Chapter CDXXX: Act 8: Parliament 1. repeated in Act 99. Parliament 7 (27)
"The German Customs Union (Deutsche Zollverein) is an
association of states, having for its declared object to
secure freedom of trade and commerce between the contracting
states, and a common interest in the customs revenue. The
terms of the union are expressed in the treaty between Prussia
and the other states, dated 22d March, 1833, which may be
regarded as the basis of the association. The states now
[1844] forming the union are Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg,
Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Nassau, the
Thuringian states, Frankfort, Brunswick, Lippe-Schaumburg, and
Luxemburg. The population of these, with the exception of the
three last mentioned states, was, in 1839, 26,858,886.
Including these three states, which have since joined the
union, the present population cannot be less than twenty-seven
millions and a half. The German powers which have not joined
the union are Austria, with twelve millions of German
subjects, and Hanover, Oldenburg, Holstein, the two
Mecklenburgs, and the Hanse Towns, whose united population is
about three millions more.
{3072}
The inhabitants of Germany are, therefore, divided in the
proportions of twenty-seven and a half within, to fifteen
without, the sphere of the Zollverein. The treaty provides in
the thirty-eighth article, for the admission of other German
states, and the thirty-ninth article for the making of
treaties with foreign states, but these latter are not
admissible into the union. … The declared principle of the
league—namely, the commercial and financial union of the
German states—is not only one to which no foreign power has
any right to object, but is excellent in itself; and is, in
fact, the establishment of free trade among the associated
states. … But it is not merely to its avowed principle that
the league owes its successful accomplishment. There are other
motives which have entered largely into the causes of its
existence. In the first place, it has given practical effect
to that vehement desire for national unity which so generally
pervades the German mind. … Then, it so happened that this
general desire for union fell in exactly with the policy of
Prussia—a power which has not failed to seize so favourable an
opportunity of extending her political influence, and
occupying a position which, though of nominal equality, has in
reality secured her predominance among the German states. To
these inducements we regret to be obliged to add
another—namely, the prevalent opinion in Germany that their
manufacturing industry ought to be protected against foreign
competition, and that the tariff of the Zollverein ought to be
used as an instrument for the exclusion of foreign
manufactures from the German market. … Although the Congress
of Vienna had established a new Germanic confederation,
(Deutsche Bund) and a federative diet charged with the
maintenance of peace at home and abroad, yet it was soon
perceived and felt that the kind of union obtained by means of
this confederation was more formal than real. … The late King
of Prussia was one of the first to perceive, that, in order to
unite Germany in reality, something more cogent than the
federative diet was indispensable. He found his own power
rather weakened than strengthened by the addition of the
Rhenish provinces, so long as they remained separated, not
only by distance, but by the customs-barriers of intervening
states, from his ancient territories. He accordingly effected,
in 1829, a convention with those states, by which he became
the farmer of their customs-revenues, and so removed the
barriers between Eastern and Western Prussia. Some years,
however, previous to this, the Prussian Government had deemed
it expedient to comply with the demands of the manufacturers
(especially those in the Rhenish provinces) for protection
against foreign goods, which, since the peace, had begun to
make their appearance; and on the 26th May, 1818, a new
Prussian Tariff had been issued, which was designed to afford
a moderate protection to the home industry, and which may be
regarded as the groundwork of the present Tariff of the
Zollverein. … But the proceedings of Prussia were considered
in a hostile light by the manufacturers of the South. They
formed a counteracting association in 1819 which numbered from
five to six thousand members, had its headquarters in
Nuremberg, and agents in all the principal towns, and
published a weekly newspaper devoted to the cause. They
addressed the Diet, the German courts, and the Congress at
Vienna in 1820, in favor of a general customs-union. They so
far succeeded that, in 1826, the small Thuringian States,
occupying the central portion of Germany, with one or two
others, formed themselves into a customs-union, under the name
of the Mittel-Verein; and within the two succeeding years a
more important union was accomplished, consisting of Bavaria
and Wurtemberg, with their small enclosed states; the Tariff
of which union is stated to have been as high, or very nearly
so, as that of Prussia. Thus Germany contained three separate
customs-associations, with separate Tariffs, and it became
obviously desirable to unite these conflicting interests.
Prussia made overtures to the other unions, but was for a long
time unsuccessful; they objecting principally to the high
scale of Prussian duties on colonial produce. At last,
however, all obstacles were removed, (principally, as Dr. List
states, through the exertions of Baron von Cotta, the eminent
publisher, and proprietor of the Allgemeine Zeitung,) and on
the 22d of March, 1833, the treaty was signed by which, for
the first time, Germany was knit together in anything like a
binding national confederation. Between that date and the
present, the league has been enlarged by the accession of
other states; but, as we have already mentioned, Hanover and
some other northern states have hitherto refused to join it.
Hanover formed a distinct union with three neighbouring
states, viz.: Brunswick, Lippe-Schaumburg, and Oldenburg,
which assumed the title of the North-western League; but the
two former having subsequently seceded from it and joined the
Zollverein, the North-western League has been reduced to
Hanover and Oldenburg only. The Hanse towns, Mecklenburg, and
Holstein, are not yet members of any customs-union. The
revenues of the Zollverein are divided among the contracting
states according to the population of each state
respectively."
_Edinburgh Review,
January, 1844
(volume 79, page 108)._
ALSO IN
_G. Krause,
The Growth of German Unity,
chapter 10._
_F. List.
National System of Political Economy,
book 4, chapter 4._
TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1836-1839.
Beginning of the Anti-Corn-Law agitation.
"Cobden was in no sense the original projector of an organized
body for throwing off the burden of the corn duties. In 1836
an Anti-Corn-Law Association had been formed in London; its
principal members were the parliamentary radicals, Grote,
Molesworth, Joseph Hume, and Mr. Roebuck. But this group,
notwithstanding their acuteness, their logical penetration,
and the soundness of their ideas, were in that, as in so many
other matters, stricken with impotence. Their gifts of
reasoning were admirable, but they had no gifts for popular
organization. … It was not until a body of men in Manchester
were moved to take the matter in hand, that any serious
attempt was made to inform and arouse the country. The price
of wheat had risen to seventy-seven shillings in the August of
1838; there was every prospect of a wet harvesting; the
revenue was declining; deficit was becoming a familiar word;
pauperism was increasing; and the manufacturing population of
Lancashire were finding it impossible to support themselves,
because the landlords, and the legislation of a generation of
landlords before them, insisted on keeping the first necessity
of life at an artificially high rate. …
{3073}
In October, 1838, a band of seven men met at a hotel in
Manchester, and formed a new Anti-Corn Law Association. They
were speedily joined by others, including Cobden, who from
this moment began to take a prominent part in all counsel and
action. That critical moment had arrived, which comes in the
history of every successful movement, when a section arises
within the party, which refuses from that day forward either
to postpone or to compromise. The feeling among the older men
was to stop short in their demands at some modification of the
existing duty. … The more energetic members protested against
these faltering voices. … The meeting was adjourned, to the
great chagrin of the President, and when the members assembled
a week later, Cobden drew from his pocket a draft petition
which he and his allies had prepared in the interval, and
which after a discussion of many hours was adopted by an
almost unanimous vote. The preamble laid all the stress on the
alleged facts of foreign competition, in words which never
fail to be heard in times of bad trade. It recited how the
existing laws prevented the British manufacturer from
exchanging the produce of his labour for the corn of other
countries, and so enabled his foreign rivals to purchase their
food at one half of the price at which it was sold in the
English market; and finally the prayer of the petition called
for the repeal of all laws relating to the importation of
foreign corn and other foreign articles of subsistence, and
implored the House to carry out to the fullest extent, both as
affects manufactures and agriculture, the true and peaceful
principles of free-trade. In the following month, January,
1839, the Anti-Com-Law Association showed that it was in
earnest in the intention to agitate, by proceeding to raise a
subscription of an effective sum of money. Cobden threw out
one of those expressions which catch men's minds in moments
when they are already ripe for action. 'Let us,' he said,
'invest part of our property, in order to save the rest from
confiscation.' Within a month £6,000 had been raised, the
first instalment of many scores of thousands still to come. A
great banquet was given to some of the parliamentary
supporters of Free Trade; more money was subscribed,
convictions became clearer and purpose waxed more resolute. On
the day after the banquet, at a meeting of delegates from
other towns, Cobden brought forward a scheme for united action
among the various associations throughout the country. This
was the germ of what ultimately became the League."
_J. Morley,
Life of Richard Cobden,
chapter 6 (volume 1)._
ALSO IN
_W. Robertson,
Life and Times of John Bright,
chapters 8 and 11-14._
TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1842.
Peel's modification of the Corn Laws.
His sliding-scale.
His Tariff reductions.
The first great step towards Free-Trade.
The Whig administration under Lord Melbourne gave way in
August, in 1841, to one formed by Sir Robert Peel. On the
opening of the session in February, 1842, "The Queen's Speech
recommended Parliament to consider the state of the laws
affecting the importation of corn and other commodities. It
announced the beginning of a revolution which few persons in
England thought possible, although it was to be completed in
little more than ten years. On the 9th of February Peel moved
that the House should resolve itself into a Committee to
consider the Corn Laws. His speech, which lasted nearly three
hours, was necessarily dull, and his proposal was equally
offensive to the country gentlemen and to the Anti-Corn Law
League. It amounted merely to an improvement of the
sliding-scale which had been devised by the Duke of
Wellington's Cabinet [See above: A. D. 1815-1828], and was
based on the axiom that the British farmer, taking one year
with another, could not make a profit by growing corn if
foreign corn were admitted at a price of less than 70s. a
quarter. By a calculation of prices extending over a long term
of years, Peel had satisfied himself that a price of 56s. a
quarter would remunerate the British farmer. He proposed to
modify the sliding-scale accordingly. … Peel retained the
minimum duty of 1s. when corn was selling at 73s. the quarter;
he fixed a maximum duty of 20s. when corn was selling at from
50s. to 51s. the quarter, and he so altered the graduation in
the increase of duty as to diminish the inducement to hold
grain back when it became dear. … So general was the
dissatisfaction with Peel's Corn Law that Russell ventured
once more to place before the House his alternative of a fixed
8s. duty. He was defeated by a majority of upwards of 120
votes. Two days later Mr. Villiers made his annual motion for
the total repeal of the Corn Laws, and was beaten by more than
four votes to one. The murmurs of Peel's own supporters were
easily overborne, and the Bill was carried through the House
of Commons after a month spent in debates. As soon as it had
passed, and the estimates for the army and navy had been
voted, Peel produced what was really his Budget, nominally Mr.
Goulburn's. … In every one of the last five years there had
been a deficit. … Peel therefore resolved to impose an income
tax." He also raised the duty on Irish spirits and on exports
of coal, besides making some changes in the stamp duties.
"With these and with the income tax he calculated that he
would have a surplus of £1,900,000. Peel was thus able to
propose a reduction of the tariff upon uniform and
comprehensive principles. He proposed to limit import duties
to a maximum of 5 per cent. upon the value of raw materials,
of 12 per cent. upon the value of goods partly manufactured,
and of 20 per cent. upon the value of goods wholly
manufactured. Out of the 1,200 articles then comprised in the
tariff, 750 were more or less affected by the application of
these rules, yet so trivial was the revenue raised from most
of them that the total loss was computed at only £270,000 a
year. Peel reduced the duty on coffee; he reduced the duty on
foreign and almost entirely abolished the duty on Canadian
timber. Cattle and pigs, meat of all descriptions, cheese and
butter, which had hitherto been subject to a prohibitory duty,
he proposed to admit at a comparatively low rate. He also
diminished the duty upon stage coaches. So extensive a change
in our system of national finance had never before been
effected at one stroke. … Immense was the excitement caused by
the statement of the Budget. … Every part of Peel's scheme was
debated with the utmost energy. … He procured the ratification
of all his measures subject to some slight amendments, and at
the cost of a whole session spent in discussing them. Little
or nothing else was accomplished by Parliament in this year.
Peel had returned to power as the Champion of protection. His
first great achievement was the extension of the freedom of
trade."
_F. G. Montague,
Life of Sir Robert Peel,
chapter 8._
{3074}
"Notwithstanding the objections which free traders might
raise, the Budget of 1842 proved the first great advance in
the direction of free trade. It did not remove the shackles
under which trade was struggling, but it relaxed the
fastenings and lightened the load."
_S. Walpole,
History of England from 1815,
chapter 18 (volume 4)._
ALSO IN:
_S. Walpole,
Life of Sir Robert Peel,
volume 3, chapter 5._
_J. Morley,
Life of Richard Cobden,
volume 1, chapter 11._
TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1842.
An Act to provide a necessary increase of revenue,
with incidental protection.
"There had been a lull in tariff legislation for ten years.
The free-trade party had been ascendant; and amendment of the
law, save in the slight ways mentioned, had been impossible.
During the decade, a financial tornado had swept over the
country; the United States bank had ceased to be; the
experiment of keeping the government deposits with the State
banks had been tried, and had failed; the government had kept
them several years without authority, but finally a bill had
been passed which authorized keeping them in that manner. The
time had now nearly come for reducing the duties [by the
gradual scaling down provided for in the Compromise tariff act
of 1833] to their lowest point. Manufactures were drying up at
the root. A material augmentation of the national revenue from
some source had become necessary. … Whatever difference of
opinion existed respecting the necessity of additional
protection to manufacturers, some expedient, it was
universally conceded, must be adopted to increase the public
revenue. As no one favored direct taxation, a revision of the
tariff was the only mode of enriching the treasury. … The
committee on manufactures did not report to the House until
the last of March, 1842. … The leading provisions of the bill
reported by the committee were the following:
1. A general ad valorem duty of 30 per cent, with few
exceptions, where the duty was on that principle.
2. A discrimination was made for the security of certain
interests requiring it by specific duties, in some instances
below, in others above, the rate of the general ad valorem
duty.
3. As a general principle, the duty on the articles subject to
discrimination was made at the rate at which it was in 1840,
after the deduction of four-tenths of the excess on 20 per
cent by the Act of 1833. …
The subject was discussed at great length by the House,
although the time was drawing near for making the last
reduction under the compromise law of [1833]. Something must
be done. Accordingly, Fillmore, chairman of the committee of
ways and means, reported a bill to extend the existing tariff
laws until the 1st day of August, 1842, which was immediately
passed by the House; but the Senate amended the bill by adding
a proviso that nothing therein contained should suspend the
operation of the Distribution law,—a law passed at the extra
session of the preceding year, distributing the proceeds of
the sales of the public lands among the States. … In the
debate on this bill the proviso became a prominent topic of
discussion. The distribution Act contained a proviso, that, if
at any time the duties under the compromise tariff should be
raised, the distribution should cease, and be suspended until
the cause of the suspension were removed. … Those who were in
favor of high protective duties desired the removal of the
proviso of the distribution Act in order that the tariff might
be raised without interfering with distribution. The House
having rejected an amendment proposing to strike out the
proviso which prohibited the suspension of the distribution
law, the bill was passed by the House, and afterward by the
Senate, but vetoed by the President. Another tariff bill was
introduced by Mr. Fillmore, drawn by the Secretary of the
Treasury,—to which, however, the committee added a proviso
that the … proceeds of the public lands should be distributed,
notwithstanding the increase of duties,—which passed both
Houses after a short debate. This contained a revision of a
considerable number of duties, and was also vetoed by the
President. Impelled by the necessity of providing additional
revenue, a bill was rapidly pushed through Congress, similar
to that previously passed, with the omission of the proviso
requiring distribution, and further modified by admitting free
of duty tea and coffee growing east of the Cape of Good Hope,
imported in American vessels. This bill was approved by the
President. A separate bill was then passed, repealing the
proviso of the distribution Act, and allowing the distribution
to take place, notwithstanding the increase of duties; but the
bill was retained by the President and defeated. Thus ended a
long and bitter controversy, in which public sentiment
expanded, and hardened against the chief Executive of the
nation. … That tariff remained without change during the next
four years."
_A. S. Bolles,
Financial History of the United States, 1789-1860,
book 3, chapter 6._
TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1845-1846.
The Repeal of the Corn Laws.
Dissolution of the League.
"The Anti-Corn-Law agitation was one of those movements which,
being founded on right principles, and in harmony with the
interest of the masses, was sure to gather fresh strength by
any event affecting the supply of food. It was popular to
attempt to reverse a policy which aimed almost exclusively to
benefit one class of society. … The economic theorists had the
mass of the people with them. Their gatherings were becoming
more and more enthusiastic. And even amidst Conservative
landowners there were not a few enlightened and liberal minds
who had already, silently at least, espoused the new ideas. No
change certainly could be expected to be made so long as bread
was cheap and labour abundant. But when a deficient harvest
and a blight in the potato crop crippled the resources of the
people and raised grain to famine prices, the voice of the
League acquired greater power and influence. Hitherto they had
received hundreds of pounds. Now, thousands were sent in to
support the agitation. A quarter of a million was readily
contributed. Nor were the contributors Lancashire mill-owners
exclusively. Among them were merchants and bankers, men of
heart and men of mind, the poor labourer and the peer of the
realm. The fervid oratory of Bright, the demonstrative and
argumentative reasoning of Cobden, the more popular appeals of
Fox, Rawlins, and other platform speakers, filled the
newspaper press, and were eagerly read.
{3075}
And when Parliament dissolved in August 1845, even Sir Robert
Peel showed some slight symptoms of a conviction that the days
of the corn laws were numbered. Every day, in truth, brought
home to his mind a stronger need for action, and as the
ravages of the potato disease progressed, he saw that all
further resistance would be absolutely dangerous. A cabinet
council was held on October 31 of that year to consult as to
what was to be done, and at an adjourned meeting on November 5
Sir Robert Peel intimated his intention to issue an order in
council remitting the duty on grain in bond to one shilling,
and opening the ports for the admission of all species of
grain at a smaller rate of duty until a day to be named in the
order; to call Parliament together on the 27th inst., in order
to ask for an indemnity, and a sanction of the order by law;
and to submit to Parliament immediately after the recess a
modification of the existing law, including the admission at a
nominal duty of Indian corn and of British colonial corn. A
serious difference of opinion, however, was found to exist in
the cabinet on the question brought before them, the only
ministers supporting such measures being the Earl of Aberdeen,
Sir James Graham, and Mr. Sidney Herbert. Nor was it easy to
induce the other members to listen to reason. And though at a
subsequent meeting, held on November 28, Sir Robert Peel so
far secured a majority in his favour, it was evident that the
cabinet was too divided to justify him in bringing forward his
measures, and he decided upon resigning office. His resolution
to that effect having been communicated to the Queen, her
Majesty summoned Lord John Russell to form a cabinet, and, to
smooth his path, Sir Robert Peel, with characteristic
frankness, sent a memorandum to her Majesty embodying a
promise to give him his support. But Lord John Russell failed
in his efforts, and the Queen had no alternative but to recall
Sir Robert Peel, and give him full power to carry out his
measures. It was under such circumstances that Parliament was
called for January 22, 1846, and on January 27 the Government
plan was propounded before a crowded House. It was not an
immediate repeal of the corn laws that Sir Robert Peel
recommended. He proposed a temporary protection for three
years, till February 1, 1849, imposing a scale during that
time ranging from 4s. when the price of wheat should be 50s.
per quarter and upward, and 10s. when the price should be
under 48s. per quarter, providing, however, that after that
period all grain should be admitted at the uniform duty of 1s.
per quarter. The measure, as might have been expected, was
received in a very different manner by the political parties
in both Houses of Parliament. There was treason in the
Conservative camp, it was said, and keen and bitter was the
opposition offered to the chief of the party. For twelve
nights speaker after speaker indulged in personal
recriminations. They recalled to Sir Robert Peel's memory the
speeches he had made in defence of the corn laws. And as to
his assertion that he had changed his mind, they denied his
right to do so. … The passing of the measure was, however,
more than certain, and after a debate of twelve nights'
duration on Mr. Miles's amendment, the Government obtained a
majority of 97, 337 having voted for the motion and 240
against it. And from that evening the corn law may be said to
have expired. Not a day too soon, certainly, when we consider
the straitened resources of the country as regards the first
article of food, caused not only by the bad crop of grain, but
by the serious loss of the potato crop, especially in
Ireland."
_L. Levi,
History of British Commerce,
part 4, chapter 4._
"On the 2nd of July the League was 'conditionally dissolved,'
by the unanimous vote of a great meeting of the leaders at
Manchester. … Mr. Cobden here joyfully closed his seven years'
task, which he had prosecuted at the expense of health,
fortune, domestic comfort, and the sacrifice of his own tastes
in every way. … Mr. Cobden had sacrificed at least £20,000 in
the cause. The country now, at the call of the other chief
Leaguers, presented him with above £80,000—not only for the
purpose of acknowledging his sacrifices, but also to set him
free for life for the political service of his country."
_H. Martineau,
History of the Thirty Years' Peace,
book 6, chapter 15 (volume 4)._
ALSO IN:
_W. C. Taylor,
Life and Times of Sir Robert Peel,
volume 3, chapters 8-10._
_J. Morley,
Life of Richard Cobden,
volume 1, chapters 15-16._
_M. M. Trumbull,
The Free Trade Struggle in England._
_A. Bisset,
Notes on the Anti-Corn Law Struggle._
_Debate upon the Corn Laws in Session 1846._
TARIFF: (United States): A. D. 1846-1861.
Lowered duties and the disputed effects.
"In 1846 was passed what we will call the 'Walker tariff,'
from Robert J. Walker, then Secretary of the Treasury. It
reduced the duties on imports down to about the standard of
the 'Compromise' of 1833. It discriminated, however, as the
Compromise did not, between goods that could be produced at
home and those that could not. It approached, in short, more
nearly than any other, in its principles and details, to the
Hamilton tariff, although the general rate of duties was
higher. From that time up to 1857 there was a regular and
large increase in the amount of dutiable goods imported,
bringing in a larger revenue to the government. The surplus in
the treasury accumulated, and large sums were expended by the
government in buying up its own bonds at a high premium, for
the sake of emptying the treasury. Under these circumstances
the 'tariff of 1857' was passed, decidedly lowering the rates
of duties and largely increasing the free list. The financial
crisis of that year diminished the imports, and the revenue
fell off $22,000,000. It rallied, however, the next two years,
but owing to the large increase of the free list, not quite up
to the old point."
_A. L. Perry,
Elements of Political Economy,
page 464._
"The free-traders consider the tariff of 1846 to be a
conclusive proof of the beneficial effect of low duties. They
challenge a comparison of the years of its operation, between
1846 and 1857, with any other equal period in the history of
the country. Manufacturing, they say, was not forced by a
hot-house process to produce high-priced goods for popular
consumption, but was gradually encouraged and developed on a
healthful and self-sustaining basis, not to be shaken as a
reed in the wind by every change in the financial world.
Commerce, as they point out, made great advances, and our
carrying trade grew so rapidly that in ten years from the day
the tariff of 1846 was passed our tonnage exceeded the tonnage
of England. The free-traders refer with especial emphasis to
what they term the symmetrical development of all the great
interests of the country under this liberal tariff.
{3076}
Manufactures were not stimulated at the expense of the
commercial interest. Both were developed in harmony, while
agriculture, the indispensable basis of all, was never more
flourishing. The farmers and planters at no other period of
our history were in receipt of such good prices, steadily paid
to them in gold coin, for their surplus product, which they
could send to the domestic market over our own railways and to
the foreign market in our own ships. Assertions as to the
progress of manufactures in the period under discussion are
denied by the protectionists. While admitting the general
correctness of the free-trader's statements as to the
prosperous condition of the country, they call attention to
the fact that directly after the enactment of the tariff of
1846 the great famine occurred in Ireland, followed in the
ensuing years by short crops in Europe. The prosperity which
came to the American agriculturist was therefore from causes
beyond the sea and not at home,—causes which were transient,
indeed almost accidental. Moreover an exceptional condition of
affairs existed in the United States in consequence of our
large acquisition of territory from Mexico at the close of the
war and the subsequent and almost immediate discovery of gold
in California. A new and extended field of trade was thus
opened in which we had the monopoly, and an enormous surplus
of money was speedily created from the products of the rich
mines on the Pacific coast. At the same time Europe was in
convulsion from the revolutions of 1848, and production was
materially hindered over a large part of the Continent. This
disturbance had scarcely subsided when three leading nations
of Europe, England, France, and Russia, engaged in the
wasteful and expensive war of the Crimea. The struggle began
in 1853 and ended in 1856, and during those years it increased
consumption and decreased production abroad, and totally
closed the grain-fields of Russia from any competition with
the United States. The protectionists therefore hold that the
boasted prosperity of the country under the tariff of 1846 was
abnormal in origin and in character. … The protectionists
maintain that from 1846 to 1857 the United States would have
enjoyed prosperity under any form of tariff, but that the
moment the exceptional conditions in Europe and in America
came to an end, the country was plunged headlong into a
disaster [the financial crisis of 1857] from which the
conservative force of a protective tariff would in large part
have saved it. … The free-traders, as an answer to this
arraignment of their tariff policy, seek to charge
responsibility for the financial disasters to the hasty and
inconsiderate changes made in the tariff in 1857, for which
both parties were in large degree if not indeed equally
answerable."
_J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, chapter 9._
TARIFF: (England): A. D. 1846-1879.
Total abandonment of Protection and Navigation Laws.
The perfected tariff of Free Trade.
"With the fall of the principle of the protection in corn may
be said to have practically fallen the principle of protection
in this country altogether. That principle was a little
complicated in regard to the sugar duties and to the
navigation laws. The sugar produced in the West Indian
colonies was allowed to enter this country at rates of duty
much lower than those imposed upon the sugar grown in foreign
lands. The abolition of slavery in our colonies had made
labour there somewhat costly and difficult to obtain
continuously, and the impression was that if the duties on
foreign sugar were reduced, it would tend to enable those
countries which still maintained the slave trade to compete at
great advantage with the sugar grown in our colonies by that
free labour to establish which England had but just paid so
large a pecuniary fine. Therefore, the question of Free Trade
became involved with that of free labour; at least, so it
seemed to the eyes of many a man who was not inclined to
support the protective principle in itself. When it was put to
him, whether he was willing to push the Free Trade principle
so far as to allow countries growing sugar by slave labour to
drive our free grown sugar out of the market, he was often
inclined to give way before this mode of putting the question,
and to imagine that there really was a collision between Free
Trade and free labour. Therefore a certain sentimental plea
came in to aid the Protectionists in regard to the sugar
duties. Many of the old anti-slavery party found themselves
deceived by this fallacy, and inclined to join the agitation
against the reduction of the duty on foreign sugar. On the
other hand, it was made tolerably clear that the labour was
not so scarce or so dear in the colonies as had been
represented, and that colonial sugar grown by free labour
really suffered from no inconvenience except the fact that it
was still manufactured on the most crude, old fashioned, and
uneconomical methods. Besides, the time had gone by when the
majority of the English people could be convinced that a
lesson on the beauty of freedom was to be conveyed to foreign
sugar-growers and slave-owners by the means of a tax upon the
products of their plantations. Therefore, after a long and
somewhat eager struggle, the principle of Free Trade was
allowed to prevail in regard to sugar. The duties on sugar
were made equal. The growth of the sugar plantations was
admitted on the same terms into this country, without any
reference either to the soil from which it had sprung or to
the conditions under which it was grown."
_J. McCarthy,
The Epoch of Reform,
chapter 12._
"The contest on the Navigation Laws [finally repealed in
1849-see NAVIGATION LAWS: A. D. 1849] was the last pitched
battle fought by the Protectionist party. Their resistance
grew fainter and fainter, and a few occasional skirmishes just
reminded the world that such a party still existed. Three
years afterwards their leaders came into power. In February,
1852, the Earl of Derby became Prime Minister, and Mr.
Disraeli Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House
of Commons. The Free-traders, alarmed at the possibility of
some at·tempt to reverse the policy of commercial freedom
which had been adopted, took the earliest opportunity of
questioning those Ministers in Parliament on the subject. The
discreet reply was that the Government did not intend to
propose any return to the policy of protection during the
present Session, nor at any future time, unless a great
majority of members favourable to that policy should be
returned to Parliament. But far from this proving to be the
case, the general election which immediately ensued reinstated
a Liberal Government, and the work of stripping off the few
rags of protection that still hung on went rapidly forward.
{3077}
On the 18th of April, 1853, Mr. Gladstone, as Chancellor of
the Exchequer, made his financial statement in an able and
luminous speech. Such was the admirable order in which he
marshalled his topics, and the transparent lucidity with which
he treated them, that although his address occupied five hours
in the delivery, and although it bristled with figures and
statistics, he never for a moment lost the attention or
fatigued the minds of his hearers. Mr. Gladstone's financial
scheme included, among other reforms, the reduction or total
remission of imposts on 133 articles. In this way, our tariff
underwent rapid simplification. Each subsequent year was
marked by a similar elimination of protective impediments to
free commercial intercourse with other countries. In 1860,
butter, cheese, &c., were admitted duty free; in 1869, the
small nominal duty that had been left on corn was abolished;
in 1874, sugar was relieved from the remnant of duty that had
survived from previous reductions. It would be superfluous, as
well as tedious, to enter upon a detailed reference to the
various minor reforms through which we advanced towards, and
finally reached, our present free-trade tariff. In fact, all
the great battles had been fought and won by the close of the
year 1849, and the struggle was then virtually over. … Is our
present tariff one from which every shred and vestige of
protection have been discarded? Is it truly and thoroughly a
free-trade tariff? That these questions must be answered in
the affirmative it is easy to prove in the most conclusive
manner. We raise about £20,000,000 of our annual revenue by
means of customs' duties on the foreign commodities which we
import, and this fact is sometimes adduced by the advocates
for protection, without any explanation, leaving their readers
to infer that ours is not, as it really is, a free-trade
tariff. That such an inference is totally erroneous will
presently be made manifest beyond all question. We now levy
import duties on only fifteen articles. Subjoined is a list of
them, and to each is appended the amount of duty levied on it
during the financial year ending 1st of April, 1879.
Not produced in England:
Tobacco, £8,589,681;
Tea, 4,169,233;
Wine, 1,469,710;
Dried Fruit, 509,234;
Coffee, 212,002;
Chicory, 66,739;
Chocolate and Cocoa, 44,671;
Total, £15,061,270.
Produced also in England:
Spirits, £5,336,058;
Plate (Silver and Gold). 5,853;
Beer, 3,814;
Vinegar, 671;
Playing Cards, 522;
Pickles. 17;
Malt. 6;
Spruce, 3;
Total, £5,346,944.
Total of both £20,408,214. It will be seen by the above
figures that £15,000,000, or three-fourths of the total sum
levied, is levied on articles which we do not and cannot
produce in England. It is clear, therefore, that this portion
of the import duties cannot by any possibility be said to
afford the slightest protection to native industry.' Every
shilling's worth which we consume of those articles comes from
abroad, and every shilling extra that the consumer pays for
them in consequence of the duty goes to the revenue. So much
for that portion of the £20,400,000 import duties. As to the
£5,336,000 levied on foreign spirits, it consists of import
duties which are only the exact counterpart of the excise
duties, levied internally on the produce of the British
distillers. The foreign article is placed on precisely the
same footing as the native article. Both have to pay the same
duty of about 10s. per gallon on spirits of the same strength.
It would of course be an absurd stultification to admit
foreign spirits duty-free while the English producer was
burdened with a tax of 10s. per gallon; but by making the
excise duty and the customs' duty precisely the same, equality
is established, and no protection or preference whatever is
enjoyed by the native distiller. The excise duty levied in the
aforesaid year ending April, 1879, on spirits the produce of
British distilleries, was no less than £14,855,000. The
trifling amounts raised on plate, beer, vinegar, &c., are
explained in the same way. They also act as a mere
counterpoise to the excise duties levied on the British
producers of the same articles, and thus afford to the latter
no protection whatever against foreign competition. It is
evident, therefore, that our tariff does not retain within it
one solitary shred of protection."
_A. Mongredien,
History of the Free Trade Movement in England,
chapter 13._
ALSO IN:
_H. Hall,
History of the Customs Revenue of England._
_S. Dowell,
History of Taxation and Taxes in England._
TARIFF: (France): A. D. 1853-1860.
Moderation of Protective duties.
The Cobden-Chevalier Commercial Treaty.
After the fall of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbons
in France, the protective system was pushed to so great an
extreme that it became in some instances avowedly prohibitive.
"The first serious attempt to alter this very severe
restrictive system was reserved for the Second Empire. The
English reforms of Peel proved the possibility of removing
most of the barriers to commerce that legislation had set up,
and consequently Napoleon III. entered with moderation on the
work of revision. Between 1853 and 1855 the duties on coal,
iron, steel, and wool were lowered, as also those on cattle,
corn, and various raw materials, the requirements for
ship-building being allowed in free. The legislative body was,
however, with difficulty brought to consent to these measures.
A more extensive proposal—made in 1856—to remove all
prohibitions on imports, while retaining protective duties of
30% on woollen and 35% on cotton goods, had to be withdrawn,
in consequence of the strong opposition that it excited. The
interest of the consumers was in the popular opinion entirely
subordinate to that of the iron-masters, cotton-spinners, and
agriculturists—one of the many instances which shows that the
long continuance of high duties does not facilitate the
introduction of free competition. It was under such
discouraging circumstances that the famous Commercial Treaty
of 1860 with England was negotiated. This important measure
(the work of Chevalier and Cobden, but owing a good deal of
its success to the efforts of the Emperor and M. Rouher),
though only a finishing step in English tariff reform,
inaugurated a new era in France."
_C. F. Bastable,
The Commerce of Nations,
chapter 8._
"By the treaty of commerce of 1860, France engaged to abolish
all prohibitions, and to admit certain articles of British
produce and manufacture at duties not exceeding 30 per cent.
ad valorem, to be further reduced to duties not exceeding 25
per cent. from the 1st October, 1864. Britain, on the other
hand, bound herself to abolish the duties on French silks and
other manufactured goods, and to reduce the duties on French
wines and brandies.
{3078}
As regards coals, France engaged to reduce the import duty,
and both contracting parties engaged not to prohibit
exportation of coal, and to levy no duty upon such exports.
Whilst both contracting parties engaged to confer on the other
any favour, privilege, or reduction in the tariff of duties on
imports on the articles mentioned in the treaty which the said
power might concede to any third power; and also not to
enforce, one against another, any prohibition of importation
or exportation which should not at the same time be applicable
to all other nations. The sum and substance of the treaty was,
that France engaged to act more liberally for the future than
she had done for the past, and England made another step in
the way of liberalising her tariff, and placing all her
manufactures under the wholesome and invigorating influence of
free competition. Nor was the treaty allowed to remain limited
to France and England, for forthwith after its conclusion both
France and England entered into similar treaties with other
nations. And inasmuch as under existing treaties other nations
were bound to give to England as good treatment as they gave
to the most favoured nations, the restrictions theretofore in
existence in countries not originally parties to the French
treaty were everywhere greatly reduced, and thereby its
benefits extended rapidly over the greater part of Europe."
_L. Levi,
Statistical Results of the Recent Treaties of Commerce
(Journal of the Statistical Society,
volume 40, 1877), page 3._
TARIFF: (Germany): A. D. 1853-1892.
Progress towards Free Trade arrested by Prince Bismarck.
Protection measures of 1878-1887.
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