Chapter IV: , VII (101)

"About the beginning of 424 B. C. Brasidas did for Sparta what
Demosthenes had done for the Athenians. Just as Demosthenes
had understood that the severest blow which he could inflict
on Sparta was to occupy the coasts of Laconia, so Brasidas
understood that the most effective method of assailing the
Athenians was to arouse the allies to revolution, and by all
means to aid the uprising. But since, from lack of a
sufficient naval force, he could not work on the islands, he
resolved to carry the war to the allied cities of the
Athenians situated on the coast of Macedonia; especially since
Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, the inhabitants of Chalkidike,
and some other districts subject to the Athenians, had sought
the assistance of Sparta, and had asked Brasidas to lead the
undertaking. Sparta permitted his departure, but so little did
she appear disposed to assist him, that she granted him only
700 Helots. In addition to these, however, he succeeded,
through the money sent from Chalkidike, in enrolling about
1,000 men from the Peloponnesus. With this small force of
1,700 hoplites, Brasidas resolved to undertake this
adventurous and important expedition. He started in the spring
of 424, and reached Macedonia through eastern Hellas and
Thessaly. He effected the march with great daring and wisdom,
and on his way he also saved Megara, which was in extreme
danger from the Athenians. Reaching Macedonia and uniting
forces with Perdikkas, Brasidas detached from the Athenians
many cities, promising them liberty from the tyranny they
suffered, and their association in the Peloponnesian alliance
on equal terms. He made good these promises by great military
experience and perfectly honest dealings. In December he
became master of Amphipolis, perhaps the most important of all
the foreign possessions of Athens. The historian Thucydides,
to whom was intrusted the defense of that important town, was
at Thasos when Brasidas surprised it. He hastened to the
assistance of the threatened city, but did not arrive in time
to prevent its capture. Dr. Thirlwall says it does not appear
that human prudence and activity could have accomplished
anything more under the same circumstances; yet his
unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence under
which he spent twenty years of his life in exile, where he
composed his history. … The revolution of the allied cities
in Macedonia astonished the Athenians, who almost at the same
time sustained other misfortunes. Following the advice of
Kleon, instead of directing their main efforts to the
endangered Chalkidike, they decided, about the middle of 424,
to recover Bœotia itself, in conjunction as usual with some
malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down
and democratize the oligarchical governments. The undertaking,
however, was not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a
ruinous defeat. A force of 7,000 hoplites [among them,
Socrates, the philosopher—see DELIUM], several hundred
horsemen, and 25,000 light-armed under command of Hippokrates,
took possession of Delium, a spot strongly situated,
overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and very
near the Attic confines. But while the Athenians were still
occupied in raising their fortifications, they were suddenly
startled by the sound of the Bœotian pæan, and found
themselves attacked by an army of 7,000 hoplites, 1,000 horse,
and 500 peltasts. The Athenians suffered a complete defeat,
and were driven away with great loss. Such was the change of
affairs which took place in 424 B. C. During the preceding
year they could have ended the war in a manner most
advantageous to them. They did not choose to do so, and were
now constantly defeated. Worse still, the seeds of revolt
spread among the allied cities. The best citizens, among whom
Nikias was a leader, finally persuaded the people that it was
necessary to come to terms of peace, while affairs were yet
undecided. For, although the Athenians had suffered the
terrific defeat near Delium, and had lost Amphipolis and other
cities of Macedonia, they were still masters of Pylos, of
Kythera, of Methone, of Nisæa, and of the Spartans captured in
Sphakteria; so that there was now an equality of advantages
and of losses. Besides, the Lacedæmonians were ever ready to
lay aside the sword in order to regain their men. Again, the
oligarchy in Sparta envied Brasidas, and did not look with
pleasure on his splendid achievements. Lately they had refused
to send him any assistance whatever: The opportunity,
therefore, was advantageous for the conclusion of peace, …
Such were the arguments by which Nikias and his party finally
gained the ascendency over Kleon, and in the beginning of 423
B. C. persuaded the Athenians to enter into an armistice of
one year, within which they hoped to be able to put an end to
the destructive war by a lasting peace. Unfortunately, the
armistice could not be carried out in Chalkidike. The cities
there continued in their rebellion against the Athenians.
Brasidas could not be prevailed upon to leave them unprotected
in the struggle which they had undertaken, relying on his
promises of assistance. The war-like party at Athens, taking
advantage of this, succeeded in frustrating any definite
conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians,
seeing that the war was continued, sent an ample force to
Brasidas. This army did not succeed in reaching him, because
the king of Macedonia, Perdikkas, had in the meantime become
angered with Brasidas, and persuaded the Thessalians to oppose
the Lacedæmonians in their passage. The year of the armistice
passed, and Kleon renewed his expostulations against the
incompetency of the generals who had the control of affairs in
Chalkidike. … The Athenians decided to forward a new force,
and intrusted its command to Kleon. He therefore, in August,
422 B. C., started from the Peiræus, with 1,200 hoplites, 300
horsemen, a considerable number of allies, and thirty
triremes. Reaching Chalkidike, he engaged in battle against
Brasidas in Amphipolis, suffered a disgraceful defeat, and was
killed while fleeing. Brasidas also ended his short but
glorious career in this battle, dying the death of a hero. The
way in which his memory was honored was the best evidence of
the deep impression that he had made on the Hellenic world.
{1586}
All the allies attended his funeral in arms, and interred him
at the public expense, in front of the market-place of
Amphipolis. … Thus disappeared the two foremost champions of
the war—its good spirit, Brasidas, and its evil, Kleon. The
party of Nikias finally prevailed at Athens, and that general
soon after arranged a conference with King Pleistoanax of
Sparta, who was also anxious for peace. Discussions continued
during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of
Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side.
Finally, at the beginning of the spring of 421 B. C., a peace
of fifty years was agreed upon. The principal conditions of
this peace, known in history as the 'peace of Nikias,' were as
follows:

1. The Lacedæmonians and their allies were to restore
Amphipolis and all the prisoners to the Athenians. They were
further to relinquish to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus,
Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But, with the
exception of Amphipolis, these cities were to remain
independent, paying to the Athenians only the usual tribute of
the time of Aristeides.

2. The Athenians should restore to the Lacedæmonians
Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, with all
the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies.

3. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sermylus, or any other town in
the possession of Athens, the Athenians should have the right
to adopt such measures as they pleased.

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies should restore Panaktum
to the Athenians.

When these terms were submitted at Sparta to the consideration
of the allied cities, the majority accepted them. The
Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, however, summarily
refused their consent. The Peloponnesian war was now
considered to be at an end, precisely ten years from its
beginning; Both the combatants came out from it terribly
maimed. Sparta not only did not attain her object—the
emancipation of the Hellenic cities from the tyranny of the
Athenians—but even officially recognized this tyranny, by
consenting that the Athenians should adopt such measures as
they choose toward the allied cities. Besides, Sparta obtained
an ill repute throughout Hellas, because she had abandoned the
Greeks in Chalkidike, who had at her instigation revolted, and
because she had also sacrificed the interests of her principal
allies. … Athens, on the other hand, preserved intact her
supremacy, for which she undertook the struggle. This,
however, was gained at the cost of Attica ravaged, a multitude
of citizens slain, the exhaustion of the treasury, and the
increase of the common hatred."

_T. T. Timayenis,
History of Greece,
part 5, chapter 4 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 23 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 421-418.
The Peloponnesian War:
New combinations.
The Argive League against Sparta.
Conflicting alliances of Athens with both.
Rising influence of Alcibiades.
War in Argos.
Spartan victory at Mantinea.
Revolution in Argos.

"All the Spartan allies in Peloponnesus and the Boeotians
refused to join in this treaty [of Nicias]. The latter
concluded with the Athenians only a truce of ten days … ,
probably on condition, that, if no notice was given to the
contrary, it was to be constantly renewed after the lapse of
ten days. With Corinth there existed no truce at all. Some of
the terms of the peace were not complied with, though this was
the case much less on the part of Athens than on that of
Sparta. … The Spartans, from the first, were guilty of
infamous deception, and this immediately gave rise to bitter
feelings. But before matters had come to this, and when the
Athenians were still in the full belief that the Spartans were
honest, all Greece was startled by a treaty of alliance
between Athens and Sparta against their common enemies. This
treaty was concluded very soon after the peace. … The
consequence was, that Sparta suddenly found herself deserted
by all her allies; the Corinthians and Boeotians renounced
her, because they found themselves given over to the
Athenians, and the Boeotians perhaps thought that the
Spartans, if they could but reduce the Eleans to the condition
of Helots, would readily allow Boeotia to be subdued by the
Athenians. Thus Argos found the means of again following a
policy which ever since the time of Cleomenes it had not
ventured to think of, and … became the centre of an alliance
with Mantinea, 'which had always been opposed to the
Lacedaemonians,' and some other Arcadian towns, Achaia, Elis,
and some places of the Acte. The Arcadians had dissolved their
union, the three people of the country had separated
themselves, though sometimes they united again; and thus it
happened that only some of their towns were allied with Argos.
Corinth at first would listen to neither party, and chose to
remain neutral; 'for although for the moment it was highly
exasperated against Sparta, yet it had at all times
entertained a mortal hatred of Argos, and its own interests
drew it towards Sparta.' But when, owing to Sparta's
dishonesty, the affairs on the coasts of Thrace became more
and more complicated, when the towns refused to submit to
Athens, and when it became evident that this was the
consequence of the instigations of Sparta, then the relation
subsisting between the two states became worse also in Greece,
and various negotiations and cavillings ensued. … After much
delay, the Athenians and Spartans were already on the point of
taking up arms against each other; but then they came to the
singular agreement (Olympiad 89, 4), that the Athenians should
retain possession of Pylos, but keep in it only Athenian
troops, and not allow the Helots and Messenians to remain
there. After this the loosened bonds between the Spartans,
Corinthians, and Boeotians, were drawn more closely. The
Boeotians were at length prevailed upon to surrender Panacton
to the Spartans, who now restored it to the Athenians. This
was in accordance with the undoubted meaning of the peace; but
the Boeotians had first destroyed the place, and the Spartans
delivered it to the Athenians only a heap of ruins. The
Athenians justly complained, that this was not an honest
restoration, and that the place ought to have been given back
to them with its fortifications uninjured. The Spartans do not
appear to have had honest intentions in any way. … While
thus the alliance between Athens and Sparta, in the eyes of
the world, still existed, it had in reality ceased and become
an impossibility. Another alliance, however, was formed
between Athens and Argos (Olympiad 89, 4) through the
influence of Alcibiades, who stood in the relation of an
hereditary proxenus to Argos.
{1587}
A more natural alliance than this could not be conceived, and
by it the Athenians gained the Mantineans, Eleans, and other
Peloponnesians over to their side. Alcibiades now exercised a
decisive influence upon the fate of his country. … We
generally conceive Alcibiades as a man whose beauty was his
ornament, and to whom the follies of life were the main thing,
and we forget that part of his character which history reveals
to us. … Thucydides, who cannot be suspected of having been
particularly partial to Alcibiades, most expressly recognises
the fact, that the fate of Athens depended upon him, and that,
if he had not separated his own fate from that of his native
city, at first from necessity, but afterwards of his own
accord, the course of the Peloponnesian war, through his
personal influence alone, would have taken quite a different
direction, and that he alone would have decided it in favour
of Athens. This is, in fact, the general opinion of all
antiquity, and there is no ancient writer of importance who
does not view and estimate him in this light. It is only the
moderns that entertain a derogatory opinion of him, and speak
of him as an eccentric fool, who ought not to be named among
the great statesmen of antiquity. … Alcibiades is quite a
peculiar character; and I know no one in the whole range of
ancient history who might be compared with him, though I have
sometimes thought of Caesar. … Alcibiades was opposed to the
peace of Nicias from entirely personal, perhaps even mean,
motives. … It was on his advice that Athens concluded the
alliance with Argos and Elis. Athens now had two alliances
which were equally binding, and yet altogether opposed to each
other: the one with Sparta, and an equally stringent one with
Argos, the enemy of Sparta. This treaty with Argos, the
Peloponnesians, etc., was extremely formidable to the
Spartans; and they accordingly, for once, determined to act
quickly, before it should be too late. The alliance with
Argos, however, did not confer much real strength upon Athens,
for the Argives were lazy, and Elis did not respect them,
whence the Spartans had time again to unite themselves more
closely with Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara. When, therefore,
the war between the Spartans and Argives broke out, and the
former resolutely took the field, Alcibiades persuaded the
Athenians to send succour to the Argives, and thus the peace
with Sparta was violated in an unprincipled manner. But still
no blow was struck between Argos and Sparta. … King Agis had
set out with a Spartan army, but concluded a truce with the
Argives (Olympiad 90, 2); this, however, was taken very ill at
Sparta, and the Argive commanders who had concluded it were
censured by the people and magistrates of Argos. Soon
afterwards the war broke out again, and, when the Athenian
auxiliaries appeared, decided acts of hostility commenced. The
occasion was an attempt of the Mantineans to subdue Tegea: the
sad condition of Greece became more particularly manifest in
Arcadia, by the divisions which tore one and the same nation
to pieces. The country was distracted by several parties; had
Arcadia been united, it would have been invulnerable. A battle
was fought (Olympiad 90, 3) in the neighbourhood of Mantinea,
between the Argives, their Athenian allies, the Mantineans,
and part of the Arcadians ('the Eleans, annoyed at the conduct
of the Argives, had abandoned their cause'), on the one hand,
and the Spartans and a few allies on the other. The Spartans
gained a most decisive victory; and, although they did not
follow it up, yet the consequence was, that Argos concluded
peace, the Argive alliance broke up, and at Argos a revolution
took place, in which an oligarchical government was
instituted, and by which Argos was drawn into the interest of
Sparta (Olympiad 90, 4). This constitution, however, did not
last, and very soon gave way to a democratic form of
government. Argos, even at this time, and still more at a
later period, is a sad example of the most degenerate and
deplorable democracy, or, more properly speaking, anarchy."

_B. G. Niebuhr,
Lectures on Ancient History,
lecture 49 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:
_Plutarch,
Alcibiades._

_W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapter 17 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 416.
Siege and conquest of Melos by the Athenians.
Massacre of the inhabitants.

"It was in the beginning of summer 416 B. C. that the
Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian
island of Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except
Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos
and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom
they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined
the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with
Athens; but, at the same time, neither had they ever taken
part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground
of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth
year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending
against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and
Tisias."

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 56._

"They desired immediate submission on the part of Melos, any
attempt at resistance being regarded as an inroad upon the
omnipotence of Athens by sea. For this reason they were wroth
at the obstinate courage of the islanders, who broke off all
further negotiations, and thus made it necessary for the
Athenians to commence a costly circumvallation of the city.
The Melians even succeeded on two successive occasions in
breaking through part of the wall built round them by the
enemy, and obtaining fresh supplies; but no relief arrived;
and they had to undergo sufferings which made the 'Melian
famine' a proverbial phrase to express the height of misery;
and before the winter ended the island was forced to surrender
unconditionally. … There was no question of quarter. All the
islanders capable of bearing arms who had fallen into the
hands of the Athenians were sentenced to death, and all the
women and children to slavery."

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 4 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN:
_Thucydides,
History,
book 5, sections 84-116._

GREECE: B. C. 415.
The mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 415.

GREECE: B. C. 415-413.
The Peloponnesian War:
Disastrous Athenian expedition against Syracuse.
Alcibiades a fugitive in Sparta.
His enmity to Athens.

See SYRACUSE: B. C. 415-413.

{1588}

GREECE: B. C. 413.
The Peloponnesian War:
Effects and consequences of the Sicilian expedition.
Prostration of Athens.
Strengthening of Sparta.
Negotiations with the Persians against Athens.
Peloponnesian invasion of Attica.
The Decelian War.

"The Sicilian expedition ended in a series of events which, to
this day, it is impossible to recall without a feeling of
horror. … Since the Persian wars it had never come to pass,
that on the one side all had been so completely lost, while on
the other all was won. … When the Athenians recovered from
the first stupefaction of grief, they called to mind the
causes of the whole calamity, and hereupon in passionate fury
turned round upon all who had advised the expedition, or who
had encouraged vain hopes of victory, as orators, prophets, or
soothsayers. Finally, the general excitement passed into the
phase of despair and terror, conjuring up dangers even greater
and more imminent than existed in reality. The citizens every
day expected to see the Sicilian fleet with the Peloponnesians
appear off the harbor, to take possession of the defenceless
city; and they believed that the last days of Athens had
arrived. … Athens had risked all her military and naval
resources for the purpose of overcoming Syracuse. More than
200 ships of state, with their entire equipment, had been
lost; and if we reckon up the numbers despatched on successive
occasions to Sicily, the sum total, inclusive of the auxiliary
troops, may be calculated at about 60,000 men. A squadron
still lay in the waters of Naupactus; but even this was in
danger and exposed to attack from the Corinthians, who had
equipped fresh forces. The docks and naval arsenals were
empty, and the treasury likewise. In the hopes of enormous
booty and an abundance of new revenues, no expense had been
spared; and the resources of the city were entirely exhausted.
… But, far heavier than the material losses in money, ships,
and men, was the moral blow which had been received by Athens,
and which was more dangerous in her case than in that of any
other state, because her whole power was based on the fear
inspired in the subject states, so long as they saw the fleets
of Athens absolutely supreme at sea. The ban of this fear had
now been removed; disturbances arose in those island-states
which were most necessary to Athens, and whose existence
seemed to be most indissolubly blended with that of Attica,
—in Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos; everywhere the oligarchical
parties raised their head, in order to overthrow the odious
dominion of Athens. … Sparta, on the other hand, had in the
course of a few months, without sending out an army or
incurring any danger or losses, secured to herself the
greatest advantages, such as she could not have obtained from
the most successful campaign. Gylippus had again proved the
value of a single Spartan man: inasmuch as in the hour of the
greatest danger his personal conduct had altered the course of
the most important and momentous transaction of the entire
war. He was, in a word, the more fortunate successor of
Brasidas. The authority of Sparta in the Peloponnesus, which
the peace of Nicias had weakened, was now restored; with the
exception of Argos and Elis, all her allies were on amicable
terms with her; the brethren of her race beyond the sea, who
had hitherto held aloof, had, by the attack made by the
Athenian invasion, been drawn into the war, and had now become
the most zealous and ardent allies of the Peloponnesians. …
Moreover, the Athenians had driven the most capable of all
living statesmen and commanders into the enemy's camp. No man
was better adapted than Alcibiades for rousing the
slowly-moving Lacedæmonians to energetic action; and it was he
who supplied them with the best advice, and with the most
accurate information as to Athenian politics and localities.
Lastly, the Spartans were at the present time under a warlike
king, the enterprising and ambitious Agis, the son of
Archidamus. … Nothing was now required, except pecuniary
means. And even these now unexpectedly offered themselves to
the Spartans, in consequence of the events which had in the
meantime occurred in the Persian empire. … Everywhere [in
that empire] sedition raised its head, particularly in Asia
Minor. Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had on several
previous occasions interfered in Greek affairs, rose in
revolt. He was supported by Greek soldiers, under the command
of an Athenian of the name of Lycon. The treachery of the
latter enabled Darius to overthrow Pissuthnes, whose son,
Amorges, maintained himself by Athenian aid in Caria. After
the fall of Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear in
Asia Minor as the first dignitaries of the Great King.
Tissaphernes succeeded Pissuthnes as satrap in the maritime
provinces. He was furious at the assistance offered by Athens
to the party of his adversary; moreover, the Great King
(possibly in consequence of the Sicilian war and the
destruction of the Attic fleet) demanded that the tributes
long withheld by the coast-towns, which were still regarded as
subject to the Persian empire, should now be levied.
Tissaphernes was obliged to pay the sums according to the rate
at which they were entered in the imperial budget of Persia;
and thus, in order to reimburse himself, found himself forced
to pursue a war policy. … Everything now depended for the
satrap upon obtaining assistance from a Greek quarter. He
found opportunities for this purpose in Ionia itself, in all
the more important cities of which a Persian party existed.
… The most important and only independent power in Ionia was
Chios. Here the aristocratic families had with great sagacity
contrived to retain the government. … It was their
government which now became the focus of the conspiracy
against Athens, in the first instance establishing a
connection on the opposite shore with Erythræ. Hereupon
Tissaphernes opened negotiations with both cities, and in
conjunction with them despatched an embassy to Peloponnesus
charged with persuading the Spartans to place themselves at
the head of the Ionian movement, the satrap at the same time
promising to supply pay and provisions to the Peloponnesian
forces. The situation of Pharnabazus was the same as that of
Tissaphernes. Pharnabazus was the satrap of the northern
province. … Pharnabazus endeavored to outbid Tissaphernes in
his promises; and two powerful satraps became rival suitors
for the favor of Sparta, to whom they offered money and their
alliance. … While thus the most dangerous combinations were
on all sides forming against Athens, the war had already
broken out in Greece. This time Athens had been the first to
commence direct hostilities. … A Peloponnesian army under
Agis invaded Attica, with the advent of the spring of B. C.
413 (Olympiad xci. 3); at which date it was already to be
anticipated how the Sicilian war would end. For twelve years
Attica had been spared hostile invasions, and the vestiges of
former wars had been effaced.
{1589}
The present devastations were therefore doubly ruinous; while
at the same time it was now impossible to take vengeance upon
the Peloponnesians by means of naval expeditions. And the
worst point in the case was that they were now fully resolved,
instead of recurring to their former method of carrying on the
war and undertaking annual campaigns, to occupy permanently a
fortified position on Attic soil." The invaders seized a
strong position at Decelea, only fourteen miles northward from
Athens, on a rocky peak of Mount Parnes, and fortified
themselves so strongly that the Athenians ventured on no
attempt to dislodge them. From this secure station they
ravaged the surrounding country at pleasure. "This success was
of such importance that even in ancient times it gave the name
of the Decelean War to the entire last division of the
Peloponnesian War. The occupation of Decelea forms the
connecting link between the Sicilian War and the
Attico-Peloponnesian, which now broke out afresh. … Its
immediate object … it failed to effect; inasmuch as the
Athenians did not allow it to prevent their despatching a
fresh armament to Sicily. But when, half a year later, all was
lost, the Athenians felt more heavily than ever the burden
imposed upon them by the occupation of Decelea. The city was
cut off from its most important source of supplies, since the
enemy had in his power the roads communicating with Eubœa. …
One-third of Attica no longer belonged to the Athenians, and
even in the immediate vicinity of the city communication was
unsafe; large numbers of the country-people, deprived of labor
and means of subsistence, thronged the city; the citizens were
forced night and day to perform the onerous duty of keeping
watch."

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapters 4-5 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN:
_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
chapter 61 (volume 7)._

GREECE: B. C. 413-412.
The Peloponnesian War:
Revolt of Chios, Miletus, Lesbos, and Rhodes from Athens.
Revolution at Samos.
Intrigues of Alcibiades for a revolution at Athens and for his
own recall.

"Alkibiades … persuaded the Spartans to build a fleet, and
send it over to Asia to assist the Ionians in revolting. He
himself crossed at once to Chios with a few ships, in order to
begin the revolt. The government of Chios was in the hands of
the nobles; but they had hitherto served Athens so well that
the Athenians had not altered the government to a democracy.
Now, however, they revolted (B. C. 413). This was a heavy blow
to Athens, for Chios was the most powerful of the Ionian
States, and others would be sure to follow its example.
Miletus and Lesbos revolted in B. C. 412. The nobles of Samos
prepared to revolt, but the people were in favour of Athens,
and rose against the nobles, killing 200 of them, and
banishing 400 more. Athens now made Samos its free and equal
ally, instead of its subject, and Samos became the
head-quarters of the Athenian fleet and army. … The
Athenians … had now manned a fresh navy. They defeated the
Peloponnesian and Persian fleets together at Miletus, and were
only kept from besieging Miletus by the arrival of a fleet
from Syracuse. [This reinforcement of the enemy held them
powerless to prevent a revolt in Rhodes, carried out by the
oligarchs though opposed by the people.] Alkibiades had made
enemies among the Spartans, and when he had been some time in
Asia Minor an order came over from Sparta to put him to death.
He escaped to Tissaphernes, and now made up his mind to win
back the favour of Athens by breaking up the alliance between
Tissaphernes and the Spartans. He contrived to make a quarrel
between them about the rate of pay, and persuaded Tissaphernes
that it would be the best thing for Persia to let the Spartans
and Athenians wear one another out, without giving help to
either. Tissaphernes therefore kept the Spartans idle for
months, always pretending that he was on the point of bringing
up his fleet to help them. Alkibiades now sent a lying message
to the generals of the Athenian army at Samos that he could
get Athens the help of Tissaphernes, if the Athenians would
allow him to return from his exile: but he said that he could
never return while there was a democracy; so that if they
wished for the help of Persia they must change the government
to an oligarchy (B. C. 412). In the army at Samos there were
many rich men willing to see an oligarchy established at
Athens, and peace made with Sparta. … Therefore, though the
great mass of the army at Samos was democratical, a certain
number of powerful men agreed to the plan of Alkibiades for
changing the government. One of the conspirators, named
Pisander, was sent to Athens to instruct the clubs of nobles
and rich men to work secretly for this object. In these clubs
the overthrow of the democracy was planned. Citizens known to
be zealous for the constitution were secretly murdered. Terror
fell over the city, for no one except the conspirators knew
who did, and who did not, belong to the plot; and at last,
partly by force, the assembly was brought to abolish the
popular government."

_C. A. Fyffe,
History of Greece
(History Primer),
chapter 5, sections 36-39._

ALSO IN:
_G. W. Cox,
The Athenian Empire,
chapter 6._

_Thucydides,
History,
book 8, chapters 4-51._

GREECE: B. C. 411-407.
The Peloponnesian War:
Athenian victories at Cynossema and Abydos.
Exploits of Alcibiades.
His return to Athens and to supreme command.
His second deposition and exile.

While Athens was in the throes of its revolution, "the war was
prosecuted with vigour on the coast of Asia Minor. Mindarus,
who now commanded the Peloponnesian fleet, disgusted at length
by the often-broken promises of Tissaphernes, and the scanty
and irregular pay which he furnished, set sail from Miletus
and proceeded to the Hellespont, with the intention of
assisting the satrap Pharnabazus, and of effecting, if
possible, the revolt of the Athenian dependencies in that
quarter. Hither he was pursued by the Athenian fleet under
Thrasyllus. In a few days an engagement ensued (in August, 411
B. C.), in the famous straits between Sestos and Abydos, in
which the Athenians, though with a smaller force, gained the
victory, and erected a trophy on the promontory of Cynossema
[see CYNOSSEMA] near the tomb and chapel of the Trojan queen
Hecuba. The Athenians followed up their victory by the
reduction of Cyzicus, which had revolted from them. A month or
two afterward, another obstinate engagement took place between
the Peloponnesian and Athenian fleets near Abydos, which
lasted a whole day, and was at length decided in favour of the
Athenians by the arrival of Alcibiades with his squadron of 18
ships from Samos."

_W. Smith,
Smaller History of Greece,
chapter 13. _

{1590}

Alcibiades, although recalled, had "resolved to delay his
return until he had performed such exploits as might throw
fresh lustre over his name, and endear him to all classes of
his fellow-citizens. With this ambition he sailed with a small
squadron from Samos, and having gained information that
Mindarus, with the Peloponnesian fleet, had gone in pursuit of
the Athenian navy, he hastened to afford his countrymen
succour. Happily he arrived at the scene of action, near
Abydos, at a most critical moment; when, after a severe
engagement, the Spartans had on one side obtained an
advantage, and were pursuing the broken lines of the
Athenians. … He speedily decided the fortune of the day,
completely routed the Spartans, … broke many of their ships
in pieces, and took 30 from them. … His vanity after this
signal success had, however, nearly destroyed him; for, being
desirous of appearing to Tissaphernes as a conqueror instead
of a fugitive, he hastened with a splendid retinue to visit
him, when the crafty barbarian, thinking he should thus
appease the suspicions of the Spartans, caused him to be
arrested and confined in prison at Sardis. Hence, however, he
found means to escape. … He sailed immediately for the
Athenian camp to diffuse fresh animation among the soldiers,
and induce them hastily to embark on an expedition against
Mindarus and Pharnabazus, who were then with the residue of
the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicum" (Cyzicus). Mindarus was
defeated and killed and Pharnabazus driven to flight (B. C.
410). "Alcibiades pursued his victory, took Cyzicum without
difficulty, and, staining his conquest with a cruelty with
which he was not generally chargeable, put to death all the
Peloponnesians whom he found within the city. A very short
space of time elapsed after this brilliant success before
Alcibiades found another occasion to deserve the gratitude of
Athens," by defeating Pharnabazus, who had attacked the troops
of Thrasyllus while they were wasting the territory of Abydos.
He next reduced Chalcedon, bringing it back into the Athenian
alliance, and once more defeating Pharnabazus, when the
Persian satrap attempted to relieve the town. He also
recovered Selymbria, and took Byzantium (which had revolted)
after a severe fight (B. C. 408). "Alcibiades having raised
the fortunes of his country from the lowest state of
depression, not only by his brilliant victories, but his
conciliating policy, prepared to return and enjoy the praise
of his successes. He entered the Piræus [B. C. 407] in a
galley adorned with the spoils of numerous victories, followed
by a long line of ships which he had taken from the foe. …
The whole city came down to the harbour to see and welcome
him, and took no notice of Thrasybulus or Theramenes, his
fellow-commanders. … An assembly of the people being
convened, he addressed them in a gentle and modest speech,
imputing his calamities not to their envy, but to some evil
genius which pursued him. He exhorted them to take courage,
bade them oppose their enemies with all the fresh inspiration
of their zeal, and taught them to hope for happier days.
Delighted with these assurances, they presented him with a
crown of brass and gold, which never was before given to any
but the Olympic victors, invested him with absolute control
over their naval and military affairs, restored to him his
confiscated wealth, and ordered the ministers of religion to
absolve him from the curses which they had denounced against
him. Theodorus, however, the high-priest, evaded the last part
of the decree, by alleging that he had never cast any
imprecation on him, if he had committed no offence against the
republic. The tablets on which the curses against him had been
inscribed were taken to the shore, and thrown with eagerness
into the sea. His next measure heightened, if possible, the
brief lustre of his triumph. In consequence of the
fortification of Decelea by the Lacedæmonians, and their
having possession of the passes of the country, the procession
to Eleusis, in honour of Athene, had been long unable to take
its usual course, and being conducted by sea, had lost many of
its solemn and august ceremonials. He now, therefore, offered
to conduct the solemnity by land. … His proposal being
gladly accepted, he placed sentinels on the hills; and,
surrounding the consecrated band with his soldiers, conducted
the whole to Eleusis and back to Athens, without the slightest
opposition, or breach of that order and profound stillness
which he had exhorted the troops to maintain. After this
graceful act of homage to the religion he was once accused of
destroying, he was regarded by the common people as something
more than human; they looked on him as destined never to know
defeat, and believed their triumph was certain so long as he
was their commander. But, in the very height of his
popularity, causes of a second exile were maturing. The great
envied him in proportion to the people's confidence, and that
confidence itself became the means of his ruin: for, as the
people really thought the spell of invincibility was upon him,
they were prepared to attribute the least pause in his career
of glory to a treacherous design. He departed with a hundred
vessels, manned under his inspection, with colleagues of his
own choice, to reduce the isle of Chios to obedience. At
Andros he once more gained a victory over both the natives and
the Spartans, who attempted to assist them. But, on his
arrival at the chief scene of action, he found that he would
be unable to keep the soldiers from deserting, unless he could
raise money to pay them sums more nearly equal to those which
the Lacedæmonians offered, than the pay he was able to bestow.
He was compelled, therefore, to leave the fleet [at Notium]
and go into Caria in order to obtain supplies. While absent on
this occasion, he left Antiochus in the command. … To this
officer Alcibiades gave express directions that he should
refrain from coming to an engagement, whatever provocations he
might receive. Anxious, however, to display his bravery,
Antiochus took the first occasion to sail out in front of the
Lacedæmonian fleet, which lay near Ephesus, under the command
of Lysander, and attempt, by insults, to incite them to attack
him. Lysander accordingly pursued him; the fleets came to the
support of their respective admirals, and a general engagement
ensued, in which Antiochus was slain, and the Athenians
completely defeated. On receiving intelligence of this unhappy
reverse, Alcibiades hastened to the fleet, and eager to repair
the misfortune, offered battle to the Spartans; Lysander,
however, did not choose to risk the loss of his advantage by
accepting the challenge, and the Athenians were compelled to
retire. This event, for which no blame really attached to
Alcibiades, completed the ruin of his influence at Athens.
{1591}
It was believed that this, the first instance of his failure,
must have arisen from corruption, or, at least, from a want of
inclination to serve his country. He was also accused of
leaving the navy under the direction of those who had no other
recommendation to the charge but having been sharers in his
luxurious banquets, and of having wandered about to indulge in
profligate excesses. … On these grounds, the people in his
absence took from him his command, and confided it to other
generals. As soon as he heard of this new act of ingratitude,
he resolved not to return home, but withdrew into Thrace, and
fortified three castles … near to Perinthus. Here, having
collected a formidable band, as an independent captain, he
made incursions on the territories of those of the Thracians
who acknowledged no settled form of government, and acquired
considerable spoils."

_Sir T. N. Talfourd,
Early History of Greece (Encyclopedia Metropolitana),
chapter 11._

ALSO IN:
_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 29 (volume 4)._

_Plutarch,
Alcibiades._

_Xenophon,
Hellenica,
book 1, chapters 1-4._

GREECE: B. C. 406.
The Peloponnesian War:
Battle of Arginusæ.
Trial and execution of the generals at Athens.

Alcibiades was succeeded by Conon and nine colleagues in
command of the Athenian fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. The
Athenians, soon afterwards, were driven into the harbor of
Mitylene, on the island of Lesbos, by a superior Peloponnesian
fleet, commanded by Callicratidas, and were blockaded there
with small chance of escape. Conon contrived to send news of
their desperate situation to Athens, and vigorous measures
were promptly taken to rescue the fleet and to save Mitylene.
Within thirty days, a fleet of 110 triremes was fitted out at
the Piræus, and manned with a crew which took nearly the last
able-bodied Athenian to make it complete. At Samos these were
joined by 40 more triremes, making 150 in all, against which
Callicratidas was able to bring out only 120 ships from
Mitylene, when the relieving armament approached. The two
fleets encountered one another near the islands of Arginusæ,
off Cape Malea, the southern promontory of Lesbos. In the
battle that ensued, which was the greatest naval conflict of
the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were completely
victorious; Callicratidas was drowned and no less than 77 of
the Peloponnesian ships were destroyed, while the Athenians
themselves lost 25. As the result of this battle Sparta again
made overtures of peace, as she had done after the battle of
Cyzicus, and Athens, led by her demagogues, again rejected
them. But the Athenian demagogues and populace did worse. They
summoned home the eight generals who had won the battle of
Arginusæ, to answer to a charge of having neglected, after the
victory, to pick up the floating bodies of the Athenian dead
and to rescue the drowning from the wrecked ships of their
fleet. Six of the accused generals came home to meet the
charge; but two thought it prudent to go into voluntary exile.
The six were brought to trial; the forms of legality were
violated to their prejudice and all means were unscrupulously
employed to work up the popular passion against them. One man,
only, among the prytanes—senators, that is, of the tribe then
presiding, and who were the presidents of the popular
assembly—stood out, without flinching, against the lawless
rage of his fellow citizens, and refused, in calm scorn of all
fierce threats against himself, to join in taking the
unconstitutional vote. That one was the philosopher Socrates.
The generals were condemned to death and received the fatal
draught of hemlock from the same populace which pressed it a
little later to the lips of the philosopher. "Thus died the
son of Pericles and Aspasia [one of the generals, who bore his
father's name], to whom his father had made a fatal gift in
obtaining for him the Attic citizenship, and with him
Erasinides, Thrasylus, Lysias, Aristocrates, and Diomedon. The
last-named, the most innocent of all, who had wished that the
whole fleet should immediately be employed in search of the
wrecked, addressed the people once more; he expressed a wish
that the decree dooming him to death might be beneficial to
the state, and called upon his fellow-citizens to perform the
thanksgiving offerings to the saving gods which they, the
generals, had vowed on account of their victory. These words
may have sunk deep into the hearts of many of his hearers; but
their only effect has been to cast a yet brighter halo in the
eyes of subsequent generations around the memory of these
martyrs. Their innocence is best proved by the series of
glaring infractions of law and morality which were needed to
ensure their destruction, as well as by the shame and
repugnance which seized upon the citizens, when they had
recognized how fearfully, they had been led astray by a
traitorous faction.

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 5 (volume 3)._

Mr. Grote attempts to uphold a view more unfavorable to the
generals and less severe upon the Athenian people.

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 64._

ALSO IN:
_Xenophon,
Hellenica,
book 1, chapters 5-7._

See, also,
ATHENS: B. C. 424-406.

GREECE: B. C. 405.
The Peloponnesian War
Decisive battle of Aigospotamoi.
Defeat of the Athenians.

After the execution of the generals, "no long time passed
before the Athenians repented of their madness and their
crimes: but, yielding still to their old besetting sin, they
insisted, as they had done in the days of Miltiades and after
the catastrophe at Syracuse, on throwing the blame not on
themselves but on their advisers. This great crime began at
once to produce its natural fruits. The people were losing
confidence in their officers, who, in their turn, felt that no
services to the state could secure them against illegal
prosecutions and arbitrary penalties. Corruption was eating
its way into the heart of the state, and treason was losing
its ugliness in the eyes of many who thought themselves none
the worse for dallying with it. … The Athenian fleet had
fallen back upon Samos; and with this island as a base, the
generals were occupying themselves with movements, not for
crushing the enemy, but for obtaining money. … The Spartans,
whether at home or on the Asiatic coast, were now well aware
that one more battle would decide the issue of the war; for
with another defeat the subsidies of the Persians would be
withdrawn from them as from men doomed to failure, and perhaps
be transferred to the Athenians. In the army and fleet the cry
was raised that Lysandros was the only man equal to the
emergency. Spartan custom could not appoint the same man twice
to the office of admiral; but when Arakos was sent out with
Lysandros [Lysander] as his secretary, it was understood that
the latter was really the man in power."
{1592}
In the summer of 405 B. C. Lysandros made a sudden movement
from the southern Ægean to the Hellespont, and laid siege to
the rich town of Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side. The Athenians
followed him, but not promptly enough to save Lampsacus, which
they found in his possession when they arrived. They took
their station, thereupon, at the mouth of the little stream
called the Aigospotamoi (the Goat's Stream), directly opposite
to Lampsacus, and endeavored for four successive days to
provoke Lysandros to fight. He refused, watching his
opportunity for the surprise which he effected on the fifth
day, when he dashed across the narrow channel and caught the
Athenian ships unprepared, their crews mostly scattered on
shore. One only, of the six Athenian generals, Conon, had
foreseen danger and was alert. Conon, with twelve triremes,
escaped. The remaining ships, about one hundred and seventy in
number, were captured almost without the loss of a man on the
Peloponnesian side. Of the crews, some three or four thousand
Athenians were pursued on shore and taken prisoners, to be
afterwards slaughtered in cold blood. Two of the incapable
generals shared their fate. Of the other generals who escaped,
some at least were believed to have been bribed by Lysandros
to betray the fleet into his hands. The blow to Athens was
deadly. She had no power of resistance left, and when her
enemies closed around her, a little later, she starved within
her walls until resistance seemed no longer heroic, and then
gave herself up to their mercy.

_G. W. Cox,
The Athenian Empire,
chapter 7._

ALSO IN:
_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 30 (volume 4)._

_Plutarch,
Lysander._

_Xenophon,
Hellenica,
book 2, chapter 1._

GREECE: B. C. 404.
End of the Peloponnesian War.
Fall of Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 404.

GREECE: B. C. 404-403.
The Year of Anarchy at Athens.
Reign of the Thirty.

See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.

GREECE: B. C. 401-400.
The expedition of Cyrus, and the Retreat of the Ten Thousand
Greeks.

See PERSIA: B. C.,401-400.

GREECE: B. C. 399-387.
Spartan war with Persia.
Greek confederacy against Sparta.
The Corinthian War.
Peace of Antalcidas.