Chapter CDXCVI: Section 10: And be it further enacted, That when any person (13)

Abraham Lincoln "believed that without the Union permanent
liberty for either race on this continent would be impossible.
And because of this belief, he was reluctant, perhaps more
reluctant than most of his associates, to strike slavery with
the sword. For many months, the passionate appeals of millions
of his associates seemed not to move him. He listened to all
the phases of the discussion, and stated in language clearer
and stronger than any opponent had used, the dangers, the
difficulties, and the possible futility of the act. In
reference to its practical wisdom, Congress, the Cabinet, and
the country were divided. Several of his generals had
proclaimed the freedom of slaves within the limits of their
commands. The President revoked their proclamations. His first
Secretary of War had inserted a paragraph in his annual report
advocating a similar policy. The President suppressed it. On
the 19th of August, 1862, Horace Greeley published a letter
addressed to the President, entitled 'The Prayer of Twenty
Millions,' in which he said, 'On the face of this wide earth,
Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined,
intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that
all attempts to put down the rebellion and at the same time
uphold its inciting cause are preposterous and futile.' To
this the President responded in that ever memorable reply of
August 22, in which he said:—'If there be those who would not
save the Union unless they could at the same time save
slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would
not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy
slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to
save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery.
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If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would
do it. If I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would
do it,—and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving
others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery
and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save
the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not
believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less
whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause,
and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help
the cause.' Thus, against all importunities on the one hand
and remonstrances on the other, he took the mighty question to
his own heart, and, during the long months of that terrible
battle-summer, wrestled with it alone. But at length he
realized the saving truth, that great unsettled questions have
no pity for the repose of nations. On the 22d of September, he
summoned his Cabinet to announce his conclusion. It was my
good fortune, on that same day, and a few hours after the
meeting, to hear, from the lips of one who participated, the
story of the scene. As the chiefs of the Executive Departments
came in, one by one, they found the President reading a
favorite chapter from a popular humorist. He was lightening
the weight of the great burden which rested upon his spirit.
He finished the chapter, reading it aloud. And here I quote,
from the published Journal of the late Chief Justice, an
entry, written immediately after the meeting, and bearing
unmistakable evidence that it is almost a literal transcript
of Lincoln's words: 'The President then took a graver tone and
said: "Gentlemen I have, as you are aware, thought a great
deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all
remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had
prepared upon the subject, which, on account of objections
made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind
has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought
all along that the time for acting on it might probably come.
I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I
wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the
army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have
best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and
Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the
rebel army was at Frederick, I determined as soon as it should
be driven out of Maryland to issue a proclamation of
emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I
said nothing to any one, but I made a promise to myself and
(hesitating a little) to my Maker. The rebel army is now
driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got
you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish
your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined
for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect
for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on
this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have
considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I
have written is that which my reflections have determined me
to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in
any minor matter which any of you thinks had best be changed,
I shall be glad to receive your suggestions. One other
observation I will make, I know very well that many others
might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and
if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully
possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any
constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he
should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But though I
believe I have not so much of the confidence of the people as
I had some time since, I do not know that, all things
considered, any other person has more; and, however this may
be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put
where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can and bear the
responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to
take." The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation
Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts as he went
on, and showing that he had fully considered the subject in
all the lights under which it had been presented to him.' The
Proclamation was amended in a few matters of detail. It was
signed and published that day."

_J. A. Garfield,
Works,
volume 2, pages 538-540._

"I was alone with Mr. Lincoln more than two hours of the
Sunday next after Pope's defeat in August, 1802. That was the
darkest day of the sad years of the war. … When the business
to which I had been summoned by the President was over—strange
business for the time: the appointment of assessors and
collectors of internal revenue—he was kind enough to ask my
opinion as to the command of the army. The way was thus opened
for conversation, and for me to say at the end that I thought
our success depended upon the emancipation of the slaves. To
this he said: 'You would not have it done now, would you? Must
we not wait for something like a victory?' This was the second
and most explicit intimation to me of his purpose in regard to
slavery. In the preceding July or early in August, at an
interview upon business connected with my official duties, he
said, 'Let me read two letters,' and taking them from a
pigeon-hole over his table he proceeded at once to do what he
had proposed. I have not seen the letters in print. His
correspondent was a gentleman in Louisiana, who claimed to be
a Union man. He tendered his advice to the President in regard
to the reorganization of that State, and he labored zealous]y
to impress upon him the dangers and evils of emancipation. The
reply of the President is only important from the fact that
when he came to that part of his correspondent's letter he
used this expression: 'You must not expect me to give up this
government without playing my last card.' Emancipation was his
last card. He waited for the time when two facts or events
should coincide. Mr. Lincoln was as devoted to the
Constitution as was ever Mr. Webster. In his view, a military
necessity was the only ground on which the overthrow of
slavery in the States could be justified. Next, he waited for
a public sentiment in the loyal States not only demanding
emancipation but giving full assurance that the act would be
sustained to the end. As for himself, I cannot doubt that he
had contemplated the policy of emancipation for many months,
and anticipated the time when he should adopt it."

_G. S. Boutwell,
Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln by
Distinguished Men of his Time,
pages 123-125._

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"It was after all efforts for voluntary emancipation by the
states interested, with pecuniary aid from the national
treasury, had failed [that the President determined to decree
emancipation in the rebellious states by a military order]. To
Mr. Seward and myself the President communicated his purpose,
and asked our views, on the 13th of July 1862. It was the day
succeeding his last unsuccessful and hopeless conference with
the representatives in Congress from the border slave states,
at a gloomy period of our affairs, just after the reverses of
our armies under McClellan before Richmond. The time, be said,
had arrived when we must determine whether the slave element
should be for or against us. Mr. Seward … was appalled and not
prepared for this decisive step, when Mr. Lincoln made known
to us that he contemplated, by an executive order, to
emancipate the slaves. Startled with so broad and radical a
proposition, he informed the President that the consequences
of such an act were so momentous that he was not prepared to
advise on the subject without further reflection. … While Mr.
Seward hesitated and had the subject under consideration, the
President deliberately prepared his preliminary proclamation,
which met the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of the
whole Cabinet, though there were phases of opinion not
entirely in accord with the proceedings. Mr. Blair, an
original emancipationist, and committed to the principle,
thought the time to issue the order inopportune, and Mr. Bates
desired that the deportation of the colored race should be
coincident with emancipation. Aware that there were shades of
difference among his counsellors, and hesitation and doubt
with some, in view of the vast responsibility and its
consequences, the President devised his own scheme, held
himself alone accountable for the act, and, unaided and
unassisted, prepared each of the proclamations of freedom."

_G. Welles,
Lincoln and Seward,
pages 210-212._

The preliminary or monitory Proclamation of Emancipation,
issued on the 22d of September, 1862, was as follows:

"'I. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of
America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof,
do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore,
the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically
restoring the constitutional relations between the United
States and each of the States and the people thereof, in which
States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. That
it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again
recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tendering
pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the
slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in
rebellion against the United States, and which States may then
have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt,
the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their
respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of
African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or
elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the
governments existing there, will be continued. That on the
first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves
within any State, or designated part of a State, the people
whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States,
shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the
Executive Government of the United States, including the
military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or
acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts
they may make for their actual freedom. That the Executive
will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation,
designate the States, or parts of States if any, in which the
people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion
against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the
people thereof, shall, on that day, be in good faith
represented in the Congress of the United States by members
chosen thereto at elections, wherein a majority of the
qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall,
in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed
conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof,
are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Then,
after reciting the language of 'An act to make an additional
article of war,' approved March 13, 1862, and also sections 9
and 10 of the Confiscation Act, approved July 17, 1862, and
enjoining their enforcement upon all persons in the military
and naval service, the proclamation concludes: 'And I do
hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the
military and naval service of the United States to observe,
obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service,
the acts and sections above recited. And the Executive will,
in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States,
who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the
rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional
relations between the United States and the people, if that
relation shall have been suspended or disturbed, be
compensated for all losses by acts of the United States,
including the loss of slaves.'"

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 6, chapters 6 and 8._

ALSO IN:
_J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, chapter 20._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(September-October: Mississippi).
Union successes under Grant.
Iuka and Corinth.

"In July, Pope was ordered to Virginia, and on the 17th of
that month Halleck was assigned to the command of all the
armies, superseding McClellan. He repaired at once to
Washington, and Grant was directed to establish his
headquarters at Corinth. Grant's jurisdiction was not,
however, enlarged by the promotion of Halleck: on the
contrary, the new general-in-chief first offered the command
of the Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Robert Allen, a
quarter-master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to
remain under Grant. He was, however, left somewhat more
independent than while Halleck had heen immediately present in
the field. Four divisions of his army (including Thomas's
command), were within the next two months ordered to Buell,
who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, unwieldy snake,
from Eastport to Decatur, and from Decatur towards
Chattanooga. This subtraction put Grant entirely on the
defensive. He had possession of Corinth, the strategic point,
but was obliged to hold the railroads from that place and
Bolivar, north to Columbus, which last, on account of the low
water in the Tennessee, he had made his base of supplies. … He
remained himself eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the
enemy, who, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, harassed and
threatened him continually.

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During this time, he directed the strengthening and
remodelling of the fortifications of Corinth. … New works,
closer to the town, were … erected. … Van Dorn at last
determined to move part of his force (under Price), east of
Grant, apparently with a view to crossing the Tennessee and
reënforcing Bragg in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified
Halleck of the probability of such a movement, and of his
intention to prevent it. … On the 13th [of September], Price
advanced from the south and seized Iuka, 21 miles east of
Corinth. … Grant had called in his forces some days before to
the vicinity of Corinth, had repeatedly cautioned all his
commanders to hold their troops in readiness, and when the
enemy's cavalry moved towards Iuka, and cut the railroad and
telegraph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven miles
to the westward, Grant began his operations. Price was at
Iuka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the southwest,
threatening Corinth. Grant's object was to destroy Price,
before the two could concentrate, and then to get back to
Corinth and protect it against Van Dorn. He accordingly
ordered Brigadier-General Rosecrans, whose troops were posted
south of Corinth, to move by way of Renzi, along the south
side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and attack Iuka
from that direction; while Major-General Ord, with a force
brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jackson, was to push
towards Burnsville, and from there take roads on the north
side of the railroad, attacking Iuka from that quarter. Ord
had 8,000 men, and Rosecrans reported 9,000, a greater force
combined than Price had, according to Grant's estimate."
Rosecrans's movement was delayed, and he was attacked
(September 19) in heavy force as he neared Iuka, Ord's advance
having been held back waiting for him. He kept his ground, but
lost in the action a battery of artillery, besides 736 men,
killed and wounded. That night the enemy retreated from Iuka,
over a road which Rosecrans was expected to occupy, but did
not. "By the battle of Iuka, the enemy was simply checked in
his plans, not seriously crippled in his force. Price moved
around by a circuitous route and joined Van Dorn, and the same
state of affairs continued which had annoyed Grant for so many
weeks. He put Rosecrans in command at Corinth, and Ord at
Bolivar, and on the 23d of September removed his own
headquarters to Jackson, from which point he could communicate
more readily with all points of his district, including
Memphis and Cairo. The rebels were in force at La Grange and
Ripley. … At last it was rendered certain … that Corinth was
to be the place of attack. Grant thereupon directed Rosecrans
to call in his forces, and sent Brigadier-General McPherson to
his support from Jackson, with a brigade of troops." He also
"hurried Ord and Hurlbut by way of Pocahontas from Bolivar, 44
miles away, to be ready to strike Van Dorn in flank or rear,
as he advanced, and at least to create a diversion, if they
could not get into the town. On the 2d of October the rebel
array, under Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villepigue, and Rust,
appeared in front of Corinth. … On the 3d the fighting began
in earnest. Rosecrans had about 19,000 men, and the enemy had
collected 38,000 for this important movement, which was to
determine the possession of northern Mississippi and West
Tennessee. Rosecrans pushed out about five miles, towards
Chewalla, Grant having ordered him to attack, if opportunity
offered; but the enemy began the fight, and, on the afternoon
of the 3d, the battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rosecrans
was driven back to his defences on the north side of Corinth,
and it was now found how important was the labor bestowed on
these fortifications, by Grant's order, a month previous. The
enemy was checked until morning; but, early on the 4th, the
whole rebel army, flushed with the success of the day before,
assaulted the works. The fighting was fierce; the rebels
charging almost into the town, when an unexpected fire from
the forts drove them back in confusion. Again and again, they
advanced to the works, but each time were received with a
determination equal to their own. Once, the national troops
came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied them in
person, and the rebels were finally repulsed before noon, with
a loss admitted by themselves to be double that of Rosecrans.
The national loss was 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232
prisoners and missing. Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at
1,423, and took 2,225 prisoners. … The repulse was complete,
by 11 o'clock in the morning, but unfortunately was not
followed up by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels,
however, started off in haste and disorder immediately after
the fight; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were struck
in flank, as Grant had planned, by Hurlbut and Ord, and the
disaster was rendered final. This occurred early on the
morning of the 5th, at the crossing of the Hatchie river,
about ten miles from Corinth. … A battery of artillery and
several hundred men were captured, and the advance was
dispersed or drowned. … Had Rosecrans moved promptly the day
before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either
as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this
defile [six miles up the stream, where Van Dorn finally made
his crossing]. In either event, the destruction of the rebels
must have been complete. … These two fights relieved the
command of West Tennessee from all immediate danger."

_A. Badeau,
Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,
volume 1, chapter 4._

"Satisfied that the enemy was retreating [on the 4th], I
ordered Sullivan's command to push him with a heavy skirmish
line, and to keep constantly feeling them. I rode along the
lines of the commands, told them that, having been moving and
fighting for three days and two nights, I knew they required
rest, but that they could not rest longer than was absolutely
necessary. I directed them to proceed to their camps, provide
five days' rations, take some needed rest, and be ready early
next morning for the pursuit."

_W. S. Rosecrans,
The Battle of Corinth
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2), page 753._

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(September-December: Missouri-Arkansas).
Social demoralizations of the Civil War.
Battle of Prairie Grove.

"The dispersion and suppression of the guerrilla bands [in
Missouri] did not serve wholly to terminate local disturbances
and offenses. The restraints of a common public opinion no longer
existed. Neighborhood good-will had become changed to
neighborhood hatred and feud. Men took advantage of the
license of war to settle personal grudges by all the
violations of law, varying from petty theft to assassination;
and parallel with this thirst for private revenge was the
cupidity which turned crime into a source of private gain. … A
rearrangement of military command appears in an order of the
President under date of September 19, 1862, directing that
Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and the bordering Indian Territory
should constitute a new department to be called the Department
of the Missouri, to be commanded by Major-General Samuel R.
Curtis. … This new arrangement served to change the relative
positions of Schofield and Curtis. The former, gathering what
troops he could, took the field in a campaign towards
Southwest Missouri to meet the expected invasion from
Arkansas, while the latter, recalled from a short leave of
absence, came to St. Louis (September 24, 1862) to take up his
headquarters and assume the general administration of the new
Department of the Missouri. … The difficulties in the military
situation had grown primarily out of the error of Halleck … in
postponing the opening of the Mississippi River. When, in the
spring and summer of 1862, Halleck abandoned all thought of
pursuing that prime and comprehensive object, and left
Vicksburg to grow up into an almost impregnable Confederate
citadel, he blighted the possibility of successful Union
campaigns on both sides of the great river. … From the
midsummer of 1862, therefore, until the fall of Vicksburg in
midsummer of 1863, military campaigning in the
trans-Mississippi country ceases to have any general
significance. … The only action of importance which marks the
military administration of Curtis was the battle of Prairie
Grove in the northwest corner of Arkansas, where on the 7th of
December the detachments respectively commanded by the Union
generals James G. Blunt (who had been hovering all summer
along the border of Kansas) and Francis J. Herron, who,
finding Blunt pressed by the enemy coming northward with a
view of entering Missouri, advanced by forced marches from
near Springfield and formed a junction with Blunt just in the
nick of time to defeat the Confederates under General Hindman.
The losses on each side were about equal, and on the day
following the engagement the Confederates retreated southward
across the protecting barrier of the Boston Mountains. It was
in a diminished degree a repetition of the battle of Pea
Ridge, fought in the preceding March within 20 or 30 miles of
the same place. … So effectually did this engagement serve to
scatter the rebel forces that Schofield reported January 31,
1863, 'There is no considerable force of the enemy north of
the Arkansas River; indeed I believe they have all gone or are
going, as rapidly as possible, to Vicksburg. Ten thousand
infantry and artillery can be spared from Southern Missouri
and Northern Arkansas.'"

_J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 6, chapter 18._

ALSO IN:
_W. Baxter,
Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove._

_O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
division 10, chapter 4 (volume 3)._

_W. Britton,
Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border,
chapter 1._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (October-December: Virginia).
The final removal of McClellan.
Burnside at Fredericksburg.

"Both armies … felt the need of some repose; and, glad to be
freed from each other's presence, they rested on their
arms—the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the
vicinity of Winchester, and the army of the Potomac near the
scene of its late exploits, amid the picturesque hills and
vales of Southwestern Maryland. The movement from Washington
into Maryland to meet Lee's invasion was defensive in its
purpose, though it assumed the character of a
defensive-offensive campaign. Now that this had been
accomplished and Lee driven across the frontier, it remained
to organize on an adequate scale the means of a renewal of
grand offensive operations directed at the Confederate army
and towards Richmond. The completion of this work, including
the furnishing of transportation, clothing, supplies, etc.,
required upwards of a month, and during this period no
military movement occurred, with the exception of a raid into
Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the middle of October, that
enterprising officer, with twelve or fifteen hundred troopers,
crossed the Potomac above Williamsport, passed through
Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, occupied Chambersburg,
where he burnt considerable government stores, and after
making the entire circuit of the Union army, recrossed the
Potomac below the mouth of the Monocacy. He was all the way
closely pursued by Pleasonton with 800 cavalry. … On the
recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, McClellan
hastened to seize the débouehé of the Shenandoah Valley, by
the possession of Harper's Ferry. … At first McClellan
contemplated pushing his advance against Lee directly down the
Shenandoah Valley, as he found that, by the adoption of the
line east of the Blue Ridge, his antagonist, finding the door
open, would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being
removed by the oncoming of the season of high-water in the
Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of
the Blue Ridge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the
Potomac by a ponton-bridge at Berlin, five miles below
Harper's Ferry. By the 2d November the entire army had crossed
at that point. Advancing due southward towards Warrenton, he
masked the movement by guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge,
and by threatening to issue through these, he compelled Lee to
retain Jackson in the Valley. With such success was this
movement managed, that on reaching Warrenton on the 9th, while
Lee had sent half of his army forward to Culpepper to oppose
McClellan's advance in that direction, the other half was
still west of the Blue Ridge, scattered up and down the
Valley, and separated from the other moiety by at least two
days' march. McClellan's next projected move was to strike
across obliquely westward and interpose between the severed
divisions of the Confederate force; but this step he was
prevented from taking by his sudden removal from the command
of the Army of the Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton.
Late on the night of November 7th, amidst a heavy snow-storm,
General Buckingham, arriving post-haste from Washington,
reached the tent of General McClellan at Rectortown. He was
the bearer of the following dispatch, which he handed to
General McClellan: … 'By direction of the President of the
United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be
relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that
Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.' … It
chanced that General Burnside was at the moment with him in
his tent.
{3485}
Opening the dispatch and reading it, without a change of
countenance or of voice, McClellan passed over the paper to
his successor, saying, as he did so: 'Well, Burnside, you are
to command the army.' Thus ended the career of McClellan as
head of the Army of the Potomac. … The moment chosen was an
inopportune and an ungracious one; for never had McClellan
acted with such vigor and rapidity-never had he shown so much
confidence in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable
fact that not only was the whole body of the army—rank and
file as well his officers—enthusiastic in their affection for
his person, but that the very general appointed as his
successor was the strongest opponent of his removal."

_W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 6, sections 2-3. _

"It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle, and
our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates'; it is more
dangerous to change the plans of troops moving in the vicinity
of the enemy. But as if impelled to do some new thing … the
new commander of the Army of the Potomac determined upon a
flank movement by his left on the north of the river towards
Fredericksburg. … Only by movements equally wary and rapid, as
well as by sure means of crossing the river, could Burnside's
manœuvre possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on
Halleck, and, of course, failed. The promised pontoons did
not, and could scarcely have been expected to come. Arrived at
Fredericksburg Burnside still might have crossed by the fords,
for the water was low. And once in possession of the heights
beyond the city he could afford to wait. But, slower than even
his predecessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north
side of the river, while Lee, having learned of his movement,
by forced marches concentrated his army on the opposite bank,
and prepared to erect impregnable defences in his front. …
Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps, Marye's
Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been crowned by a triple
line of works, and Lee had brought together nearly 90,000
troops to man them. Two canals and a stone wall in front of
the left, as well as open, sloping ground on both flanks,
served to retain an attacking party for a long period under
fire. To assault these works in front was simple madness. To
turn them below necessitated the crossing of a wide and now
swollen river, in the face of a powerful enemy in his
immediate front. … To turn them above was practicable, but it
was a confessed return to McClellan's plan. Burnside chose the
first. Preparations foe crossing were begun. The better part
of three days [December 11-13] was consumed in throwing the
bridges and putting over the two Grand Divisions of Franklin
and Sumner, all of which was accomplished under fire. But Lee
was by no means unwilling to meet the Army of the Potomac
after this fashion. Such another happy prospect for him was
not apt soon again to occur. He did not dispute the crossing
in force. Burnside's one chance in a hundred lay in a
concentrated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy
could oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one well-sustained
attack, or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered away
this single chance by putting in Franklin on the left and
Sumner on the right, without concerted action." Both assaults
were bloodily repulsed. "Hooker is ordered across. Under
protest, and yet Hooker lacked not stomach for a fight, he
obeys the useless order, and leads his men into the slaughter
pen. … All is in vain. Even the Army of the Potomac cannot do
the impossible. The defeated troops are huddled into
Fredericksburg, and gradually withdrawn across the river.
Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault next
day. But the counsels of his officers prevailed on him to
desist. No such useless slaughter, with the exception,
perhaps, of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and 13,000
men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but one in three of
ours."

_T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War,
chapter 21._

ALSO IN:
A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps,
part 2, chapters 4-8.

_F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapters 5-6._

_B. P. Poore,
Life of Burnside,
chapters 18-19._

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 21._

_J. Longstreet,
D. N. Couch, and others,
Burnside at Fredericksburg,
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3)._

_F. W. Palfrey,
The Antietam and Fredericksburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5), pages 129-135._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (December: On the Mississippi).
The second attempt against Vicksburg.
General Sherman and Admiral Porter.
Miscarriage of Grant's plans.

"Rear-Admiral Porter took command of the Mississippi squadron
in October, 1862. … Up to this time the gun-boats had,
strictly speaking, been under the control of the Army, but now
all this was changed, and the Mississippi Squadron, like all
the other naval forces, was brought directly under the
supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. … The new
arrangement left the commander of the squadron at liberty to
undertake any expedition he thought proper, and he was not in
the least hampered by any instructions from the Navy
Department. … Before Admiral Porter left Washington he was
informed by the President that General McClernand had been
ordered to raise an Army at Springfield, Illinois, to
prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. The President expressed the
hope that the rear-admiral would co-operate heartily with
General McClernand in the operations to be carried on. But as
Vicksburg never would have been taken if it had depended on
General McClernand's raising an Army sufficient for the
purpose, the Admiral, immediately on his arrival at Cairo,
sent a message to General Grant, at Holly Springs,
Mississippi, informing him of McClernand's intention; that he,
Porter, had assumed command of the Mississippi Squadron, and
was ready to cooperate with the Army on every occasion where
the services of the Navy could be useful. A few days
afterwards General Grant arrived at Cairo and proposed an
expedition against Vicksburg, and asking the rear-admiral, if
he could furnish a sufficient force of gun-boats, to accompany
it. Grant's plan was to embark Sherman from Memphis, where he
then was, with 30,000 soldiers, to be joined at Helena,
Arkansas, by 10,000 more. Grant himself would march from Holly
Springs with some 60,000 men upon Granada. General Pemberton
would naturally march from Vicksburg to stop Grant at Granada,
until reinforcements could be thrown into Vicksburg from the
south, and while Pemberton was thus absent with the greater
part of his Army, Sherman and Porter could get possession of
the defences of Vicksburg.
{3486}
General Grant having been informed that the gun-boats would be
ready to move at short notice, and having sent orders to
Sherman to put his troops aboard the transports as soon as the
gun-boats arrived in Memphis, returned immediately to Holly
Springs to carry out his part of the programme. … The
expedition from Memphis got away early in December, 1862.
Commander Walke, in the 'Carondelet,' being sent ahead with
[three iron-clads and two so-called 'tin-clads'] … to clear
the Yazoo River of torpedoes and cover the landing of
Sherman's Army when it should arrive. This arduous and
perilous service was well performed," but one of the
iron-clads engaged in it, the Cairo, was sunk by a torpedo.
"General Sherman moved his transports to a point on the river
called Chickasaw Bayou without the loss of a man from
torpedoes or sharpshooters, his landing [December 27] being
covered in every direction by the gunboats. Sherman first made
a feint on Haines' Bluff, as if to attack the works, and then
landed at Chickasaw Bayou. Owing to the late heavy rains he
found the roads to Vicksburg heights almost impassable, and
when he attempted to advance with his Army he was headed off
by innumerable bayous, which had to be bridged, or corduroy
roads built around them. It was killing work. Even at this
time Vicksburg had been fortified at every point, and its only
approaches by land led through dense swamps or over boggy open
ground, where heavy guns were placed, so as to mow down an
advancing Army. A general has seldom had so difficult a task
assigned him, and there was little chance of Sherman's
succeeding unless Pemberton had drawn off nearly all his
forces to oppose Grant's advance on Granada. … Sherman and his
Army overcame everything and at last reached terra firma. In
the meanwhile the Navy was doing what it could to help the
Army. … Grant had left Holly Springs with a large Army at the
time he had appointed, merely with the design of drawing
Pemberton from Vicksburg and thus helping Sherman in his
attack on that place. … Grant moved towards Granada, and
everything looked well; but the Confederate General, Earl Van
Dorn, dashed into Holly Springs, 28 miles in the rear of the
Union Army, capturing the garrison and all their stores. At
the same time General Forrest pushed his cavalry into West
Tennessee, cutting the railroad to Columbus at several points
between that place and Jackson. … Due precautions had been
taken to prevent this mishap by leaving a strong force behind
at Holly Springs, but the commanding officer was not on the
alert and his capture was a complete surprise. In this raid of
the Confederates a million dollars' worth of stores were
destroyed. Under the circumstances it was impossible for Grant
to continue his march on Granada, which Pemberton perceiving,
the latter returned to Vicksburg in time to assist in
Sherman's repulse. … Sherman made all his arrangements to
attack the enemy's works on the 20th of December, 1862, and
the assault took place early on that day. One division
succeeded in occupying the batteries on the heights, and hoped
shortly to reach those commanding the city of Vicksburg, but
the division that was to follow the advance was behind time
and the opportunity was lost. A portion of Pemberton's Army
had returned from Granada just in time to overwhelm and drive
back the small force that had gained the hills. … The enemy
did not follow, being satisfied with driving our troops from
the heights, and there was nothing left for Sherman to do but
to get his Army safely back to the transports."

_D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the Civil War,
chapter 24._

ALSO IN:
_S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin,
Sherman and his Campaigns,
chapter 7._

_W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 11._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862-1863
(December-January: Tennessee).
Bragg and Rosecrans.
The Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough.

"The Confederate government was greatly disappointed with the
issue of Bragg's campaign. Scarcely had he reached Chattanooga
when he was ordered to move northward again. Rosecrans, on
assuming command of Buell's army, … concentrated his forces at
Nashville, and there accumulated large supplies. … Bragg had
already reached Murfreesborough on his second northward march
from Chattanooga. Rosecrans had given out that it was his
intention to take up his winter quarters at Nashville, and
Bragg, supposing that this would be the case, sent out strong
detachments of cavalry under Morgan and Forrest, the former
being ordered to break Rosecrans's communications. As it was
about the season of Christmas, Murfreesborough was the scene
of much gayety … and the giddy Confederates danced on floors
carpeted with the American flag. Suddenly, on the 26th of
December, Rosecrans moved. His march commenced in a heavy min.
The Confederate outposts retired before his advance, the
pressure upon them being so vigorous that they had not time to
destroy the bridges on the Jefferson and Murfreesborough
turnpikes. On the 30th, Bragg, finding he was about to be
assailed, had concentrated his army a couple of miles in front
of Murfreesborough. The position of the national army, which
was 43,000 strong on the evening of that day, was on the west
side of Stone River, a sluggish stream fringed with cedar
brakes, and here flowing in a north-northwesterly course. The
line ranged nearly north and south, and was three or four
miles in length. Crittenden was on its left, with three
divisions. Wood, Vancleve, Palmer; Thomas in the centre, with
two divisions, Negley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve;
McCook on the right with three, Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The
left wing touched the river. … Bragg's army, 62,000, stood
between Rosecrans and Murfreesborough. … Breckinridge's
division formed his right, in his centre, under Polk, were two
divisions, those of Withers and Cheatham; on his left, under
Hardee, two divisions, Cleburne and McCown. The river
separated Breckinridge from the rest of the Confederate army.
Rosecrans had concentrated two thirds of his force on his
left. His intention was that his right wing, standing on the
defensive, should simply hold its ground; but his extreme
left, the divisions of Wood and Vancleve, crossing Stone
River, should assail Breckinridge's division, exposed there,
and seize the heights. … On his part, also, Bragg had
determined to take the offensive. … Both intended to strike
with the left, and therefore both massed their force on that
wing. … In the dawn of the last day of the year (1862), while
Rosecrans's left was rapidly crossing Stone River to make its
expected attack, Bragg, with his left, had already anticipated
him. Coming out of a fog which had settled on the
battle-field, he fell furiously upon Johnson's division, and
so unexpectedly that two of its batteries were taken before a
gun could be fired.
{3487}
The Confederate success was decisive. Johnson's division,
which was on the extreme national right, was instantly swept
away. Davis, who stood next, was assailed in front and on his
uncovered flank. He made a stout resistance, but the shock was
too great; he was compelled to give way, with the loss of many
guns. And now the triumphant Confederate left, the centre also
coming into play, rushed upon the next division—but that was
commanded by Sheridan. Rosecrans's aggressive movement was
already paralyzed; nay, more, it had to be abandoned. He had
to withdraw his left for the purpose of saving his right and
defending his communications. He must establish a new line.
The possibility of doing this—the fate of the battle—rested on
Sheridan." He held his ground for an hour, until "the
cartridge-boxes of his men were empty. The time had come when
even Sheridan must fall back. But, if he had not powder, he
had steel. The fixed bayonets of his reserve brigade covered
him, and he retired, unconquered and unshaken, out of the
cedar thicket toward the Nashville road. In this memorable and
most glorious resistance he had lost 1,630 men. 'Here's all
that are left,' he said to Rosecrans, whom he had saved and
now met. After Sheridan had been pushed back, there was
nothing for Negley but to follow. … Meantime, on a knoll in
the plain to which these divisions had receded, Rosecrans had
massed his artillery. He was forming a new line, in which the
army would face southwestwardly, with the Nashville turnpike
on its rear." Against this new line the Confederates dashed
themselves, desperately but vainly, four times that day, and
were repelled with horrible slaughter. "Bragg, unwilling to be
foiled, now brought Breckinridge, who had hitherto been
untouched, across the river to make a final attempt on
Rosecrans's left flank with 7,000 fresh men. His first attack
was repulsed; he made a second; it shared the same fate. So
stood affairs when night came, … the closing night of 1862. On
New Year's Day nothing was done; the two armies, breathless
with their death-struggle, stood looking at each other. On
January 2d Rosecrans was found, not retreating, but busily
engaged in trying to carry out his original plan. He had made
his position impregnable; he had thrown a force across Stone
River, and, as he at first intended, was getting ready to
crown with artillery the heights beyond the east bank.
Hereupon Bragg brought Breckinridge back to his old position,
ordering him to drive the enemy across the river—a task which
that officer bravely tried, but only imperfectly accomplished,
for the artillery on the opposite bank tore his division to
pieces. In twenty minutes he lost 2,000 men. A violent storm
prevented the renewal of the battle on the 3d. On that night
Bragg, despairing of success, withdrew from Murfreesborough,
retreating to Tullahoma. … In these dreadful battles the
Confederates lost 14,700 men. On the national side there were
killed 1,553, wounded more than 7,000, prisoners more than
3,000; more than one third of its artillery and a large
portion of its train were taken. The losses were about one
fourth of each army. Henceforth the Confederates abandoned all
thought of crossing the Ohio River."

_J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 53 (volume 2)._

"The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far—only behind
Duck River to Shelbyville and Tullahoma—and but little
endeavor was made to follow him. Indeed, we were not in
condition to pursue, even if it had been the intention at the
outset of the campaign. … The victory quieted the fears of the
West and Northwest, destroyed the hopes of the secession
element in Kentucky, renewed the drooping spirits of the East
Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists in Middle
Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned
the result on the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have
planned the battle with the idea that the enemy would continue
passive, remain entirely on the defensive, and that it was
necessary only to push forward our left in order to force the
evacuation of Murfreesboro'. … Had Bragg followed up with the
spirit which characterized its beginning the successful attack
by Hardee on our right wing—and there seems no reason why he
should not have done so—the army of Rosecrans still might have
got back to Nashville, but it would have been depleted and
demoralized."

_P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 12-14._

ALSO IN:
_A. F. Stevenson,
Battle of Stone's River._

_T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapters 16-17 (volume 1)._

_Official Records,
series 1, volume 20._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January).
The final Proclamation of Emancipation.

The immediate practical effect of the warning Proclamation of
Emancipation issued by President Lincoln on the 22d of
September, 1862, "did, perhaps, more nearly answer the
apprehensions of the President than the expectations of those
most clamorous for it. It did, as charged, very much 'unite
the South and divide the North.' The cry of 'the perversion of
the war for the Union into a war for the negro' became the
Democratic watchword, and was sounded everywhere with only too
disastrous effect, as was plainly revealed by the fall
elections with their large Democratic gains and Republican
losses. Indeed, it was the opinion of Mr. Greeley that, could
there have been a vote taken at that time on the naked issue,
a large majority would have pronounced against emancipation.
But Mr. Lincoln did not falter. Notwithstanding these
discouraging votes at the North, and the refusal of any
Southern State to avail itself of the proffered immunity and
aid of his Proclamation of September, he proceeded, at the
close of the hundred days of grace allowed by it, to issue his
second and absolute Proclamation, making all the slaves of the
Rebel States and parts of States forever and irreversibly
free." It was in the following words:

"Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a
proclamation was issued by the President of the United States,
containing, among other things, the following, to wit: 'That
on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as
slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the
people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United
States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and
the Executive Government of the United States, including the
military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or
acts to repress such persons or any of them, in any efforts
they may make for their actual freedom.
{3488}
That the Executive will, on the first day of January
aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and parts of
states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall
then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact
that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in
good faith represented in the Congress of the United States,
by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of
the qualified voters of such state shall have participated,
shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be
deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people
thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.'
Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power in me vested as
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States,
in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and
government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary
war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first
day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so
to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred
days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate,
as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof
respectively are this day in rebellion against the United
States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana
(except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson,
St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre
Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including
the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except
the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also
the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth
City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of
Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the
present left precisely as if this proclamation were not
issued. And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose
aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as
slaves within said designated states and parts of states are
and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive
Government of the United States, including the military and
naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the
freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people
so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless
in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in
all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable
wages. And I further declare and make known that such persons
of suitable condition will be received into the armed service
of the United States, to garrison forts, positions, stations,
and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said
service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of
justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military
necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and
the gracious favor of Almighty God.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States
of America the eighty-seventh.
Abraham Lincoln.
By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."

"Though the immediate effects of the Proclamation might not
have answered all that was expected of it, it was not many
months before its happy influences became manifest. Its
tendency from the first was to unify and consolidate the
antislavery and Christian sentiment of the land, to give
dignity and consistency to the conflict. … It strengthened,
too, the cause immensely with other nations, secured the
sympathy and moral support of Christendom, and diminished, if
it did not entirely remove, the danger of foreign
intervention."

_H. Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power,
volume 3, chapter 28._