Chapter IV: , VII (99)

The Ionic Greek cities, or states, of Asia Minor, first
subjugated by Crœsus, King of Lydia, in the sixth century B.
C., were swallowed up, in the same century, with all other
parts of the dominion of Crœsus, in the conquests of Cyrus,
and formed part of the great Persian Empire, to the
sovereignty of which Cambyses and Darius succeeded. In the
reign of Darius there occurred a revolt of the Ionians (about
502 B. C.), led by the city of Miletus, under the influence of
its governor, Aristagoras. Aristagoras, coming over to Greece
in person, sought aid against the Persians, first at Sparta,
where it was denied to him, and then, with better success, at
Athens. Presenting himself to the citizens, just after they
had expelled the Pisistratidæ, Aristagoras said to them "that
the Milesians were colonists from Athens, and that it was just
that the Athenians, being so mighty, should deliver them from
slavery.
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And because his need was great, there was nothing that he did
not promise, till at the last he persuaded them. For it is
easier, it seems, to deceive a multitude than to deceive one
man. Cleomenes the Spartan, being but one man, Aristagoras
could not deceive; but he brought over to his purpose the
people of Athens, being thirty thousand. So the Athenians,
being persuaded, made a decree to send twenty ships to help
the men of Ionia, and appointed one Melanthius, a man of
reputation among them, to be captain. These ships were the
beginning of trouble both to the Greeks and the barbarians.
… When the twenty ships of the Athenians were arrived, and
with them five ships of the Eretrians, which came, not for any
love of the Athenians, but because the Milesians had helped
them in the old time against the men of Chalcis, Aristagoras
sent an army against Sardis, but he himself abode in Miletus.
This army, crossing Mount Tmolus, took the city of Sardis
without any hindrance; but the citadel they took not, for
Artaphernes held it with a great force of soldiers. But though
they took the city they had not the plunder of it, and for
this reason. The houses in Sardis were for the most part built
of reeds, and such as were built of bricks had their roofs of
reeds; and when a certain soldier set fire to one of these
houses, the fire ran quickly from house to house till the
whole city was consumed. And while the city was burning, such
Lydians and Persians as were in it, seeing they were cut off
from escape (for the fire was in an the outskirts of the
city), gathered together in haste to the market-place. Through
this market-place flows the river Pactolus, which comes down
from Mount Tmolus, having gold in its sands, and when it has
passed out of the city it flows into the Hermus, which flows
into the sea. Here then the Lydians and Persians were gathered
together, being constrained to defend themselves. And when the
men of Ionia saw their enemies how many they were, and that
these were preparing to give battle, they were stricken with
fear, and fled out of the city to Mount Tmolus, and thence,
when it was night, they went back to the sea. In this manner
was burnt the city of Sardis, and in it the great temple of
the goddess Cybele, the burning of which temple was the cause,
as said the Persians, for which afterwards they burnt the
temples in Greece. Not long after came a host of Persians from
beyond the river Halys; and when they found that the men of
Ionia had departed from Sardis, they followed hard upon their
track, and came up with them at Ephesus. And when the battle
was joined, the men of Ionia fled before them. Many indeed
were slain, and such as escaped were scattered, every man to
his own city. After this the ships of the Athenians departed,
and would not help the men of Ionia any more, though
Aristagoras besought them to stay. Nevertheless the Ionians
ceased not from making preparations of war against the King,
making to themselves allies, some by force and some by
persuasion, as the cities of the Hellespont and many of the
Carians and the island of Cyprus. For all Cyprus, save Amathus
only, revolted from the King under Onesilus, brother of King
Gorgus. When King Darius heard that Sardis had been taken and
burned with fire by the Ionians and the Athenians, with
Aristagoras for leader, at the first he took no heed of the
Ionians, as knowing that they would surely suffer for their
deed, but he asked, 'Who are these Athenians?' And when they
told him he took a bow and shot an arrow into the air, saying,
'O Zeus, grant that I may avenge myself on these Athenians.'
And he commanded his servant that every day, when his dinner
was served, he should say three times, 'Master, remember the
Athenians.' … Meanwhile the Persians took not a few cities
of the Ionians and Æolians. But while they were busy about
these, the Carians revolted from the King; whereupon the
captains of the Persians led their army into Caria, and the
men of Caria came out to meet them; and they met them at a
certain place which is called the White Pillars, near to the
river Mæander. Then there were many counsels among the
Carians, whereof the best was this, that they should cross the
river and so contend with the Persians, having the river
behind them, that so there being no escape for them if they
fled, they might surpass themselves in courage. But this
counsel did not prevail. Nevertheless, when the Persians had
crossed the Meander, the Carians fought against them, and the
battle was exceeding long and fierce. But at the last the
Carians were vanquished, being overborne by numbers, so that
there fell of them ten thousand. And when they that
escaped—for many had fled to Labranda, where there is a great
temple of Zeus and a grove of plane trees—were doubting
whether they should yield themselves to the King or depart
altogether from Asia, there came to their help the men of
Miletus with their allies. Thereupon the Carians, putting away
their doubts altogether, fought with the Persians a second
time, and were vanquished yet more grievously than before. But
on this day the men of Miletus suffered the chief damage. And
the Carians fought with the Persians yet again a third time;
for, hearing that these were about to attack their cities one
by one, they laid an ambush for them on the road to Pedasus.
And the Persians, marching by night, fell into the ambush, and
were utterly destroyed, they and their captains. After these
things, Aristagoras, seeing the power of the Persians, and
having no more any hope to prevail over them—and indeed, for
all that he had brought about so much trouble, he was of a
poor spirit—called together his friends and said to them, 'We
must needs have some place of refuge, if we be driven out of
Miletus. Shall we therefore go to Sardinia, or to Myrcinus on
the river Strymon; which King Darius gave to Histiæus?' To
this Hecateus, the writer of chronicles, made answer, 'Let
Aristagoras build a fort in Leros (this Leros is an island
thirty miles distant from Miletus) and dwell there quietly, if
he be driven from Miletus. And hereafter he can come from
Leros and set himself up again in Miletus.' But Aristagoras
went to Myrcinus, and not long afterwards was slain while he
besieged a certain city of the Thracians."

_Herodotus,
The Story of the Persian War
(version of A. J. Church, chapter 2)._

See, also,
PERSIA: B. C. 521-493;
and ATHENS: B. C. 501-490.

GREECE: B. C. 496.
War of Sparta with Argos.
Overwhelming reverse of the Argives.

See ARGOS: B. C. 496-421.

GREECE: B. C. 492-491.
Wrath of the Persian king against Athens.
Failure of his first expedition of invasion.
Submission of 'Medizing' Greek states.
Coercion of Ægina.
Enforced union of Hellas.
Headship of Sparta recognized.

{1571}

The assistance given by Athens to the Ionian revolt stirred
the wrath of the Persian monarch very deeply, and when he had
put down the rebellion he prepared to chastise the audacious
and insolent Greeks. "A great fleet started from the
Hellespont, with orders to sail round the peninsula of Mt.
Athos to the Gulf of Therma, while Mardonius advanced by land.
His march was so harassed by the Thracians that when he had
effected the conquest of Macedonia his force was too weak for
any further attempt. The fleet was overtaken by a storm off
Mt. Athos, on whose rocks 300 ships were dashed to pieces, and
20,000 men perished. Mardonius returned in disgrace to Asia
with the remnant of his fleet and army. This failure only
added fury to the resolution of Darius. While preparing all
the resources of his empire for a second expedition, he sent
round heralds to the chief cities of Greece, to demand the
tribute of earth and water as signs of his being their
rightful lord. Most of them submitted: Athens and Sparta alone
ventured on defiance. Both treated the demand as an outrage
which annulled the sanctity of the herald's person. At Athens
the envoy was plunged into the loathsome Barathrum, a pit into
which the most odious public criminals were cast. At Sparta
the herald was hurled into a well, and bidden to seek his
earth and water there. The submission of Ægina, the chief
maritime state of Greece, and the great enemy of Athens,
entailed the most important results. The act was denounced by
Athens as treason against Greece, and the design was imputed
to Ægina of calling in the Persians to secure vengeance on her
rival. The Athenians made a formal complaint to Sparta against
the 'Medism' of the Æginetans; a charge which is henceforth
often repeated both against individuals and states. The
Spartans had recently concluded a successful war with Argos,
the only power that could dispute her supremacy in
Peloponnesus; and now this appeal from Athens, the second city
of Greece, at once recognized and established Sparta as the
leading Hellenic state. In that character, her king Cleomenes
undertook to punish the Medizing party in Ægina 'for the
common good of Greece'; but he was met by proofs of the
intrigues of his colleague Demaratus in their favour. …
Cleomenes obtained his deposition on a charge of illegitimacy,
and a public insult from his successor Leotychides drove
Demaratus from Sparta. Hotly pursued as a 'Medist,' he
effected his escape to Darius, whose designs against Athens
and Sparta were now stimulated by the councils of their exiled
sovereigns, Hippias and Demaratus. Meanwhile, Cleomenes and
his new colleague returned to Ægina, which no longer resisted,
and having seized ten of her leading citizens, placed them as
hostages in the hands of the Athenians. Ægina was thus
effectually disabled from throwing the weight of her fleet
into the scale of Persia: Athens and Sparta, suspending their
political jealousies, were united when their disunion would
have been fatal; their conjunction drew after them most of the
lesser states: and so the Greeks stood forth for the first
time as a nation prepared to act in unison, under the
leadership of Sparta (B. C. 491). That city retained her proud
position till it was forfeited by the misconduct of her
statesmen."

_P. Smith,
History of the World: Ancient,
chapter 13 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_G. W. Cox,
The Greeks and the Persians,
chapter 6._

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
chapter 36 (volume 4.)_

See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 501-490.

GREECE: B. C. 490.
The Persian Wars: Marathon.

The second and greater expedition launched by Darius against
the Greeks sailed from the Cilician coast in the summer of the
year 490 B. C. It was under the command of two generals,—a
Mede, named Datis, and the king's nephew, Artaphernes. It made
the passage safely, destroying Naxos on the way, but sparing
the sacred island and temple of Delos. Its landing was on the
shores of Eubœa, where the city of Eretria was easily taken,
its inhabitants dragged into slavery, and the first act of
Persian vengeance accomplished. The expedition then sailed to
the coast of Attica and came to land on the plain of Marathon,
which spreads along the bay of that name. "Marathon, situated
near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a
direction E. N. E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge
of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated
by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that
mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the
shortest and the most difficult, is 22 miles in length. …
[The plain] 'is in length about six miles, in breadth never
less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the
extremities of the plain; the southern is not very large and
is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the
northern, which generally covers considerably more than a
square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons
impassable. Both, however, leave a broad, firm sandy beach
between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the
plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheatre
of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest
of Attica."

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 36 (volume 4)._

The Athenians waited for no nearer approach of the enemy to
their city, but met them at their landing-place. They were few
in number—only 10,000, with 1,000 more from the grateful city
of Platæa, which Athens had protected against Thebes. They had
sent to Sparta for aid, but a superstition delayed the march
of the Spartans and they came the day after the battle. Of all
the nearer Greeks none came to the help of Athens in that hour
of extreme need; and so much the greater to her was the glory
of Marathon. The ten thousand Athenian hoplites and the one
thousand brave Platæans confronted the great host of Persia,
of the numbers in which there is no account. Ten generals had
the right of command on successive days, but Miltiades was
known to be the superior captain and his colleagues gave place
to him. "On the morning of the seventeenth day of the month of
Metagitnion (September 12th), when the supreme command
according to the original order of succession fell to
Miltiades, he ordered the army to draw itself up according to
the ten tribes. … The troops had advanced with perfect
steadiness across the trenches and palisadings of their camp,
as they had doubtless already done on previous days. But as
soon as they had approached the enemy within a distance of
5,000 feet they changed their march to a double-quick pace,
which gradually rose to the rapidity of a charge, while at the
same time they raised the war-cry with a loud voice.
{1572}
When the Persians saw these men rushing down from the heights,
they thought they beheld madmen: they quickly placed
themselves in order of battle, but before they had time for an
orderly discharge of arrows the Athenians were upon them,
ready in their excitement to begin a closer contest, man
against man in hand-to-hand fight, which is decided by
personal courage and gymnastic agility, by the momentum of
heavy-armed warriors, and by the use of lance and sword. Thus
the well-managed and bold attack of the Athenians had
succeeded in bringing into play the whole capability of
victory which belonged to the Athenians. Yet the result was
not generally successful. The enemy's centre stood firm. …
But meanwhile both wings had thrown themselves upon the enemy;
and after they had effected a victorious advance, the one on
the way to Rhamnus, the other towards the coast, Miltiades …
issued orders at the right moment for the wings to return from
the pursuit, and to make a combined attack upon the Persian
centre in its rear. Hereupon the rout speedily became general,
and in their flight the troubles of the Persians increased;
… they were driven into the morasses and there slain in
numbers."

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2)._

The Athenian dead, when gathered for the solemn obsequies,
numbered 192; the loss of the Persians was estimated by
Herodotus at 6,400.

_Herodotus,
History,
book 6._

ALSO IN:
_E. S. Creasy,
Fifteen Decisive Battles,
chapter 1._

_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 14 (volume 2)._

_G. W. Cox,
The Greeks and Persians,
chapter 6._

_Sir E. Bulwer Lytton,
Athens: Its Rise and Fall,
book 2, chapter 5._

GREECE: B. C. 489-480.
The Æginetan War.
Naval power of Athens created by Themistocles.

SEE ATHENS: B. C. 489-480.

GREECE: B. C. 481-479.
Congress at Corinth.
Hellenic union against Persia.
Headship of Sparta.

"When it was known in Greece that Xerxes was on his march into
Europe, it became necessary to take measures for the defence
of the country. At the instigation of the Athenians, the
Spartans, as the acknowledged leaders of Hellas and head of
the Peloponnesian confederacy, called on those cities which
had resolved to uphold the independence of their country to
send plenipotentiaries to a congress at the Isthmus of
Corinth. When the envoys assembled, a kind of Hellenic
alliance was formed under the presidency of Sparta, and its
unity was confirmed by an oath, binding the members to visit
with severe penalties those Greeks who, without compulsion,
had given earth and water to the envoys of Xerxes. This
alliance was the nearest approach to a Hellenic union ever
seen in Greece; but though it comprised most of the
inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achæa, the
Megarians, Athenians, and two cities of Bœotia, Thespiæ and
Platæa, were the only patriots north of the Isthmus. Others,
who would willingly have been on that side, such as the common
people of Thessaly, the Phocians and Locrians, were compelled
by the force of circumstances to 'medize.' From the time at
which it met in the autumn or summer of 481 to the autumn of
480 B. C., the congress at the Isthmus directed the military
affairs of Greece. It fixed the plan of operations. Spies were
sent to Sardis to ascertain the extent of the forces of
Xerxes; envoys visited Argos, Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse, in
the hope, which proved vain, of obtaining assistance in the
impending struggle. As soon as Xerxes was known to be in
Europe, an army of 10,000 men was sent to hold the pass of
Tempe, but afterwards, on the advice of Alexander of Macedon,
this barrier was abandoned; and it was finally resolved to
await the approaching forces at Thermopylæ and Artemisium. The
supreme authority, both by land and sea, was in the hands of
the Spartans; they were the natural leaders of any army which
the Greeks could put into the field, and the allies refused to
follow unless the ships also were under their charge. … When
hostilities were suspended, the congress re-appears, and the
Greeks once more meet at the Isthmus to apportion the spoil
and adjudge the prizes of valour. In the next year we hear of
no common plan of operations, the fleet and army seeming to
act independently of each other; yet we observe that the
chiefs of the medizing Thebans were taken to the Isthmus
(Corinth) to be tried, after the battle of Platæa. It appears
then that, under the stress of the great Persian invasion, the
Greeks were brought into an alliance or confederation; and for
the two years from midsummer 481 to midsummer 479 a congress
continued to meet, with more or less interruption, at the
Isthmus, consisting of plenipotentiaries from the various
cities. This congress directed the affairs of the nation, so
far as they were in any way connected with the Persian
invasion. When the Barbarians were finally defeated, and there
was no longer any alarm from that source, the congress seems
to have discontinued its meetings. But the alliance remained;
the cities continued to act in common, at any rate, so far as
naval operations were concerned, and Sparta was still the
leading power."

_E. Abbott,
Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens,
chapter 3._

ALSO IN:
_C. O. Müller,
History and Antiquity of the Doric Race,
volume 1, appendix 4._

GREECE: B. C. 480.
The Persian War: Thermopylæ.

"Now when tidings of the battle that had been fought at
Marathon [B. C. 490] reached the ears of King Darius, the son
of Hystaspes, his anger against the Athenians," says
Herodotus, "which had been already roused by their attack on
Sardis, waxed still fiercer, and he became more than ever
eager to lead an army against Greece. Instantly he sent off
messengers to make proclamation through the several states
that fresh levies were to be raised, and these at an increased
rate; while ships, horses, provisions and transports were
likewise to be furnished. So the men published his commands;
and now all Asia was in commotion by the space of three
years." But before his preparations were completed Darius
died. His son Xerxes, who ascended the Persian throne, was
cold to the Greek undertaking and required long persuasion
before he took it up. When he did so, however, his
preparations were on a scale more stupendous than those of his
father, and consumed nearly five years. It was not until ten
years after Marathon that Xerxes led from Sardis a host which,
Herodotus computes at 1,700,000 men, besides half a million
more which manned the fleet he had assembled. "Was there a
nation in all Asia," cries the Greek historian, "which Xerxes
did not bring with him against Greece? Or was there a river,
except those of unusual size, which sufficed for his troops to
drink?" By a bridge of boats at Abydos the army crossed the
Hellespont, and moved slowly through Thrace, Macedonia and
Thessaly; while the fleet, moving on the
coast circuit of the same countries, avoided the perilous
promontory of Mount Athos by cutting a canal.
{1573}
The Greeks had determined at first to make their stand against
the invaders in Thessaly, at the vale of Tempe; but they found
the post untenable and were persuaded, instead, to guard the
narrower Pass of Thermopylæ. It was there that the Persians,
arriving at Trachis, near the Malian gulf, found themselves
faced by a small body of Greeks. The spot is thus described by
Herodotus: "As for the entrance into Greece by Trachis, it is,
at its narrowest point, about fifty feet wide. This, however,
is not the place where the passage is most contracted; for it
is still narrower a little above and a little below
Thermopylae. At Alpeni, which is lower down than that place,
it is only wide enough for a single carriage; and up above, at
the river Phœnix, near the town called Anthela, it is the
same. West of Thermopylæ rises a lofty and precipitous hill,
impossible to climb, which runs up into the chain of Œta;
while to the east the road is shut in by the sea and by
marshes. In this place are the warm springs, which the natives
call 'The Cauldrons'; and above them stands an altar sacred to
Hercules. A wall had once been carried across the opening; and
in this there had of old times been a gateway. … King Xerxes
pitched his camp in the region of Malis called Trachinia,
while on their side the Greeks occupied the straits. These
straits the Greeks in general call Thermopylæ (the Hot Gates);
but the natives and those who dwell in the neighbourhood call
them Pylæ (the Gates). … The Greeks who at this spot awaited
the coming of Xerxes were the following:—From Sparta, 300
men-at-arms; from Arcadia, 1,000 Tegeans and Mantineans, 500
of each people; 120 Orchomenians, from the Arcadian
Orchomenus; and 1,000 from other cities; from Corinth, 400
men; from Phlius, 200; and from Mycenæ 80. Such was the number
from the Peloponnese. There were also present, from Bœotia,
700 Thespians and 400 Thebans. Besides these troops, the
Locrians of Opus and the Phocians had obeyed the call of their
countrymen, and sent, the former all the force they had, the
latter 1,000 men. … The various nations had each captains of
their own under whom they served; but the one to whom all
especially looked up, and who had the command of the entire
force, was the Lacedæmonian, Leonidas. … The force with
Leonidas was sent forward by the Spartans in advance of their
main body, that the sight of them might encourage the allies
to fight, and hinder them from going over to the Medes, as it
was likely they might have done had they seen Sparta backward.
They intended presently, when they had celebrated the Carneian
festival, which was what now kept them at home, to leave a
garrison in Sparta, and hasten in full force to join the army.
The rest of the allies also intended to act similarly; for it
happened that the Olympic festival fell exactly at this same
period. None of them looked to see the contest at Thermopylæ
decided so speedily." For two days Leonidas and his little
army held the pass against the Persians. Then, there was found
a traitor, a man of Malis, who betrayed to Xerxes the secret
of a pathway across the mountains, by which he might steal
into the rear of the post held by the Greeks. A thousand
Phocians had been stationed on the mountain to guard this
path; but they took fright when the Persians came upon them in
the early dawn, and fled without a blow. When Leonidas learned
that the way across the mountain was open to the enemy he knew
that his defense was hopeless, and he ordered his allies to
retreat while there was yet time. But he and his Spartans
remained, thinking it "unseemly" to quit the post they had
been specially sent to guard. The Thespians remained with
them, and the Thebans—known partisans at heart of the
Persians—were forced to stay. The latter deserted when the
enemy approached; the Spartans and the Thespians fought and
perished to the last man.

_Herodotus,
History
(translated by Rawlinson), book 7._

ALSO IN:
_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1._

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 40 (volume 4)._

See, also,
ATHENS: B. C. 480-479.

GREECE: B. C. 480.
The Persian Wars: Artemisium.

On the approach of the great invading army and fleet of
Xerxes, the Greeks resolved to meet the one at the pass of
Thermopylæ and the other at the northern entrance of the
Eubœan channel. "The northern side of Eubœa afforded a
commodious and advantageous station: it was a long beach,
called, from a temple at its eastern extremity, Artemisium,
capable of receiving the galleys, if it should be necessary to
draw them upon the shore, and commanding a view of the open
sea and the coast of Magnesia, and consequently an opportunity
of watching the enemy's movements as he advanced towards the
south; while, on the other hand, its short distance from
Thermopylæ enabled the fleet to keep up a quick and easy
communication with the land force."

_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 15 (volume 1)._

The Persian fleet, after suffering heavily from a destructive
storm on the Magnesian coast, reached Aphetæ, opposite
Artemisium, at the mouth of the Pagasæan gulf. Notwithstanding
its losses, it still vastly outnumbered the armament of the
Greeks, and feared nothing but the escape of the latter. But,
in the series of conflicts which ensued, the Greeks were
generally victorious and proved their superior naval genius.
They could not, however, afford the heavy losses which they
sustained, and, upon hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ and
the Persian possession of the all-important pass, they deemed it
necessary to retreat.

_W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapter 8, section 4 (volume 2)._

GREECE: B. C. 480.
The Persian Wars: Salamis.

Leonidas and his Spartan band having perished vainly at
Thermopylæ, in their heroic attempt to hold the pass against
the host of Xerxes, and the Greek ships at Artemisium having
vainly beaten their overwhelming enemies, the whole of Greece
north of the isthmus of Corinth lay completely at the mercy of
the invader. The Thebans and other false-hearted Greeks joined
his ranks, and saved their own cities by helping to destroy
their neighbors. The Platæans, the Thespians and the Athenians
abandoned their homes in haste, conducted their families, and
such property as they might snatch away, to the nearer islands
and to places of refuge in Peloponnesus. The Greeks of
Peloponnesus rallied in force to the isthmus and began there
the building of a defensive wall. Their fleet, retiring from
Artemisium, was drawn together, with some re-enforcements,
behind the island of Salamis, which stretches across the
entrance to the bay of Eleusis, off the inner coast of Attica,
near Athens.
{1574}
Meantime the Persians had advanced through Attica, entered the
deserted city of Athens, taken the Acropolis, which a small
body of desperate patriots resolved to hold, had slain its
defenders and burned its temples. Their fleet had also been
assembled in the bay of Phalerum, which was the more easterly
of the three harbors of Athens. At Salamis the Greeks were in
dispute. The Corinthians and the Peloponnesians were bent upon
falling back with the fleet to the isthmus; the Athenians, the
Eginetans and the Megarians looked upon all as lost if the
present combination of the whole naval power of Hellas in the
narrow strait of Salamis was permitted to be broken up. At
length Themistocles, the Athenian leader, a man of fertile
brain and overbearing resolution, determined the question by
sending a secret message to Xerxes that the Greek ships had
prepared to escape from him. This brought down the Persian
fleet upon them at once and left them no chance for retreat.
Of the memorable fight which ensued (September 20 B. C. 480)
the following is a part of the description given by Herodotus:
"Against the Athenians, who held the western extremity of the
line towards Eleusis, were placed the Phœnicians; against the
Lacedæmonians, whose station was eastward towards the Piræus,
the Ionians. Of these last, a few only followed the advice of
Themistocles, to fight backwardly; the greater number did far
otherwise. … Far the greater number of the Persian ships
engaged in this battle were disabled, either by the Athenians
or by the Eginetans. For as the Greeks fought in order and
kept their line, while the barbarians were in confusion and
had no plan in anything that they did, the issue of the battle
could scarce be other than it was. Yet the Persians fought far
more bravely here than at Eubœa, and indeed surpassed
themselves; each did his utmost through fear of Xerxes, for
each thought that the king's eye was upon himself. … During
the whole time of the battle Xerxes sat at the base of the
hill called Ægaleos, over against Salamis; and whenever he saw
any of his own captains perform any worthy exploit he inquired
concerning him; and the man's name was taken down by his
scribes, together with the names of his father and his city.
… When the rout of the barbarians began, and they sought to
make their escape to Phalêrum, the Eginetans, awaiting them in
the channel, performed exploits worthy to be recorded. Through
the whole of the confused struggle the Athenians employed
themselves in destroying such ships as either made resistance
or fled to shore; while the Eginetans dealt with those which
endeavoured to escape down the straits; so that the Persian
vessels were no sooner clear of the Athenians than straightway
they fell into the hands of the Eginetan squadron. … Such of
the barbarian vessels as escaped from the battle fled to
Phalêrum, and there sheltered themselves under the protection
of the land army. … Xerxes, when he saw the extent of his
loss, began to be afraid lest the Greeks might be counselled
by the Ionians, or without their advice might determine, to
sail straight to the Hellespont and break down the bridges
there; in which case he would be blocked up in Europe and run
great risk of perishing. He therefore made up his mind to
fly."

_Herodotus,
History
(edited and translated by Rawlinson),
book 8, sections 85—97 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN:
_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2)._

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 4 (volume 4)._

_W. W. Goodwin,
The Battle of Salamis
(Papers of the American School at Athens, volume 1)._

GREECE: B. C. 479.
The Persian Wars: Platæa.

When Xerxes, after the defeat of his fleet at Salamis, fled
back to Asia with part of his disordered host, he left his
lieutenant, Mardonius, with a still formidable army, to repair
the disaster and accomplish, if possible, the conquest of the
Greeks. Mardonius retired to Thessaly for the winter, but
returned to Attica in the spring and drove the Athenians once
more from their shattered city, which they were endeavoring to
repair. He made overtures to them which they rejected with
scorn, and thereupon he destroyed everything in city and
country which could be destroyed, reducing Athens to ruins and
Attica to a desert. The Spartans and other Peloponnesians who
had promised support to the Athenians were slow in coming, but
they came in strong force at last. Mardonius fell back into
Bœotia, where he took up a favorable position in a plain on
the left bank of the Asopus, near Platæa. This was in
September, B. C. 479. According to Herodotus, he had 300,000
"barbarian" troops and 50,000 Greek allies. The opposing
Greeks, who followed him to the Asopus, were 110,000 in
number. The two armies watched one another for more than ten
days, unwilling to offer battle because the omens were on both
sides discouraging. At length the Greeks undertook a change of
position and Mardonius, mistaking this for a movement of
retreat, led his Persians on a run to attack them. It was a
fatal mistake. The Spartans, who bore the brunt of the Persian
assault, soon convinced the deluded Mardonius that they were
not in flight, while the Athenians dealt roughly with his
Theban allies. "The barbarians," says Herodotus, "many times
seized hold of the Greek spears and brake them; for in
boldness and warlike spirit the Persians were not a whit
inferior to the Greeks; but they were without bucklers,
untrained, and far below the enemy in respect of skill in
arms. Sometimes singly, sometimes in bodies of ten, now fewer
and now more in number, they dashed forward upon the Spartan
ranks, and so perished. … After Mardonius fell, and the
troops with him, which were the main strength of the army,
perished, the remainder yielded to the Lacedæmonians and took
to flight. Their light clothing and want of bucklers were of
the greatest hurt to them: for they had to contend against men
heavily armed, while they themselves were without any such
defence." Artabazus, who was second in command of the
Persians, and who had 40,000 immediately under him, did not
strike a blow in the battle, but quitted the field as soon as
he saw the turn events had taken, and led his men in a retreat
which had no pause until they reached and crossed the
Hellespont. Of the remainder of the 300,000 of Mardonius'
host, only 3,000, according to Herodotus, outlived the battle.
It was the end of the Persian invasions of Greece.

_Herodotus,
History
(translated by Rawlinson), book 9._

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 42 (volume 5)._

_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 16 (volume 1)._

_G. W. Cox,
History of Greece,
book 2, chapter 7 (volume 1)._

{1575}

In celebration of the victory an altar to Zeus was erected and
consecrated by the united Greeks with solemn ceremonies, a
quintennial festival, called the Feast of Liberty, was
instituted at Platæa, and the territory of the Platæans was
declared sacred and inviolable, so long as they should
maintain the appointed sacrifices and funeral honors to the
dead. But these agreements did not avail to protect the
Platæans when the subsequent Peloponnesian War broke out, and
they stood faithfully among the allies of Athens. "The last
act of the assembled army was the expedition against Thebes,
in order, according to the obligation incumbent upon them, to
take revenge on the most obstinate ally of the national enemy.
Eleven days after the battle Pausanias appeared before the
city and demanded the surrender of the party-leaders,
responsible for the policy of Thebes. Not until the siege had
lasted twenty days was the surrender obtained. … Timagenidas
and the other leaders of the Thebans were executed as traitors
against the nation, by order of Pausanias, after he had
dismissed the confederate army."

_E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2)._

GREECE: B. C. 479.
The Persian Wars: Mycale.

The same day, in September, B. C. 479, on which the Greeks at
Platæa destroyed the army of Mardonius, witnessed an almost
equal victory won by their compatriots of the fleet, on the
coast of Asia Minor. The Persian fleet, to avoid a battle with
them, had retreated to Mycale on the narrow strait between the
island of Samos and the mainland, where a land army of 60,000
men was stationed at the time. Here they drew their ships on
shore and surrounded them with a rampart. The Greeks, under
Leotychides the Lacedæmonian, landed and attacked the whole
combined force. The Ionians in the Persian army turned against
their masters and helped to destroy them. The rout was
complete and only a small remnant escaped to reach Sardis,
where Xerxes was still lingering.

_Herodotus,
History
(translated by Rawlinson),
book 9._

ALSO IN:
_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 16 (volume 1)._

_G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 42 (volume 5)._

GREECE: B. C. 479-478.
Athens assumes the protection of Ionia.
Siege and capture of Sestus.
Rebuilding and enlargement of Athens and its walls.
Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles.

See ATHENS: B. C. 479-478.

GREECE: B. C. 478-477.
Reduction of Byzantium.
Mad conduct of Pausanias.
His recall.
Alienation of the Asiatic Greeks from Sparta.
Their closer union with Athens.
Withdrawal of the Spartans from the war.
Formation of the Delian Confederacy.

"Sestos had fallen: but Byzantion and the Thrakian Doriskos,
with Eion on the Strymon and many other places on the northern
shores of the Egean, were still held by Persian garrisons,
when, in the year after the battle of Plataiai, Pausanias, as
commander of the confederate fleet, sailed with 20
Peloponnesian and 30 Athenian ships to Kypros (Cyprus) and
thence, having recovered the greater part of the island, to
Byzantion. The resistance here was as obstinate perhaps as at
Sestos; but the place was at length reduced, and Sparta stood
for the moment at the head of a triumphant confederacy. It was
now in her power to weld the isolated units, which made up the
Hellenic world, into something like an organised society, and
to kindle in it something like national life. … But she had
no statesman capable, like Themistokles, of seizing on a
golden opportunity, while in her own generals she found her
greatest enemies." Pausanias "was, it would seem, dazzled by
Persian wealth and enamoured of Persian pleasures. He had
roused the indignation of his own people by having his name
inscribed, as leader of all the Greek forces, on the tripod
which was to commemorate the victory of Plataiai: and now his
arrogance and tyranny were to excite at Byzantion a discontent
and impatience destined to be followed by more serious
consequences to his country as well as to himself. On the fall
of Byzantion he sent to the Persian king the prisoners taken
in the city, and spread the report that they had escaped. He
forwarded at the same time, it is said, … a letter in which
he informed Xerxes that he wished to marry his daughter and to
make him lord of all Hellas." Xerxes opened negotiations with
him, and "the head of this miserable man was now fairly
turned. Clad in Persian garb, he aped the privacy of Asiatic
despots; and when he came forth from his palace it was to make
a royal progress through Thrace, surrounded by Median and
Egyptian life guards, and to show his insolence to men who
were at least his equals. The reports of this significant
change in the behaviour of Pausanias led to his recall. He was
put on his trial; but his accusers failed to establish the
personal charges brought against him, while his Medism also
was dismissed as not fully proved. The suspicion, however, was
so strong that he was deprived of his command. … All these
events were tending to alienate the Asiatic Greeks and the
islanders of the Egean from a state which showed itself
incapable of maintaining its authority over its own servants."
Even before the recall of Pausanius, "the Asiatic Greeks
intreated Aristeides the Athenian commander to admit them into
direct relations with Athens; and the same change of feeling
had passed over all the non-medising Greek states with the
exception of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta. In short, it
had become clear that all Hellas was divided into two great
sections, the one gravitating as naturally to Sparta, the
great land power, as the other gravitated to Athens with her
maritime preponderance. When therefore a Spartan commission
headed by Dorkis arrived with a small force to take the place
of Pausanias, they were met by passive resistance where they
had looked for submission; and their retirement from the field
in which they were unable to compel obedience left the
confederacy an accomplished fact."

_G. W. Cox,
History of Greece,
book 2, chapter 8 (volume 2)._

This confederacy of the Asiatic Greeks with Athens, now
definitely organized, is known as the Confederacy of Delos, or
the Delian League. "To Athens, as decidedly the preponderant
power, both morally and materially, was of necessity, and also
with free good-will, consigned the headship and chief control
of the affairs and conduct of the alliance; a position that
carried with it the responsibility of the collection and
administration of a common fund, and the presidency of the
assemblies of delegates. As time went on and circumstances
altered, the terms of confederation were modified in various
instances; but at first the general rule was the contribution,
not only of money or ships, but of actual personal service.
… We have no precise enumeration of the allies of Athens at
this early time, but the course of the history brings up the
mention of many.
{1576}
… Crete was never directly affected by these events, and
Cyprus was also soon to be left aside; but otherwise all the
Greek islands of the Aegean northwards—except Melos, Thera,
Aegina, and Cythera—were contributory, including Euboea; as
were the cities on the coasts of Thrace and the Chalcidic
peninsula from the Macedonian boundary to the Hellespont;
Byzantium and various cities on the coasts of the Propontis,
and less certainly of the Euxine; the important series of
cities on the western coast of Asia Minor—though apparently
with considerable exceptions—Aeolian, Ionian, Dorian, and
Carian, as far as Caunus at least on the borders of Lycia, if
not even round to the Chelidonian isles. The sacred island of
Delos was chosen as the depository of the common treasure and
the place of meeting of the contributors. Apart from its
central convenience and defensibleness as an island, and the
sanctity of the temple, … it was a traditional centre for
solemn reunions of Ionians from either side the Aegean. … At
the distinct request of the allies the Athenians appointed
Aristides to superintend the difficult process of assessing
the various forms and amounts of contribution. … The total
annual amount of the assessment was the large sum of 460
talents (£112,125), and this perhaps not inclusive of, but
only supplementary to, the costly supply of equipped ships."

_W. W. Lloyd,
The Age of Pericles,
chapter 14 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:
_E. Abbott,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapters 6 and 8._

GREECE: B. C. 477-462.
Advancing democracy of Athens.
Sustentation of the Commons from the Confederate Treasury.
The stripping of power from the Areopagus.

See ATHENS: B. C. 477-462.

GREECE: B. C. 477-461.
Athens as the head of the Delian League.
Triumph of Anti-Spartan policy at Athens and approach of war.
Ostracism of Cimon.

"Between the end of the Persian war and the year 464 B. C.,
Sparta had sunk from the champion of the whole of Hellas to
the half-discredited leader of the Peloponnese only. Athens,
on the contrary, had risen from a subordinate member of the
league controlled by Sparta to be the leader and almost the
mistress of a league more dangerous than that over which
Sparta held sway. Sparta unquestionably entertained towards
Athens the jealous hatred of a defeated rival. By what steps
Athens was increasing her control over the Delian League, and
changing her position from that of a president to that of an
absolute ruler will be explained. …

See ATHENS: B. C. 466-454.

She was at the same time prosecuting the war against Persia
with conspicuous success. Her leader in this task was Cimon.
In the domain of practice Athens produced no nobler son than
this man. He was the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon,
and by heredity and inclination took his stand with the
conservative party in Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 477-462, to 460-449.

He succeeded here to the leading position of Aristides, and he
possessed all that statesman's purity of character. … It was
as a naval commander, and as a supporter of a forward policy
against Persia, that Cimon won his greatest renown. But he had
also a keen interest in the domestic development of Athens and
her attitude to the other states of Greece. To maintain
friendship with Sparta was the root of all his policy. His
perfect honesty in supporting this policy was never
questioned, and Sparta recognised his good will to them by
appointing him Proxenus in Athens. It was his duty in this
capacity to protect any Spartan resident in or visiting
Athens. His character and personality were eminently
attractive. … Under his guidance the Athenian fleet struck
Persia blow on blow. … In 466, near the mouth of the
Eurymedon in Pamphylia [see ATHENS: B. C. 470-466], the
Persian fleet was destroyed, and after a fierce struggle her
land forces also were defeated with very great slaughter. It
was long before Persian influence counted for anything again
on the waters of the Mediterranean. Cimon, with the personal
qualities of Aristides, had obtained the successes of
Themistocles. Opposition to Cimon was not wanting. The
Athenian democracy had entered on a path that seemed blocked
by his personal supremacy. And now the party of advancing
democracy possessed a leader, the ablest and greatest that it
was ever to possess. Pericles was about thirty years of age.
… He was related to great families through both father and
mother, and to great families that had championed the
democratic side. His father Zanthippus had prosecuted
Miltiades, the father of Cimon. … To lead the party of
advanced democracy was to attack Cimon, against whom he had
hereditary hostility. … When in 465 Thasos rebelled from
Athens, defeat was certain unless she found allies. She
applied to Sparta for assistance. Athens and Sparta were still
nominally allies, for the creation of the Delian League had
not openly destroyed the alliance that had subsisted between
them since the days of the Persian war. But the Thasians hoped
that Sparta's jealousy of Athens might induce her to disregard
the alliance. And they reckoned rightly. The Spartan fleet was
so weak that no interference upon the sea could be thought of,
but if Attica were attacked by land the Athenians would be
forced to draw off some part of their armament from Thasos.
Sparta gave a secret promise that this attack should be made.
But before they could fulfil their promise their own city was
overwhelmed by a terrible earthquake. … Only five houses
were left standing, and twenty thousand of the inhabitants
lost their lives. King Archidamus saved the state from even
more appalling ruin. While the inhabitants were dazed with the
catastrophe, he ordered the alarm-trumpet to be blown; the
military instincts of the Spartans answered to the call, and
all that were left assembled outside of the city safe from the
falling ruins. Archidamus's presence of mind saved them from
even greater danger than that of earthquake. The disaster
seemed to the masses of Helots that surrounded Sparta clear
evidence of the wrath of the god Poseidon. … The Helots
seized arms, therefore, and from all sides rushed upon Sparta.
Thanks to Archidamus's action, they found the Spartans
collected and ready for battle. They fell back upon Messenia,
and concentrated their strength round Mount Ithome, the
natural Acropolis of that district. … All the efforts of
their opponents, never very successful in sieges, failed to
dislodge them. At last, in 464, Sparta had to appeal to her
allies for help against her own slaves; and, as Athens was her
ally, she appealed to Athens. Should the help be granted? …
Cimon advocated the granting of Sparta's demand with all his
strength. … But there was much to be said on the other side,
and it was said by Ephialtes and Pericles.
{1577}
The whole of Pericles's foreign policy is founded on the
assumption that union between Athens and Sparta was
undesirable and impossible. In everything they stood at
opposite poles of thought. …. Cimon gained the vote of the
people. He went at once with a force of four thousand
heavy-armed soldiers to Ithome. Athenian soldiers enjoyed a
great reputation for their ability in the conduct of sieges;
but, despite their arrival, the Helots in Ithome still held
out. And soon the Spartans grew suspicious of the Athenian
contingent. The failure of Sparta was so clearly to the
interest of Athens that the Spartans could not believe that
the Athenians were in earnest in trying to prevent it; and at
last Cimon was told that Sparta no longer had need of the
Athenian force. The insult was all the more evident because
none of the other allies were dismissed. Cimon at once
returned to Athens. …

See MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD.

On his return he still opposed those complete democratic
changes that Pericles and Ephialtes were at this time
introducing into the state. A vote of ostracism was demanded.
The requisite number of votes fell to Cimon, and he had to
retire into exile (461). … His ostracism doubtless allowed
the democratic changes, in any case inevitable, to be
accomplished without much opposition or obstruction, but it
also deprived Athens of her best soldier at a time when she
needed all her military talent. For Athens could not forget
Sparta's insult. In 461 she renounced the alliance with her
that had existed since the Persian wars; and that this rupture
did not mean neutrality was made clear when, immediately
afterwards, Athens contracted an alliance with Argos, always
the enemy and now the dangerous enemy of Sparta, and with the
Thessalians, who also had grounds of hostility to Sparta.
Under such circumstances war could not be long in coming."

_A. J. Grant,
Greece in the Age of Pericles,
chapter 5._

ALSO IN:
_Plutarch,
Cimon; Pericles._

_C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 17 (volume 3)._

_E. Abbott,
Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens,
chapters 5-6. _

GREECE: B. C. 460-449.
Disastrous Athenian expedition to Egypt.
Cimon's last enterprise against the Persians.
The disputed Peace of Cimon, or Callias.
Five years truce between Athens and Sparta.

See ATHENS: B. C. 460-449.

GREECE: B. C. 458-456.
Alliance of Corinth and Ægina against Athens and Megara.
Athenian victories.
Siege and conquest of Ægina.
The Spartans in Bœotia.
Defeat of Athens at Tanagra.
Her success at Œnophyta.
Humiliation of Thebes.
Athenian ascendancy restored.