
the environs, razed thousands of houses to the ground, felled
roadside trees, and constructed huge barricades with them;
laid in fact all the beautiful suburbs in waste; listened to
the thousand and one wild schemes put forth by patriotic
madmen for exterminating the invaders, and launched a huge
captive balloon, which hovered daily over Paris to give timely
notice of their dreaded arrival."

_H. Vizetelly, editor,
Paris in Peril,
chapter 1._

ALSO IN:
_J. Favre,
The Government of the National Defence, June-October._

_W. Rüstow,
The War for the Rhine Frontier,
chapter 22 (volume 2)._

{1387}

FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (September-October).
Futile striving for allies and for peace without
territorial sacrifices.
Investment of Paris.
Gambetta's organization of defense in the provinces.
Bazaine's surrender at Metz.

"The Government of National Defence … imagined that the fall
of the Empire would simplify the cruel position of France
towards the enemy. The Dynasty which had declared war being
reversed, and the men now in power having been throughout
opposed to war and in favour of German unity, and now
demanding nothing but peace, what motive could the King of
Prussia have to continue the invasion of France? It was
further to be considered that free France would defend her
integrity to the last drop of her blood; that she would
voluntarily give up neither an inch of her territory nor a
stone of her fortresses. Such were the ideas which the new
Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Jules Favre, expressed on the
6th of September, in a circular addressed to the French agents
in foreign countries. The Cabinet of Berlin was not slow in
disabusing him of these convictions. Far from accepting the
view that the Emperor Napoleon was the sole promoter of war,
Count Bismarck, in two despatches of the 13th and of the 16th
of September, threw the responsibility of the conflict on the
French nation. He stated that the vast majority of the
Chambers had voted for war, and that the Emperor was justified
in assuring the King that he had been forced into a war to
which he was personally averse. … In order to be secure
against future aggression, Germany would ask for guarantees
from the French nation itself, and not from a transitory
Government. … In any case, Germany would require Strasburg
and Metz. Thus the accession to power of the Republican
Government did not modify the reciprocal positions of the two
belligerents. Nevertheless, hope was entertained in Paris that
the friendly intervention of the great powers might induce the
victor to soften his rigour;" but intervention was declined by
the Berlin Cabinet and not undertaken. "On the 19th of
September the investment of Paris was completed. At the desire
of the French Government, the English Cabinet applied to the
German head-quarters, with the object of obtaining for M.
Jules Favre an interview with Count Bismarck. This request
having been granted, the two statesmen held conferences, on
the 19th and 20th of September, at Ferrières, a castle of
Baron Rothschild near Meaux. During these interviews the
French Minister was sentimental and the German Minister coldly
logical. They could not come to an agreement on any single
point. … The Government of Paris … again proclaimed that
France would not cede an inch of her territory. Meanwhile, in
consequence of the investment of Paris, the Government of
National Defence was divided into two parts; some of its
Delegates withdrew to Tours, forming a delegation of the
central Government which remained in Paris. The German armies
had continued their onward march, as well as their operations
against the fortresses. Toul capitulated on the 23rd and
Strasburg on the 28th of September. On the 5th of October,
King William had established his headquarters at Versailles."
Meantime "the Government of National Defence made a last
attempt to secure allies, or at least the help of powerful
mediators. With this object M. Thiers, who had placed himself
at the disposal of the Administration of the 4th of September,
was sent on a mission to the European Courts. From the 12th of
September till the 20th of October, the old statesman visited
in succession London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Florence. In
none of these cities were his measures attended with happy
results." At St. Petersburg and at London he was told—and he
was himself convinced—"that the King of Prussia was
compelled to consider the public opinion of Germany, and that
France would have to resign herself to territorial
sacrifices." He returned to France to advise, and to procure
authority for, a conference with the German Chancellor. But
events had already occurred which aggravated the forlorn
condition of France. "The youngest and most enterprising
member of the Government of Paris, M. Gambetta, had left the
Capital on the 8th of October in a balloon for Tours. It was
his intention to organise national defence in the Provinces.
The day after his arrival at Tours, he issued a fiery
Proclamation to the French people. … With an energy that
called forth universal admiration, the Government of Tours,
over which Gambetta presided as Dictator, organised
resistance, formed a new army, and gathered together every
possible resource for defence both in men and in materials.
All these efforts could not arrest the progress of the
invasion. From the 11th to the 31st of October, the Germans
took successively Orleans, Soissons, Schlestadt and Dijon.
Round Paris they repulsed the sallies of Malmaison, Champigny,
and le Bourget. But all these defeats of heroic soldiers waned
when compared to the appalling and decisive catastrophe of
Metz. After the battle of Gravelotte, Marshal Bazaine had
unsuccessfully attempted several sallies. … On the 7th of
October, after an unfortunate battle at Woippy, lasting nine
hours, Bazaine considered the situation desperate. His only
thought was to obtain the most favourable conditions he could,
and with this object he sent General Boyer to the headquarters
at Versailles." After two weeks of negotiation, "on the 21st
of October, the army encamped within the walls of Metz found
itself without provisions. … Negotiations with Prince
Frederick Charles, nephew of the King and Commander-in-chief
of the besieging Army, were opened on the 25th, and terminated
on the 27th of October. The conditions were identical with
those of Sedan: capitulation of the town and its forts with
all the material of war, all the army of the Rhine to be
prisoners and the officers to be liberated on parole."

_E. Simon,
The Emperor William and his Reign,
chapter 13 (volume 2)._

"The French Army of the Rhine at the time of the surrender
still numbered 173,000 men, inclusive of 6,000 officers and
20,000 men remaining temporarily in Metz as sick or
convalescent."

_The Franco-German War: German Official Account,
part 2, volume 1, page 201._

ALSO IN:
_A. Forbes,
My Experiences of the War between France and Germany,
part 2 (volume 1)._

FRANCE: A. D. 1870-1871.
The war in the provinces.
Unsuccessful attempts to relieve the capital.
Distress in Paris.
Capitulation and armistice.

"The surrender of Metz and the release of the great army of
Prince Frederick Charles by which it was besieged fatally
changed the conditions of the French war of national defence.
Two hundred thousand of the victorious troops of Germany under
some of their ablest generals were set free to attack the
still untrained levies on the Loire and in the north of
France, which, with more time for organisation, might well
have forced the Germans to raise the siege of Paris. The army
once commanded by Steinmetz was now reconstituted, and
despatched under General Manteuffel towards Amiens; Prince
Frederick Charles moved with the remainder of his troops
towards the Loire. Aware that his approach could not long be
delayed, Gambetta insisted that Aurelle de Paladines should
begin the march on Paris.
{1388}
The general attacked Tann at Coulmiers on the 9th of November,
defeated him, and re-occupied Orleans, the first real success
that the French had gained in the war. There was great alarm
at the German headquarters at Versailles; the possibility of a
failure of the siege was discussed; and 40,000 troops were
sent southwards in haste to the support of the Bavarian
general. Aurelle, however, did not move upon the capital: his
troops were still unfit for the enterprise; and he remained
stationary on the north of Orleans, in order to improve his
organisation, to await reinforcements, and to meet the attack
of Frederick Charles in a strong position. In the third week
of November the leading divisions of the army of Metz
approached, and took post between Orleans and Paris. Gambetta
now insisted that the effort should be made to relieve the
capital. Aurelle resisted, but was forced to obey. The
garrison of Paris had already made several unsuccessful
attacks upon the lines of their besiegers, the most vigorous
being that of Le Bourget on the 30th of October, in which
bayonets were crossed. It was arranged that in the last days
of November General Trochu should endeavour to break out on
the southern side, and that simultaneously the army of the
Loire should fall upon the enemy in front of it and endeavour
to force its way to the capital. On the 28th the attack upon
the Germans on the north of Orleans began. For several days
the struggle was renewed by one division after another of the
armies of Aurelle and Prince Frederick Charles. Victory
remained at last with the Germans; the centre of the French
position was carried; the right and left wings of the army
were severed from one another and forced to retreat, the one
up the Loire, the other towards the west. Orleans on the 5th
of December passed back into the hands of the Germans. The
sortie from Paris, which began with a successful attack by
General Ducrot upon Champigny beyond the Marne, ended after
some days of combat in the recovery by the Germans of the
positions which they had lost, and in the retreat of Ducrot
into Paris. In the same week Manteuffel, moving against the
relieving army of the north, encountered it near Amiens,
defeated it after a hard struggle, and gained possession of
Amiens itself. After the fall of Amiens, Manteuffel moved upon
Rouen. This city fell into his hands without resistance. …
But the Republican armies, unlike those which the Germans had
first encountered, were not to be crushed at a single blow.
Under the energetic command of Faidherbe the army of the north
advanced again upon Amiens. Goeben, who was left to defend the
line of the Somme, went out to meet him, defeated him on the
23rd of December, and drove him back to Arras. But again,
after a week's interval, Faidherbe pushed forward. On the 3rd
of January he fell upon Goeben's weak division at Bapaume, and
handled it so severely that the Germans would on the following
day have abandoned their position, if the French had not
themselves been the first to retire. Faidherbe, however, had
only fallen back to receive reinforcements. After some days'
rest he once more sought to gain the road to Paris, advancing
this time by the eastward line through St. Quentin. In front
of this town Goeben attacked him. The last battle of the army
of the North was fought on the 19th of January. The French
general endeavoured to disguise his defeat, but the German
commander had won all that he desired. Faidherbe's army was
compelled to retreat northwards in disorder; its part in the
war was at an end. During the last three weeks of December
there was a pause in the operations of the Germans on the
Loire. … Gambetta … had … determined to throw the army
of Bourbaki, strengthened by reinforcements from the south,
upon Germany itself. The design was a daring one, and had the
… French armies been capable of performing the work which
Gambetta required of them, an inroad into Baden, or even the
reconquest of Alsace, would most seriously have affected the
position of the Germans before Paris. But Gambetta
miscalculated the power of young, untrained troops,
imperfectly armed, badly fed, against a veteran army. In a
series of hard-fought struggles the army of the Loire under
General Chanzy was driven back at the beginning of January
from Vendôme to Le Mans. On the 12th, Chanzy took post before
this city and fought his last battle. While he was making a
vigorous resistance in the centre of the line, the Breton
regiments stationed on his right gave way; the Germans pressed
round him, and gained possession of the town. Chanzy retreated
towards Laval, leaving thousands of prisoners in the hands of the
enemy, and saving only the debris of an army. Bourbaki in the
meantime, with a numerous but miserably equipped force, had
almost reached Belfort. … Werder had evacuated Dijon and
fallen back upon Vesoul; part of his army was still occupied
in the siege of Belfort. As Bourbaki approached he fell back
with the greater part of his troops in order to cover the
besieging force, leaving one of his lieutenants to make a
flank attack upon Bourbaki at Villersexel. This attack, one of
the fiercest in the war, delayed the French for two days, and
gave Werder time to occupy the strong positions that he had
chosen about Montbéliard. Here, on the 15th of January, began
a struggle which lasted for three days. The French, starving
and perishing with cold, though far superior in number to
their enemy, were led with little effect against the German
entrenchments. On the 18th Bourbaki began his retreat. Werder
was unable to follow him; Manteuffel with a weak force was
still at some distance, and for a moment it seemed possible
that Bourbaki, by a rapid movement westwards, might crush this
isolated foe. Gambetta ordered Bourbaki to make the attempt:
the commander refused to court further disaster with troops
who were not fit to face an enemy, and retreated towards
Pontarlier in the hope of making his way to Lyons. But
Manteuffel now descended in front of him; divisions of
Werder's army pressed down from the north; the retreat was cut
off; and the unfortunate French general, whom a telegram from
Gambetta removed from his command, attempted to take his own
life. On the 1st of February, the wreck of his army, still
numbering 85,000 men, but reduced to the extremity of weakness
and misery, sought refuge beyond the Swiss frontier. The war
was now over. Two days after Bourbaki's repulse at Montbéliard
the last unsuccessful sortie was made from Paris. There now
remained provisions only for another fortnight; above 40,000
of the inhabitants had succumbed to the privations of the
siege; all hope of assistance from the relieving armies before
actual famine should begin disappeared.
{1389}
On the 23rd of January Favre sought the German Chancellor at
Versailles in order to discuss the conditions of a general
armistice and of the capitulation of Paris. The negotiations
lasted for several days; on the 28th an armistice was signed
with the declared object that elections might at once be
freely held for a National Assembly, which should decide
whether the war should be continued, or on what conditions
peace should be made. The conditions of the armistice were
that the forts of Paris and all their material of war should
be handed over to the German army; that the artillery of the
enceinte should be dismounted; and that the regular troops in
Paris should, as prisoners of war, surrender their arms. The
National Guard were permitted to retain their weapons and
their artillery. Immediately upon the fulfilment of the first
two conditions all facilities were to be given for the entry
of supplies of food into Paris. The articles of the armistice
were duly executed, and on the 30th of January the Prussian
flag waved over the forts of the French capital."

_C. A. Fyffe,
History of Modern Europe,
volume 3, chapter 6._

ALSO IN:
_H. Murdock,
The Reconstruction of Europe,
chapters 29-30._

_Daily News Correspondence of the War
chapters 13-21._

_Cassell's History of the War,
volume 1, chapter 36,
volume 2; chapters 1-18._

_Comte d'Herrison,
Journal of a Staff Officer in Paris._

_E. B. Washburne,
Recollections of a Minister to France,
volume 1, chapters 5-10._

_J. A. O'Shea,
An Iron-bound City._

_F. T. Marzials,
Life of Gambetta,
chapter 5._

_H. von Moltke,
The Franco-German War of 1870-71,
sections 3-7._

_T. G. Bowles,
The Defence of Paris._

_W. Rüstow,
The War for the Rhine Frontier, 1870,
volume 3._

FRANCE: A. D. 1871 (January-May).
Preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles.
The Treaty of Frankfort.
Cession of Alsace and one-fifth of Lorraine.
Five milliards of indemnity.

"On the afternoon of January 28 [1871] the capitulation of
Paris was signed, and an armistice agreed upon to expire on
February 19 at noon. The provinces occupied by the armies of
Bourbaki and Munteuffel were alone excluded from this
agreement. On January 29 the German troops quietly took
possession of the Paris forts. The regulars and mobiles became
prisoners of war, with the exception of 12,000 men who were
left under arms to preserve order. At the earnest request of
Favre the National Guard were allowed to retain their arms. If
Favre urged this as a measure to counteract the imperialistic
ideas supposed to be still cherished by the prisoners
returning from Germany, it was a political crime as well as a
military folly. The National Guard became the armed Commune.
… While the armies withdrew to the lines stipulated in the
armistice, the elections went quietly forward. The assembly
convened at Bordeaux, and manifested a spirit that won for it
universal respect. On February 17 M. Thiers was appointed
chief of the executive power, and having named his ministry,
he repaired to Versailles to arrange the preliminaries of
peace. The conferences that followed with the German
chancellor were perhaps the most trying ordeals to which the
Frenchman had ever been subjected. No peace was possible save
on the basis of the cession of miles of territory and the
strongest of fortresses. France must also pay a war indemnity
of no less than five milliards of francs. Bismarck, it is
true, thought Thiers 'too sentimental for business, … hardly
fit indeed to buy or sell a horse,' but no diplomatist,
however astute, could have made better terms for stricken
France. So thought the assembly at Bordeaux; and when Thiers
announced the result of his mission with a quivering lip, he
had its sympathy and support. On the 2d of March the assembly
formally ratified the peace preliminaries by a vote of 546 to
107. It had been stipulated in the armistice that the German
troops should not occupy Paris. The extension of time granted
by the Germans entitled them to some compensation, and the
entry of Paris was the compensation claimed. The troops
detailed for this purpose were not chosen at random. To the
Frenchman who on the 1st day of March beheld them pass along
the Avenue de Malakoff or the Champs Elysées it was an ominous
pageant. It was a German and not a Prussian army that he
beheld. … That night the Hessians smoked their pipes on the
Trocadéro, and the Bavarians stacked their arms in the Place
de la Concorde, while the lights blazing from the palace of
the Elysée announced the German military headquarters. On the
third day of the month, the Bordeaux Assembly having ratified
the peace preliminaries, the German troops marched out, and
Paris was left to herself again. The war was over. Beyond the
Rhineland, in Bavaria and Würtemberg as well as in the north,
all was joy and enthusiasm over the return of the army that
had answered before the world the question, 'What is the
German Fatherland?' On the 10th of May the definite treaty of
peace was signed at Frankfort by which France ceded Alsace and
a portion of Lorraine, including the fortresses of Metz and
Strasburg, to her conqueror."

_H. Murdock,
The Reconstruction of Europe,
chapter 30._

The following are the heads of the Preliminary Treaty
concluded at Versailles, to which the final Treaty of
Frankfort conformed:

"1. France renounces in favour of the German Empire the
following rights: the fifth part of Lorraine including Metz
and Thionville, and Alsace less Belfort.

2. France will pay the sum of five milliards of francs, of
which one milliard is to be paid in 1871 and the remaining
four milliards by instalments extending over three years.

3. The German troops will begin to evacuate the French
territory as soon as the Treaty is ratified. They will then
evacuate the interior of Paris and some departments lying in
the western region. The evacuation of the other departments
will take place gradually after payment of the first milliard,
and proportionately to the payment of the other four
milliards. Interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum
will be paid on the amount remaining due from the date of the
ratification of the Treaty.

4. The German troops will not levy any requisitions in the
departments occupied by them, but will be maintained at the
cost of France. A delay will be granted to the inhabitants of
the territories annexed to choose between the two
nationalities.

6. Prisoners of war will be immediately set at liberty.

7. Negotiations for a definitive Treaty of Peace will be
opened at Brussels after the ratification of this Treaty.

8. The administration of the departments occupied by the
German troops will be entrusted to French officials, but under
the control of the chiefs of the German Corps of occupation.

9. The present Treaty confers upon the Germans no rights
whatever in the portions of territories not occupied.

10. This Treaty will have to be ratified by the

National Assembly of France."

_C. Lowe,
Prince Bismarck,
volume 1, chapter 9._

ALSO IN:
_E. Hertslet,
The Map of Europe by Treaty,
volume 3, numbers 438 and 446._

{1390}

FRANCE: A. D. 1871 (March-May).
Insurrection of the Communists of Paris.
Second siege and reduction of the capital.